ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
DENKSCHRIFTEN, 222. BAND

BEITRÄGE ZUR KULTUR- UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE ASIENS

Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

Proceedings of the
Second International Dharmakīrti Conference
Vienna, June 11–16, 1989

Edited by

ERNST STEINKELLNER



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WIEN 1991

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Vorgelegt von w. M. ERNST STEINKELLNER in der Sitzung am 6. März 1991

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung durch den Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung

ISBN 3-7001-1915-1

Druck und Bindung: F. Seitenberg Ges. m. b. H., A-1050 Wien

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Preface

The Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, June 11-16, 1989, at Schloß Neuwaldegg in Vienna was organized by the Forschungsstelle für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. I would like to acknowledge the generous support and sponsorship of the Austrian Academy of Sciences that made the conference as well as the publication of the proceedings possible.

A number of papers that were prepared for the conference but could not be read at the venue for various reasons are included in this volume, while others that were read are for various reasons not included. Mangala R. Chinchore's paper "Dharmakīrti on Criteria of Knowledge" has already been published (*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* 16/3, 1989, 319-344).

All papers by authors whose native language is not English were read and corrected for style by Ms. Sophie Kidd, lecturer at the University of Vienna, for whose painstaking efforts I am very grateful. The substantial and interesting paper by T. Tani is written in an idiosyncratic style too concentrated and technical to allow amelioration of its language by the hand of a reader. Faced with the choice between linguistic smoothness and the proper mediation of the author's intentions I opted for the latter and proposed limited editorial changes only where it seemed necessary for understanding the argument. Thus the responsibility for the linguistic shape of this paper is mine.

The camera ready copy of these proceedings was prepared by Dr. Helmut Krasser, Forschungsstelle für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. I would like to thank Dr. Krasser for the great care he took in processing the manuscripts and standardizing the bibliographies. Finally I would like to thank Dr. Ardo Schmitt-Rousselle, Bonn, for writing Prof. Karuṇesh Shukla's Śubhāśaṃsanam with his "Bona-Nāgarī" program.



This second conference on Dharmakīrti was held at a fascinating phase of Dharmakīrti studies. On the one hand, some of Dharmakīrti's major works are still not available in critical editions nor completely interpreted. Work on the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* or the third chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, for example, has only started during the past few years, but these major treatises on the theory of proof are in general still practically unknown and unexplained. A critical edition of the long-neglected *Vādanyāya* has just been finished and will help us to appreciate Dharmakīrti's work and intentions during his later years. While we are still making do with the available Sanskrit editions and the Tibetan translations we have received information that the lost Sanskrit originals of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and the *Hetubindu* are extant in China and will be available sooner or later.

On the other hand, the penetration of Dharmakīrti's thought is deep enough by now for us to realize that we have relinquished the doxographic attitude which has governed most of our work so far. As a number of the papers presented in this volume clearly demonstrate, we are finally starting to follow the path of Dharmakīrti's thought as it developed and moved from problems to solutions and then on to new problems.

Work towards providing critical editions and authoritative, careful and clear translations will be one of the tasks of our research in the future. The other will be to trace in detail the arduous progress of Dharmakīrti's rigorous thought in developing his theories and theorems.

The two conferences on Dharmakīrti held in 1982 and 1989 have certainly provided a decisive impulse in these directions and our gratitude is due to Professor Kajiyama Yūichi to whom we owe the original idea of a "Dharmakīrti conference".

Vienna, September 1990 E. Steinkellner

Report on the First International Dharmakīrti Conference at Kyōto, June 16 and 17, 1982

From April to June 1982, Professor Ernst Steinkellner of Vienna University was invited by the Japanese Ministry of Education to serve Kyōto University as visiting professor, and conducted a seminar on Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*. Taking advantage of his presence at Kyōto, I and Professor Katsumi Mimaki decided to hold a conference on Buddhist logic and epistemology as represented by Dharmakīrti at Kyōdai Kaikan, an annex of Kyōto University. In response to our invitation, a truly surprising number of over fifty scholars gathered in Kyōto from all over Japan. Although the participants included only five foreign scholars, the conference was named the International Dharmakīrti Conference.

On June 16, following a brief opening speech by Y. Kajiyama, four scholars read their papers in the first session in which Prof. H. Nagasaki acted as chairman, and, after a coffee break, another four demonstrated the fruits of their studies, with Prof. S. Katsura as chairman in the second session; Prof. Steinkellner was the last speaker. Lively questions and answers were exchanged on each paper. The two sessions were succeeded by a panel discussion, in which, under the chairmanship of Prof. Steinkellner, the participants discussed problems of Buddhist logico-epistemology and communicated the results of their current research to the audience. In the morning of the following day, many of the participants gathered again to attend a free discussion session.

Yūichi Kajiyama

PROGRAM

I. Opening speech (Prof. Y. Kajiyama)

II. First Session (Chair: Prof. H. Nagasaki)

1. AKAMATSU Akihiko, "Karṇakagomin and Śāntarakṣita"
2. IWATA Takashi, "Position der Sākārajñānavādins unter den Yogācāras bei Kommentatoren Dharmakīrtis"
3. KATSURA Shōryū, "On Perceptual Judgement"
4. TANI Tadashi, "Fragen zur Interpretation des *prasaṅgasādhana* — Unterschiede in der Interpretation der 'negativen Prädikation im negativen Feld' bei Dharmottara und Prajñākaragupta"

Second Session (Chair: Prof. S. Katsura)

5. OKI Kazufumi, "Dharmakīrti's *citrādvaita* Theory"
6. NAGASAKI Hōjun, "The Influence of Buddhist Epistemology on Jaina Epistemology"
7. TOSAKI Hiromasa, "An Approach to Dharmakīrti"
8. STEINKELLNER Ernst, "Remarks on *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* — Dharmakīrti's Development of a Theorem"

III. Panel Discussion (Chair: Prof. E. Steinkellner)

1. Future Research on Dharmakīrti: Problems and Questions
2. Exchange of information concerning the participants' current studies on the Pramāṇa-school

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1. AKAMATSU Akihiko, Kyōto Univ.
2. AKIMOTO Masaru, Kyōto Univ.
3. BALADBAS Ramesh Chandra, Tōkyō Univ.
4. EJIMA Yasunori, Tōkyō Univ.
5. ENOMOTO Fumio, Kyōto Univ.
6. GREINER Fred, Kyōto Univ.
7. HATTORI Masaaki, Kyōto Univ.
8. HERRERA José León, Catholic Univ., Lima
9. HISHIDA Kunio, Aichi Kyōiku Univ.
10. ICHIGO Masamichi, Kyōto Sangyō Univ.
11. ISHITOBI Michiko, Hokkaidō Univ.
12. IWATA Takashi, Waseda Univ.
13. KAJIYAMA Yūichi, Kyōto Univ.
14. KAKEI Mukan, Komazawa Univ. (Hokkaidō)
15. KAMIYA Kiyoharu, Bukkyō Univ.
16. KATANO Michio, Ōtani Univ.
17. KATSURA Shōrū, Hiroshima Univ.
18. KIMURA Toshihiko, Tōkai Joshi Univ.
19. KOBAYASHI Nobuhiko, Kyōto Univ.
20. LODE Talpe, Kyōto Univ.
21. MIKOGAMI Eshō, Ryūkoku Univ.
22. MIMAKI Katsumi, Kyōto Univ.
23. MINOURA Mamoru, Kyōto Univ.
24. MUROJI Yoshihito, Kyōto Univ.
25. NAGASAKI Hōjun, Ōtani Univ.
26. OGAWA Ichijō, Ōtani Univ.
27. ŌJIHARA Yutaka, Kyōto Univ.
28. OKAZAKI Yasuhiro, Hiroshima Univ.
29. OKI Kazufumi, Shuchiin Univ.
30. ONODA Shunzō, Bukkyō Univ.
31. ŌMAE Futoshi, Kyūshū Univ.
32. ŌTA Shinkai, Saga Ryūkoku Univ.
33. SATO Michio, Iwate Univ.
34. SHIMA Iwao, Nagoya Univ.
35. SHIMIZU Yō, Ryūkoku Univ.
36. SHIMODA Hiroaki, Ryūkoku Univ.
37. STEINKELLNER Ernst, Vienna Univ.
38. TACHIKAWA Musashi, Nagoya Univ.
39. TAKASAKI Jikidō, Tōkyō Univ.
40. TAMARU Toshiaki, Nakatsu Joshi Tanki Univ.
41. TANI Tadashi, Kōchi Technical College
42. TODA Hirofumi, Tokushima Univ.
43. TOSAKI Hiromasa, Kyūshū Univ.
44. UNO Atsushi, Hiroshima Univ.
45. WATANABE Fumimaro, Kinki Univ.
46. TAKENAKA Tomoyasu, Hanazono Univ.
47. YAMAKAMI Shōdō, Kyōto Sangyō Univ.
48. KURODA Hiroshi, Kyōto Univ.
49. KANO Kyō, Kyōto Univ.
50. NOGUCHI Keiya, Kyōto Univ.
51. WAKAHARA Yūshō, Ryūkoku Univ.
52. KUWATSUKI Shin, Ryūkoku Univ.

Account of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference at Vienna, June 11–16, 1989*

PROGRAM

MONDAY, June 12th

Morning Session (Chair: Prof. Yūichi Kajiyama)

Presidential address

David SEYFORT RUEGG, "The Significance of Dharmakīrti for the Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)"
David JACKSON, "Previously Unrecognized Sources for the Study of Tibetan *pramāṇa* Traditions Preserved at the Bihar Research Society, Patna"
Brendan S. GILLON, "Word Order in the *svārthānumāna* Chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*"
Mangala R. CHINCHORE, "Dharmakīrti on Criteria of Knowledge"

Afternoon Session (Chair: Prof. Shōryū Katsura)

Christian LINDTNER, "The Initial Verses of the *pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter in the *Pramāṇavārttika*"
Georges DREYFUS, "mKhas grub's Explanation of Dharmakīrti's *pramāṇa* Definition

Reception given by the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Host: General Secretary Prof.Dr. Werner Welzig)

TUESDAY, June 13th

Morning Session (Chair: Prof. Lambert Schmithausen)

Eli FRANCO, "The Disjunction in *pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter 5c"
Takashi IWATA, "On the Classification of Three Kinds of Reason in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III — Reduction of Reasons to *svabhāvahetu* and *kāryahetu*"

* Another report of the conference in Japanese has been published by Iwata Takashi ("Dai-nikai kokusai Dharmakīrti kaigi" [Second International Dharmakīrti Conference], *Tōyō no Shisō to Shūkyō* 7, 1990, 52-58).

Brendan S. GILLON, "Inference and Metaphysics in the *svārthānumāna* Chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*"

Masahiro INAMI, "On *pakṣābhāsa*"

Tadashi TANI, "Transformation from Hypothetical Negative Reasoning (*prasaṅga*) to Proper Proof (*prasaṅgasādhana* and *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*) — Dharmakīrti's Logical Standpoint of Self-different/displacing Boundary Line as Time-ness of Momentary Existence"

Afternoon Session (Chair: Prof. David Seyfort Ruegg)

Claus OETKE, "*svabhāvapratibandha* and the Types of Reasons in Dharmakīrti's Theory of Inference"

Tom J.F. TILLEMANS, "Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms"

Marek MEJOR, "On the Date of the Tibetan Translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Pramāṇavārttika*"

Ernst STEINKELLNER, "The Logic of the *svabhāvahetu* in Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*"

WEDNESDAY, June 14th

Morning Session (Chair: Prof. Takashi Iwata)

Futoshi ŌMAE, "The Mīmāṃsā Theory of *vedāpauruṣeyatva* as Criticized by Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita"

Alex WAYMAN, "Dharmakīrti and the Yogācāra Theory of *bīja*"

Tabe E. MEINDERSMA, "A Brief Section on *apoha* Theory in the *paralokasiddhi* Part of *Pramāṇavārttika* II"

Shōryū KATSURA, "Discussion of the *svabhāvapratibandha*"

Afternoon and evening

"Fünfter Erich Frauwallner Gedächtnis-Spaziergang"

"Heuriger"

THURSDAY, June 15th

Morning Session (Chair: Prof. Tilmann Vetter)

Karunesh SHUKLA, "The Philosophical Background of Dharmakīrti's Works"

Bishwanarayan SHASTRI, "Dharmakīrti's Philosophical Position"
Kyō KANŌ, "On the Background of *Pramāṇavārttika* II 12ab"
Chishō Mamoru NAMAI, "Two Aspects of *paralokasādhana* in the Dharmakīrtian Tradition"
M. T. MUCH, "Fragments from Dignāga? Traces of a Pre-Dharmakīrti Buddhist Polemic against the Nyāya-*nigrahasthānas*"

"Information on Research and Projects in Japan" (Shōryū Katsura)

Afternoon Session (Chair: Dr. Karin Preisendanz)

Yūichi KAJIYAMA, "On the Authorship of the *Upāyahṛdaya*"
Hōjun NAGASAKI, "Perception in Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts"

"Information on International Research and Projects" (Tom Tillemans)

Seitetsu MORIYAMA, "The Later Mādhyamika and Dharmakīrti"
Mangala R. CHINCHORE, "Post-Udayana Nyāya Reactions to Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya* — An Evaluation"

"Information on Research and Projects in Vienna" (Ernst Steinkellner)

Closing Session

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1. Hartmut BÜSCHER, Copenhagen
2. Mangala R. CHINCHORE, Poona Univ.
3. Georges DREYFUS, Charlottesville
4. Eli FRANCO, La Trobe Univ.
5. Brendan S. GILLON, Toronto Univ.
6. Takaaki HARADA, Bukkyō Univ.
7. Zoltán HORVATH, Budapest
8. Haiyan HU, Copenhagen
9. Masahiro INAMI, Hiroshima Univ.
10. Takashi IWATA, Waseda Univ.
11. David JACKSON, Hamburg Univ.
12. Yūichi KAJIYAMA, Bukkyō Univ.
13. Kyō KANŌ, Kyōto Univ.
14. Shōryū KATSURA, Hiroshima Univ.
15. Helmut KRASSER, Vienna Univ.
16. Christian LINDTNER, Copenhagen Univ.
17. Tabe E. MEINDERSMA, Onnen
18. Marek MEJOR, Warszawa Univ.
19. Seitetsu MORIYAMA, Bukkyō Univ.
20. Michael Torsten MUCH, Vienna Univ.
21. Yoshihito MUROJI, Hamburg Univ.
22. Hojun NAGASAKI, Ōtani Univ.
23. Chishō Mamoru NAMAI, Kōyasan Univ.
24. Claudius NENNINGER, Hamburg Univ.
25. Claus OETKE, Hamburg Univ.
26. Futoshi ŌMAE, Fukuoka
27. Motoi ONO, Vienna Univ.
28. Monika PEMWIESER, Vienna Univ.
29. Karin PREISENDANZ, Berlin Univ.
30. Hidenori SAKUMA, Hamburg Univ.
31. Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN, Hamburg Univ.
32. David SEYFORT RUEGG, Hamburg Univ.
33. Bishwanarayan SHASTRI , Gauhati
34. Kenjō SHIRASAKI, Kyōto
35. Karunesh SHUKLA, Gorakhpur Univ.
36. Ernst STEINKELLNER, Vienna Univ.
37. Tadashi TANI, Kōchi Technical College
38. Helmut TAUSCHER, Vienna Univ.
39. Michaela TAUSCHER-LAMBERG, Vienna
40. Tom J.F. TILLEMANS, Lausanne Univ.
41. Tilmann VETTER, Leiden Univ.
42. Kōdō YOTSUYA, Hamburg Univ.

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

Helmut KRASSER, Michael Torsten MUCH, Motoi ONO, Monika PEMWIESER, Helmut TAUSCHER, Michaela TAUSCHER-LAMBERG, Ernst STEINKELLNER

शुभाशंसनम्

अयि विपश्चिदपश्चिमा मनीषिमूर्धन्या विविधविद्याविद्योतितान्तःकरणा विद्वद्वरेण्या अध्यक्षचरणाः सम्मेलनस्यास्या-ध्यक्षा अस्मत्सुहृद्वरा आचार्यवर्याः स्टाइन्केलनरमहाशया अस्य सम्मेलनस्याध्यक्षचरा आचार्यवर्याः काजियाममहा-शया विविधदेशेभ्यः समुपागताः समवेता विद्वत्तल्लजा वियनास्थाः शोधैकचेतसो विद्यारसिकाः सुधियश्च ॥
महत्प्रमोदस्थानमिदमस्माकं कृते यद्वियनानगर्यामास्त्रियाराजनिकेतनायामिदं द्वितीयं धर्मकीर्तिसम्मेलनमायोजितं तत्र च सुगतदेशाद्वयमन्यदेशेभ्यश्च श्रीमन्तो भवन्तो विलसितसौगतशेमुषीका विद्वद्धुरीणाः संप्राप्ताः । तत्र समेषां भवतां मादरं साभिनन्दनं सभाजनां व्याहरामः ॥

सर्वदृष्टिप्रहाणाय यः सद्धर्ममदेशयत् ।
अनुकम्पामुपादाय तं नमस्यामि गौतमम् ॥ १ ॥
वियनानगरी रम्या शैलमालासुशोभिता ।
पार्वतीवास्त्रियादेशे क्रोडे हिमवतः स्थिता ॥ २ ॥
अदीनाश्च कुलीनाश्च जनाः सौजन्यसम्पदः ।
कादम्बरीमुखां नित्यं कुर्वते यत्र सङ्गतिम् ॥ ३ ॥
विद्यापीठं महत्तत्र राजते प्रत्नमद्भुतम् ।
यत्रास्ते सुबहोः कालाद्विद्याशोधपरम्परा ॥ ४ ॥
शास्तृशासनतत्त्वज्ञैस्तत्र नित्यं निनाद्यते ।
विद्यातन्त्री तमोहन्त्री प्रमाणख्यातिसुस्वरा ॥ ५ ॥
फ्राउवालनरो ऽत्रत्यो बौद्धविद्याविशारदः ।
पण्डितेषु महामान्यो बभूव विश्वविश्रुतः ॥ ६ ॥
तच्छिष्यश्चात्र पीठे ऽस्मिन्भोटविद्याविदां वरः ।
स्तैनकेलनरो भाति बौद्धन्यायविचक्षणः ॥ ७ ॥
तेनात्र बहवो ग्रन्था भोटविद्याविवेचकाः ।

विद्याकाशे कृता भान्ति तारका नूतना इव ॥ ८ ॥
काजियामेन चार्येण पूर्वं सम्मेलनं कृतम् ।
धर्मकीर्तिं समाश्रित्य क्योटोनाम्नि पुरे ततः ॥ ९ ॥
अपरोऽयं सुबुद्धानां बौद्धविद्याविपश्चिताम् ।
समवायः समाहूतः प्रामाण्ये वियनापुरि ॥ १० ॥
वयमिह शास्त्रिप्रमुखा विद्वांसः सुगतदेशतः प्राप्ताः ।
जापानाच्च कनाडादेशादप्यन्यतश्चापि ॥ ११ ॥
वेमैनप्रमुखाः प्रमाणपटवो यत्रागताः सौगताः
नीरक्षीरविवेकिनश्च परितो देशाच्च देशान्तरात् ।
सौभाग्यादतिशय्य देवनगरीमेषा पुरी राजते
धन्यः कस्य कृते यदत्र नाद्य विदुषां भोः जङ्गमः सङ्गमः
धन्यं बौद्धमतन्तथागतकृतं सञ्चारतं भारतं ॥ १२ ॥
धन्यं धर्मयुतञ्च कीर्तिविततं प्रामाण्यकं शासनम् ।
धन्याश्चात्र वयं हि यैरनुगतैस्तच्छासनन्तन्यते
धन्येयं वियनापुरी सुखकरी विद्यावतां सुन्दरी ॥ १३ ॥
करुणेशाभिधः सोऽहं विद्वद्वर्गमुपागतः ।
धर्मकीर्तिमुपाश्रित्य वक्ष्ये सौगतपर्षदि ॥ १४ ॥
कुतो वा नूतनं वस्तु वयमुत्प्रेक्षितुं क्षमाः ।
वचोविन्यासवैचित्र्यमात्रमत्र विचार्यताम् ॥ १५ ॥

भारतदेशीयस्य शुक्लोपाह्वस्य करुणेशशर्मणः वियनास्थस्य ऐशवीये १९८९ तमे संवत्सरे जूनमासि पञ्चदश १५ तारिकायाम्। ज्येष्ठे मासि शुक्लैकादश्यां गुरुवासरे २०४६ वैक्रमाब्दे वागियं प्रस्फुटिता ॥

MARGINAL NOTES ON *ANTARVYĀPTI*

by

Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, Paris

I. Satkari Mookerjee in his pioneering work, *The Buddhist Philosophy of the Universal Flux*, proposed to render *antarvyāpti* by 'intrinsic determination' — a conception that has been followed by other scholars. In his final contribution to the subject, the great scholar expresses the same idea, relating the Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara's *antarvyāpti* to Dharmakīrti's *svabhāvapratibandha*:

> "If *antarvyāpti* is understood to maintain that the concomitance of the probans with the probandum is integral to the constitution of the terms, this will not be any innovation. Dharmakīrti lays exclusive stress on the fact that the relation of concomitance is essentially bound up with the nature of the probans. The probans cannot exist without the probandum by virtue of its very constitution. The concept of internal concomitance (*antarvyāpti*) is a paraphrasis of this *svabhāvapratibandha*."[1]

The question is whether we should understand *antarvyāpti* in this way. The thing is clear, according to the testimony of the old logicians: there is *antarvyāpti* 'internal concomitance' when the *vyāpti* ('pervasion', 'concomitance') is apprehended in the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference itself, whereas there is *bahirvyāpti* 'external concomitance' when the *vyāpti* is apprehended in a corroborative example (*dṛṣṭānta*).[2]

If a further proof is needed, it is also easily available. Even the upholders of the *bahirvyāpti* theory resort to *antarvyāpti* in the course of the inferential process: the fourth member of the 'five-membered sentence' (*pañcāvayavavākya*), the *upanaya* 'application', states the *antarvyāpti*, while the second and third members, the *hetu* 'reason', and the *udāharaṇa* 'example', state the *bahirvyāpti*.[3]

All that can be affirmed with certainty is that Dharmakīrti prepared the ground for the theory of *antarvyāpti*.[4] We can, therefore, accept Mookerjee's statement later in the same work:

> "The relation of *antarvyāpti* is thus a deduction from Dharmakīrti's conception of natural concomitance (*svabhāvapratibandha*)."[5]

But it seems to me difficult to go further.

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[1] Mookerjee 1971: 5; cf. also 83f. – I am most grateful to Professor Y. Kajiyama for having made a copy of this work available to me from Kyōto.

[2] See Bhattacharya 1986.

[3] See, e.g., Vyom 614, 617. Jayantabhaṭṭa also says: *sāmānyena ca vyāptir gṛhītā satī siṣādhayiṣitadharmyapekṣāyāṃ saivāntarvyāptir ucyate* (NM I 102), but the illustration he gives is not clear to me; see also Satkari Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of the Universal Flux*, Calcutta 1935: 398 n. 3; unfortunately, Cakradhara does not explain Jayanta's conception.

[4] See Bhattacharya 1986, where other points also are discussed (e.g., the equivalence between Dharmakīrti's *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* – on which see E. Steinkellner's illuminating observations in this volume – and the Jainas' *anyathānupapannatva*); see also on this point Mookerjee 1971: 83.

Ratnākaraśānti, the author of the *Antarvyāptisamarthana*, was heavily indebted to Dharmakīrti (Bhattacharya 1986; see also K. Bhattacharya, "A Note on the Buddhist Syllogism", in *Philosophical Essays. Professor Anantalal Thakur Felicitation Volume*, Calcutta 1987, 7-10). The identification of the *ācārya* mentioned by Ratnākaraśānti with Dharmakīrti (Bhattacharya 1986: 91ff.) appears, therefore, to be more than plausible.

[5] Mookerjee 1971: 7.

As Śāntarakṣita made it clear, to Dharmakīrti, the *sarvopasaṃhārā vyāpti* 'all-inclusive concomitance' was more basic than *antarvyāpti* or *bahirvyāpti*.[6] And this concept of Dharmakīrti's was adopted by all Indian logicians who came after him.

II. By a curious confusion, the contention that, when the subject of the inference is unlimited in extension — 'all' (*sarva*) —, one or another of the things which constitute the subject may be allowed to figure in the capacity of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in which the positive concomitance is apprehended, is sometimes ascribed to the upholders of the theory of *antarvyāpti*. As a matter of fact, it is the upholders of the theory of *bahirvyāpti* who are compelled to do so — as Ratnākaraśānti explicitly states at the end of the *Antarvyāptisamarthana*: *adṛṣṭāntam api tatraikaṃ dṛṣṭāntayati*. See also Jayantabhaṭṭa, NM II 17, 19, 183.

Abbreviations and Literature

Bhattacharya 1986	Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya, "Some Thoughts on *Antarvyāpti, Bahirvyāpti,* and *Trairūpya*." In *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, eds. Bimal K. Matilal and Robert D. Evans. Dordrecht, 89-105.
Mookerjee 1971	Satkari Mookerjee, "A Critical and Comparative Study of Jaina Logic and Epistemology on the Basis of the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara." *Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin* 1, 1-143.
NM I, II	*Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Surya Nārāyana Śukla. [2 vols.] Benares (vol. 1) 1936, (vol. 2) 1934.
Vyom	*Vyomavatī: The Praśastapādabhāṣyam by Praśastapāda Devāchārya with Commentaries (up to Dravya) Sūkti by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Setu by Padmanābha Miśra and Vyomavatī by Vyomaśivāchārya (to the end)*. Ed. G. Kavirāj. Benares 1930.

[6] See Śāntaraksita's *Vipañcitārthā* p. 8 (= *Ācārya-śrī-Dharmakīrti-viracitā Dharmakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ (2), Vādanyāya-prakaraṇam, ācārya-Śāntarakṣita-kṛta-Vipañcitārtha-vyākhyāyutam* . . ., ed. Dvārikādās Śāstrī, Vārāṇasī 1972); cf. Bhattacharya 1986: 94.

POST-UDAYANA NYĀYA REACTIONS TO DHARMAKĪRTI'S *VĀDANYĀYA* – AN EVALUATION*

by

Mangala R. Chinchore, Poona

In the post-Udayana Nyāya tradition[1] attempts were made to rebut Dharmakīrti's views concerning *nigrahasthānas* as expressed in his *Vādanyāya*. Principally there are two such attempts, viz. the *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha*[2] of Vardhamāna and the *Nyāyasūtravṛtti*[3] of Viśvanātha, representative of the two trends reacting to Dharmakīrti. This paper aims at understanding their arguments and evaluate their significance.

In the post-Udayana era of the Nyāya-school one comes across discussion of different issues concerning *vāda* in general and *nigrahasthānas* in particular in the three major works,[4] viz. the *Tārkikarakṣā* of Varadarāja, the *Anvīkṣā* of Vardhamāna and the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha. Of them, for the reasons to be explained later, we shall concentrate here only on the last two. While dealing with them in their chronological order the first section of the present study deals with the contention of the *Anvīkṣā*. The second section considers the arguments of the *Vṛtti*. In both these sections we shall not only study their arguments against Dharmakīrti but shall explain their philosophical stand-points. This will enable us to place them in their proper perspective and assess and examine their importance in the last section.

As stated earlier, we shall not deal in this paper with the *Tārkikarakṣā*. This is for the following two important reasons:

1. Broadly speaking, post-Udayana Nyāya reactions to Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya* fall chronologically into two groups: (a) prior and (b) posterior to the advent of Navyanyāya.[5] Further, both these kinds of reactions fall into two major camps: (i) those which take the shape or form part of an independent treatise, as evidenced by Varadarāja's *Tārkikarakṣā* or Vardhamāna's *Anvīkṣā*, or (ii) those which form part of an elaborate commentary written to explicate the contention of Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtras*. This trend is illustrated by Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*. Being a post-Udayana reaction to Dharmakīrti we should have normally taken note of Varadarāja's contention in this paper. However, in contrast to Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha, Varadarāja seems more to fall in line with post-Dharmakīrti Nyāya reactions to *Vādanyāya* till Udayana in an important respect. In any of such reactions, no matter whether advanced in the form of an independent treatise like Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's

* I am indebted to Prof. M. P. Marathe for his valuable help at various stages of completing this essay.

[1] Those interested in the Nyāya reactions to Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya* prior to Udayana as well, may please refer to my book *Vādanyāya: A Glimpse of the Nyāya-Buddhist Controversy*, New Delhi 1988: 166-205.

[2] Henceforth abbreviated as *Anvīkṣā* (ANTB).

[3] Henceforth abbreviated as *Vṛtti* (NSūVṛ).

[4] Even though in the Navyanyāya tradition the *padārthas* like *vāda* or *nigrahasthānas* are considered in works like *Dinakarī*, *Nīlakaṇṭhī*, etc. we are not going to consider them here. For, there they are dealt with from an altogether different i.e. reductive perspective. To consider those works here, lies outside the scope of the present paper. We hope to return to the issues sometime later.

[5] Advent of Navyanyāya is understood with Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* being written.

Nyāyamañjarī or as a part of a full-scale commentary like Vācaspati's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*[6] or Udayana's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi*[7], a prolonged attempt seems to be made to elaborate and defend the views either of Vātsyāyana or Uddyotakara as the chief, if not the sole, exponent of Gautama, and dispose of Dharmakīrti's views concerning *nigrahasthāna*s on the ground that they do not merit any serious attention. This sort of an almost dogmatic refusal to take cognizance of Dharmakīrti's views on the theme is also evidenced by Varadarāja's *Tārkikarakṣā* and in the consequence it falls more in line with Nyāya reactions to Dharmakīrti till Udayana, although it is written in the post-Udayana era of the Nyāya tradition. Therefore it does not seem to merit an independent treatment.

2. In some of the post-Udayana reactions to Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, no matter whether in the form of an independent treatise or part of an elaborate commentary, one notices a differential trend in so far as they concentrate upon such issues as the following and proceed to consider their importance in the changed intellectual atmosphere that came in vogue with the advent of Navyanyāya[8]:

a) What should be an appropriate definition of *nigrahasthāna*/s?
b) In which context should *nigrahasthāna*s be taken a serious note of?
c) What should be the basis of their classification?

On this count too Varadarāja's *Tārkikarakṣā* does not seem to merit any serious separate treatment not only because it was written prior to the advent of Navyanyāya but also because it is almost silent about the above-mentioned issues. Vardhamāna's *Anvīkṣā* as well as Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, on the contrary, though written posterior to Gangeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, the pioneering work of Navyanyāya, are alive to these problems. Yet they seem to deal with them following divergent, though not exactly opposite, tracks. Both the works, format-wise, seem to be indebted to Udayana. The *Anvīkṣā* avowedly follows the route of Udayana's *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*,[9] whereas the *Vṛtti* is in accordance with the *Pariśuddhi*.[10] Of them, again, while the *Anvīkṣā* represents a thematic treatment of *nigrahasthāna*s in a commentary on the line of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, the *Nyāyamañjarī* or the *Pariśiṣṭa*, wherein different themes, issues, problems, topics, concepts etc. from the Nyāya tradition are discussed and the views of the adversaries are criticized, the *Vṛtti* represents the trend of the literal commentary of the *Nyāyasūtra*s on the pattern of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*,[11] the *Nyāyavārttika*,[12] the *Tātparyaṭīkā*, the *Pariśuddhi* etc., where the consideration is not merely to concentrate on a certain theme, but rather to explain each Sūtra of Gautama.

Although in the time during which the *Anvīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* were written the controversies between the Buddhists and the Nyaiyāyikas were not as live and strong as they were till the time of

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[6] Henceforth abbreviated as *Tātparyaṭīkā*.

[7] Henceforth abbreviated as *Pariśuddhi*.

[8] See *supra* note 5. The various commentaries written on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* also subscribe to Navyanyāya.

[9] *Udayana's Nyāyapariśiṣṭa with Pañcikā of Vāmeśvaradhvaja*, ed. S. N. Srirama Desikan, Tirupati 1976. Henceforth abbreviated as *Pariśiṣṭa* (NPar).

[10] Although Udayana considers the nature and status of *nigrahasthāna*s in his two different works, viz. the *Pariśuddhi* and the *Pariśiṣṭa*, it is clear from the number of references to *Pariśiṣṭa* occurring in the *Pariśuddhi*, that the latter is chronologically posterior to the former.

[11] Henceforth *Bhāṣya*.

[12] Henceforth *Vārttika*.

Udayana, yet the impact exerted by them on the intellectual atmosphere had not died down completely. Moreover, philosophical debates between adherents of different philosophical trends continued to be carried on. Hence importance of the consideration of such *padārtha*s as *vāda* acknowledged by the Prācīnanyāya had not disappeared completely. And yet in the then prevalent intellectual atmosphere their treatment was required to be refined in such a way that hitherto discovered points of weakness and vulnerability do not continue to infect it. Hence attempts were made in the *Anvīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* to refine and modify the tradition in such a way that the stronger points of the prevalent tradition could be highlighted and the reasons plausible according to Nyāya tradition of non-acceptance of Dharmakīrti's contention could be brought out. In order to carry out such an exercise more refined terminology of the Navyanyāya was taken help of wherever feasible. Nonetheless, it is also important to note that though the foundations of Navyanyāya were laid, the scheme of the seven *padārtha*s accepted by it does not seem to have taken profound roots and in the consequence the reduction of the sixteen *padārtha*s of the Prācīnanyāya[13] to the seven *padārtha*s of the Navyanyāya[14] was not attempted then as it came to be done much later at the hands of Nīlakaṇṭha, Dinakara etc. It is in the juncture-period of the disappearance of the Prācīna- and advent of the Navyanyāya tradition that both these works were written. Hence, one finds that the discussion of *vāda-padārtha*s in general and *nigrahasthāna*s in particular is pursued therein within the framework of the sixteen *padārtha*s of the Prācīnanyāya and yet their interpretation is attempted with the help of the technical language of the Navyanyāya, wherever feasible. Thus understood, both these works represent a new mode of defending the tradition of Prācīnanyāya in the post-Udayana era of the Nyāya tradition.

With this background we turn to the consideration of the arguments of the *Anvīkṣā* regarding the nature and status of *nigrahasthāna*s.

I. *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha*: A Philosophical Study

As pointed out earlier, *Anvīkṣā* is a thematic commentary on the fifth chapter of the *Nyāyasūtra*s. It consists of two sections, viz. *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*/s, dealing with the last two *padārtha*s accepted by Prācīnanyāya. In the present context we shall concentrate only on the second section of the *Anvīkṣā*, i.e. *nigrahasthāna*/s.

Before we turn to analyze the arguments of the *Anvīkṣā*, an explanation about the intention behind its being written appears to be essential. For that would enable us to answer two important questions:
(a) Why Vardhamāna feels that refinement in the discussion of *nigrahasthāna*s is essential, and
(b) granted that it is essential, how it is to be brought in while interpreting the *Nyāyasūtra*s.
The following reasons seem to have prompted the *Anvīkṣā* being written:

(i) Vardhamāna wrote the *Anvīkṣā* obviously to interpret the fifth chapter of the *Nyāyasūtra*s in a modified way. Although he has respect for his predecessors like Vātsyāyana, Udayana[15], etc. and makes use of the important points put forth by them, yet he also seems to be aware of the fact that

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[13] *pramāṇaprameya . . . tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*. NSū I.1.1 (p. 28).

[14] *dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa, samavāya* and *abhāva*. For this see relevant sections of such works as *Tarkasaṅgraha* and various commentaries on it or *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and various commentaries on it. For reduction issue see *supra* note 4.

[15] This could be seen from the second *pariśiṣṭa* of the *Anvīkṣā*.

it is not merely enough to defend the *Nyāyabhāṣya* against the *Nyāyavārttika* or conversely.[16] For, that will not bring in precision and clarity essential for rebutting the opponents like Dharmakīrti. Hence, use of the prevalent technical terminology of Navyanyāya is necessary for interpreting the *Nyāyasūtras*. Accordingly, he makes use of such terminology in his work wherever needed.

(ii) In the rebuttal of the contention of an opponent an almost dogmatic defence of the views of the predecessors is not enough. At times, it is equally essential and important to show their limitations. Knowing this, Vardhamāna seems to point out some of the inadequacies of his Nyāya predecessors while defining *vāda, kathā, nigrahasthānas*, etc. He criticizes their definitions to be more inclusive and vague, and hence pleads strongly for refinement of them. Of course, while doing this, according to him, enough care should be taken to ensure that the distinction between three kinds of determiners of *vāda*, etc. should not be ignored. They are:

a) direct determiners (*sākṣāt-niyāmaka*)
b) primary determiners (*pradhāna-niyāmaka*) and
c) derivative determiners (*gauṇa-niyāmaka*).

The requisite precision and clarity should never be attempted to be brought in at the cost of ignoring such vital distinctions. This aspect lacking in the works of his predecessors is sought to be introduced with the help of the refined language of the Navyanyāya.

Similarly, while modifying the prevalent interpretation of the *Nyāyasūtras* additional varieties of *nigrahasthānas*, if any, should also be considered and incorporated, in the absence of which the discussion of them is likely to remain incomplete, and thus may jeopardize comprehensiveness of the consideration of *nigrahasthānas*. Consequently, he seems to introduce certain newer species of them too.[17]

(iii) Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, since Dharmakīrti in the *Vādanyāya* criticizes the Nyāya theory of *nigrahasthānas* in general and Uddyotakara's in particular, if the *Nyāyasūtras* are to be interpreted, it is essential to react to Dharmakīrti's view. But while doing this counter-criticism of Dharmakīrti's view should not be the only aim.[18] Rather, on careful closer scrutiny one is likely to notice that re-interpretation of the tradition is the primary objective of Vardhamāna's work. However, it also becomes clear that while on the one hand Dharmakīrti's philosophically important points are acknowledged tacitly, yet on the other hand an attempt is also made to criticize Dharmakīrti showing indirect redundancy of his theory, and thus bring out non-dispensability of the contention of the Nyāya tradition. That is why the *nigrahasthānas* accepted by Dharmakīrti are still shown to be subsumable under those accepted by the Nyāya tradition and in this way superiority and importance of the treatment of *nigrahasthānas* at the hands of Nyāya predecessors of his is attempted to be the principal aim behind writing the *Anvīkṣā*.

With this, we wish to outline the theory of *nigrahasthānas* according to the *Anvīkṣā*. Here our task is two-fold: one, to capture the modifications Vardhamāna introduces while interpreting the *Nyāyasūtras* and mark his departure from his predecessors. And two, to comprehend his criticism of Dharmakīrti's theory of *nigrahasthānas*. We shall deal with these points in the same order. For, unless one knows his theory, it is not possible to assess and evaluate his criticism of Dharmakīrti's view.

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[16] In the Prācīnanyāya, works like the *Tātparyaṭīkā* advocate the views of the *Bhāṣya*, whereas works like the *Pariśuddhi* are defending the view of the *Vārttika* on the nature and status of *nigrahasthānas*.

[17] See *infra* note 30.

[18] Just as Uddyotakara's *Vārttika* opens with this very contention that the aim of writing this treatise is to criticize opponents like Dignāga, one at least *prima facie* does not see any such motto of the *Anvīkṣā*, though if one reads it in between the lines this could be seen very well. Be that as it may.

Vardhamāna's theory of *nigrahasthānas*:

Vardhamāna seems to hold that *nigrahasthānas* should be considered within the context of *kathā* in general and *vāda* in particular. For, the former is the generic (primary) determiner (*pradhāna-niyāmaka*) of it, whereas the latter is the direct determiner (*sākṣāt-niyāmaka*) of it. Further, by *vāda* he seems to mean both *vijigīṣu-vāda* and *tattvabubhutsu-vāda* as well, and *kathā* is constituted of four elements, viz.

i) *vādin* who seeks to establish a thesis without giving rise to fallacies and guarding against blemishes (*hetvābhāsaśaṅkānirāsa* and *kaṇṭakoddhāra*).

ii) *prativādin* who attempts to advance his own thesis (*prativādisiddhāntasthāpanā*).

iii) To expose weakness in other's arguments together with attempting to establish one's own thesis (*paroktadūṣaṇasahitasvapakṣasthāpanā*).

iv) Adjudication of success etc. (*jāyādivyavasthāpana*).[19]

In the light of these constitutive conditions Vardhamāna defines *kathā* as that in which while *vādin* puts forth his thesis with the intention of establishing it, *prativādin* proceeds showing faults in *vādin*'s arguments and attempts to establish his own contention instead.

This does not, however, mean that the traditionally laid down determiners of *kathā* in general and *vāda* in particular should be neglected. While formulating the definition of *nigrahasthāna* they have a significant role to play. For, the determiners of *vāda* are derivatively the determiners of *nigrahasthānas*, i.e.

i) The thesis put forth must be in accordance with the accepted *pramāṇas* and appropriate *tarka* (*pramāṇatarkasādhanopalambha*).

ii) The thesis sought to be established must not be inconsistent with the philosophical position of the school to which one subscribes (*siddhāntāviruddha*), and that

iii) It should be sought to be advanced with the help of an argument with five constituents (*pañcāvayavopapanna*).[20]

On the background of these three kinds of determiners acknowledged in the Nyāya tradition it is interesting to enquire into Vardhamāna's definition of *nigrahasthāna*/s.

A *nigrahasthāna*, according to him, is that (context) wherein one (arguer) fails to understand the reason prompting the discussion (*kathā-uddeśa*), the results and consequences of the discussion (*kathā-phala*), the motive of the discussion (*kathā-prayojana*) or the purpose of the discussion (*kathā-hetu*) on account of absence of an appropriate knowledge of any (one) of them (*yathārthajñānavirahaliṅga-tva*).[21]

On this background it is easy to understand his objections to his predecessor's theory of *nigrahasthāna*/s. They are:

(1) According to Vardhamāna, predecessors' definition of *nigrahasthāna* seems to be incorrect. For, *nigrahasthāna* is not differentiated from *chala, jāti*, etc. and hence their definition of it is too inclusive (*ativyāpta*). Rather, *nigrahasthānas* like *niranuyojyānuyoga*, etc. should be used for differentiating *nigrahasthānas* from *chala, jāti*,[22] etc. Otherwise, the definition of *nigrahasthāna* remains either *avyāpta-* or *ativyāptadūṣita*.

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[19] *tad idaṃ caturvidham – . . . svoktisambhavaḥ*. ANTB 103

[20] *pramāṇatarkasādhanopālaṃbhaḥ . . . vādaḥ*. NSū I.2.1 (p. 335).

[21] – *kathakoddeśya . . . nigrahasthānatvam*. ANTB 77.

[22] *yady api chalajātīyāni . . . lakṣaṇārtham āhnikārthaḥ*. ANTB 76.

(2) It is incorrect to understand *nigrahasthāna*/s in terms of faults of arguments instrumental to the establishment of a thesis (*sādhana-dūṣaṇa*) as Dharmakīrti does. For, when one indulges in a discussion/debate different arguments pertaining to variety of subjects are used. And one cannot be held to be defeated just because he has used variety of arguments, which apparently seem to be inconsistent. It is, therefore, not the argument which is so much at fault but rather the person resorting to such arguments. Hence, a person is defeated on account of his failure to recognize proper use of arguments.[23]

(3) One's failure to respond (*ananubhāṣaṇa*) in itself does not constitute to be a *nigrahasthāna* for it may be due to such contingent factor as the audience turning violent (*sabhākṣobha*).[24] Hence, it is the reason behind one's not arguing further which should be taken into account rather than merely the fact that one does not argue further.

(4) To define *nigrahasthāna* in terms of *apratipatti* and/or *vipratipatti* too is incorrect. For, *apratipatti* and/or *vipratipatti* could at the most be used as classificatory clues rather than as defining marks. The definition of *nigrahasthāna* should be free from defects of its being either too wide or too narrow.

Further, even *apratipatti* and/or *vipratipatti*, as marks classificatory of *nigrahasthāna*s, need to be understood in a refined way. It is the individual who is defeated,[25] since the faults - *apratipatti* and/or *vipratipatti* - of comprehending the subject matter in an incorrect way lies with the individual. Thus understood, *apratipatti* means lack of proper knowledge of the motive behind the discussion resulting in improper use of words in their proper context, while *vipratipatti* means knowledge contradictory of it.[26]

Thus, *nigrahasthāna*s broadly speaking, are of two kinds, viz. *apratipatti* and *vipratipatti*. And twenty-two kinds of *nigrahasthāna*s, discussed in the *Nyāyasūtra*s, could be classified under these two heads. Such a classification of *nigrahasthāna*s could be shown to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. For, the *fundamentum divisionis* of them, mentioned above, could be shown to be an appropriate basis of their classification, especially since it revolves around the consideration of internal (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) and/or external negation (*paryudāsa*).[27]

(5) Unlike his Nyāya predecessors Vardhamāna seems to hold that *hetvābhāsa*s are not only a kind of *nigrahasthāna*s but also that the latter arise due to the former. For *hetvābhāsa*s are indicative of defective *hetu*s on account of lack of proper comprehension on the part of the individual involved in the discussion and hence he is declared to be defeated. Going a step further, he also seems to hold that along with defective *hetu*s other *sādhanābhāsa*s, like *pakṣābhāsa*s, *sādhyābhāsa*s, *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*s too lead to *nigrahasthāna*s. For, they too are related with defective *hetu* and thus indicate failure of knowing the subject matter properly on the part of the individual in whose arguments they figure. Thus, in the context of *kathā*, *hetvābhāsa*s are *prima facie nigrahasthāna*s and directly fallacies of *hetu*.[28]

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23 . . . *vādipuruṣanigrāhakatvāt, . . . puruṣaṃ nigrāhayati.* ANTB 78.

24 *na vā sarvatra nigrahasthāne . . . ca sambhavāt.* ANTB 76.

25 *tasmād vākyam avākyaṃ vā puruṣaṃ nigrāhayati.* ANTB 78.

26 *athoddeśyakathaka . . . vipratipattiḥ.* ANTB 76.

27 . . . *prasajyapratiṣedhaparyudāsābhyāṃ . . . bhāvaḥ.* ANTB 78 and also . . . *atra paryudāsanayā . . . nigrāhyaḥ.* ANTB 115.

28 *na caivaṃ nigrahasthānāntarāṇām api . . . niyamāt.* ANTB 4-5 and also *hetvābhāsāḥ . . . sūtrārthaḥ.* ANTB 126.

Further, other varieties of *hetu-doṣas*, viz. *ātmāśraya, anyonyāśraya, cakraka*, etc. too should be added to the list of *hetvābhāsas* primarily and *nigrahasthānas* derivatively.[29]

(6) Consideration of different *nigrahasthānas* at the hands of predecessors, according to Vardhamāna, is perhaps incomplete. Certain other sub-varieties should be added for bringing in greater comprehensiveness in their consideration. For instance, *pratijñāhāni* and *pratijñāsanyāsa*, etc. are of five kinds, whereas *hetvantara* or *arthāntara*, etc. are of four kinds.[30]

Having briefly taken account of Vardhamāna's theory of *nigrahasthānas* and the rationale behind its refinement, it would be interesting to understand his criticism of Dharmakīrti, our main point of interest. It is to this that we now turn.

Vardhamāna's criticism of Dharmakīrti

Following are the grounds on which Dharmakīrti is criticized in the *Anvīkṣā*:
(a) Vardhamāna seems to bring out four kinds of incompleteness in Dharmakīrti's theory of *nigrahasthānas*: (i) The basis of *nigrahasthāna*/s, viz. *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*,[31] provided in the *Vādanyāya* is incorrect. For, instead of defining *nigrahasthāna* it rather tells us what leads to it. On the contrary, in the *Anvīkṣā* an attempt is made to give both the genera and the differentia of *nigrahasthāna* through its definition. Hence, Vardhamāna claims definitional superiority for the Nyāya treatment of *nigrahasthānas*. (ii) Since neither differentia nor genera being provided through the definition of *nigrahasthāna*, it becomes very difficult for Dharmakīrti to correlate different kinds of *nigrahasthānas*. Thus, a unificatory principle not being provided, the treatment of *nigrahasthānas* at his hands remains scattered and incoherent. On the contrary, in the *Anvīkṣā* an attempt is made not only to spell out the direct (*sākṣāt*), primary (*pradhāna*) and the derivative (*gauṇa*) determiners (*niyāmaka*) of *nigrahasthānas*, but an appropriate relation between them also is ascertained. Hence, the theory of *nigrahasthānas* put forth in the *Anvīkṣā* is claimed to be more comprehensive as compared to that of *Vādanyāya*. (iii) The so-called definition of *nigrahasthāna* given by Dharmakīrti does not take into consideration negation - internal or external - of comprehension, i.e. either lack of proper cognition (*yathārthapratipatti-abhāva*) or contradictory cognition (*viruddhapratipatti*) whereas Vardhamāna claims that his definition of *nigrahasthāna* revolves around the notion of *pratipatti*[32] and hence is held to be supplying a classificatory clue to it as well. (iv) The two kinds of *nigrahasthānas*, viz. *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*, given by Dharmakīrti, are neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive.[33] On the other hand, the kinds of *nigrahasthānas* accepted by Nyāya not only fulfill this requirement but all the twenty-two *nigrahasthānas* acknowledged by it remain properly classifiable under them. Thus considered, Dharmakīrti also seems to score poorly on the count of classification of *nigrahasthānas*.

(b) Dharmakīrti's criticism of the Nyāya predecessors, like Uddyotakara, too seems to be irrelevant and hence dispensable. For, he fails to show twenty-two *nigrahasthānas* accepted by the Nyāya to be

[29] ANTB 126-127.

[30] ANTB 78-88, 89-98.

[31] *saugatā . . . dvayor nigrahasthānatvam.* ANTB 78.

[32] *tarhi yathārthapratipatti . . . virodhaḥ.* ANTB 78.

[33] ANTB 78.

reducible to those accepted by him. On the top of it all he himself admits that his consideration of *nigrahasthānas* is incomplete[34] and hence for its comprehensiveness accepts some of the *nigrahasthānas* like *apratibhā*, given by the Nyāya tradition.[35] Moreover, *nigrahasthānas* at the hands of Dharmakīrti are considered within the limited context of *tattvanirṇiṣu-vāda* alone and hence seems to be inflexible. The Nyāya treatment of *nigrahasthānas*, on the contrary, treating them in both the contexts, viz. *tattvabubhutsu-vāda* and *vijigīṣu-vāda*, i.e. the general framework of *kathā*, appears to be more flexible and inclusive. Accordingly Vardhamāna seems to hold it to be philosophically more valuable, precise and comprehensive in nature.

(c) Moreover, Dharmakīrti seems to have failed to comprehend importance of such *nigrahasthānas* as *apratibhā*, which could have been used as a unificatory principle in his framework, and thus correlate the two *nigrahasthānas*, viz. *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*, acknowledged by him under one heading. Thus, the Nyāya perspective concerning *nigrahasthānas* seems to be superior to that of Dharmakīrti.

Having discussed above Vardhamāna's objections to Dharmakīrti's treatment of *nigrahasthānas* in the *Vādanyāya* and its rationale, we now turn to the consideration of the theme at the hands of Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti*. This is our next section.

II. The *Vṛtti* on *nigrahasthānas*

On careful study one finds that by and large the interpretation of *Nyāyasūtras* in the *Vṛtti*, seems to be nothing else but a rationalization of the stand of the Nyāya tradition along with circumvention of the limitations of the predecessors. Something of this kind is perhaps natural to happen especially because the living and creative opposition from the Buddhists' camp had died down by that time. What remained to be considered was historical and intellectual relevance of *nigrahasthānas* as they were discussed in the Nyāya tradition. As a result, one does not notice sharp opposition to the Buddhist contention on the theme in Viśvanātha's work. Rather, there seems to be an unconscious attempt to imbibe in the Nyāya tradition some of the points advanced by such Buddhist opponents as Dharmakīrti without mentioning his name. There is also an attempt at re-interpreting the thrust of the Nyāya tradition on the theme without giving up allegiance to it, although Prācīnanyāya had then ceased to be living trend within the fold of which the Nyāya-Buddhist controversy concerning nature and status of *nigrahasthānas* was carried on over couple of centuries.

As mentioned earlier, by the time when the *Vṛtti* was written intra-school or inter-school philosophical controversies concerning the nature and status of debates had dried down. In fact even the tradition of Prācīnanyāya was not taken seriously by the adherents of the Nyāya school themselves as much as it once used to be taken. As a result, Viśvanātha's writing a commentary called *Vṛtti* on the *Nyāyasūtras* was more a matter of academic and historical interest. And yet, while doing this sort of an exercise he has focussed attention on some of the important points in the light of which we wish to proceed:

(1) In the *Vṛtti* Viśvanātha clearly acknowledges some of the absurdities and dogmatic elements in the thoughts of the Nyāya predecessors. For he states that a detailed discussion of such *padārthas* as

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[34] ANTB 78.

[35] ANTB 78.

nigrahasthānas, etc. can at the most serve the purpose of instructing novices and sophomores in the art of debating.[36] That is, the discussion of *nigrahasthānas* can hardly be said to be philosophically illuminating. Secondly, the move on the part of Gautama to speak of *hetvābhāsas* as the thirteenth independent *padārtha* on the one hand and to subsume them under the sixteenth *padārtha* called *nigrahasthāna*/s on the other is too inscrutable to understand and make satisfactory sense of.[37] The only reason, perhaps, to discuss them separately may be that while the *padārthas* like *jāti*, *nigrahasthānas*, etc. have no significant role to play in one's epistemic enterprise, those like *hetvābhāsas* necessarily have. Thus understood, Viśvanātha's writing a brief commentary on the first and second section of the fifth chapter of the *Nyāyasūtras* seems more a matter of an academic exercise indulged in order not to give an impression that he has not totally ignored it. This may also be done, in so far as debates and discussions used actually to go on, to show that the theme of *nigrahasthānas* discussed by the Prācīnanyāya has historical interest to serve and continues to be important from the point of history of ideas.

(2) In the Nyāya tradition up to Udayana, interpreting the *Nyāyasūtras* two camps were seen - one following the *Bhāṣya* and another the *Vārttika*. And in Udayana, too, in his works, viz. the *Pariśiṣṭa* and the *Pariśuddhi*, an attempt is made to defend the significant points of one predecessor against those raised by another.[38] But in the *Vṛtti* it is seen for the first time that Viśvanātha not only acknowledges the faults of the predecessors but attempts also to give them up by bridging up the gaps by trying to bring the two warring camps[39] together. For, he clearly sees the fact that the divergence in the interpretation of the *Nyāyasūtras* generated by the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārttika* facilitated the opponents like Dharmakīrti. He seems to be aware of the controversies between his predecessors of the system and the opponents, especially like the Buddhists. Hence a due care seems to be taken while interpreting some of the varieties of *nigrahasthānas*, like *apārthaka*[40], *aprāptakāla*[41], *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa*[42], *niranuyojyānuyoga*[43], etc. And, at times, one finds that Dharmakīrti's views are twisted in such a way that they could be fitted in the Nyāya framework easily for bringing in the homogeneity in the tradition.[44]

(3) Following the prevalent tradition, he states that there are three kinds of *kathās*, viz. *vāda, jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*.[45] Taking into consideration the nature of means used and the objectives sought to be accomplished, *kathā* should be defined. For, communicability-context is essential for each one of them. Hence, he defines *kathā* as that which is carried out with the help of the rules of arguments and in

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[36] . . . *prakārabhedena pratipādanaṃ śiṣyabuddhi* . . .. NSūVṛ 57.

[37] NSūVṛ 57-58. Note also that Viśvanātha refuses to accept subsumption of *hetvābhāsas* under *nigrahasthānas* – see NSūVṛ 58.

[38] See for instance NPar (cited in note 9) 94.

[39] NSūVṛ 57-58.

[40] NSūVṛ 1179.

[41] NSūVṛ 1183f.

[42] NSūVṛ 1195f.

[43] NSūVṛ 1198.

[44] See commentary on the *nigrahasthāna* called *nyūna* in the NSūVṛ 1185.

[45] NSūVṛ 1101f.

which either establishment of truth or one's own victory or opponent's defeat are aimed at.[46] Thus, on the one hand, in his view, *vāda, jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* could be correlated and yet their distinction could be recognized on the other. Eventhough the use of an argument having five constituents (*pañcāvayavy anumāna*) is the minimum condition for each one of them, it is on the basis of use of *pramāṇa* and *tarka* by *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa* that they could be distinguished.[47] Further, since *pañcāvayavy anumāna* is the necessary condition of *kathā* in general, the fallacies related to *anumāna* too are applicable to all the three kinds of *kathā*s equally. Hence, *hetvābhāsa*s have an important role to play on the general level of *kathā*.[48] Nonetheless, *nigrahasthāna*s alone could be located in *vāda*, i.e. one variety of *kathā*, and hence they too need to be considered separately. Thus, consideration of *hetvābhāsa*s on two levels - as an independent *padārtha* and as a kind of *nigrahasthāna* - seems to be in order.[49]

(4) According to the *Vṛtti*, following the prevalent tradition, there is a distinction between two kinds of *vāda* - *tattvabubhutsu-vāda* and *vijigīṣu-vāda* - and use of *chala, jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*/s is prohibited in the former but not in the latter. The use of them is permitted in *vijigīṣu-vāda*,[50] since it is meant for training of the beginners and not helpful for the establishment of the truth. There is a marked difference between *vāda* carried out between a teacher and a pupil, between adherents of the same school and that between adherents of different schools aiming at the establishment of the truth. Hence, *nigrahasthāna*s have an educative importance in teacher-pupil debates.[51]

(5) Lastly, *nigrahasthāna* indicates a defeat of the person involved in a debate and consists of either *vipratipatti* and/or *apratipatti*.[52] The basis of the consideration of *nigrahasthāna*/s should not involve exigencies - like one's fainting and hence keeping mum (*ananubhāṣaṇa*), etc. but rather only of those cases where either opposing cognition or lack of cognition is the cause of it.

Thus, in the *Vṛtti*, an attempt is made to criticize Dharmakīrti and his followers sympathetically while re-interpreting the tradition to bring out its historical relevance.

Up till now we gave a sketch of the main contention of the *Anvīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* regarding the nature and status of *nigrahasthāna*/s in response to such opponents as Dharmakīrti. However, from a methodological point of view it is necessary to critically consider the points made by the defenders of the Nyāya tradition and assess their acceptability. This would enable us to see their philosophical significance and contribution they made to the furtherance of thought. It is to this that we turn in the next section.

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[46] NSoVṛ 1159.

[47] NSoVṛ 331-334.

[48] NSoVṛ 1200.

[49] NSoVṛ 58, 1200.

[50] NSoVṛ 343f.

[51] NSoVṛ 57.

[52] NSoVṛ 1191f.

III. Critical Evaluation

Turning to the critical evaluation of the responses of the representatives of the post-Udayana Nyāya adherents to the points raised by Dharmakīrti and his followers regarding the nature and status of *nigrahasthānas*. In this sort of an attempt one finds that while there are some points of agreement between them, there is also an important divergence. First coming to the points of similarity on the basis of which both the *Anvīkṣā* and *Vṛtti* criticize Dharmakīrti:

(1) Both Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha agree with their Nyāya predecessors on the view that *kathā* is of three kinds, viz. *vāda, jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*, and *nigrahasthānas* are to be located in the context of *vāda* primarily. However, it is not denied that *nigrahasthānas* could be considered along with *chala, jāti*, etc. too, in the context of *kathā* in general. In other words, *vāda* is of two kinds, viz. *tattvabubhutsu-vāda* and *vijigīṣu-vāda*, and *chala, jāti* etc. are permissible in the *vijigīṣu-vāda* if not in the *tattvabubhutsu-vāda* as well. And *nigrahasthānas* could be located in both the contexts. The only difference that lies in the treatment of *nigrahasthānas* is such that while in the context of *tattvabubhutsu-vāda* it is a positive hindrance, in the context of *vijigīṣu-vāda* it is a boon in disguise. Again, in the latter context *nigrahasthānas* are said more to be instrumental to the defeat of the adversary rather than one's own victory. Thus contextually they have a differential role to play.

On the contrary, Dharmakīrti rightly insists that *nigrahasthānas* have an important role to play only in the context of *tattvanirṇīṣu-vāda*, i.e. *vāda* proper. For, the other two varieties of *kathā*, viz. *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*, or the other kind of *vāda*, viz. *vijigīṣu-vāda*,[53] where defeat of the adversary is the sole aim and where resorting to methodologically foul means is freely permissible, is not philosophically worthwhile, especially since such a kind of *vāda* does not aim at discovery of truth. Merely defeating somebody in a debate is not an important consideration,[54] and hence the other variety of *vāda*, viz. *vijigīṣu-vāda* or of *kathās*, viz. *jalpa* and/or *vitaṇḍā* are not worthy of seriously being entertained as a means of discovery of truth.[55] Moreover, if defeating an adversary somehow and anyhow is the solitary aim, independent of discovery of truth, then various kinds of *argumentum ad hominem*, physically assaulting somebody, pushing, pulling, etc. could also profitably be added to the list of acknowledged *nigrahasthānas*.[56] Further, points of philosophical interest are never intended to be inquired into in this way. Instead of concentrating upon the nature and status of such debates and the factors which are beneficial or obstructive to them, it is futile to indulge into enlistment of number of *kathās*, species of *vāda* and varieties of *nigrahasthānas*. For, nothing of this kind is methodologically rewarding and can hardly enable us to stipulate context-free determiners of *nigrahasthānas*, and that of *vāda* as well. Thus, Dharmakīrti seems to be right in holding that no philosophically interesting purpose would be served in the dual consideration of *vāda* and the role of *nigrahasthānas* in them.

(2) Secondly, for Naiyāyikas in general and Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha in particular *nigrahasthānas* means a point of defeat or a failure in argumentation. It may be because of the lack of appropriate knowledge (*apratipatti*) or due to misunderstanding (*vipratipatti*) of the persons involved in the debate. Thus, according to them, a *nigrahasthāna* is envisaged to figure in a similar fashion both from the side

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[53] *chalavyavahāro 'pi . . . satām ācāraḥ.* VN 68.

[54] VN 66-69.

[55] See also Viśvanātha's NSūVṛ 1179.

[56] *tattvarakṣaṇārthaṃ . . . nakhacapeṭaśastraprahārādipanādi . . . tattvarakṣaṇopāyaḥ.* VN 69 and . . . *anyat tu na yuktam iti neṣyate.* p. 5.

of a *vādin* or *prativādin*. Further, it is said to revolve around victory or defeat in a debate. This, however, is a mistake on two accounts: (i) As pointed out by Dharmakīrti, discovery of truth involves a twin exercise[57] – (a) establishment of viability of truth (*svapakṣasthāpana*) and (b) inviability of untruth. Just any one of them would not make up for both. (ii) The role of *vādin* and *prativādin* in the discovery of truth is not analogous but rather differential, and accordingly that which might occasion occurrence of a *nigrahasthāna* legitimately from each side cannot be the same as Nyāya advocates imagine. For, a *nigrahasthāna* would arise from each of their side according as they fail to perform their appropriate role. Thus considered, whereas what should constitute to be a *nigrahasthāna* from one side is failure to spell out proper determiners of establishment of truth (*asādhanāṅgavacana*) while from the other side failure to spot illegitimate determiners to be such (*adoṣodbhāvana*).[58] Both of them may originate from ignorance or lack of intelligence (*apratibhā*).[59] But to say that is too simplistic and hardly spells out differential responsibilities of *vādin* and *prativādin* in the discovery of truth.

(3) Thirdly, both Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha, in agreement with Nyāya adherents, seem to be dogmatic and uncompromising on the following three counts, and accordingly their view seems to be alike questionable –
(a) They seem to insist, in conformity with the Nyāya tradition, that an *anumāna* appropriated in any form of *kathā* must necessarily be *pañcāvayavī* and that this nature of it must be accepted by anybody irrespective of the school of philosophical thought to which he adheres.[60] They also seem not to question Vātsyāyana's principal contention that conclusion of every argument must be jointly yielded by all the *pramāṇa*s which Naiyāyikas accept, especially because its premisses are held to correspond with the *pramāṇa*s accepted by them. Secondly, they also seem to accept, in conformity with the view of the adherents of Nyāya, that while debate between a teacher and a pupil, or that between adherents of like-minded trends of thought could be conducive to the discovery of truth, such a debate between adherents of unlike-minded schools cannot be. Both these views, however, are untenable. The former because it seeks to dogmatically universalize the Nyāya view concerning *anumāna*, while the latter because it simply rules out the possibility of adherents of unlike-minded schools of philosophical thought being seriously engaged in discovery of truth. For instance, debates between adherents of Nyāya and Buddhism and their contribution to furtherance of philosophical thought can hardly be ignored, however the Nyāya adherents may like dogmatically to disregard their significance.
(b) The dogmatic subscription to the view on the part of Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha, that debates/discussions are basically of three kinds, that these three kinds are on par with one another, and that *nigrahasthāna*s are envisaged to play a differential role depending on the purpose for which one engages oneself in a debate, too, likewise is questionable. For, while *vāda* proper concentrates merely on establishment of one's own position, perhaps independently of the consideration whether it is shown to be so questionably or otherwise, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* concentrate merely on defeating an adversary by any means – fair or foul. Each of them involves fallacy of omission, although of a different sort. *vāda* seems to undermine the importance of dis-establishment of a counter knowledge claim, while *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* seem merely to concentrate upon dis-establishment of a counter knowledge claim, but caring nothing for the establishment of that knowledge claim which one intends

[57] *tasmāj jigīṣatā . . .nirākartavyaḥ*. VN 71.

[58] *asādhanāṅga . . . neṣyate*. VN 4f.

[59] . . . *tadabhyupagamya apratibhayā . . . vā*. VN 5.

[60] See for instance their explanation respectively of the *nigrahasthāna* called *nyūna*.

to put forth. Each of these approaches, thus, amounts to mistaking part for the whole, - the task that appropriately lies in front of each party indulging in a philosophically interesting debate.
(c) Further, if *nigrahasthāna*s are those points in debate/discussion reaching which one forfeits one's right to continue the debate, their exploitation cannot be permitted in one kind of debate and prohibited in another coherently, and at the same time both these kinds of *vāda* cannot simultaneously be treated to be equally interesting varieties of a philosophically appropriate debate. The prolonged exercise of rationalization through which Nyāya adherents take the prospective readers of their respective treatises seems to make smack the rat of dogmatism, rather than allowing unbiased and free intellectual air to circulate.

(4) Generic determining conditions like *apratipatti*, *vipratipatti* and *apratibhā* cannot be uniquely and unequivocally connected with occurrence of *nigrahasthāna*s. For, conditions like failure to comprehend, ignorance, irresoluble differences of opinion, etc. are hindrances in an epistemic enterprise, and debates indulged into with the intention of discovery of truth are not the solitary exception to it. Hence, to seek to reduce any *nigrahasthāna*, no matter whether accepted by Nyāya or Buddhist adherents, to *apratipatti* or *vipratipatti* as Uddyotakara seems to do or its dogmatic defence is irrelevant and methodologically indefensible. Dharmakīrti's *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*, on the contrary, seem to be more appropriate *nigrahasthāna*s in the domain of philosophically interesting debates leading to discovery of truth, no matter whether they are indulged in intra-systematically or inter-systematically.

(5) Lastly, coming to the consideration of *hetvābhāsa*s. Naiyāyikas seem to be considering *hetvābhāsa*s on two levels, viz. as an independent *padārtha* and as a kind of *nigrahasthāna*. The only difference in their treatment is seen according to the approach from which they are considered, i.e. in the context of *vāda nigrahasthāna*s are primary, but since fallacies of *hetu* (*hetvābhāsa*) arise in arguments, which opens the possibility of *vāda* context, *hetvābhāsa*s too need to be considered. Thus, up to Udayana and under his influence up to Vardhamāna in the Nyāya tradition *hetvābhāsa*s are subsumed under *nigrahasthāna*s particularly in the context of *vāda*, while, on the other hand, they were treated to be an independent *padārtha*. No one till Viśvanātha did even faintly suspect that there is a serious kind of double-think in this. Rather everybody kept on mixing between reverence (for Gautama) with truth (what should defensibly be the case). At the hands of Viśvanātha, for the first time in the entire Nyāya tradition, a serious question of methodological impropriety came to be raised in his *Vṛtti*.[61] But he too, unfortunately, did not stick to this point till the end, and in consequence seems to have failed in understanding the implications of it, otherwise he would not have blindfoldedly reiterated the tradition while explaining the nature of *hetvābhāsa*/s as a kind of *nigrahasthāna*/s.[62]

Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, seems to be succinctly clear in so far as he never allows the distinction between *hetvābhāsa*/s and *nigrahasthāna*/s to be undermined or subsumption of the former under the latter, especially because whereas the former has something basically to do with validity of an argument, the latter with the methodologically appropriate decision as to when does one forfeit one's right to continue to participate in a philosophically interesting debate. In other words, while the former revolves around the logical aspect of an argument, the latter with its rhetorical use in the debate. The determiners of each one of them are different, i.e. *hetvābhāsa*s arise due to the non-fulfillment of the condition of *trairūpya*, viz. *pakṣe sattvam*, *sapakṣe sattvam* and *asapakṣāsattva*,[63]

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[61] NSūVṛ 57-59.

[62] NSūVṛ 1200.

[63] . . . *trirūpahetuvacanasamudāyaḥ* . . . VN 59 or . . . *sādhanasya siddher yan nāṅgam – asiddhaḥ, viruddhaḥ, anaikāntiko*

whereas *nigrahasthānas* arise due to either *asādhanāṅgavacana* or *adoṣodbhāvana*. Hence, the attempts of both Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha not only of imbibing but of mixing between these two important considerations appear to be both misleading and indefensible.

Turning to the differential points brought forth by Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha. For fear of undue length of the essay we shall concentrate on one representative point from each of them. First turning to Vardhamāna. The point of appropriate definition and classification of *nigrahasthānas* is pertinent as far as it goes. But in so far as it amounts to be a sophisticated rationalization of the view handed down by the Nyāya tradition, it smacks more of dogmatic defence rather than unbiased acceptance of the views even of a philosophical adversary, in so far as they merit subscription to it. To say what Dharmakīrti and his followers say does not deserve serious attention in so far as it is indefensible is one thing; to refuse to accept it, however reasonable, smacks the rat of dogmatism - and that too on the part of adherents of that school of philosophical thought which claims itself to be exclusive custodian and forerunner of a defensible methodologically appropriate consideration. This is something which is unfortunately deplorable and indefensible as well, being unconducive to genuine conceptual growth.

With reference to Viśvanātha too one does not notice unfortunately a differential trend. Consider for instance, the reason as to why Gautama might have dealt with the theme of *nigrahasthānas* and the subsumption of *hetvābhāsas* under *nigrahasthānas*. He claims that this is more for pedagogic and educative interest, serving the need more of novices and sophomores. But if this is so, is similar consideration at stake with reference to other *padārthas* as well? If not, why are topics which merit advanced treatment and those which are meant for the convenience of beginners treated on par in the same treatise? Unfortunately, Viśvanātha or any other later Nyāya adherent has no satisfactory answer. Thus, the so-called differential points raised both by Viśvanātha and Vardhamāna too unfortunately lapse into dogmatic and sterile rationalization and defence of the tradition.

We pointed out above the combined and distinctive shortcomings of the exercises carried out by Vardhamāna's *Anvīkṣā* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* to respond to Dharmakīrti and his followers, and assessed their intellectual worth. Before we close we turn below briefly to outline the morals to be learnt from the point of view of the growth and development of philosophical ideas from such instances:

(a) Merely *prima facie* imbibing the view of a philosophical opponent without appropriate modification in one's own substantive position - even at the cost of incurring wrath of fellow adherents - or continued rationalization of the tradition is intellectually less rewarding as compared to undogmatic and open minded acceptance of the views even of a philosophical adversary. For, the latter is more conducive to intellectual growth than the former.

(b) Though dialogues, discussions and debates are important from the point of view of intellectual advancement it is too rigid to claim that any intellectual development worth the name is impossible to be brought out without such debates. For, although *vāda-sabhās* did contribute their mite to conceptual growth and clarification, it would be too idle to claim that with their stoppage such a phenomenon would automatically come to an end. Newer modes of dialogue and discussion continue to be devised rather than gathering under one roof at a specified time and indulging in prolonged debates.

(c) Establishment of truth is not a monopoly of the adherents of a particular school/system, nor does it depend upon age. Quest for truth is unending, although better and better modes of articulating various facets of truth would continue to surface and may perhaps outwit the hitherto accepted ones.

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vā hetvābhāsaḥ. p. 64.

No one can legitimately claim to have chanced upon any final and irrevocable truth, although quest after truth is interminable and discovery of better and better truth always possible, final truth being no one's exclusive property.
(d) Though the sixteen *padārthas* accepted by the Prācīnanyāya came ultimately to be reduced to the seven *padārthas* accepted by the Navyanyāya the relative importance of such traditionally accepted *padārthas* as *nigrahasthānas* etc. came to be missed in the process and their contribution to the conceptual growth and development came either to be sidetracked or ignored altogether.

One, however, interested in studying and assessing the relative importance of such exercises from the point of view of intellectual growth cannot afford to be dogmatic or blind to the nuances which contributed to such a kind of development. In this essay we hoped to concentrate on such aspects and bring to surface their importance to the extent to which it deserves serious attention. Assessment as to what extent we have succeeded in our task be better left to the judicious discretion of the competent and conscientious scholars.

Abbreviations

ANTB *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha* (Vardhamāna): *Vardhamānopadhāyaviracitaḥ Anvīkṣānayatattvabodhaḥ*. Ed. K. Raghunāthan. Allahabad 1979

NSū *Nyāyasūtra*: v. NSūVṛ

NSūVṛ *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* (Viśvanātha): *Nyāyadarśanam. With Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha. [2 vols.] Calcutta 1936 [reprint Kyoto 1982].

VN *Vādanyāya* (Dharmakīrti): *Ācārya-śrī-Dharmakīrti-viracitā Dharmakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ (2), Vādanyāya-prakaraṇam, ācārya-Śāntarakṣita-kṛta-Vipañcitārtha-vyākhyāyutam* . . . Ed. Dvārikādās Śāstrī. Vārāṇasī 1972.

DHARMAKĪRTI'S DEFINITION OF *PRAMĀṆA* AND ITS INTERPRETERS

by

Georges Dreyfus, Charlottesville

I. Dharmakīrti and mKhas grub on Defining *pramāṇa*

This essay examines Dharmakīrti's explanation of valid cognition (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*),[1] as well as conflicting interpretations of this explanation. I will consider the explanations provided by some of Dharmakīrti's main Indian commentators such as Devendrabuddhi, Śākyamati, Prajñākaragupta, and Dharmottara.

Although these classical commentators are the primary sources besides Dignāga and Dharmakīrti themselves, we can also use with profit the important Tibetan commentarial tradition. I will examine some of the relevant material coming from the dGe lugs pa and the Sa skya traditions of logic and epistemology. I will present several points of view within the dGe lugs pa tradition, specifically focusing on mKhas grub's view, which represents, in my opinion, an original explanation of the passage we are about to examine. I will also present Śākya mchog ldan and Go ram pa's views as they are expressed in their commentaries on Sa skya Paṇḍita's *Rigs gter*.

I will start by presenting the two conflicting interpretations of Dharmakīrti's definition of valid cognition given by mKhas grub and rGyal tshab. This will give me the occasion to examine the dGe lugs pa views on valid cognition as well as to inquire into whether novelty is a requirement of epistemological validity, which most Buddhist epistemologists state. mKhas grub is one of the few to refuse it. The inquiry into the background of his remarkable position will lead me to examine some of the characteristics of the different epistemologies that Buddhist thinkers have elaborated in India and in Tibet. I will then continue my investigation of Dharmakīrti's definition by examining several solutions proposed by Indian and Tibetan interpreters of Dharmakīrti, as well as the criticisms that these attempts have drawn from the Sa skya scholars Śākya mchog ldan and Go ram pa. I will conclude by presenting mKhas grub's solution to the textual and philosophical problems raised here.

Dharmakīrti's clearest statement on valid cognition is found at the beginning of Chapter II of his masterwork, the *Pramāṇavārttika*. There, he explains *pramāṇa* as a cognition (*jñāna, śes pa*) that is reliable (*avisaṃvādin, mi bslu ba*). He starts by giving the following definition of valid cognition:[2]

"Valid cognition is that cognition [which is] reliable (*avisaṃvādin, mi bslu ba*).[3]
Reliability [consists] in the readiness [for the object] to perform a function."

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[1] I translate *pramāṇa* by "valid cognition" when used in Buddhist context and by "means of valid cognition" when used in more general contexts. Here, valid cognition (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*) is identified by Dharmakīrti (see below) as right cognition (*samyagjñāna, yaṅ dag pa'i śes pa*). I have chosen the word "valid cognition" as a translation of *pramāṇa* and "right cognition" as a translation of *samyagjñāna*.

[2] Dharmakīrti's direct disciple Devendrabuddhi uses the words "form" (*rūpa*) as well as "defining property" (*lakṣaṇa, mtshan ñid*) to describe Dharmakīrti's characterization of valid cognition (PVP 2a2, 3b3).

Similarly, his disciple Śākyamati says: "The words 'valid cognition is a reliable cognition' expresses the definition [of] valid cognition, after having taught the illustrations [that are] reliable and cognitions" (PVṬ 87a2 [= *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*: P 5718 (Vols. 131, Tshad ma, Ñe 1-348a8)]).

[3] I have here chosen the more colloquial "reliable" to translate *avisaṃvādi* over trustworthy or uncontradicted. For some of the canonical background of this word, see van Bijlert 1989: 174.

(pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ /
avisaṃvādanaṃ śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt //
tshad ma bslu med can śes pa / don byed nus par gnas pa ni /
mi slu sgra las byuṅ ba yaṅ / mṅon par 'dod pa ston phyir ro // PV II 1)

This verse has received a great deal of attention from commentators. For example, mKhas grub gives his definition of valid cognition as a gloss of this verse. He says:

"The defining property of valid cognition is: the cognition that is reliable with respect to the object that it (the cognition) realizes by its own power. Accordingly, [Dharmakīrti says] in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*: '[Perception and inference are right cognitions] because [a person] who acts (*'jug pa na*) having determined (*yoṅs su bcad nas*) the object by means of these two (cognitions) is not deceived with regard to a purposeful action [performed by the object].'" (*tshad ma'i mtshan ñid / raṅ dbaṅ du raṅ gis yoṅs bcad ba'i gźal bya la slu ba med pa'i śes pa / de ltar yaṅ mam ṅes las / 'di dag gis yoṅs su bcad nas 'jug pa na don bya ba la slu ba med pa'i phyir ro / źes* (PVin I 30,17f.)[4] *gsuṅs pa yin no // Mun sel* 64b4f.)

According to mKhas grub's interpretation of Dharmakīrti, valid cognition is the definite cognition which is reliable and which ascertains its object by its own power. For example, let us imagine that I see some smoke. My visual perception of the smoke will then be valid if, and only if, three criteria are satisfied: a) this definite experience must realize its object smoke, i.e., it must correctly identify this object so that I gain certainty with respect to it. b) this object must be able to help me to achieve some practical results.[5] c) this ascertainment must be induced by the cognition's own power, not by another cognition (as in the case of the remembrance of smoke).

That is to say that in order for a cognition to be valid it must have what I call independent[6] epistemic access to its object. For example, a visual perception of my favorite rocking chair has access to its object independently of my previous perceptions of that chair, despite the fact that the information it conveys is not new. A remembrance of that same chair does not have such an epistemical independence, for it is a mere mechanical repetition of the results of a cognition. In short, for mKhas grub, a cognition is valid if, and only if, the experience of the object turns out to bring certainty through its own power and to be uncontradicted by any other items of knowledge that we might acquire.

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[4] *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Chapter I: Tilmann Vetter, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung*, Wien 1966.

[5] The interpretation of reliability is a subject of conflict among Dharmakīrti's commentators. Although they all accept the practical interpretation given here, some insist on adding a cognitive connotation. As we will see, this conflict of interpretation is particularly clear in Tibet.

[6] mKhas grub does not make the distinction between psychological and epistemological independence made by some modern thinkers such as Lakoff, Proudfoot, etc. Although it is clear that some cognitions have a psychological independence in the sense that they arise in our stream of consciousness without requiring the direct presence of other perceptions, that does not mean that these cognitions are epistemologically independent. For example, the perception of a chair is probably not epistemologically independent of previous conceptual identifications of the chair. It is not clear to me whether Dharmakīrti or mKhas grub would be willing to make a distinction between these two types of independence. The strong opposition between conception and perception, which is at the heart of Dharmakīrti's epistemology, suggests that these thinkers would grant to perception both psychological and epistemological independence. On the other hand, the fact that even perceptions depend on latencies (*vāsanā, bag chags*, some of those being the results of conceptions) suggests that the Dharmakīrtian system might not exclude such a distinction.

II. A Conflicting Interpretation

mKhas grub's gloss seems to elegantly capture the gist of Dharmakīrti's first two verses. Solely based on this passage it would be hard to dissent from his explanations. However, most other dGe lugs pa commentators have not followed mKhas grub's simple gloss and have adopted a conflicting interpretation. rGyal tshab, who is often considered by later dGe lugs pa scholars as the main authority in logical and epistemological matters, defines valid cognition as "that cognition which is newly reliable" (*gsar du mi bslu ba'i śes pa*, *Thar lam gsal byed* 229,15). This definition, which is also given by dGe 'dun grub,[7] has been accepted as standard by the later authors of the textbooks (*yig cha*) of the important dGe lugs pa monasteries. In opposition to mKhas grub's requirement of epistemical independence, these thinkers insist on a stronger requirement for validity, that of novelty. They are more restrictive as to what they allow to count as a valid cognition. Thus, we have two different versions of the requirements for validity: novelty and epistemical independence.

How do these interpretations fare when compared with their Indian sources? Although Dignāga is not explicit on this question, we can find some elements that indicate that he supports the requirement of novelty. When discussing the fact that there are only two types of valid cognition, Dignāga asserts that not every kind of cognitive activity corresponds to a different kind of valid cognition. Otherwise, there would be an infinite number of different types of valid cognition. Moreover, since there would be no limit on what can count as an independent valid cognition, states of consciousness such as recollection, which are well known as being not valid, would have to be valid. Dignāga says:

> "For example, recollection, desire, aversion, etc., are not independent (lit. different) valid cognitions with respect to a previously cognized thing." (*dper na dran pa daṅ / 'dod pa daṅ / że sdaṅ la sogs pa sṅar rtog pa'i don la tshad ma gźan ma yin pa bźin no //*)[8]

In other words, these cognitions are not valid when applied to previously cognized things. Implicit in Dignāga's argument is that a cognition must apprehend a new object in order to qualify as valid cognition.

Similarly, we find passages in Dharmakīrti that tend to suggest that he holds that novelty is required for a cognition to be valid. In PV II 3a, he says that "Since it apprehends what is [already] held, conventional [cognition] is not accepted [as a valid cognition]". Thus, if we take this statement literally, a cognition has to apprehend an object not yet apprehended in order to be a valid cognition. We find confirmation of Dharmakīrti's view on novelty in the *Hetubindu* where he also defines valid cognition:

> "With respect to this, valid cognition is only that which first sees an uncommon object." (*de la daṅ po yul thun moṅ ma yin pa mthoṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de kho na tshad ma yin no //* HB_t 32,24f. = P 338a5f.)

A valid cognition sees an uncommon, i.e., individual, object that has not yet been realized by the person. Dharmakīrti further states that:

> "Because [a remembering cognition] apprehends an [already] completely seen aspect, it is not

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[7] *Rigs rgyan* 18,10. This definition is not too different from Phya pa's own definition as it is reported by Śākya mchog ldan. For Phya pa, the defining property of valid cognition is: that which contradicts and eliminates a false super-imposition by an unmistaken mode of apprehension with respect to a previously unrealized true thing (*sṅar ma rtogs pa'i don bden pa la mi 'khrul ba'i 'dzin staṅs kyis bzlog pa'i sgro 'dogs daṅ 'gal ba'o*, *Pham byed II* 298,4f.

[8] PSV 14a2f. [= *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga): P 5701 (Vol. 130, Tshad ma, Ce 13a6-93b2]; Hattori 1968: 25, 176. Quoted in van Bijlert 1989: 177. The Nyāya criticism of the requirement of novelty also confirms the fact that this requirement was considered a significant tenet of Dignāga's system. See Hattori 1968: 82.

a valid cognition. [This is so for the following reason:] having seen the uncommon [real thing] one states '[this is] an uncommon thing' [but such a judgment] does not realize any previously unrealized object." (*ji ltar yoṅs su mthoṅ ba'i rnam pa 'dzin pa'i phyir tshad ma ma yin te / sṅar thun moṅ ma yin pa mthoṅ nas / thun moṅ ma yin pa'o žes mṅon par brjod pas ni sṅon ma rtogs pa'i don rtogs pa med pa'i phyir /*)[9]

Real things are the individual objects which have their own uncommon nature. These objects are apprehended by perception, which in turn induce perceptive judgments. The Nyāya school holds these judgments to be a form of perception and, therefore, to be valid. For Dharmakīrti, judgments cannot be instances of perception. They are not valid because they realize already perceived objects. Implicit in this passage is that a cognition must realize a new object in order to be valid. A judging or remembering cognition is not valid because it does not bring any new information in the cognitive process. Therefore, there seems to be evidence that the requirement of novelty corresponds to both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's own ideas.

Most commentators describe valid cognition accordingly. As we will see later, Dharmakīrti's two earliest interpreters, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati, also support the requirement of novelty. Commenting on verse PV II 3ab, Devendrabuddhi says:

"With respect to a [particular], only the first vision, a valid cognition, makes [the perceiving person] engage [in an object]." (*de la daṅ por mthoṅ ba ñid tshad ma ñid de 'jug par byed pa yin no //*)[10]

Here again, implicit in Devendrabuddhi's argument is that validity requires novelty. Later commentators of Dharmakīrti are somewhat more explicit in their acceptance of the requirement of novelty.[11] For example, Prajñākaragupta, in answer to the objection that nothing more than reliability is required to define valid cognition, says:

"Quite right! Nevertheless, [by] saying that the object [of a valid cognition must] be [previously] unknown one can eliminate the cognitions apprehending [something already] held by [another cognition]. This is not the case [if] one [merely] speaks of reliability, for [by this criterion such a non-new cognition] would have reliability." (*de ni bden mod kyi de ltar yaṅ ma šes pa'i don smos pa ni bzuṅ ba 'dzin pa'i šes pa spoṅ bar nus kyi / mi slu smos pas ni ma yin te / de la yaṅ ni mi slu ba yod pa'i phyir ro //* PVBh$_t$ 31a4f.)[12]

Cognitions apprehending objects already perceived also meet, according to Prajñākaragupta, the criterion of reliability.[13] It is only by adding the requirement of novelty that valid and non-valid cognitions can be differentiated.

Similarly, Dharmottara asserts that valid cognitions realize objects that have been previously unknown to the realizing person. Dharmottara says:

"Although mere realization [of an object] is engagement (*pravṛtti, 'jug pa*) [in this object], there is no valid cognition with respect to [an already] realized object, for a person is made to engage [in an object] by the very first showing of this object of engagement independently of anything else . . . Therefore, all valid cognitions only take as their objects [previously] unrealized things. Consequently, since the very moment of first perception or inference ascertains the continuum of things that are able to perform a function, they can take [these things] as [their] objects of

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[9] HB$_t$ 32,29-32 (= P 338a7f.). I thank Professor Katsura for drawing my attention to this passage.

[10] PVP 4a2. See also below p. 26 the passage PVP 6b1f.

[11] See: Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1298, and Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*.

[12] *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (Tibetan text): P 5719 (Vol. 132, Tshad ma, Te 1-382a7).

[13] I am here assuming that this passage represents Prajñākaragupta's own opinion. Although this assumption seems reasonable, it is by no means sure that this is the case, for Prajñākaragupta presents several alternatives without choosing among those.

engagement. Therefore, the later continuation of those [moments of cognition] that are established and abide differently (i.e., the moments that are the effects of the first moment) are to be excluded [from being] valid cognitions." (*yons su gcod pa tsam 'jug par byed yin na yan / gan gis dan po 'jug pa'i yul bstan pa de ñid kyis gźan la ltos pa med par skyes bu gcug pa'i phyir rtogs pa'i don la tshad ma yod pa ma yin no / . . . de'i phyir tshad ma thams cad ni ma rtogs pa'i don can kho na'o / de ñid kyi phyir dan po'i mnon sum dan rjes su dpag pa'i skad cig ma ñid kyis don byed nus pa'i dnos po'i rgyun nes pas 'jug pa'i yul du byed nus pa'i phyir / de'i rgyun du gyur pa grub pa dan bde ba tha mi dad pa phyi ma rnams tshad ma yin pa spans yin no //* PVinṬ 9a5-9b2)

For Dharmottara, only the first moment of a given direct perception (except that of an omniscient consciousness) can be a valid cognition. The cognitions of the same type that arise following the first moment can in no way be considered valid. Whereas for mKhas grub the important point is not whether the cognition has or does not have novelty, but whether the cognition has or does not have independent access to its object, for Dharmottara and rGyal tshab, only a new cognition can be valid. Thus, according to this second group of thinkers, only the first perception of my favorite rocking chair can be a valid cognition. My subsequent perceptions of that chair are not valid since they do not add any new information.

III. Three Groups of Thinkers

We have seen so far two views of valid cognition: that of mKhas grub, who refuses the requirement of novelty and that of rGyal tshab, who is one of the more radical proponents (together with Dharmottara) of this requirement. Both positions differ from the views of the more classical Buddhist epistemologists (Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyamati, Prajñākaragupta). Although this "third"[14] group of thinkers accepts the requirement of novelty, they hold that the second moment of perception is valid. The second moment is valid since it holds a new object, the second moment of the object. The difference between these thinkers and later epistemologists is that, for this earlier group of thinkers, perception is a mere passive holding of a real thing present in the perceptual ken. Contrary to later thinkers such as Dharmottara[15] and Mokṣākaragupta[16], these more classical thinkers hold that perception has no power to determine anything whatsoever. Since there is no determination in perception, the sole relevant factor to perception is the mere presence of the object in the perceptual ken. And since the object perceived is undergoing constant transformation, perception is always new.

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[14] This appellation is paradoxical in view of the fact that these thinkers represent the original Buddhist epistemology. Their views differ from those of later thinkers such as Dharmottara, Mokṣākaragupta, etc., who transformed the old epistemological system in order to answer the Nyāya criticisms. In Tibet, Phya pa's school further developed this new epistemology which was then taken over by the dGe lugs pa tradition. The often surprising positions taken by mKhas grub come from the fact that he often relies on more classical authors such as Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati, while remaining within the conceptual framework of the new epistemology of Dharmottara and Phya pa. Sa skya thinkers such as Śākya mchog ldan and Go ram pa come sometime closer to the original model because they operate within the framework of the more classical epistemology of Sa skya Paṇḍita.

[15] I am not suggesting that Dharmottara completely invented this new epistemology. He probably had predecessors (such as Śubhagupta) but he is certainly one of the dominant figures in this new development. On Śubhagupta, see Mikogami's forthcoming "Śubhagupta's Theory of Sense-Perception".

[16] Yuichi Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta*, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters Kyoto University No. 10, 1966: 56-59.

According to all three groups of thinkers, the memory of what happened to me yesterday is not a valid cognition because it is the mere repetition of the content of a previous cognition. Since one cannot rely on one's memory to decide whether an object really exists or not, memory cannot be epistemically valid.

Although rGyal tshab and mKhas grub both share this assumption, the reasons for which they exclude remembrance from valid cognition differ. According to mKhas grub, remembrance is not a valid cognition because it does not have independent epistemic access to its object, whereas according to Dharmottara, rGyal tshab and most other scholars, a remembrance is not valid because it does not bring a new element to the cognitive process.

This difference in the reasons adduced for the exclusion of memory comes out clearly in the Tibetan tradition in the case of a direct perception lasting for several moments. Let us suppose that I am gazing at my rocking chair for several moments. The first moment of perception is a valid cognition according to both sides (mKhas grub and rGyal tshab). According to rGyal tshab the second moment is not valid because it does not introduce a new element to the cognitive process, it is a mere subsequent cognition (*bcas śes*)[17]. Based on Dharmottara's discussion, rGyal tshab asserts the existence of direct perceptions that are not valid cognitions.

mKhas grub adamantly rejects this position which is, nevertheless, accepted by most later dGe lugs pa thinkers. According to him, this second moment of perception is valid because it perceives its object through its own power, i.e., it does not rely on any other cognition to apprehend its object in the same way as does remembrance, for example.[18] mKhas grub strongly rejects the idea that a cognition is not valid because of apprehending something that has already been perceived.[19]

The fact that neither author tries to use the doctrine of momentariness in order to resolve the difficulty comes from their understanding of perception. The more classical epistemologists hold that direct perception is constantly perceiving its object anew because it passively holds an object that is changing every moment. Therefore, for them, the question of knowing whether perception is always valid or not does not arise. Dharmottara and some later Indian and Tibetan thinkers have a different view of perception which accords to perception not only the capacity to passively hold its object but also the (at least indirect) ability to actively apprehend it. Consequently, these thinkers put a greater emphasis on the structure apprehended by the perception. Since the object perceived by the first and the second moment of perception have the same structure, the objects of these two perceptions are

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[17] The word "*bcas śes*" (lit. cognition of the [already] perceived, also some times spelled *dpyad śes*, i.e., investigating cognition) is not found in Dharmakīrti's works and seems to have been coined by later epistemologists to designate the cognitions that follow a valid cognition and cognize the same object as that valid cognition. For example, I perceive a golden pot on the table today. The next day I remember this pot. This remembrance is accepted by all dGe lugs pa scholars as being the proto-typical 'subsequent cognition'. Dharmakīrti's text supports this interpretation, despite the fact that Dharmakīrti did not use this word. In an oral exchange, Steinkellner suggested that the word might have been at an earlier stage *rjes śes* (later cognition).

Subsequent cognition is one of the epistemological categories elaborated in the works called *blo rigs* (*Types of Mind*), also sometimes spelled *blo rig* (*Mind and Awareness*).These texts, which are part of the textbooks of the important dGe lugs pa monastic colleges, are late compilations whose aim is to introduce the student to Buddhist epistemology by the systematical presentation of several cognitive typologies which are either taken, or at least derived, from Indian texts. Among those typologies, the most significant is the division of cognition into seven categories: perception (*mṅon sum, pratyakṣa*), inference (*rjes dpag, anumāna*), subsequent cognition (*bcas śes*), inattentive perception (*snaṅ la ma ṅes pa*), correct assumption (*yid dpyod*), doubt (*the tshom*), mistaken cognition (*log śes*). See Elizabeth Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*, Ithaca 1981. Go ram pa attributes this typology of cognition to the famous Phya pa, who is said to be at the origin of the tradition of Collected Topics to which these epistemological texts belong (*rNam bśad* 35b1).

[18] For mKhas grub, subsequent cognition is strictly limited to remembrance. See *Mun sel* 58b5-59a3. Here, mKhas grub is in agreement with Dharmakīrti's original system.

[19] His arguments are developed in *Mun sel* 63b-64b.

found to be essentially the same (despite their having undergone changes due to their momentariness). This is why Dharmottara and rGyal tshab, following their acceptance of the criterion of novelty, exclude subsequent direct perceptions from being valid cognitions and assert the existence of direct perceptions that are not valid. mKhas grub, who shares the same basic understanding of perception, rejects this criterion of novelty on the ground that it leads to absurd consequences.[20]

This is not the proper place to thoroughly assess the merits of these two, mKhas grub's and rGyal tshab's, positions. However, a few remarks might help to gain a better understanding of the issues involved. First let us notice that both positions correspond to certain elements in Dharmakīrti's text, although they both diverge in some respect from the original model. mKhas grub's position corresponds quite well to Dharmakīrti's presentation of direct perception and inference as subdivisions of valid cognition. This suggests that, for Dharmakīrti, a direct perception is necessarily a valid cognition. Thus, Dharmottara and rGyal tshab's idea that some direct perceptions might not be valid runs counter to Dharmakīrti's presentation of direct perception as a sub-division of valid cognition. In this respect, mKhas grub's interpretation follows the views of his favorite commentator, Devendrabuddhi.[21]

On the other hand, earlier passages show that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti support the requirement of novelty. This requirement is also advocated by most major commentators such as Devendrabuddhi, Śākyamati, and Prajñākaragupta. Thus, we can see that rGyal tshab's advocation of novelty has strong scriptural backing and that mKhas grub's rejection goes against the most authoritative texts of the tradition.

From a purely philosophical point of view, however, rGyal tshab's requirement that a cognition introduce new information in order to qualify as valid is difficult to justify. Why is the second moment of perception of the same rocking chair any less valid than the first? In the case of memory there is an element of mechanical repetition lessening the validity of the cognition. A remembering cognition is a mere conceptual thought with only a weak link to reality to ensure its validity (inference, on the contrary, has a stronger causal connection to reality). It is, for example, difficult to assert the existence of something on the mere basis of remembrance. Memory is noticeably unreliable, making its exclusion from validity easily understandable. The exclusion from validity of cognitions on the grounds that they lack novelty, as in the case of the second moment of perception of the rocking chair, is more difficult to justify. In this respect, mKhas grub's requirement of epistemic independence fares better, for it does not force us to exclude from validity some cognitions that we intuitively conceive as valid.

IV. A Second Definition?

Let us now come back to Dharmakīrti's text and examine some of the problems that his interpreters have encountered. In PV II 1a Dharmakīrti defines valid cognition as that cognition which

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[20] According to mKhas grub, if novelty were a requirement for validity, then the second moment of an omniscient consciousness (*rnam mkhyen skad cig gñis pa*) would absurdly be a subsequent cognition since it perceives what has already been realized by the first moment. Moreover, people would have no valid cognition of sound once they had realized what sound is (presumably at a very young age). Finally, the inference of the impermanence of the sound would also absurdly turn out to be a subsequent cognition, since it apprehends previously realized objects such as sound and impermanence. For more detail, see *Mun sel* 63b-64b. Another argument adduced by mKhas grub against the requirement of novelty is that if novelty were required for validity there could not be any valid mental direct perception of sound (*sgra 'dzin mṅon sum gyi tshad ma*) in ordinary beings. See *Mun sel* 66b3-4.

[21] lCaṅ skya tells that, whereas rGyal tshab relies mainly on Dharmottara, mKhas grub often follows Devendrabuddhi. *Grub mtha' rnam bźag*, Delhi 1970: 213,13-16.

is reliable. In the fifth stanza, Dharmakīrti makes a new move which has puzzled commentators, for it seems to suggest another definition of valid cognition. He says: "Or, it is the revealing of a [yet] unknown thing". The word "or" (*vā*) seems to introduce an alternative, a second definition of valid cognition. This is the point of view held by Devendrabuddhi. The first stanza gives a first approximative definition. The fifth stanza gives us a more complete account. Devendrabuddhi says:

> "Thus, 'reliable' is explained as being one defining property of valid cognition. Or, 'revealing of a [yet] unknown object' is a second alternative defining property. A clearly revealing consciousness is a valid cognition in as much as it acts as the revealer of the quiddity of a thing, an object unknown to the knower." (*des na de ltar tshad ma'i mtshan ñid mi slu ba gcig bśad do / ma śes don gyi gsal byed kyaṅ / gźan mtshan ñid pa yin no / rtogs pa po'i mi śes pa'i don gyi dṅos po'i de kho na ñid gsal bar byed pa ste / mṅon par gsal bar byed pa'i śes pa yaṅ tshad ma yin no /* PVP 6b1f.)

Devendrabuddhi's conclusion in the face of the presence of these two passages, each suggesting a different definition, is that a cognition must reveal some new aspect of the reality of the cognized object in order to be valid. However justified his conclusion is, his belief that Dharmakīrti gives two different definitions of valid cognition is difficult. It is in definite tension with the standard theory of definition, which states that a defined object (*lakṣya, mtshon bya*) cannot have two definitions given from the same point of view.

A definition defines its object by stating its defining property (*lakṣaṇa, mtshan ñid*). That is, it explains and points out that object by cognitively identifying it with a certain property. Thus, an object is provided its identity by being picked out by a certain property. Impermanence, for example, is distinguished by its defining property momentariness. If the same object were to have two independent defining properties, it would have two separate identities! Since this is impossible, commentators have tried to interpret Dharmakīrti's text in a way that would avoid this logical conundrum. Devendrabuddhi's direct disciple Śākyamati tries to resolve the difficulty by differentiating these two definitions. He explains Devendrabuddhi's gloss this way:

> "With respect to [Dharmakīrti's words] 'Or, it is the revealing of a [yet] unknown thing', [Devendrabuddhi's words] 'second alternative defining property' state that since it is asserted by the world, [reliability] is one [defining property]. The [other one] is a different second aspect." (*ma śes don gyi gsal byed kyaṅ źes bya ba la sogs pa la / gźan mtshan ñid gñis pa źes bya ba ni 'jig rten gyi brjod pas 'di ni gcig yin la / 'di ni gźan rnam pa gñis pa yin no źes bya ba smos pa yin no /* PVṬ [cited in note 2] 96a8-b1)

According to Śākyamati, the two definitions are not conflicting, for they are given from two different points of view. From the point of view of worldly convention, valid cognition should be defined as the cognition that is reliable, for this is what the world means by "valid". However, this is only a rough approximation, for valid cognition is understood more precisely by philosophers; from their point of view, a valid cognition should be defined as the 'revealing of a new object' for this is what philosophers mean by "valid".

Other Indian and Tibetan commentators have tended not to accept the idea of two different definitions of valid cognition and have tried to come up with a more unified account. For example, Prajñākaragupta presents a point of view supporting the requirement of novelty. In fact, his explanation only slightly differs from Devendrabuddhi's: whereas Devendrabuddhi sees Dharmakīrti's text as presenting two different definitions, Prajñākaragupta holds that the two passages (PV II 1ab and 5c) should be interpreted as constituting together the definition of valid cognition. Thus, for him, the word "or" (*vā*) does not introduce a second definition, as Devendrabuddhi holds.

dGe 'dun grub gives a similar explanation which he holds to be Devendrabuddhi's real view.

According to dGe 'dun grub's interpretation, Devendrabuddhi called "defining property" what was in reality two parts of the defining property of valid cognition. The first passage ("valid cognition is a reliable cognition") constitutes one part of the definition. The second passage ("Or, it is a revealing of a [yet] unknown thing") completes the definition. The combination of these two passages yields the complete definition of valid cognition: valid cognition is a cognition that is newly reliable.[22] Thus, according to both Prajñākaragupta and dGe 'dun grub the puzzle is resolved by putting together the two passages.

rGyal tshab has the same opinion and finds confirmation in Dharmottara who says:

> "Therefore, a valid cognition is the subject [cognizing] a not [yet] realized object. The very cognition that realizes the object at the very beginning [also] introduces the person to this object and brings him in touch with it. Any further cognition will not add anything to the [knowledge] of that very object." (*de bas na ma bcad pa'i yul can tshad ma yin no / śes pa gaṅ gis thog ma ñid du rtogs pa de ñid kyis skyes bu bcug par gyur ciṅ don daṅ phrad par gyur ba yin te / don de kho na la ni śes pa gźan gyis lhan pa ci byar yaṅ me do /* NBT$_t$ 37b7-38a1)

Dharmottara seems to be saying that after a valid cognition has introduced a person to a certain object under a certain aspect,[23] subsequent cognitions of the same object under the same aspect cannot bring anything new and, therefore, are not valid. Both rGyal tshab and dGe 'dun grub take Dharmottara's passage as a confirmation of their own definition of valid cognition, "that cognition which is newly reliable" (*gsar du mi bslu ba'i śes pa, Rigs rgyan* 18,10). In particular, both rGyal tshab and dGe 'dun grub understand Dharmakīrti's words "reliable cognition" to refer to a cognition that realizes (*rtogs pa, bcad pa*) its object and both are under the misapprehension that they can find support for their view in Dharmottara. For example, dGe 'dun grub says of a cognition: "it follows that it is not a newly reliable cognition because it does not newly realize its object" (*gsar du mi slu ba'i śes pa ma yin par thal / khyod kyis gźal bya ma rtogs pa'i phyir, Rigs rgyan* 18,17f.).

In addition to his attempt to combine the two passages, Prajñākaragupta also presents a more creative interpretation. According to a second possible reading of Dharmakīrti's text, this passage (PV II 5c) refers to ultimate valid cognition, which cognizes the absence of duality between perceiving subject and perceived object. Prajñākaragupta says:

> "Or, [another explanation] is that the word 'thing' (*artha, don*) refers to the ultimate. The *meaning* of [the words] 'it is the revealing of a [yet] unknown thing' is that it (valid cognition) reveals the ultimate. Furthermore, since the ultimate is the very nature absent of all duality, that which reveals this [nature] is the valid cognition [*par excellence*]. Accordingly, this [ultimate valid cognition] is also taught by [the passage 'The mind] understands by itself its own nature'. [The passage] 'Validity is established from conventional practices' (*vyavahāra, tha sñad*) explains [the conventional point of view]. Here, the present [characteristic of revealing an object] is the defining property of ultimate valid cognition. The preceding [characteristic] (reliability) is [the defining property] of conventional [valid cognition]." (*yaṅ na 'dir don gyi sgras ni don dam brjod pa yin te / ma śes don gyi gsal byed ces bya ba ni don dam pa gsal bar byed ces bya ba'i don to / don dam pa yaṅ gñis su med pa'i de bźin ñid yin pas de gsal bar byed pa ñid tshad ma yin no / de ltar yaṅ raṅ las raṅ gi ṅo bo rtogs źes bstan pa yin no / tha sñad las ni tshad ma ñid ces bya ba bśad de / de la 'di ni don dam pa'i mtshan ñid yin la / sṅa ma ni tha sñad pa'i yin no /* PVBh$_t$ [cited in note 12] 31a6-8)

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[22] *Rigs rgyan* 18,5-14.

[23] The same object can be cognized from different angles, as when we see a chair as produced, impermanent, etc. These cognitions bring new elements because they cognize the same object by considering its different aspects.

Prajñākaragupta takes Dharmakīrti's text to be intentionally ambiguous: on the one hand, this passage (5c: "Or, it is the revealing of a [previously] unknown thing") refers to the requirement of novelty for validity. But, on the other hand, it also refers to the ultimate. Here, "thing" is not any thing, but the ultimate object of knowledge, the non-dual nature of things. Thus, the cognition that reveals such a nature is a valid cognition in the ultimate sense of the word. Prajñākaragupta bases his surprising gloss on verse 5a, which states that "validity is established through conventional practices (*vyavahāra, tha sñad*)". According to him, in addition to discussing the question of intrinsic *versus* extrinsic nature of knowledge, this verse characterizes conventional valid cognitions as proceeding from conventional practices in contradistinction to ultimate cognitions which perceive the real nature of things. This is what verse 4d says: "The [mind] understands by itself its own nature". That is to say that mind understands the ultimate non-dual nature of things by its own meditative efforts, not by following conventional usages.

Śākya mchog ldan makes the helpful remark[24] that Prajñākaragupta holds that ultimate cognitions are not reliable in the usual sense of the word since they do not obtain anything. Conventional valid cognitions make us obtain things but ultimate ones just make us realize the true nature of things. Therefore, they are not reliable cognitions in the usual sense of the word but they are revealing something previously unrealized. Therefore, they are valid cognitions despite their not being reliable (in the usual sense of the word).

It is quite clear that, here, Prajñākaragupta is developing a creative interpretation of Dharmakīrti's text. The author of the *Alaṃkāra* is probably quite aware that his explanation does not reflect the surface meaning of the text. However, his interpretation probably conveys one of the hidden meanings of this intentionally ambiguous text. The existence of several possible interpretations of Dharmakīrti's text is not an accident but was probably meant by Dharmakīrti from the very first. He composed his text to serve as a basis for a plurality of interpretations. This plurality of meaning is required by the essentially composite nature of Dharmakīrti's system, which asserts the existence of external objects on the conventional level but denies it on the ultimate level. The Tibetan tradition captures well this essential hermeneutical plurality when it says that Dharmakīrti's text has "a hundred systems" (*lugs rgya ldan*), meaning that it can be interpreted in many ways,[25] which are all correct up to a certain point. All these interpretations correspond to one of the several hermeneutical levels of this multifaceted text.

Before going on, we should notice that although most of the discussion here has tended to focus on a few stanzas of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, we can find other passages in Dharmakīrti's works that indicate other definitions of valid cognition. As we already saw, Dharmakīrti defines valid cognition in his *Hetubindu* in a way that supports the requirement of novelty: "With respect to this, valid cognition is only that which sees first an uncommon object".[26] In his *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Dharmakīrti also discusses the nature of valid cognition. There, differentiating the two types of right cognition (*samyagjñāna, yaṅ dag pa'i śes pa*, a synonym of valid cognition), Dharmakīrti says:

> "[Perception and inference are right cognitions] because [a person] who acts (*'jug pa na*) having determined (*yoṅs su bcad nas*) the object by means of these two (cognitions) is not deceived with regard to a purposeful action [performed by the object]." (*de dag gis don yoṅs su bcad nas 'jug pa na don bya ba la slu ba med pa'i phyir* / PVin I [cited in note 4] 30,17f. = P 251a1f.)

This definition contains two important elements which give a double characterization of valid

[24] *Pham byed II* 284.

[25] Hundred here means many.

[26] HB_t 32,24f. (= P 338a5f.)

cognition. The first is pragmatic: a valid cognition is what helps us to fulfill our purpose. Thus, a cognition is right because we can rely on it in order to accomplish our goal. The second is a cognitive element as well: a valid cognition enables us to reach our aim by determining (i.e., correctly identifying) some object (*don bcad pa*). It would seem that according to the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* a valid cognition is the cognition that combines these two elements (pragmatic value and cognitive capacity).

Commenting on this passage, Dharmottara explains that the nature of valid cognition is to be reliable. He then explains reliability:

> "We should understand that just as in the world where reliability is to get in touch with the promised object, reliability for a cognition [is characterized by] getting in touch with the indicated object." (*ji ltar 'jig rten na khas blaṅs pa'i don daṅ phrad par byed pa mi slu ba yin pa de bźin du śes pa yaṅ bstan pa'i don daṅ phrad par byed pas mi slu bar blta bar bya ba'o* / PVinṬ 8a6)

In this passage, Dharmottara takes Dharmakīrti's definition to be focusing on the practical value of cognition. Although the cognitive element is not absent, it is clearly the practical results brought about by a given cognition that are determinant for its being a valid cognition. Dharmottara further explains the preceding passage when he says:

> "The meaning of this [preceding passage] is this: it is not the apprehending of the object that [makes a cognition] a right cognition but only the obtainment of a thing." (*de'i don 'di yin te / dṅos po 'dzin par byed pas ni yaṅ dag pa'i śes pa ñid ma yin kyi 'on kyaṅ dṅos po thob par byed pa ñid yin no* / PVinṬ 8a6f.)

For Dharmottara, pragmatic considerations are far more important than cognitive ones in determining the reliability of a cognition. However, even for him pragmatic considerations are not sufficient to determine what knowledge is. Otherwise, cases of successful illusions would have to count as genuine knowledge! For example, in the case in which we actually find water upon chasing only a mirage, we cannot be said to have genuine knowledge of water despite our practical success.[27] What is wrong in this case is that we have not obtained the particular object we were looking for. This is why, says Dharmottara,

> "[Dharmakīrti] speaks of [cognitions engaging] 'having determined their objects', for [cognitions] engage [in their objects] in dependence upon previous determination." (*don yoṅs su bcad nas źes gsuṅs te / 'dis sṅar yoṅs su bcad pa la ltos nas 'jug pa'i phyir* / PVinṬ 9a2f.)

For Dharmottara, valid cognition is to be defined in pragmatic terms with a cognitive *addendum*, according to which not any success is to be taken as validating a given cognition. Only success that agrees with previous realization is to be accepted as grounds for validating a cognition.

This view is not fundamentally at odds with the other interpretations here presented. Dharmottara's insistence on the pragmatic considerations is not conflicting with the views of most of other commentators. However, his explanation does not agree with dGe 'dun grub's and rGyal tshab's views. These two authors, who mistakenly take Dharmottara to share their understanding of reliability as having a cognitive sense, assert that new reliability is the defining property of valid cognition. Moreover, they interpret reliability (*mi slu ba, avisaṃvādana*) in terms of realization of an object.[28]

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[27] Example given by Dharmottara in PVinṬ 8a4. Dharmottara's procedure is to point out a case in which the requirements of a putative definition of valid cognition are satisfied, despite the fact that common sense tells us that there is no knowledge. This argument, which aims at refuting a proposed definition of valid cognition (or an interpretation of it) has an interesting parallel in modern analytical philosophy. In his famous "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Gettier has used a number of cases in which common sense tells us that we do not have knowledge, despite the fact that the elements of the standard definition of knowledge (justified true belief) are present. See: Griffith Phillips, *Knowledge and Belief*, Oxford 1967.

[28] *Rigs rgyan* 18,17-18 and *Thar lam gsal byed* 231. Although Dharmakīrti's discussion of reliability in the context of

Although rGyal tshab seems to be suggesting that reliability can also be interpreted in practical terms,[29] most of his discussion of reliability seems to hinge on his understanding of reliability in cognitive terms. For a cognition to be reliable it must realize things, i.e., apprehend things in a way that false super-impositions can be eliminated (*sgro 'dogs gcod pa*). This last assumption, which can be traced back to Phya pa and is shared by rGyal tshab and dGe 'dun grub[30] has drawn strong criticisms in Tibet.

V. Sa skya Views

One of the most vocal critics of the cognitive interpretation of reliability is the Sa skya scholar Śākya mchog ldan.[31] He develops at great length[32] arguments against the definition of valid cognition as newly reliable cognition that rGyal tshab and dGe 'dun grub defend and dGe lugs pa scholars follow. Śākya mchog ldan mainly targets their cognitive interpretation of reliability (*avisaṃvādin, mi slu ba*) according to which a valid cognition is reliable in as much as it realizes an object. For Śākya mchog ldan, reliability can have several pragmatic meanings but cannot have a cognitive connotation. He says:

> "There is no scriptural [basis] for the explanation of reliability [in terms of] realization of an object [for the following reason:] when arguments establishing that this [cognition] is reliable with respect to that [object] are explained in the texts of the Knower of Reasoning (Dignāga or Dharmakīrti), [equivalents such as] obtaining that (*de thob pa*), indirectly relating to that (*de la rgyud nas 'brel ba*), relying upon that (*de la brten pa*), etc., are mentioned. Explanations such as '[this is reliable with respect to that] because this realizes that' are not observed." (*mi slu ba'i don rtogs pa la 'chad pa la ni luṅ yod pa ma yin te / rigs pa mkhyen pa'i gźuṅ du de de la mi slu ba'i sgrub byed 'chad pa na de thob pa daṅ / de la rgyud nas 'brel ba daṅ / de la brten pa daṅ / de'i mthar thug pa źes bya ba rnams bśad pa yod kyi / de rtogs pa'i phyir źes bśad pa ni ma dmigs pa'i phyir /*
> *Pham byed II* 288,4-6)

Moreover, continues Śākya mchog ldan, the explanation of reliability in terms of cognitive realization is philosophically unsound. For a cognition to realize its object it must connect with the past or the present of that object. To be reliable means to have the capacity to obtain something and this is a quality that relates the cognition to the future of the object. Another argument given by Śākya mchog ldan is that if I act upon mistaking the light reflecting from a jewel for the actual jewel I can still obtain the jewel. The mind making this mistake is reliable with respect to the jewel despite its not

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defining valid cognition seems to be formulated in pragmatic terms, it is possible to find passages giving a cognitive interpretation of reliability. For example, in his PV I 215, Dharmakīrti explains reliability in reference to scriptural statements as freedom from contradiction (*abādhana, mi gnod pa*) from any other sources of knowledge, perceptual or inferential.

[29] rGyal tshab speaks of "reliability with respect to an action" (*las la mi slu ba*), *Thar lam gsal byed* 230,1.

[30] This assumption is even stronger in some of the later dGe lugs pa writers of textbooks who seem to take for granted the fact that for a cognition to be reliable means to realize its object.

[31] Both Śākya mchog ldan and Go ram pa are closely following Sa skya Paṇḍita's *Rigs gter*. Some of their differences come from the fact that they belong to different lineages of interpretation of this text. Sa skya Paṇḍita's work has been so seminal that all Tibetan epistemologists accept it as authoritative. Tsoṅ kha pa, rGyal tshab and mKhas grub are part of the lineage of the *Rigs gter*. See David P. Jackson, *The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III). Sa skya Paṇḍita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of Pramāṇa and Philosophical Debate*. Wien 1987: 138-147.

[32] *Pham byed II* 288-294.

being able to correctly realize its object, the jewel. Therefore, the cognitive interpretation of reliability is inconsistent.

Śākya mchog ldan adds that the cognitive interpretation of reliability also conflicts with Dharmakīrti who holds that all valid cognitions have real things (*dṅos po, vastu*) as their objects. Dharmakīrti says:

"Both [types of] valid cognition (perception and inference) have [real] things as their objects" (*tshad ma gñis ka dṅos po'i yul can* / PVin II 7a)[33].

According to the cognitive interpretation of reliability, inferential cognitions that apprehend non-real things (*dṅos med, abhāva*) such as space, selflessness, etc., could not be valid because they do not have real functioning things as their objects.[34] The only way to conciliate the requirement that a valid cognition must have a real object and the possibility of having inference apprehending unreal things is to hold that the object of reliability can be different from the realized object. But for those who admit that reliability towards an object is realization of that object, the object of comprehension (*gźal bya, prameya*) and the object of reliability must be the same. Therefore, the cognitive interpretation of reliability is incompatible with Dharmakīrti's system.

Moreover, this interpretation of reliability also contradicts Dharmottara who propounds an interpretation of reliability in pragmatic terms. For Dharmottara, a cognition is reliable only in as much as it is able to help us obtain things. Its cognitive capacity is only a secondary characteristic that limits the range of acceptable practical results that could count as indicating the reliability of a cognition. Therefore, the cognitive interpretation of reliability is, according to Śākya mchog ldan, without any logical or scriptural support.

Another target of criticism for both Śākya mchog ldan and Go ram pa[35] is the dGe lugs pa view (first defended by Phya pa) that reliability necessitates the elimination of false super-impositions (*sgro 'dogs gcod*). For example, dGe 'dun grub asserts that if a cognition does not eliminate a super-imposition it cannot be a valid cognition. For both Śākya mchog ldan and Go ram pa, elimination of false super-impositions is a function of conceptual thinking. Direct perception cannot eliminate false views since it merely passively holds its object. Therefore, reliability cannot be understood in terms of elimination of super-impositions, for the definition of valid cognition would then altogether exclude perception from being valid.

These strong arguments point to a significant problem in the cognitive interpretation of reliability.[36] Based on Dharmakīrti's opening words in *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Śākya mchog ldan defines valid cognition as "that cognition which is both reliable and newly determines [its object]" (*gsar du bcad pa daṅ mi slu ba gñis tshogs kyi rig pa*, *Pham byed II* 294,7). This definition implies that the determined object and the object of reliability do not always coincide. The determined object is either the appearing object (*snaṅ yul*), the held object (*gzuṅ yul*),[37] or the object experienced by self-

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[33] *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Chapter II: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte*, Wien 1973.

[34] This is so because both the realized object (*bcad pa'i yul*) and the appearing object (*snaṅ yul*) of such an inferential cognition cannot be real. The only possible real object would be the purposeful object, but this object is, according to the cognitive interpretation, identical with the realized object.

[35] Here, Śākya mchog ldan is by far the most vocal critique of the dGe lugs pa views: *Pham byed II* 314,3-320,3.

[36] mKhas grub struggles with the same problem and his double interpretation of reliability is meant to respond to similar criticisms. This will be addressed in the next section.

[37] Sa skya thinkers do not follow Dharmottara's identification of held and appearing objects. For them, the held object is the real external object. See *rNam bśad* 7b4 and 13b3. dGe lugs pa thinkers who follow Dharmottara's identification usually distinguish the held object (*gzuṅ yul*) and the held thing (*gzuṅ don*).

cognition (*raṅ rig gi myoṅ bya*). It can be a real thing (*dṅos po, vastu*) existing moment by moment or a non-thing (*dṅos med, abhāva*). The object of reliability consists of the specifically characterized phenomena together with their continuums (*rgyun daṅ bcas pa'i don raṅ mtshan rnams*).

Another way of phrasing the definition is to say that valid cognition is that cognition which is reliable with respect to a specifically characterized thing in accordance with what has been determined (*gaṅ bcad pa daṅ mthun pa'i don raṅ mtshan la mi slu ba'i rig pa*, *Pham byed II* 308,1). This definition is quite similar to that of Go ram pa who characterizes valid cognition as that cognition which is reliable (*mi slu ba'i rig pa*, *rNam bśad* 116a3). For Go ram pa, there is no need of adding the word "newly" as do most dGe lugs pa scholars. Here, reliability is to be understood in a restricted sense: a cognition is reliable if, and only if, it possesses the following three characteristics: it must have reliability of the agent (*byed pa po gaṅ gis mi slu ba*), with respect to a certain object (*las la mi slu ba*), and in a certain way (*tshul ji ltar mi slu ba*). That is to say that the agent, the cognition itself, must know the object and that the object must be able or unable to perform its function in accordance with the way it is perceived. Therefore, since a subsequent cognition cannot realize its object, it is not reliable because it does not have reliability of the agent.[38] Thus, for Go ram pa, there is no need to add the word "newly" to the definition of valid cognition, for that word does not exclude anything that is not already disallowed by reliability. Go ram pa says:

> "[The property of being] a reliable cognition is enough for the defining property of valid cognition. This [type of] reliability requires three characteristics. The reliability of the agent contains [in itself] the meaning of newly realizing [an object]. Therefore, there is no need to put the word 'newly' since it does not eliminate anything and is redundant." (*mi slu ba'i śes pa tsam gyis tshad ma'i mtshan ñid yoṅs su rdzogs pa yin te / 'di'i mi bslu ba la chos gsum ldan dgos pa'i byed pa po'i mi slu ba la gsar rtogs kyi don tshaṅ ba'i phyir ro / des na gsar du źes pa'i tshig smos mi dgos te / de la rnam bcad med ciṅ zlos pa'i skyon yod pa'i phyir / rNam bśad* 116a3f.)

According to both Śākya mchog ldan and Go ram pa, the necessity for a valid cognition to be reliable is indicated by Dharmakīrti's verse II 1a ("Valid cognition is that cognition which is reliable"). The requirement of novelty is, furthermore, not taught by the famous verse II 5c ("[Valid Cognition] is also the revealing of a [yet] unknown thing.") as one would expect, but by the verse II 3a ("Since it apprehends what is [already] held, conventional [cognition] is not accepted [as a valid cognition]").[39] According to Śākya mchog ldan, this verse supports the requirement of novelty since it shows that a valid cognition must apprehend a previously unapprehended object. Authors such as Prajñākaragupta, rGyal tshab, etc., who hold that the requirement of novelty is indicated by verse II 5c simply forget that verse II 3a has already taught this requirement! If Śākya mchog ldan is right, then how is verse II 5c to be interpreted?

Śākya mchog ldan asserts that verse II 5c is an explanation of Dignāga's own words. If reliability and new realization define valid cognition, why does Dignāga come to define it as the cognition that reveals a [yet] unknown thing?[40] Śākya mchog ldan's solution is that in verse II 5c Dharmakīrti is

[38] *rNam bśad* 115b4-116a3. Both Go ram pa and Śākya mchog ldan's definitions are quite close to that of rṄog blo ldan śes rab who defines valid cognition as reliable cognition. For rṄog too, reliability implies knowledge of the object with respect to which the cognition is reliable.

[39] For more on this verse, see below.

[40] *Pham byed II* 304,2. Neither Śākya mchog ldan nor Go ram pa quotes any passage in Dignāga's texts that would indicate such a definition. Go ram pa goes slightly further than Śākya mchog ldan and asserts that not only the second but also the first definition is Dignāga's. Thus, he takes Dharmakīrti to be saying that Dignāga's two definitions are identical. *rNam bśad* 115a3-b4.

saying that valid cognition "is also the revealing of a [yet] unknown thing". Therefore, the definition of valid cognition as reliable cognition does not conflict with Dignāga's implicit definition of valid cognition as revealing unknown objects.[41] These two definitions are in fact identical; they are conceptually one and the same thing (*ldog pa gcig*). Thus, Śākya mchog ldan, in contrast to Devendrabuddhi, holds that these two definitions are not distinct. They are just two ways of phrasing the same idea.

VI. mKhas grub's Interpretation

mKhas grub disagrees with the preceding commentators'[42] interpretations and proposes his own original interpretation.[43] mKhas grub does not think that the second passage teaches an alternative definition of valid cognition. For mKhas grub, the differentiation between the two definitions (the first referring to validity in the world, the second to validity in philosophy) identified by Devendrabuddhi and explained by his commentator Śākyamati is arbitrary.[44] How can one separate validity in the world and validity in philosophy? Since no such distinction can be made unarbitrarily, it then follows that either the two passages are redundant or they teach two different defining properties of valid cognition. The latter is impossible, because two defining properties either define two different objects or, at least, define the same object from two different perspectives.[45] Dissatisfied with all the preceding solutions, mKhas grub offers his own solution to the apparent puzzle created by Dharmakīrti's alternative:

> "[Another explanation:] or, it is the revealing of a [yet] unknown thing." (*ajñātārthaprakāśo vā; ma śes don gyi gsal byed kyaṅ* / PV II 5c)

The question which immediately comes to mind is: what is the implied subject to which the quality of revealing is attributed to? That is, what is this alternative an explanation of? We saw that most commentators, Indian as well as Tibetan, thought that the implied subject must be valid cognition. These commentators read this passage in this way:

Van Bijlert points to a passage of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS II 5ab) as introducing reliability in epistemological matters. This passage explicitly refers to the validity of scriptures and thus implicitly introduces the idea of reliability as characteristic of valid cognitions. See van Bijlert 1989: 122.

[41] We have already discussed Dignāga's acceptance of the requirement of novelty for valid cognitions (PSV [cited in note 8] 14a2f.; Hattori 1968: 25, 176. Quoted in van Bijlert 1989: 177).

[42] Since he was historically earlier, mKhas grub does not mention the opinions expressed by Go ram pa and Śākya mchog ldan. However, his differentiation of two meanings of reliability indirectly answers the criticisms of the two Sa skya scholars.

[43] mKhas grub even makes a rather unusual statement for a writer belonging to a commentarial tradition. He says: "since I am the only one who has access to this meaning, I shall explain [it]!" (*don 'di ni kho bo cag 'ba' źig gi spyod yul yin pas bśad par bya ba'o, Mun sel* 65b6). Although the "this" ostensibly refers to the meaning of the 6th stanza, mKhas grub is boasting in a most unusual fashion about his whole explanation of valid cognition.

[44] About Śākyamati's interpretation, mKhas grub says: "I do not think that this way [of explaining Dharmakīrti's definition] is correct for the following reason. If the latter passage teaches that "cognition that is newly free from contradiction" is the defining property of valid cognition, then there is no possibility of [establishing] any difference between these [two definitions], either in terms of being established in the world or among [students of philosophical] treatises, or in terms of eliminating false views. If, [on the other hand], mere "cognition that is reliable" (without further qualification) is taught as being the defining property of valid cognition, then, since it would [absurdly] follow that subsequent cognition would also be a valid cognition, the defining property [of valid cognition] would [then] be faulty." *Mun sel* 59b6-60a1.

[45] *Mun sel* 60a4.

"[Another explanation:] or, [valid cognition] is the revealing of a [yet] unknown thing."

They interpret this passage as providing an alternative definition for valid cognition. As we saw, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyamati, and Prajñākaragupta have slightly different interpretations but they all agree that in this passage the understood subject is valid cognition. mKhas grub dissents from these interpretations and proposes his own reading. According to him, in Dharmakīrti's passage the subject is not valid cognition (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*) but reliability (*avisaṃvādana, mi slu ba*). Thus, instead of being an alternative explanation of valid cognition, this passage is an alternative explanation of reliability. Accordingly, mKhas grub reads this passage as:

"Or, [reliability] is the revealing of a [yet] unknown thing."

From this perspective, this passage does not state an alternative definition of valid cognition but an alternative meaning of reliability.[46] According to mKhas grub, it shows that "any valid cognition must have the power to know an object previously unknown" (*tshad ma yin na raṅ gi gźal bya ma śes pa śes par byed pa'i nus pa yod pas khyab*, *Mun sel* 65a3). Thus, if we follow mKhas grub, reliability has a double meaning: it can mean that the object of the cognition is able to perform its function in accordance with the way it is perceived. It can also mean that a cognition is reliable if it has the potential to reveal a previously unknown object.[47] Putting mKhas grub's point of view in modern terms, I would say that Dharmakīrti's first stanza defines valid cognition. Then the other verses (1cd and 5c) provide the criteria that allow us to judge whether a given cognition is reliable. Since reliability is a defining property, it cannot be defined by another defining property.[48] However, one still needs grounds to decide whether a cognition is reliable. This is what verses 1cd and 5c provide us with.

mKhas grub's startling interpretation contradicts the opinions of all the main commentators. Since mKhas grub does not rely here on another commentator, on what basis does he reach his conclusion? In order to understand the rationale and importance of mKhas grub's remarks, we have to make a diversion into one of the many puzzling issues surrounding Dharmakīrti's epistemology.

VII. A Dharmakīrtian Puzzle

In his discussion on valid cognition, Dharmakīrti asserts that reliability (*avisaṃvādana, mi slu ba*), the defining characteristic of valid cognition, consists of the readiness to perform some function. This means that reliability consists of the capacity of the object of a valid cognition to perform a function

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[46] Since mKhas grub follows Khyuṅ rin chen grags' view that a defining property (*lakṣaṇa, mtshan ñid*) cannot have a second, reliability cannot be in turn defined, for it is a defining property.

[47] For example, the second moment of the perception of a chair has the potential to reveal a previously unknown object. It just happens that its object has already been perceived by the first moment of perception. On the other hand, memory does not have such a potentiality and can never reveal a previously unknown object.

[48] A defining property cannot have a defining property because that would open the possibility of an infinite regress. This is the point of view of Khyuṅ rin chen grags which is also accepted by dGe lugs pa scholars. Phya pa and Śākya mchog ldan defend a more nuanced position in which a defining property can have a second defining property. They take a defining property to be the reason justifying the usage of a name. Since a defining property can be named, it must in turn have a defining property that can justify the use of its name. The infinite regress created by the possibility of defining a defining property does not concern the real order of things, but just the linguistic usage in which there is no limit to naming. However, these thinkers agree that a defined object cannot have two definitions given from the same point of view. See *Pham byed II* 251-5.

in accordance with the way in which it is cognized by that cognition. Only causally effective phenomena (*vastu, dṅos po*) have such a capacity. Thus, valid cognitions are reliable in as much as they relate appropriately to real, i.e., to specifically characterized things (*svalakṣaṇa, raṅ mtshan*). Therefore, the conclusion that only real, i.e., specifically characterized phenomena are objects of valid cognitions seems hard to resist. Moreover, this conclusion seems to be reasserted in *Pramāṇavārttika* III, where Dharmakīrti says that only real things are objects of comprehension of valid cognitions:

> "Only specifically characterized phenomena are objects of apprehension." (*meyaṃ tv ekaṃ svalakṣaṇam; raṅ gi mtshan ñid gcig bźal bya* / PV III 53d)

However, the conclusion that only real phenomena can be objects of valid cognition cannot be right either because Dharmakīrti asserts at the beginning of the same chapter that there are two types of valid cognition, direct perception (*pratyakṣa, mṅon sum*) and inference (*anumāna, rjes dpag*), and that perception relates to really existing phenomena, whereas an inference relates to conceptually existing phenomena (which are non effective) as its prima *facie object*. Therefore, the conclusion that non-effective phenomena are objects of valid cognitions cannot be escaped.

Thus, we, as interpreters, are apparently saddled with a contradiction. On one hand, Dharmakīrti is saying that only specifically characterized phenomena are objects of valid cognition, but on the other hand, he is also saying that generally characterized phenomena are objects of inference, which is a type of valid cognition. One way to respond to this contradiction would be to assert that such a contradiction is really present in Dharmakīrti's thought and that no further efforts of clarification are required. However, the maxim of charity in interpretation compels us to examine some other possible solutions to this apparent contradiction. Only where such a solution is not possible do we, as interpreters, have to accept a contradiction.

In order to solve this imbroglio, mKhas grub differentiates two types of object of engagement (*'jug yul*)[49] of valid cognitions. He says:

> "There are two kinds of object of engagement of valid cognition: a) That object in which the person, whose continuum is endowed with a valid cognition, is engaged because he seeks a [certain] desirable fruit is called 'object of engagement of valid cognition' (*tshad ma'i 'jug yul*). [It is so called] because it is the object determined (*yoṅs su gcod par bya ba'i yul*) by the valid cognition in order for the person whose continuum is endowed with [such a valid cognition] to engage [in that object]. b) Whatever object of engagement of the action of a valid cognition is realized [by the valid cognition] but is not engaged for the sake of obtaining the effect of that object, is also the object of engagement of valid cognition.
>
> Anything that is the former [type of object of engagement] must be a specifically characterized phenomenon (*raṅ mtshan, svalakṣaṇa*) because no thinking person would engage with respect to an ineffective phenomenon in order to obtain [it as] a result. Having this in mind, [Dharmakīrti] said: Only specifically characterized phenomena are objects of apprehension because it is through them that [people interested in] examining [whether certain things] exist or not achieve [their] goals." (*tshad ma'i 'jug yul mam gñis te / tshad ma raṅ ñid rgyud la ldan pa'i gaṅ zag gis mṅon par 'dod pa'i 'bras bu don du gñer ba'i phyir / 'jug par bya ba'i yul yaṅ raṅ rgyud ldan gaṅ zag de 'jug par bya ba'i phyir / tshad mas yoṅs su gcod par bya ba'i yul yin pas tshad ma'i 'jug yul źes bya ba la / yul de'i 'bras bu thob phyir 'jug pa ma yin yaṅ / yul de yoṅs su gcod pa la tshad ma'i byed pa 'jug pa yul gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ tshad ma'i 'jug yul yin no / daṅ*

[49] An object of engagement is the object engaged by the cognition, that is to say the object in relation to which the cognition operates. For example, the object of engagement of the perception of a blue patch is the apprehended blue patch.

po yin na raṅ mtshan yin pas khyab pa yin te / don byed mi nus pa'i chos la 'bras bu thob phyir du rtog ldan su yaṅ mi 'jug pa'i phyir / don 'di la dgoṅs nas /

raṅ gi mtshan ñid gcig gźal bya /

yod med ñid du dpyod mams kyi / don bya de las grub phyir ro / (PV III 53d-54b)

źes . . . gsuṅs pa yin no / (*Mun sel* 65a4-6)

mKhas grub distinguishes two types of object of cognitions, the purposeful object (*las* or *don du gñer bya*) and the determined object (*yoṅs su gcod par bya ba*). The first type of object is the object whose obtainment is the cognizing person's aim. Dharmottara has described it as that object which valid cognitions enable us to reach. This object is indicated to us by valid cognition as an object of purposeful action (lit. engagement, *'jug pa, pravṛtti*),[50] i.e., the object which it causes us to obtain (*thob par byed pa, prāpaka*).[51] For example, I correctly see water while being thirsty in the desert. Water is then the purposeful object of my perception whose main function is to enable me to drink water.[52] When this perception arises, it also has a determined object (*bcad pa'i yul*), water. This object is the second type of object of valid cognition, the determined object of valid cognition (*tshad mas yoṅs su gcod pa'i yul*). Often these two types of object coincide, as in this example. In other cases these two types of object can come apart.

Suppose I am looking for a pen on my desk. The purposeful object of my search is the pen and I take stock of the absence of the pen. The cognition of the desk on which there is no pen is valid, having as its apprehended object the pen-less desk. This cognition realizes explicitly the desk and implicitly the absence of pen. Thus, this cognition has two kinds of determined object (*bcad pa'i yul*): the desk, which is a specifically characterized phenomenon, and the absence of pen, which is a merely conceptually existing phenomenon. Hence in this example, since both objects are different from the purposeful object of the perception (the pen), the two types of object of engagement, the purposeful object and the realized object, come apart. The purposeful object of a valid cognition (here, the pen) is always a real object (a specifically characterized object *svalakṣaṇa, raṅ mtshan*), for no wise[53] person would seek something which does not exist really. The realized object of a valid cognition (here, the desk and the absence of pen) does not need to be a specifically characterized phenomenon and can be a merely conceptually existing generally characterized phenomenon (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyi mtshan*).

In relation to the two types of objects to which valid cognitions are applied, mKhas grub posits two meanings of reliability: a) A valid cognition is reliable towards its purposeful object when this object performs a function that agrees with the way in which it is perceived by that valid cognition. This is the meaning of Dharmakīrti words: "Reliability [consists in] the readiness [for the object] to perform some function". b) Secondly, a valid cognition is reliable toward the realized object of that cognition in as much as that cognition has the potential to reveal a previously unknown object (or aspect of that object). This is what Dharmakīrti means when he says: "Or, it is the revealing of a [yet] unknown object". A cognition is reliable if its apprehension does not conflict with any other valid cognition. This explanation also corresponds to Dharmakīrti's characterization of reliability as freedom from contra-

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50 NBT_t 37a4-6. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* II. p. 4.

51 NBT_t 38a3.

52 rGyal tshab mentions reliability in a similar sense when he says: if reliability with respect to the object [of the action] means obtention of an object . . . (*las la mi slu ba ni yul thob pa'i don yin na*).

53 Since we are investigating the nature of valid cognition, we do not need to bother with examples of delusion, which are not valid.

diction (*abādhana, mi gnod pa*) given while commenting on the validity of scripture.[54]

mKhas grub thus explains the first meaning of reliability:

> "Moreover, accordingly, the meaning of reliability from the point of view of the first [type of] object of engagement is: the object is ready to perform some function in accordance with the way in which it is apprehended by the valid cognition (thus enabling the person in whose continuum it is produced to act successfully). This is the meaning [of Dharmakīrti's words]: 'Reliability [consists in] the readiness [for the object] to perform some function'." (*de yaṅ 'di ltar 'jug yul daṅ po'i dbaṅ du byas pa'i mi slu ba ni / yul de tshad ma des ji ltar don byed par gźal ba ltar / dṅos po la yaṅ don de byed par gnas pa'o / don 'di ni / don byed nus par gnas pa ni / mi slu / źes pas bstan pa yin no // Mun sel* 65b3f.)

The second understanding of "reliability" is explained by mKhas grub:

> "The meaning of reliability with regard to the second [type of] object of engagement is: the valid cognition has the potentiality of revealing the previously unknown nature of something. This is the meaning shown [by Dharmakīrti's words]: "or, it is the revealing of a [yet] unknown thing". (*'jug yul gñis pa la ltos pa'i mi slu ba'i don ni / tshad ma de yul de'i gnas lugs ma śes pa śes par byed pa'i nus pa yod pa ste / don 'di ni ma śes don gyi gsal byed kyaṅ / źes pas bstan pa yin no // Mun sel* 65b4f.)

According to mKhas grub's suggestion, the two ways in which a valid cognition can be valid yield two criteria of reliability. The first is practical; a cognition is reliable if and only if its purposeful object can fulfill some kind of practical function. That is to say that a cognition must in order to be valid successfully relate (lit. engage) to an object. The second criterion is cognitive; a cognition is reliable if and only if it has the capacity[55] to provide some new information in accordance with the way things exist in reality. Both criteria are dispositional, that is they are capacities that a valid cognition has but which might remain unexpressed.

mKhas grub's interpretation has the merit of bringing a solution to the apparent contradiction between Dharmakīrti's assertion that only real objects can be objects of valid cognition and his other assertion that conceptually existing objects are objects of inferential valid cognitions. Accordingly, only real things can be [purposeful] objects of valid cognitions. Conceptually existing things are not taken as purposeful objects by undeluded people, but they can be realized objects of valid cognitions (such as inference). They are the objects newly revealed by valid cognitions. In this way, the affirmation that inferential valid cognitions relate to conceptually existing phenomena is preserved without contradicting Dharmakīrti's other assertions.

mKhas grub offers an original solution to the apparent contradiction in Dharmakīrti's system through correlating Dharmakīrti's treatment of the definition of valid cognition with a solution to an apparent contradiction. In doing so, mKhas grub elegantly resolves the problem created by the presence of a second definition by showing that, here, we do not have two definitions but two criteria of reliability. By explaining the double meaning of reliability mKhas grub is also able to answer some of the criticisms addressed to the dGe lugs pa tradition by Śākya mchog ldan and Go ram pa. mKhas grub's explanation can accommodate the pragmatic connotation that reliability has for Indian epistemologists while providing a source for the dGe lugs pa contention that reliability can be interpreted in cognitive terms.

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54 PV I 215.

55 mKhas grub transforms the requirement of novelty: a cognition does not need to actually bring new information but must only have the capacity (*nus pa*) to do so.

Abbreviations and Literature

Hattori 1968 — Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya; from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Translated and annotated.* Cambridge, Massachusetts.

HB_t — *Hetubindu* (Tibetan text): Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I. Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text,* Wien 1967. [= Peking edition No. 5712 (Vol. 130, Tshad ma, Ce 337a8-357a3).

Mun sel — *Tshad ma sde bdun yid kyi mun sel* (mKhas grub). In *mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzaṅ po'i gSuṅ 'bum*. New Delhi 1980, Vol. Tha 1-223a4.

rNam bśad — *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi dka' ba'i gnas rnam par bśad pa sde bdun rab gsal* (Go ram pa): In *The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism.* Vol 12. = *The Complete Works of Go ram bsod nams seng ge.* Vol. 2. Tokyo 1969, Ga 1-334a3.

$NBṬ_t$ — *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara, Tibetan text): D 4231 (Vol. 16, Tshad ma, We 36b2-92a2).

Pham byed II — *Tshad ma rigs gter gyi dgoṅs rgyan rigs pa'i 'khor los lugs ṅan pham byed ces bya ba'i bstan bcos smad cha* (Śākya mchog ldan). In *The Collected Works (Gsuṅ 'bum) of Gser-mdog paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan.* Vol. 10. Ed. Kunzang Tobgey. Thimphu 1975.

PV I, II, III — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapters I, II, III: *Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan).* Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206. [PV I = *Svārthānumāna*; PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*]

PVinṬ — *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara): D 4229 (Vol. 15, Tshad ma, Dse 1b1-289a7)

PVP — *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi): P 5717(b) (Vols. 130-131, Tshad ma, Che 1-390a8).

Rigs rgyan — dGe 'dun grub, *Tshad ma'i bstan bcos chen po rigs pa'i rgyan.* Mundgod 1984.

Thar lam gsal byed — rGyal tshab, *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed.* Varanasi 1974.

van Bijlert 1989 — Vittorio A. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority. The Development of Epistemology and Logic in the Old Nyāya and the Buddhist School of Epistemology, with an Annotated Translation of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika II (Pramāṇasiddhi) vv. 1-7.* Wien.

THE DISJUNCTION IN *PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA*, *PRAMĀṆASIDDHI* CHAPTER VERSE 5c*

by

Eli Franco, Bundoora

As is well-known, the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* contains two definitions of means of knowledge: 1) A cognition which does not belie [its promise][1] (*avisaṃvādi jñānam*); 2) Illumination of a [previously] unapprehended object (*ajñātārthaprakāśaḥ*). There is much to be said on each of these definitions, but what I propose to do here is not to deal with the definitions themselves, but with their logical relationship, which is expressed by the disjunctive particle *vā*. This disjunction seems to have puzzled not only modern scholars, but also the Buddhist philosophers and commentators of the Dharmakīrti school from both its Indian and Tibetan traditions[2]; and so far, at least to the best of my knowledge, no satisfactory explanation of it can be found in any of the commentaries or the super-commentaries, nor in modern studies.

Therefore, the question I would like to raise and try to answer here is: Why should Dharmakīrti propose these two definitions alternatively?

Manuals of modern logic usually distinguish between exclusive and inclusive 'or'. The first alternative, namely, to take the *vā* as an exclusive 'or', can be immediately rejected. For it is easy to see that the two definitions of *pramāṇa* were not meant to exclude each other. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent a cognition from being both non-belying and illuminating an unapprehended object. At least I cannot see any such reason.

Furthermore, attention may be drawn to the fact that some modern logicians call the exclusive 'or' a myth, by which they mean that there is no such operator in natural languages. In other words, if a proposition contains an exclusive alternative 'either A or B, but not both', the exclusiveness is not due to the operator 'or', but to the disjuncts themselves. When we are asked 'tea or coffee?', the only reason to take this as an exclusive alternative, that is, the only reason for the asking person to be surprised if we answer 'both', is the somewhat arbitrary custom we have of not putting tea in our coffee. Were we to be asked 'coffee or schnapps?', the choice may very well lose of its exclusiveness. Therefore, neither internal reasons concerning the disjuncts, nor formal reasons concerning the logical operator would favour the assumption of an exclusive 'or'.

So let us try to interpret the disjunction as an inclusive 'or'. This means that *pramāṇa* can be either non-belying, or illuminating an unapprehended object, or both. The trouble with this interpretation is that a cognition which belies, but apprehends an unapprehended object, as well as a cognition which does not belie, but apprehends an apprehended object, would have to be considered as *pramāṇa*. Two inadmissible consequences which immediately arise from this interpretation are that hallucination of an entirely new object on the one hand, and memory or recollection on the other hand, would become means of knowledge.

Therefore, what we expect Dharmakīrti to do is to relate his definitions not with a disjunctive *vā*,

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* I am indebted, as usual, to Dr. K. Preisendanz for reading the manuscript and making some excellent suggestions.

[1] I translate *avisaṃvāda* as non-belying in order to account for the primary meaning of the word as well, that is, not belying one's promise, not breaking one's word (cf. *PW*, *s.v.* *visaṃvāda*, "Wortbruch").

[2] For the interpretations proposed by the Tibetan tradition, especially by mKhas grub, cf. Geshe Dreyfus' paper in this volume.

but with a conjunctive like *ca*. And this is also what the commentators expected him to do, and for this reason, as I will try to show later on, they had some trouble to explain the disjunction. It is true, of course, that a disjunction does not exclude a conjunction, and in many cases the two are interchangeable. For instance, 'travel by plane or by car is dangerous' means that travel by plane and by car is dangerous. Nevertheless, if we maintain that in every single case the cognition, in order to be a means of knowledge, must be both non-belying and apprehending an unapprehended object, then no matter how weakly interpreted, the disjunctive *vā* is inadequate to express the logical relationship between the two definitions. For if each of the two definitions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for validity, they must be connected by a conjunctive particle, there is no way around it[3]. However, since the disjunction is there, as is clearly testified by all manuscripts and Tibetan translations[4], and since Dharmakīrti would be the last person to be suspected of expressing himself sloppily and disregarding the logical and semantical difference between 'and' and 'or', the above interpretation of the definitions, which is explicitly or implicitly assumed in most if not all Dharmakīrti studies, must be wrong. But before proposing my own interpretation, let us have a look at what the *Pramāṇavārttika* commentaries had to say on this point.

Devendrabuddhi does not have much to say on our subject matter here, but it is clear that he takes the two definitions as independent from each other, saying that PV II 5c should be understood as another, second definition of *pramāṇa* (**ajñātārthaprakāśo vā, anyad dvitīyaṃ lakṣaṇam*)[5]. However, already at this early stage, the problem mentioned above was seen. If a cognition illuminating a non-apprehended object is *pramāṇa* without further qualification to guarantee its correctness, then the illusion of a new object would be *pramāṇa*. Devendrabuddhi explains that such a case is excluded from the realm of the definition because of the word *artha*, which means both object and thing. The object of illusion such as the double moon is not a thing.[6] This explanation is indeed ingenious. However, Devendrabuddhi is not completely off the hook, for one still expects him to keep the symmetry and explain how the first definition would do without the qualification offered by the second. As far as I can see he is silent on that point.

Prajñākaragupta as well, who knew, of course, Devendrabuddhi, takes the two definitions as independent from each other.[7] He also repeats Devendrabuddhi's interpretation of *artha*.[8] But for Prajñākaragupta the matter does not end here. Devendrabuddhi remarks *en passant* that the validity in the case of the second definition is also derived from non-belying in respect to a purposeful action

[3] The suggestion offered by Professors A. Wayman and K. Katsura in the discussion that followed the reading of this paper, namely, that *vā* simply means 'and' here, seems unacceptable to me.

[4] Cf. PV_t II 5c: *ma śes don gyi gsal byed kyaṅ*. Note that the Tibetan *kyaṅ* usually translates *api* (also). This does not necessarily deform the intention: either A or B is the definition of *pramāṇa* = A is the definition of *pramāṇa* and B also is the definition of *pramāṇa*. However, it is quite possible that the Tibetan translators deliberately chose a word which is ambiguous enough in this context to allow both interpretations, i.e., both as a conjunction and as a disjunction.

[5] Cf. PVP 6b1: *mi śes don gyi gsal byed kyaṅ // gźan mtshan ñid gñis pa yin no /*

[6] PVP 6b2f.: *don smos pas ni zla ba gñis la sogs par snaṅ ba tshad ma ñid ma yin par bśad de /*

[7] Cf. PVBh 30,3: *athavā idaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇam.*

[8] PVBh 30,7f.: *nanu yady avisaṃvādam antareṇājñātārthaprakāśanaṃ pramāṇaṃ, dvicandrādyākārasyāpi pramāṇatāprasaṅgaḥ. na, arthagrahaṇāt. asau hi nārthaḥ.*

(**arthakriyāvisaṃvāditvāt*)[9]. This remark is transformed into a problem in the *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, for doesn't this mean that the second definition amounts, in fact, to the first?[10]

"[Objection:] The fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing is known by non-belying. And consequently only 'a cognition which does not belie' is the definition [of *pramāṇa*]. How [could 5c be] another definition?

[Reply:] No, because what is indicated by capacity (i.e., by implication) is not a definition. What is apprehended by the capacity of what is said, is not a definition; [for if it were] so, something else as well, such as the reality [of the cognition] (*vastutva*) [could] be the object of the definition (i.e., the defining property). For a definition is only that by which [the defined] is directly appropriated. On the other hand, that by which the definition is realized (or: proved), that is not a definition just because it is possible (i.e., capable of being included in the definition). Otherwise, the reality etc., [of the cognition] would [also] be [included in the definition].

[Objection:] The reality is not serving any purpose there [in the definition], neither directly nor otherwise. Non-belying, however, serves a purpose in making known that [the object of the cognition is] a real thing.

[Reply:] This is true, but even so [the second definition is not superfluous, for] by employing [the word] non-apprehended object, the cognition which apprehends an apprehended object can be rejected [from the realm of the definition, but] not by employing [the word] non-belying, because non-belying is apprehended even in [the case of a cognition which apprehends an apprehended object]. Nor is the fact that [the object of the cognition] is a real thing apprehended by [the cognition's] non-belying, because [things] which exist empirically (*saṃvṛtisat*) are not established as real even though [their cognitions] do not belie.

[Objection:] Then how is the fact of being real apprehended?

[Reply:] We should think that it is by deliberation (*parāmarśa*)."

So what happened to Devendrabuddhi's suggestion that the word *artha* guarantees the validity and independence of the second definition? At first sight it seems to be entirely dissolved in Prajñākaragupta's arguments and counter-arguments. But in the final analysis it still stands. If we feel uneasy with Prajñākaragupta's elaborate explanation, it is not because he rejects Devendrabuddhi altogether, but because he deforms his intention and gives to the discussion a new perspective. Not only are the two definitions independent of each other, they are also relegated to different planes or levels. The first definition is meant for empirical reality, the second for the absolute.

This is perhaps only implicit in the above quoted discussion, but it becomes entirely clear in the next passage where Prajñākaragupta proposes another explanation of the definition:[11]

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[9] PVP 6b2: *don byed par mi slu ba ñid kyi phyir de daṅ de rtogs par bya'o //*

[10] PVBh 30,8-18: *nanv arthatvam avisaṃvāde (na) ca jñāyate* (read *avisaṃvādena jñāyate*, against $PVBh_t$ [= P 5719 (Vol. 132, Tshad ma, Te 1-382a7)] 31a1: *mi slu ba ñid las śes pa ma yin*). *tataś cāvisaṃvādi jñānam iti tad eva lakṣaṇam iti kathaṃ lakṣaṇāntaram. na, sāmarthyākṣiptasyālakṣaṇatvāt.*

uktasāmarthyato yasya pratītis tan na lakṣaṇam. tathānyasyāpi vastutvaprabhṛter lakṣaṇārthatā. lakṣaṇaṃ hi yadupāttaṃ sākṣāt tad eva. yena tu tal lakṣaṇaṃ sādhyate, tad api sambhavitvamātreṇa na lakṣaṇam. anyathā vastutvādikam api bhavet.

athāpi syāt – na vastutvaṃ tatropayogi sākṣād anyathā vā. avisaṃvādas tūpayogy arthatvajñāpane.

satyam etat. tathāpy ajñānārthagrahaṇena (read *ajñātārtha-*) *gṛhītagrāhi pratyayaḥ* (read *-grāhī* or into a compound) *śakyaḥ parihartuṃ, nāvisaṃvādigrahaṇena tatrāpy avisaṃvādagrahaṇāt. na cāvisaṃvādenārthatvagatir, avisaṃvāde 'pi saṃvṛtisatām arthatvasyāsiddheḥ.*

kathaṃ tarhy arthatvagatiḥ. parāmarśād iti mantavyam.

[11] PVBh 30,19-22: *atha vārthaśabdena paramārtha ucyate. ajñātārthaprakāśa iti paramārthaprakāśa ity arthaḥ. paramārthaś*

"Or by the word *artha* absolute reality (*paramārtha*) is expressed. [Thus] illumination of an unapprehended object means illuminating absolute reality. And absolute reality consists in [the cognition's] having a non-dual nature *(advaitarūpatā)* . . . This (i.e., illumination of an unapprehended object) is the definition of the means of knowledge relating to absolute reality, whereas the previous one (i.e., a cognition which does not belie) is [a definition] of [the means of knowledge] relating to the conventional (*sāṃvyavahārika*)."

Thus, just like Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta too interprets the *vā* as pointing at independent definitions. However, the relationship between the two definitions is explained in an entirely different manner. For Devendrabuddhi there were two alternative definitions presumably for the same thing. For Prajñākaragupta the two definitions are no longer independent alternatives, for they are no alternatives at all. It is like saying: 'Means of knowledge is A, o r , if we take means of knowledge in a different sense, it is B'. But even if we accept this not really convincing interpretation, we are still faced with the same problem as in Devendrabuddhi's commentary. For if the second definition is reserved to absolute reality, we are left with only one definition for everyday practice, which means that the apprehension of an apprehended object, at least in everyday practice, would be a means of knowledge[12].

A solution to this problem can be found not in any of the direct commentaries on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, but in Dharmottara's commentary on NB I 1. Commenting on the word *samyagjñāna* he says:[13]

"A valid cognition is a cognition which does not belie. For among the people, [a person] who makes one obtain a previously indicated object is called 'one who does not belie'. In the same manner, a cognition too is said to be non-belying in as much as it makes one obtain the object indicated by [the cognition] itself. And to make obtain [means] only to induce to action towards the indicated object, nothing else. For the cognition does not make one obtain the object in as much as it produces it, but rather makes one obtain the object in as much as it induces a person to act towards the object. To induce to action, in its turn, [means] only to indicate the object of action. For the cognition cannot induce a person to act by force.

And precisely for this [reason] only the apprehension of the object is the result of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇaphala*). For when the object is apprehended, the person is induced to act and the object is made to be obtained. And when this is the case, the activity of the means of knowledge is finished/accomplished with the apprehension of the object. And precisely for this [reason], a means of knowledge has an unapprehended object. For by whatever cognition the object is apprehended for the first time, by that very [cognition] the person is induced to act

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cādvaitarūpatā . . . tatra pāramārthikapramāṇalakṣaṇam etat. pūrvaṃ tu sāṃvyavahārikasya.

[12] This also goes directly against PV II 3a: *gṛhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ sāṃvṛtam.*

[13] NBṬ (= *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa. [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]*, ed. D. Malvania, Patna [2]1971) 17,1-19,4: *avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānaṃ samyagjñānam. loke ca pūrvam upadarśitam arthaṃ prāpayan saṃvādaka ucyate. tadvaj jñānam api svayaṃ pradarśitam arthaṃ prāpayat saṃvādakam ucyate. pradarśite cārthe pravartakatvam eva prāpakatvaṃ, nānyat. tathā hi na jñānaṃ janayad arthaṃ prāpayati, api tv arthe puruṣaṃ pravartayat prāpayaty artham. pravartakatvam api pravṛttiviṣayapradarśakatvam eva. na hi puruṣaṃ haṭhāt pravartayituṃ śaknoti jñānam.*

ata eva cārthādhigatir eva pramāṇaphalam. adhigate cārthe pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaś cārthaḥ. tathā ca saty arthādhigamāt samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāpāraḥ. ata eva cānadhigataviṣayaṃ pramāṇam. yenaiva hi jñānena prathamam adhigato 'rthas, tenaiva pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ, prāpitaś cārthaḥ. tatraiva cārthe kim anyena jñānenādhikaṃ kāryam? ato 'dhigataviṣayam apramāṇam.

and the object is made to be obtained. And in respect to that object, what else could be done in addition by another cognition? [Nothing!] Therefore, in as much as the object is [already] apprehended [the second cognition] is not a means of knowledge."

What Dharmottara does is a sort of equation among the following concepts: *samyagjñāna, avisaṃvādakajñāna, pradarśitārthaprāpaka, pradarśitārthapravartaka* and *pravṛttiviṣayapradarśaka*. This equation, or perhaps better, implication of each term by the previous one, allows Dharmottara to derive or deduce the second definition from the first. A cognition which does not belie is a cognition which c a n make the cognizer obtain the apprehended object by showing the object of activity to him. This is the reason why the result of the means of knowledge is nothing but the apprehension of the object and not its actual obtainment. Consequently the second cognition of the object is not a means of knowledge, for the capacity to obtain the object is already produced by the first cognition, and, therefore, it cannot be reproduced by the second cognition.

Thus, according to Dharmottara, there are not two definitions of means of knowledge, but only one. For the second definition is included in or implied by the first. If we apply Dharmottara's statements to PV II 5c, and try to read it into the disjunction, we get the following interpretation: Dharmakīrti had only one definition of the means of knowledge, but this definition can be formulated in two different ways. One can say 'non-belying cognition' *or* 'an apprehension of an unapprehended object', but in fact one is referring to different aspects of one and the same thing.

The last commentator I would like to consult is Manorathanandin. He was acquainted with all the different interpretations I tried to sketch above, and perhaps others which are unknown to us; so it is interesting to see which solution he thought best. Like Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta, Manorathanandin also starts his comments on PV II 5c by introducing the definition as an independent alternative[14], and on the whole he follows Prajñākaragupta very closely. The word *artha* rejects the cognition of the double moon, and the word *ajñāta* rejects the cognition of empirical reality which consists in conceptually combining a colour/form, a flavour, etc., which were separately perceived before, into a whole.[15] He also repeats with some modifications Prajñākaragupta's arguments about what can be included in a definition. The perspective, however, somewhat changes, and typical Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology is used. Even though it is accepted that illumination of a non-apprehended object is known by non-belying (this was accepted only provisionally by Prajñākaragupta and in the final analysis rejected), not everything which can be said about the definiendum should be included in the definition. For instance the Nyāya practice of *uddeśa*, that is, naming by a technical term which refers to a property common to all individuals of a certain class[16], is not considered as a definition. Otherwise, one would have to add the fact of being a cognition, the fact of existing etc., to the definition.[17] So far, no significant change is brought in by Manorathanandin to what was already said by Prajñākaragupta, and one could expect him to follow Prajñākaragupta all the way, as

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[14] PVV 8,6: *tad evam avisaṃvādanaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇam uktam. idānīm anyad āha . . .*

[15] PVV 8,7-9: *arthagrahaṇena dvicandrādijñānasya nirāsaḥ, ajñātagrahaṇena sāṃvṛtasyāvayavyādiviṣayasya, pṛthag gṛhītānām eva rūpādīnām ekatvena vikalpanāt.*

[16] Manorathanandin seems to refer to the relatively new definition of *uddeśa* as it appears for instance in NM I 29,12: *sāmānyasañjñayā kīrtanam uddeśaḥ*. Cf. also *Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara*, ed. D. J. Sharma, Varanasi ²1977: 21,6f.

[17] PVV 8,12-15: *nanv avisaṃvādād evājñātārthaprakāśo jñātavyaḥ, anyathā pītaśaṅkhajñānam api pramāṇaṃ syāt. tathā cāvisaṃvāditvam eva pramāṇam astu, kim anenābhihitena. syād etad yadi sambhavitvamātre lakṣaṇaṃ syāt. kiṃ nūddiṣṭatvena. anyathā jñānatvasattvādikam api lakṣaṇaṃ syāt.*

he usually does. But suddenly at this point everything collapses.[18]

"[Objection: A cognition] is known as illuminating an unapprehended object by the fact of non-belying etc., but not by the fact of being a cognition etc. Thus the definition depends on the former (i.e., non-belying), but not on the latter. Thus, there is a difference [between the two]. [Reply:] If so, then non-belying too depends on the illumination of an unapprehended object, [for] otherwise it is impossible to exclude [the cognition] relating to things which are [only] empirically real. Therefore, both should be known as definitions dependent on each other."

How this interpretation should be read into the disjunctive *vā* I don't know. Manorathanandin does not say anything else, and it seems to me that he has given up the attempt to make sense out of it. He simply states what should have been there, but isn't. And so we are back to square one.

Whatever the respective merits of the above interpretations may be, and I will be the last to deny their ingeniousness, elegance, shrewdness and/or charm, they fail to convince us as being faithful to Dharmakīrti. Rather, they impress us as skilful but cunning commentators' tricks.

Let us, therefore, take a fresh look at Dharmakīrti's definitions in their own context, trying to forget all that has been said so far.[19] The chapter starts with the definition of *pramāṇa* as a non-belying cognition, and non-belying is explained, in its turn, as standing firm in respect to purposeful action. Then follows what seems to be a short digression on the validity of words, which appears odd at first sight, for this subject has already been discussed, and in far greater detail, in the previous chapter on *svārthānumāna*[20]. Next it is explained that the cognition itself is the means of knowledge, because it is most important for the activity in respect to objects to be rejected or appropriated. This statement is too laconic to enable us to determine with certainty whether Dharmakīrti means objects to be rejected or obtained in general, i.e., objects in everyday life, or whether they are to be taken in a soteriological sense. However, a similar formulation towards the end of the *pramāṇabhūta*-section

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[18] PVV 8,11-14: *nanv avisaṃv<āditv>ādibhyo 'jñātārthaprakāśo jñāyate, na tu jñānatvādibhya iti pūrvasyāpekṣaṇīyatā lakṣaṇena, na tu pareṣām iti viśeṣaḥ. yady evaṃ tadāvisaṃvāditve 'py ajñātārthaprakāśanam apekṣyata eva, nānyathā sāṃvṛtasya nirāsaḥ śakyaḥ kartum. tasmād ubhayam api parasparasāpekṣam eva lakṣaṇaṃ boddhavyam.*

[19] Cf. PV II 1-5b:

pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam, arthakriyāsthitiḥ / avisaṃvādanaṃ, śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt // 1 //
vaktṛvyāpāraviṣayo yo 'rtho buddhau prakāśate / prāmāṇyaṃ tatra śabdasya, nārthatattvanibandhanam // 2 //
gṛhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ sāṃvṛtaṃ, dhīpramāṇatā / pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād dheyopādeyavastuni // 3 //
viṣayākārabhedāc ca dhiyo 'dhigamabhedataḥ / bhāvād evāsya tadbhāve, svarūpasya svato gatiḥ // 4 //
prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa, śāstraṃ mohanivartanam /

"(1) A means of knowledge is a cognition which does not belie. Non-belying [means] to stand firm in respect to purposeful action. [Non-belying may occur] in verbal cognition too, because it communicates the intention [of the speaker]. (2) The validity of a word relates to the thing which forms the object of the speaker's activity, [and] which appears in the cognition [of the hearer]; it does not depend on the reality of [that] object. (3) [Cognition] relating to empirical reality [such as 'this is a pot'] is not admitted [as means of knowledge] because it apprehends a [previously] apprehended [object]. The cognition [itself] is the means of knowledge, because (A) the [cognition] is the most important factor for the activity in respect to a thing to be rejected or adopted, (4) and (B) because the difference in apprehension is due to the difference in the objective form of the cognition, for the [apprehension] takes place [only] when the [form of the object] is present. The [cognition's] own form is apprehended by [the cognition] itself. (5a) [Its] validity [is determined] by everyday practice. A [religious] treatise stops delusion."

These verses have been recently translated and commented on by Vittorio A. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority*, Wien 1989. The above translation, however, is my own.

[20] Cf. E. Frauwallner, "Beiträge zur Apohalehre. I. Dharmakīrti. Übersetzung", *WZKM* 39, 1932, 247-285, and "Beiträge zur Apohalehre. I. Dharmakīrti. Übersetzung (Fortsetzung)", *WZKM* 40, 1933, 51-94.

indicates that Dharmakīrti has in mind, at least as one possible interpretation, the four noble truths[21], and in this case, the object to be avoided is suffering and the object to be adopted is the cessation of suffering, or Nirvāṇa. This interpretation is also corroborated by the concluding sentence of this section which states that a (religious)[22] treatise stops delusion (*moha*). Thus, when Dharmakīrti speaks about validity as determined by everyday practice in the immediately preceding sentence, he must refer to the validity of the B u d d h a ' s word. Then follows the second definition:[23]

"Or [a means of knowledge is] illumination of an unapprehended object.

[Objection:] The cognition of the universal which is subsequent to the apprehension of the own form [of the particular] would be [a means of knowledge].

[Reply: No,] because [in the above definition we] intend [only] the cognition in respect to a non-apprehended particular, for the particular is examined [here]. (7) The exalted-one is such a means of knowledge. He proclaims the truth in order to dispel error. (Or[24]: [Dignāga] says '*-bhūta*' in order to exclude something which has not become [a means of knowledge].) Thus, the fact that [the Buddha] is a means of knowledge is correctly [established] in dependence on a proof. (8-9) Something eternal [such as God, the Veda, etc.] is not a means of knowledge, (A) because validity [appertains] to a cognition of an [object] which exists as real thing (*vastusat*), [and the cognition of a real object cannot be eternal], for in as much as the object to be cognized is not eternal, it (i.e., its cognition) too does not last, (B) because [cognitions] which arise successively, cannot be produced by something eternal, for the dependence [of an eternal cause on co-producers] is impossible, since something eternal cannot be helped in any way. Even if [God etc.] is not eternal, he is not a means of knowledge."

Dharmakīrti goes on to refute arguments for the existence of God,[25] but the quotation is already a bit too long, and I think it is long enough to make the context clear. The purpose of Dharmakīrti in this passage is not to develop a general theory of means of knowledge, but rather to prove that the Buddha, and not God or any other eternal entity, is the only true means of knowledge. This also explains the short digression on the validity of words, for whatever the source of the Buddha's knowledge may be, his teaching consists in, or must take the form of words. Further, as is also well-known, the word *pramāṇa* in the title of this chapter does not refer to means of knowledge such as perception and inference, but to the Buddha's epithet *pramāṇabhūta* which appears in the *maṅgalaśloka* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. If we bear this in mind, the disjunction is easily understandable. Dharmakīrti wants to check whether the Buddha is *pramāṇa*, and this checking may be

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[21] Cf. PV II 32: *heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ / yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ //*
Cf. also PVBh 52,16f.: *tatra heyopādeyatattvaṃ duḥkhanirodhasatye. abhyupāyatattvaṃ tayor eva duḥkhanirodhasatyayoḥ kāraṇaṃ samudāyamārgasatye.*

[22] Prima facie at least three interpretations are possible for the word *śāstra*: 1) any science or scientific work; 2) *pramāṇaśāstra*; 3) *paralokaśāstra*. I opted for the third alternative, because *moha* has stronger connotations of a metaphysical illusion rather than a simple error. This is also the reason why I translate *nivartana* as 'stops' and not as 'keeps back from' or 'prevents', because in this case the delusion is not something we can fall into, but a state in which we already are.

[23] PV II 5c-9: *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā, svarūpādhigateḥ param // 5 //*
prāptaṃ sāmānyavijñānam, avijñāte svalakṣaṇe / yaj jñānam ity abhiprāyāt svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ // 6 //
tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān, abhūtavinivṛttaye / bhūtoktiḥ, sādhanāpekṣā tato yuktā pramāṇatā // 7 //
nityaṃ pramāṇaṃ naivāsti prāmāṇyād vastusadgateḥ / jñeyānityatayā tasyā adhrauvyāt, kramajanmanām // 8 //
nityād utpattivišleṣād apekṣāyā ayogataḥ / kathañcin nopakāryatvād, anitye 'py apramāṇatā // 9 //

[24] This is the interpretation favoured by Devendrabuddhi, Manorathanandin as well as all modern scholars. Cf., however, PVBh 32,10 (on *abhūtanivṛttaye*): *bhrāntinivṛttyartham*.

[25] For more details cf. the paper by Dr. Kanō in this volume.

done according to one definition *or* according to another. Dharmakīrti shows that no matter which definition we take, the Buddha (and not God or the Veda) deserves his title of *pramāṇa*. If this interpretation is accepted, it modifies our understanding of the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, not so much in terms of the general purpose, but in terms of structure and content. For it has been generally assumed that before explaining or proving that the Buddha is *pramāṇa*, Dharmakīrti first defines *pramāṇa* in general[26]. Under my interpretation there are no two stages of discussion, and there is no attempt to define the means of knowledge in general.

I claimed that taken in its context the disjunction can be easily understood. The question which arises next is, of course: Why didn't any of the traditional commentators understand it in this manner?

I do not wish to speculate whether this solution did not occur to them, or whether it occurred to them and was deliberately rejected. Intuitively I opt for the second alternative, but this is irrelevant here. What should concern us here is: What led the commentators to interpret the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter as a general theory of *pramāṇa*, as containing some sort of *pramāṇasāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, a general definition of means of knowledge? The answer is, I think, that this is the best passage, in all of Dharmakīrti's writings, which could be interpreted as incorporating such a definition. Dharmakīrti himself, it is interesting to note, never defined the means of knowledge in general, except perhaps for saying that there are only two of the sort[27]. Surely, one may argue that the *Pramāṇa-siddhi* chapter, or the *Pramāṇavārttika* in general, is not the appropriate place for such a definition, for it is, after all, a sort of commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and Dignāga too did not define means of knowledge in general, but was content with saying that there are only two. Nor should such a definition be expected in the treatises devoted to special problems such as *Hetubindu*[28], *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, *Santānāntarasiddhi*, or *Vādanyāya*. However, there are two systematic works, namely the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and its simplified version *Nyāyabindu*, where a general definition of *pramāṇa* is conspicuously missing. There too Dharmakīrti contents himself with limiting the number of *pramāṇa*s to two, without attempting any general definition. One can safely conclude, therefore, that Dharmakīrti did not see the need for a general definition of *pramāṇa*; the commentators, on the contrary, did feel such a need, and read a general definition into the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter.

This conclusion may seem surprising. In all probability, Dharmakīrti spent most of his life working on epistemological problems. He certainly attached great importance to the formulation of correct definitions of the means of knowledge, perception and inference, and, when necessary, did not hesitate to modify Dignāga's definitions; why didn't he think it necessary or worthwhile to suggest any definition at all for the means of knowledge in general? Did he think that it was impossible to define them in general? Or did he think that limiting their number to two might serve as a definition? Or are we asking perhaps the wrong question?

[26] To mention only two of the more recent studies, cf. R. Jackson, "The Buddha as *pramāṇabhūta*: Epithets and Arguments in the Buddhist 'Logical' Tradition", *JIPh* 16/4, 1988 [335-365]: 342f.; van Bijlert (cited in note 19) 1989: XXI, 119.

[27] Dharmottara claims that the enumeration is an integral part of the definition, but I do not think that Dharmakīrti would agree. In any case it cannot be taken as a complete definition. Cf. NBṬ [cited in note 13] 36,3: *tato lakṣaṇakathanāṅgam eva saṅkhyābhedakathanam*; cf. also Steinkellner/Krasser 1989: 72.

[28] Professor Katsura has kindly drawn my attention to *Hetubindu* [= Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*, Wien 1967] 2,18f.: *tatra yad ādyam asādhāraṇaviṣayaṃ darśanaṃ tad eva pramāṇam*. A closer look at the context, however, makes clear that this statement was not intended as a definition of *pramāṇa*, but rather answers the question which cognition is *pramāṇa* for the determination (*niścaya*) of the inferential sign (*liṅga*).

Indeed, why should Dharmakīrti give a general definition? I mentioned that Dignāga didn't. Nor did Vasubandhu, at least not in the remaining fragments of his epistemological works[29]. But let us take a look at other schools up to that time. The Nyāya, at least in the texts which have come down to us, that is, *Nyāyasūtra, Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Nyāyavārttika*, did not have any general definition of *pramāṇas*, and was content with the old simple enumeration. The same is true for the Vaiśeṣika. No definition of the means of knowledge is to be found in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* or the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. The case of the Sāṅkhya is not entirely clear, but even if such a definition was proposed by Vindhyavāsin[30], it does not seem to have been generally accepted, and neither the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* nor the *Yuktidīpikā* or other early commentaries refer to it. The same is true for Yoga, even though the *Yogabhāṣya* is supposed to be heavily influenced by Vindhyavāsin. Vedānta was practically non-existent in Dharmakīrti's time. Thus the only exception is the Mīmāṃsā. But even in the Mīmāṃsā we do not know of any general definition before Kumārila, who is supposed to be an older contemporary of Dharmakīrti. Therefore, we can safely conclude that the definition of *pramāṇa* in general, unlike the definition of each *pramāṇa* in particular, was not undertaken by Indian philosophers before Dharmakīrti's time. Consequently, there is no reason why one should expect Dharmakīrti to do so.

During the time which separates Dharmakīrti from his commentators some change in the philosophical requirements must have happened, which produced an expectation of a general definition of *pramāṇas*. What brought about this change, whether it should be attributed to the development in other philosophical schools as the Mīmāṃsā, or whether it was the natural drive of systematization from within the Buddhist school, I cannot say. Nor do I want to take this 'or' as an exclusive 'or'. All I wanted to do here is to draw your attention to the fact that this development happened, and that it probably did not happen immediately after Dharmakīrti's time.[31]

Furthermore, if my interpretation is accepted, it implies that Devendrabuddhi, just like the other commentators, misunderstood and misinterpreted Dharmakīrti. In this case the Tibetan legend that Devendrabuddhi's commentary was approved by Dharmakīrti himself[32] is discredited and can no longer be taken as referring to a historical event. This in itself is hardly surprising. Among the main sources of error in dating Indian philosophers Frauwallner mentioned in his "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic" the tendency to rally the famous philosophers in a *guruparamparā*[33]:

[29] Cf. E. Frauwallner, "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam", *WZKM* 40, 1933, 281-304, and "Vasubandhu's Vādavidhiḥ", *WZKSO* 1, 1957, 104-146.

[30] The information comes from a rather late Jaina source, and I have some doubts about its authenticity. Cf. *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa of Prabhācandra*, ed. Mahendrakumar Jain, Bombay ²1943: I 19,3; *Nyāyakumudacandra of Prabhācandra*, ed. Mahendrakumar Jain, Bombay 1938-1941: I 41,10f.: *indriyavṛttiḥ pramāṇam*. Vācaspatimiśra, for instance, knows nothing about it; cf. his somewhat clumsy attempt (*Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspatimiśra*, ed. S. A. Srinivasan, Hamburg 1967: 78,18) to read a definition of *pramāṇa* into *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 4.

[31] It is interesting to note that even in what seems to be a later work like the *Tattvasaṅgraha* the definition of *pramāṇa* appears only as an aside in the detailed discussion of *svataḥ* and *parataḥ prāmāṇya*; cf TS 2958 [= *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*, ed. Dvarikadas Shastri, [2 vols.] Varanasi 1981, 1982.]:

ucyate vastusaṃvādaḥ prāmāṇyam abhidhīyate / tasya cārthakriyābhāsajñānād anyan na lakṣaṇam //*

I would like to thank Dr. H. Krasser for communicating to me a part of his dissertation dealing with this verse and the relationship between Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

* *cārthakriyābhāsajñānāt* corr. : *cārthakriyābhyāsajñānāt*; cf. TS_t P 5764, 129a2: *de yaṅ don byed par snaṅ ba'i // śes pa las gźan mtshan ñid can min //*; cf. also the next verse: *arthakriyāvabhāsaṃ ca jñānam* . . . TS 2929ab |

[32] Cf. Lama Chimpa and A. Chattopadhyaya (transl.), *Tāranātha, History of Buddhism in India*, Simla 1970: 239; E. Obermiller (transl.), *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston*, Part 2, Heidelberg 1932: 154f.

[33] E. Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic", *WZKSO* 5, 1961 [125-148]: 126. Of course, one can imagine different scenarios to accommodate the tradition that Devendrabuddhi was a personal disciple of Dharmakīrti with the fact

"Special attention is to be paid to certain sources of error which lead again and again to the distortion of tradition. For example, we observe very often that in course of time unimportant persons are forgotten and only the memory of really important personalities is preserved. The gaps in the tradition thus created are bridged in such a way that the persons who are still remembered are brought into relation with each other. In our field this is especially observed in the relation of teacher and pupil. If, therefore, a famous author is said to be the pupil of another famous man, it is a priori suspicious."

One more thing in this connection. If I am right in arguing that Dharmakīrti did not attempt a general definition of the *pramāṇas*, but only wanted to prove that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa*, it would be reasonable to assume that he would take ready-made or generally accepted characteristics of *pramāṇas*, and test whether the Buddha fulfills their requirements. So what are the precedents for Dharmakīrti's definitions?

The apprehension of an unapprehended object seems to have been widely accepted as a characteristic of *pramāṇa* even before Dharmakīrti, and as an immediate antecedent we may mention Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*. It is true, as Steinkellner and Krasser pointed out[34], that it forms a part of the definition only in the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, but in fact it is already explicitly stated in the *Ślokavārttika* as a characteristic of all *pramāṇas*[35]. Further, in some form or another[36], this characteristic was accepted by, or acceptable to, all Brahmanical schools like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya, for none of these schools admitted memory or recollection as a means of knowledge. But was it also acceptable to the Buddhists, and more specifically to Dignāga? A well-known objection claims that the mention of apprehension of an unapprehended object is superfluous, and thus unacceptable as a formal definition, in a system which professes the momentariness of all things, for if a different object arises each moment, one cannot apprehend twice the same object anyway.[37]

Further, there is a famous passage in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* to which one usually refers in order to show that Dignāga already accepted that *pramāṇa* apprehends a new object. The passage itself, however, is not unambiguous: "Such mental faculties as recollection, desire (*icchā*), anger (*dveṣa*), etc., since they operate on an object once cognized, are not independent means of valid cognition."[38]

All Dignāga says is that *smṛti* is not an independent or different *pramāṇa*, he does not say that recollection is not a *pramāṇa* at all. This statement could imply, for instance, that the second cognition

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that he sometimes seems to misunderstand him. For instance, Dharmakīrti dies when Devendrabuddhi was still a beginner, they did not read the PV together, etc. The point I am concerned with is not the absolute or relative chronology of Devendrabuddhi, but the status of his commentary, which, I am quite sure (from other cases as well), could not have been approved by Dharmakīrti.

[34] Steinkellner/Krasser 1989: 3, n. 2.

[35] Cf. ŚV *Autpattika* 12ab: *sarvasyānupalabdhe 'rthe prāmāṇyaṃ smṛtir anyathā*.

[36] The Naiyāyikas, for instance, at least in a later period, refused to incorporate this characteristic into their definition, because they felt that it might endanger the validity of the continuous cognitions (*dhārāvāhijñāna*), but not because they accepted recollection as *pramāṇa*; cf. NM I 57,10ff., esp. 59,8f.; cf. also *Prakaraṇapañcikā of Śālikanātha*, ed. Mukunda Shastri, Benares 1903-4: 42,15-20.

[37] Cf., for instance, *Tattvārthavārttika of Akalaṅkadeva*, ed. Mahendrakumar Jain, Delhi ^{2}1982: 56,6f.: *kṣaṇe kṣaṇe 'nyatvopapatter apūrvādhigamalakṣaṇam aviśiṣṭam*. "As [the object] arises as different/other at every moment, the definition [of *pramāṇa*] as apprehension of a new [object] is not good." Cf. also Hattori 1968: 82, n. 1.24.

[38] Hattori 1968: 25. The Sanskrit reconstruction in *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakraṃ of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. With the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*, Part 1, ed. Muni Jambūvijayajī, Bhavnagar 1966, *Bhoṭapariśiṣṭam* 101,3 seems better: *yathā smṛtīcchādveṣādi pūrvādhigatārthe na pramāṇāntaram, tadvat*. Cf. also Eli Franco, *Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief. A Study of Jayarāśi's Scepticism*, Stuttgart 1987: 413f. n. 156.

of the same object does not involve any other means of knowledge except the one by which the object was cognized for the first time, or, to account better for the context, that the second cognition of the same object does not involve any other means of knowledge except perception and inference, just as recognition or the cognition of colour as non-eternal does not involve any other means of knowledge.

Finally, one may argue that Dharmakīrti, as a good debater and not without certain irony, takes his opponents' characteristic of *pramāṇa* and shows that their own characteristic is not applicable to God, the Veda, etc., but only to the Buddha. In order to do so, he need not accept the characteristic himself, but only adapt it for the sake of argument. For, as I claimed above, his purpose was not to define *pramāṇa*, but only to prove that the Buddha is one.

Such an interpretation, however, which could have been adequate for a Mādhyamika or for a philosopher like Jayarāśi, seems unlikely in Dharmakīrti's case. For if he wanted to argue not only negatively that God etc., are not *pramāṇa*s, but also positively that the Buddha is *pramāṇa*, he could not have relied on characteristics which are unacceptable to himself. As for Dignāga's formulation, which admittedly is a bit odd, it seems to have been determined by the context, which aims at the restriction of the *pramāṇa*s to two. It is unlikely that he would argue that recollection is reducible to perception or inference or to a combination of both. Unlike the European tradition where memory and history were considered among the chief means of knowledge, all Indian schools, the Jainas excepted,[39] did not allow recollection as *pramāṇa*. Finally, the alledged incompatibility between what later came to be considered as a definition and the theory of momentariness is based on a deliberate or innocent misunderstanding. The purpose of the definition is not to exclude a further apprehension of the same object, but to exclude recollection from the realm of *pramāṇa*. Therefore, we can conclude that the apprehension of an unapprehended object is a characteristic of *pramāṇa* which is acceptable both to Dharmakīrti and to his opponents (*ubhayasiddha*).

The same pattern can be seen in the case of the first characteristic as well, though here things had to take a different form. Unlike the second characteristic, where common ground could be reached, in the case of *avisaṃvādin* Dharmakīrti and his opponents had completely different theories of truth. The idea of correctness was, of course, always associated with the *pramāṇa*s. However, the choice of the word *avisaṃvādin* was certainly not accidental. We find it in Kumārila's definition of *pramāṇa*[40], where '*na visaṃvādam ṛcchati*' means something like *abādhita* (not sublated). The same word is used by Dignāga to designate the validity of inference and verbal testimony.[41] What Dharmakīrti obviously needed was, on the one hand, a word which did not have the connotation of truth or correctness in the strong sense of the term, but which would allow a looser, more pragmatic, notion of truth. Otherwise, inference and verbal testimony which admittedly apprehend only conceptual constructions could not retain their status of *pramāṇa*. (To designate 'true' in the stronger and more usual sense Dharmakīrti uses the word *abhrānta*.) On the other hand, he also needed a word acceptable to (at least some of) his opponents, for otherwise they could argue that the Buddha, just like inference, is a *bhrānta* means of knowledge, not communicating the absolute truth. The use of

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[39] Cf. S. Sanghavi, *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*, Calcutta 1960: 40.

[40] *tasmād dṛḍhaṃ yad utpannaṃ na visaṃvādam ṛcchati /*
jñānāntareṇa vijñānaṃ tat pramāṇaṃ pratīyatām // ŚV *Codanā* 80
The variant *nāpi saṃvādam ṛcchati* seems unlikely to me; if adopted, one may translate 'the cognition which does not obtain [its] confirmation by another cognition', but does this mean that a false cognition is confirmed by another cognition?

[41] Cf. PS II 5ab: *āptavākyāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā*. Cf. H. N. Randle, *Fragments from Dignāga*, London 1926: 17f. (Fragment E). Also quoted by Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* [= Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, Roma 1960] 108,1, trans. in Richard P. Hayes, "Diṅnāga's Views on Reasoning", *JIPh* 8/3, 1980 [219-277]: 252. Cf. also ŚV *Śabdapariccheda* 23, 47.

the word *avisaṃvādin* by both Dignāga and Kumārila made it a perfect candidate to bridge the gap between the opposing schools.

Thus we see that the same tendency recurs. In both characteristics Dharmakīrti tried to reach a common ground with his opponents. But, while the second characteristic was indeed acceptable to both parties, the different concepts of truth did not allow the same in the case of the first characteristic. What Dharmakīrti did was perhaps the second best thing. He chose a word which was acceptable to the Buddhists and their opponents - in one sense to the Buddhists and in another sense to their opponents.

This double entendre can also be seen in the second word of the definition - *jñāna*. One usually says (following the commentators) that the word *jñāna* (cognition) was introduced into the definition in order to indicate the ontological identity between the means of knowledge and its result (*pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala*), as propounded by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. However, one can also designate *pramāṇa* as *jñāna* without accepting such an identity, e.g., when the cognition is considered *pramāṇa* and the obtainment of a desirable object or the avoidance of an undesirable one *pramāṇaphala*. In this respect, the characteristic is acceptable to the Naiyāyikas[42], the Mīmāṃsakas[43] and the Sāṅkhyas[44].

This interpretation of '*avisaṃvādi jñānam*' sheds a new light on, and is itself substantiated by, the reasons advanced by Dharmakīrti as to why the cognition is the means of knowledge. Two reasons are raised - one for opponents, the other for Dharmakīrti himself: "The cognition is the means of knowledge, (1) because it is the most important [factor] for the activity in respect to things to be rejected or adopted, and (2) because the difference in apprehension (= *pramāṇaphala*) is due to the cognition's having a different form of object." The first reason is clearly acceptable for the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and perhaps the Sāṅkhyas as well; it also clearly alludes to the Grammarians' definition of instrument as *sādhakatama*[45]. The second is basically the Sautrāntika definition and it appears as an alternative in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*[46].

Finally, let it be reminded that the concept of *arthakriyā* is not exclusively a Buddhist concept, and that it was used by Naiyāyikas before and after Dharmakīrti[47]. Of course, there are important differences in the way they use this concept. For Dharmakīrti a purposeful action does not prove the

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[42] Cf. NBh [= *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Vātsyāyana): *Nyāyadarśanam. With Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha, [2 vols.] repr. Kyoto 1982] 87,1 on NSū 1.1.3: *yadā sannikarṣas tadā jñānaṃ pramitir, yadā jñānaṃ tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalam*.

[43] Cf. ŚV *Codanā* 80 quoted above n. 40, cf. also ŚV *Pratyakṣa* 78cd: *pramāṇatvaṃ bhavej jñāne pramāṇe tu paraṃ phalam*. Cf. also *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā (Tātparyaṭīkā) of Bhaṭṭombeka*, ed. Ramanatha Shastri, Madras 1940: 139,9: *jñānapramāṇapakṣe 'pi hānādīnāṃ phalatvād asty eva pramāṇaphalayor bhedaḥ*.

[44] Cf. *Yuktidīpikā. An Ancient Commentary on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa*, ed. Ram Chandra Pandeya, Delhi 1967: 35,10f.: . . . *etat pramāṇam. anena yaś cetanāśakter anugrahas tat phalam*. Cf. also 35,17: *buddhyāśrayaṃ hi pramāṇam adhyavasāyākhyaṃ, puruṣāśrayaṃ phalam anugrahalakṣaṇam*.

[45] Cf. *Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini* (In O. Böhtlingk, *Pāṇini's Grammatik*, Leipzig ²1887) 1.4.42: *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam*. Cf. also Hattori 1968: 98; B. K. Matilal, "The Doctrine of *karaṇa* in Grammar and Logic", *PAIOC* 20, vol. 2, 1959, 303-308; cf. also *Journal of Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* (Allahabad) 17, 1969, 63-69 (not available to me).

[46] Cf. Hattori 1968: 29. I cannot undertake here a discussion of the different definitions in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Professor Schmithausen suggested (in a personal communication, cf. Eli Franco "Once again on Dharmakīrti's deviation from Dignāga on *pratyakṣābhāsa*", *JIPh* 14, 1986 [79-97]: 85) that the *Vṛtti* was written later than the *kārikās*, and that Dignāga had changed his mind on several topics in the meantime. The discussion on *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* seems to be one of these topics.

[47] Cf. NBh (cited in note 42) on NSū 1.2.12 and on 3.2.60; NM I 450,11f. uses *arthakriyā* as a quasi-synonym of *pravṛttisāmarthya*.

reality of the object, whereas for the Nyāya it does. Nevertheless, by deriving validity from everyday practice (*vyavahāra*), Dharmakīrti follows, at least to a certain extent, the Naiyāyikas[48]. It should also be borne in mind, as Dr. Kanō has pointed out[49], that the concept of *arthakriyā* was already used in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, and in a context which is directly connected to our subject matter here.

To conclude, if there is a 'pun' (the term seems to me unduly stretched, and I also fail to see that it applies to the second characteristic) in the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, as suggested by Professor Lindtner[50], I would say that it consists in matching the Buddha against characteristics of *pramāṇa* which are acceptable in one sense to opponents like Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas and in another sense to Dharmakīrti himself. Further, this kind of double entendre (unlike the pun proposed by Professor Lindtner) is not restricted to the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter. Elsewhere as well it can be observed that Dharmakīrti formulates his sentences vaguely enough in order to be interpreted both from the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra point of view.

Abbreviations and Literature

Hattori 1968 — Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya; from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Translated and annotated.* Cambridge, Massachusetts.

JIPh — *Journal of Indian Philosophy*

NM I, II — *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇī – Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor.* Ed. K. S. Varadacharya. [2 vols.] Mysore 1969, 1983.

PV II, III, IV — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapters II, III, IV: *Pramāṇavārttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan).* Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206. (PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).

PVBh — *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam).* Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.

PVP — *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi): P 5717(b) (Vols. 130-131, Tshad ma, Che 1-390a8)

PVV — *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*: *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the Commentary 'Vritti' of Manorathanandin.* Ed. Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi 1968.

Steinkellner/Krasser 1989 — Ernst Steinkellner und Helmut Krasser, *Dharmottaras Exkurs zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Pramāṇaviniścaya. Tibetischer Text, Sanskritmaterialien und Übersetzung.* Wien.

ŚV — *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with The Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra.* Ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī. Varanasi 1978.

WZKM — *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*

WZKSO — *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*

[48] Cf. Steinkellner/Krasser 1989: 3, n. 2.

[49] Cf. his contribution to this volume.

[50] Cf. his paper in this volume.

DHARMAKĪRTI AND THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

by

Brendan S. Gillon, Toronto

0. Introduction

The problem of induction, so often associated with David Hume, is neither peculiar to, nor original with him. It has now been recognized, though not widely acknowledged, that the problem was known to the Greek skeptics.[1] What has not been recognized, however, is that it was also known to classical Indian philosophers. Dharmakīrti, for example, stated the problem and attempted its solution in his auto-commentary on the *Svārthānumāna* chapter of his celebrated text on metaphysics, *Pramāṇavārttika*.

As one would expect, different philosophers state the problem in different ways. Hume's formulation of the problem[2] is not Mill's[3]; nor is Mill's that of Sextus Empiricus'[1]; nor is Sextus Empiricus' that of Dharmakīrti's. The aim of this paper is to set out Dharmakīrti's formulation and proposed solution, and to understand why his solution does not work.

1.0 The Metaphysical Basis of Inference

For classical Indian philosophers, inference is a mental act whereby one acquires knowledge of a fact from knowledge of other facts in an infallible way. Facts, in this setting, are analyzed into things (*dravya*), or property-possessors (*dharmin*), properties (*dharma*), and relations (*pratibandha*). A particularly important relation is the occurrence relation (*vṛtti*), whose logically equivalent converse is the possession relation. The occurrence relation itself is of two kinds: inherence (*samavāya*) and contact (*saṃyoga*). Inherence is a relation which properties bear to things and contact is a relation which things bear to each other. A further relation, the pervasion relation (*vyāpti*), can be defined on the basis of the occurrence relation:

(1) x pervades y if and only if wherever y is x is.

It is useful for the sake of the discussion below to distinguish various kinds of facts, taking a cue from the kinds of statements which express them. Singular facts are expressed by statements of the form either "x has y" or "y is at x" (where "x" denotes a thing and "y" denotes either a thing or a property). General facts are either universal or existential. General facts are expressed by statements of the form either "whatever has x has y" or "Wherever x is y is" (where "x" and "y" may denote either things or properties); while existential facts are expressed by statements of the form either "something

[1] Cf. Leo Groarke, "Greek Skepticism: Ancient Thought and Modern Arguments", (forthcoming).

[2] Cf. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 1748, in *Hume's Enquiries*, ed. L.A. Selby Bigge, Oxford 1894: Section V, Part I and Section VII, Part I.

[3] Cf. John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*, in *John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Methods*, ed. Ernst Nagel, New York 1843 [reprinted 1974]: Book II, Chapter III.

has x and y" or "x and y are in something" (where "x" and "y" may denote either things or properties). Finally, any fact logically equivalent to a general one is general and any fact logically equivalent to an existential one is existential. This means that the denial of an existential fact is a general one. Thus, a fact expressible by a statement of the form "there is no place where there is x and non-y" is a general fact, since it is logically equivalent to a statement of the form "wherever there is x there is y". In an analogous fashion, one may distinguish beliefs into singular beliefs and general beliefs, and general beliefs into universal and existential beliefs. In addition, beliefs which are instances of knowledge are epistemic beliefs.

The following logical implication of a singular fact by two other facts, one general and the other singular, namely,

(2) If S pervades H and p has H, then p has S,

provides the factual basis for the following inference schema[4]:

(3) Major Premiss: *yatra* H_1 *vartate tatra* S_1 *vartate*.
Wherever H is S is.
Minor Premiss: H_1 p_7 *vartate*.
H is at p.
Conclusion: S_1 p_7 *vartate*.
S is at p.

Most classical Indian philosophers, including Dharmakīrti, recognize these two paradigmatical inferences:

(4) Example 1:
Major Premiss: *yatra śiṃśapā vartate tatra vṛkṣaḥ vartate*.
Wherever a *śiṃśapā* is a tree is.
Minor Premiss: *śiṃśapā* p_7 *vartate*.
A *śiṃśapā* is at p.
Conclusion: *vṛkṣaḥ* p_7 *vartate*.
A tree is at p.

(5) Example 2:
Major Premiss: *yatra dhūmaḥ vartate tatra vahniḥ vartate*.
Wherever (a cloud of) smoke is fire is.
Minor Premiss: *dhūmaḥ* p_7 *vartate*.
(A cloud of) smoke is at p.
Conclusion: *vahniḥ* p_7 *vartate*.
A fire is at p.

Although they are both instantiations of the inference schema given in (3), nonetheless, they differ in important ways. One way to see the difference is to consider the following reformulations of these exemplary inferences:

[4] Subscripts to the schematic letters, used in the Sanskrit sentences, indicate the case to be assigned to their substitution instances. These subscripts follow the Pāṇinian numbering of the Sanskrit cases.

(6) First Reformulation of Example 1:
Major Premiss: *yā śiṃśapā vartate saḥ vṛkṣaḥ vartate.*
Whatever is a *śiṃśapā* is a tree.
Minor Premiss: p_1 *śiṃśapā vartate.*
p is a *śiṃśapā.*
Conclusion: p_1 *vṛkṣaḥ vartate.*
p is a tree.

(7) First Reformulation of Example 2:
Major Premiss: *yaḥ dhūmaḥ vartate saḥ vahniḥ vartate.*
Whatever is (a cloud of) smoke is fire.
Minor Premiss: p_1 *dhūmaḥ vartate.*
p is (a cloud of) smoke.
Conclusion: p_1 *vahniḥ vartate.*
p is a fire.

Both reformulated inferences involve reference only to individual things. However, while the first inference and its reformulation are perfectly synonymous, the second one and its reformulation are not, as evidenced by the fact that the major premiss in (5) is true while the one in (7) is false.

This disparity between the two inferences can be seen from still another reformulation of them. Consider this recasting of Example 1.

(8) Second Reformulation of Example 1:
Major Premiss: *yatra śiṃśapā-tvam vartate tatra vṛkṣa-tvam vartate.*
Wherever *śiṃśapā*-ness is tree-ness is.
Minor Premiss: *śiṃśapā-tvam* p_7 *vartate.*
śiṃśapā-ness is at p.
Conclusion: *vṛkṣa-tvam* p_7 *vartate.*
Tree-ness is at p.

This inference involves two properties, one thing, and the occurrence relation. The occurrence relation here is that of inherence, since it obtains between things and properties. An analogous recasting of Example 2 is this:

(9) Second Reformulation of Example 2:
Major Premiss: *yatra dhūma-tvam vartate tatra vahni-tvam vartate.*
Wherever smoke-ness is fire-ness is.
Minor Premiss: *dhūma-tvam* p_7 *vartate.*
Smoke-ness is at p.
Conclusion: *vahni-tvam* p_7 *vartate.*
Fireness is at p.

Here too are involved two properties, one thing and the occurrence relation of inherence. Once again, however, the major premiss of the first inference is true, while the major premiss of the second is false.

II.1 Dharmakīrti's Version of the Problem of Induction

Dharmakīrti, following Dignāga, adopts the view that epistemic beliefs are acquired in one of only two ways: by perception (*pratyakṣa*) and by inference (*anumāna*).[5] As is clear from its schema, inference requires that the inferrer have a general epistemic belief. So, the question arises: how does an inferrer acquire a general epistemic belief? Clearly, it is not by inference, since the conclusion of an inference is a singular belief. Therefore, it must be by perception.

Now perception directly results in a singular belief. For example, perception can directly result in the singular belief that this mountain has fire. And perception can indirectly result in a general belief, where the general belief is logically equivalent to a conjunction of singular beliefs and the logical equivalence is known. Dharmakīrti alludes the this when he says "only to him who has seen everything might the exclusion of <something's> observation reveal <its> absence everywhere" (PVSV 10,6-7). And this is certainly the case when a general belief is equivalent to a small number of singular beliefs. For example, one can know through direct perception that this fruit on this branch is red and that that fruit on this branch is red; and if these are the only fruits on the branch and if one knows it, then one knows that every fruit on the branch is red. And this is a general belief.

The question remains: can one acquire a general epistemic belief which is not known to be logically equivalent to a small finite number of singular epistemic beliefs; and if so, how? Clearly one does, otherwise most inferences would not be possible. In most of these instances, an extrapolation from a few cases of a certain type to all cases of that type is necessary, but it may be wrong. After all, as Dharmakīrti observes, "things observed one way in one place may be observed to be otherwise <elsewhere> due to difference in time, place and cultivation" (PVSV 10,7-8). (See also PVSV 15,9-15). He substantiates this claim with several examples: First, there was thought to be some kind of tree, which, when watered with milk, yielded a sweet fruit, at least in some regions and at some times; though, for the most part, such watering did not make the fruit sweet (PVSV 10,8-10). Second, he points out that one cannot generalize from the fact that some of the grains of rice in a pot are cooked that all of them are cooked (PVSV 10,13-15).

II.2 Dharmakīrti's Solution

If inference and perception are the only two means whereby to acquire epistemic beliefs, and inference yields only singular beliefs, and perception yields only singular beliefs, and for most cases, a general belief is not equivalent to a finite set of singular beliefs, then how are general beliefs acquired?

One answer is to postulate another kind of belief: namely, relational beliefs, i.e., beliefs expressed in relational statements of the form "xRy", where "x" and "y" denote things and "R" denotes a relation other than the occurrence relation (or, its converse, the possession relation). This is Dharmakīrti's answer: "one who desires the exclusion of one thing through the exclusion of another must accept some natural relation between them" (PVSV 10,23-24). Dharmakīrti recognizes two kinds of natural relations (*svabhāva-pratibandha*): causation (*tadutpatti*) and identity (*tādātmya*). Knowledge that these relations obtain, and this knowledge alone, enables one to arrive at general epistemic beliefs: "There is the restriction of invariability from the restraint either of the relation of cause and effect or of the

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[5] See Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* (= *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa. [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]*, ed. D. Malvania, Patna [2]1971) I 2-3 (pp. 35-37) and Dignāga's PS I 2 (translated in Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1968: 24).

thing on its own, and not from either observation or non-observation" (PVSV 20,14-15). All inferential knowledge establishing a positive fact, then, is based either on knowledge of the relation of identity or on knowledge of the relation of causation.


II.3 The Inadequacy of Dharmakīrti's solution

If examined closely, however, Dharmakīrti's solution can be seen not to work. To begin with, consider inferences thought to be based on relation of identity. The major premiss of such inferences expresses a subset relation between the extensions of the two properties involved. Now the subset relation is a relation, not between things, but between sets of things. However, the subset relation can be defined in terms of the identity relation, which is a relation between things. One set is a subset of another, if and only if every member of the former is identical with some member of the latter; or, more formally,

(10) $X \subseteq Y$ if and only if $\forall x \in X \; \exists y \in Y \; x = y$

Notice, however, that the identity relation alone does not entail the subset relation. The subset relation has been absorbed by the set membership relation and the order of the quantifiers. If the preference of the identity relation over the subset relation is that the former is only between individuals whereas the latter is between sets, then the preference is ill-founded inasmuch as the identity relation is not strong enough to provide the truth conditions for the Major Premiss without the set membership relation, which relates things to sets. The invocation of sets or properties, for which sets are surrogates, seems inescapable.

Another way to see the same point is this. Knowledge of the identity relation cannot be inferential, otherwise there would be an infinite regress of inferences to establish even one instance of it. Therefore, knowledge of it must result from perception. Presumably, on the observation of any thing, one could yield the following epistemic beliefs: H occurs in p; S occurs in q; and p = q. But there is no way on the basis of these beliefs to know whether the extension of H is a subset of the extension of S or the extension of S is a subset of the extension of H or neither's extension is a subset of the other. In other words, given these beliefs alone, one does not know which of the following three distinct states of affairs is the actual one, yet one allows no inference at all and the other two allow two distinct inferences.



Situation 1 Situation 2 Situation 3

(Figure 1)

Can the causation relation provide for the pervasion relation? The answer depends on what the constraints on the causation relation are. Two typical ones are these (see Mill [cited in note 3] Book III, Chapter 10 Sections 1 and 2):

(11) a. Similar causes have similar effects.
b. Similar effects have similar causes.

Although Dharmakīrti unequivocally endorses the second constraint (PVSV 22,14-19), he has some reservations about the first principle. Dharmakīrti observes that sometimes the operation of a cause can be inhibited by countervailing circumstances, the cause thereby failing to give rise to its expected effect (PVSV 6,21-7,12). However, he holds that if the causes are uninhibited then similar causes have similar effects. Dharmakīrti thus recognizes the inference from a cause to its effect, provided one knows that the cause has not been inhibited. (PVSV 7,12-8,5)

But, how is knowledge of the causation relation acquired? Dharmakīrti's answer is that it is acquired by observation. One knows that an f is the cause of an s if one knows that (1) at some time and in some place an f exists and an s does not and (2) immediately thereafter in the same place an f exists and an s exists, and (3) later in the same place when an f does not exist, an s does not exist (PVSV 22,2-4). (See Yuichi Kajiyama ("Trikapañcakacintā: Development of the Buddhist Theory of Determination of Causality", *Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia* 4-5, 1963, 1-15) for further discussion of this principle and its place in later Buddhist thought.) In other words, Dharmakīrti seems to believe that a sequence of five simple non-relational observations results in relational knowledge. For example, one observes (1) first that a place has neither smoke nor fire; (2) then, when fire is brought, that the place has fire yet no smoke; (3) next, that the place has both smoke and fire; (4) then, when the fire is removed, that the place has smoke yet no fire; and (5) finally, that the place has neither smoke nor fire. The problem is that this sequence cannot discriminate between genuine causes and spurious correlations. Suppose one observes that a place has neither a donkey nor smoke, then when a donkey is brought, one observes that the place has the donkey but still no smoke, but a moment later, one observes the place to have both the donkey and smoke. Later, when the donkey is removed, one observes that the place has no donkey but still has smoke. And finally, when the smoke dissipates, the place has neither a donkey nor smoke. But the donkey, even though it satisfies the conditions for being the cause of the smoke, is not its cause. Moreover, further observations will never eliminate the possibility of spurious correlation. But this is just the induction problem again.

In short, all Dharmakīrti has done is to shift the problem from one of arriving at general beliefs to one of arriving at relational knowledge; but both of these problems are simply the same problem in two different guises, namely, the problem of induction.

Abbreviation

PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*. Roma 1960.

WORD ORDER IN THE *SVĀRTHĀNUMĀNA* CHAPTER OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S *PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA*

by

Brendan S. Gillon, Toronto

0. Introduction

Contrary to the opinion of many, word order in Sanskrit prose is not free. That is to say, it is not the case that any pair of words in a Sanskrit expression can be permuted without disturbing its meaning. This is patent in the case of Sanskrit compounds: *rāja-puruṣa* ("king's man") does not mean the same as *puruṣa-rāja* ("man's king"). Indeed, only in very special circumstances can two words in a Sanskrit compound be permuted without disturbance of meaning. And while it is true that in a Sanskrit sentence many pairs of words can be permuted without altering its sense; many cannot. This is especially evident in the case where one of the candidates for permution is a particle such as *eva*:

(1) a. *martyaḥ eva mānuṣayaḥ.*
Humans are mortal.
b. *mānuṣayaḥ eva martyaḥ.*
Mortals are human.

or in the case where each of the pair is taken from a different clause:

(2) a. *yatra dhūmaḥ asti tatra vahniḥ asti.*
Where there is smoke there is fire.
b. *yatra vahniḥ asti tatra dhūmaḥ asti.*
Where there is fire there is smoke.

So, the theoretical question is not whether or not Sanskrit has word order, but to what degree is its word order constrained.

Staal, addressing himself to just this question, entertained a hypothesis which proposed a weak but interesting set of constraints.[1] Unfortunately, as Staal points out, the hypothesis has counter-examples. However, in light of more recent work in linguistics, I have been able to modify the hypothesis in a principled way so that the counter-examples discussed by Staal are overcome. Moreover, I have shown that this modified hypothesis provides a satisfactory syntactic analysis of a small but diverse sample of prose sentences from Classical Sanskrit[2] - sentences culled by V. S. Apte[3] from fourteen major Classical Sanskrit texts.

Currently, Richard Hayes and I are working on a translation of the *Svārthānumāna* chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*. Part of this project involves my providing a syntactic analysis of each

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
[1] J. F. Staal, *Word Order in Sanskrit and Universal Grammar,* Dordrecht 1967.

[2] For details, cf. Brendan S. Gillon, "Sanskrit Syntax and Universal Grammar." Unpublished ms, Center for South Asian Studies, University of Toronto 1988.

[3] Vāman Shivarām Apte, *The Student's Guide to Sanskrit Composition. A Treatise on Sanskrit Syntax for Use of Schools and Colleges,* Poona (1885) ^{24}1960.

There are three notations used to present constituent structure: labeled brackets, labeled trees, and context free rules. Two of them, labeled brackets and labeled trees, are equivalent, as should be clear from their schematic representation below.

(6) a. labeled tree:



b. labeled brackets: $[_A\ B_1 \ldots B_n\ ]$

The labeled tree corresponding to the labeled brackets in (3), for example, is found in (9) below.

The assumption is that every sentence can be analyzed for its syntactic structure by at least one set of labeled, nested brackets, or equivalently, by at least one labeled tree. Since the number of sentences in a language is infinite, the number of labeled trees to analyze the sentences of the language is infinite. The usual assumption is that a language's sentences can be finitely specified. The set of labels used to annotate the nodes of a tree are finite and the number of nodes in a tree immediately dominated by another node is finite. The finite characterization of all possible labeled trees reduces to the finite characterization of the possible expansions of a labeled node into an array of labeled daughters. These expansions can be characterized by context free rules. These rules have the form


(7) context free rule: $A \rightarrow B_1 \ldots B_n$

where A is the label of a node and B_1 through B_n are the labels of all and only the nodes which A immediately dominates, in their linear (left to right) order. The following context free rules, for example, characterize the expansion of the labeled nodes in the labeled tree in (3).

(8) a. S $\rightarrow$ NP VP
b. VP $\rightarrow$ V NP
c. NP $\rightarrow$ N

Staal's basic idea was to try to find a structure which permits all and only the elements under any expansion to permute with one another. By way of illustration, consider the labeled tree corresponding to the labeled brackets in (3):

(9)



There are six possible linear orderings of the three words "*rāmaḥ*", "*govindam*", and "*apaśyat*". Staal's

word order constraint permits four and prohibits two. The ones permitted correspond to the linear configurations obtained from zero or more permutations of NP1 with VP and of NP2 with V.

(10) a. *rāmaḥ apaśyat govindam.* (0 permutations)
b. *rāmaḥ govindam apaśyat.* (1 permutation: NP2 and V)
c. *apaśyat govindam rāmaḥ.* (1 permutation: NP1 and VP)
d. *govindam apaśyat rāmaḥ.* (2 permutations: NP1 and VP; NP2 and V)

The ones prohibited correspond to no linear configurations obtained from any permutations of the labeled nodes.

(11) a. *govindam rāmaḥ apaśyat.*
b. *apaśyat rāmaḥ govindam.*

Indeed, any tree for these last two linear configurations would have to have descending lines which cross. Equivalently, any labeled brackets for them would have to have a discontinuous constituent. In particular, the verb phrase would be broken up by the subject noun phrase, intervening between the verb and its object. The sentences in (11), however, are acceptable Sanskrit sentences.

At first glance, it might appear that a language which permits both discontinuity and the free permutation of elements in a constituent has no constraints on its word order. But, as will be shown below, this is not true. A careful study of discontinuity in Sanskrit shows not only that it is constrained but that it patterns with forms of discontinuity encountered in word order languages such as English, Chinese, and German. Consider, by way of illustration, the following pairs of English sentences:[5]

(12) a. [S [NP A review [PP of the book]] [VP appeared]]
b. [S [NP A review _] [VP appeared] [PP of the book]]

(13) a. [S Lakṣmaṇa knows [S [NP Rāma] [VP loves [NP Sītā]]]]
b. [S Lakṣmaṇa knows [S [NP whom] [NP Rāma] [VP loves _]]]

("_" marks the point of departure of the moved constituent.) The sentences in (a) exhibit no discontinuity; but the equivalent ones in (b) do. In the one case, the subordinate prepositional phrase has been moved to the end of its clause; and in the other case, the object of the verb in the subordinate clause has been moved to the beginning of its clause.

II.0 The Modified Hypothesis

A concise statement of the pattern of discontinuity in Sanskrit requires the introduction of a few supporting assumptions and technical terms. First, Sanskrit has the four basic lexical categories of adjectives (A), nouns (N), prepositions (P), and verbs (V). Each lexical category has its respective phrasal category of adjective phrase (AP), noun phrase (NP) prepositional phrase (PP), and verb phrase (VP). A phrase consists of its head and any number of phrasal complements or clausal complements; while a clause consists in a (subject) noun phrase (NP), which is optional, and a verb phrase

[5] The labeled brackets around the head word of constituents have been omitted to improve the readability of the notation. The notion of a head word is defined in the next section.

(VP). These facts are expressed in the rules below:

(14) a. XP → {... , X , ...}
b. S → {(NP) , VP}

(The parenthesis around "NP" indicates that it is optional; and the braces may be interpreted to mean that the elements to the right of the arrow freely permute among themselves.[6]) Finally, these rules do not take into consideration either parentheticals, which include vocatives and interjections, or conjunctions. They do not participate in the syntactic structures just outlined, though their placement in a sentence does depend on them.

It is usual to distinguish within a phrase a head and its complements. The head of a phrase is the constituent to which all other elements in the phrase are subordinate. The subordinate elements are complements. On the basis of the order-free categorical rules adopted above, the head of a Sanskrit phrase XP is a lexical category X: so, an adjective (A) is the head of an adjective phrase (AP), a noun (N) of a noun phrase (NP), a preposition (P) of a prepositional phrase (PP), and a verb (V) of a verb phrase (VP). Discontinuity in Sanskrit is confined to the following:

(15) a. Only a complement which is not contained within a complement may move, unless the containing complement is a verb phrase.
b. If a constituent is moved, then all the elements in the constituent are moved.
c. If a constituent is moved, then it is moved to a terminal position in its clause. (Parentheticals, conjunctions, adverbials, gerundial phrases, absolutive phrases, and other moved constituents are not reckoned in determining a clause's terminal position.)

Since a clause's subject noun phrase and verb phrase are never complements, there are only two constituents from within which movement can originate: from within a clause's subject noun phrase and from within its verb phrase. Each case will be examined in turn below.

II.1 Movement From Subject Noun Phrase

The rule above permits movement only of those immediate constituents of the subject noun phrase which are complements of its head, and nothing else. Accordingly, the first sentence below is grammatical, since the adjective phrase "[AP1 [NP5 *rāmāt*] *uccataraḥ*]" is a complement of the subject noun phrase; whereas the second sentence is not, since "[NP5 *rāmāt*]", while occurring in the subject noun phrase, is not a complement of it.

(16) a. [S [NP1s *puruṣaḥ* [AP1 [NP5 *rāmāt*] *uccataraḥ*]] [VP [NP2 *vanam*] *gacchati*]]
b. [S [NP1s *puruṣaḥ* _][VP [NP2 *vanam*] *gacchati*] [AP1 [NP5 *rāmāt*] *uccataraḥ*]]
c. *[S [NP1s *puruṣaḥ* [AP1 *uccarataḥ* _]] [VP [NP2 *vanam*] *gacchati*] [NP5 *rāmāt*]]
A man taller than Rāma is going to the forest.

(The numerals following the label "NP" indicate the relevant case, following the numbering of Pāṇini; "s" after "NP1" indicates that the noun phrase is a subject; and the asterix indicates that the sentence

[6] See Gillon (cited in note 2) for a precise account of how the free permutation is to be captured within formal syntactic theory, in a way which overcomes objections raised in Emmon Bach, "Order in Base Structure", in *Word Order and Word Order Change*, ed. Charles N. Li, Austin 1975.

violates the hypothesis as formulated.) In some cases, constituents moved from the subject noun phrase are moved to the very beginning of the clause, as shown below.

(17) a. [S [AP1 *te*] [NP1 [AP1 *ete*] *kārya-svabhāva-anupalabdhi-lakṣaṇāḥ*] [NP1s _ [AP1 *trayaḥ*] *hetavaḥ*]] <PVSV 2,14>
The three *hetu* are those of effect, of individual, and of non-apprehension.
b. [S [NP6 *kāruṇikasya api*] [AP1 *niṣ-phalaḥ*] [NP1s _ *ārambhaḥ*] [NP5 *a-viparyāsāt*] *iti cet*] <PVSV 9,16>
Suppose it is argued that a compassionate person's undertaking is pointless because of <his> non-delusion.

In many cases, the moved constituents are preceded by some peripheral element, such as a conjunction or adverb.

(18) [S *iti* [AP1 *iyam*] [NP5 *prayoga-bhedāt*] [AP1 *aṣṭadhā*] [NP1s _ *anupalabdhiḥ*]] <PVSV 6,18>
So, this <sort of > non-apprehension is eight-fold, due to <its> different applications.

There are a few cases where a complementary constituent moves to the end of its clause.

(19) a. [S [NP1 *a-pravṛttiḥ* [NP6 *pramāṇānām*] _] [NP1s *anupalabdhiḥ*] [AP1 *a-pravṛtti-phalā* [NP7 *asati*]]] <PVSV 4,5>
Non-apprehension is the non-adversion of cognitively epistemic means, which results in one's not acting on what is not present.
b. [S *api ca* [NP1s [AP1 *artha-antara-nimittaḥ*] *hi dharmaḥ* _] [VP *syāt* [NP1 *anyaḥ eva*]] [AP1 *saḥ*]] <PVSV 20,18>
Moreover, the property whose cause is different <from that in which it inheres> must be different <from that in which it inheres>.

And there is a case where even two complementary constituents in the same subject noun phrase are moved to the end of the clause.

(20) [S [NP1s *avaśyam-bhāva-niyamaḥ* _ _] [NP1 *kaḥ*] [NP6 *parasya*] [ADV *anyathā*] [NP3 *paraiḥ*]] <PVSV 20,16>
Otherwise, in what consists the determination of the necessary existence of the one <i.e., the *sādhya*> by the others <i.e., the *hetu*>.

Here, one of the moved constituents is followed by both an adverb and another moved constituent.

II.2 Movement From Verb Phrase

Constituents in the verb phrase may move; and constituents within those constituents may move; but no others. So, for example, the object of the verb may move; and so may a modifier of the object; but no modifier of the modifier can move. Each of these cases is exemplified below.

(21) a. [S [NP1s *sītā*] [VP [NP2 *puruṣam* [AP2 [NP5 *rāmāt*] *uccataram*]] *apaśyat*]]
b. [S [NP2 *puruṣam* [AP2 [NP5 *rāmāt*] *uccataram*]] [NP1s *sītā*] [VP _ *apaśyat*]]

c. [S [AP2 [NP5 *rāmāt*] *uccataram*] [NP1s *sītā*] [VP [NP2 *puruṣam* _] *apaśyat*]]
d. *[S [NP1s *sītā*] [VP [NP2 *puruṣam* [AP2 *uccaratam* _]] *apaśyat*] [NP *rāmāt*]]
Sītā saw a man taller than Rāma.

Complementary constituents moved from verb phrases include a verb's object, its instrument, and a predicate adjective phrase, either with or without a copular verb.

(22) a. [S [NP2 *karaṇa-guṇa-vaktu-kāmate*] *hi* [NP1s *vacanam*] [VP _ *anumāpayet*]] <PVSV 10,1>
Speech implies both qualities in the organ <of speech> and a desire to speak alone.
b. [S [NP3 [AP3 *tena*] *ca pramāṇena*] [NP1s [NP6 *sādhya-dharmasya*] *tat-mātra-anubandhaḥ*] [VP _ *khyāpyate*]] <PVSV 18,1>
And the dependence of the *sādhya* property merely on it <i.e., the *hetu*> is made known by that epistemic cognition.
c. [S *tathā hi* [AP1 *sattva-dharma-ādi-ālambanāḥ*] [NP1s *maitreya-ādayaḥ*] [VP _ *iṣyante*]] <PVSV 9,14>
Likewise, for instance, such things as friendliness are accepted as based on such things as beings and laws.
d. [S [ADV *anyathā*] [AP1 *a-gamakaḥ*] [NP1s *hetuḥ*] [VP _ *syāt*]] <PVSV 10,24>
Otherwise, a *hetu* would be unindicative.

Constituents are moved not only to the beginning of their clauses, as in the examples above, but also to the end, as shown below.

(23) [S [S [VP *bhavati* _] *ca* [NP1s *dhūmaḥ*] [PP [NP2 *agnim*] *antareṇa*]] [S *tat na* [VP [AP1 *tat-hetuḥ*] *syāt*]]] <PVSV 22,9>
Yet if smoke arises without fire, then <smoke> would not have it <i.e., fire> for its cause.

It should be added that there is nothing to prohibit movement from both a clause's subject noun phrase and its verb phrase.

(24) [S [AP1 *iyam*] *ca* [NP3 *hetu-a-siddhyā eva*] [NP1s _ *tat-viruddha-siddhiḥ*] [ADV *prāk eva*] [AP1 _ *nirdiṣṭā*]] <PVSV 6,17>
And pointed out just above by the non-establishment of a cause was the establishment of what is contradictory with it.

II.3 Movement Within Relative Clauses

Movement occurs within all kinds of clauses, including relative clauses. In relative clauses (labeled "RC"), the relative pronoun, or a constituent containing it, may, but need not, move. If it does move, it moves to the beginning of its clause; and no other constituent moved from within the clause may precede it. (Ellipsis is marked by "E".)

(25) a. [S *tasmāt* [RC [NP5 [AP5 *yathā-bhūtāt*] *hetoḥ*] [NP1s *rasaḥ*] [AP1 _ *utpannaḥ*]] [NP1s [PC [NP2 [AP2 *tathā-bhūtam*]] *anumāpayan*] E] [VP [NP2 *rūpam*] *anumāpayati*]] <PVSV 8,3>
Therefore, in bringing about an inference of a *hetu* from which it has arisen, flavor brings

about an inference of color.

b. [S [RC [AP1 *yaḥ*] *tarhi* [NP3 [AP3 *samagreṇa*] *hetunā*] [NP1s _ *kārya-utpādaḥ*] [VP _ *anumīyate*]] [NP1s *saḥ*] *katham* [VP [NP7 [AP7 *trividhe*] *hetau*] *antarbhavati*]] <PVSV 6,24>
How, then, is the production of an effect which is inferred through <its> complete <set of> causes included within the threefold *hetu*?

c. [S [RC [NP6 *yasya*] [NP3 *a-darśana-mātreṇa*] [NP1s _ *vyatirekaḥ*] [VP _ *pradarśyate*]] [NP5 [NP6 *tasya*] *saṃśaya-hetutvāt*] [AP1 *śeṣavat*] [NP1s *tad*] [AP1 _ *udāhṛtam*]] <PVSV 10,19>
That whose contra-concomitance is shown through mere non-observation is called inadequate, because it is grounds for doubt.

III.0 Summary of the Data

There are only sixty-two cases of discontinuity, or otherwise anomalous consistency,[7] to be found among the first four-hundred sixty-five or so sentences of Dharmakīrti's *Svārthānumāna* chapter, the vast majority of which are sentences without any verse. Of these, there are only twelve problematic sentences, eight occurring in sentences with verse and four occurring in purely prose sentences. Let us consider the problematic sentences with verse first.

To begin with, there are two sentences which, although not violating the modified hypothesis, are nonetheless not what one would expect. In each case, an adverbial element having scope over the entire clause occurs inside of a sub-constituent of the clause.

(26) a. [S [NP5 *saṃnidhānāt* [ADV *tathā*] [NP6 *ekasya*]] [ADV *katham*] [NP1s [NP6 *anyasya*] *saṃnidhiḥ*]] <PVSV 17,10>
In the same way, how is there the presence of one thing because of the presence of another?

b. [S *tathā hi* [PP [NP3 *śakti-pravṛttyā* [NP3 [NP6 *sva-karaṇasya*] [PP [NP2 *phala-utpādanam*] *prati*] *ābhimukhyena*]] *na vinā*] [NP1s *rasaḥ*]] <PVSV 7,18>
For in this way, flavour <does> not <arise> without the incitement of <its cause's> potentiality, <that is,> not without the imminence of its own cause with respect to producing <its> effect.

In the first case, the adverb "*tathā*", occurring as the second word in the sentence, occurs within an ablative noun phrase, even though its scope is the entire clause. This, of course, is the usual position for the placement of sentential conjunctions such as "*hi*" and "*ca*", but not for the adverb "*tathā*". In the second case, the negative particle "*na*" occurs within a prepositional phrase, even though it has scope over the entire clause.

In addition to these oddities, there are six clear violations of the modified hypothesis. The violations include movement of complements which are not permitted to move (infraction of (15)a above):

[7] The cases are as follows: PVSV 1,2v; 1,5v; 2,14; 3,7; 4,1v; 4,5v; 4,9; 4,19; 5,7v; 5,19; 6,17; 6,18; 6,19; 6,21v; 6,22; 6,24v; 6,26; 7,3v; 7,18v; 8,3; 8,16v; 9,14; 9,16; 10,1; 10,15; 10,19v; 10,23; 10,24; 11,11; 12,6v; 12,12; 12,26v; 13,6; 13,7; 13,12v; 14,19v; 14,21; 16,8v; 16,11; 16,19; 16,20; 17,10v; 18,1; 18,2; 18,3; 19,1; 19,6; 19,16; 19,20; 19,25; 20,9; 20,16v; 20,18v; 20,23; 21,13; 21,15; 21,22; 22,9; 22,16; 23,2; 23,25. Sentences which are not purely prose are labeled with "v".

(27) a. [S *prāyaḥ* [NP1s [AP1 *prākṛta-saktiḥ*] [AP1 *a-pratibala-prajñaḥ*] *janaḥ*] [AP1 *kevalam na an-arthī eva* [NP3 *subhāṣitaiḥ*]] [AP1 *parigataḥ* _] [VP *vidveṣṭi api*] [NP3 *īrṣyā-malaiḥ*]] <PVSV 1,5>
For the most part, people, devoted to the vulgar and with inadequate intelligence, are not only disinterested in what is well said, <but>, being afflicted with the filth of envy, are even hostile <to it>.

b. [S [AP7 [NP6 *sāmagrī-phala-śaktīnām*] *pariṇāma-anubandhini*] [NP1s *anaikantikatā* [NP7 _ *kārye*]] [NP5 [NP6 *pratibandhasya*] *sambhavāt*]] <PVSV 7,3>
There is deviation with regard to an effect, which depends on the development of the potentialities for the result of <its> causal totality because of the possibility of <its> obstruction.

c. [S [NP1 E [NP7 *svabhāve* _]] [NP1s *bhāvaḥ api*]] [AP7 *bhāva-mātra-anurodhini*] <PVSV 4,1>
A thing too is a *hetu* for an intrinsic property, which depends only on the existence <of the thing>.

d. [S *kim ca* [RC [NP6 *ātma-mṛd-cetana-ādīnām*] [NP1s *yaḥ*] [NP1 [NP6 _ *abhāvasya*] *a-prasādhakaḥ*]] [NP1s [AP1 *saḥ eva*] *anupalambhaḥ*] *kim* [NP1 [NP6 *hetu-abhāvasya*] *sādhakaḥ*]] <PVSV 16,8>
Moreover, how can the very same non-apprehension which does not establish the absence of such things as the self and consciousness in earth establish the absence of the *hetu* <from the *vipakṣa*>.

movement to a position to which movement is not permitted (infraction of (15)c above):

(28) [S *kim ca* [NP1s *dṛṣṭa-a-yuktiḥ* _ [NP5 *a-dṛṣṭeḥ*]] *ca* [VP *syāt* [NP6 *sparśasya*] [AP1 *a-virodhinī*]] <PVSV 14,19>
Moreover, <the conclusion of> the non-connection of touch with what is observed due to its non-observation would be uncontradicted.

or a combination of the two:

(29) [S [RC [NP3 *hetunā*] [AP1 *yaḥ*] [AP3 *samagreṇa*] [NP1s *kārya-utpādaḥ*] [VP *anumīyate*]] [NP5 *artha-antara-an-apekṣatvāt*] [NP1s *saḥ*] [AP1 [NP1 *svabhāvaḥ*] *anuvarṇitaḥ*]] <PVSV 6,24>
The production of an effect which is inferred through <its> complete <set of> causes is described as <their> *svabhāva* <of causes> because it does not require anything else.

Of course, unusual word order in sentences with verse is no surprise. However, unusual word order is also found in purely prose sentences. There are, to be precise, two oddities, one found three times and the other found once. The first oddity consists in material belonging to a participial phrase moving beyond it to the beginning of the main clause. This violates what I had concluded from my study of Apte's sentences, for, in those sentences, movement of elements in a participial phrase is confined to it, the participial phrase functioning essentially as a clause.

(30) a. [S [NP2 *anupalambham*] *ca* [NP6 *asya* [AP6 [PC _ *pramāṇayataḥ*]]] [NP1s *ātma-vādaḥ*] [VP [AP1 *nirālambhaḥ*] *syāt*] [NP5 [NP5 *a-pratyakṣatvāt* [NP6 *ātmanaḥ*]] *tat-kārya-a-siddheḥ*]] <PVSV 16,11>

The view of the self <as existent> would be baseless for one who regards non-apprehension as epistemic, because, due to the self's imperceptibility, its effects cannot be established.

b. [S [NP6 *mṛdaḥ*] *khalu api* [NP1s *kaḥ-cit* [AP1 [PC [NP2 _ *caitanyam*] [AP2 *anupalabhyamānam api*] *icchan*]]] [NP5 *a-darśanāt*] [VP [NP2 [NP6 *vacana-ādeḥ*] *vyāvṛttim*] *āha*]] <PVSV 16,19>
It is well-known too that some, who accept the awareness of earth, even though being unapprehended, assert the exclusion of such things as speech <from such things as omniscient beings> due to their non-observation <therein>.

c. [S [NP2 *dadhy-ādikam*] *ca* [NP1s *aparaḥ* [AP1 [PC _ *kṣīra-ādiṣu*] [AP2 E] E]]] [NP5 [NP7 *a-para-artheṣu*] *saṃghātatva-a-darśanāt*] [VP [NP2 *vyatirekam*] E] <PVSV 16,20>
And others, who accept <the existence of> such things as curds in such things as milk, even though being unapprehended, assert exclusion of compositeness from things not for others, because of their non-observation in them.

The last sentence is particularly puzzling, since it appears that only part of a constituent has been moved. However, much of the material belonging to this sentence has been elided, thereby obscuring its actual syntactic structure.

The second oddity consists in a constituent ineligible for movement moving into a position into which it should not be moved (violation of (15)c): the complement to "*anyat*" is moved to the other side of the element to which "*anyat*" is a complement.

(31) [S [NP1s [AP1 *sā*] *ca yogyatā*] [NP1 [NP5 *hetu-bhāvāt*] *kim* [AP1 _ *anyat*]]]
<PVSV 23,2>
And what else is this aptitude than the existence of a cause?

I do not think this is an isolated case, since I have seen other cases in, for example, Karṇakagomin's commentary. What is uncanny is that English tolerates the same sort of discontinuity both with comparative adjectives as well as with the English counterpart of "*anyat*", namely, "different".

(32) a. [NP A man [AP taller [PP than Rāma]]] [VP arrived yesterday].
b. [NP A [AP taller _] man [PP than Rāma]] [VP arrived yesterday].
c. [NP A boon [AP different [PP from that one]]] [VP was chosen by Rāma].
d. [NP A [AP different _] boon [PP from that one]][VP was chosen by Rāma].

In conclusion, there are only seven violations of the modified hypothesis presented in (15) above. Of these, only one is a purely prose sentence; and its violation has an exact analogue in word order languages such as English. It seems to me, then, that the modified hypothesis finds strong support within the sentences of the *Svārthānumāna* chapter on other grounds; after all, there is only one violation of the hypothesis among the four hundred or so purely prose sentences, that is, a quarter of one percent deviation!

Abbreviation

PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes.* Roma 1960.

ON *PAKṢĀBHĀSA*

by

Masahiro Inami, Hiroshima

In Dignāga's system of logic, a syllogism consists of three members, viz., *pakṣa* (thesis), *hetu* (reason), and *dṛṣṭānta* (example). Concerning the *pakṣa*, he excludes those theses which are refuted by *pratyakṣa* (perception), etc. – a thesis of this type is called a *pakṣābhāsa* (fallacious thesis). His theory of *pakṣābhāsa* had a considerable influence upon post-Dignāga logicians. The aim of this paper is to trace the development of the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti.

I. Dignāga wrote two important works on logic: the *Nyāyamukha*, founded on the *vāda* tradition, and the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, founded on the *pramāṇa* tradition. He constructed his system of logic after careful consideration of his predecessors such as Vasubandhu. While the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* had not been clearly discussed by the preceding Indian logicians, the germ of the theory, however, can be found in Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* and the *Ru-shi-lun* (如實論 **Tarkaśāstra*) attributed to Vasubandhu. Vātsyāyana mentioned the term '*nyāyābhāsa*' (false reasoning) as an opposite of '*nyāya*' (reasoning), treating inferences which did not agree with what is obtained by perception or verbal (scriptural) testimony, as *nyāyābhāsa*s.[1] In the first chapter of the *Ru-shi-lun*, the author counters the opposition by pointing out its errors, some of them being the cases where the opponent contradicts himself, perception, inference, or common knowledge. We also find that the instances used there resemble ones mentioned later with reference to *pakṣābhāsa*.[2] But, in these works, the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* is not explicitly stated. Dignāga seems to be the first logician to set out the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* in relation to the definition of *pakṣa* or *pratijñā*.

Dignāga's definitions of *pakṣa* are as follows:

svayam /
sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ // (NMu v. 1b-d)[3]

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[1] NBh on NSū 1.1.1: *pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇaṃ nyāyaḥ. . . . yat punar anumānaṃ pratyakṣāgamaviruddhaṃ nyāyābhāsaḥ sa iti.* See S. Chatterjee, *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, Calcutta 1965: 281. Also see Bimal K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, Delhi 1985: 23-29.

[2] The *Ru-shi-lun* (如實論 **Tarkaśāstra*) Taishō Vol. 32, 29a16-b12:
復次汝稱我言說無道理者。非是言說。若是言說不得無道理。有言說無道理。此二相違。譬如童女有兒。若是童女不得有兒　若有兒則非童女。童女有兒此二相違。是故稱有言說無道理。是義不然。
復次與證智相違故。汝聞我言說而稱無道理者。若汝已聞則爲證智所成就。證智力大。汝言則壞。譬如有人說聲不爲耳識得。耳識既得聲爲證智所成就。證智力大。此言則壞。
復次與比智相違故。若汝稱我有言說比智所得則智有道理。若無道理言說亦無。若有言說知有道理。譬如有人說聲常住從因生故。一切從因生者則無常住。譬如瓦器從因生故不得常住。. . .
復次與世間相違故。汝稱我言說無道理。是語與世間相違。何以故。於世間中立四種道理。一因果道理。二相待道理。三成就道理。四如如道理。因果道理者。. . .
For G. Tucci's Sanskrit retranslation, see Giuseppe Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Baroda 1929: 4,11-5,8; part II: 2. H. Ui, *Indotetsugaku Kenkyū* 5, 1929: 489.

[3] NMu 1a6f.: 唯隨自意樂　爲所成立說名宗　非彼相違義能遣 The Sanskrit fragment is found in PVBh 50, etc. Cf. Katsura [1] 109f.

"A thesis is that which [the proponent] himself intends to prove, and which is not refuted by objects contradictory to it."

svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ // (PS III 2ab)[4]

"A thesis is that which [the proponent] himself intends to state just according to its nature [i.e. as a *sādhya*], and which is not refuted [by objects of perception, etc.]."

In these definitions Dignāga mentioned the word '*anirākṛta*' (not refuted), which had not been used in the previous definitions of *pakṣa* or *pratijñā*.[5] Let us examine Dignāga's explanation of the word '*anirākṛta*'.

anirākṛtaḥ /

pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi // (2)

yo hi dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭas tatra yadi sādhyadharmaviruddhena pratyakṣānumānāgamaprasiddhena dharmāntareṇa anirākṛtas tarhi sādhyanirdeśo niravadyaḥ. anyathā tadābhāsaḥ. (PS(V) III 2b-d)[6]

"With regard to [the proponent's] own subject, [a thesis] is not refuted by what is known by perception, by inference, by trustworthy words, or by what is commonly known. (2) With regard to a subject which is intended to prove to be qualified by a property (A), if the property to be proved (A) is not refuted by the other property (B) which is contradictory to it (A) and which is known by perception, by inference, by scripture, or by verbal convention, the statement of the thing to be proved (i.e. thesis) is faultless, otherwise it is a fallacious [thesis]."

A thesis (*pakṣa* = *sādhyanirdeśa*) should not be refuted by perception, etc. More precisely, its property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) should not be refuted with regard to the subject by what is obtained by perception, etc. A thesis that is so refuted is a *pakṣābhāsa*.

In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga enumerated four sorts of *pakṣābhāsa*s, together with examples.[7]

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[4] PS III 2ab: *raṅ gi ṅo bo kho na bstan / bdag 'dod . . . ma bsal ba'o /* The Sanskrit fragment is found in PVBh 467, etc. Cf. Jambūvijaya 1968: 126; Kitagawa 1965: 126-129.

[5] Cf. NSū 1.1.33: *sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā*; *Carakasaṃhitā* 3.8.30: *atha pratijñā - pratijñā nāma sādhyavacanam, yathā nityaḥ puruṣeti*; NBh on NSū 1.1.33: *prajñāpanīyena dharmeṇa dharmiṇo viśiṣṭasya parigrahavacanaṃ pratijñā.*

The definitions attributed to Vasubandhu are as follows: *sādhyābhidhānaṃ pratijñā* (*Vādavidhi*); *vicāraṇāyāṃ iṣṭo 'rthaḥ pakṣaḥ* (*Vādavidhi*); *pakṣavacanaṃ pratijñā //* (*Vādavidhāna*); *pakṣo yaḥ sādhayituṃ iṣṭaḥ //* (*Vādavidhāna*) (See E. Frauwallner, "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 40, 1933, 281-304, and "Vasubandhu's Vādavidhi", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 1, 1957, 104-146).

Cf. AS (*Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga*, ed. Pralhad Pradhan, Santiniketan 1950) 105,5: *pratijñā sādhyasya svarucitārthasya parasaṃprāpaṇavijñāpanā.*

[6] PS(V) 125a1-4: *de yaṅ*

raṅ gi chos can la //

mṅon sum don daṅ rjes dpag daṅ // yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba'o //

chos can gaṅ la chos kyi khyad par bsgrub par 'dod pa ste / gal te de bsgrub bya'i chos daṅ 'gal ba'i mṅon sum daṅ / rjes su dpag pa daṅ luṅ daṅ / grags pa'i chos gźan gyis ma bsal ba'o // de ltar na bsgrub bya bstan pa kha na ma tho ba med pa yin la / gźan du ni . . . der snaṅ ba yin no //

This Sanskrit text was reconstructed by Jambūvijaya from the Sanskrit fragments found in PVBh 551, etc. (Jambūvijaya 1968: 129,2f.). Cf. Kitagawa 1965: 129f.

[7] PSV 125a3-5. Cf. Jambūvijaya 1968: 129,4-130,1; Kitagawa 1965: 130.

The five sorts of *pakṣābhāsa* are enumerated in the *Nyāyamukha* 31a16-22:

1. A thesis which is refuted by *svavacana* e.g. *sarvam uktam mṛṣā*
2. A thesis which is refuted by *pūrvābhyupagama* e.g. *aulūkyasya nityaḥ śabda iti sādhayataḥ.*
3. A thesis which is refuted by *śabdaprasiddha* e.g. *acandraḥ śaśī satvāt.*
4. A thesis which is refuted by *pratyakṣa* e.g. *aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ.*
5. A thesis which is refuted by *anumāna* e.g. *nityo ghaṭaḥ.*

Cf. Katsura [1] 113-115.

1. A thesis which is refuted by perception (*pratyakṣa-nirākṛta*)
   e.g. "Sound is not audible." (*aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*)
2. A thesis which is refuted by inference (*anumāna-nirākṛta*)
   e.g. "A pot is permanent." (*nityo ghaṭaḥ*)
3. A thesis which is refuted by trustworthy words/scripture (*āpta-/āgama-nirākṛta*)
   e.g. "There are no *pramāṇa*s which have cognizable things as their objects." (*na santi pramāṇāṇi prameyārthāni*)
4. A thesis which is refuted by verbal convention (*śābdaprasiddha-nirākṛta*)
   e.g. "The moon is not [called] *candra*, because it exists. (*acandraḥ śaśī sattvāt*)

According to him, these are the cases of refutation of the nature of *dharma* (*dharmasvarūpanirākaraṇa*). He additionally listed other categories of *pakṣābhāsa* in terms of what is refuted.[8]

[A. Refutation of the nature of *dharma* (*dharmasvarūpa-nirākaraṇa*)]
B. Refutation of a qualification of *dharma* (*dharmaviśeṣa-nirākaraṇa*)
C. Refutation of the nature of *dharmin* (*dharmisvarūpa-nirākaraṇa*)
D. Refutation of a qualification of *dharmin* (*dharmiviśeṣa-nirākaraṇa*)
E. Refutation of the nature or qualification of both [*dharma* and *dharmin*] (*ubhayasvarūpaviśeṣa-nirākaraṇa*)

Before Dignāga, fallacious theses had been included in *nigrahasthāna* (points of defeat), but they were regarded as fallacious in relation to other members of syllogism. For example, according to the Nyāya school, *pratijñāvirodha* (contradiction of the thesis) means a statement of a thesis contradictory to the reason.[9] *pratijñāhāni* (violation of the thesis) occurs when the proponent admits that a contrary property, which belongs to the counter-instance cited by the opponent, is present in the example cited by himself.[10] A fault concerned exclusively with *pratijñā* as in Dignāga's case had not been mentioned. Whether a thesis was correct or not was ascertained by a consideration of the subsequent members of the syllogism. Therefore the thesis had not been qualified by '*anirākṛta*'. Dignāga was the first logician to introduce the theory of faults of the thesis itself, and who restricted the statement of *pakṣa*.

The introduction of the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* may be regarded as a result of applying the contrast between *hetu* and *hetvābhāsa* to other members of the syllogism. In consequence, it has a role to exclude an apparently absurd statement before actually commencing the proof. This theory was introduced in order to avoid useless investigation. Moreover, according to H. Kitagawa, there are cases of apparently invalid inference which can not be excluded from Dignāga's *trairūpya* system. For example, in the case of the inference "Sound is not audible, because it ensues on human effort, like

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[8] PSV 125a5-b2. Cf. Jambūvijaya 1968: 130,1-132,2; Kitagawa 1965: 131-134. These categories are not enumerated in the *Nyāyamukha*, which predates the PS(V). Their examples are mentioned in the PSV as follows:

B. *nānyo 'vayavī avayavebhyaḥ, tulānativiśeṣāgrahāt.*
C. *nānye 'vayavā avayavinaḥ, apratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāt.*
D. *nāsti dravyam, guṇadravyāṇāṃ dravyādravyatvaprasaṅgāt.*
E. *sarvaṃ vākyam anṛtārtham.*

These are not the examples of refuted theses belonging to the opponents, but those of refutation asserted by Dignāga himself. For example, in the case of the refutation of a qualification of *dharma* (B), the Vaiśeṣika's thesis that the whole is different from the parts (*anyo 'vayavī avayavebhyaḥ*) is refuted. It is not the *sādhyadharma* (i.e. 'difference' (*anyatva*) which is refuted by this reasoning, but the qualification (i.e. 'heaviness', *gaurava*, etc.) for the latter is necessarily connected with the *sādhyadharma*.

[9] NSū 5.2.4: *pratijñāhetvor virodhaḥ pratijñāvirodhaḥ.*

[10] NSū 5.2.2: *pratidṛṣṭāntadharmābhyanujñā svadṛṣṭānte pratijñāhāniḥ.*

a pot (*aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnānantarīyakatvāt ghaṭavat*)", the *hetu* has *trirūpa* (the three characters of the valid reason), so this inference, which is refuted by perceptual experience, should be correct. In order to exclude such a paradox Dignāga introduced this *pakṣābhāsa* theory.[11]

II. Dignāga's theory of *pakṣābhāsa*, together with that of *trairūpya*, had a considerable influence upon post-Dignāgean logicians. Praśastapāda mentioned the term '*avirodhī*' (not contradicted) in his definition of *pratijñā*, and he enumerated five sorts of *virodhī* (contradicted thesis).[12] Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also stated a more detailed theory of *pratijñābhāsas* in the *Ślokavārttika*.[13] The most important logician in relation to Dignāga, however, was Uddyotakara. In the *Nyāyavārttika*, we can find many passages criticizing Dignāga. We shall now examine Uddyotakara's criticism of Dignāga's *pakṣābhāsa* theory in the *Nyāyavārttika* on NSū 1.1.1 and 1.1.33.[14]

Uddyotakara seemed to accept two types of fault, viz. *pratyakṣaviruddha* and *āgamaviruddha*, as *pratijñādoṣa* (which correspond to Dignāga's *pakṣābhāsa*), following Vātsyāyana's view of *nyāyābhāsa*. But he did not accept Dignāga's theory. He pointed out that the term '*anirākṛta*' in Dignāga's definition should not have been mentioned because the term '*īpsita*' or '*iṣṭa*' (intended) had already excluded the unintended thesis (*aniṣṭa*).[15] Furthermore Uddyotakara criticized each *pakṣābhāsa* enumerated by Dignāga as follows:

(1) The example "Sound is not audible" is not appropriate for the *pratyakṣavirodha*, for sound's audibility is not perceived but inferred. The proper example of *pratyakṣavirodha* is "Fire is not hot" (*anuṣṇo 'agniḥ*). (NV 15,9-10, 15,12-15, 517,8-11; cf. ŚV *Anumāna* 60cd)

(2) The example "When a Vaiśeṣika would prove that sound is permanent" (*aulūkyasya nityaḥ śabda iti sādhayataḥ*) is not appropriate for the *āgamavirodha*, for the Vaiśeṣikas do not prove by *āgama*, that sound is impermanent, but by inference. The proper example is "Wine should be drunk by the Brāhmaṇa" (*brāhmaṇena surā peyā*) or "The human skull is sacred, because it is part of a living being, like the conch shell" (*śuci naraśiraḥkapālaṃ prāṇyaṅgatvāc chaṅkhaśuktivat*). (NV 15,15-21, 517,12-17)

(3) *prasiddhivirodha* ought not to be stated separately, for *prasiddhi* means knowledge acquired by some *pramāṇas*, and *prasiddhivirodha* is included in the ones which contradict the preceding *pramāṇas*. (NV 517,17-20)

(4) *anumānavirodha* never occurs, for, on the same object, there cannot be two mutually contradictory inferences based on *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. (NV 15,21-25)

(5) The term '*pakṣadoṣa*' (i.e. *pakṣābhāsa*) is incorrect. The term '*pratijñādoṣa*' should be used,

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[11] Kitagawa 1965: 54-67; Katsura [1] 114; Shōryū Katsura, "Dignāga no ninshikiron to ronrigaku", *Kōza Daijō Bukkyō 9 – Ninshikiron to ronrigaku*, Tōkyō 1984: 137-139: 137-139.

[12] *The Praśastapāda Bhāshya with Commentary Nyāyakandali of Sridhara*, ed. Vindhyasvari Prasad Dvivedin, Delhi ²1984: 233,25-234,8: *tatrānumeyoddeśo 'virodhī pratijñā. pratipipādayiṣitadharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇopadeśaviṣayam āpādayitum uddeśamātraṃ pratijñā, yathā dravyaṃ vāyur iti. avirodhigrahaṇāt pratyakṣānumānābhyupagatasvaśāstrasvavacanavirodhino nirastā bhavanti, yathā 'nuṣṇo 'gnir iti pratyakṣavirodhī, ghanam ambaram ity anumānavirodhī, brāhmaṇena surā peyety āgamavirodhī, vaiśeṣikasya satkāryam iti bruvataḥ svaśāstravirodhī, na śabdo 'thapratyāyaka iti svavacanavirodhī.*

[13] ŚV *Anumāna* 59c-75b. Dignāga's theory of *pakṣābhāsa* influenced Bhāvaviveka (ca.490-570) and Bhāmaha (7c). Cf. Y. Ejima, *Chūkanshisō no tenkai – Bhāvaviveka kenkyū*, Tōkyō 1980: 96-98, 106-113. A. B. Dhruva, NP note p. 36. N. Kobayashi, "Bhāmaha ni in-yō sareru Dignāga to Vasubandhu", *IBK* 25/2, p. (160).

[14] NV 15,9-27 on NSū 1.1.1, NV 517,4ff. on NSū 1.1.33.

[15] NV 519,4-13.

for only the statement is affirmed or negated, but not the object itself.[16]

Let us now turn to a post-Dignāgean manual of Buddhist logic, the *Nyāyapraveśa* attributed to Śaṅkarasvāmin, which contains the following enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas*:[17]

1. A thesis which is contradicted by perception (*pratyakṣaviruddha*)
   e.g. "Sound is not audible." (*aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*)
2. A thesis which is contradicted by inference (*anumānaviruddha*)
   e.g. "A pot is permanent." (*nityo ghaṭaḥ*)
3. A thesis which is contradicted by scripture (*āgamaviruddha*)
   e.g. It is seen when a Vaiśeṣika would prove that sound is permanent (*vaiśeṣikasya nityaḥ śabda iti sādhayataḥ*).
4. A thesis which is contradicted by common knowledge (*lokaviruddha*)
   e.g. "A human skull is sacred, because it is a part of a living being, like the conch shell." (*śuci naraśiraḥkapālaṃ prāṇyaṅgatvāc chaṅkhaśuktivat*)
5. A thesis which is contradicted by one's own statement (*svavacanaviruddha*)
   e.g. "My mother was barren." (*mātā me bandhyā*)
6. A thesis in which the qualifier is not admitted to exist (*aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*)
   e.g. It is seen when a Buddhist says to a Sāṃkhya that sound is perishable (*bauddhasya sāṃkhyaṃ prati vināśī śabda iti*).
7. A thesis in which the qualificand is not admitted to exist (*aprasiddhaviśeṣya*)
   e.g. It is seen when a Sāṃkhya says to a Buddhist that the soul is sentient (*sāṃkhyasya bauddhaṃ prati cetana ātmeti*).
8. A thesis in which the qualifier and the qualificand are not admitted to exist (*aprasiddhob-haya*)
   e.g. It is seen when a Vaiśeṣika says to a Buddhist that the soul is the inherent cause of happiness, etc. (*vaiśeṣikasya bauddhaṃ prati sukhādisamavāyikāraṇam ātmeti*).
9. A thesis in which the relation of the qualifier and the qualificand is well known (*prasiddha-sambandha*)
   e.g. "Sound is audible." (*śravaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*)

The author states that the above are faults of the thesis because they reject the property itself as in the first five cases, or because they cannot convince the opponent as in the next three cases, or because the proof is useless as in the last case. Dignāga, in the *Nyāyamukha*, enumerated only the first five of these nine sorts of *pakṣābhāsa*. The last one, i.e. *prasiddhasambandha*, is synonymous with *siddhasādhana* (proving of anything already proved), which is a fault familiar to Indian philosophers from old times.[18] Dignāga did not actually enumerate *siddhasādhana* as *pakṣābhāsa* but he alluded to it by the word '*sādhyatvena*' (NMu) or '*svarūpeṇa*' (PS) in his definition of the *pakṣa*.[19]

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[16] NV 517,22ff. Unlike Dignāga, Uddyotakara seems to use the term '*pakṣa*' in a strict sense.

[17] NP 2,13-3,7. Cf. M. Tachikawa, "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic (A Translation of the Nyāyapraveśa)", *JIPh* 1/2, 1971, 111-145.

[18] "The *Vigrahavyavartanī* of Nāgārjuna", ed. E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst, *Melanges chinois et bouddhiques* 9, [1948-1951] 1951: 134,13-21. Jitāri and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa enumerate *siddhasādhana* as one of *pakṣābhāsas*. Cf. HTU 263,1f.; NM II 133,29-32.

[19] NMu 1a14-16. PSV 124b7-125a1. Cf. Jambūvijaya 1968: 128,1-129,1; Kitagawa 1965: 128f.; Katsura [1] 112. Dharmakīrti explains it in PV IV 79, 85 etc. See Motoi Ono, "Dharmakīrti ni okeru shuchomeidai no teigi ni tsuite", *IBK* 34/2, 1986, (109)-(112).

The remaining three sorts of *pakṣābhāsa* (6,7,8) reflect the peculiar nature of *Nyāyapraveśa*'s definition of *pakṣa*:

pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī prasiddhaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatayā svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ. pratyakṣādyaviruddha iti vākyaśeṣaḥ. (NP 1,6f.)

Tachikawa translates: "The *pakṣa* is a recognized property-possessor which the arguer wishes to prove to be qualified by a recognized qualifier. It is tacitly implied that no *pakṣa* is to be contradicted by perception, etc." (Tachikawa [cited in note 17] 1971: 120f.)

The core of this definition is the same as Dignāga's definitions, but we find two additional expressions. In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* II, Dignāga insists that *anumeya* (object of inference, which is also called *pakṣa*) is a *dharmin* qualified by *sādhyadharma*.[20] Śaṅkarasvāmin introduces this theory into his own definition of *pakṣa*, and adds that *dharma* (*viśeṣaṇa*) and *dharmin* (*viśeṣya*) should be commonly known (*prasiddha*), namely known by both proponent and opponent. Thus, if *viśeṣaṇa*, *viśeṣya*, or both are not commonly known, the statement of such a thesis must be *pakṣābhāsa*. These three sorts of *pakṣābhāsa* were criticized by Dharmakīrti's followers, e.g. Śākyamati, Prajñākaragupta, Manorathanandin, Jinendrabuddhi, etc., on the basis of Dharmakīrti's assertion which we will examine below.[21] Furthermore it is a little curious that Śaṅkarasvāmin's example of *lokaviruddha* "*śuci naraśiraḥkapālam* . . ." is different from Dignāga's and similar to the example of *āgamavirodha* in the *Nyāyavārttika*. Śaṅkarasvāmin, moreover, does not refer to the other categories of *pakṣābhāsa* (A,B,C,D,E) in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Thus, although the *Nyāyapraveśa*'s view on *pakṣābhāsa* is based on Dignāga's, it is different from Dignāga's in the several points discussed above, which is not supported by Dharmakīrti and his followers.[22] This fact suggests that like the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra, Śaṅkarasvāmin does not belong to the main current of Buddhist logic continuing from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti's followers.

III. Now, let us examine Dharmakīrti's theory of *pakṣābhāsa*. Dharmakīrti deals with *pakṣābhāsa* in PV IV 91ff. There he begins his explanation as follows:

aniṣiddhaḥ pramāṇābhyāṃ sa copagama iṣyate /
sandigdhe hetuvacanād vyasto hetor anāśrayaḥ // (PV IV 91)[23]

"Moreover, the tentative acceptance which is not refuted by the two *pramāṇa*s is regarded [as the thesis]. Since the reason is stated with regard to something doubtful, what is refuted [by the two *pramāṇa*s] cannot be the object of the reason."

According to this verse, the theory of *pakṣābhāsa*, as mentioned in Dignāga, has the practical purpose of rejecting a clearly wrong proposition before actually stating the proof. A proposition to be proved must be doubtful, and so one clearly refuted by *pramāṇa*s has no need of proof, nor does one already proved by *pramāṇa*s have to be proved again – otherwise, the fault of *siddhasādhana* occurs.

[20] PSV 111a6 on PS II 5cd: *dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmy anumeyaḥ*. Cf. Kitagawa 1965: 96; Richard P. Hayes, "Diṅnāga's Views on Reasoning (*svārthānumāna*)", *JIPh* 8/3, 1980 [219-277]: 252.

[21] PVṬ [= *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śākyamati): P 5718 (Vols. 131-132, Tshad ma, Je 1 - Ñe 348a8)] 332a7-b1; PVBh 552,3-15; *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (= *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin*, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna 1938-1940) 463,23-464,10; PSṬ [= *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi): P 5766 (Vol. 139, Tshad ma, Ye 1-355a5)] 169b3-170a1.

[22] Exceptionally, the *Hetutattvopadeśa* attributed to Jitāri has an enumeration similar to NP's (cf. HTU 262,5-263,3). Among non-Buddhist works, the *Nyāyamañjarī*'s enumeration is similar to the NP's (cf. NM II 133,22-32).

[23] Cf. PVin III 196a6-b1; T. Tani, "The Problem of Interpretation on Pramāṇaviniścaya III ad vv. 26-27", *The Bulletin of the Kōchi National College of Technology* 28, 1988 [1-16]: 2-5.

Dharmakīrti, in accordance with the number of *pramāṇa*s which he admits, classifies *pakṣābhāsa*s into two sorts, viz., (1) a thesis which is refuted by perception (*pratyakṣa*) and (2) a thesis which is refuted by inference (*anumāna*). This does not agree with Dignāga's classification of the four sorts of *pakṣābhāsa* in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Dharmakīrti solves this problem as follows:

anumānasya bhedena sā bādhoktā caturvidhā /
tatrābhyupāyaḥ kāryāṅgaṃ svabhāvāṅgaṃ jagatsthitiḥ // (PV IV 92)[24]

"Dividing inference [into three sorts], [Dignāga] mentioned the four sorts of refutation [in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III]. Of them, 'trustworthy words' (*abhyupāya*) is the reason as effect (*kāryāṅga*) and 'verbal convention' (*jagatsthiti*) is the reason as essence (*svabhāvāṅga*)."

Thus a thesis which is refuted by inference is subdivided into three sorts, viz., i) a thesis which is refuted by an inference which functions due to the force of reality (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*)[25], ii) by trustworthy words (*abhyupāya*) and iii) by verbal convention (*jagatsthiti*). These three respectively correspond to the last three sorts of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Dharmakīrti regards trustworthy words (*abhyupāya*, i.e. *āpta*) as *kāryahetu*, and verbal convention (*jagatsthiti*, i.e. *śābdaprasiddha*) as *svabhāvahetu*. Thus they are included in inference. Moreover, *svavacananirākṛta* which is mentioned in the *Nyāyamukha* is regarded by Dharmakīrti as being included in a thesis which is refuted by *abhyupāya*. According to him, *āpta* means a speaker himself as well as other speakers who utter something after having determined its truth. A person does not speak anything unless he thinks it is true. Similarly he does not investigate a treatise (*śāstra*) unless he thinks it is true. Thus a treatise and one's own statement are regarded as same in essence, this is why Dharmakīrti considers that they were mentioned together in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Therefore, a thesis which is refuted by trustworthy words is subdivided into two sorts, viz., a thesis which is refuted a) by treatise and b) by one's own statement.[26] The results may be tabulated as follows:[27]

1. A thesis which is refuted by perception
2. A thesis which is refuted by inference
   i) A thesis which is refuted by an inference which functions due to the force of reality
   ii) A thesis which is refuted by trustworthy words
      a) A thesis which is refuted by treatise/scripture
      b) A thesis which is refuted by one's own statement
   iii) A thesis which is refuted by verbal convention

Thus, Dharmakīrti reorganizes the *pakṣābhāsa*s enumerated by Dignāga into two groups in

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[24] Cf. PVin III 196b1-3; Tani (cited in note 23) 1988: 6-7. Jinendrabuddhi makes the same explanation; cf. PSṬ (cited in note 21) 164b2-4.

[25] The first category is not clearly mentioned by Dharmakīrti himself in this context, but enumerated by his commentators, Śākyamati and Dharmottara; cf. PVṬ (cited in note 21) 324b5-6, *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* III [(Dharmottara) P 5727 (Vol. 137, Tshad ma, We 1a1-209b8)] 50a4-5.

[26] PV IV 93-97. Cf. PVin III 196b3-197a1.

[27] The enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas* in the *Nyāyabindu* III 48-53 is as follows:

1. *pratyakṣanirākṛta* e.g. *aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*
2. *anumānanirākṛta* e.g. *nityaḥ śabdaḥ* (*ghaṭaḥ*)
3. *pratītinirākṛta* e.g. *acandraḥ śaśī*
4. *svavacananirākṛta* e.g. *nānumānaṃ pramāṇam*

(According to Vinītadeva, the example of *anumānanirākṛta* is '*nityo ghaṭaḥ*'. Cf. NBṬ$_V$ 105,16-20.)

Dharmakīrti deals with *pakṣābhāsa* in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III (D 196a6ff.) as well. His enumeration there bears a close resemblance to the one in the *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, and thus we need not examine it here. Dharmakīrti fully discusses each *pakṣābhāsa* in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III. I have reported on his explanation of *pratītinirākṛta*, in another paper ("Dharmakīrti no *pakṣābhāsa* setsu – *pratītinirākṛta* no baai", *IBK* 37/2, 1988, (130)-(133)), and will examine the others in future papers.

accordance with the two *pramāṇas*. He seems to think that what refutes a thesis must be a *pramāṇa*.[28] For each *pakṣābhāsa*, Dharmakīrti inherits an example from the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. The example of *śāstranirākṛta* (2.ii.a) was not mentioned there, and Dharmakīrti supplies it by his own example, viz., "Morality does not bring happiness in the next world" (*pretya dharmo 'sukhapradaḥ*).[29]

Dharmakīrti adopts Dignāga's other categories of *pakṣābhāsa* in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in that he also refers to five sorts of *pakṣābhāsa*, viz., (A) *dharmasvarūpa-nirākaraṇa*, (B) *dharmaviśeṣa-nirākaraṇa*, (C) *dharmisvarūpanirākaraṇa*, (D) *dharmiviśeṣa-nirākaraṇa*, and (E) *ubhayasvarūpaviśeṣa-nirākaraṇa*. (PV IV 151-163)

IV. Now, let us look at the status of the *pakṣābhāsa* theory in Dharmakīrti's logic. *pakṣābhāsa* is explained in detail only in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III and *Nyāyabindu* III. In his later works,[30] viz. the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya*, however, it is not mentioned at all and no fallacy is logically admitted of a thesis. In order to understand the reason behind this theoretical change, we must investigate the concept of *pakṣa* in his works.

As is well known, Dharmakīrti stops the statement of a *pakṣa* in his syllogism. A typical example of his syllogism is as follows:

yat kiṃcit kṛtakaṃ tat sarvam anityaṃ yathā ghaṭādayaḥ, śabdaś ca kṛtaka iti. (PVSV 97,19-21 = PVin II 25,29-26,2)[31]

It differs from Dignāga's syllogism in lacking the statement of *pakṣa*. So let us first look at the status of *pakṣa* in Dignāga's logic.

As has been pointed out, the status of *pakṣa* differs in the *Nyāyamukha* and the *Pramāṇasumuccaya*.[32] In the *Nyāyamukha*, Dignāga regards the *pakṣa* as an indispensable member of syllogism. He insists that a proof must consist of a set of three members, so that once any one of them is lacking, there is a fault of the proof called *nyūnatā* (deficiency)[33] which is regarded as one of the *nigrahasthānas* in the *Nyāyasūtra*, etc.[34] Dignāga sticks to the traditional view in the *Nyāyamukha*, but he

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28 Kumārila also enumerates *pakṣābhāsas* in accordance with the *pramāṇas* which he accepts; cf. ŚV *Anumāna* 59cd-75ab. Uddyotakara, on the other hand, discusses the *nyāyābhāsas* in accordance with the four *pramāṇas*, but he does not regard *anumānavirodha* and *upamānavirodha* as *nyāyābhāsa*; cf. NV 15,9-27 on NSū 1.1.1.

29 *svavāgvirodhe vispaṣṭam udāharaṇam āgame /*
diṅmātradarśanaṃ tatra pretya dharmo 'sukhapradaḥ // (PV IV 97)

30 On the chronological order of Dharmakīrti's works, I accept Frauwallner's assumption; cf. E. Frauwallner, "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's" in *Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller*, Leipzig 1954, 142-154.

31 = *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Chapter II: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte,* Wien 1973. Such *prayogas* are seen not only in PVSV and PVin II, but also in his other works; cf. NB III 8-22, HB 5,19f., VN 8,1f.

32 Kitagawa 1965: 127 note (158), Katsura [1] 109-111, [4] 73-75.

33 NMu 1a10-11:

又以一言説能立者爲顯總成一能立性。由此應知隨有所闕名能立過。

(fragment: *sādhanam iti caikavacananirdeśaḥ samastasādhanatvakhyāpanārthaḥ*. NPV 13,23-24)
NMu 3c18-21:

能破闕等言　似破謂諸類

此中能破闕等言者。謂前所説闕等言詞諸分過失彼一一言皆名能破。由彼一一能顯前宗非善説故。

Cf. Katsura [5] 97f.

34 NSū 5.2.12: *hīnam anyatamenāpy avayavena nyūnam*. NBh on this Sūtra: *pratijñādīnām avayavānām anyatamenāpy avayavena hīnaṃ nyūnaṃ nigrahasthānam, sādhanābhāve sādhyāsiddhir iti.*

does not regard a fault of this type as a *nigrahasthāna*.[35]

In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, on the other hand, Dignāga does not consider *pakṣa* to be necessary for a proof. He insists that *pakṣa* is a mere statement of the object of the *hetu*, in other words, a statement where the problem is posed. It is not always necessary to formulate a *pakṣa* – he does not think that the proof can be faulty merely because *pakṣa* is not formulated. In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the meaning of *nyūnatā* changes. It comes to mean the fault in which the *hetu* lacks any of the three characters of a valid *hetu*.[36] Thus Dignāga develops a system of logic based on the theory of *trairūpya*, outgrowing the *vāda* tradition.

In the *Pramāṇavārttika*, the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, and the *Nyāyabindu*, when Dharmakīrti interprets Dignāga's definition of *pakṣa* in PS III 2ab, he accepts Dignāga's later position, considering that a statement of the *pakṣa* does not have the power to prove the *sādhya*, and that it only plays a role in showing the object of the *hetu*. As *pakṣa* is not directly or indirectly useful for the proof, it is not always necessary to formulate a *pakṣa*.[37] According to him, Dignāga only gave the definition of

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[35] NMu 5c26-28. Cf. Katsura [7] 64f.

[36] PS(V) III 1cd: *atra cānyatamasyaikasyāpi rūpasyānuktau nyūnatety uktaṃ bhavati. nanu yas tarkaśāstreṣv anumeyanirdeśasya pratijñāyāḥ parārthānumāne prayogaḥ. sa katham. ta eva prastavyāḥ, asmākaṃ tu*
tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviṣayo mataḥ // (1cd)
avayaveṣu yo 'numeyanirdeśaḥ so 'smākaṃ na sādhanatvena mataḥ, tata eva saṃśayotpatteḥ, api tu hetvarthaviṣayatvena. sa tena prakāśyate. (Jambūvijaya 1968: 125,9-126,4) Cf. Kitagawa 1965: 127f.

Uddyotakara, in NV on NSū 5.2.12, refers to the view that the loss of *pratijñā* is not a *nigrahasthāna*. NV (Calcutta Sanskrit Series 1936) 1185,8: *eke tu pratijñānyūnaṃ nāstīty ācakṣate.* Cf. M. T. Much 1991: Fragment #8 [= "Fragments from Dignāga? Traces of a Pre-Dharmakīrti Buddhist Polemic Against the Nyāya-*nigrahasthāna*" (in this volume)].

Vācaspatimiśra refers to the view that *nyūnatā* is a fault of the *hetu* when it lacks any of the three characters. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (edition of NV) 523,22-524,2: *na punar dūṣaṇāni nyūnatāvayavottaradoṣākṣepabhāvodbhāvanānīti trairūpya saṃpanno hetuḥ pūrnaḥ. sa triṣu rūpeṣv anyatamena rūpeṇa rahito nyūno 'siddho vā viruddho vā anaikāntiko vā bhavatīti so 'yaṃ nyūnatādoṣo hetoḥ. avayavadoṣaś ca pratijñādoṣaḥ svavacanavirodhādiḥ. hetudoṣo 'siddhatvādiḥ evam udāharaṇadoṣaḥ sādhyavikalatvādiḥ. uttaradoṣo jātiḥ prāptyaprāptisamādiḥ. tasyākṣepa upādānaṃ svikāra iti yāvat. bhāvo 'pratibhādiḥ. sa hi vādino vā prativādino vābhiprāyaḥ. tasyodbhāvanāni dūṣaṇānīti.* Cf. Much (cited above) 1991: Fragment #1 and note (13).

[37] *tat pakṣavacanaṃ vaktur abhiprāyanivedane / pramāṇaṃ saṃśayotpattes tataḥ sakṣān na sādhanam //*
sādhanasyaivābhidhānena pāraṃparyeṇa nāpy alam / śaktasya sūcakaṃ hetuvaco 'śaktam api svayam //
hetvarthaviṣayatvena tadaśaktoktir īritā / (PV IV 16-18b; cf. PVin III 189b6-170a7. See Tom J. F. Tillemans, "Pramāṇavārttika IV (2)", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 31, 1987, 141-161.)

NB III 34: *dvayor apy anayoḥ prayogayor nāvaśyaṃ pakṣanirdeśaḥ.*

NB III 45: *iṣṭa iti yathārthe vivādena sādhanam upanyastaṃ tasya siddhim icchatā so 'nukto 'pi vacanena sādhyaḥ.*

PVSV 97,21-27: *kṛtakatvasyāpy anityatvena vyāptiṃ pradarśya śabdasya kṛtakatve kathite sāmarthyād evānityaḥ śabda iti. tasmān nāvaṣyam iha pakṣanirdeśa iti. . . . sāmarthyāt siddheḥ pūrvavan na pratijñāvacanam.* (= PVin II [cited in note 31] 26,4-10)

On NB III 34, commentators seem to give different interpretations.

$NBṬ_V$ 99,8-18: *gal te śugs kyis dam bcas pa'i don rtogs par 'gyur na / de'i tshe dam bcas pa'i tshig la ṅo mi chod pa ci yod 'di ltar skabs kyi śugs kyis log par rtogs pa'i yul gyi don ṅes par śes pa daṅ / phyogs kyi chos daṅ khyab pa bstan pa'i stobs kyis dam bcas pa'i don khoṅ du chud pa de la phyogs bstan pas ci źig bya / de ni rnam par ṅes pa'i tshig brjod pa la lta bar bya'o // spros pa brjod par ni phyogs bstan kyaṅ ṅes pa 'ga' yaṅ med do // de ñid kyi phyir ṅes pa med do źes bya ba smos so // ci ste rnam pa thams cad du phyogs bstan pa dgag par dgoṅs pa kho na źig yin par gyur na ni / de'i tshe 'di skad du gdon mi za bar bstan par mi bya'o źes bśad par 'gyur ro /*

NBṬ 172,8-10: *yataś ca sādhanaṃ sādhyadharmapratibaddhaṃ tādātmyatadutpattibhyāṃ pratipattavyaṃ dvayor api prayogayoḥ, tasmāt pakṣo 'vaśyam eva na nirdeśyaḥ. yat sādhanaṃ sādhyaniyataṃ pratītaṃ tata eva sādhyadharmiṇi dṛṣṭāt sādhyapratītiḥ. ato na kiṃcit sādhyanirdeśeneti.*

Vinītadeva interprets the passage '*nāvaśyam*' as a partial negation. So he reads it to mean that it is not always necessary to formulate a *pakṣa*. On the other hand, Dharmottara reads it to mean that it is absolutely unnecessary to formulate a *pakṣa*. It is difficult to say which is the better reading. But I think Vinītadeva's reading is natural and Dharmakīrti's standpoint in his later works, viz. *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*, made Dharmottara give such an interpretation. Cf. DhPr 172,15-18: *tasmāt pakṣo 'vaśyam eva na nirdeśya ity anena nāvaśyaṃ pakṣanirdeśa ity asyārthaḥ kathitaḥ. evaṃ ca vyācakṣāṇena yat kaiścit svayūthyair vidvasyamānair avaśyaṃ pakṣanirdeṣo na, kintarhi, kadācin nirdeśaḥ, kadācin na iti vyākhyātaṃ tad apahastitaṃ*

pakṣa for the sake of refuting false opinions on *pakṣa*.[38] In *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, Dharmakīrti mentions that *pakṣa* is characterized by *sādhyābhyupagama* (a tentative acceptance of the thing to be proved).[39] Moreover, he also regards *nyūnatā* as the fault where the *hetu* lacks any of the three characters.[40]

In the *Hetubindu*, Dharmakīrti also mentions that formulating a *pakṣa* is superfluous.[41] Moreover, he comes to deal with it negatively. The *pakṣa* completely loses its status as a member of the syllogism. According to him, an inferential knowledge is produced only by the statement of the *pakṣadharma* (the reason's being a property of the subject) and the statement of the *sambandha* (the necessary relation between the property to be proved and the reason) even without the statement of the *pakṣa*, and the statement of the object of the proof (*prameya* = *anumeya*) is quite useless. He states:

dṛṣṭā ca pakṣadharmasambandhavacanamātrāt pratijñāvacanam antareṇāpi pratītir iti kas tasyopayogaḥ. svaniścayavad anyeṣām api niścayotpādanāya ca sādhanam ucyate, tatra svayam ayaṃ prameyasyopadarśanam antareṇāpi pratipadya paraṃ pratipādayan apūrvam arthakramam āśrayata iti kim atra kāraṇam. tasmān na prameyasya vacanena kiṃcit prayojanam, anyathāpi pratipatter utpatteḥ. (HB 6,15-22)

Steinkellner translates: "Und man beobachtet ja, daß die Erkenntnis [des zu Beweisenden] auch ohne eine Mitteilung der Behauptung bloß auf Grund der Mitteilung der Verknüpfung und der Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes [eintritt]; was [wäre] also die Aufgabe [der Mitteilung der Behauptung]? Ferner trägt man den Beweis (*sādhanam*) zu dem Zwecke vor, auch bei anderen [Personen] eine sichere Erkenntnis (*niścayaḥ*) zu erzeugen gleich der eigenen sicheren Erkenntnis. Was ist [aber] Anlaß dafür, daß sich dabei der [eine], nachdem er für sich selbst auch ohne Angabe dessen, was erkannt werden soll, [eben dieses] erkannt hat, wenn er einen anderen belehrt, auf eine [völlig] neue Ordnung (*arthakramaḥ*) stützt? Deshalb hat die Mitteilung dessen, was erkannt werden soll, keinen Zweck, weil die Erkenntnis [des zu Beweisenden] auch auf andere Weise entsteht." (Steinkellner 1967: 41)

In this connection, it should be noted that Dharmakīrti is referring to and tacitly criticizing the following verse by Dignāga.

svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayā /
pakṣadharmatvasambandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam // (NMu v. 13 = PS IV 6)[42]

Hattori translates: "In order to produce in the mind of others the ascertainment in the same way as it is produced in one's own mind, one should state (a) that M is resident in S (*hetu*), (b) the

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draṣṭavyam, kadācid api tasya prayogārhatve pratijñāyāḥ sādhanāṅgatvaprasaṅgāt. tathātve ca Vādanyāyasya [virodhaḥ syāt].

[38] PV IV 28ab: *gamyārthatve 'pi sādhyokter asaṃmohāya lakṣaṇam /* Cf. NBṬ 176,8-10: *atha yadi pakṣo na nirdeśyaḥ, katham anirdeśyasya lakṣaṇam uktam. na sādhanavākyāvayavatvād asya lakṣaṇam uktam, api tv asādhyaṃ kecit sādhyam, sādhyaṃ cāsādhyaṃ kecit pratipannaḥ. tat sadhyāsādhyavipratipattinirākaraṇārthaṃ pakṣalakṣaṇam uktam.*

[39] PV IV 86ab: *sādhyābhyupagamaḥ pakṣalakṣaṇam* (= PVin III 195a2).
Siddhasena Divākara defines *pakṣa* as *sādhyābhyupagama* and *pratyakṣādyanirākṛta*, and he regards it as the statement of the object of the *hetu*. This view is very similar to Dharmakīrti's. However, Siddhasena concludes that its formulation is necessary. Cf. *Nyāyāvatāra* 14: *sādhyābhyupagamaḥ pakṣaḥ pratyakṣādyanirākṛtaḥ /*
tatprayogo 'tra kartavyo hetor gocarādipakṣaḥ //

[40] *anuktāv api pakṣasya siddher apratibandhataḥ /*
triṣv anyatamarūpasyaivānuktir nyūnatoditā // (PV IV 23; cf. Tillemans [cited in note 37] 1987: 151f.)
The *nyūnatā* which the Nyāya school accepts is criticized by Dharmakīrti in the *Vādanyāya* (VN 104,10-14).

[41] HB 5,23f.: *atra sāmarthyād eva pratijñārthasya pratīter na pratijñāyāḥ prayogaḥ.*

[42] NMu 3a7f. = PS(V) 150b7f. Cf. Katsura [4] 74; Kitagawa 1965: 267f.

connection between M and P (*dṛṣṭānta*) and (c) the proposition to be proved (*pratijñā*). Other (members of syllogism, i.e. *upanaya* and *nigamana*) are to be excluded (because they are no other than the repetition of *hetu* and *pratijñā*)." ("Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya", *IBK* 6/1, 1958 [(66)-(71)]: (69)-(70))

There Dignāga declared that from the viewpoint of the inferential process a syllogism consisted of the three members: the *hetu* in which the *pakṣadharmatva* was stated, the *dṛṣṭānta* in which the *sambandha* (*avinābhāva*, *vyāpti*) was stated, and the *pakṣa* (*pratijñā*) in which the *sādhya* was stated. He did not regard *upanaya*, etc. as a member of the syllogism. Thus Dignāga never discarded the statement of the *pakṣa*. On the other hand, Dharmakīrti, from the viewpoint of the inferential process, insists that a syllogism consists of only two statements, viz. the statement of the *pakṣadharma* and that of the *sambandha*, and that the statement of not only the *upanaya*, etc. but also the *pratijñā* is quite useless.[43]

In the *Vādanyāya*, Dharmakīrti goes further to prohibit one from formulating a *pakṣa* as well as an *upanaya* and a *nigamana*. To formulate a *pakṣa* is regarded as a *nigrahasthāna*.

atha vā tasyaiva sādhanasya yan nāṅgaṃ pratijñopanayanigamanādi tasyāsādhanāṅgasya sādhanavākye upādānaṃ vādino nigrahasthānam, vyarthābhidhānāt. (VN 59,8f.)

"Moreover, *pakṣa*, *upanaya*, *nigamana*, etc. are not a means of proof [because a proof consists of the statements of the three characters of a valid reason]. To formulate any of them, which are not a means of proof, in the syllogism is a *nigrahasthāna* for the proponent because he states such a useless thing."[44]

In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Pramāṇavārttika*, etc., Dignāga and Dharmakīrti insist that the *pakṣa* is no more than the statement of the object of the *hetu*. In the *Vādanyāya*, however, Dharmakīrti explicitly insists that even if the *pakṣa* is the statement of the object of the *hetu*, it ought not to be stated. Since an inferential object is known from the statement of the *pakṣadharma* and that of the *sambandha*, the statement of the *pakṣa* is quite useless. That is why to state a *pakṣa* is a *nigrahasthāna*.[45]

This shows that Dharmakīrti's theory of *pakṣa*, as well as Dignāga's, underwent an important development. The theory of the three membered syllogism can be attributed to Vasubandhu.[46] Following

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[43] For the commentators it is difficult to solve the discrepancy between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on this matter. Cf. PVBh 488,6-10: *kathaṃ tarhi pakṣadharmatvasambandhasādhyoktinirdeśābhyupagamaḥ. nāsyāyam arthaḥ, pakṣadharmaś ca sambandhaś ca sādhyoktiś ceti, api tu sambandhasādhyoktisaṅgatā sādhyoktiḥ sambandhasādhyoktiḥ. yat kṛtakaṃ tat anityam iti vyāptyantargatā sādhyoktiḥ, na pratijñārūpena. avaśyaṃ hi sādhane vyāpakatvaṃ sādhyasyopadarśanīyam. ato 'vayavadvayam eva darśanīyam.*

VNṬ 64,22-36: *kathaṃ tarhy uktaṃ pakṣadharmatvasambandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam iti nāsti virodhaḥ. pakṣadharmatvasambandhābhyāṃ sādhyasyoktiprakāśanam ākṣepaḥ, tasmād anyeṣāṃ pakṣopanayavacanādīnām upādeyatvena sādhanavākyavarjanam iti vyākhyānāt. . . .*

[44] Cf. Michael T. Much, "Dharmakīrti's Definition of 'Points of Defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*)." In *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, ed. Bimal K. Matilal and Robert D. Evans. Dordrecht etc.: 134f.

[45] VN 63,4-64,4: *nanu ca viṣayopadarśanāya pratijñāvacanam asādhanāṅgam apy upādeyam eva. na, vaiyarthyāt. asaty api pratijñāvacane yathoktāt sādhanavākyād bhavaty eveṣṭārthasiddhir ity apārthakaṃ tasyopādānam. . . . tasmād vyartham eva sādhanavākye pratijñāvacanopādānaṃ nigrahasthānam.* The objection at the beginning of this passage is attributed to the Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkākāra by Śāntarakṣita. Cf. VNṬ 63,26: *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkākāras tv āhuḥ nanv ityādi.* The same topic is dealt with in the *Hetubindu*, where Dharmakīrti does not conclude that the formulation of a *pakṣa* is the fault of *nigrahasthāna*; cf. HB 6,9-13.

[46] Frauwallner (cited in note 5) 1957: 118 fn. 21. Frauwallner refers to the fragment '*teṣāṃ trayo durvihitāḥ*', but I do not think there is sufficient material to prove that Vasubandhu posits the theory of the three-membered syllogism. The theory is clearly seen in the other fragment '*upanayanigamane tu nāvayavāntare arthāviśeṣāt*' (NV 575,17), but its source is not clear. Following this, Uddyotakara quotes the passage '*pakṣadharmatvasambandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam*', which is a fragment of Dignāga. The three-membered syllogism can be attributed to Vasubandhu on the basis of the following passage of the

him in the *Nyāyamukha*, Dignāga regards *pakṣa* as an indispensable member of the proof. In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, however, he thinks that *pakṣa* is no more than a statement of the object of the *hetu*, and that it is not always necessary to formulate a *pakṣa*. Dharmakīrti first accepts this theory, and then completely abandons the formulation of a *pakṣa* in the *Hetubindu*. To formulate a *pakṣa* comes to be regarded as the fault of *nigrahasthāna* in the *Vādanyāya*. Post-Dharmakīrtian Buddhist logicians, following Dharmakīrti's final position, reject the formulation of a *pakṣa*.[47]

Now let us examine the *pakṣābhāsa* theory. It is likely that Dignāga regards *pakṣābhāsa* as a fault of the proof. In the *Nyāyamukha*, the confutation (*dūṣaṇa*) is defined as an indication of *nyūnatā*, etc., and an indication of any fault of the *avayavas*, viz. *pakṣābhāsas*, *hetvābhāsas*, and *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas*, is included in it (NMu 3c18-21; see note 33). He seems to hold the same view in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.[48]

As was mentioned above, Dharmakīrti explains the *pakṣābhāsa* only in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III, and *Nyāyabindu* III. There *pakṣābhāsa* is interpreted as a logical fault in connection with the *pakṣa* alone and is stated separately from *hetvābhāsa*. He thinks that although any fault of *sādhana*, such as *hetvābhāsa*, can obstruct the thesis to be proved, the fault in connection with *pakṣa* alone is regarded as proper *pakṣadoṣa*. Therefore *hetudoṣas*, e.g. *āśrayāsiddha*, etc., are not regarded as *pakṣadoṣa*.[49] The theory of *pakṣābhāsa* plays a role in rejecting a clearly wrong proposition before actually commencing the proof.[50] Thus Dharmakīrti regards *pakṣābhāsa* as one of the *sādhanadoṣas* in his early works on logic.[51]

Nyāyamukha (NMu 1a8f.:

宗等多言説能立者。由宗因喻多言辯説他未了義故。此多言於論式等説名能立。

Cf. Katsura [1] 110f.

[47] Cf. TS (= *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalshīla*, ed. Dvarikadas Shastri, [2 Vols.] Varanasi 1968) 1429cd: *asādhanāṅgabhūtatvāt pratijñānupayoginī*. HTU 27,17f.: *pratijñānigamane punaḥ sarvathā na vaktavye*. etc.

[48] PS III 17cd: *rtags daṅ dam bca' gźan dag la // skyon brjod sun 'byin śes par bya //* Cf. Kitagawa 1965: 168. Śaṅkarasvāmin clearly mentions the *pakṣābhāsa* as a *sādhanadoṣa* in his definition of the *dūṣaṇa*. Cf. NP 8,1-5: *sādhanadoṣodbhāvanāni dūṣaṇāni. sādhanadoṣo nyūnatvam. pakṣadoṣaḥ pratyakṣādiviruddhatvam. hetudoṣo 'siddhānaikāntikaviruddhatvam. dṛṣṭāntadoṣaḥ sādhanadharmādyasiddhatvam. tasyodbhāvanaṃ prāśnikapratyāyanaṃ dūṣaṇam.*

[49] *uttarāvayavāpekṣo na doṣaḥ pakṣa iṣyate / tathā hetvādidoṣo 'pi pakṣadoṣaḥ prasajyate //*
sarvaiḥ pakṣasya bādhātas tanmātrasaṅginaḥ / pakṣadoṣā matā nānye pratyakṣādivirodhavat //
(PV IV 82-83 = PVin III 195a4-6)
sarvasādhanadoṣeṇa pakṣa evoparudhyate / tathāpi pakṣadoṣatvaṃ pratijñāmātrabhāvinaḥ //
uttarāvayavāpekṣo yo doṣaḥ so 'nubadhyate / tenety uktam ato 'pakṣadoṣo 'siddhāśrayādikaḥ // (PV IV 149-150)
On the basis of this assertion of Dharmakīrti's, his followers criticize the *Nyāyapraveśa*'s classification of *pakṣābhāsa* as mentioned above. See note 21.

[50] Cf. PVBh 523,22-29: *nanu yadi hetur asti sādhakaḥ, kasmān na pakṣaḥ. atha na, tadā hetor eva sa doṣo bhaviṣyati. kim anirākṛtavacanam. satyam etat, tathāpi pakṣadoseṇa prathamam eva nirākaraṇe hetudoṣānapekṣam eva yathā syād iti pakṣadoṣa evāyaṃ tanmātrabhāvāt. na hi pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ nirākṛte kaścit sādhanam apekṣyate. tathā sati anāśvāsa eveti tatrāpi sādhake kaḥ samāśvāsaḥ. tasmāt sandigdhe hetor viṣayaḥ, sādhakabādhakapramānābhāvamātraṃ cātra sandehena lakṣyate, na sandehasaṃmukhībhāva eva. asaṃmukhībhūtāsandeho 'py anumānād ekasmād agnim avagacchaty eva. atha vā yatra sandeha utpādayituṃ śakyas tatra hetuviṣayatvam. na svarūpatadviparyayābhyāṃ sādhakabādhakābhyāṃ niścite.*

[51] As for the *dūṣaṇa*, Dharmakīrti defines it in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III and *Nyāyabindu* III. Cf. NB III 137-138: *dūṣaṇā nyūnatādyuktiḥ. ye pūrvaṃ nyūnatādayaḥ sādhanadoṣā uktās teṣām udbhāvanaṃ dūṣanam, tena pareṣṭārthasiddhipratibandhāt* (= PVin III 229a7). But what *sādhanadoṣas* are is not clearly explained by him. Commentators interpret the *sādhanadoṣas* as the *hetvābhāsas*, viz. *asiddha*, *anaikāntika*, and *viruddha*, and they do not refer to the *pakṣābhāsas* at all. NBṬ 258,8: *ye pūrvaṃ nyūnatādayo 'siddhaviruddhānaikāntikā uktās teṣām udbhāvakaṃ yad vacanaṃ tad dūṣaṇam.* NBT_V 148,11-13: *'dir sogs pa źes smos pas ni ma grub pa daṅ / 'gal ba daṅ / ma ṅes pa daṅ / skyon rnams yoṅs su bsdu'o //*. *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*

In the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya*, however, the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* comes to be regarded as useless, for there he prohibits the formulation of *pakṣa*. In the *Hetubindu*, Dharmakīrti mentions that if there is *avinābhāva* then no *bādhā* (obstruction) can occur (HB 29,2ff.). Therefore he concludes as follows:

> *tasmād dhetoḥ prayoge pratijñāyā doṣāṇāṃ sambhavo nāsti. nāpi kevalā pratijñā prayujyata iti na pratijñādoṣā vācyāḥ.* (HB 31,3-5)
>
> Steinkellner translates: "Daher sind [auch] Fehler der Behauptung (*pratijñā*), wenn der Grund verwendet wird, nicht möglich. Da ferner die Behauptung allein nicht verwendet wird, sind die Fehler der Behauptung überhaupt nicht zu nennen." (Steinkellner 1967: 73)

According to this passage, if a *hetu* endowed with the three characters is formulated, no fault of *pratijñā* (*pakṣa*) can occur. Thus he regards the conception of *pratijñādoṣa* (*pakṣābhāsa*) as useless.

In the *Vādanyāya*, Dharmakīrti enumerates *sādhanadoṣas*, but *pakṣābhāsas* or *pratijñādoṣas* are not included.

> *sādhanadoṣāḥ punaḥ nyūnatvam, asiddhiḥ, anaikāntikatā, vādinaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭasyārthasya viparyayasādhanam, aṣṭādaśadṛṣṭāntābhāsaś ca.* (VN 67,13f.)
>
> "Furthermore, faults of proof are deficiency (*nyūnatva*, i.e. lack in any of the three characters of valid reason), irrelevance (*asiddhi*), inconclusiveness (*anaikāntika*), proving the opposite of what is intend to be proved (*viparyayasādhana*) and the eighteen fallacious examples (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*)."[52]

As I mentioned above, Dharmakīrti regards the formulation of a *pakṣa* as a *nigrahasthāna* in the *Vādanyāya*; consequently, there is no scope for a theory of *pakṣābhāsa*. In refuting the concept of *pratijñāvirodha* which the Nyāya school accepts, Dharmakīrti insists that there is no possibility of *pratijñādoṣa*, whether it is taken as *svavacanavirodha* or *pramāṇavirodha*, because stating a *pakṣa* is itself a fault.[53]

Thus, in his later works, Dharmakīrti abandons the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* altogether. The theory of *pakṣābhāsa* introduced by Dignāga is first accepted and then abandoned by Dharmakīrti - it is a short-lived theory. Post-Dharmakīrtian Buddhist logicians, following Dharmakīrti's final view, do not mention the theory of *pakṣābhāsa*.[54]

(Jñānaśrībhadra) sDe dge No. 4228, 93a7: *ma tshaṅ ba la sogs pa źes bya ba ni ma grub pa daṅ / ma ṅes pa daṅ / 'gal ba dag gi dbye rgyas par bstan pa rnams so //* This interpretation, I suppose, is due to the fact that Dharmakīrti abandons the *pakṣābhāsa* theory in his later works.

[52] Cf. Much (cited in note 44) 1986: 135f.

[53] VN 79,21-23: *yad uktaṃ svavacanapratijñāyāḥ svavacanavirodhe pratijñāvirodha iti tatredam eva nigrahādhikaraṇam asādhanāṅgabhūtāyāḥ pratijñāyāḥ prayogaḥ, na virodhaḥ, tadadhikaraṇatvāt.*
VN 90,1f.: *pratijñāyāḥ pramāṇavirodhaḥ svavacanavirodhena vyākhyātaḥ.*

[54] In the definition of the *dūṣaṇa*, the *pakṣābhāsa* is not mentioned as a *sādhanadoṣa* by the later Buddhist logicians. Cf. *Tarkabhāṣā* (ed. H. R. R. Iyengar, Mysore 1952) 49,8f.: *asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikānām anyatamasyodbhāvanaṃ dūṣaṇam. Tarkasopāna* (ed. G. Tucci, Roma 1956) 309,28-310,2: *dūṣaṇā nyūnatādyuktiḥ. . . . ādiśabdenāsiddhaviruddhānaikāntikā dṛṣṭāntadoṣāś ca gṛhyante.* Cf. above p. 80.

Exceptionally, the *Hetutattvopadeśa* refers to the *pakṣābhāsa* in the explanation of the *dūṣaṇa*, as is inferred from the fact that the *pakṣābhāsas* are enumerated there. Cf. HTU 270,27-271,5: *eta eva sarve pakṣahetudṛṣṭāntābhāsāḥ. vādinā sādhayitum iṣṭam arthaṃ na sādhayantīti sādhanābhāsā vādino bhavanti. evaṃ ca prativādinā dūṣaṇatvenopanyastā dūṣaṇāni bhavanti, pūrvapakṣavādino 'bhipretārthasiddhipratibandhanāt. sādhanasya nyūnatodbhāvanam eva dūṣaṇasya lakṣaṇaṃ vibhajya pṛthag ucyate.*

V. Finally, I would like to suggest that Dharmakīrti's abandonment of the *pakṣābhāsa* theory may be attributed to his attempt to remove an imperfection from Dignāga's logic. Dignāga's system of logic as based on the *trairūpya* theory was still rough and approximate, and the *pakṣābhāsa* theory had a role in making up for this imperfection (see note 11). Dharmakīrti, however, improved on Dignāga's logic, and thus he came to find no use for the theory of *pakṣābhāsa*. In his system of logic, *pakṣābhāsa*s can be included in *hetvābhāsas*.[55] I have discussed this problem regarding *pratītinirākṛta* in a previous paper.[56]

The results of the foregoing investigation suggest that there were three stages in the development of the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti in accordance with the change in status of *pakṣa*:

STAGE I. *pakṣa* is regarded as useful for the proof; hence it is an indispensable member of a syllogism. The notion of *pakṣābhāsa* is introduced by Dignāga. This theory is found in the *Nyāyamukha*.
STAGE II. *pakṣa* is regarded as useless for the proof, hence it is not always necessary to formulate a *pakṣa*. Yet the notion of *pakṣābhāsa* is still maintained by Dignāga. Dharmakīrti at first inherits this view of Dignāga. It is found in *Pramāṇasamuccaya(-vṛtti)* III, *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III, and *Nyāyabindu* III.
STAGE III. Finally the formulation of *pakṣa* is prohibited and the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* is abandoned by Dharmakīrti in the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya*.

Abbreviations and Literature

DhPr — *Dharmottarapradīpa*: *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa. [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]*. Ed. D. Malvania. Patna 1955.

HB — *Hetubindu*: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text.* Wien 1967.

HTU — "*Hetutattvopadeśa* of Jitāri", in *Minor Buddhist Texts, Part I*. Ed. G. Tucci. Roma 1956 [repr. Kyōto 1978].

IBK — *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*

Jambūvijaya 1968 — Muni Jambūvijayajī (ed.), *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakraṃ of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. With the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*. Part 1. Bhavnagar.

JIPh — *Journal of Indian Philosophy*

[55] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also concludes that *pakṣadoṣas* and *dṛṣṭāntadoṣas* are nothing but *hetvābhāsas*, but he regards *abādhitatva* as a character of the *hetu*. Cf. NM II 133,32-134,6: *ye caite pratyakṣaviruddhādayaḥ pakṣadosāḥ, ye ca vakṣyamāṇāḥ sādhanavikalatvādayo dṛṣṭāntadoṣāḥ, te vastusthityā sarve hetudoṣā eva. prapañcamātraṃ tu pakṣadṛṣṭāntadoṣavarṇanam. tathā cābādhitatvaṃ hetulakṣaṇam evoktam. dṛṣṭāntaduṣṭatayā ca hetor eva lakṣaṇam anvayavyatirekayor anyad dhīyata iti sarve ca te hetudoṣā eva.*

ata eva ca śāstre 'smin muninā tattvadarśinā / pakṣābhāsādayo noktā hetvābhāsās tu darśitāḥ //
kaścid dhetvānapekṣo 'pi pakṣamātrapratiṣṭhitaḥ / bādho 'numānarūpasya svavākyādikṛto yathā //

[56] Inami 1988 (cited in note 27).

Katsura [1]-[7] — Shōryū Katsura, "Inmyōshōrimonron kenkyū, [1] *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* 37, 1977, 106-126; [2] 38, 1978, 110-130; [3] 39, 1979, 63-82; [4] 41, 1981, 62-82; [5] 42, 1982, 82-99; [6] 44, 1984, 43-74; [7] 46, 1987, 46-85.

Kitagawa 1965 — Hidenori Kitagawa, *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū – Jinna (Dignāga) no taikei –*. Tōkyō [reprint Kyōto 1985]

NB — *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): v. DhPr

NBh — *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Vātsyāyana): v. NV

NBṬ — *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): v. DhPr

NBṬ$_V$ — *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Vinītadeva): L. de La Vallee Poussin, *Tibetan translation of the Nyayabindu of Dharmakīrti (A treatise on Buddhist logic) with the commentary of Vinitadeva*. Calcutta ²1984.

NM I, II — *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*, ed. Surya Nārāyana Śukla. [2 vols.] Benares (vol. 1) 1936, (vol. 2) 1934.

NMu — *Nyāyamukha* (Dignāga): Taishō Vol. 32. No. 1628. 1a1-6a7.

NP — *Nyāyapraveśa of Śaṅkarasvāmin, with Nyāyapraveśavṛtti of Haribhadrasūri and Nyāyapraveśavṛttipañjikā of Pārśvadeva*. Ed. A. B. Dhruva. Baroda 1930.

NPV — *Nyāyapraveśavṛtti* (Haribhadrasūri): v. NP

NSū — *Nyāyasūtra* (Gautama): *Nyāyadarśanam. With Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Critically edited with notes by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha. [2 vols.] Calcutta 1936 [reprint Kyoto 1982].

NV — *Nyāyavārttika* (Uddyotakara): *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati & the Pariśuddhi of Udayana*. Ed. Anantal Thakur. Muzaffarpur 1967.

PSV — *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)* (Dignāga; tr. Kanakavarman): P 5702 (Vol. 130, Tshad ma, Ce 93b4-177a7)

PV IV — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter IV: *Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*. Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206.

PVBh — *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇvārtikam)*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.

PVin III — *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Chapter III: D 4211 (Vol. 1, Tshad ma, Ce 187a6-230a7)

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*. Roma 1960.

Steinkellner 1967 — Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubindu, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*. Wien.

ŚV — *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with The Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Ed. Svāmī Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. Vārāṇasī 1978.

VN — *Vādanyāya*: *Ācārya-śrī-Dharmakīrti-viracitā Dharmakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ (2), Vādanyāyaprakaraṇam, ācārya-Śāntarakṣita-kṛta-Vipañcitārtha-vyākhyāyutam* . . . Ed. Dvārikādās Śāstrī. Vārāṇasī 1972.

VNṬ — *Vādanyāyaṭīkā (Vipañcitārthā)* (Śāntarakṣita): v. VN

ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF THREE KINDS OF REASON IN *PRAMĀṆAVINIŚCAYA* III – REDUCTION OF REASONS TO *SVABHĀVAHETU* AND *KĀRYAHETU*

by

Takashi Iwata, Tokyo

One of the fundamental ideas of Dharmakīrti's theory of inference is the point that logical pervasion is guaranteed not by the pure logical relation between concepts but by the factual relation of real things, i.e. by the essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*), which consists of two relations, i.e., that the thing indicated by the reason is the same with the thing indicated by the consequence (*tādātmya*), or that the thing indicated by the reason is caused by others things indicated by the consequence.[1] According to this theory one comes to the conclusion that in principle any logical reason is to be reduced either to reason as essential property (*svabhāva*), based upon the factual identity between reason and its consequence,[2] or to reason as effect (*kārya*) based upon causality. In reality, however, because of the fact that many kinds of inference are accepted in the mundane world it is an open question whether the reasons of these inferences are necessarily contained within the two types of reason, i.e., *svabhāva* or *kārya*. If there were another type of reason, then it might be possible that the pervasion between this reason and consequence is based upon another type of connection. Therefore this problem brings up the point whether the essential connection is restricted only to real identity and causality. Dharmakīrti himself becomes conscious of this problem and shows that the various kinds of reason, which are accepted as mundane but appear as if they do not correspond to any of the above mentioned two valid reasons as effect and as essential property, are to be reduced finally to one of the two[3] and that even the valid reasons proposed by Dignāga in his *hetucakra* (i.e., the second and eighth types of reason) are to be interpreted as forms of Dharmakīrti's own two valid reasons.[4] These proofs show indirectly how Dharmakīrti's postulate of the essential connection as the basis of the pervasion has the validity. This is the main motive why in this paper we deal with proofs to reduce logical reasons accepted in the mundane world as valid to either reason as *svabhāva* (in the first chapter) or reason as *kārya* (in the second chapter). We use *Pramāṇaviniścaya* as the basic literature, because this subject is treated in its third chapter relatively systematically, while in *Pramāṇavārttika* the description of these proofs is divided between the chapter on *svārthānumāna* and the chapter on *parārthānumāna*.

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[1] Cf. PVSV 17,12ff. = PVin II 46,17ff.; PVSV 2,19ff. = PVin II 10,14f.; PVSV 4,2f. = PVin II 24,12ff.

[2] For reason as *svabhāva* cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "On the interpretation of the svabhāvahetu", *WZKS* 18, 1974, 117-129; Ernst Steinkellner, "*Svabhāvapratibandha* again", *Acta Indologica* 6, 1984, 457-476. As to the interpretation of reason as *svabhāva* by the present writer see Takashi Iwata, "Hōshō no jishōshōin *(svabhavahetu)* setsu oboegaki" [A note on Dharmakīrti's theory of the *svabhāvahetu*] *Tōyō no Shisō to Shūkyō* 5, 1988, 1-32.5, 1988, 1-32.

[3] Cf. PVin III 310b7-313a3 (ad vv. 64-67); PV I 7-11; 144bd-145ab and its autocommentary.

[4] Cf. PVin III 301a4-303a5 (ad vv. 34-39); PV IV 195-204. For a synopsis of PVin III see Takashi Iwata, "Pramāṇaviniścaya Third Chapter", in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy*, ed. K. Potter (forthcoming).

I. Reasons reduced to *svabhāvahetu*

In *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II (*svārthānumāna* chapter) Dharmakīrti enumerates three kinds of valid reason, i.e. reason as noncognition (*anupalabdhi*), reason as *svabhāva* and reason as *kārya* (cp. PVin II v. 28). In *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III (*parārthānumāna* chapter), however, he reduces reason as noncognition to reason as *svabhāva*. It is the main theme of this chapter to trace back his proof of this reduction. The key point of his proof is that "inference of effect by reason of cause" is applied to the reduction. In order to make clear the reduction of reason as *anupalabdhi* to reason as *svabhāva* we analyze at first the structure of the inference of effect by reason of cause.

I.1 As to the inference of effect by reason of cause Dharmakīrti concludes that it is reduced to inference which is based upon reason as *svabhāva*. In this section it is examined how this conclusion is drawn. It is well-known that in general cause is inferred by reason of effect, but not effect by reason of cause. Then causes do not always produce their effect, even when they are causes sufficient to produce their effect.

> It is not [true] that things as causes [can necessarily] produce their effect only by [the fact that they are gathering and become] sufficient (*samagra*) [causes]. Then the origination of effect is dependent upon the [momentary] transformations (*pariṇāma*) of forces (*śakti*) which arise from the sufficient complex [of causes] (*sāmagrījanman*). Since further during this [transformation] (i.e., while in each instances each succeeding force is produced by the preceding force and this continues until the last phase of the force produces its effect) it is possible [to enter] objections (*pratibandha*), [in general] the effect [can] not be inferred [from the cause]. (PVin III 311a1-3 = PVSV 7,5-7)[5]

But Dharmakīrti asserts that when there is a sufficient complex of causes, the origination of effect which is identified with the e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t y (*svabhāva*) of the sufficient complex of causes, is drawn from these causes.

> When the origination of effect is inferred by [the reason of a sufficient] cause which has the capacity (**samartha*) [to produce it], this [origination of effect] is called essential property [of the sufficient] cause, because [it (= origination of effect)] does not depend on any other things [than that cause] (*arthāntarānapekṣatva*). (PVin III 64 ~ PV I 7)[6]

In answer to an objection that because of the fact that cause and effect consist in different things, neither effect nor production of the effect is the essential property of the sufficient complex of causes, Dharmakīrti describes the essential property more precisely, namely, that it is the p o s s i b i l i t y (*sambhava*) or the f i t n e s s (*yogyatā*) for the production of effect:

> Then in this [case of inference of effect by reason of cause] only the fitness for the production of effect [existing] in the sufficient causes is inferred [by the reason of the sufficient complex of causes], and [this] fitness is connected only with the sufficient complex [of causes], therefore [this] is the essential property [of the sufficient complex of causes]. (PVin III 310b8-311a1 ~ PVSV 6,27ff.)[7]

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[5] PVin III 311a1-3 = PVSV 7,5-7: *na hi samagrāṇīty eva kāraṇadravyāṇi svakāryaṃ janayanti. sāmagrījanmanāṃ śaktīnāṃ pariṇāmāpekṣatvāt kāryotpādasya. atrāntare ca pratibandhasambhavān na kāryānumānam.*

[6] PVin III 64 ~ PV I 7:
hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryotpādo 'numīyate /
arthāntarānapekṣatvāt sa svabhāva 'nuvarṇitaḥ //

[7] PVin III 310b8-311a1: *de la* (D : om. P) *ni rgyu tshogs pa rnams kyi 'bras bu bskyed par* (D : *pa* P) *ruṅ ba ñid 'ba'* (P : *'ga'* D) *źig rjes su dpog la /* (D : *par* P) *ruṅ ba ñid kyaṅ tshogs pa tsam daṅ rjes su 'brel pa yin pas na raṅ bźin du gyur pa*

The above stated passages show that Dharmakīrti bases his assertion that the fitness (i.e. ability) for the production of effect (i.e., consequence to be inferred, Y) is the essential property (/ essence) of the sufficient complex of causes (i.e., reason as inferring factor, X) on the fact that this fitness (Y) does not depend on other factors than the complex of causes (X); therefore that factor to be inferred (Y) is connected only with the existence of the inferring factor (X) (*tanmātrānubandhin*) (cp. ibid. 310b8). This fact is worthy of notice, because, as interpreted in Dharmottara's commentary (PVinṬ III 133a7f.), it is the very ground for the reduction of the reason, sufficient complex of causes, into reason as *svabhāva*: from the definition of reason as *svabhāva*

> A property (X), too, is the reason for [the inference of another] essential property (*svabhāva*), which follows only the existence [of the property (X)] (*bhāvamātrānurodhin*) (i.e., this property (X) is reason as *svabhāva*). (PVSV 4,1-2 ad v. 2cd)[8]

the following lemma is to be drawn:

> When property (Y), which is inferred by property (X), follows (/ is connected with) only the existence of property (X), the property (X) is the reason as *svabhāva*.

Since the fitness for the production of effect (Y), too, does not depend on any other factors and follows only the sufficient complex of causes (X), reason as sufficient complex of causes is reduced to reason as *svabhāva*. This reduction is described in the following diagram

> If Y is consequence of X and X-*mātrānubandhin*, then X is reason as *svabhāva*. *kāryotpādana-yogyatā* (Y), too, is *hetusāmagrī-mātrānubandhin*. Therefore *hetusāmagrī* (X) is the reason as *svabhāva*.

1.2 Now let us turn our attention to the proof of the statement that reason as noncognition (*anupalabdhi*) belongs to reason as *svabhāva*. Contextually this proof appears in a section where Dharmakīrti due to his own logical system interprets Dignāga's valid reasons in the *hetucakra* in the following way:

in the *hetucakra* two valid reasons (second and eighth types of reason) are listed for the purpose of indicating that reason as *svabhāva* and reason as *kārya* alone can draw their consequence because there is an essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) between these reasons and their consequence (cp. PVin III 301a4ff. and v. 34ab = PV IV 195ab). According to this interpretation, as already analyzed by M. Ono[9], the second reason in the *hetucakra* (ex. reason *kṛtakatva* for the consequence *anityatva*) has the same extension with that of the consequence while reason as *kārya* has always smaller extension than that of consequence (cp. ibid. 301a6-8; PV IV 196); therefore the second reason in the *hetucakra* refers not to reason as *kārya* (cp. ibid. 303a1f.; PV IV 199), but to the other valid reason, i.e., reason as *svabhāva*. The eighth reason (ex. reason *prayatnānantarīyakatva* for the consequence *anityatva*), on the other hand, can refer not only to reason as *kārya* (cp. ibid. v. 36 = PV IV 198) but to reason as *svabhāva* (cp. ibid. 303a2f; PV IV 201). Here remains, however, the problem about the treatment of reason as noncognition: if the valid reasons in the *hetucakra* are to be interpreted by Dharmakīrti's valid reasons, reason as noncognition, which is asserted by Dharmakīrti

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kho na yin no // (~ PVSV 6,27ff.: *tatra hi kevalaṃ* ... ... *samagrāṇāṃ kāryotpādanayogyatānumānāt. yogyatā ca sāmagrīmātrānubandhinīti svabhāvabhūtaiva* . . .). Cf. S. Mookerjee and Hojun Nagasaki, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*, Patna 1964: 33-36; Ernst Steinkellner, "Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti", *WZKS* 15, 1971 [179-221]: 185f.

[8] PVSV 4,1f. ad v. 2cd:

svabhāve(Y) *bhāvo*(X) *'pi bhāva*(→ X)*-mātrānurodhini //*

hetur (→ *svabhāvahetuḥ*) *iti vartate.*

[9] Cf. Motoi Ono, "Dharmakīrti no kukuin kaishaku." [Interpretation of Dignāga's nine reasons by Dharmakīrti (translation of title mine)] *Hikaku Shisō no Michi* 4, 1985, 81-85.

himself as valid, too, should have been mentioned in the interpretation of *hetucakra*, and why was it not treated in it (cp. ibid. 303a5f.)? Dharmakīrti answers: "Because it (i.e., the reason as noncognition), too, belongs to reason as *svabhāva*, [by the exposition of reason as *svabhāva*] the example [of the reason as noncognition] is already shown [indirectly]" (ibid. 303a6)[10], therefore "In the exposition of the classification of reasons [which satisfy the condition that they are property of the subject of inference, reason as noncognition] is not separately [from reason as *svabhāva*] exemplified" (ibid. v. 44cd = PV IV v. 269cd).[11] In order to prove the deduction of reason as noncognition to reason as *svabhāva*, Dharmakīrti makes use of the above mentioned logical relation "*hetusāmagrī* → *kāryotpādanayogyatā*" (pervasion of sufficient complex of causes by fitness/possibility for the production of effect). When an object (A), which is to be seen (*dṛśya*) if the sufficient condition for its cognition is satisfied, is not perceived under a certain situation, verbal expression "The object (A) does not exist in this situation" and behavior based upon this expression (*vyavahāra*) are caused by the noncognition of the object (A). In this causal relation the point worthy of remark is that this cause is nothing but the sufficient cause for the effect.

> When [an object (A)] is expressed as nonexistent and dealt with so, with respect to any [object] there is no other cause (*nimittāntara*) [for the determination of nonexistence of object (A) than the noncognition of object (A) in that situation].[12] (PVin III 303b2)[13]

Due to the fact that the effect - verbal expression "nonexistence of the object (A)" or behavior based upon it — is caused only by the noncognition of the object (A) and does not depend on other causes,

> cognition and verbal expression [that a visible object (A) does not exist in this situation), though [they are] effects [caused] by that (i.e., noncognition of the object (A)), could be undoubtedly [inferred] by that (i.e., noncognition of the object (A)).[14] (PVin III v. 41cd ~ PV IV 266cd)[15]

Since without any subsidiary factors the cause, noncognition of A, can produce the effect, verbal expression and cognition "nonexistence of A", the noncognition of A is the sufficient complex of causes for the effect, and as mentioned before, by this sufficient complex of causes as the logical reason the fitness for the production of effect is inferred.

> When there is noncognition of a visible [object (A)], there is no doubt about [the inference of] that fitness (*yogyatā*), too, for [the production of effect] caused by that [noncognition as sufficient complex of causes, i.e., fitness for the production of] cognition and expression [that the object (A)] does not exist. (PVin III 303b3f.)[16]

Consequently the conclusion that reason as noncognition belongs to reason as *svabhāva* can be drawn from the combination of two propositions: reason as noncognition belongs to reason as sufficient complex of causes, and the latter belongs to reason as *svabhāva*:

reason as *anupalabdhi* → reason as *kāraṇasāmagrī* → reason as *svabhāva*.

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[10] PVin III 303a6: *de yaṅ raṅ bźin gyi* (P : *gyis* D) *gtan tshigs kyi khoṅs su 'dus pa'i phyir dper brjod pa kho na ste /*

[11] PVin III v. 44cd = PV IV 269cd:
hetuprabedhākhyāne na darśitodāhṛtiḥ pṛthak //

[12] Cf. HB 4,14-16.

[13] PVin III 303b2: *med pa'i tha sñad la* (D : *las* P) *gaṅ du yaṅ rgyu mtshan gźan ni 'ga' yaṅ yod pa ma yin no //*

[14] Cf. PVin II 11,12-16 (ad v. 32ab) and its note of German translation no.122.

[15] PVin III v. 41cd ~ PV IV 266cd:
tasyāḥ (= *anupalabdheḥ*) *siddhāv asandigdhau tat*(= *anupalabdhi*)*-kāryatve 'pi dhīdhvanī* (→ *asadvyavahāraḥ*) *//*

[16] PVin III 303b3f.: (*de'i phyir*) *bltar ruṅ ba* (D : *bar* P) *ma mthoṅ bar* (**dṛśyādṛṣṭi*) *grub na de'i rgyu mtshan can med pa'i śes pa daṅ sgra dag* (*asajjñānaśabda*) *gi ruṅ ba ñid de* (P : *de ñid* D) *la yaṅ the tshom med pa ñid de /*

The same idea to reduce reason as noncognition to reason as *svabhāva*, as pointed out by H. Yaita[17], is to be seen in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PVSV 104-105), too.

II. Reasons reduced to *kāryahetu*

In the preceding chapter we have examined the inference of which reason and consequence indicate the same object. What is dealt with in this chapter is the case where reason and consequence indicate different objects, therefore the reason, so long as it is valid, should be reduced to a reason as *kārya*. There is no problem about the determination of reason as *kārya*, when the causal relation between two objects indicated by reason and effect is ascertained. For example, smoke from which fire is inferred is assigned to reason as *kārya*, because smoke is the effect of fire. The problem arises from the experience that inferences, of which reason and consequence indicate different objects and exist s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , are accepted. Then in this case it seems to be difficult to find the causal relation between them, because according to Dharmakīrti's theory of causality cause precedes effect;[18] therefore simultaneous causal relation is excluded. Let us see how Dharmakīrti solves this problem.

II.1 As the stock example of the valid inference, where the objects indicated by reason and consequence are different and simultaneous, Dharmakīrti picks the inference of visible form (*rūpa*) of a thing by the reason of its taste (*rasa*). It is indeed our usual experience that in the dark one infers fire when one perceives the feel of fire (*sparśa*) and vice versa infers the feel of fire when one sees the form of fire.[19] Here arises the question, whether the reason of this kind of inference can be reduced to either of two valid reasons proposed by Dharmakīrti; then this reason belongs neither to reason as *svabhāva*, because reason and consequence indicate different objects and therefore there is no factual identity (*tādātmya*) between them which is necessary for the establishment of the pervasion of the reason as *svabhāva* by its consequence, nor to reason as *kārya*, because due to the simultaneousness of the two there is no causal relation between them.[20]

From the standpoint of Dharmakīrti all these reasons must be reduced to reason as *kārya*, because the sufficient condition to assign it to reason as *svabhāva*, i.e., factual identity, is already excluded by the difference of two objects indicated by reason and consequence. For convenience of understanding, before going into Dharmakīrtis proof to reduce it to reason as *kārya*, let us point out his characteristic ideas on the causality which he presupposes for his proof. Firstly he analyses the factual relation between form (*rūpa*) and taste (*rasa*) not from the standpoint of the static aspect that they only simultaneously coexist, but from the dynamic aspect: he takes into consideration two causal relations,

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[17] Cf. Hidcomi Yaita, "Hōshō no hininshiki" [Reason as *anupalabdhi* in Dharmakīrti's theory of logic (translation of title mine)] in *Chūgoku no Shūkyō – Shisō to Kagaku, Makio Ryōkai Hakushi Shōju Kinen Ronshū*, Tōkyō 1984 [34-45]: 37-39.

[18] Cf. PV III 246a-c:
asataḥ prāg asāmarthyāt paścāc cānupayogataḥ /
prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnāṃ //
"[Cause is] not capable [to produce effect at the instance] before [the existence of effect] because [according to the opponent's view that cause and effect are simultaneous, cause] does not exist [at the instance], and later (i.e., at the instance of effect) it is of no use [because the effect is already produced]. Consequently [it should be accepted that] all causes exist before [the production of their effects]". Cf. PVin I 60,8-11; Hiromasa Tosaki, *Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū (1)*, Tōkyō 1979: 344.


[19] Cf. PVSVṬ 45,27ff.

[20] The same topic is taken up for discussion in DhPr (= *Dharmottarapradīpa*: *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa*, ed. D. Malvania, Patna 1955.) 115,9ff.

namely causality between taste (X1) as effect existent at an arbitrary point in time (t1) and its material cause (X0) (*upādānakāraṇa*) which was existent at the preceding point in time (t0), and between form (Y1) existent at the point in time (t1) and its material cause (Y0) which was existent at the preceding point in time (t0). Secondly he introduces the function of cooperating condition (*sahakāripratyaya*): when these material causes produce their own effects, each material cause functions as cooperating condition (i.e., subsidiary condition) for the function of the other material cause. This causal condition implies that in the case of production of taste (X1) and form (Y1) they are produced by the same causes, i.e., two material causes (X0 and Y0) cooperating together.

> [On the one hand] that itself (i.e., functioning of material cause (X0) towards its own effect, taste (X1)) is the cause (i.e., cooperating condition) for the function of material causes (Y0) [to produce] form (Y1) (*rūpopādānahetūnāṃ pravṛttikāraṇam*), [on the other hand] that function of the material causes (X0) [to produce] the taste (X1), too, has the function of material causes (Y0) [to produce] the form (Y1) as its cooperating factor (*rūpopādānakāraṇa-pravṛtti-sahakāriṇī*). (PVin III 311b3 = PVSV 8,1-3)[21]

Since both taste (X1) and form (Y1) as effects are produced by these two cooperating material causes (X0 and Y0), the latter function as sufficient complex of causes for the production of effects. This point, as will be seen later, plays an important role in the inference of form by the reason of taste. The above mentioned causal relations are illustrated in the following diagram:



Viewed from the angle of causes contributing to the production of taste (X1) the causal relation is described as follows.

> The [material] cause of taste (*rasahetu*) (X0), which is the cooperating condition for the material cause of form (Y0) (*rūpopādānakāraṇasahakāripratyaya*) possessing the force which functions [to produce the form (Y1) without being obstructed], produces the taste (X1). (PVin III 311b1f. = PVSV 7,16f.)[22]

These are the causal relations which are the basis for the inference of form by the reason of taste. Dharmakīrti draws the following logical statement from these factual relations:

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[21] PVin III 311b3 = PVSV 8,1-3: <[1]*saiva . . . rūpo*[1]> *-pādānahetūnāṃ*(Y0) *pravṛttikāraṇam. sāpi rasopādānakāraṇa*(X0)*-pravṛttī rūpopādānakāraṇa*(Y0)*-pravṛttisahakāriṇī.*

<1> Tibetan text (313b3): "(. . . *med na ro med pa*) *de ñid* (P : *ñid gzugs* D) *kyi* . . ." is corrupt. By reference to PVSVṬ (48,22ff.: . . . *vinā na rasa utpadyate. saiva* . . .) I have tried to read: (. . . *med na ro med do //*) *de ñid gzugs kyi* . . . For "*de ñid*" see PVinṬ III 136b1f.: *ro'i ñe bar len pa raṅ gi 'bras bu la mṅon du phyogs pa de ñid gzugs kyi ñe bar len pa'i rgyu rnams kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu yin no //*

[22] PVin III 311b1f. = PVSV 7,16f.: *pravṛttaśaktirūpopādānakāraṇasahakāripratyayo hi rasahetū rasaṃ janayati.*

> Therefore from the taste (X_1) produced by such [material] cause [of taste (X_0) which has the material cause of form (Y_0) as its cooperating condition] one infers such [material cause of taste (X_0) and further] infers [indirectly] the form (Y_1). (PVin III 311b3f. = PVSV 8,3f.)[23]

Let us interpret this statement in the light of the commentaries. Since the taste (X_1) is the product of its material cause (X_0), the taste (X_1) as the reason, from which the material cause (X_0) is inferred, is determined as reason as *kārya*.[24] This material cause of taste (X_0), while producing its own effect, functions as cooperating condition for the production of another effect, form (Y_1). In other words, when the material cause of taste (X_0) and the material cause of form (Y_0) gather, they can produce their effect, form (Y_1).[24] Therefore these two material causes become a sufficient complex of causes for the production of form (Y_1). Here we find the possibility to apply the logical relation "sufficient complex of causes → fitness for the production of effect" to this causal relation. As stated before (cp. I.1) in the inference effect cannot be generally drawn by cause; what is inferred is not the effect itself but the fitness to produce future effect. In our case of inference of form (Y_1) by the reason of taste (X_1), however, as long as the consequence to be inferred from the complex of causes (X_0 and Y_0) is restricted to the particular form (Y_1), which is s i m u l t a n e o u s with the other effect, i.e., taste (X_1) which plays the role of reason, one can say that the effect itself, form (Y_1), is inferred from the complex of causes (X_0 and Y_0) without taking into consideration the qualification "fitness", because at the point in time (t_1) of taste (X_1) form (Y_1), the effect of the complex of causes, is not an effect to be produced, but an effect already produced. Consequently, through the medium of logical relation "Viewed at the point in time of an effect (X_1) produced from the complex of causes (X_0 and Y_0), when there is this sufficient complex of causes, there is the other effect (Y_1)" we can infer the form (Y_1) from the taste (X_1): at first from the taste (X_1) as reason as *kārya* its material cause (X_0) is inferred. Then from the factual relation that the latter (X_0) constitutes together with the material cause of form (Y_0) the sufficient complex of causes for two effects (X_1 and Y_1),[25] the following logical proposition is drawn: viewed at the point in time of the taste as an effect (X_1), when there is the complex of causes (X_0 and Y_0), it is selfevident that there is necessarily the form as the other effect (Y_1), which is simultaneous with the taste (X_1). Accordingly the taste (X_1) as reason as *kārya* can imply indirectly the existence of the form (Y_1).[25] In this sense the taste (X_1) as reason, from which the form (Y_1) is inferred, is considered as reason as *kārya* (cp. PVin III 311b4f.). The main idea of this proof may be interpreted by the combination of two logical relations:

(*rasa* (X_1) → *rasopādāna* (X_0)) • (*rasopādāna* (X_0) • *rūpopādāna* (Y_0) → *rūpa*(Y_1)).

In the same manner the reason "smoke" for the inference of ash and coal is to be reduced to reason as *kārya*: by the reason "smoke (X_1)" as *kārya* its cause "fire (X_0)" is inferred. Fire (X_0) and firewood (Y_0) constitute a sufficient complex of causes for the production of ash and coal (Y_1); so that it is selfevident that when there are fire (X_0) and firewood (Y_0), at a point in time (t_1) of smoke (X_1), there is ash and coal (Y_1). Since, in this way, from smoke (X_1) as reason as *kārya*, fire (X_0) is inferred, and the latter implies ash and coal (Y_1), smoke (X_1), implying indirectly ash and coal (Y_1), is considered as reason as *kārya*.

> Form (Y_1) and so on [produced] by the same sufficient complex [of causes] (*ekasāmagryadhīna*) [which produces taste (X_1)] is recognized by [the reason of] taste (X_1) through [the medium of]

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[23] PVin III 311b3f. = PVSV 8,3f.: *tasmād yathābhūtād dheto rasa utpannas tathābhūtam anumāpayan rūpam anumāpayati.*

[24] Cf. PVṬ 26a6-b1; PVSVṬ 48,28; 49,4 (read: *ut<pa>nnas*).

[25] Cf. PVṬ 25b7; PVSVṬ 48,17; *Tshad ma rnam par ṅes pa'i ṭik, Tshig don rab gsal* (Bu ston rin chen grub), in *The Collected Works of Bu-ston*, ed. Lokesh Chandra, [28 vols.] New Delhi 1965-1971, Vol. 24 (Ya), No. 2: 509,3f.

> inferring the property of [material] cause [of taste (X_0)] (i.e., inferring the fitness to produce the form (Y_1) which is simultaneous with taste (X_1)). [Consequently the reason, taste (X_1), is reduced to reason as *kārya*] as [for example ash and coal] transformed by firewood [is recognized by the reason of] smoke. (PVin III v. 65 = PV I 9)[26]
>
> In this case [of inference], too, [material cause of taste (X_0) or material cause of form (Y_0), which are] past [with respect to the taste (X_1) as effect,] and [form (Y_1) which is] simultaneous [with the taste (X_1)] are recognized [by the reason of taste (X_1)], but not future [form], then [the inference of the future effect by the reason of past cause is] uncertain (*vyabhicāra*). (PVin III 311b4 = PV 8,6-8)[27]

The key point of these proofs is that 1) Dharmakīrti introduces material causes (X_0 and Y_0) to both inferring factor (X_1) and factor to be inferred (Y_1), and tries to find causality between effect (X_1) and material cause (X_0) which is indispensable for the reduction of reason to reason as *kārya*; 2) he presupposes the pervasion "sufficient complex of causes $\rightarrow$ fitness for the production of effect", which belongs essentially to the pervasion between the reason as *svabhāva* and consequence, as the self-evident logical relation.

Due to this line of thinking the reason of inference, where reason and consequence are brought about by the same cause, can be reduced to reason as *kārya*. For example, in the well known inference of rain from the observation of the disturbance of ants, the disturbance of the ants and rain are brought about by the same cause, i.e., transformation of four fundamental elements (*bhūtapariṇāma*) (cp. PVin III 311b5f., PVSV 8,14f.; PVinṬ III 137a5-6), hence the inference of rain (Y_1) by the reason of the disturbance of ants (X_1) is possible through the following logical steps:

> ants' disturbance (X_1) (=*kāryahetu*) $\rightarrow$ *bhūtapariṇāma* as cause (X_0) $\rightarrow$ rain (Y_1).

II.2 As another type of inference of which reason is to be reduced to reason as *kārya*, Dharmakīrti deals with an inference of parts by the reason of whole (*samudāya, tshogs pa*), of which example is given by the proposition: "It has horns, because it is a cow". This inference is formulated, for example, when one conceptually recognizes an object separated by a wall as a cow and infers horns by the reason of cow. Since parts and whole are not the same entity, it is clear that the reason "whole" does not belong to the reason as *svabhāva*. It must therefore belong to the reason as *kārya*. But there seems to be no causal relation between parts and whole. In this case he does not dare to introduce the factual causal relation between the two, but pays attention to a relation described in the negative proposition, i.e., "Without parts, whole is not possible", by which he regards parts as a kind of cause for the establishment of whole. As mentioned in Dharmottara's commentary this causal relation is only appearance (*mtshan ñid pa, *lākṣaṇika*) but not real (*dṅos po pa, *vāstava*). (cp. PVinṬ III 138a4f.)

> Since the cause of ascertainment of whole (ex. of verbal expression "It is a cow") are [parts, which are] possessed of whole (*tshogs pa can*) (ex. horn, dewlap etc.), [between whole and parts there is a necessary connection that] without them (i.e., parts) this (i.e., whole) does not exist;

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[26] PVin III v. 65 = PV I 9:
ekasāmagryadhīnasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ /
hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat //
This verse is cited in *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (= *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajña-praṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam*, ed. Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ, Vārāṇasī 1968) 294,14f.; TSP 510,17f.; Kāśikā [*Mīmāṃsaślokavārttikaṃ Sucaritamiśrapraṇītayā Kāśikākhyayā ṭīkayā sametam*, ed. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī, V. A. Rāmasvāmi Śāstrī, Trivandrum 1926-1943] (III) 6,26f. Cf. Mookerjee/Nagasaki (cited in note 7) 1964: 36-38; Yuichi Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta*. Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters Kyoto University No. 10.: note 191.

[27] PVin III 311b4 = PVSV 8,6-8: *tatrāpi atītaikakālānāṃ gatis, nānāgatānāṃ, vyabhicārāt.*

hence the horn-possessed[ness] is [inferred] by [the reason of] cowness. (PVin III 311b7 = v. 66)[28]

Incidentally in the contrary case, i.e., when one infers cow by the reason of its parts, strictly speaking, when one infers the fitness for the verbal expression of cow (→ effect) by the reason of horns, dewlap etc. (→ cause), it belongs to the inference of fitness for the production of effect by means of sufficient complex of causes, therefore this reason belongs to reason as *svabhāva* (cp. ibid. 303b3f.).

II.3 The kernel of Dharmakīrti's view about reason as *kārya*, as seen in the above mentioned arguments, lies in the insistence that when reason and consequence of valid inference indicate different objects, this reason is to be reduced to reason as *kārya*. He bases this on the theory that every connection between d i f f e r e n t entities can be reduced to a causal relation.

All kinds of connections (*sambandha*) between entities, [though they are determined as] classified [differently] due to the difference in useful functions (*upayogaviśeṣa*) of producing factor (*janaka*), are determined [essentially only[29]] in conformity with the relation between cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*). (PVin III 312a6f. = PVSV 71,2-4)[30]

According to this theory, connections between different entities - for example between factor to be manifested and manifesting factor (*vyaṅgyavyañjaka*)[31], supporting factor and factor to be supported (*ādhārādheya*)[32] etc.[33] - are reduced to the causal relation between factor to be produced and producing factor (*janyajanaka*).

The causal relation which is useful for our topics to reduce reasons to reason as *kārya* is the one which exists not between effect and material cause, but between effect and subsidiary cause which cooperates with the material cause, because this causal relation makes it possible to establish the causality between two different entities which are existent simultaneously.

For example when fruits of jujube tree (*badara*) or water stays in a vessel or on the earth, there is a relation of supporting factor and factor to be supported, but there seems to be no causal relation between them. In this case, too, by making use of this subsidiary cause a causal relation is to be extracted. The stationary state of jujube-fruits (X_1) at a point in time (t_1) is produced materially by the material cause of jujube-fruits (X_0) which was existent at the preceding point in time (t_0), and at the same time receives subsidiary operation from the vessel (Y_0) which was existent simultaneously with the material cause of jujube-fruits (X_0). Viewed from the angle of the vessel,

the vessel (Y_0), which cooperates with [the material cause of the jujube-fruits (X_0) existent] at the point in time (t_0) preceding that [point in time of jujube-fruits (X_1)], produces (*janayat*) the jujube-fruits (X_1) as effect on the same place [where the material cause of the jujube-fruits (X_0) was existent], therefore is called supporting factor (*ādhāra*). (PVSV 70,17-19)[34]

Consequently

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[28] PVin III 311b7 (= v. 66):
/ tshogs pa rnam par gźag pa yi // rgyu ni tshogs pa can yin pas /
/ de dag med na de med phyir // ba laṅ ñid las rwa can yin /

[29] Cf. PVinT III 139b8.

[30] PVin III 312a6f. = PVSV 71,2-4: . . . *sarva eva vastusambandhā janakasya evopayogaviśeṣavaśāt pravibhāgena kāryakāraṇabhāvād vyavasthāpyante.*

[31] Cf. PVSVT 281,8ff.

[32] Cf. PVinT III 139b8-140a1.

[33] As to other examples see DhPr (cited in note 20) 115,19ff.

[34] PVSV 70,17-19: . . . *tatpūrvakṣaṇasahakāri kuṇḍaṃ tatraiva badarakāryaṃ janayad ādhāra ity ucyate.*


> this [property,] being a supporting factor, of which vessel, earth etc. are possessed, too, is nothing but the force to produce jujube-fruits, water etc. (PVin III 312a7 ~ PVSV 71,4f.)[35]

Thus taking into consideration the subsidiary cause it is possible to extract the causal relation that standstill of jujube-fruits (X_1) at the point in the succeeding time is the effect of vessel (Y_0) as cooperating condition at the point in the preceding time.

On the ground of application of this thought pattern to the inference of bottom (Y) to support water from the reason of stationary water (X), or to the inference of water (Y) by the reason of crane's alighting (X) which is listed by Uddyotakara as an example of inference by the observation of similarity (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*)[36], one can find the causal relation that object indicated by the reason (X) is the effect of object indicated by consequence (Y), and hence reduce these reasons to reason as *kārya*.

> That [cognition, which] infers the existence of supporting bottom from the perception of stationary water without seeing the depths, too, does come about (→ is deduced) by reason as *kārya*, because such essence of water is established (i.e., produced[37]) by that supporting bottom; then [the stationary water (X_1) at a point in time (t_1)] could not gain the particular state (i.e., stationaryness) from that [supporting bottom], if it would not receive a subsidiary assisting operation (*upakāra*) [for the standstill] from that (i.e., supporting bottom (Y_0) at the preceding point in time (t_0)). (PVin III 312a1f.)[38]

Due to the factual causality that stationary water (X_1), as illustrated in the figure, is the effect produced by the subsidiary assisting operation of the supporting bottom (Y_0), in the case of inference of supporting bottom from the reason "stationary water" this reason is reduced to reason as *kārya*.



Summary: According to Dharmakīrti's view on logical system that the pervasion of reason by consequence is based upon the essential connection, real identity and causality, the relation between entities indicated by reason and consequence is divided into two types: either they are identical or not.

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[35] PVin III 312a7; cf. PVSV 71,4f.: .. *ayaṃ kuṇḍādīnām apy ādhārabhāvo badarādiṣu jananaśaktir eva.*


[36] Cf. *Nyāyavārttika* (in *Nyāyadarśanam*, ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha et al., Calcutta 1936, [repr. Kyoto 1982]) 47,20f.

[37] Cf. PVin III 312b8 ~ PVSV 71,23ff.

[38] PVin III 312a1f.: <[1]*chu brtan pa mthoṅ nas gtiṅ ma mthoṅ yaṅ gźi yod par rjes su dpog par byed pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ 'bras bu'i rtags las skyes pa ñid de / chu'i bdag ñid de 'dra ba ni gźi de las grub pa'i phyir ro //*[1]> *de las phan pa ñams su myoṅ ba med par ni de las gnas skabs kyi khyad par thob par mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro //*

<1> According to D (214a5f). This sentence is omitted in P, but cf. *pratīka* in PVinṬ III 138b5ff.

When they are identical the reason is classified as reason as *svabhāva*, like the reason "producedness" from which consequence "noneternalness" is inferred. This implies that when they are not identical reason is to be reduced to reason as *kārya*, like "smoke" from which "fire" is inferred. But there are reasons which, though accepted as valid in daily life, are difficult to determine as belonging to either of them or not. Confronting the problem Dharmakīrti gives concrete examples with a view to proving that any valid reasons are only of these two types. As the case where reason and consequence indicate the same entity the reduction of reason "sufficient complex of causes" to reason as *svabhāva* is treated. The reason as noncognition, too, belongs to this type. In the case where reason and consequence indicate different entities, reasons are reduced to reason as *kārya*. They are of two kinds: reason which is caused by consequence, like the reason "standstill of water" from which "bottom to support water" is inferred; and reason which is caused not directly by consequence, like the reason "taste" from which "visible form" is inferred.



X = reason, Y = consequence, x = object indicated by X, y = object indicated by Y

The reason as noncognition is reduced to the reason "sufficient complex of causes", from which the "fitness for the production of effect" is inferred. Further, the reason "sufficient complex of causes" is reduced to reason as *svabhāva*, because its consequence, fitness for the production of effect, does not

depend on any other factors than it. Hence the reason as noncognition is reduced to reason as *svabhāva*. Here it is worthy of note that the logical relation "sufficient complex of causes → fitness for the production of effect" is useful to find out an aspect of identical relation in the causal phenomenon. In the case where entities indicated by valid reason and consequence are different from each other and exist simultaneously, in order to reduce this reason to reason as *kārya* Dharmakīrti pays special regard to the dynamic causal relation between effect and material cause on the one hand and subsidiary cause on the other hand, and establishes causal relation even between the two which at a glance appear to be simultaneous and devoid of causality. This line of thinking comes from his idea that any connection between two different entities is based finally upon the causal relation of producing factor and factor to be produced. The above mentioned proof of Dharmakīrti to reduce any valid reasons, which include Dignāga's valid reasons (i.e., second and eighth type of reason in the *hetucakra*), too, to either reason as *svabhāva* or reason as *kārya*, shows indirectly that Dharmakīrti's system of inference based upon the essential connection holds in general.

Abbreviations and Literature

PV I — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter I: v. PVSV

PV II, III, IV — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapters II, III, IV: *Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*. Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206. (PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).

PVin III — *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Chapter III: P 5710 (Vol. 130, Tshad ma, Ce 285a7-329a7).

PVinṬ III — *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara) Chapter III: P 5727 (Vol. 137, Tshad ma, We 1a1-209b8).

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Roma 1960.

PVSVṬ — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (Karṇakagomin): *ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā ṭaṭīkayā ca sahitam*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Kyoto 1982 [Reprint].

PVṬ — *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śākyamati): P 5718 (Vols. 131-132, Tshad ma, Je 1 - Ñe 348a8)

TSP — *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalshīla*. Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri. [2 Vols.] Varanasi 1968.

WZKS — *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*

SOURCES FOR THE STUDY OF TIBETAN *PRAMĀṆA* TRADITIONS PRESERVED AT THE BIHAR RESEARCH SOCIETY, PATNA*

by

David Jackson

Modern Dharmakīrti studies have long been indebted to the discoveries of Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1903-1962), the Indian savant who in the 1930s through great labor and personal sacrifice rescued from Tibet many Sanskrit original texts of Dharmakīrti's works and of related writings.[1] In the fifty years that have intervened since their discovery, the Sanskrit materials he found have still not been completely worked through or exhausted by scholars.[2] But these discoveries were not Rāhulјī's only contributions to Dharmakīrti studies. In addition, he also recovered a significant amount of important indigenous Tibetan *pramāṇa* materials, managing to bring them and many other texts out of Tibet loaded on the backs of twenty-two mules. These include some rare sources on the indigenous Tibetan traditions of Dharmakīrti exegesis and *pramāṇa* studies, though these have remained until now more or less unremarked and unknown. The purpose of the present paper is therefore to introduce the existence of these Tibetan materials to interested scholars.

I came to know of these materials during my brief stay in Patna in 1987. At that time I had the chance to go through most of the non-canonical Tibetan texts kept in the library of the Bihar Research Society, and as I did so, I took extensive notes. Those notes became the basis for a handlist which has been published in the recently inaugurated series *Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies* and which can serve as a preliminary guide to the so-called "miscellaneous" (i.e. non-canonical) series of Tibetan materials in Patna.[3]

General Description of the Collection

Though the background of the Bihar Research Society's Tibetan collection is known in its broad outlines, the precise history and provenance of the individual works it contains are uncertain. No

* I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the support received from the American Institute of Indian Studies (1986-87) and the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung (1987-89) which made possible these findings in Patna and the writing of this paper. I am also indebted to the Austrian Academy of Science for supporting my attendance of the conference in Vienna.

[1] On the life of Rāhulјī, in addition to the extensive autobiographical writings of his which survive in Hindi, see Prabhakar Machwe, *Makers of Indian History*, Delhi 1978; Heather Stoddard, *Le Mendiant de l'Amdo*, Paris 1985: 157-160; V. S. Agrawal, "Mahapandita Rahul Sankrityayan", *Journal of the Bihar Research Society* 47, 1961, 1-6; and S. K. Pathak (ed.), *The Album of the Tibetan Art Collections (Collected by Pt. Rahula Samkrityayan from the Ṅor, Zhalu and other monasteries in 1928-29 and 1934)*, Patna 1986: 1-4.

On his writings, I have seen in India a bibliography of 129 items as printed in a Hindi journal [Ganga-Puratattwank? (Sultanganj, Bihar)?], published in 11 April 1965, pp. 4-7. A selection of his minor English writings has recently been published under the title *Selected Essays of Rahula Sankrityayan*, New Delhi 1984, which includes (pp. xv-xix) an interesting biographical sketch of Rāhulјī written by his friend and patron K. P. Jayaswal: "Lost Sanskrit Works Recovered from Tibet", which was reprinted from *Modern Review* (Calcutta) 61, 1937, and the *Mahā Bodhi* 45/3, 1937.

[2] The present extent and condition of the Sanskrit materials acquired by Rāhulјī (especially the photographic negatives) have been surveyed recently by Dr. M. T. Much, who has reported on his own recent visit to the Bihar Research Society, Patna. See his *A Visit to Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana's Collection of Negatives at the Bihar Research Society: Texts from the Buddhist Epistemological School*, Vienna 1988.

[3] David Jackson, *The Miscellaneous Series of Tibetan Texts in the Bihar Research Society, Patna: A Handlist*, Stuttgart 1989. All bundle and work numbers in the following pages refer to the numbers in that handlist.

record exists of exactly where and when Rāhuljī obtained each manuscript or xylograph. In the case of new Central-Tibetan xylographs, it is probable that he acquired many of them directly from the places where they were printed, for example from the Źol or bKra śis lhun po printing houses. Some of the older materials would seem to have come from Sa skya pa temples in gTsaṅ, but in many cases one can only speculate about where Rāhuljī found them.[4]

Condition of the Books

The books are generally in a good state of preservation physically, except that many were apparently already fragments when Rāhuljī found them. The only books found missing in my investigation of the collection (when compared with the earlier catalogue) were nos. 910, 1047 and 1500. These may still turn up when the collection is catalogued more systematically.

Previous Cataloguing Efforts

In my handlist I have briefly outlined the previous attempts made at cataloguing these materials, beginning with the preparation of a shelf-list or handlist in 1937-39 by the Amdo savant Gendun Choephel, and including the publication in 1965 by the society of a cursory "catalogue" largely based upon it.[5] My handlist supercedes these, but of course it is not a definitive catalogue. One hopes that a complete catalogue will one day be prepared and published by the society.

Important Sources for Tibetan *pramāṇa* Studies Preserved in the Collection

To date, only a tiny fraction of this collection has been edited, translated, or reproduced, and so far no important *pramāṇa*-related work has been reprinted.[6] In the following pages I will describe the main *pramāṇa*-related works in the collection that deserve further investigation. Some of these are commentatorial works on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, while others are more general indigenous treatises or

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[4] It may be worthwhile to mention here that many of the places Rāhuljī went were also visited at about the same time by the similarly oriented Italian scholar G. Tucci. Therefore one would expect to find similar materials among the xylographs and manuscripts collected by the latter which are now preserved in Rome (and which likewise remain still uncatalogued).

[5] The two previously published cataloguing efforts were:

1. C. Sarkar, "Catalogue of the Miscellaneous Tibetan Xylographic Works in the Bihar Research Society's Library, Patna", *Journal of the Bihar Research Society* 33, 1947, 155ff. (which was incomplete and only covered bundles 1 and 2).

2. *The Catalogue of the Tibetan Texts in the Bihar Research Society, Patna, Volume I (Miscellaneous Series)*, Compiled by G.R. Choudhary and Tadasu Mitsushima, Patna 1965 (no subsequent volumes were published). dGe 'dun chos 'phel's handlist would seem to have been the basis for the second "catalogue". See also the review by J. W. de Jong, *Indo-Iranian Journal* 11, 1968, 56.

[6] The works that have appeared so far include the following:

1. G. Roerich (ed. and transl.), *Biography of Dharmasvāmin (Chag lo tsā ba Chos rje dpal)*, Patna 1959. Since then, two later editions have appeared, both based on the same photos taken in Tibet of a manuscript found there by Rāhuljī: (1) Paṇ chen 'Os tul (ed.), *Biography of Chag lo tsā ba Chos rje dpal*, Varanasi 1969, and (2) Champa Thubten Zongtse (ed.), *Chos dpal dar dpyan (13th c.), The Biography of Chag lo tsā ba Chos rje dpal (Dharmasvāmin)*, New Delhi 1981.

2. Aniruddha Jha, *dPal ldan ye śes: Śambha la'i lam yig*, Patna 1966.

3. Sa paṇ's minor works: Madan Mohan Singh, *Sulekha of Sakya Paṇḍita*, Patna 1971.

4. Śākyaśrī's biography: The Hindi translation by Rājeśvara Jhā: *Śākyaśrībhadra kī Jīvanī*, Patna 1970. This was based on Tibetan texts (no. 981, B. 252, and 1511, B. no. 591) which I will present in a future edition: *Two Biographies of Śākyaśrībhadra: The Eulogy by Khro phu lo tsā ba and its Commentary by bSod nams dpal bzaṅ po. Texts and Variants from Two Rare Exemplars in the Bihar Research Society*, Patna (forthcoming).

5. dGa' ldan Śar rtse history: Grags pa mkhas grub, *mKhas grub bye ba'i bsti gnas 'brog ri bo dge ldan rnam par rgyal ba'i gliṅ gi ya gyal śar rtse nor bu gliṅ gi chos 'byuṅ lo rgyus 'jam dpal sñiṅ po'i dgoṅs rgyan*, Vol. 1. Ed. Nawang Sopa. Delhi 1975.

important sources for a history of *pramāṇa* in Tibet. My list here is by no means exhaustive, however, and those who would like a more complete picture of such holdings in Patna are invited to go through the handlist itself. For the texts discussed below, however, the present descriptions supercede those in the handlist.

I. Rare Commentatorial Sources: *Pramāṇavārttika* Commentaries

Among the most important sources for Tibetan *pramāṇa* studies preserved in the collection are three rare Tibetan sub-commentaries on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*.

(1) A *Pramāṇavārttika* Commentary of the gSaṅ phu Tradition

The first of these is a work entitled *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi ['grel] pa yi ge daṅ rig[s?] pa'i gnad la 'jug pa*, now forming no. 1004 (B. no. 258) in the collection. It is a rare indigenous Tibetan commentary on the fourth (*gźan don rjes dpag*) chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, preserved as an archaic-looking *dbu med* manuscript of some 72 folios which is nevertheless incomplete (it is missing one or two final folios). Added in a different hand beneath the title, there occurs the note: *bsaṅ bu ne'u thog yig cha* ("textbook of gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog").

This manuscript was carefully executed, but it is difficult for the uninitiated to read because of an abundance of abbreviations (*bsdu yig*). It is mainly written in black ink, though the words of the *Pramāṇavārttika* itself are highlighted by their having been written in red ink. It is thus almost a phrase-by-phrase annotation (*mchan 'grel*), though the order of the words of the original verses have been changed in places, assuming that it is based on the standard retranslation of the *Pramāṇavārttika* by Śākyaśrībhadra and Sa skya Paṇḍita executed in ca. 1210 and preserved in the Tanjur.

Hitherto it had been supposed that the Sa skya tradition of *Pramāṇavārttika* exposition was the only one current in 13th- or 14th-century Tibet, and that before the time of Śākyaśrībhadra (d. 1225) and Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251), the main Dharmakīrti commentatorial tradition at gSaṅ phu and its branches had been concerned with the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* instead of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. This work shows that a rival tradition of *Pramāṇavārttika* studies also existed in Tibet, the product precisely of the competing gSaṅ phu tradition. Since it rejects in at least one place (9b7) an interpretation of 'U yug pa Rigs pa'i seṅ ge, the work cannot be earlier than about the mid-13th century and it is certainly later than the time of Sa paṇ. Moreover on the last folio it mentions three *Pramāṇavārttika* translations: *sṅa 'gyur / bar 'gyur / phyis 'gyur 3*, the third being apparently that of Sa paṇ. The commentator also cites approvingly Phywa pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109-1169) (see 20a2: "Rigs pa'i dbaṅ phyug Chos kyi seṅ ge" and 14a7?: "Rigs pa'i dbaṅ phyug") as well as rṄog Blo ldan śes rab (1059-1109) (see 20a3: "Lo tsā ba chen po").[7] Thus the work apparently represents a late-13th or 14th-century tradition of gSaṅ phu *Pramāṇavārttika* studies that grew up there in the post-Sa paṇ period but which strove to maintain certain exegetical traditions peculiar to the gSaṅ phu school. In any case, historians of Tibetan *pramāṇa* such as Śākya mchog ldan (1428-1507) elsewhere record that even the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* exegetical traditions of gSaṅ phu were on the verge of dying out by the late-15th century, and this tradition of *Pramāṇavārttika* exegesis too may have been on the verge of extinction

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[7] On f. 20a6 there is also mentioned "*Rigs pa'i seṅ ge['i] rnam ṅes ṭīkka*". Here this apparently refers to the commentary by Phywa pa, and not to any work by 'U yug pa Rigs pa'i seṅ ge *alias* bSod nams seṅ ge.

then, if it had not already died out.[8] This particular commentary thus probably dates from between the mid-13th and late-15th centuries.

The following is an extract from the work:

Incipit (1b):

brtse ba'i 'od brgya spros pa yis // sñiṅ gi bduṅ ba 'phrog byed ciṅ //

blo gros ku mud bźad pa'i dpal // 'jam dbyaṅs smra ba'i zla ba rgyal //

gñis pa raṅ gi źal bya rtogs nas gźan rjes su 'dzin pa'i thabs gźan don gyi le'u bśad pa la / brjod byed dag gi raṅ bźin bśad / rjod bya don gyi raṅ bźin bśad pa 2 / daṅ po la / spyi daṅ yan lag? [= bye brag?] don gñis / gźan don rjes dpag gi mtshan ñid / dbye ba / logs par rtogs pa spaṅs pa daṅ gsum / daṅ po ni /

(2) An Important Early Sa lugs Commentary on *Pramāṇavārttika* Chapter I: The *Rigs pa'i snaṅ ba* (of lDoṅ ston?)

The next work is apparently one chapter of an "early" (i.e. 13th-c.?) Tibetan sub-commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika* by lDoṅ ston (sometimes spelled mDoṅ ston), a scholar in the Sa skya pa *pramāṇa* tradition who evidently was a direct disciple of Sa paṇ. The name lDoṅ ston Śes rab dpal bzaṅ po appears in a listing of Sa paṇ's senior students who took monastic ordination from him, and the same person is recorded to have been a teacher to Sa paṇ's nephew 'Phags pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan (1235-1280).[9]

The identification of lDoṅ ston as the author of this work, however, is based merely on the fact that he is said by other sources to have written a *Pramāṇavārttika* commentary with the same title - *Rigs pa'i snaṅ ba*. Glo bo mkhan chen, for instance, lists such a work among three early important *Pramāṇavārttika* "topical commentaries" (*don 'grel*, as opposed to word-by-word glosses, *tshig 'grel*) in the Sa lugs, along with the *Rigs pa sgrub pa* of 'U yug pa and the *sDe bdun gsal ba* of Lho pa kun mkhyen Rin chen dpal. The full title of the work as actually found in the chapter colophon in this manuscript is: *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam par bśad pa rigs pa'i snaṅ ba las raṅ gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa bśad pa ste le'u daṅ po'i rnam par bśad pa'o //*. Since the *Rigs pa'i snaṅ ba* commentary of lDoṅ ston is also quoted occasionally by Glo bo mkhan chen, it may be possible later to confirm this identification.[10]

The manuscript preserved in Patna (no. 1023-2, B. no. 264) is rather old-looking and incomplete. It is written in an *dbu med* script, ten lines to the page, and of its thirty-nine folios the first is missing. As in the gSaṅ phu commentary, the words of the *mūla* are written in red ink. The work is the second of several fragmentary *Pramāṇavārttika* commentatorial works preserved in bundle no. 264.[11]

To give a sample of his exposition, here is his explanation of the difference between the *bar skabs kyi tshigs bcad* and *bsdu ba'i tshigs bcad* (28a9):

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[8] See David P. Jackson, *The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III): Sa-skya Paṇḍita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of Pramāṇa and Philosophical Debate*, Wien 1987.: 135 and 155, note 51.

[9] On lDoṅ ston, see L. van der Kuijp, "lDoṅ ston Śes rab dpal and a version of the *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter* in Thirteen Chapters", *Berliner Indologische Studien* 2, 1986, 51-64.

[10] It should be noted that Bo doṅ Paṇ chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1375-1451) is also known to have written a *tshad ma* treatise entitled *Rigs pa'i snaṅ ba*. See A khu Śes rab rgya mtsho, *dPe rgyun dkon pa 'ga' źig gi tho yig*, Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature, part 3, Śatapiṭaka Series, vol. 30, no.11844; and D. P. Jackson, "Commentaries on the Writings of Sa skya Paṇḍita: A Bibliographical Sketch", *The Tibet Journal* 8/3, 1983: 9. This work of Bo doṅ Paṇ chen, however, was an independent general treatise and not a *Pramāṇavārttika* sub-commentary.

[11] Not no.263, as erroneously stated in my handlist.

bar skabs kyi tshigs bcad daṅ / bsdu ba'i tshigs bcad kyi don ni / don tshan gźan gyis bar du chod pa'i tshul gyi[s] goṅ gi rtsa ba'i tshigs bcad kyi don bsdu ba'i tshigs bcad ni bar skabs kyi tshigs bcad yin la / ma chod pa'i tshul gyis bsdu ba ni bsdu ba'i tshigs bcad yin źiṅ / rtsa ba'i tshigs bcad la dṅos su med kyaṅ 'grel par tshig lhugs par smos pa tshigs bcad du bsdus pa yaṅ bsdu ba'i tshigs bcad yin źes bram zes so /

The chapter has a final colophon (39a6):
de lta le'u daṅ po 'dir / raṅ 'grel daṅ / śākya blo gñis dpaṅ po byas te / ci nus kyis de 2 daṅ 'thun par bkod ciṅ / de gñis daṅ mi mthun pa'i bram ze'i bśad pa snaṅ ba rnams kyaṅ btaṅ sñoms su bźag ste / de gñi[s] na mi gsal ba re re tsam bram ze'i bkod do /

> *raṅ don rnam bśad rigs pa'i snaṅ ba 'di // raṅ 'grel 'grel bśad rta bdun gyis draṅs te //*
> *ma nor gźuṅ gi de ñid don gñer ba'i // 'dun ldan skye bo'i gliṅ bźir gsal bar byas //*
>
> *gźuṅ don ñi 'od śar tshe mig loṅ źiṅ // kun brtags mun pa'i khrod na dga' bas rtse //*
> *phyogs źen raṅ bzo'i brag la gnas bcas pa'i // mtshan mo brgyu ba'i phyogs rnams gźan du bros //*

tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam par bśad pa rigs pa'i snaṅ ba las raṅ gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa bśad pa ste le'u daṅ po'i rnam par bśad pa'o //

It is also interesting to note the existence of a short Mahāmudrā text in this same collection composed by a certain "sDoṅ gi bande" - an otherwise unidentified Sa skya pa teacher from apparently the same lDoṅ/mDoṅ/sDoṅ clan, possibly the same lDoṅ ston as the above. This work (980-5, B. no. 251) is entitled *Phyag rgya chen po ma bu mñam sbyor*, and this *dbu med* manuscript of it is 8 folios long. It is noteworthy as an instance of a Mahāmudrā teaching lineage from Saraha among the Sa skya pa.

(3) One Chapter of a Major 14th-century Tibetan *Pramāṇavārttika* Subcommentary. Ña dbon Kun dga' dpal on *Pramāṇavārttika* Chapter II

In the later Sa skya pa scholastic tradition there was a saying that in Tibet "[the main traditions of] Madhyamaka studies go back to Red mda' ba" (*dbu ma red la thug*), "[the main lines of] Prajñāpāramitā studies go back to g.Yag ston" (*phar phyin g.yag la thug*), and "[the main lines of] *pramāṇa* studies go back to Ña dbon" (*tshad ma ña la thug*)." In the case of *pramāṇa* studies this saying was to a large extent true not only for the Sa skya pa but also for the whole of later Tibetan scholasticism. Ña dbon Kun dga' dpal (d. 1379?) was an important teacher of the *Pramāṇavārttika* to both Red mda' ba (1349-1412) and g.Yag ston (1348-1414). Nevertheless, many later Sa skya pas preferred to stress their lineage as descending through mkhan chen brTson 'grus dpal, a contemporaneous teacher at Sa skya who like Ña dbon had studied *pramāṇa* under Bla ma dam pa bSod nams rgyal mtshan (1312-1375).

This work may provide important hints about the origin and development of some of the particular *pramāṇa* interpretations of Red mda' ba and Tsoṅ kha pa. Until now none of the writings of Ña dbon on *pramāṇa* have become available. In the present manuscript, however, there survives one chapter of this great savant's "brief" commentary on the second chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (i.e. *Pramāṇasiddhi, Tshad ma grub pa*). Near the end of the chapter (27a9) he refers the reader to his more extensive comments in two longer commentaries: *rgyas par śes 'dod [na] sṅa brtsams rgyas 'briṅ 2 la ltos*, which one hopes will likewise turn up intact one day.

The present manuscript (1023-1, B. no. 264) is written in an archaic-looking *dbu med* script, nine lines to the page, with a profusion of contracted spellings. As in the two similar manuscripts described above, the words of the *mūla* have been highlighted by being written in red ink. In this manuscript the comments on the first chapter amount to twenty-seven folios. It forms another part of the same bundle (B. no. 264) in which the chapter from the *Rigs pa'i snaṅ ba* also survives.
Incipit:
swasti /

mtha' yas phyogs su bstan pa'i mi mthun phyogs // mtha' yas sun 'byin nus pas spobs pa can //
mtha' yas 'gro la legs bśad rab spel ba // mtha' yas yon tan gyi[s] brgyan phyogs glaṅ rgyal //
gñis pa lam daṅ lam min phye ste tshad ma mdo [mdzad?] pa'i? mchod bstod bśad pa la 2/ tshad mar bstod pa rgya bcas bśad / tshad mas bstod pa'i dgos pa bśad pa'o //

The colophon for this chapter is as follows (27a9):

tshad ma grub pa blo gros 2 kyi lugs bźin du // 'khrul pa'i dri ma spaṅs nas ma nor gsal bar bśad //
bsdus la dga' bas 'di la 'bad na gźuṅ don rtogs // rgyas par śes 'dod snar brtsams rgyas 'briṅ 2 la ltos//
tshad ma rnam [27b] 'grel las thar pa don gñer gyi tshad ma grub pa źes bya ba le'u 2 pa'i 'grel pa slar yaṅ kun dga' dpal gser mig gi miṅ grags pas sbyar ba'o //

In addition it should be noted that another important work relating to Ña dbon – though belonging to the realm of Madhyamaka studies – is preserved in this collection: no. 962 (B. no. 248), the refutations by a certain bKa' bźi pa Rin chen rdo rje (?) of Kun dga' dpal's defenses of the *gźan stoṅ* Madhyamaka doctrines. (Ña dbon at one point served as abbot of Jo naṅ, and was called upon to defend its *gźan stoṅ* teachings.) This is a rare and previously unrecognized work which may contribute importantly to a better understanding of the history of Madhyamaka in Tibet and in particular to a history of the Jo naṅ pa doctrines and the related Madhyamaka controversies. The xylographic print of this work preserved in Patna is incomplete, lacking as it does one or more folios at the end.

II. General Treatises, Propaedeutics, and Ancillary Works on *pramāṇa*

The collection also contains many indigenous *pramāṇa* works of a more general sort, and I will list here a few of them just to give an indication of the rich variety of materials that are available here.

(1) no. 1031 (B. no. 270)

This seems to be a general work on *pramāṇa* of the Sa skya pa tradition. The explanations accord with the *Tshad ma rigs gter* of Sa skya Paṇḍita, and the presentation is in the *thal-phyir* argument form. The full title of the work is: *Tshad ma'i bstan bcos gźan phan rna sgra'i dgoṅs don gtan la 'bebs pa sde bdun dgoṅs pa'i rgyan.* It is extant here as an *dbu med* manuscript, 7 lines, ff. 1-90, margin: ka. This verse occurs at the end of the treatise:

yi ge lho pa kun dga' bsam 'grub kyis // bris pa mkhas gsuṅ lhag chad med gyur kyaṅ //
blo rmoṅs bdag gis ñes tshogs ci mchis rnams // bzod gsol slad 'char mkhas pas źu dag mdzod //

(2) no. 1044-1 (B. no. 277).

The title of this work is: *Zin mthun rin po che'i 'phreṅ ba blo gsal padmo'i rngul rgyan źes bya ba*

luṅ daṅ rigs pa'i thog 'bebs . . . [unclear]. This is an *dbu med* manuscript (8 lines, ff. 1-10?). It is an introductory treatise of the Sa skya pa tradition, dealing with the fundamental categories of dialectics and philosophy. The structure of the treatise is given in a sixfold subject outline [1b4]: *gsuṅ rab kun la thun moṅs su 'jug par byed pa'i sgo / zin thun rin po che'i 'phreṅ ba blo gsal gyi mgul rgyan 'chad pa la don drug ste / yul / śes bya / gźal bya / yod pa / gźi grub / chos daṅ drug go /*. The work quotes Sa paṇ's *Rigs gter* on 1b5.

(3) A number of fragmentary and possibly rare introductory dialectical works such as *bsDus grwa* manuals and similar texts are also preserved here, for example:

(a) no. 1016 (B. no. 260)
The title appearing on the cover is: *bsKa' sdus chen mo'i dbus phyogs* [sic]. The work survives as an *dbu med* manuscript (8 lines, 6ff.). It appears to be a portion of an elementary text on logic (*bsdus grwa*). Many similar-looking works are found in bundle no. 247.

(b) no. 1044-2 (B. no. 277)
This is an old-looking *dbu med* manuscript (8 lines, ff. 7-88) which is incomplete at the beginning and end. A Mongolian notation is found on 27a, left margin, and it has some insect and water damage. It would appear to be an introductory manual of dialectics (*bsdus grwa*) or a similar scholastic manual of the Dge lugs pa.
Other fragments of Sa skya pa *bsdus grwa* manuals or similar materials are found in nos. 1044-4, 1044-5 of bundle 277.

(c) no. 1124-2 (B. no. 334).
This 6-folio *dbu med* manuscript has the title *rDzas ldog rnam gźag skor*, and it deals with a topic treated in the *bsdus grwa* manuals.

(d) no. 1001 (B. no. 257)
The title of this scholastic manual on *pramāṇa* and *pratyakṣa* is : *'Di na mṅon sum gyi mtha' dpyad luṅ daṅ rigs pa'i 'khor lo lugs ṅan 'pham par byed pa'i legs bśad*. It survives as an *dbu med* manuscript, 9 lines, ff. 1-18, margin: om. The presentation follows a *bsdus grwa* style of argumentation.

(4) A *'Phros bśad* Introductory Speech, no. 1008 (B. no. 260)

This unusual little work is a brief *Pramāṇavārttika* "history" of sorts. Actually it is a kind of "Molla" speech to introduce and accompany a formal public exposition of the *Pramāṇavārttika* in a seminary. Its title is: *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'phros spyi bśad pa bcas*. This exemplar is an incomplete and old, dirty, *dbu can* manuscript (5 lines, ff. 1-10). A similar *'Phros bśad* was composed by the gZim 'og sprul sku bsTan 'dzin sñan grags of 'Phan po Na lendra (d. 1885?), but it is not known to be extant.

III. Historical Sources for *pramāṇa* Studies

As research on the early history of *pramāṇa* studies in Tibet proceeds, a number of sources in this collection are likely to prove very useful, such as the biography of rṄog lo tsā ba Blo ldan śes rab (1059-1109) by his disciple Gro luṅ pa Blo gros 'byuṅ gnas and the very brief versified biography by Śes rab seṅ ge printed with it (see nos. 1435-1 and 1435-2, B. no. 545). Two other works by rṄog's

disciple Gro luṅ pa are incidentally preserved in the collection: his brief praises of rṄog (no. 797, B. no. 172) and his monumental *bsTan rim chen mo* (1289, B. no. 459). Other works useful for the study of the history of learned traditions in Tibet include sTag tshaṅ lo tsā ba's *Rig gnas kun śes* (955, B. no. 246) and A mes źabs's questions and Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags's answers on scholastic traditions (1449-5, B. no. 554).

IV. Other Texts of Potential Interest

(1) Standard Seminary Manuals (*yig cha*) from the Great Central Tibetan Colleges.

Many dialectical manuals are preserved here in original xylograph editions, not only from the three great Central Tibetan dGe lugs pa monasteries, but also standard manuals from the Rwa stod tradition, for example the *blo rig* manual by Druṅ chen Legs pa bzaṅ po (no. 1197-2, B. no. 387), and a Peking (?) edition of the *sTag tshaṅ Ra ba stod pa'i bsdus ra* (of Phyogs lha 'od zer?), no. 1499, B. no. 583.

(2) Editions not widely available

(a) Sa paṇ's *Tshad ma rigs gter gyi raṅ 'grel*, Sa skya ed., no. 1503.

It is strange, given the importance of Sa paṇ's *Rigs gter* in the history of *pramāṇa* studies in Tibet, that this Sa skya edition of the autocommentary on his major work on *pramāṇa* has not yet become available through a reprint. It is therefore worth recording its presence here, and one should note that an exemplar of the Sa skya edition of the *mūla* (though not a very clear print) is available in the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala (LTWA Kha 6, 14, acc. no. 2832).

(b) Two Major *pramāṇa* Treatises of Go rams pa

Also preserved here are editions of important *pramāṇa* works by the major Sa skya pa scholar Go rams pa (1429-1489). These are namely of his [*Tshad ma'i dka' 'grel*] *sDe bdun rab gsal*, here preserved in its Sa skya ed. (no. 1508, B. no. 588), and apparently also his *Pramāṇavārttika* commentary *Kun tu bzaṅ po'i 'od zer* [?] (no. 1036, B. no. 272), the present exemplar of which is an incomplete and unidentified early edition. Apparently one more folio of this second blockprint is preserved in B. no. 264, no. 1023-3 (3).

It may be worthwhile also to note that many small fascicles of the first volume of a previously unknown gTsaṅ edition of Go rams pa's collected works have turned up in this collection (968-2, B. no. 248), as have one of Ṅor chen Kun dga' bzaṅ po's writings in a similar, apparently early gTsaṅ edition (1502-3, B. no. 584).

(c) A Manuscript of One Chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* Commentary of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, no. 1022 (B. no. 264)

This is a manuscript of a Tibetan commentatorial work on the *Pramāṇavārttika* chapter 4 (*gźan don rjes dpag, parārthānumāna*), that by the renowned rGyal tshab Darma rin chen (1364-1432), though the title on the first page is given simply as *gTan tshigs rab dbye ma'i ṭīkka legs pa gcig*. In the chapter colophon one finds the title: *rNam 'grel ṭīkka rnam bśad thar pa'i lam phyin ci ma log pa'i dgoṅs pa legs par bkral ba*. The manuscript is written in an *dbu med* script, black ink, eight lines to the page, and the whole fragment is nineteen folios long.

Incipit:
gñis pa dṅos gtan tshigs kyi rab dbye bśad pa la / mdor bstan pa daṅ / rgyas par bśad pa gñis / daṅ po 'chad pa la / gtan tshigs rab tu dbye ba'i don źes pa nas gsuṅs pa yin źes pa'i bar byuṅ /
Chapter colophon:
tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam bśad thar lam phyin ci ma logs par gsal bar byed pa las / gźan don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste le'u bźi pa'i 'grel pa'o //

rigs par smra ba gtsug gi nor bu yi // gźuṅ mchog śin tu skyoṅs par dka' ba'i gnas //
mkhas maṅ [b]rgya phrag byed pas [?] bgrod pa'i lam // go sla'i ṅag gi[s] cuṅ zad rnam par bye //

sṅa phyi'i 'grel daṅ so so'i tshig don rnams // lha śag rgyan daṅ chos mchog bram ze'i 'grel //
legs par bśad daṅ bla ma'i man ṅag las // tshul bźin sems dpa'i rigs pa'i lam nas draṅs //

(d) Printed Editions of the *Pramāṇavārttika* used by Rāhuljī

Two editions of the *Pramāṇavārttika* are preserved here, that of the Se ra Byes blocks and that of Sa skya (?). Two copies of the first are available: work no. 1337.(B. no. 486) and no. 1506 (B. no. 586). In this edition the text is 59 folios long, seven lines of text per page. The marginal notation is: *rnam rtsa.* The other edition is no. 1507-1 (B. no. 587), consisting of 72 folios of text, six lines per side. Here the marginal notation is: *ka*. The latter two xylographs (nos. 1506 and 1507-1) have the numbering of the verses added in pencil (in Arabic numerals); probably they were used by Rāhuljī for his own research.

Suggestions for the Use of These Materials

Given the importance of these manuscripts and xylographs for *pramāṇa* and Dharmakīrti studies, scholars will want to get access to them and to use them for research. Interested scholars should be forewarned, however, that without visiting Patna, it can be difficult to use these materials. Even on the spot, arranging copies is not always easy (unless the policies of the Bihar Research Society have changed since I was last there), and by mail it is nearly impossible to acquire microfilms or xeroxes of a whole unpublished text. If you can show that the text has already been published elsewhere, you have a much better chance to obtain copies. For a few folios, for very short or fragmentary texts, or for already published works needed for comparative editions, the society might allow xeroxes or photographs in reply to a mailed request.

In any case, it is normally no problem to *read* and *use* any of the books if one actually visits Patna. If one has the chance to go there and consult texts in the collection, it is best to write well in advance to the secretary of the society, informing him of your intention to come and mentioning which works you wish to read and the type of research you need them for. Your request will then be discussed and approved at a meeting of the society before your arrival, letting you avoid possible delays. You should anyway be prepared to stay a few days in Patna, in case there is a local holiday or in case one of the workers concerned is temporarily out of town when you first arrive.[12]

[12] The address of the society: The Bihar Research Society, Patna Museum Building, Patna, Bihar, 800 001, India. Decent and relatively economical lodging can be had at the Hotel President or Hotel Rajasthan, both of which are located just a few minutes away by foot. The society office is normally open from about 10:30 until 4:30 daily except for Mondays and government holidays.

The best approach is to work cooperatively with the research society in such a way that they too can benefit from these materials and from the results of any research. It would be good, for instance, to propose to publish one's results also through the journal of the Bihar Research Society, or to contribute an introduction or foreword to their simultaneous photo-offset publication of whatever text you are interested in, if it is possible to arrange its publication by the society. They would no doubt publish more of these texts if competent scholars from elsewhere would collaborate with them.

Both of my own past visits to Patna have been very fruitful, and I urge others not to overlook the great significance of the materials there for future studies on Tibetan traditions of *pramāṇa* studies.

ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE *UPĀYAHṚDAYA*

by

Yūichi Kajiyama, Kyōto

1. Unlike the Vādamārgapadāni of the *Carakasaṃhitā* (abbr. CS) and *Nyāyasūtra* (abbr. NSū), the *Upāyahṛdaya* (abbr. UH)[1] does not, in its essential parts, intend to describe logic systematically, but to teach how to refute opponents' syllogistic arguments in order to defend Buddhist doctrines.

The *Upāyahṛdaya* is extant only in a Chinese translation made by Chi-ka-yeh and T'an yao in 472 A.D. The book is not listed in any of the early Chinese Catalogues of Buddhist Texts. It was ascribed to Nāgārjuna by the editor of the Sung Version of the Chinese Tripiṭaka. The Korean Version, however, treats it as an anonymous work, discarding the Sung ascription for a reason that has remained unknown.

Around 1925 the late Professor Ui published a large article "An Exposition of the *Upāyahṛdaya*"[2], giving invaluable interpretations and comments on the text. In so doing, however, Ui denied the authorship of Nāgārjuna, surmising that the text must have been written by a Hīnayāna Buddhist before Nāgārjuna (Ui 1925: 493). This opinion of Ui's has been accepted by the late Professor C. Tucci[3], the editor of the *Mochizuki Buddhist Dictionary* (*Bukkyō Daijiten*)[4], that of the *Dictionary of Buddhist Literature* (*Bussho kaisetsu Daijiten*)[5], and so forth, not to mention numerous writers of Indological and Buddhist articles.

To our surprise, however, the sole reason for which Ui denied the authenticity of our text is a single passage in the *Upāyahṛdaya* which runs: "The Buddha's true teachings are such as the twelve-membered dependent origination, four noble truths, thirty-seven elements necessary for emancipation, four gains of a mendicant (*śramaṇa*), . . ." (UH 24a14-15; Ui 1925: 493). Ui thought that Nāgārjuna the Mahāyānist would not have mentioned the above doctrines as the Buddha's true teachings, and that only a Hīnayānist could have conceived them in that manner. One might well question, however, why Nāgārjuna could not have said that the Buddha taught the twelve-membered dependent origination and the above other doctrines.

These doctrines are accepted as the Buddha's teachings both by Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. Nāgārjuna himself talks about the very items in the *Madhyamakakārikā* (Chap. 26), *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*[6] and other works. Nāgārjuna was well acquainted with Hīnayāna doctrines, which, as a matter of course, he could have enumerated as the Buddha's teachings in general. What is more, the above passage occurs in the *Upāyahṛdaya*, when the latter mentions as examples of *siddhānta*s the main doctrines of the Fire worshippers, Grammarians, Medical School, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Jaina and others. Hence, nothing is to be wondered even if Nāgārjuna, in such an occasion, mentions as the Buddha's teachings in the level of conventional truth the twelve-membered dependent origination, etc., which he himself believes to be empty of own-beings in the highest truth. Furthermore, Ui as well as Tucci disregarded the fact that central doctrines of Mahāyāna Buddhism are also described in our

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[1] The reconstruction of the title into *Upāyahṛdaya* is not definite. Sometimes it is also rendered into *Upāyakauśalyahṛdaya* or *Prayogasāra*: UH 23, footnote 2 ascribes it to Nāgārjuna.

[2] = Ui 1925. Ui edited the Chinese text, translated it into Japanese, and gave profuse comments and interpretations.

[3] Giuseppe Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Baroda 1929: xi.

[4] Shinko Mochizuki, *Bukkyō Daijiten*, Vol. 5, Kyōto 1933: 4641a (repr. 1958).

[5] Genmyo Ono (ed.), *Bussho Kaisetsu Daijiten*, Vol. 9, Tōkyō 1935: 437 (repr. 1974).

[6] Taishō Vol. 25 (*Ta-chih tu-lun*) 100b; 197b sq., etc.

text. The *Upāyahṛdaya* says for example, "All things are empty and quiescent, are devoid of *ātman* and *pudgala*, and are as unreal as magic and transformation. This kind of profound teaching can be understood only by the wise while it deteriorates the fool" (UH 25a4-7; 12f.; Ui 1925: 504). Again it says, "All things are empty and without *ātman*, because all perceptible objects are produced out of causes and conditions" (UH 25a12f.). Observing these passages makes it difficult indeed to understand how Ui came to ascribe the *Upāyahṛdaya* to a pre-Nāgārjuna Hīnayānist, while Ui himself was translating these passages into Japanese.

2. We have to take note that the *Upāyahṛdaya* knows the syllogistic arguments consisting of five members, viz., *pratijñā, hetu, dṛṣṭānta, upanaya*, and *nigamana*, and that curiously enough, however, it neither includes these members of a syllogism (*avayava*) among the topics (*padārtha*) of the book, nor tries to interpret the members. These facts are not to be overlooked. Our text introduces for the sake of criticism an opponent's syllogism which runs: "(*pratijñā*:) *Ātman* is permanent; (*hetu*:) because it is not cognized by sense organs; (*dṛṣṭānta*:) just as space which, being not cognized by sense organs, is permanent - whatever is not cognized by sense organs is permanent; (*upanaya*:) *ātman* is incognizable by sense organs; (*nigamana*:) therefore, how can *ātman* be impermanent?" (UH 28a4-6). This is a perfect syllogism - perfect when viewed from the standard of early Indian logic.

The *Upāyahṛdaya* criticizes this syllogism of the opponent's by means of twenty *prasaṅgas* (*hsiang-ying*[7]: reductio ad absurdum), or what are called *jāti*s in the *Nyāyasūtra*, which our text regards as valid arguments. Our text says that there are twenty answers by means of which one helps true doctrines develop, so that one may be named a comprehender of the true doctrines of Buddhism (UH 27c11f.; Ui 1925: 568).

Having interpreted the twenty *prasaṅga*s or *jāti*s, Ui stated, "The Chinese translators of the UH thought that one could refute the above syllogism proving permanency of *ātman* by means of these twenty futile rejoinders. One who knows a little of logic should comprehend that this chapter explains wrong and futile rejoinders. It is really absurd and unpardonable that the translators regard these futile rejoinders as valid arguments by which one is able to refute permanency of *ātman*" (Ui 1925: 577). Ui continues to say, "This stupid misunderstanding must have been made by the Chinese translators, because the original Indian author would not have written a logical text without knowing the invalidity of *jāti*s" (Ui 1925: 577). Thus, Ui imputed what he calls misunderstanding not to the author, but to the Chinese translators.

These very comments by Ui are themselves absurd and inexcusable. When neither the original text, nor a Tibetan translation is extant, how can one infer that the misunderstanding is not the original author's, but the Chinese translators'? Moreover, it is very much questionable whether the characteristic of *jāti* was misunderstood by the author and/or translators, or was purposefully reckoned to be valid. Ui considered the *Upāyahṛdaya* as one of the texts explaining logic such as the *Carakasaṃhitā*, *Nyāyasūtra*, etc., and could not construe it otherwise. However, if, on the contrary, the author wrote the *Upāyahṛdaya* in order to criticize and ridicule syllogism in the earliest stage of Indian logic, it is no wonder that he denied logic by using sophistic arguments such as reductio ad absurdum (*prasaṅga*) or cunning rejoinders (*jāti*). We do know that at the time the text was written there was a great philosopher who attacked logicians by means of sophism and paradox. He is none other than Nāgārjuna. If the *Upāyahṛdaya* which refutes syllogistic arguments by using *jāti*s and

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[7] The Chinese word '*hsiang-yin*' is most likely to correspond to *prasaṅga* or *prasaṅga-jāti*. Cf. A. Hirakawa et al (ed.), *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Part One (Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese)*, Tokyo 1973: 259; U. Wogihara (ed.), revised by N. Tsuji, *Bonwa Daijiten (Sanskrit-Japanese Dictionary)*, Vol. IX, Tokyo 1974: 877a (reprint by Kodansha, 1986). *Jāti* in *prasaṅga-jāti* is probably used in the sense, not of 'casuistry', but of 'class, species' by the *Upāyahṛdaya*.

prasaṅgas is absurd and unpardonable as Ui comments, the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* (abbr. VP) and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (abbr. VV) as well as *Madhyamakakārikā* will be absurd and unpardonable, because in these works Nāgārjuna freely uses *prasaṅgas*, *chalas* (casuistries), *jātis* and *nigrahasthānas* (clinchers, points of defeat) in order to reduce his opponents, Naiyāyikas and Ābhidhārmikas, to utter silence.

It is now certain that the chapter on *jātis* or *prasaṅgas* in the *Upāyahṛdaya*, the central portion of the text, does not disapprove *jātis* and *prasaṅgas*, but recognizes their validity. Only when we observe the text from this point of view, can we understand it correctly and pay due appreciation. Thus I find no reason to cancel the ascription of the text to Nāgārjuna made by the editor of the Sung Version of the Chinese Tripiṭaka.

3. The *Upāyahṛdaya* consists of four chapters. Chap. I deals with eight subjects or topics (*padārtha*) of the text, which do not cover the whole sixteen topics of the *Nyāyasūtra*. Especially noteworthy is the fact that in the text explanations of the members of a syllogism (*avayava*) are totally lacking, as noted above. Chap. II explicates seventeen kinds of points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*). In general, an opponent raises an assertion such as "Sound is permanent, because it is without color-form, as space"; then it is criticized from the Buddhist standpoint and is declared to be a clincher. In Chap. III, the author criticizes his opponent's views such as existence of *ātman* and non-existence of *nirvāṇa*. As a whole this serves as an introduction to the final and fourth chapter, which is of central significance in the text. Chap. IV deals with twenty kinds of *prasaṅgas* regarded as valid arguments for refuting permanency of *ātman*, as discussed above.

3.1. First, I would like to present here some important theories gleaned from the first three chapters.

3.1.1. In Chap. I, the author classifies 'cause' into 'creating cause' (*kāraṇa-hetu*) and 'informing cause' (*jñāpaka-hetu*) (UH 23c11; Ui 1925: 479). This classification is not found in the *Carakasaṃhitā*, but is recognized by Nāgārjuna, who says in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (com. on v. 64) that the words "Devadatta is absent from home" do not create (*karoti*) Devadatta's absence, but only make the fact known (*jñāpayati*).

3.1.2. In the history of Indian logic, the *Upāyahṛdaya* is the first text which recognized precisely four kinds of cognitions (*pramāṇa*), viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), identification (*upamāna*), and testimony (*śabda*) (UH 25a25f.; Ui 1925: 515). This theory was transmitted to the *Nyāyasūtra* (NSū 1.1.3) and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (VV vv. 5-6).

3.1.3. Our text points out that 'example' (*dṛṣṭānta, udāharaṇa*) must be a fact of which the wise and the fool share the same knowledge. Our author divides 'example' into a wholly similar example and a partially similar one, without giving any interpretation. The *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* (Secs. 27 and 29) provides the same classification.[8]

3.1.4. The author enumerates eight kinds of fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) which include two kinds of casuistries (*chala*), viz., the verbal casuistry (*vāk-chala*) and the casuistry by generalization (*sāmānya-chala*).[9] The *vāk-chala* in the *Upāyahṛdaya* is actually twofold: One is what the *Nyāyasūtra* calls *vāk-chala*, in which one misinterprets (on purpose) *nava-kambala* (one who wears new clothes) as 'one who wears nine clothes', and the other one which the *Nyāyasūtra* calls *upacāra-chala* (figurative casuistry): Here one refutes statements such as "that mountain is afire", saying that it is not the mountain, but only grass and trees that are afire. The *Upāyahṛdaya*, explaining these two kinds

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[8] UH 23c8f., 18-21; Ui 1925: 479, 483.

[9] UH 25c19-20; *sāmānya-chala* is illustrated as follows: when a party says that things made by causes and conditions (*saṃskṛta-dharma*) are empty and quiescent like space, the other party criticizes the thesis, saying that if so, both (*saṃskṛta-dharma* and space) are non-existent.

of *chalas*, does not differentiate them, but treats them under the same *vāk-chala* (UH 25c14-18). The *Nyāyasūtra* criticizes an opponent who says that *upacāra-chala* is not different from *vāk-chala* (NSū 1.2.15-16). By the opponent the *Nyāyasūtra* must have meant the author of the *Upāyahṛdaya*. This fact, together with other instances, proves that the *Upāyahṛdaya* was a target of criticism by the *Nyāyasūtra*.[10] As is well known, the *Nyāyasūtra* in Chaps. II, III, and IV often criticizes Nāgārjuna. In the above case the *Upāyahṛdaya* is criticized instead of Nāgārjuna.

4. Second, I would like to illustrate parallelism between *prasaṅgas* in the *Upāyahṛdaya* and those found in Nāgārjuna's works by explaining some examples in order to clarify the close relation between them, a comparison of which is given in Table II attached at the end of this paper. In Chap. IV the *Upāyahṛdaya* sets forth the opponent's syllogism which has been introduced above, i.e., "*ātman* is permanent; because it is not cognized by sense organs; just as space, being not cognized by sense organs, is permanent - whatever is not cognized by sense organs is permanent; *ātman* is incognizable by sense organs; therefore, how can *ātman* be impermanent?" Then the author of the *Upāyahṛdaya* demonstrates how to refute this syllogism by each of twenty *prasaṅgas* (or *jātis*). These twenty rejoinders, some of which I will explain below, are valid arguments according to our author, as discussed above.

4.1. *Prasaṅga* No. 3 (*t'ung-i hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through identity and heterogeneity; UH 28a10-12): "Neither when space is identical with *ātman* nor when the former is different from the latter, is space an example of *ātman*." Nāgārjuna says that fire cannot be an example of fire, because the former is the same as the latter, and that water cannot be an example of fire, just because they are different from each other (VP 27 and 28). No doubt, Nāgārjuna knew and utilized *Prasaṅga* (abbr. *Pra.*) No. 3 of the *Upāyahṛdaya*.

4.2. *Pra.* No. 6 (*yin-t'ung hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through difference; UH 28a17-19): The grounds on which the opponent maintains permanency of *ātman* are its imperceptibleness which is common to space. The author of the *Upāyahṛdaya* refutes it, saying that space and *ātman* are different in spite of the common characteristic of imperceptibleness. I have found no grounds to doubt that the refutation is identical with that in VP 60. In the latter text an opponent holds that space is impermanent because of its formlessness, as in the case of action; and Nāgārjuna points out that the formlessness of action is produced, whereas the formlessness of space is eternal and unproduced, and that therefore they are not the same.

4.3. *Pra.* No. 10 (*shih-t'ung hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through the three times; UH 28a24-27) = *ahetusama*: Against the same assertion of the opponent's, our author says: If the probans 'being incognizable by sense organs' is in the past, it has disappeared; if the probans is in the future, it is not yet existent; and if the probans is at the same time as the probandum, the two things cannot act upon each other just as the two horns of a cow cannot do so. In the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, Nāgārjuna says (11): Neither when *pramāṇa* (the instrument of cognition) precedes in time to *prameya* (the object of cognition), when it succeeds *prameya*, nor when it is at the same time as *prameya*, can *pramāṇa* establish *prameya*. In VP 12 the Naiyāyika counterattacks, saying that Nāgārjuna's negation of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is not established, because the negation is not effective in the three times; and in VP 13 and 14 Nāgārjuna points out that the Naiyāyika has already been defeated because he has admitted his opponent's opinion, i.e., he has exposed his own fault (*matānujñā*) before he criticizes

[10] Cf. Ui 1925: 535f.

Nāgārjuna by using the very same arguments as the latter's.

The similar controversies recur in VV 20 and 69. The Naiyāyika, utilizing the same argument as *Pra.* No. 10, contends that Nāgārjuna's negation of own beings in all things is not established, because the negation is ineffective in the three times (v. 20). In reply to this criticism, Nāgārjuna condemns the Naiyāyika's argument, pointing out that the 'ineffectiveness of the negation in the three times' is a probans which is still to be proved (*sādhyasama*) for a realist like the Naiyāyika, although it is true for Nāgārjuna who negates own beings of all things (v. 69). The *Nyāyasūtra*, in 5.1.18, calls *Pra.* No. 10 of the *Upāyahṛdaya* a futile rejoinder named 'parity through non-probativeness' (*ahetusama*), and in 5.1.19, says that the negation by one who uses this rejoinder, (i.e. Nāgārjuna,) is also ineffective. We have to note that neither *sādhyasama* nor *matānujñā* is known to the *Upāyahṛdaya*, whereas both appear in the *Nyāyasūtra* (Chap. 5) and Nāgārjuna's works (*sādhyasama* in VV 69; *matānujñā* in VP 13). The *Upāyahṛdaya* does not know the Naiyāyika's counterattack which appears in VP 12, VV 20 and 69, and NSū 5.1.19. The *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* enumerates all the sixteen subjects of the *Nyāyasūtra*; the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* criticizes the four kinds of cognitions of the Naiyāyika; and both texts use many *prasaṅgas* which are regarded as wrong and futile rejoinders (*jāti*) in the *Nyāyasūtra*, often recriticizing the Naiyāyika's opinions on *jātis*. From these facts we infer that Nāgārjuna was well acquainted with Chaps. 1 and 5 of the *Nyāyasūtra*. Although I do not intend here to discuss in detail the relation between the *Nyāyasūtra* and Nāgārjuna's works,[11] I am now able to determine at least the temporal sequence of the above texts: The *Upāyahṛdaya* follows the *Carakasaṃhitā*, but definitely antecedes the *Nyāyasūtra* and Nāgārjuna's works such as the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. Nāgārjuna knew Chaps. 1 and 5 of the *Nyāyasūtra*, although he was criticized in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4 of the *Nyāyasūtra*.

4.4. *Pra.* No. 11 (*pu-tao hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through non-convergence; UH 28a27-28b1) = *aprāptisama*: The *Upāyahṛdaya* says that the probans 'being incognizable by sense organs', when it does not reach the probandum 'permanency', cannot establish the latter, just as fire does not burn an object which is not reached, and a sword cannot slay a man without touching him.

4.5. *Pra.* No. 12 (*tao hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through convergence; UH 28b1f.) = *prāptisama*: Even when the probans reaches the probandum, it cannot establish the latter, because then the two things are not distinct from each other. No. 11 and No. 12 of the *Upāyahṛdaya* are the same arguments found in VP 6, where Nāgārjuna says that *pramāṇa* establishes *prameya*, neither when the former touches the latter, nor when it does not, just as lamplight does not illumine darkness whether or not the former reaches the latter. Where there is lamplight, there is no darkness; and lamplight cannot illumine darkness without coming in contact with it, just as a sword does not cut an object without touching it. *Pras.* Nos. 11 and 12 of the *Upāyahṛdaya* appear in NSū 5.1.7 as futile rejoinders named 'parity through non-convergence' (*aprāptisama*) and 'parity through convergence' (*prāptisama*).

The Naiyāyika rebuts the above two arguments of the *Upāyahṛdaya*, citing examples of a jar which is accomplished when its causes are in contact with it, and killing by magical spells which is attained without the killer coming into contact with the killed person (NSū 5.1.8). Nāgārjuna cites this answer of the Naiyāyika's in VP 7, changing 'killing by magical spells' into 'calamities caused by stars', and criticizes the Naiyāyika's argument, saying that calamities caused by stars touch people, even if stars themselves do not, and that if lamplight illumines without reaching darkness, a single lamp at this place would illumine darkness in all caves on all mountains. That is to say, Nāgārjuna used *Pras.* Nos.

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[11] I have not completed a detailed comparison between Nāgārjuna's works and Chaps. 2, 3, and 4 of the *Nyāyasūtra*, though a part of it was published in Yūichi Kajiyama, "Bukkyō chishikiron no keisei" [Formation of Buddhist Logic and Epistemology], *Kōza Daijō Bukkyō* 9 – *Ninshikiron to ronrigaku*, 1984.: 43-52.

11 and 12 of the *Upāyahṛdaya*, and having known the Naiyāyika's answer, he refuted it.

4.6. *Pra.* No. 13 (*hsiang-wei hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through difference; UH 28b1-3); *Pra.* No. 14 (*pu-hsiang-wei hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through non-difference; UH 28b4-7) = *aviśeṣasama*: The author of the *Upāyahṛdaya* criticizes the opponent's thesis regarding permanency of *ātman*, saying that *ātman* is impermanent, because it is identical with impermanent things in respect of 'existence'; No. 14 points out that if *ātman* is identical with space in respect to permanency, *ātman* will not have cognizing function as space does not. These two *Pras.* are adopted in VP 29 which denies A being an example of B, even if A is partially similar to B. The *Nyāyasūtra* (5.1.23) introduces No. 14 of the *Upāyahṛdaya*: "If the presence of a single common property were to make the two things non-different, then all things would have to be regarded as non-different, because the property of 'existence' is present in all - this contention constitutes parity through non-difference". The *Nyāyasūtra*, however, rebuts it (5.1.24).

5. Third, I would like to cite several *Pras.* of the *Upāyahṛdaya*, which, though not found in Nāgārjuna's works, correspond to rejoinders considered futile by the *Nyāyasūtra*.

5.1. *Pra.* No. 1 (*Tsêng-to hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through augmentation; UH 28a4-9) = *utkarṣasama*: When *ātman* is asserted to be permanent on the grounds that its property 'being incognizable by sense organs' is common to space, which is permanent, the author of the *Upāyahṛdaya* argues: If space is unintelligent and therefore permanent, *ātman* is intelligent and therefore should be impermanent. The *Nyāyasūtra* mentions 'parity through augmentation' (*utkarṣasama*) (5.1.4); and the commentator explains that it occurs when the refuter connects an additional property of the example with the subject.

5.2. *Pra.* No. 2 (*Sun-chien hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through subtraction; UH 28a9f.) = *apakarṣasama*: Against the same syllogism of the opponent, the author of the *Upāyahṛdaya* says that when space lacks intelligence and *ātman* is intelligent, the former cannot be an example of *ātman*. The *Nyāyasūtra* includes among others 'parity through subtraction' (*apakarṣasama*) in the same Sūtra, and the commentator says that it is so called because the refuter connects the absence of a certain property in the example with the subject.

5.3. *Pra.* No. 8 (*pien-t'ung hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through omnipresence; UH 28a20-22): Our author says: You think that space is incognizable by sense organs and therefore permanent; but space is present in all things, which are not incognizable by sense organs (and therefore impermanent; *ātman* is also present in all things, and therefore it should be impermanent)." This argument is logically confused. But it is at least similar to 'parity through similarity' (*sādharmyasama*) (NSū 5.1.2) in which the opponent seeks to prove the contrary of the predicate in the original thesis.

5.4. *Pra.* No. 9 (*pu-pien-t'ung hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through non-omnipresence; UH 28a22-24): Our author argues: "Atoms are not omnipresent and, though imperceptible, are impermanent; *ātman* is also imperceptible and therefore not permanent." This argument is also implausible, but is similar to 'parity through dissimilarity' (*vaidharmyasama*) (NSū 5.1.2).

5.5. *Pra.* No. 15 (*I hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through doubt; UH 28b7f.) = *saṃśayasama*: Our author says: "*ātman* is also existent and is not necessarily permanent. Thus we have doubt as to whether it is permanent or not." The *Nyāyasūtra* knows 'parity through doubt' (*saṃśayasama*) in

which the assertion that sound is impermanent because it is produced by effort is doubted on the grounds that sound has 'being cognized by senses' (*aindriyakatva*) which is a property none other than a permanent universal (*sāmānya*) (5.1.14). *Pra.* No. 15 is similar to *Pra.* No. 14 (cf. sec. 4.6) in the same way as *saṃśayasama* is similar to *aviśeṣasama* in the *Nyāyasūtra*. In both cases, the former only casts doubt over the original proposition, while the latter condemns it definitely.

5.6. *Pra.* No. 16 (*pu-i hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through non doubt; UH 28b8-11) = *kāryasama*: The author doubts the thesis that *ātman* is permanent because of imperceptibleness, and says that you should explain the hindrance which makes it imperceptible. We find in the *Nyāyasūtra* 'parity through effect' (*kāryasama*) in which the refuter points out the property of sound 'being produced by effort' does not prove impermanence of sound, because even a permanent thing is manifested after removal of hindrance (5.1.37).

5.7. *Pra.* No. 17 (*yü-p'o hsiang-yin*: reductio ad absurdum through contrary example; UH 28b11-13): The author denies the theory that *ātman* is permanent because of imperceptibleness, saying that roots of trees and underground water are imperceptible and impermanent. This *Pra.* is similar to the preceding one and also to *anupalabdhisama* (NSū 5.1.29: parity through non-apprehension), which, however, is more complex.

As we have seen above, *prasaṅga*s in the *Upāyahṛdaya* are considered to be valid arguments by the author, just as those in the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* are so considered by Nāgārjuna. Many of them are condemned by the *Nyāyasūtra* to be futile rejoinders. It is clear that the *prasaṅga*s of the *Upāyahṛdaya* are of the exactly same nature as those in the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. If the *Carakasaṃhitā*, which seems to be antecedent to the *Upāyahṛdaya*, is a work written in the first half of the second century, the *Upāyahṛdaya* which is previous to the *Nyāyasūtra*, may be dated at a time during which Nāgārjuna (c.150-250) began his activities. It is most probable that Nāgārjuna wrote the *Upāyahṛdaya* before the *Madhyamakakārikā*, *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, and *Vigrahavyāvartanī*.

Abbreviations and Literature

NSū — *Nyāyasūtram: Śrī-Gautama-mahāmunipraṇītaṃ Nyāyasūtram (Nyāyasūtra of Gautama: A System of Indian Logic), Vātsyāyanīyaṃ Nyāyabhāṣyaṃ Vācaspatimiśrākṛta-Nyāyasūcinibandha-sahitaṃ mahāmahopadhyāya Gaṅganātha Jha kṛtaṭippanyā samalaṅkṛtaṃ ca*. Poona 1939

UH — *Upāyahṛdaya: Fang-pien hsin-lun* Taishō 1632, Vol. 32, 23b-28c.

Ui 1925 — H. Ui, "Hobenshinron no chūshakuteki kenkyū." *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* 2, 1925, 473-585 (repr. 1965).

VP — *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*: Yuichi Kajiyama, "The Vaidalyaprakaraṇa of Nāgārjuna", in *Y. Kajiyama, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy*. Ed. Katsumi Mimaki et al. Kyoto 1989, 361-387.

VV — *Vigrahavyāvartanī*: E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst (ed.), "The Vigrahavyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna." *Melanges chinois et bouddhiques* 9, [1948-1951] 1951.

Nyāyasūtra	Carakasaṃhitā	Upāyahṛdaya
1 pramāṇa 認識（量）	11 hetu = upalabdhikāraṇa	I.3.5 知因（生因・了因）
1.1 pratyakṣa 知覚	18 pratyakṣa 現量	1) 現見
1.2 anumāna 推理	19 anumāna 比量	2) 比知（前比・後比・同比）
1.3 upamāna 比定	21 aupamya 譬喩	3) 以喩知
1.4 śabda 証言	20 aithihya 伝承	4) 随経書
	17 śabda 証言	
2 prameya 認識対象（12種）	2~7 所量（実・徳・業・同・異・和合）	
3 saṃśaya 疑惑	22 saṃśaya	
4 prayojana 動機	23 prayojana	
5 dṛṣṭānta 喩例	12 dṛṣṭānta	I.3.1 喩（具足喩・少分喩）
6 siddhānta 定説（4種）	16 定説（4種）	I.3.2 随所執（究竟義）（4種）
7 avayava 支分		
pratijñā 主張	8 pratijñā 宗	
hetu 理由	11 hetu ⎤ 9 sthāpanā 立量	
udāharaṇa 喩例	12 dṛṣṭānta ⎥ 9 sthāpanā 立量	
upanaya 連合	13 upanaya ⎥ 9 sthāpanā 立量	
nigamana 結論	14 nigamana ⎦ 9 sthāpanā 立量	
	10 pratiṣṭhāpanā 反立量	
8 tarka 思択		
9 nirṇaya 決定		
10 vāda 論議	1 vāda（2種）	II.1 語法（非語・是語）
11 jalpa 論諍	1.1 jalpa	
12 vitaṇḍā 論詰	1.2 vitaṇḍā	
13 hetvābhāsa 似因	36 ahetu 非因（3種）	I.3.7 似因（非因）8種
13.1 savyabhicāra	36.3 varṇyasama 所証相似	7) 言異？ 6) 説同？

Nyāyasūtra	Carakasaṃhitā	Upāyahṛdaya
13.2 viruddha	cf. 33.5	8) 相違
13.3 prakaraṇasama	36.1 prakaraṇasama 問題相似	5) 類同
13.4 sādhyasama	36.2 saṃśayasama 疑惑相似	3) 疑似因
13.5 kālātīta	37 atītakāla 過時	4) 過時語
14 chala 曲解(3種)	35 chala (2種)	I.3.8 隨語難
14.1 vākchala	35.1 vākchala	I.3.7 1) 隨其言橫為生過
14.2 sāmānyachala	35.2 sāmānyachala	2) 就同異為生過
14.3 upacārachala		
15 jāti 誤難(別表)		(別表)
16 nigrahastāna 負処 (22種)	44 nigrahasthāna (15種)	II.2 負処 17種
16.1 pratijñāhāni (5.2.1)	40 pratijñāhāni 壊宗 =NSū 16.4	II.3.17 捨本宗(NSūの 1,2,3)
16.2 pratijñāntara (5.2.2)		
16.3 pratijñāvirodha (cf.13.2)	33.5 viruddha (=NSū 13.2) 相違	II.3.2 立因不正
16.4 pratijñāsannyāsa		
16.5 hetvantara	42 hetvantara 異因	
16.6 arthāntara	43 arthāntara 異義	
16.7 nirarthaka	33.3 anarthaka 無義	I.3.4.3 飾文辞無有義趣?
16.8 avijñātārtha		II.3.14 無義語
16.9 apārthaka	33.4 apārthaka (vyarthaka) 欠義，離義	II.3.6 三説法要不令他解
16.10 aprāptakāla		II.3.1 語顛倒
	33. vākyadoṣa 語失	I.3.4 言失
16.11 nyūna	33.1 nyūna 欠減	II.3.12 語少
16.12 adhika	33.2 adhika (2種) 増加	II.3.13 語多
16.13 punarukta (śabdārthayoḥ punarvacanam)	33.2.1 arthapunarukta	I.3.4.1 辞無異而重分別；II.3.16 義重
	33.2.2 śabdapunarukta	I.3.4.2 義無異而重分別

Nyāyasūtra	Carakasamhitā	Upāyahṛdaya
16.14 ananubhāṣaṇa		II.3.10 有説者衆人悉解而独不悟
16.15 ajñāna	44.1 avijñāna 不了知	II.3.7 自三説法而不別知
16.16 apratibhā		II.3.5 応答不答?
16.17 vikṣepa		
16.18 matānujñā	41 abhyanujñā 認容	
16.19 paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa	44.3 anuyojyasyānanuyoga (所難詰にたいする無難詰)	II.3.4 応問不問; II.2.8 彼義短闕不覚知
16.20 niranuyojyānuyoga	44.2 ananuyojyasyānuyoga (無難詰にたいする詰問)	II.3.9 他正義而為生過
16.21 apasiddhānta		
16.22 hetvābhāsa	cf. 36, 37	II.3.15 非時語; cf. II.2.1
		I.3.4.4 雖義理而無次第
		II.3.3 引喩不同
	15 uttara 答破	II.3.11 経疾聴者不悟
	24 savyabhicāra 不確定	
十支論証の第 1 jijñāsā	25 jijñāsa 欲知	
(同上の第 10 saṃśayavyudāsa	26 vyavasāya 決断	
(anumāna に含める)	27 arthāpatti 義準	
(anumāna に含める)	28 sambhava 随生	
(cf. NSū 5.2.21)	29 anuyojya 所難詰	
	30 ananuyojya 無難詰	
	31 anuyoga 詰問	
	32 pratyanuyoga 反詰問	
	34 vākyapraśaṃsā 語善	
	38 upālambha 顕過	
	39 parihāra 反駁	

Nyāyasūtra	Upāyahṛdaya	Nāgārjuna
1 sādharmya-sama	8 遍同相応	
2 vaidharmya°	9 不遍同 〃	
3 utkarṣa°	1 増多 〃	
4 apakarṣa°	2 損減 〃	
5 varṇya°		
6 avarṇya°		
7 vikalpa°		
8 sādhya°		VP 37; VV 28, 69
9 prāpti°	12 到 〃	VP 6
10 aprāpti°	11 不到 〃	VP 6
11 prasaṅga°		VP 41
12 pratidṛṣṭānta°		
13 anutpatti°		
14 saṃśaya°	15 疑 〃	
15 prakaraṇa°		
16 ahetu°	10 時同 〃	VP 11, 35; VV 20, 69
17 arthāpatti°		
18 aviśeṣa°	14 不相違 〃	VP 29
19 upapatti°		
20 upalabdhi°		
21 anupalabdhi°	17 喩破 〃 ?	
22 nitya°		
23 anitya°		
23 kārya°	16 不疑 〃	
	3 同異 〃	VP 27, 28
	4 問多答少 〃	
	5 答多問少 〃	
	6 因同 〃	VP 60
	7 果同 〃	VP 46
	13 相違 〃	
	18 聞同 〃	
	19 聞異 〃	
	20 不生 〃	

ON THE BACKGROUND OF PV II 12ab
– THE ORIGIN OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S IDEA OF *ARTHAKRIYĀ*

by

Kyō Kanō, Kyōto

0. All creative philosophers, who have established original systems or arguments, so long as they worked in a stream of thoughts, cannot be, consciously or unconsciously, free from the influence of preceding thinkers. They are not free even from the influence of the thinkers who belong to other philosophical groups.

As with most philosophers in India, the thoughts of Dharmakīrti were also not isolated from the influence of others. Recently, from this point of view, many scholars have been discussing Dharmakīrti's thought relative to that of Dignāga. In this paper, however, I will point out an element of Dharmakīrti's thought, the origin of which can be traced back to other philosophical groups. It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify the origin of his idea with certainty, but the aim of this paper is to present one possibility.

I. There is one verse of Dharmakīrti which cites an assertion of the Naiyāyikas but has not yet been elucidated clearly. The verse reads:

sthitvāpravṛttisaṃsthānaviśeṣārthakriyādiṣu /
iṣṭasiddhir asiddhir vā dṛṣṭānte saṃśayo 'thavā // (PV II 12)

This verse is found in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, and comes at the beginning of a series of verses in which Dharmakīrti denies the existence of eternal things and refutes the argument that they can be means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). In this verse, Dharmakīrti rejects the three logical reasons which were asserted by the Naiyāyikas in order to establish the existence of God (*īśvara*). The three logical reasons are:

a) *sthitvā pravṛtteḥ*,
b) *saṃsthānaviśeṣāt*, and
c) *arthakriyākāritvāt* (or *arthakriyāsādhanatvāt*)

My arguments are concerned mainly with the meaning of the term '*arthakriyā*' in the passage above. Before focusing on the meaning of *arthakriyā*, we must investigate the precise meaning of two other terms in this verse, and their backgrounds.

We can find various kinds of syllogisms for the establishment of the existence of God in Naiyāyika literature, and these are often cited in Buddhist texts. In addition to the proof of God's existence, these syllogisms include the proof of some natures of God, for instance, his omniscience (*sarvajñātva*), oneness (*ekatva*), and eternity (*nityatva*). These proofs are sometimes discussed separately, but usually they are discussed concurrently. The main discussion, as a matter of course, focuses on the establishment of God's existence.

In order to clarify the ideas expressed by the three terms in Dharmakīrti's verse and their background, it is helpful to list and classify relevant syllogisms, especially those concerning the

establishment of the e x i s t e n c e of God. (Such a list[1] is given in an appendix to the present paper.) The list shows that they can be divided into two basic groups:

I *kārya*-type
The formulas in this group are based on the idea that an effect presupposes an intelligent being who produces it as its cause.
In this case, the subject (*pakṣa* in the narrow sense) is an effect (*kārya*) such as *kṣiti, tanu* or *pṛthivī*, and the logical reason (*hetu*) is, for example, *kāryatvāt* or *sanniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt*.
I tentatively call these formulas '*kārya*-type'.

II *acetana*-type
The formulas in this group are based on the idea that material causes or instrumental causes which are themselves unconscious (*acetana*) become active only when they are controlled by an intelligent being (*cetana*).
In this case, the subject is a material or instrumental cause, and the logical reason is, for example, *acetanatvāt*, or *pravṛttimattvāt*.
I will call these formulas '*acetana*-type'.

There are, of course, many formulas which cannot be included in these two basic groups. However, these two groups are important to the development of the formulas for the establishment of the existence of God, because they are logically well founded and therefore were often adopted as the subject of controversy between Naiyāyikas and Buddhists.

In group A of the list, material causes such as *pradhāna* and *paramāṇu*, or instrumental causes such as *dharmādharma*, *adṛṣṭa* and *karman* are the subject.

In group B, the subject is *upādāna*.

In group C, the subject is *mahābhūta*.

In group E, effects (*kārya*) such as *kṣiti* or *tanu*, and so on, are adopted as the subject.

Group A is based on idea II (*acetana*-type), and group B is also fundamentally based on idea II. Group C, however, has both of these two aspects because *mahābhūta* is not only an element which composes an effect (*kārya*), but also an effect composed of some atoms in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, as Praśastapāda said.[2] The formulas in this group were employed only in the beginning of the history of the proof of the existence of God. Group E is essentially based on idea I (*kārya*-type). Group F, asserted by Vācaspatimiśra, is a complex formula which has two logical reasons. It is quite possible that Vācaspatimiśra, being conscious of the two types, put them together into one formula.

In the *acetana*-type formula, for example in group A, B, and partly C, there are some similarities to the proof of the existence of the soul (*puruṣa* = *ātman*) found in the Sāṃkhya system. In the formulas of the *acetana*-type, the Naiyāyika often used the terms '*adhi*-√*sthā*' (for instance, nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20) and '*pra*-√*vṛt*' (nos. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13), which the Sāṃkhya used for expressing the relationship between *puruṣa* and *pradhāna*, as was stated by Vārṣagaṇya in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* '*puruṣādhiṣṭhitaṃ pradhānaṃ pravartate*'.[3]

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[1] In the list a classification is made by taking notice of the subject and the logical reason corresponding to it.

[2] Cf. PBh 48ff.

[3] Cf. SKM (= *Sāṃkhyakārikā-Māṭharavṛtti*, Varanasi 1970) 22,24: *api coktaṃ ṣaṣṭitantre – puruṣādhiṣṭhitaṃ pradhānaṃ pravartate.*
SKG (= *Sāṃkhyakārikā-Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, ed. H. D. Sharma, Poona 1933) 20,21f.: *tathā coktaṃ ṣaṣṭitantre – puruṣādhiṣṭhitaṃ*

In addition to the common use of the terms *adhi-√sthā* and *pra-√vṛt*, there are some similarities between the proof of the existence of the soul (*puruṣa* = *ātman*) in the Sāṃkhya system and the proof of the existence of God in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, so far as we know, Uddyotakara first defined the role of Īśvara as efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*).[4] This idea is also found in the Sāṃkhya system. In fact, in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*[5], as is stated in the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* of Jinendrabuddhi, *puruṣa* was called '*nimitta* (*rgyu msthan*)' in relation to *pradhāna*.[6]

These two facts suggest that the Naiyāyika's *acetana*-type formulas were based on the proof of the existence of the soul found in the Sāṃkhya system.[7] However, I cannot go into the details of this question in the present paper.

II. The first logical reason, a), cited by Dharmakīrti (*sthitvā pravṛtteḥ*) belongs to the *acetana*-type formula group and means that material causes or instrumental causes which were inactive before become activated when they are controlled by an intelligent being. In group I there is a similar logical reason which is '*abhūtvā bhāvitvāt*'[8]. In this case, the subject is an effect (*kārya*) and the formula means that an effect which was at first nonexistent comes into existence when controlled by an intelligent being.

The second logical reason, b), cited by Dharmakīrti (*saṃsthānaviśeṣatvāt*) belongs to the *kārya*-type. It expresses the idea that a particular configuration of an effect must have been provided by an intelligent being. The same idea is also expressed in other reasons such as '*sanniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt*' and '*saṃsthānaviśeṣaviśiṣṭatvāt*'.[9]

The third logical reason, c), cited by Dharmakīrti (*arthakriyākāritvāt*), which calls to mind Dharmakīrti's well known definition of a real entity - *vastu* (*bhāva*)[10] - is not clear in this context.

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pradhānaṃ pravartate.

[4] Cf. NV 943,5: *tatkāritvād ity evaṃ bruvatā nimittakāraṇam Īśvara ity upagataṃ bhavati.*

[5] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* [P 5766, D 4268]: P 134a5-6; D 118a3-5: *rgyu mtshan daṅ rgyu mtshan can gyi dṅos pos ni / . . . rdza mkhan daṅ bum pa bźin daṅ / skyes bu daṅ gtso bo'i 'jug pa bźin no /* cf. E. Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya Systems", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 2, 1958 [84-139]: 118f.

[6] In the *Yogabhāṣyavivaraṇa* (112,24-26) we can find the same interpretation of *puruṣa* as *nimitta* concerning this kind of formula: *nirhetukatvaṃ ca pradhānasya (puruṣasya). . . . pradhānapravṛttau bhoktṛtvena nimittaṃ bhavatīty arthaḥ.*

[7] In the formulas of the early history of this proof, the Naiyāyika often uses the terms *adhi-√sthā* and *pra-√vṛt*, but later (nos. 4, 5, 9', 10, 18 of the list) they begin to use *adhi-√sthā*, and *kāryam-ā-√rabh*, or *√kṛ* instead of or together with (no. 5) *pra-√vṛt*. Moreover, in the *kārya*- type of formulas (in group E) we find the term '*kartṛ*' (nos. 21, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36) which in early times was expressed only as "*kāraṇa*", yet not clearly stated as '*kartṛ*'.

These two phenomena suggest that both changes were initiated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas based on the Ārambhavāda. This point is also related to the subtly different interpretations of the term '*adhi-√sthā*', as has been already pointed out by Prof. Imanishi (cited in note 14), and the term '*nimitta*' in the Sāṃkhya system. The later is suggested in the descriptions of Jinendrabuddhi, where, with the example of *puruṣa* and *pravṛtti* of *prakṛti*, we can find 'pot' and 'potter' as example of *nimitta*, which can be construed as *kārya* and *kartṛ*.

[8] Cf. no. 31 on the list.

[9] See nos. 20 and 29 on the list.

[10] For example,

a) PV I 166ab (= Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*, Roma 1960): *sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ /*

b) PVSV 87,4: *yad arthakriyākāri tat eva vastv iti uktam.*

c) *Nyāyabindu* I 15 (in *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa. [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]*, ed. D. Malvania, Patna [2]1971): *arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ.*

However, refuting this verse of Dharmakīrti, Bhāsarvajña cites these three logical reasons in a complete formula.[11] One of these formulas, c), is as follows:

dharmādinimittaṃ buddhimadadhiṣṭhitaṃ pravartate, arthakriyākāritvāt.[12]

"Being controlled by an intelligent being, efficient causes such as *dharma* and other things are in action, because they accomplish [one and the same] purpose."

From this description by Bhāsarvajña we know that this formula belongs to the *acetana*-type in which material or instrumental causes form the subject. In this formula, we find the two terms '*adhi-√sthā*' and '*pra-√vṛt*' which are common in the proof of the existence of the soul and characteristic of this *acetana*-type of formula.

Then, what exactly does the term '*arthakriyā*' mean in this context? There is another formula which clearly expresses the idea of this type of proof. Professor Frauwallner has pointed out the importance of *Dvādaśāranayacakra*, which makes several reference to the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, the lost important text of the Sāṃkhya school. The following formula is found in the third chapter, which deals mainly with the thought of the Sāṃkhya.

tanukaraṇabhuvanasādhanāya pravṛttāni adṛṣṭānupradhānādīni viśiṣṭacetanādhiṣṭhitāny eva pravartante, sambhūyaikārthakāritvāt, takṣādhiṣṭhitarathadāruganavat. tathācetanatvāt sthitvā pravṛtteḥ turyādivat.[13]

"Invisible power, atoms, and primary material cause, and other things which make up a body, organs, and the material world become activated only when they are governed by a specific intelligence. Because these things come together and accomplish one and the same purpose, like the pieces of wood governed (=brought together) by the carpenter to make a chariot. Also because they are without consciousness and static, yet become active, like the fibrous stick [used in weaving]."

This formula is essentially based on idea II (*acetana*-type), but it is noteworthy in this respect that this formula clearly specifies how these two aspects are related to one another. These two types express one and the same process from two different points of view. The *kārya*-type approaches from the point of effect and the *acetana*-type from the point of material or instrumental causes which participate in this process of causality. Moreover, the formula above clearly specifies that the meaning of the term '*arthakriyā*' is that material or instrumental causes, when controlled by a special intelligent being, namely by God, come together and accomplish one and the same purpose.

Careful attention should be given to the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in the formula above. This example has been slightly modified from the original example, viz. the pieces of wood which make up a chariot and the carpenter (as craftsman), instead of the chariot and driver which is often adopted by the Sāṃkhya in order to explain the relationship of '*adhi-√sthā*' with regard to *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.[14] In the Sāṃkhya system, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are often compared to a driver and a chariot respectively.

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d) HB 3,14: *arthakriyāyogyalakṣaṇaṃ hi vastu.*

[11] Nos. 6, 11 and 29 on the list.

[12] NBhūṣ 471,22; no. 6. on the list.

[13] *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakraṃ of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. With the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*, Part 1, ed. Muni Jambūvijayajī, Bhavnagar 1968: 328f.

[14] For example,

a) SKG (cited in note 3) 20,19f.: *adhiṣṭhānāt, yatheha laṅghanaplavanadhāvanasamarthair aśvair yukto rathaḥ sārathinādhiṣṭhitaḥ pravartate tathā ātmādhiṣṭhānāc carīram iti.*

b) SKM (cited in note 3) 22,21f.: *tad yatheha loke laṅghanaplavanadhāvanasamarthair aśvair yukto rathaḥ sārathinādhiṣṭhitaḥ pravartate.*

Cf. Junkichi Imanishi, "Sāṃkhya tetsugaku ni okeru puruṣa kan no hitotsuno mondai – adhiṣṭhātṛ ni tsuite –", [*puruṣa* as the *adhiṣṭātṛ* in Sāṃkhya Philosophy] *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 13/2, 1965.

This shows that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who maintains Ārambhavāda, devised the second type of formula based on the proof of the soul (*puruṣa* = *ātman*) in the Sāṃkhya.

In the Sāṃkhya, the existence of the soul (*puruṣa*) is proved in five ways. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 17 states:

saṃghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt /
puruṣo 'sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalārthaṃ pravṛtteś ca //

In these five proofs, we find two terms - *adhi-√sthā* and *pra-√vṛt* - which are in common with the *acetana*-type of the proof of the existence of God.

Unfortunately, there is nothing in the text of the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* that indicates who composed the formula above. As a result it is impossible to know whether this formula is a direct citation, or whether it was composed by the author of *Dvādaśāranayacakra*, Mallavādin.[15] The author must have either cited it or composed it directly based on an original text. At any rate, this formula was composed by someone who had been influenced by the theistic Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya.

The idea that many material or instrumental causes controlled by a specific intelligent being (= God) produce one and the same effect is the basic idea of the proof of the existence of God. It is quite possible that this basic idea was formulated by theistic groups influenced by the proof of the soul (*puruṣa*) in the Sāṃkhya system. The idea of causality can be found in other literature concerning the proof of the existence of God. The *Yogabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, for instance, investigates this proof in detail and in it we find a similar idea. The *Vivaraṇa* (59,11-15) says:

buddhimadekasvāmikaṃ jagat, anyonyaviruddhasaṃhatānekaprāṇināyakādhiṣṭhitabahumaṇḍalatvāt, itthaṃjātīyakaikarājyavat. sarvam etat sādhanasādhyavyāpārāvasthaṃ pratyakṣaṃ kasyacid ekasya, avāntaravirodhānugrahavattayaikaprayojanatvāt, sāṃgrāmavastuvat, saṃhatatvāt, kulālādivastuvat.

From this description, we know that the author of the *Vivaraṇa* also had the idea of a 'plurality of causes' which is connoted in the word *sāṃgrāmavastu*, 'one and the same purpose (*ekaprayojana*)' and '[cooperating] together (*saṃhata*)' in the context of the proof of the existence of God.

III. It is not difficult to conclude that Dharmakīrti's definition of a real entity '*vastu* (*bhāva*)' has the same features as those definitions cited above. However, before comparing the above stated idea for the proof of the existence of God with that of Dharmakīrti, we have to clarify the specific meaning and character of '*arthakriyā*' in Dharmakīrti's system.

In Dharmakīrti's system, as has been already clearly pointed out by Professor Katsura,[16] '*arthakriyā*' is to be considered on two different levels. First, at the level of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) which corresponds to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) in its epistemological aspect, and particularity (*svalakṣaṇa*) on the side of the objective entity. Second, at the level of continuity (*santāna*), which corresponds to conceptual or verbal judgement (*vikalpa*) and relates to particularity (*svalakṣaṇa*) by way of generality (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*).

In Dharmakīrti's system, every moment is the only ultimate reality and each moment has the ability to produce the next moment. Cooperating with other entities it also has the efficiency to produce a certain effect and, at the same time, to produce perceptual knowledge of the object by projecting the

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[15] The commentary to the *Dvādaśāranayacakra*, the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* only states that this formula concerns the theory of the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika, and says nothing about the author of the formula.

[16] Cf. M. Nagatomi, "*Arthakriyā*", *The Adyar Library Bulletin* 31-32, 1967-1968, 52-72. Eshō Mikogami, "Mono ni sonawaru fuhen kinō (Sāmānyā śakti) to tokushu kinō (Pratiniyatā śakti)", [*sāmānyā śakti* and *pratiniyatā śakti* as existing in things] *Ryūkoku Daigaku Bukkyō Bunka Kenkyūsho Kiyō* 17, 1978, 1-15. Shōryū Katsura, "Dharmakīrti no ingaron", [Dharmakīrti's Theory of Causality] *Nanto Bukkyō* 50, 1983, 96-114.

shape (*ākāra*) of the object on our minds. On the second level, when we have the idea of an object, e.g. 'a pot', we assume the general function of the object, viz. 'holding water'.

In this respect, '*arthakriyā-śakti, -sāmarthya, -yogyatā*' principally mean 'causal efficiency' and secondly mean 'ability to fulfill a human purpose'. Therefore, '*arthakriyā*' means

1. producing an effect, and
2. fulfilling a human purpose.

These two aspects are related to the ontological and the epistemological context and, as has already been pointed out, the germ of the epistemological aspect of the idea was found in the statement of Vātsyāyana.[17] However, as stated above, these two aspects essentially presuppose Dharmakīrti's ideas about causality.

In regard to the relationship of cause and effect Dharmakīrti states the following in the *Hetubindu*:

a) *apratirodhaśaktikeṣv anantarakāryeṣv anādheyaviśeṣeṣu kṣaṇikeṣu pratyayeṣu parasparaṃ kaḥ sahakārārtha iti cet, na vai sarvatrātiśayotpādanaṃ sahakriyā. kiṃ tarhi. bahūnāṃ yad ekārtha-karaṇam api, yathāntyasya kāraṇakalpasya.*[18] (HB 11,11-14)

b) . . . *tatraikārthakriyaiva sahakāritvam.*[19] (HB 11,22f.; 15,18f.)

c) *tasmād idam ekārthakriyālakṣaṇaṃ sahakāritvaṃ kṣaṇikānām eva bhāvānām, na tv akṣaṇikā-nāṃ pṛthagbhāvasambhavānām, pṛthakkriyāsambhavena sahakāritvaniyamāyogāt.*[20] (HB 15,4-6)

From these statements, we know that the ontological aspect of the concept of *arthakriyā* is closely correlated with that of *sahakārin* or *sahakāritva* in Dharmakīrti's system. In other words, in this case *arthakriyā* or correctly *ekārthakriyā* and *sahakāritva* are two sides of the same idea that many causes cooperate for one and the same purpose.

In these aspects, namely

1) plurality of causes, and 2) cooperating for one and the same purpose,

we find the same features as in the proofs of God. Of course, with regards to the proofs of the existence of God, the character of many causes, except God, are limited; they are only material or instrumental. They are themselves unconscious (*acetana*) and have no ability to create an effect by themselves.

In Dharmakīrti's system also, causes have no special intention (*buddhi, prekṣā, abhiprāya*), as is stated in the *Hetubindu*:

d) *teṣu sarveṣu sahakāriṣu samarthasvabhāveṣu ko 'parasyopayoga iti cet, na vai bhāvānāṃ kācit prekṣāpurvakāritā yato 'yam eko 'pi samarthaḥ kim asmābhir ity apare nivarteran. nirabhiprāyavyā-*

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[17] NBh 1,1-21,1: *pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam, pramāṇam antareṇa nārthapratipattiḥ, nārthapratipattim antareṇa pravṛttisāmarthyam.* Cf. Nagin J. Shah, *Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy*, Ahmedabad 1967: 45 n.31.

[18] Steinkellner 1967: 47f.: "[Einwand:] 'Was kann der Sinn von wechselseitigem Zusammenwirken (*sahakāraḥ*) sein bei Ursachen, deren Wirkungen unmittelbar eintreten [und] deren Fähigkeiten [daher] unbehindert sind, die [außerdem] augenblicklich sind [und] bei denen [daher] eine Besonderheit (*viśeṣaḥ*) nicht bewirkt werden kann?' [Antwort:] Zusammenwirken ist wahrlich nicht in allen Fällen das Hervorbringen einer zusätzlichen Beschaffenheit (*atiśaya*), sondern [kann] auch darin bestehen, daß viele [Ursachen] ein und dasselbe Ding bewirken, wie im Falle des letzten [unmittelbar wirkenden] Ursachenbündels."

[19] Steinkellner 1967: 48, 52: ". . . [und] in diesem Fall ist das Mitursachesein eben das Bewirken ein und desselben Gegenstandes."

[20] Steinkellner 1967: 52: "Deshalb ist dieses als Bewirken ein und desselben Gegenstandes bestimmte Mitursachesein nur für augenblickliche Dinge gegeben, aber nicht für nichtaugenblickliche, die [auch] getrennt vorkommen können. Da [diese] nämlich [auch] getrennt wirken können, ist die Beschränkung (*niyamaḥ*) des Mitursacheseins [auf sie] nicht gegeben."

pārā hi svahetupariṇāmopanidhidharmās tatprakṛtes tathābhavanto nopālambham arhanti.[21] (HB 9,5-10)

According to Dharmakīrti, many cooperators (*sahakārin*) act as if their actions are a natural process, but as a Buddhist, Dharmakīrti naturally did not assume that there is another cause which consciously, and intentionally controls these causes.

It must not be overlooked that Dharmakīrti uses this term not only when he states his original ontological or epistemological theory, but when he rejects eternal things as a cause.[22] In the *Hetubindu* he states:

e) *na cākṣaṇikasya kvacid kācic chaktiḥ, kramayaugapadyābhyāṃ arthakriyāvirahāt. tasmāt yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eveti vyāptisiddhiḥ.*[23] (HB 19,11-13)

f) *tasmād akṣaṇikānāṃ kāraṇānāṃ naikārthakriyayā kaścit sahakāritvaniyamo nāpi santānopakāreṇeti na tasya kaścit sahakārī*; . . . (HB 17,12-14)[24]

Dharmakīrti established the criterion of reality based on the idea of '*arthakriyā*' and showed its applicability to momentary things and its inapplicability to non-momentary (= eternal) things. In this respect, the definition of real entity (*vastu, bhāva*) viz. '*arthakriyāyogyatā*' relates to the proof of momentariness and the refutation of eternity.

Conclusion

It was not merely by chance that Dharmakīrti selected these three logical reasons of the many asserted by the Naiyāyikas when he began to refute eternal things as a cause. For Dharmakīrti, criticizing these logical reasons, especially the third one, *arthakriyā*, was necessary and of crucial importance to support his theory of causality.

I would like to present the following possibility.

Preceding the appearance of Dharmakīrti's idea, those who contended that non-momentary things (= eternal things) are the cause of the world had an idea of *arthakriyā* related to causality from a standpoint totally different from that of Dharmakīrti. However, Dharmakīrti, who stood on his original ontology and epistemology, putting a new interpretation upon the original idea, established the criterion of a real entity based on the new idea of *arthakriyā*, and attempted the proof of momentariness and criticism of eternity.

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21 Steinkellner 1967: 44f.: "[Einwand:] 'Wenn alle diese miteinander wirkenden [Ursachen] (*sahakārī*) fähigen Eigenwesens sind, was nützt (*upayogaḥ*) dann die [je] andere [Mitursache]?' [Antwort:] Die Dinge stellen doch nicht vor ihrem Wirken eine Überlegung an, so daß [in dem Gedanken:] 'Dieses [Ding] ist auch als einzelnes imstande [die Wirkung hervorzubringen], was sollen wir [dabei]?' die [jeweils] anderen [Dinge von ihrer Tätigkeit] abstehen würden. Denn die [Dinge] sind ohne Überlegung tätig [und] haben [nur] auf Grund einer Entwicklung ihrer Ursachen die Beschaffenheit des Vorhandenseins [am Ort der Wirkung; infolgedessen] kann man ihnen, wenn sie auf Grund dieser [ihrer] Natur (*prakṛtiḥ*) so [beschaffen] sind, keinen Vorwurf machen."

22 Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla also mention *sahakāritva* and *arthakriyā* when they refute Seśvara-Sāṃkhya, who maintains that *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (*ubhaya*) are causes of the world.

prakṛtīśvarayor evaṃ hetutvapratiṣedhanāt / pratyekaṃ sahitaṃ kartṛ nobhayaṃ janminām idam // (94)

sāhityaṃ sahakāritvād etayoḥ kalpate ca yat / tat syād atiśayādhānād ekārthakriyāpi vā // (95)

sāhityaṃ nāma sahakāritvam. tac ca dvividham – parasparātiśayādhānād vā syād, ekārthakāritvād vā. (TSP 74,16f.)

23 Steinkellner 1967: 57: "Es gibt aber für ein Nichtaugenblickliches nirgendwo irgendeine Fähigkeit, weil es [bei einem solchen] weder allmälich noch gleichzeitig eine Betätigung gibt. Daher ist die Umfassung 'Was seiend ist, das ist ausschließlich augenblicklich.' erwiesen."

24 Steinkellner 1967: 55: "Deshalb gibt es bei nichtaugenblicklichen Ursachen keine Notwendigkeit des Mitursacheseins, [weder] in Form des Bewirkens ein und desselben Gegenstandes noch auch in Form des Einwirkens auf eine Phasen-Reihe. Daher gibt es für die [nichtaugenblickliche Ursache] keine Mitursache . . ."

		pakṣa	sādhya
A	1	pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇi	prāk pravṛtter buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni pravartante
	2	bhuvanahetavaḥ pradhānaparamāṇvadṛṣṭāḥ	svakāryotpattāv atiśayabuddhimantam adhiṣṭhātāram apekṣante
	3	dharmādharmau	buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitau puruṣasyopabhogaṃ kurutaḥ
	4	dharmādiḥ	tadadhiṣṭhātāram antareṇa na svakāryam ārabhate
	5	dharmādharmāṇavas sarve	cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāḥ svakāryārambhakāḥ
	6	dharmādinimittaṃ	buddhimadadhiṣṭhitaṃ pravartate
	7	vivādāspadībhūtāḥ paramāṇvādayaḥ	kasyacid icchānurodhinaḥ
	8	paramāṇvādayaś	cetanāyojitāḥ pravartante
B	9	tanvādīnām upādānaṃ	cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitam
	9'	tanubhuvanakāraṇopādānāni	cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāni svakāryam ārabhante
	10	vivādādhyāsitāni, upādānopakaraṇāni	buddhimadadhiṣṭhitāny eva kāryaṃ kurvanti
	11	vivakṣitam upādānādi	buddhimadadhiṣṭhitam
C	12	mahābhūtādivyaktaṃ	buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitaṃ sukhaduḥkhādinimittaṃ bhavati
	13	mahābhūtāni vāyvantāni	buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni svāsu svāsu dhāraṇādikriyāsu pravartante
	14	mahābhūtādikaṃ vyaktaṃ	buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitaṃ sukhaduḥkanimittaṃ bhavati
	15	mahābhūtādi vyaktaṃ	cetanādhiṣṭhitaṃ sat sukhaduḥkhe janayati
	16	mahābhūtacatuṣṭayam	upalabdhimatpūrvakam
D	17	tṛṇādi	(buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitam)
	18	dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ	buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam
	19	acetanāny asmadanyenānadhiṣṭhitāni	kāryotpattau buddhimadadhiṣṭhitāni
E	20	dehānām utpattiḥ	cetanādhiṣṭhā
	21	tanubhuvanādayo	buddhimatkartṛkāḥ
	22	sarvaṃ dharaṇidharaṇīdharatarupuraprākārādikaṃ	buddhimatpūrvakam
	23	jagat	buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam
	24	jagat	prāṇikarmatatsādhanaphalavibhāgavidekaniṣpāditam
	25	niyatakālam ādityodayāstamayādisañcaraṇam	etatprayojanajñānavadekaprayuktam
	26	sūryagrahacandranakṣatrādipravṛttiḥ	buddhimadekeśvaraprayuktā
	27	kṣityādīni	kāryāṇi
	28	vivādāspadaṃ	bodhādhārakāraṇam
	29	kṣityādi kāryaṃ	buddhimatkṛtam
	30	sarvaṃ kāryaṃ	sarvavitkartṛpūrvakam
	31	vivādādhyāsitam	upalabdhimatkāraṇam
	32	pṛthivyādi kāryaṃ	tadutpattiprakāraprayojanādyabhijñakartṛpūrvakam
	33	pṛthivyādi kāryam	asmadādivilakṣaṇasarvajñaikakartṛkam
	34	kṣityādi	kartṛpūrvakam
F	35	vivādādhyāsitās tarumahīdharādaya	upādānābhijñakartṛkā
	36	vivādādhyāsitā	upalabdhimatkartṛkāḥ
	37	nityetarat samastaṃ	sarvajñapūrvakam
G	38	vimatyadhikaraṇāni tanubhuvanakaraṇādīny	upādānādyabhijñabuddhimatpūrvakāṇi

hetu	dṛṣṭānta+	
acetanatvāt	vāsyādi	NV 945,7f.
sthitvā pravṛtteḥ	tantuturyādi	TS 54,6 (Uddyotakara)
karaṇatvāt	vāsyādi	NV 947,7
acetanatvāt	mṛtpiṇḍadaṇḍasalilasūtrādayaḥ	TSP 52,2*
sthitvā pravṛtteḥ	turitantu	TS 54 (k. 50)
arthakriyākāritvāt	ghaṭādi	NBhūṣ 471,22
pravṛttimattvāt	vastrādi	NBhūṣ 455,10
acetanatvāt	vāsyādi	NKus 503,15*
rūpādimattvāt	tantvādi	TS 54 (k. 49) (Aviddhakarṇa)
rūpādimattvāt	tantvādi	TSP 54,4*
acetanatvāt	citrādyupādānopakaraṇa	NBhūṣ 452,12
sthitvā pravartamānatvāt	daṇḍādi	NBhūṣ 471,21
rūpādimattvāt	turyādi	NV 947,6
acetanatvād	vāsyādi	NV 957,8
acetanatvāt kāryatvāt vināśitvāt	vāsyādi	TSP 55,3
rūpādimattvāt		(Uddyotakara)
rūpādimattvāt	tūryādi	NM I 502,10
kāryatvāt	ghaṭa	NK 54,10
darśanasparśanaviṣayatvāt	(vāsyādi)	NV 957,10
svārambhakāvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt	ghaṭādi	TS 52,14 (Aviddhakarṇa)
acetanatvāt	tantvādi	Vyom 304,12
sanniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt	gṛhādi	ŚV 467 (k. 7)*
kāryatvāt	ghaṭādi	VSūV 2,9 (ad I.1.3)*
kāryatvāt	ghaṭa	ṢDS 12,6
sāvayavatvāt kāryatvāt vā	ghaṭādi	BSBh (B) 8,18
tadupabhogyasthānādiracanāviśeṣavattvāt	prāsādādi	YBhVi 58,21f.
pratiniyatakālatvāt	kṛṣyādi	YBhVi 59,3f.
pravṛtter duḥkhātmakatve sati niyatasamayatvāt	dharmajñaśiṣyabhṛtyādipravṛtti	YBhVi 59,5f.
racanāvattvāt	ghaṭādi	Vyom 301,30
kāryatvāt	ghaṭādi	Vyom 302,8
saṃsthānaviśeṣaviśiṣṭatvāt	gṛhādi	NBhūṣ 471,22
kādācitkatvāt		NBhūṣ 303,27
abhūtvā bhāvitvāt	vastrādi	NBhūṣ 447,7
kāryatvāt	ghaṭādi	NM I 492,2f.
asmadādiṣu bādhakotpattau satyāṃ kāryatvāt		NM I 503,7ff.
kāryatvāt		NKus 479 (k. 1)
utpattimattvāt acetanopādānatvād vā	prāsādādi	NVTṬ 953,5
kāryatvād acetanopādānatvād vā	prāsādādi	NKaṇikā 150,15
utpattimattvāt acetanopādānatvād vā	prāsādādi	NKaṇikā 153,3
sthitvā pravṛtteḥ saṃshtānaviśeṣāt arthakriyāsādhanatvāt kāryatvādeś ca	turyādi prāsādādi vāsyādi ghaṭādi	PVV 10,15-17

* *is not the original text as such but reconstructed by the author*

\+ ~vat *as last member of the terms in this list is omitted.*

Abbreviations and Literature

BSBh (B)	*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*: *Brahmasūtra with a Commentary by Bhāskarāchārya*. Ed. Vidhyesvarī Prasāda. (Chowkhambā S.S. 70, 185, 209) Benares 1915.
HB	*Hetubindu*: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*. Wien 1967.
NBh	*Nyāyabhāṣya* (Vātsyāyana): *Nyāyadarśanam. With Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Critically edited with notes by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha. [2 vols.] Calcutta 1936 [reprint Kyoto 1982].
NBhūṣ	*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*: *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajña-praṇītasya Nyāya-sārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāya-bhūṣaṇam*. Ed. Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ. Vārāṇasī 1968.
NK	*Nyāyakandalī* (Śrīdhara): v. PBh
NKus	*Nyāyakusumañjalī of Udayanācharya*. Ed. Padmaprasāda Upādhyāya et al. Varanasi 1957.
NM I, II	*Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇī – Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor*. Ed. K. S. Varadacharya. [2 vols.] Mysore 1969, 1983.
NV	*Nyāyavārttika* (Uddyotakara): v. NBh
NVTṬ	*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (Vācaspatimiśra): v. NBh
PBh	*The Praśastapāda Bhāshya with Commentary Nyāyakandali of Sridhara*. ed. Vindhyasvari Prasad Dvivedin. Delhi [2]1984.
PV II	*kārikā*s of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter II, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, in appendixes to the *Journal of the Bihar Oriental Research Society* (1938), Parts I-II.
PVV	*Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*: *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the Commentary 'Vritti' of Manorathanandin*. Ed. Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi 1968.
ṢDS	*Ṣaḍdarśanasamuchchaya of Haribhadra Suri*. Ed. Goswami Damodara Lala Shastri. Varanasi 1979.
Steinkellner 1967	Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubindu, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*. Wien.
ŚV	*Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with The Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī. Varanasi 1978.
TS	*Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri. [2 vols.] Varanasi 1981, 1982.
TSP	*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): v. TS
VSūV	*Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti* (Candrānanda): *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*. Ed. Muni Jambuvijayaji. Baroda 1961.
Vyom	*Vyomavatī: The Praśastapādabhāṣyam by Praśastapāda Devāchārya with Commentaries (up to Dravya) Sūktī by Jagadiśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Setu by Padmanābha Miśra and Vyomavatī by Vyomaśivāchārya (to the end)*. Ed. G. Kavirāj. Benares 1924-1930 [repr. Varanasi 1983].
YBhVi	*Yogabhāṣyavivaraṇa*: *Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vivaraṇam of Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpāda*. Ed. Rama Sastri. Madras 1952.

DIGNĀGA AND DHARMAKĪRTI ON *APOHA*

by

Shōryū Katsura, Hiroshima

Two recent contributions to the study of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine by Radhika Herzberger (1986) and Richard Hayes (1988) argue strongly that we should not consider that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti shared the same basic philosophical position, although they traditionally have been regarded as belonging to the same Buddhist school of epistemology and logic. I basically agree with them and in this paper I would like to comment on Dr. Herzberger's interpretation of the *apoha* doctrines of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and to present what I can summarize at the moment as the main doctrinal differences between the two Buddhist logicians.

In Chapter 3 of her book, Herzberger attempts a new interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine, completely different from what she terms 'the dominant view of Dignāga's theories of language' presented by Masaaki Hattori. She quotes the following passage from Hattori's monumental work on Dignāga:

> ". . . a word indicates an object merely through the exclusion of other objects (*anyāpoha*, -*vyāvṛtti*). For example, the word 'cow' simply means that the object is not a non-cow. As such, a word cannot denote anything real, whether it be an individual (*vyakti*), a universal (*jāti*), or any other thing." [Hattori 1968: 12; Herzberger 1986: 109]

Although Herzberger does not directly reject Hattori's presentation of Dignāga's theories, she seems to regard it as inconsistent with some of Dignāga's crucial arguments found in chapter 5 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Apparently she considers that Hattori and others have been misled by Dharmakīrti in interpreting Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine. In contrast with the above received view, Herzberger presents the gist of her own interpretation as follows:

> "My conclusion . . . will be that Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine was meant to ensure that names apply directly to their perceptual objects (*sākṣādvṛtti*), and are not in excess of their perceptual objects." [Herzberger 1986: 109; my emphasis]

She bases her argument on two verses of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* chapter 5, namely,

> *na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat* (or *saḥ*) /
> *kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate* //[1] (1)
> *vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya tadbhedārthair abhinnatā* /
> [*sākṣādvṛtter abhedāc ca*] *jātidharmavyavasthitiḥ* //[2] (36)

She translates them as follows:

> "Knowledge derived from words is not a separate means to truth from inference; for the name signifies its own object (*svārtha*) by excluding what is other in the same way as (the reason) 'being an artifact' [establishes what is to be proved]." [Herzberger 1986: 145; my emphasis]
> "Where the concomitance excludes others, there is non-separation [of the word for the universal] from the meaning of its individuals [i.e. with its sub-classes]. Because [the name] directly applies

[1] Sanskrit fragment recovered by Hattori 1982: 107 fn. 1.

[2] Sanskrit fragment of v. 36ab is found in the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* (cf. DANC II) p. 730, and that of v. 36d recovered by Hattori 1982: 137 fn. 33. Sanskrit reconstruction of v. 36c was done by Jambūvijaya, DANC II 728 fn. 9.

[to its bearer] and is not distinct [from it], the characteristic of universals are properly established." [Herzberger 1986: 163; my emphasis]

Regarding Herzberger's translation of verse 1, I have no serious objection except for her peculiar interpretation of the word '*svārtha*', which I shall discuss later. Her translation of the verse 36, however, is simply a mistranslation. It seems to have resulted from her failure to consult Jinendrabuddhi's subcommentary.[3] It is true that Jinendrabuddhi is often heavily influenced by Dharmakīrti, so that we should be very careful in adopting his interpretation of Dignāga. In the present case, however, I do not see any reason to suspect that this is the case. Let me quote Jinendrabuddhi's comments on the verse 36ab together with Jambūvijaya's Sanskrit reconstruction.

> *gźan* bkag pa ni khyab pa'i phyir *źes pa /* khyab pa *ni raṅ gi khyad par mi spoṅ ba'o // gźan* bkag pa *ni ji skad bśad pa'i spyi'o // de* khyab pa'i phyir *te / raṅ gi khyad par rnams la khyab par byed pa ñid kyi phyir źes pa'i don to // gźan* bkag pa'i *źes pa kṛti sbyor ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi byed pa po la drug pa 'di'o //* de khyad don daṅ tha dad med *ces pa / gźan sel ba'i khyad par brjod pa rnams daṅ ste / rdzas la sogs pa'i sgra rnams daṅ yod pa la sogs pa'i sgra gźi mthun pa'o źes pa'i don to //*(PSṬ V 201,36-202,2)
>
> vyāpter anyaniṣedhasye*ti* vyāptiḥ *svabhedāpratikṣepaḥ,* anyaniṣedho *yathoktaṃ sāmānyam, tasya* vyāpteḥ *svabhedeṣu vyāpakatvād ity arthaḥ.* anyaniṣedhasye*ti kṛdyogalakṣaṇeyaṃ kartari ṣaṣṭhī.* tadbhedārthair abhinnate*ti anyāpohabhedārthavācakair dravyādiśabdaiḥ sadādiśabdasya sāmānādhikaraṇyam ity arthaḥ.* (DANC II 729)

My translation:

> "In the phrase '*vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya*' (= v. 36a), '*vyāpti*' (pervasion) means non-rejection of its own particulars (*bheda*) and '*anyaniṣedha*' (negation of others) refers to a universal (*sāmānya*) discussed above. 'Since it pervades' (*vyāpteḥ*) means 'since [negation of others] pervades its own particulars'. Of '*anyaniṣedhasya*' the genitive case ending (*ṣaṣṭhī*) characterized by its connection with the Kṛt suffix is applied in the sense of an agent (*kartṛ*). '*tadbhedārthair abhinnatā*' means that a [universal] term, such as 'being' (*sat*), and [particular] terms, such as 'substance' (*dravya*), which express particular objects belonging to that [universal, i.e.] negation of others, can refer to the same object."

Jinendrabuddhi clearly identifies *anyaniṣedha* (i.e., *anyāpoha*) as the subject (*kartṛ*) - not as the object (*karman*) as Herzberger understands it - of the action of pervasion. Furthermore, he explains that what is meant by the expression '*anyaniṣedha*' is a universal, such as being-ness (*sattā*), which does not reject but pervades its own particulars, such as substance. The expression '*tadbhedārthair*' is a Bahuvrīhi compound - not a Tatpuruṣa as Herzberger understands it - meaning '[the words] whose objects are the particulars of that [universal]'. And '*abhinnatā*' simply means the fact that the two words, viz. the word for a universal and that for its particular, say e.g. '*sat*' and '*dravyam*', can refer to the same object (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*); in other words, they can be put in apposition like '*sad dravyam*'. Following Jinendrabuddhi, I translate verse 36ab as follows:

> "Since negation of others (i.e. a universal) pervades [its particulars], [the word for the universal] is not different [in terms of the case-ending] from [the words] whose objects are particulars of that [universal]."[4]

A linguistic phenomenon called 'co-reference' (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) is possible between two terms

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
[3] Herzberger [1986: 163] translates Jambūvijaya's Sanskrit reconstruction of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* ad PS V 36. Her translation is not always accurate. For a better translation of the same passage from the original Tibetan texts, see Hayes 1988: 299f.

[4] Cf. Hayes 1988: 299: "Since a term's denial of other terms pervades narrower terms, the wider term is not different from terms narrower than itself." Note that Hayes translates *sāmānyaśabda* by 'wider term' and *bhedaśabda* by 'narrower term'.

'A' and 'B', if A is the universal of particular Bs and consequently A pervades the domain of B. What Dignāga wants to stress in this half verse is that co-reference is explainable only when universals and particulars are understood in terms of *anyāpoha*. A similar view is more fully expressed by Dignāga in PS V 27.[5]

Commenting upon PS V 25c-38, I have once argued[6] that Dignāga was well aware of the fact that in his *apoha* doctrine the 'exclusion' (*apoha*) operation is not universally applicable but quite limited in its scope; namely, two synonyms (e.g. *vṛkṣa* and *taru*, both meaning a tree) do not exclude each other's object, a term for a particular (*bhedaśabda*, say *vṛkṣa*) does not exclude the object of a term for its universal (*sāmānyaśabda*, say *pārthiva* 'made of the earth element'), nor vice versa.[7] As a matter of fact, the *apoha* operation is possible only in the following two cases; namely, a term for a particular A (say *vṛkṣa*) directly excludes the object of a term for a particular B (say *ghaṭa*) when A and B share the same universal (*pārthivatva*), and a term for a particular A (say *śiṃśapā*) indirectly excludes the object of a term for a particular B (say *ghaṭa*) when B shares the same universal (*pārthivatva*) with another particular C (*vṛkṣa*), to whose class the particular A belongs, and B is directly excluded by the word for C.[8]

As I demonstrated then, it is clear that Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine presupposes a genus-species type of hierarchy of terms for universals and particulars. With the help of Jinendrabuddhi, we can reconstruct a part of his presupposed hierarchy in the following manner:[9]



[5] *tanmātrākāṅkṣaṇād bhedaḥ svasāmānyena nojjhitaḥ / nopāttaḥ saṃśayotpatteḥ sāmye caikārthatā tayoḥ //* Hattori 1982: 129 fn. 24. Cf. Hayes 1988: 290: "A wider term does not exclude its narrower terms, because it creates anticipation for them alone. Neither does it entail them, because uncertainty arises concerning which of its narrower terms is applicable. In either case the two terms can apply to the same set of object."

[6] "The Apoha Theory of Dignāga", *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 28/1, 1979, (16)-(20).

[7] See PS V 25cd: *anyatve 'pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavacyanut //* Hattori 1982: 129 fn. 22. Cf. Hayes 1988: 287: "A term does not exclude terms of wider extension, terms of narrower extension or co-extensive terms, even though they differ from it."

[8] See PS V 28: *bhedo bhedāntarārthaṃ tu virodhitvād apohate / sāmānyāntarabhedārthāḥ svasāmānyavirodhinaḥ //* Hattori 1982: 129 fn. 24 and 131 fn. 25. Cf. Hayes 1988: 291: "A narrower term precludes the objects denoted by other narrower terms because of hostility. (Because) particulars of another wider term are contradicted by the word (*śiṃśapā*)'s own wider term." (parentheses mine)

[9] I then thought that Dignāga borrowed a hierarchical structure of universals from the Vaiśeṣika school; however, thanks to Herzberger's studies of Bhartṛhari, it seems more likely that Dignāga owes the idea to Bhartṛhari. Cf. Herzberger 1986: 35ff.

My criticism of Herzberger's translation so far does not perhaps pose a serious threat to her interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine. However, her misunderstanding of verse 36c presents a fundamental problem for her theory of d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n . Let us first look at Jinendrabuddhi's comments.

> dṅos su 'jug phyir *źes pa . . . / 'dir ni yod pa ñid la sogs pa'i yon tan gźan la ma ltos par yod pa ma yin pa bsal ba'i dṅos po la sgra 'jug go // . . . /* don gźan sel ba tsam ni tha mi dad pa'i phyir *źes pa ste / 'dis ni* tha dad med phyir *źes pa 'di bkral ba'o //* (PSṬ V 202,31-203,10)
> sākṣādvṛtter *iti . . . atra sattādiguṇāntarānapekṣayā asadapohavastuni śabdaḥ pravartate. . . .* arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād *ity* abhedāt *ity etad anena vyākhyāyate.* (DANC II 729)

My translation:

> "Concerning the phrase '*sākṣādvṛtteḥ*', . . . Here [it is meant that] without depending upon external qualities, such as 'being-ness' (*sattā*), the term ['*sat*' (being)] applies to the thing which is the exclusion of 'non-being' (*asat*). . . . The phrase '*abhinnatvāt*' is explained by [the Teacher Dignāga as] 'since the mere exclusion (*apoha*) of other objects has no subdivisions'."

If we follow Jinendrabuddhi, the phrase '*sākṣādvṛtteḥ*' (literally: because of the direct application) in verse 36c in no case supports Herzberger's new interpretation of the *apoha* doctrine that names d i r e c t l y a p p l y to their perceptual objects. Rather, it means that names directly apply to their proper objects, *anyāpoha* (i.e. *anyaniṣedha* in v. 36a). For instance, the term '*sat*' directly applies to the exclusion of non-being (*asadapoha*) without depending on the universal *sattā*. As a matter of fact, as the conclusion in v. 36d clearly indicates and as Hattori and Hayes have demonstrated,[10] *anyāpoha* is a substitute for a universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*) of other schools of Indian realism. Thus, '*sākṣādvṛtti*' in v. 36c must mean that a term applies directly to a universal, which is nothing but *anyāpoha*, without the intervention of another universal.

Furthermore, the word '*abheda*' in verse 36c does not mean that a name is not distinct from its bearer, as Herzberger understands it. But it means that *anyāpoha* (i.e. *anyaniṣedha* in v. 36a) has no internal subdivision; consequently, it fulfills one of the conditions of a universal, unity (*ekatva*). Now I translate verse 36cd as follows:

> "Because [a word] directly applies to [the negation of others] and there is no subdivision [in the negation of others], the properties of a universal (viz. *ekatva, nityatva* and *pratyekaparisamāpti*) are established."[11]

Let us now return to verse 1. Commenting upon the term '*svārtha*' (own object), Herzberger says:

> ". . . the own object of a name is the object in space/time directly designated by a demonstrative. . . . it is exempt from the *apoha* operation because it does not designate its object on the basis of a universal but directly. The *apoha*-operation is restricted to that part of the name-giving sentence which designates its object indirectly through universals. This is because demonstratives are never in excess (*ati-vṛt*) of their bearers." [Herzberger 1986: 124f.; my emphasis]

Now the expression 'name-giving sentence' in her comment may need some explanation. According to her, Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine consists of a pair of basic sentences: a singular affirmative sentence, "this has H" (where H is a name) and a singular negative sentence "this has nonnonH" (Herzberger

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[10] Masaaki Hattori, "The Sautrāntika Background of the Apoha Theory", in *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization: essays in honor of Herbert V. Guenther on his sixtieth birthday*, ed. L. S. Kawamura and K. Scott, Emeryville, California 1977: 48, and Hayes 1988: 185.

[11] Cf. Hayes 1988: 299: "Because denial of others applies directly, and because it has no internal divisions, the properties of a universal are established." He wrongly takes '*anyāpoha*' as the subject rather than the object of the verb 'applies'.

1986: 107). From this she develops a complex procedure of the *apoha* operation, the full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. Anyhow, if I am not mistaken, Herzberger seems to understand that every name (say e.g. *vṛkṣa*) possesses a kind of deep structure consisting of a demonstrative and a name (e.g. '*ayaṃ vṛkṣaḥ*'). The demonstrative directly designates an individual or what she calls a spatio-temporal object, while the name designates a class of such spatio-temporal objects indirectly through a universal or a shared feature (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). She does not seem to regard that spatio-temporal object either as an intrinsic feature (*svalakṣaṇa*) or as a shared feature (Herzberger 1986: 144, 168). It should be noted in passing that Herzberger (1986: 126) considers the demonstrative to be omitted/dropped by an operation similar to *matuplopa*.

The fact that Dignāga himself never discusses the role of a demonstrative in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* chapter 5 makes it rather difficult for Herzberger to work on the hypothesis that his *apoha* doctrine tacitly presupposes what she calls a pair of basic sentences. It seems to me a rather futile undertaking to reconstruct such an elaborate theory of *apoha* which was never even mentioned by Dignāga. Her only textual support for the idea of the basic affirmative sentence comes from the *Pramaṇasamuccaya* chapter 1 where Dignāga criticizes the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception. The passage she quotes[12] simply indicates that Dignāga admits a phase immediately after perception, which involves both a demonstrative and a generic name. It is of course concerned with a psychological process from perception to judgement rather than a process of name-giving.

I will refrain from commenting further upon her detailed interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine and I will concentrate upon what she calls a spatio-temporal object. Herzberger says:

> "Dignāga proposed granting spatio-temporal continuants such as human bodies a status in between the illusory and the unconstructed, a status he described as 'constructed in dependence on realities', i.e., 'in dependence on' the purely empirical." [Herzberger 1986: 114]

As I mentioned above, she takes this spatio-temporal object to be directly designated by the demonstrative and to be neither *svalakṣaṇa* nor *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. She understands that it possesses both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* at the same time, which she believes conflicts with Hattori's whole framework of understanding Dignāga. In this connection she quotes Hattori:

> "The former is real, while the latter lacks reality. As each is incompatible with the other, there cannot be anything which possesses both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* at the same time." [Hattori 1968: 80; Herzberger 1986: 115]

There are several questions to be raised in this context. What is the ontological status of Herzberger's spatio-temporal object? What are the *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga's system? And what is it that bears both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*? Is there any unsurmountable gap between the perceptual and the conceptual realm?

First, what is it that Herzberger calls a spatio-temporal object? Relying on Hidenori Kitagawa's English summary of Dignāga's **Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa*, she believes that Dignāga's concept of *upādāyaprajñapti*, which she understands as an e n t i t y "constructed in dependence on realities", permits her to propose just such a spatio-temporal object which bridges the gap between the perceptual and the conceptual.[13]

It should be pointed out at the outset that the term *upādāyaprajñapti* cannot mean any entity, but literally means a 'concept based on' realities. Therefore, it cannot be something distinct from both

[12] Herzberger 1986: 119; cf. Hattori 1968: 43f.; for Sanskrit reconstruction, see Jambūvijaya 1961: 170 (Appendix 7).

[13] Herzberger 1986: 113f. Cf. H. Kitagawa, "A Study of a Short Philosophical Treatise ascribed to Dignāga", *Sino-Indian Studies*, 5/3-4, 1957 = reprinted in Kitagawa 1965, 430-439.

svalakṣaṇa and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*; it belongs to the conceptual realm and it must be identified as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga's system. As a matter of fact, the idea of *upādāyaprajñapti* goes back much earlier than Dignāga. For example, Nāgārjuna mentions it in his celebrated *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* 24.18:

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe /
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā //[14]

"It is conditioned origination which we call 'emptiness'. It is a 'concept based on' (*upādāya prajñapti*, 'concept attached to') something (else, i.e. not in itself some entity, something 'existing'), and precisely it is the 'intermediate way' (avoiding the extremes of 'it is' and 'it is not')."[15]

Candrakīrti explains *upādāyaprajñapti* by the example of a chariot. He says that a concept of a chariot is formed, based upon its components, such as wheels.[16] The idea of *upādāyaprajñapti* is neither unique to Nāgārjuna nor to Dignāga. It is rooted in the common Buddhist belief that an apparently singular object should be analyzed into its real components. For example, such common ideas as 'I', 'Self' and 'Person' can be and should be analyzed into the five Groups (*skandha*). This is the basic principle behind the *dharma* theory of Abhidharma schools, as well.

Hattori, too, was well aware of the fact that Dignāga utilized the term *upādāyaprajñapti* (Hattori [cited in note 10] 1977: 54-56). Actually Dignāga mentions three types of *upādāyaprajñapti*, viz. whole (*samūha*) like a body, continuant (*santāna*) like a person, and particular states or aspects (*avasthāviśeṣa*) such as non-eternity (*anityatā*). Hattori takes them to be understood by Dignāga as 'nominal existence' and finds them discussed in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*.[17] Thus, the theory of *upādāyaprajñapti* cannot be a dividing point between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as Herzberger supposes.

Dignāga works out his epistemological and logical investigation through two key words, viz. *dharma* and *dharmin*. I would like to understand the significance of *upādāyaprajñapti* in terms of *dharma* and *dharmin*. Let me quote three half verses from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

dharmiṇo 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ | (PS I 5ab)[18]

"A thing possessing many properties cannot be cognized in all its aspects by the sense."[19]

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[14] Edited by L. de la Vallée Poussin together with *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti, St. Petersburg 1903-1913 [Reprint: Osnabrück 1970: 503].

[15] Translation by A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Delhi 1970: 383. Warder has written an interesting article on *prajñapti*, using Pāli sources: "The Concept of a Concept", *JIPh* 1, 1971, 181-196. For a detailed discussion of the Kārikā of Nāgārjuna, see J. May, "On Mādhyamika Philosophy", *JIPh* 6, 1978, 233-241.

[16] *Prasannapadā* (cited in note 14) p. 504.

[17] PVSV 68f.: *evaṃjātīyāś ca sarve samūhasantānāvasthāviśeṣaśabdā* . . . For a German translation of this portion, see Tilmann Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*, Wien 1964: 110-112.

It may be noted in passing that although Hattori attributes the idea of *upādāyaprajñapti* to the Sautrāntika school, it was shared by most of the Abhidharma schools including the Pudgalavādins who actually insist that *pudgala* is an *upādāyaprajñapti*. Cf. the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu, chapter 9, (the recent translation by James Duerlinger, *JIPh* 17, 1989, 129-187) as well as the **Āśrayaprajñaptiśāstra* of the Saṃmatīya school (Taisho 1649, tr. by K. Venkataramanan in *Visvabhārati Annals* 5, 1953). Hattori seems to have been influenced by Frauwallner who identified the *Abhidharmakośa* VI 4 (ed. together with Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā* by Dvārikādāsa Śāstri, Varanasi 1972: 889: *yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat / ghaṭāmbuvat saṃvṛtisat paramārthasad anyathā //*) as a typical Sautrāntika view (*Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Berlin 1958: 119-122). However, I once demonstrated that the theory of two existences, nominal and ultimate (*saṃvṛtisat* and *paramārthasat*), expressed in this verse was not unique to the Sautrāntika but shared by the orthodox Vaibhāṣika school too, by referring to a parallel verse in the **Saṃyuktābhidharmasāra*, Taishō 1552, by Dharmatrāta who preceded Vasubandhu (*Indological Review* 2, 1976: 28).

[18] Sanskrit fragment recovered by Jambūvijaya, DANC I 104 (Appendix); Hattori 1968: 91.

[19] Translation by Hattori 1968: 27. Hayes [1988: 138] gives a different translation: "No knowledge at all of a possessor

[*anekadharmiṇo 'rthasya na liṅgāt sarvathā gatiḥ*] | (PS II 13ab)[20]
"An object has many properties. But we do not become aware of them all through the inferential sign."[21]
bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ | (PS V 12ab)[22]
"Although that which is expressed by a word has many properties, it is not cognized in its entirety through a word.."[23]

These parallel lines clearly indicate that Dignāga does not admit the complete understanding (*sarvathā gati*) of a single object (*dharmin* / *abhidheya*) with many properties (*dharma*) either by a sense organ (*indriya*), or an inferential mark (*liṅga*) or a linguistic item (*śabda*). According to him the *dharma-dharmin* distinction exists only in our conceptual realm, not in the external world.[24] I understand that both *dharmin* and its *dharma*s are identified as such separately and negatively (i.e. through *anyāpoha*), but never in totality (*na sarvathā*), by the conceptual cognition (*vikalpa*), while the actual object is perceived as it really is in its totality and positively.[25] Concerning the three types of *upādāyaprajñapti* I would like to propose that the first two, viz. 'whole' and 'continuant', correspond to the concept of *dharmin* and the last one, particular aspects, represents that of *dharma*s. They are nothing but *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga's system. Thus I cannot support Herzberger's identification of *upādāyaprajñapti* as a single spatio-temporal entity which is distinct from both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and which is the bearer of both features. Her remarks on *upādāyaprajñapti*, however, are not always consistent because she also mentions that shared features (i.e. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) are constructed 'in dependence on' what is given in the perceptual world (Herzberger 1986: 159).

Now what are the *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga's system? The two terms certainly go back to the Abhidharma literature. For example, Vasubandhu, commenting upon the *Abhidharmakoṣa* VI 14cd, says:

kāyaṃ svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ parīkṣate, vedanāṃ cittaṃ dharmāṃś ca. svabhāva evaiṣāṃ svalakṣaṇam. sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ tu anityatā saṃskṛtānām, duḥkhatā sāsravāṇāṃ śūnyatānātmate sarvadharmāṇām.[26]

"One examines the body by its *sva-* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, as well as sensation, mind and *dharma*s. Their *svalakṣaṇa* is precisely [their] own nature (*svabhāva*), while *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is

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of properties that has many characteristics is derived from a sense faculty." For his comments on Hattori's translation, see ibid 170 n. 20.

[20] *don gyi chos mams du ma ni // thams cad rtags las rtogs ma yin //* Kitagawa 1965: 462. Sanskrit reconstruction given by Jambūvijaya, DANC II 724 fn. 6. For another Sanskrit reconstruction, see Frauwallner 1959: 102: *bahutve 'py arthadharmāṇāṃ na liṅgāt sarvathā gatiḥ* /

[21] Translation by Hayes 1988: 244.

[22] Sanskrit fragment recovered by Hattori 1982: 115 fn. 18.

[23] Translation by Hayes 1988: 277.

[24] Cf. a possible fragment of the *Hetumukha*: *sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhenaiva dharmadharmibhedena na bahiḥ sadasattvam apekṣate* (Frauwallner 1959: 164). Cf. PVSV 2-3. Dharmakīrti is also very keen to establish the *dharma-dharmin* distinction conceptually by the *apoha* doctrine. See PV I 61-62 and *Svavṛtti*, PV II 90-102, and PV IV 181-188. Cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 15, 1971 [179-211]: 199f.

[25] Cf. PS II 15: *dṛṣṭavad vidhirūpeṇa yadi liṅgaṃ prakāśayet / sarvathāpratipattiḥ syāt sarvathā vā gatir bhavet //* Sanskrit reconstruction given by Jambūvijaya, DANC II 720.

[26] *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (cited in note 17): 902. Cf. Yaśomitra on this passage: *kaḥ svabhāvaḥ. kāyasya bhūtabhautikatvam, vedanāyā anubhavatvam, cittasyopalabdhitvam.*

the non-eternity of the conditioned [*dharmas*], the unhappiness of the defiled [*dharmas*], and the emptiness and non-substantiality of all *dharmas*."[27]

Thus, for the Abhidharmikas *svalakṣaṇa* is *svabhāva* of a *dharma*, such as hardness of the earth-element (*pṛthivīdhātu*), and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is the common feature of *dharmas*, such as non-eternity, and every *dharma* is supposed to possess both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.[28] Since *svalakṣaṇa* of a *dharma* is nothing but that *dharma* itself, we must understand the Abhidharma framework, just as we have seen with reference to Dignāga, in terms of a *dharmin* (i.e. *svalakṣaṇa* or a particular *dharma* itself) and *dharmas* (i.e. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, such as non-eternity) which are possessed by that *dharmin* and shared by other *dharmins*. It is unnecessary to say that, being legitimate *dharmas*, both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* are real according to the Abhidharmika ontology.

I am sure that Dignāga inherited the two terms, *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalaksaṇa*, from the Abhidharmikas. As is well known, Dignāga admits only two means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), because he accepts only two types of the object of cognition (*prameya*), viz. *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, which are to be cognized respectively by the two means of cognition.[29] Unfortunately, he gave no formal definition of those two key-terms, which may suggest that Dignāga accepted the Abhidharmika's concepts of them at least in general. Nonetheless, he appears to have attached to them new significances.

When Dignāga discusses the sense cognition, one of the four subdivisions of perception acknowledged by him, he refers to its object, which is no other than *svalakṣaṇa*, in the following manner:

> *svasaṃvedyam anirdeśyaṃ rūpam indriyagocaraḥ* | (PS I 5cd)[30]
>
> "The object of the sense is the form which is to be cognized [simply] as it is and which is inexpressible."[31]

As to *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, he says:

> */ raṅ gi mtshan ñid bstan bya min // yul tha dad phyir gźan du yin /*

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[27] Cf. Vittorio A. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority*, Wien 1989: 56.

[28] Cf. Yaśomitra on *Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya* [Varanasi 1970] 12 (ad *Abhidharmakośa* I 2ab): *svasāmānyalakṣaṇam* . . . *khakkhaṭalakṣaṇaḥ pṛthivīdhātuḥ, anityaṃ duḥkham ity evamādi*. Ibid 16: *svasāmānyalakṣaṇadhāraṇād dharmāḥ*.

[29] The idea first appeared in the *Nyāyamukha* (Taisho 1628, 3b), then in PS(V) I 2: *tatra pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇe dve eva, yasmād lakṣaṇadvayaṃ prameyaṃ. na hi svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām anyat prameyam asti. svalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ hi pratyakṣam, sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam iti pratipadayiṣyāmaḥ*. Sanskrit reconstruction is given by Jambūvijaya, DANC I 100 (Appendix). Hattori (1968: 24) translates: "Now, the means of cognition are [immediate and mediate, namely,] perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (anumāna). They are only two, because the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects. Apart from the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception has only the particular for its object and inference only the universal." For Herzberger's disagreement with Hattori's translation and interpretation of this passage, see Herzberger 1986: 115f.

I have some reservations with regard to Hattori's translation of '*lakṣaṇadvayaṃ prameyam*' as "the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects" (my emphasis), which may suggest that the object to be cognized is a possessor of the two *lakṣaṇas* and something different from them. This might have resulted in Herzberger's peculiar interpretation of '*svārtha*' as a spatio-temporal entity which possesses *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Van Bijlert (cited in note 27, p. 56) states: "they are two aspects of one and the same object, the real visible aspect which is revealed by perception and the conceptualized aspect of the thing, which is the field of inference." He, too, seems to be presupposing the existence of the object apart from *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. He characterizes *svalakṣaṇa* of Dignāga by momentariness (1988: 57), which is the doctrine of Dharmakīrti and which has no textual basis in Dignāga.

I do not think that Dignāga admitted any bearer of the two *lakṣaṇas*. I would prefer the simple translation of '*lakṣaṇadvayaṃ prameyam*' given by Hayes (1988: 133): "two attributes are knowable". Tibetan translation (Hattori 1968: 177: *mtshan ñid gñis gźal bya*) does not support the sense of possession in that sentence.

[30] Sanskrit fragment recovered by Jambūvijaya, DANC I 104 and by Hattori 1968: 91.

[31] Translation by Hattori 1968: 27.

I mthoṅ ba la sogs ñid kyis bstan II raṅ gi ṅo bos brjod pa min I (PS II 2)[32]

"Because the particular is inexpressible. [Inference], since the object grasped by it differs, is otherwise. It is described through the fact of its being seen, but it is not named through its essential property."[33]

This is virtually all Dignāga says about the two *lakṣaṇas*. Now the main distinction between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, according to Dignāga, lies in the fact that the former is inexpressible, while the latter can be expressed through its general feature. Thus it is clear that *svalakṣaṇas* of Abhidharma, viz. *dharmas* which are actually named as *rūpa, vedanā*, etc., should be regarded by Dignāga not as *svalakṣaṇas* but as *sāmānyalakṣaṇas*. Consequently, Dignāga's *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* corresponds to both *sva-* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* of the Abhidharma, which cannot be regarded as real in Dignāga's system. To him *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is after all *anyāpoha*.[34] It is an equivalent of *sāmānya/jāti* (universal) of other schools,[35] whose reality he rejects.[36]

Dignāga's concept of *svalakṣaṇa* is hard to clarify because his only positive phrase about it is 'the object of the sense' (*indriyagocara*). What is the object of the sense? He says that it is 'inexpressible'! Therefore, we must wait for Dharmakīrti who gives the more detailed analysis of *svalakṣaṇa* at the beginning of the *Pramaṇavārttika* Chapter 3.[37] I suspect that Dignāga's *svalakṣaṇa* may carry the sense of *svabhāva* of its Abhidharma equivalent and that it perhaps means the object i t s e l f, whatever we may call and describe it. It is to be noted in passing that to Dharmakīrti *svalakṣaṇa* is the only real object of both perception and inference. According to him, perception grasps *svalakṣaṇa* directly and inference takes it indirectly through *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.[38]

Now let us consider what it is that bears *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga's system. I have already proved that Herzberger's spatio-temporal entity or *upādāyaprajñapti* cannot be the bearer of the two *lakṣaṇas* because it itself is a mere concept. Actually I do not think Dignāga would admit any real bearer of the two *lakṣaṇas*. Consequently, I do not accept Herzberger's framework for understanding Dignāga.[39] As a matter of fact, I would like to propose an even more radical version of the framework than Hattori's. Namely,

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32 Kitagawa 1965: 448f.

33 Translation by Hayes 1988: 232.

34 See e.g. Hattori 1982: 135: *ci ltar don la don gźan gsal* (sic) *ba spyi yin pa de bźin du I sgra gźan rnam par gcod pa ni II sgra la spyir ni brjod pa yin* (PS V 33ab). Hayes (1988: 296) translates: "What a universal is at the level of objects is an object's exclusion of contrary objects. Similarly, at the level of verbal symbols, expression of a universal is the term's preclusion of contrary terms."

35 Cf. PS V 36d discussed above, which declares that *anyāpoha* possesses the three properties of *jāti*.

36 See PS II 16 (Kitagawa 1965: 464): *spyi ni yod pa ma yin na'aṅ II rten ni mthoṅ ba med pa'i phyir II de las gźan te mthoṅ mi 'gyur II gcig la mthoṅ phyir tha dad pa'am II* For Sanskrit reconstruction see DANC II 725. Hayes (1988: 246) translates: "But there really is no universal. Because we do not observe it throughout its substratum, nor do we see it outside its substratum. But if it is observed in each of its substrata, it is divided."

37 For my own discussion of Dharmakīrti's distinction between the two *lakṣaṇas*, see Shoryu Katsura, "Dharmakīrti's Theory of Truth", *JIPh* 12/3, 1984 [215-235]: 217, where I characterized them by 'moment' and 'continuum'.

38 See PV III 53-54.

39 In order to support her opposition to Hattori's framework, Herzberger (1986: 159) quotes the following remark of Jinendrabuddhi's from Hayes' article: "In the process of learning an object's name by having the object pointed out while its name is being uttered, we simultaneously grasp its particular aspect and its general aspect. When that name is used later, only the general aspects are communicated." (Richard P. Hayes, "Diṅnāga's views on reasoning (*svārthanumāna*)", *JIPh* 8/3, 1980, 219-277: 69 fn. 57; cf. Hayes 1988: 238.) She should be reminded that the above quotation is not a literal translation of Jinendrabuddhi's and that it is meant to be a summary, the original source of which, however, I could not trace in Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*.

There cannot be anything (in the external reality) which possesses either *svalakṣaṇa* or *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* at any time.

I would like to assume that in Dignāga's system *svalakṣaṇa* is the object itself which is to be grasped directly by perception, which is neither expressible nor identifiable at that moment, but which is later identified by our conceptual thinking (*kalpanā*) and given a certain name, while *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is the general feature common to individual objects which is to be grasped by our conceptual thinking, e.g. inference and verbal communication, and which is a concept or a name itself.

Now, if there is no bearer of the two *lakṣaṇas*, is there any unsurmountable gap between the perceptual and the conceptual realm in Dignāga's system as Herzberger thought? I do not think that there are enough textual sources to solve this question. Dignāga does not seem to be much interested in the question of how to relate the perceptual realm with the conceptual one. We must again wait for Dharmakīrti who attempted to bridge the gap between the two realms by introducing a new category of cognition called 'perceptual judgement', which arises immediately after the perception, which identifies the perceived object, and which is the driving force behind both inferential and verbal cognition.[40]

Then what is actually meant by the word '*svārtha*' in the verse 1? The relevant portion of v. 1 may be re-written as follows:

śābdaṃ svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate /

And it should be compared with the following concluding remark on v. 36 given by Dignāga:

śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha /[41]

"A name really designates objects qualified by the exclusion of others." [Herzberger 1986: 163]

In spite of the importance attached to the second statement by the post Dignāga Buddhist logicians, such as Dharmakīrti and Jñānaśrīmitra, Dignāga himself never elaborated on this part of the *apoha* doctrine. Unfortunately, Jinendrabuddhi provides no comment on this passage. Therefore, we are forced to conjecture.

Following Herzberger, if we take '*svārtha*' to mean what she calls a spatio-temporal entity, i.e. *upādāyaprajñapti*, then the above first statement of Dignāga must mean that a name designates its own object, i.e. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, by excluding others, which cannot be what she wants to present. Taking into consideration the second statement and accepting a part of her suggestion, I would like to take '*svārtha*' as referring to the perceptual object itself which is something real in our external world.[42]

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[40] I dealt with this topic at the First Dharmakīrti Conference in Kyōto 1982 and the revised version of my paper "On Perceptual Judgement" will appear in *A.K. Warder Festschrift*. H. Yaita recently published a new critical edition of the *Tarkarahasya* (*Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies* 12, 1988), which includes the following two important Sanskrit fragments of PSV: *cakṣuḥsparśanābhyāṃ bhinnaṃ viṣayam upalabhyānyad eva tatsahacarasamudāyaviṣayaṃ smārtam abhedajñānam utpadyate; tathā viśeṣyān svair indriyair bhinnān upalabhyārthāntaravyavacchedaviṣayam abhedena sarvatra mānasaṃ jñānam utpadyate. na bhāvaguṇatvayoḥ pratyakṣam, tasyānupalakṣaṇāt. pratyakṣābhimāna eṣa kutārkikāṇām* (my emphasis). Cf. Hattori 1968: 48 and 204f.; Jambūvijaya 1961: 172. This material clearly indicates that Dignāga, besides his concept of *saṃvṛtisajjñāna* (cognition of conventional existence), had already developed the notion of *smārta* (recognition) as a kind of perceptual judgement. I regret that I cannot utilize this new information in the present paper.

[41] Hattori 1982: 139 fn. 36. I would like to thank Mr. Wasō Harada of Kōyasan University who first suggested to me the parallelism between the two passages. Dharmakīrti quotes the second sentence together with a possible fragment of the *Hetumukha*, a lost work of Dignāga: *ayam arthāntaravyāvṛttyā tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo gamyate* (PVSV 62,26). He does so in order to support his view that a linguistic item expresses a positive conceptual image of a universal (e.g. a cow in general) and at the same time indicates the negation of others (e.g. the negation of non-cows). It is well known that this simultaneous understanding of both positive and negative aspects of an object is later strongly advocated by Jñānaśrīmitra. See my paper "Jñānaśrīmitra on *apoha*", in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, ed. Matilal & Evans, Dordrecht etc. 1986.

[42] It is quite certain that Dignāga admitted the external reality, for he mentioned it at least twice in PSV (ad PS IV 4) in connection with the 'example'. Kitagawa 1965: 515: *phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no*; 517: *phyi rol gyi don la bltos pa 'di ni dpe yin no*.

Even in that case, however, the first statement can only mean that a name designates its own object, i.e. *svalakṣaṇa*, by excluding others (viz. i n d i r e c t l y through *anyāpoha*). Thus in any case, we cannot read the theory of direct application into the first verse as Herzberger wishes to do.

In this connection, it should be noted that the above interpretation of '*svārtha*' should not conflict with our common understanding of *svalakṣaṇa* being 'inexpressible'. Of course, a name or our verbal cognition does not grasp the perceptual object directly, nor does it designate the same object of the complex features totally and positively. A name refers to the object only indirectly, partially and negatively through *anyāpoha*.[43] It is in this sense, perhaps that *svalakṣaṇa* is called 'inexpressible'. I must admit that my conjecture as to Dignāga's position may have been much influenced by Dharmakīrti's interpretations.

Now what is the main difference between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti with reference to the *apoha* doctrine? As the late Professor Frauwallner (1959: 98ff.) so elegantly demonstrated, Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine was first suggested in the *Nyāyamukha* in connection with the function of a logical mark (*liṅga*) and it was later incorporated into chapter 2 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, where the *apoha* theory of inference was fully expounded; then it was applied to the verbal cognition in chapter 5 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in order to establish the *apoha* theory of semantics.[44] Thus, the *apoha* doctrine became a sort of the general theory of the conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*) which includes both inference and verbal cognition in the case of Dignāga. In other words, what Dignāga tried to advocate is that there is no essential difference between the inferential and verbal cognition because both a logical mark (*liṅga*) and a linguistic item (*śabda*) function in the exactly same way, i.e. *anyāpoha*.

As I have assumed elsewhere,[45] Dignāga was much concerned with the problem of the inevitable relation (*avinābhāva*) between *liṅga* and *liṅgin* or between *hetu* and *sādhya*. He insists that a logical mark can successfully indicate its object (*liṅgin*) not when there is a casual relation such as 'causality' etc. proposed by the Vaiśeṣika (and the Sāṃkhya), but only when there is the inevitable relation between *liṅga* and *liṅgin*.[46]

Dignāga established the theory of pervasion (*vyāpti*) in order to justify the inevitable relation. Namely, an item x has the inevitable relation to another item y only when the domain of x is pervaded by the domain of y. The introduction of the restrictive particle *eva* into the *trairūpya* formulae of a legitimate *liṅga* or *hetu* seems to have played a decisive role in giving formal and precise expression to the pervasion. When the domain of x is pervaded by the domain of y, the situation can be expressed by 'x y *eva*', if we follow Vyāḍi's metarule: *yata evakāras tato 'nyatrāvadhāraṇam* (Restriction should be made to the item other than that which is accompanied by the particle *eva*.)

How to establish the pervasion is one of the questions which Dignāga never satisfactorily answered. Of course, he was fond of utilizing the *anvaya-vyatireka* (inductive) method[47] to determine the relation between *liṅga* and *liṅgin* or between *śabda* and *artha* (its object). However, as the following

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[43] See PS V 12ab quoted above.

[44] Cf. *Nyāyamukha* vv. 17 and 18; PS II 13 and 17, PS V 12 and 13.

[45] See e.g. "Dignāga on trairūpya", *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū 32/1*, 1983, and "On the origin and development of the concept of *vyāpti* in Indian logic", *Tetsugaku* 38, 1986.

[46] See e.g. Dignāga's criticism of the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference in chapter 2 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*; Jambūvijaya 1961: 184ff.

[47] Cf. G. Cardona, "On Reasoning from Anvaya and Vyatireka in Early Advaita." in *Studies in Indian Philosophy*, Ahmedabad 1981, 79-104.

well-known passage of chapter 5 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* indicates, he was aware of the shortcomings of such a method:

kathaṃ punaḥ śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne pūrvadoṣāprasaṅgaḥ. yasmād

adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṃśe 'pi darśanāt /

śruteḥ sambandhasaukaryaṃ na cāsti vyabhicāritā // (PS V 34)

śabdasyānvayavyatirekāv arthābhidhāne dvāram, tau ca tulyātulyayor vṛttyavṛttī, tatra tulye nāvaśyaṃ sarvatra vṛttir ākhyeyā, kvacit ānantye 'rthasyākhyānāsambhavāt. atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam adarśanamātreṇāvṛtter ākhyānam. ata eva svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt tadvyavacchedānumānaṃ svārthābhidhānam ity ucyate.[48]

"If a term expresses its own meaning by precluding other meanings, why do the faults mentioned above not arise?

Because a term is not observed to apply to objects in the extension of a contrary term, and because it is observed to apply to members of its own extension, it is easy to connect [the term to its meaning], and the term is not errant in its meaning.

Association and dissociation are the two ways that a verbal symbol expresses its object. They consist respectively in applying to what is similar and in not applying to what is dissimilar. It is not necessary to say that a verbal symbol applies to every instance of what is similar, because in some cases it is not possible to express an extension that is unlimited. But it is possible to say that it does not occur in the dissimilar - although it too is unlimited - simply on the basis of its not being observed to apply to any dissimilar instance. For this reason, because a term is not observed to apply to anything other than that to which it is related, its expression of its own object is said to be a negative inference."[49] (my emphasis)

Here Dignāga is clearly aware of the fact that it is impossible to establish the *anvaya* relation (association, agreement in presence) between a particular linguistic item (or a verbal symbol) and all of its objects, which reflects the core of the difficulty faced by any inductive method. As to the *vyatireka* relation (dissociation, agreement in absence), he seems to believe that it can be established on the basis of mere non-observation (or non-perception, *adarśanamātra*) of a counterexample. In view of Dignāga's general principle of the essential identity between the verbal communication and the inferential process, the above interpretation should not be restricted to the former; the same must apply to the latter. Thus it is clear that Dignāga's theory of pervasion has no strong claim for universality and that it is of a purely hypothetical nature:

It is possible that the domain of x is pervaded by the domain of y (what is similar to x, *tulya* = *sapakṣa*) as long as x is not observed in the domain of non-y (what is dissimilar to x, *atulya* = *vipakṣa*).

Consequently, for Dignāga all the verbal as well as the inferential knowledge essentially amount to the negative inference of a hypothetical nature. In this sense he cannot and does not have to establish a universal relation between a linguistic item or a logical mark and their respective objects.

As Richard Hayes suggests, Dignāga's system of epistemology and logic does not seem to be bound by any doctrinal prejudice.[50] I believe that this is due to the fact that he does not commit himself to any specific kind of ontology or metaphysics at least when he is dealing with the epistemological and logical subjects in the *Nyāyamukha*, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, etc., which may be inferred from the

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[48] Sanskrit reconstruction made by Frauwallner, 1959: 100f.; cf. DANC II 650. For Tibetan version and Sanskrit fragments, see Hattori 1982: 134f.

[49] Translation by Hayes 1988: 297f. Cf. Herzberger 1986: 161.

[50] Cf. Hayes 1988: 166-168.

lack of his own clear definition of *svalakṣaṇa* as I argued above. I have suggested that Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine presupposes a certain hierarchical tree of universals and particulars. Yet we should not superimpose any metaphysical doctrine, even a Buddhist one, upon such a hierarchy. Dignāga's final recourse in determining the domain of application of a certain linguistic item is people's common sense (*lokavyavahāra* or *lokaprasiddhi*).[51] Thus Dignāga's hierarchy of universals and particulars must reflect common sense, and the pervasion between two items, either linguistic or logical, in his logic should be determined by the observation of how people use their own language. Naturally people can argue and debate each other on the common ground. One cannot convince another solely by basing one's argument upon his own system of logic and metaphysical doctrines. In this sense, it may be possible to argue that Dignāga tried to build a n e w system of logic which is free from any tradition (*āgama*) and which is acceptable to any one who is interested in a serious investigation based on our common experience and knowledge.

Let us now examine Dharmakīrti's fundamental difference from Dignāga. I agree with Herzberger (1986: 212) when she says "Dharmakīrti sought stronger conditions for the truth of universal sentences". She is also quite right in pointing out that "Dharmakīrti argued that non-observation by itself is altogether a very weak form of proof" on the basis of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*.[52] Although Dharmakīrti does not mention the above-quoted passage of Dignāga when he denies *adarśanamātra* theory there and in chapter 2 of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*,[53] I believe that he is tacitly criticizing the whole inductive framework of Dignāga's logic. See e.g. PV I 13:

na cādarśanamātreṇa vipakṣe 'vyabhicāritā /
sambhāvyavyabhicāratvāt sthālītaṇḍulapākavat //

"By mere non-observation in the opposite one cannot be sure of the necessary concomitance of the probans, because there is the possibility of the concomitance proving to be contingent, as it is found to be the case with the grains in a cooking vessel."[54]

As a matter of fact, Dharmakīrti in this context quotes a passage from chapter 2 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, where Dignāga mentions the expression '*adarśanamātra*' in order to refute the Vaiśeṣika proof of the existence of the invisible 'wind',[55] together with a few passages from the *Nyāyamukha*. The sheer silence in face of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* V 34 seems to indicate his dissatisfaction with Dignāga's whole approach towards the problem of how to determine the pervasion and the logical connection.

As is well known, Dharmakīrti introduced the theory of *svabhāvapratibandha* (essential connection) in order to assure the universality of his theory of the logical connection, as a result of which he could reject the inductive nature of Indian logic represented by Dignāga. It is most likely that Dharmakīrti was the first to establish the deductive method of logic in India. Furthermore, he introduced the new

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[51] Cf. PSV ad PS V 38b, Hattori 1982: 138 (Vasudhararakṣita): *gdon mi za bar mig gi gzuṅ bya ñid med par / sṅon po daṅ ser po la sogs pa'i tha dad pa la yaṅ gzugs kyi sgra 'jig rten la grags pa khas blaṅ bar bya ba'i ro la sogs pa la ni ma yin no //* 140 (Kanakavarman): *mig gis gzuṅ bar bya ba ñid spaṅs nas / sṅon po daṅ ser po la sogs pa tha dad pa rnams la yaṅ / 'jig rten la bstan pa'i gzugs kyi sgra khas blaṅ bar bya'i ro la sogs pa rnams la ni ma yin no //* (my emphasis).

[52] Herzberger 1986: 215f.; PVSV 14.

[53] PVSV 10ff. and PVin II 39ff. (= Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte*, Wien 1973).

[54] Translation by Mookerjee and Nagasaki, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. An English Translation of the First Chapter with the Autocommentary and with Elaborate Comments*, Patna 1964: 43.

[55] PVSV 14: *yady adarśanamātreṇa dṛṣṭebhyaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate, na ca so 'pi yuktaḥ*. Cf. PSV ed. Kitagawa 1965: 461.

categories of *hetu*, viz. *kārya* (result), *svabhāva* (essence), and *anupalabdhi* (non-perception). The first two correspond to the two types of *svabhāvapratibandha* recognized by him, viz. *tadutpatti* (causality) and *tādātmya* (identity), while the last one must have been introduced by him in order to replace the preceding incorrect notions about the proof of non-existence (or negative inference) including Dignāga's concept of *adarśanamātra*. I propose to discuss Dharmakīrti's criticism of Dignāga's theory of *adarśanamātra* in a future paper.

Thus the first and foremost important difference between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the *apoha* doctrine is closely related to the fundamental difference of their systems of logic; namely, Dignāga's logic carries with itself the inductive approach of traditional Indian logic, while Dharmakīrti's system has a strong tendency towards deductive logic with his new theory of *svabhāvapratibandha*. Dignāga's theory of pervasion reveals a hypothetical nature, which is strongly criticized by Dharmakīrti.

Now Herzberger (1986: 212) says "[Dharmakīrti] found these [stronger] conditions [for the truth of universal sentences] in an *a priori* sphere". She maintains that Dharmakīrti established the inevitable logical relation not in the actual world of reality but in the conceptual realm of essential natures (*svabhāva*) which are *a priori* given by the beginningless *vāsanā* (impressions); thus, there is a great gulf between the perceptual and the conceptual realm in the framework of Dharmakīrti.

Regarding Dharmakīrti's concept of *vāsanā*, we are not in a position to say anything definitive, for the study of this very interesting topic has only just begun[56] and whether or not the distinction once made by Stcherbatsky between *anubhava-* and *anādi-vāsanā* is valid for Dharmakīrti[57] is still to be investigated. In any case, Dignāga also refers to *vāsanā* at least once in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.[58] Therefore, Herzberger should not take the theory of *vāsanā* to be an important dividing concept between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.[59]

As to the concept of *svabhāva* in Dharmakīrti's works, however, we have a thorough study by Steinkellner (cited in note 24). Following his lead, I would like to take the term to mean not only the concept (*vikalpa*) but also the causal efficiency (*arthakriyāśakti*) of real existence. Thus, although *svabhāvapratibandha* holds primarily between two conceptual items, either linguistic or logical, it certainly reflects the state of affairs in reality which stimulates us to conceptually construct an essential relation of this kind. Namely, there is an essential connection between smoke and a fire in the conceptual realm (or the universe of discourse) because a fire can produce smoke in the actual world, and there is a similar connection between being a *śiṃśapā* and being a tree because a *śiṃśapā* can be called a tree. Thus, it is certain that to Dharmakīrti the conceptual realm of the universals are not necessarily given *a priori* by the beginningless *vāsanā* but firmly rooted in the actual world of causal efficiency.

An important characteristic of Dharmakīrti's epistemology, which is apparently missing in Dignāga, is the strong interest in explaining away the whole epistemological process which begins with an object in the external world, being followed by perception of the object, identification or judgement of it, verbal or inferential knowledge based on the judgement, a desire to act towards the perceived object, an action, etc., and ends with the actual fulfillment of the desire.[60] Thus he is not only interested

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[56] See e.g. Ishō Mikogami, "Śubhagupta no *vāsanā*-riron hihan", *Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 38, 1982, and Yūshō Wakahara, "*vāsanā* to *pratyakṣa*", *Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 44, 1988.

[57] *Buddhist Logic*. Vol. 2. Dover 1962: 367f.

[58] PS V 47. Cf. M. Hattori, "*Apoha* and *Pratibhā*", in *Sanskrit and Indian Studies*, ed. Nagatomi et al., Dordrecht etc. 1980: 65.

[59] Cf. Herzberger 1986: 167.

[60] See Katsura (cited in note 37) 1984: 231.

in knowledge but also in a human activity stimulated by knowledge and aimed at a certain external object which is capable of fulfilling a human purpose. Therefore he is bound to deal with the problem of how to relate the perceptual realm with the conceptual one. As I mentioned before it is perceptual judgement which bridges the two realms in Dharmakīrti's system. In any case it is hard to imagine the gulf between the two realms there as Herzberger suggests.

Let us now consider how Dharmakīrti could claim the universal concomitance between two items without relying on the *a priori* sphere proposed by Herzberger. Here I would like to refer to Richard Hayes' interpretation of Dharmakīrti. As I mentioned before he takes Dignāga to hold 'the essentially open-minded and critical spirit' of classical Buddhism, but he regards Dharmakīrti as one who violates such a spirit by strongly defending Buddhist teachings.[61] As far as I can see Dharmakīrti could claim the stronger conditions for the logical relation than Dignāga because his 'universe of discourse' was neatly organized in accordance with the two principal relations of *tadutpatti* and *tādātmya* while Dignāga's was just a collection of common sense. The whole system of Dharmakīrti is based upon the Buddhist doctrine of causation and everything can be and should be explained away there by means of causal relation. In this connection it is unnecessary to mention that Dharmakīrti gave the clear definition of *svalakṣaṇa*, which constitutes the perceptual realm of the ultimate reality by introducing the concept of causal efficiency. For Dharmakīrti, to be is to be causally efficient. The notion of causal efficiency is not found in Dignāga.

Dharmakīrti's strong inclination towards the causal interpretation finds its way into his *apoha* doctrine. As I have shown before, Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine is based on his open-ended hierarchy of universals and particulars especially when it comes to determine what is *anya* (the contrary, which is to be excluded) in *anyāpoha*. It seems significant that Dharmakīrti never refers to such a hierarchy. He determines *anya* by causation. According to him two items are non-different when they share the same result (*ekakāryatā*) and they are different when they do not share the same result (*atat-kāryatā*).[62] For example, a number of different items can be grouped together and identified as a pot when they can all contain water or other liquids; they are distinguished from the other kinds of vessels such as a dish because the latter cannot hold water. Thus it is clear that identity and difference in Dharmakīrti's system are determined by causal relation.

As I mentioned before, Dignāga would not accept causality as the basis of his inference, while Dharmakīrti strongly relies upon the theory of causation, which seems to make it possible for him to claim the universal connection between the two items. It might have been the case that Dharmakīrti substituted people's common sense, which is Dignāga's final recourse in his system of logic, by the traditional Buddhist doctrine of causation equipped with the new theory of causal efficiency. This may be counted as the other important difference on the *apoha* doctrine between the two logicians.

In conclusion I would like to state that Herzberger's new interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine cannot be textually supported and that the orthodox view still holds good. I cannot accept her understanding of the whole framework of Dharmakīrti's system. Yet I appreciate her critical spirit and great efforts to investigate the three important figures of Indian philosophy. Certainly she stimulated me to re-consider the whole *apoha* doctrine of both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. I am quite sure that Dharmakīrti and post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logicians shared Herzberger's keen interest in the problem of how to relate the perceptual and the conceptual realm, which had not been fully

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[61] Hayes 1988: 309-312.

[62] PVSV 57: *ekakāryataiva bhāvānām abhedaḥ*; PV I 76, 83.

discussed by Dignāga. Let me now give a tentative list of the main doctrinal differences between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

(1) Ontology: Dignāga gives no explicit definition of reality, which seems to indicate his non-commitment to any ontology and system of metaphysics. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, presents the celebrated definition of reality by introducing the concept of *arthakriyāśakti*. Furthermore, his reality is characterized by momentariness, an idea which has no place in Dignāga.

(2) Epistemology: Again Dignāga gives no definition of *pramāṇa* in general. His main contribution in this field is the introduction of the theory of *svasaṃvedana* (self-cognition) and *apoha*. Dharmakīrti, however, gives the definition of *pramāṇa* being *avisaṃvādin* (non-contradictory) and *apūrvagocara* (fresh knowledge), which enables him to classify various kinds of cognitions systematically. He introduced a new category of cognition, 'perceptual judgement', by which he was able to bridge the gap between the perceptual and the conceptual realm and explain away the whole epistemological process leading to a practical activity.

(3) Logic: Dignāga's logic centers upon the theory of *trairūpya*. He first introduced the wheel of reasons (*hetucakra*) in order to map various possible relations between a logical reason and a property to be proved. He must be the first Indian logician to hit upon the concept of *vyāpti*. Dignāga's logic is essentially inductive in nature. Dharmakīrti seems to have tried to eliminate the weakness of Dignāga's inductive method. He introduces the concept of *svabhāvapratibandha*, consisting of *tadutpatti* and *tādātmya*, in order to ensure the universal nature of *vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*. Thus Dharmakīrti finds a small space for the *trairūpya* theory and develops a new set of three reasons, viz. *kārya*, *svabhāva*, and *anupalabdhi*. The whole framework of his logic is based on causation, while Dignāga rejects causation as the basis of inference.

Finally, there are a number of topics which are discussed for the first time by Dharmakīrti. For example, he tries to prove several Buddhist doctrines, viz. momentariness, existence of the other world (*paraloka*) and other continuants (*santānāntara*), etc. He also gives a detailed discussion on both Buddha and *āgama*.

APPENDIX

Pramāṇasamuccaya V 13

anekadharmā śabdo 'pi yenārthaṃ nātivartate /
pratyāyati tenaiva na śabdaguṇatvādibhiḥ //
(Sanskrit reconstruction by Frauwallner 1959: 102; Jambūvijaya, DANC II 630, reconstructs: . . . *na tu śabdaguṇādibhiḥ*)

Kanakavarman (Hattori 1982: 117) translates:

/ du ma chos can sgra la yaṅ // gaṅ gis don ni mi spoṅ ba /
/ de ñid kyis ni rtogs byed kyi // sgra daṅ yon tan sogs kyis min /

Vasudhararakṣita (Hattori 1982: 114-116) translates:

/ sgras kyaṅ chos gaṅ du ma yi // don la 'jug pa ma yin gyi /
/ sbyar bya de ñid la de sgra'i // yon tan ñid sogs kyis ma yin /

Herzberger translates: "Even though a word has multifarious properties, it causes the object to be conveyed by means of that [quality] alone which does not exceed over (*ati-vṛt*) the object; not by means of qualities etc. which belong to words. [Herzberger 1986: 155]

Hayes translates: "A word too has many properties. But it makes its object known through those properties by which it does not deviate from the object; it does not make its object known through the fact that significant sound is a quality and other such properties. [Hayes 1988: 277] (my emphasis)

It is amazing that all of the four translators misunderstood the last *pada* of this important verse.[63] The compound *śabdaguṇatvādi* should be understood as a *dvandva* compound, meaning 'being a word (*śabdatva*), being a quality (*guṇatva*), etc.' The purport of the verse is that a word (e.g. *vṛkṣa*) possesses many properties, viz. being a quality, being a word, being a particular word '*vṛkṣa*', etc.; of them only those properties, such as 'being a particular word '*vṛkṣa*'', by which the word '*vṛkṣa*' does not deviate from its object, can help that same word denote its object, but the rest of its properties, namely, 'being a word', 'being a quality', etc., can be of no help, for they, being higher universals, deviate from the object of the word '*vṛkṣa*'.

Herzberger, who understands the compound as a *tatpuruṣa* meaning 'qualities of words', tries to read the influence of the Vyāḍi-Vajapyāyana debate as well as the negative allusion to Bhartṛhari into the above verse (Herzberger 1986: 110-112). This is simply impossible. As a matter of fact, Bhartṛhari holds a similar remark of the hierarchy of universals related to a word, which Herzberger herself quotes and translates:

> *yathā hi ghaṭe dravyatvapṛthivītvaghaṭatvādīnām aviruddhaḥ samavāyas tathā vṛkṣaśabde 'pi guṇatvaśabdatvavṛkṣaśabdatvādīnām ākṛtiviśeṣāṇām aviruddhaḥ samavāyaḥ.* (*Vākyapakīyavṛtti* p. 53, Herzberger 1986: 61)
>
> "Just as there is in the pot a compatible inherence of [universals such as]: being a substance, being earthen, being a pot, so also there is in the word 'tree' a compatible co-inherence of particular universals, such as: being a quality, being a word, being the word 'tree'." [Herzberger 1986: 18, my emphasis]

[63] The *pada* quoted by Jinendrabuddhi is also not correctly translated. See Hattori 1982: 174: *sgra yi yon tan sogs kyis min.*

In this connection I would like to express my thanks again to Mr. Harada who first suggested the possible link between PS V 13 and *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* and who also supplied me with his excellent studies of Dignāga and Bhartṛhari from which I profited immensely.

Abbreviations and Literature

DANC I, II — *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakraṃ of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. With the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*. Ed. Muni Jambūvijayajī. Part 1. Bhavnagar 1966. Part 2. Bhavnagar 1976.

Frauwallner 1959 — E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 3, 83-164.

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Jambūvijaya 1961 — Muni Jambuvijayaji (ed.), *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*. Baroda.

JIPh — *Journal of Indian Philosophy*

Kitagawa 1965 — Hidenori Kitagawa, *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū*, Tōkyō.

PS — *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga)

PSṬ V — *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (Viśālāmalāvatī)*, Chapter 5 (Jinendrabuddhi): v. Hattori 1982

PSV — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga)

PV I — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter I: v. PVSV

PV II,III,IV — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapters II, III, IV: *Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*. Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206. (PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*. Roma 1960.

DHARMAKĪRTIS SPRACHTHEORIE – EINE SYNOPSE*

von

Toshihiko Kimura, Kyōto

Einführung

Im *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Kapitel des *Pramāṇavārttika* erklärt Dharmakīrti, daß man mit Hilfe von Argumenten und der autoritativen Überlieferung überlege (*yuktyāgamābhyāṃ vimṛśan*) und daß der Kanon die religiöse Unwissenheit beseitige (*śāstram mohanivartanam*).[1] Nach Devendrabuddhi (*Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*: D 4217, 89b1) deuten die Argumente das Denken (*cintā*) und die autoritative Überlieferung das Hören (*śrutiḥ*) an.

Weiters sagt er, daß der buddhistische Kanon die Worte des Menschen Buddha (*pramāṇa-bhūtaḥ* = der Mensch mit Autorität) enthält. Die Heiligkeit des Buddha liegt in seinem Mitleid und seiner religiösen Weisheit, also seinem Wissen von den vier edlen Wahrheiten (*catvāryāryasatyāni*), nämlich dem Leiden, der Ursache des Leidens, der Beendigung des Leidens und dem zur Beendigung des Leidens führenden Weg.

Dementsprechend kritisiert Dharmakīrti im *svārthānumāna*-Kapitel in Zusammenhang mit der Sprache den brahmanischen Kanon als Offenbarung (*śrutiḥ*). Er faßt seine *apoha*-Theorie als Sprachtheorie folgendermaßen zusammen:

> "Vom Lehrer der Logik (d.i. Dignāga) wurde gesagt, daß der Gegenstand der Worte eine als Objekt der Vorstellungerkenntnis vorgestellte Beschaffenheit ist, (und) daß diese nicht als auf ein wirkliches Ding (*vastuḥ*) gegründet erwiesen ist. Weil es keine notwendige Verbindung zwischen Wörtern und Dingen gibt, werden die (wirklichen) Gegenstände nicht durch diese (Wörter) erwiesen, denn die (Wörter) drücken [nur] die Absicht des Sprechers aus." (Ausgabe von Malvania vv. 215-216, Gnoli 212-213; im folgenden M und G abgekürzt).

Nach Dignāga wird der Gegenstand der Worte nur vorgestellt, und zwar durch Ausschluß anderer Attribute (*anyāpohaḥ*). Ich nehme an, daß sich die *anyāpoha*-Theorie aus der *bhedāpoha*-Theorie Bhartṛharis entwickelt hat.[2] Bhartṛhari stellt seine Sprachtheorie folgendermaßen dar:

> *bhedānāṃ vā parityāgāt saṅkhyātmā sa tathāvidhaḥ /*
> *vyāpārāj jātibhāgasya bhedāpohena vartate // (Vākyapadīya*, Benares Skt. Ser. 3, 14,103)
> "Oder diese derartige (undifferenzierte Einzahl) ist das Wesen der Zahl, weil sie alle besonderen (Arten von Zahlen, wie Singular, Dual) ausschließt. Sie existiert auf Grund der Funktion des Gattungsaspektes unter Ausschließung der besonderen (Zahlen)." [3]

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* Die vorliegende Arbeit wurde von Herrn Professor Ernst Steinkellner während der ersten Dharmakīrti-Konferenz in Kyōto angeregt, dem ich dafür meinen herzlichen Dank ausspreche. Auch Herrn Helmut Krasser danke ich für die Verbesserung des deutschen Textes.

[1] Siehe meine Monographie: *Dharmakīrti shūkyō tetsugaku no kenkyū*, [Studien zu Dharmakīrtis Religionsphilosophie] Tōkyō 1987, zu vv. 133 und 5.

[2] Zu Dignāgas Verwendung des *Vākyapadīyam*, vgl. E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 3, 1959: Anhang 4 (*Traikālyaparīkṣā*).

[3] Helārāja scheint folgendermaßen zu kommentieren: *idānīṃ tu samastabhedānugatarūpam anyāpoharūpam iti śeṣaḥ* (*Prakāśa* [Benares S.S.] 503,5-6).

Dharmakīrti entwickelte eine epistemologische Theorie der Sprache, die davon ausgeht, daß es die Funktion der Sprache ist, die Absicht des Sprechers zu vermitteln. Daher sei der Kanon der Buddhisten eine Predigt des Menschen Buddha, die seinem Mitleid und seiner Weisheit entstammten. Unmittelbar nach der oben beschriebenen Zusammenfassung der *apoha*-Theorie kritisiert Dharmakīrti den brahmanischen Kanon als Offenbarung. Seine Argumente sollen in den folgenden Abschnitten besprochen werden:

§ 3 Der buddhistische Kanon (M vv. 217-226, G 214-223)
§ 3a Kritik an der Theorie von der Nichtverfaßtheit des Veda (M vv. 227-252b, G 224-248)
§ 3b Kritik an der *sphoṭa*-Theorie (M vv. 252c-272b, G 249-268)
§ 3c Nicht-Ewigkeit der Sprache (M vv. 272c-287b, G 269-283)
§ 3d Die Verfaßtheit des Veda (M vv. 287c-304b, G 284-301)
§ 3e Abschluß der Kritik am brahmanischen Kanon (M vv. 304c-342b, G 302-339)

§ 3 Der buddhistische Kanon

Dignāga bezieht die Reden von Heiligen (*āptaḥ*) in die Logik mit ein, da ihnen wegen ihrer ausgezeichneten Intuition Verläßlichkeit (*avisaṃvādaḥ*) zukommt. Dharmakīrti zitiert in M 219a (G 216a) aus Dignāgas *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, zweites Kapitel, v. 5a und erklärt den Begriff 'heilige Rede' (*vākyam*) als Predigt der vier edlen Wahrheiten, die Männer und Frauen auf den Weg der Erlösung führen.

In der ersten Hälfte des *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Kapitels haben wir bereits Dharmakīrtis Buddhologie gesehen. Im weiteren zeigt seine ethische Doktrin, daß Fehler des Menschen ihren Ursprung im Glauben an ein 'Ich' (*satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ*) haben, den er als 'Unwissenheit' (*avidyā*) bezeichnet. Dies wird auch in der zweiten Hälfte des *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Kapitels ausführlich besprochen. Der Vers M 224 (G 221) ist übrigens aus dem *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Kapitel, vv. 210cd und 211ab,[4] übernommen.

Wir dürfen auch nicht Manorathanandins falsche Erklärung zu M v. 222 (G 219) übersehen, daß nämlich mit *apare* im Vers die Buddhisten gemeint seien.[5] Denn die Idee, daß wir eine Person nicht als fehlerhaft oder fehlerfrei bezeichnen können, da wir ja nicht fähig sind, dies zu erkennen, findet sich vor allem bei den Mīmāṃsakas. Manorathanandin denkt nicht an die Bedeutung von *pramāṇasiddhiḥ*.

Die Autorität des Buddha wird auch durch seine Verwendung des analytischen Urteils in der Hauptprämisse bestätigt, die von Dharmakīrti in den letzten beiden Versen im *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Kapitel aus den *āgama*s zitiert wird und die besagt, daß alles was entsteht, die Natur der Vergehens in sich trägt (*yat kiñcid udayātmakaṃ nirodhadharmakaṃ sarvaṃ tat*).[6] Diese Hauptprämisse beweist auch die Nicht-Ewigkeit aller Dinge. Nicht-Ewigkeit ist auch der erste Begriff der 16 Aspekte (*ṣoḍa-śākārāḥ*), die den vier edlen Wahrheiten zugewiesen werden. In § 3 wird auch die Autorität des Buddha bewiesen.

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[4] Siehe meine oben (Anm. 1) angeführten "Studien".

[5] Dharmakīrti verwendet auch in M v. 221a (G 218b) den Ausdruck *apare*, um einen Gegner, nämlich die Naiyāyikas zu bezeichnen. Im Gegensatz dazu bezeichnet er am Anfang des folgenden Abschnittes die Mīmāṃsakas als *kecit* und die Buddhisten als *anye*.

[6] Auf Pāli lautet der Satz: *yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman* (Vinaya, *Mahāvagga; Māgandiya-sutta* in Majjhima Nikāya; *Ambaṭṭha-sutta* in Dīgha Nikāya; etc.).

§ 3a Kritik an der Theorie von der Nichtverfaßtheit des Veda

Die Mīmāṃsakas behaupten, daß die Verbindung von einem Wort und seinem Gegenstand naturgegeben ist (*autpattikaḥ*), und Śabarasvāmin ersetzt den Ausdruck 'naturgegeben' durch 'nicht von Menschen verfaßt' (*apauruṣeyam*).[7] Dharmakīrti weist diese Theorie zurück indem er sagt:

> "Gewisse [Gelehrte, nämlich die Mīmāṃsakas] erklären, daß (nur eine Aussage), die nicht von Menschen verfaßt ist, einen wahren Gegenstand hat, weil die Fehler, die Grund für die Falschheit von Aussagen sind, (ihre) Grundlage im Menschen haben. Andere [d.h. die Buddhisten] (hingegen) erklären: 'Weil die Vorzüge, die Grund für einen wahren Gegenstand der Aussagen sind, (ihre) Grundlage im Menschen haben, warum sollte (eine Aussage), die nicht von Menschen verfaßt ist, keinen falschen Gegenstand haben?'" (M vv. 227-228, G 224-225).

Der Kommentator Karṇakagomin zitiert die Verse 62, 63, 68, 71 (mit Abweichung), 89, 90, 91a, 92, 93a, 99b und 100a aus dem zweiten Kapitel des *Ślokavārttika* als Dharmakīrtis *pūrvapakṣaḥ*.[8] Kumārila ist also der Meinung, daß die Aussagen des Veda keine Fehler haben, daß sie nicht von Menschen verfaßt sind und daß es in von Menschen verfaßten Aussagen Fehlermöglichkeiten gibt, da eine Verfälschung von Aussagen durch die Menschen zustandekommt. Aussagen, die von Menschen verfaßt sind, bedürfen, um als gültig erkannt zu werden, einer weiteren gültigen Erkenntnis (*pauruṣeye tu vacane pramāṇāntaramūlatā*), aber die Prämissen der Veden (*codanā*) sind aus sich selbst gültig (*svataḥprāmāṇyam*). Im Gegensatz dazu betont Dharmakīrti die Verfaßtheit der Sprache, da sie auf einer sozialen Vereinbarung (*saṅketaḥ*) beruht.[9] Er sagt:

> "Denn die Vereinbarung, die der den Gegenstand erkennen lassende Grund ist, hat (ihre) Grundlage im Menschen. (Und) selbst wenn die Aussagen [des Veda] nicht von Menschen verfaßt wären, wäre aufgrund dieser (Vereinbarung) eine Falschheit [der Aussagen] möglich. Wenn die (Verbindung bereits) aufgrund der Vereinbarung offenbar wird, ist die Annahme einer anderen (Verbindung als der Vereinbarung) zwecklos." (M vv. 229, 230; G 226, 227).

Soziale Vereinbarungen werden von den Menschen willentlich getroffen; daher ist die Verbindung zwischen einem Wort und seinem Gegenstand nicht-ewig. Wenn die Verbindung a priori wäre, könnten wir andere Bedeutungen eines Wortes nicht verstehen und ein Wort könnte auch unverständlichen Unsinn darstellen. Wenn wir aber die Sprache der sozialen Vereinbarung entsprechend verwenden, läßt die durch die Sprache entstandene Erkenntnis (*śābdajñānam*) den Wunsch des Sprechers (*vivakṣā*) erkennen.[10]

Die Brahmanen bestehen darauf, daß die Nichtverfaßtheit des Veda auf der Nicht-Tradition (*a-smṛtiḥ*) beruht, aber Dharmakīrti weist dies zurück, indem er sich auf Kumārilas Vers *vedādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam*[11] bezieht. Somit meint Dharmakīrti, daß die Autoren des Veda nur vergessen sind, und daß die Annahme von seiner Unverfaßtheit zu einem unendlichen Regreß bezüglich der Autorschaft führt.

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[7] Vgl. Erich Frauwallner, *Materialien zur älteren Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā*, Wien 1968: 32f.; Francis X. D'Sa, *Śabdaprāmāṇyam in Śabara and Kumārila*, Vienna 1980: Chapter 4.

[8] PVSVṬ 404f.; ŚV *Codanā* 49-56.

[9] Der Begriff *saṅketaḥ* findet sich in Bhāvivekas *Madhyamakahṛdaya*. Siehe S. Kawasaki, "The Mīmāṃsā Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā (2)", *Tetsugaku Shisō Ronshū* 12, 1987: 13f. Dharmakīrti scheint einiges von Bhāviveka zu übernehmen. Natürlich muß Dharmakīrti die *saṅketa*-Theorie auch durch die Werke Dignāgas und der Sautrāntika-Schule kennen.

[10] Vgl. *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Kapitel § 1a der oben (Anm. 1) angeführten "Studien".

[11] ŚV *Vākyasamuddeśaḥ* 366a.

§ 3b Kritik an der *sphoṭa*-Theorie

Der Grammatiker Patañjali, dem nachgesagt wird, den Begriff *sphoṭaḥ* zum ersten Mal verwendet zu haben, hat behauptet, daß *sphoṭaḥ* (Aufdeckung) das Wesen der Worte ist, und daß der Laut ein Attribut der Worte ist (*dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ*)[12]. Bhartṛhari entwickelt eine metaphysische Theorie vom *sphoṭaḥ* indem er annimmt, daß jedes Wort alle Bedeutungen in sich enthält, ebenso wie Dharmakīrti der Meinung ist, daß eine Eigenschaft (*svabhāvaḥ*) durch den Ausschluß von allem was unähnlich ist (*anyāpohaḥ*) alle Beurteilungen enthält. Karṇakagomin zitiert folgende Sätze Bhartṛharis, die vielleicht aus einem verlorenen Eigenkommentar zum *Vākyapadīya* stammen, als Dharmakīrtis *pūrvapakṣaḥ*:

> *sarveṣām pṛthagarthavattā sarveṣu pratiśabdaṃ kṛtsnārthaparisamāpteḥ. tathā yad eva prathamaṃ padam upādīyate asmiṃ sarvarūpārthopagrāhiṇi niyamānuvādanibandhanāni padāntarāṇi vijñāyante.* (PVSVṬ 464)

Bhartṛhari beharrt auf den zahlreichen Fähigkeiten eines Wortes. Dharmakīrti weist dies zurück, da ja sonst ein Mensch, wenn er einmal ein Wort hört, alle seine Gegenstände erkennen würde. Da wir einen Satz nach und nach verstehen, warum ist er dann nicht ein Nichtewiges und Künstliches? (M v. 254, G 250c-251b) Kein anderer, zusätzlicher Faktor kann so wirken, wie das ewige Wesen *sphoṭaḥ*. Kumārila sagt, daß die Ewigkeit und Universalität der Sprache durch Wiedererkennen (*pratyabhijñayā*) erkannt werden kann. Dies kann aber nicht so sein, da alle Dinge vergänglich sind (*kṣaṇabhaṅgataḥ*).

Wenn es ein Wesen wie den *sphoṭaḥ* gibt, warum hören sich dann viele gleichzeitig vorgebrachte Reden undeutlich an? Oder warum gibt es verschiedene Auffassungen von der Fähigkeit (*yogyatā*) der Worte? Ebenso ist die Reihenfolge der Silben (*varṇaḥ*) nicht a priori festgelegt, wie Kumārila im folgenden Vers sagt:

> *kiñca śabdasya nityatvaṃ śrotrajapratyabhijñayā /*
> *vibhutvaṃ ca sthitaṃ kasya ko vyavasyed viparyayam //*[13]

Nach Dharmakīrti ist ein Laut die direkte Ursache der Silben, und durch die Wahrnehmung des Sprechers und Apperzeption (*dhī*) des Hörers erscheint der Gegenstand eines Wortes als *anyāpohaḥ* in Übereinstimmung mit der sozialen Vereinbarung (*saṅketaḥ*). Ein Wort ist daher nicht wie ein Licht, das einen Gegenstand erhellt, wie Bhartṛhari meint, sondern eher ein Resultat.[14]

§ 3c Nicht-Ewigkeit der Sprache

"Laute sind nicht-ewig, da das Vergehen mit dem bloßen Sein verbunden ist" (M v. 272cd, G 269ab). Dharmakīrti argumentiert, daß es für das Vergehen des Seienden keine Ursache gibt, sondern daß die Vergänglichkeit das Wesen des Seienden ist.[15] Kumārila weist die Theorie der Sautrāntikas vom Vergehen ohne Ursache zurück, indem er sagt, daß bei demjenigen, bei welchem eine Ursache gesehen wird, auch ein Vergehen gesehen wird, wie etwa bei einem Sproß (*aṅkuraḥ*), und erklärt, daß Vergehen einen Übergang in einen anderen Zustand bedeutet. Holz, zum Beispiel, das mit Feuer

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[12] Hajime Nakamura, *Kotoba no keijijōgaku*, [Metaphysik der Sprache] Tōkyō 1957: 258. Vgl. auch K. A. S. Iyer, *Bhartṛhari*, Poona 1969: Ch. 3, § 2.

[13] Dieser Vers kommt im *Ślokavārttikam* nicht vor, sondern stammt vielleicht aus der *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*; er wird von Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 489) und von Śāntarakṣita (*Tattvasaṅgraha*, ed. Dvarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1968, v. 2116) zitiert.

[14] Vgl. Nakamura (zit. in Anm. 12) p. 20.

[15] Siehe meine "Studien" § 4a.

verbunden ist, verändert sich und wird zu Kohle, und ein Topf, der mit einem Hammer zerschlagen wird, verändert sich und wird zu Tonscherben.[16]

Darauf antwortet Dharmakīrti, daß das Holz wegen der dem Holz innewohnenden Natur (*dharmatā*) vergeht. Dharmakīrti beweist die Vergänglichkeit aller Dinge durch die Hauptprämisse, daß allem, was entsteht, das Wesen des Vergehens innewohnt. In diesem Abschnitt argumentiert er daher, daß die Nicht-Ewigkeit der Worte auf ihrem 'Seiendsein' beruht.[17] Der logische Grund 'Seiendsein' (*sattvam*), der die Nicht-Ewigkeit beweist, ist also ein Grund, der im Eigenwesen besteht (*svabhāvahetuḥ*). Daher ist das Vergehen von keinen anderen verursachenden Faktoren abhängig.

§ 3d Die Verfaßtheit des Veda

Die Veden, sagt Dharmakīrti, unterscheiden sich nicht von säkularen und nicht-ewigen Worten und sind aus den Vorstellungen (*vikalpaḥ*) und dem Karma der Menschen entstanden.[18] Sie haben daher keine Verbindung mit realen Dingen. Und wenn die Gegner meinen, daß nur nichtverfaßte Worte wahr sind, weil Menschen künstliche Worte als falsch empfinden, so ist das nicht richtig, denn wir können nicht nur beobachten, daß nichtverfaßte Worte wahr sind, sondern wir können auch beobachten, daß künstliche Worte eine wahre Bedeutung haben. Daher wird der logische Grund 'nicht von Menschen verfaßt', der die Autorität des Veda beweisen soll, von Dharmakīrti nicht anerkannt.

Des weiteren ist Invokation (*mantraḥ*) für einige Menschen eine Disziplin (*vratam*). Worte eines Gebetes verbinden sich mit einer besonderen Hoffnung. Aber die Reihenfolge der Silben ist a posteriori, wie früher argumentiert wurde, und der Effekt eines Gebetes ist für den Betenden unbestimmt.

Warum ist für euch der Autor des Vertrages nicht Prajāpati? Nur ein solches reales Produkt (d.h. ein Nichtewiges) kann die Hoffnung (*abhimatārthaḥ*) erfüllen. Aber ein ewiges Wesen wie der *sphoṭaḥ* oder die Verbindung (*sambandhaḥ*) von Worten und ihren Gegenständen, oder die Fähigkeiten (*yogyatā*),[19] die den Worten immanent sind, können keinen Effekt hervorrufen.[20]

§ 3e Abschluß der Kritik am brahmanischen Kanon

Hier wird der Akt des Redens selbst diskutiert. Die Silben werden von einem Sprecher seinem Willen entsprechend angeordnet, und der Hörer versteht die Silben in dieser Reihung nach und nach auf Grund seiner Erinnerung. Bei der Invokation spielt sich der gleiche Vorgang ab, aber die Kenner des Kanons (*tantravidaḥ*) sind durch ihre Intelligenz und Kraft dafür qualifiziert. Sie schufen Invokationen, weil sie Wohlergehen wünschten. Die Argumente der Verse 139-141 des *Ślokavārttika*, *Codanā*-Kapitel, daß mit menschlichem Geist verbundene Worte fehlerhaft seien, sind daher *śeṣavat-*

[16] ŚV *Śabdanityatādhikaraṇam* vv. 24-26.

[17] Vgl. Ernst Steinkellner, "Die Entwicklung des kṣaṇikatvānumānam bei Dharmakīrti", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 12-13, 1968/69, 361-377. Vgl. auch besonders § 3 des vorliegenden Beitrages.

[18] *vāsanā* in M v. 289 (G 286) bedeutet *karmavāsanā*. Vgl. auch *saṃsārasya hi karma kleśāś ca kāraṇaṃ tayoś ca kleśāḥ pradhānam*. (Sthiramati, *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣyam*, ed. Lévi, 38).

[19] Vgl. Nakamura *op.cit.* 221-223; Iyer *op.cit.* 204 (beide zit. in Anm. 12).

[20] Die beiden letzten Kritiken beziehen sich auf das Ende des Abschnittes 3c.

Argumente.[21] Menschen haben, entgegen der Thesen der Mīmāṃsakas, die Fähigkeit, Wohlergehen (*phalam*) zu erreichen. "Und warum anerkennst du keinen anderen Kenner der Wirklichkeit als Jaimini?", fragt Dharmakīrti (M v. 316c-317b; G 313).

Nicht jeder kann die metaphysischen Inhalte des Veda erfassen, weil er den Gegenstand der Sprache im Gebiet der Erfahrung transzendiert, kritisiert Dharmakīrti, ebenso wie Kant. Wenn der brahmanische Kanon von einem echten Weisen erstellt worden wäre (*yasya pramāṇasaṃvādivacanaṃ tatkṛtaṃ vacaḥ*), könnte eine derartige heilige Schrift nicht nichtverfaßt sein.

Die folgenden 13 Verse (M vv. 320c-333b; G 317-329) wurden von Dharmakīrti, zusammen mit drei anderen Versen, zur Erklärung der Nichtbeobachtung (*anupalabdhiḥ*) in den *Pramāṇaviniścaya* übernommen.[22] Aus der Übersetzung von Steinkellner können wir entnehmen, daß v. 32cd des *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, zweites Kapitel, der diesen Abschnitt einleitet, mit den Ideen von *Nyāyabindu* II 24,47 und 48 in Zusammenhang steht.

Dharmakīrti zeigt die Antinomie, die sich aus der Hingabe an den brahmanischen Kanon ergibt. Brahmanen selbst haben Leidenschaften (*rāgaḥ*) und können keine so intelligenten Menschen sein, daß sie die Bedeutung des Veda, die jenseits der Erkenntnis liegt, verstehen können. Worte jenseits der sozialen Vereinbarung, wie z.B. 'Paradies' (*svargaḥ*) oder 'Urvaśī', können von menschlichen Wesen nicht verstanden werden.

Ein alter Mīmāṃsaka stützt sich auf ein *śeṣavat*-Argument: "Feuer beseitigt Kälte" (*agnir himasya bheṣajam*).[23] Dieser Satz der *Taitirīya-Saṃhitā* 7,4,18 ist wahr. Andere Sätze sind ebenfalls wahr, 'weil sie Teile des Veda sind'. Dharmakīrti macht sich über diese *śeṣavat*-Argumente lustig, wie es bereits Dignāga im ersten Abschnitt des zweiten Kapitels des *Pramāṇasamuccaya* getan hat.[24]

Der brahmanische Kanon, sagt Dharmakīrti, hat in sich logische Widerprüche und berücksichtigt die beiden Arten von richtiger Erkenntnis (d.i. *pratyakṣam* und *anumānam*) nicht. Die Worte des brahmanischen Kanons beziehen sich nicht auf die wirklichen Dinge (*vastavaḥ*). Ein Kanon, der sich auf die wirklichen Dinge bezieht, muß auf jeden Fall von einem Seher (*pratipattā*) verfaßt worden sein. Diese Verse (M vv. 341c-342b; G 338) beziehen sich auf den buddhistischen Kanon. Der folgende und der letzte Vers müssen mit dem die Besprechung der *anupalabdhiḥ* einleitenden Vers im *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, zweites Kapitel, verglichen werden.[25]

Dies bedeutet, daß selbst Gegenstände, die dem Ort, der Zeit und dem Charakter nach entfernt sind und die wir nicht erkennen können, nicht als nicht-existent betrachtet werden können. Im letzten Abschnitt der *apoha*-Lehre erklärt Dharmakīrti, daß es einen Bereich der kanonischen Sprachobjekte gibt, und daß er sich nicht durch Nichtbeobachtung leugnen läßt. Diese Lehre ist die Einführung zum Abschnitt über den buddhistischen Kanon (§ 3).[26]

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[21] Vgl. ŚV *Codanā* 139-141. Dharmakīrti erwähnt in seinem Kommentar die Titel *Ḍākinī-tantraḥ* und *(Catur)bhaginī-tantraḥ*, die vielleicht mit dem *Ḍākinīsaṃvaratantrarājā* (Tōhoku No.406) und dem *Caturyoginīsampuṭatantraḥ* (Nr.376) identifiziert werden können. Dharmakīrti's Argument scheint eine Tendenz der 1. Hälfte des 7. Jahrhunderts zu vertreten.

[22] Zu den zitierten 13 Versen vgl. Steinkellner 1979: 74-77.

[23] Diese Sätze aus der Taittirīya-Saṃhitā 7.4.18 sind das *brahmodyam* des *aśvamedhaḥ* (vgl. A.B. Keith, *The Veda of the Black Yajus School entitled Taittirīya-Sanhitā*, Harvard 1914: 615: "The sun moveth alone. The moon is born again. Fire is the remedy for the cold. Earth is the great enveloper.").

[24] H. Kitagawa, *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū*, [Untersuchung der klassischen indischen Logik] Tōkyō 1965: 369-378.

[25] Steinkellner 1979: 61-79.

[26] Vgl. den Satz: *eṣā bauddhārthaviṣayā (vāg) matā* (M v. 211, G 208).

Abbreviations and Literature

G — *kārikās* des *Pramāṇavārttika* in: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Auto-commentary. Text and Critical Notes.* Roma 1960.

M — *kārikās* des *Pramāṇavārttika* in: Dalsukh Malvania, *Svārthānumāna-parichcheda by Dharmakīrti.* Varanasi 1959.

PVSVṬ — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (Karṇakagomin): *ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā ṭīkayā ca sahitam.* Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Kyoto 1982 [Reprint].

Steinkellner 1979 — Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Wien.

ŚV — *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with The Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra.* Ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī. Varanasi 1978.

THE INITIAL VERSES OF THE *PRAMĀṆASIDDHI* CHAPTER IN THE *PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA**

by

Christian Lindtner, Copenhagen

The initial verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* are possibly the most tricky in all of Dharmakīrti's extant works.

They run as follows:[1]

1. *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ /*
   avisaṃvādanaṃ śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt //
2. *vaktṛvyāpāraviṣayo yo 'rtho buddhau prakāśate /*
   prāmāṇyaṃ tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam //
3. *gṛhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ sāṃvṛtaṃ dhīpramāṇatā /*
   pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād dheyopādeyavastuni //
4. *viṣayākārabhedāc ca dhiyo 'dhigamabhedataḥ /*
   bhāvād evāsya tadbhāve svarūpasya svato gatiḥ //
5. *prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa śāstraṃ mohanivartanam /*
   ajñātārthaprakāśo vā svarūpādhigateḥ param //
6. *prāptaṃ sāmānyavijñānam avijñāte svalakṣaṇe /*
   yaj jñānam ity abhiprāyāt svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ //
7. *tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān abhūtavinivṛttaye /*
   bhūtoktiḥ sādhanāpekṣā tato yuktā pramāṇatā //

Whatever the difficulties, the topic, at least, is certain: The verses purport to define *pramāṇa*.[2] Not only the commentators differ in their interpretation (Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati on the one hand, Prajñākaragupta on the other).[3] Modern translators also differ, as will be seen by comparing the attempts of Nagatomi[4], Katsura[5], and, most recently, Dr. van Bijlert.[6] Likewise, if we ourselves try to look at these verses without too many preconceived notions, the syntax puzzles us again and again. We can hardly ever be quite sure where sentences begin and where they end. Sometimes Dharmakīrti is speaking, sometimes an opponent is speaking. And, finally, many of the terms used are vague or ambiguous. What is Dharmakīrti talking about anyhow?

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* Earlier versions of this paper were read in Harvard University (Dec. 1988), and in the University of British Columbia, Vancouver (April 1989). I wish to thank the audiences there for many valuable remarks.

[1] No significant variant readings have been transmitted, nor is there any reason to suspect any. In 1a, however, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati read *avisaṃvādijñānam* in one word. See Ernst Steinkellner, "Philological remarks on Śākyamati's Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā", in *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus, Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf*, ed. K. Bruhn and A. Wezler, Wiesbaden 1981: 290. Theoretically, but most unlikely, we could, likewise, read *yajjñānam* in 6c, and *tadvatpramāṇam* in 7a.

[2] Or more precisely, *pramāṇa*, and the Buddha as such a *pramāṇa*. Cf. Tilmann Vetter, *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika*, Wien 1984, and the review article of Eli Franco in *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 17, 1989, 81-99.

[3] For references see e.g. my "Apropos Dharmakīrti – Two new Works and a new Date", *Acta Orientalia* 41, 1980, 27-37, and van Bijlert 1989: ix-xviii.

[4] Masatoshi Nagatomi, *A Study of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika: An English Translation and Annotation of the Pramāṇavārttika, Book I*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 1957.

[5] Shoryu Katsura, "Dharmakīrti's Theory of Truth", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12/3, 1984, 215-236.

[6] van Bijlert 1989: 125. Cf. my review to appear in *Studies in Central and East Asian Religions* 2, 1989.

Why is all this? Is Dharmakīrti a blockhead, or is he trying to make a fool of his reader? Or how?

As I see it, Dharmakīrti is being deliberately ambiguous. We are, if I am not mistaken, dealing with a rather extraordinary case of philosophical punning (*śleṣa*), to which I can quote no direct parallels.

In other words, these verses not only c a n , but were in fact intended to be read in s e v e r a l equally meaningful ways.

Let me, to the extent time permits me to do so, briefly indicate some of these possible interpretations - equally meaningful - and, finally, suggest the "historical" and "personal" reasons that would have prompted Dharmakīrti to indulge in philosophical punning the way I find he does. There are at least three ways to go about this.

I. The first and perhaps most natural mode of interpretation is the one reflected by Devendrabuddhi and his commentator, Śākyamati, and, roughly, though with some reservations, by modern translators of these verses. It is more or less like this: *pramāṇa*, i.e. *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, is first defined as reliable (*avisaṃvādi*) cognition (*jñāna*), i.e. n o t as a m e a n s of cognition, but simply cognition as an act. Reliability is then defined as *arthakriyāsthiti*. (*sthiti*[7] has given modern translators some problems; thus Nagatomi suggests "invariability", Katsura "existence", and van Bijlert "constancy";[8] but actually *sthiti* is here most naturally taken as a metrical substitute for the usual *sāmarthya*, or *samarthana*, i.e. "capability"; sometimes Dharmakīrti also uses *-kṣama*.) Then Dharmakīrti adds that *śābdajñāna* also is valid for telling us not necessarily about the facts of life, but certainly for telling us what someone else has in mind.[9] - A cognition that is *sāṃvṛta*, however, is not valid because it really just repeats what we already know in advance. It would seem - also to judge from the corresponding context in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*[10], and Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*[11] - that *sāṃvṛta* is here more or less a synonym of *smārta*, what relates to memory. So recollection, or memory, does not have the status of *pramāṇa*.

Then Dharmakīrti goes on to stress that *jñāna* - he now uses the term *dhī* - is and must be a *pramāṇa*, valid cognition. He gives various reasons for this contention. His intention seems to be to exclude various other possible candidates for *pramāṇa*-status, such as senses, etc. - This brings us to the final part of this set of verses: *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ*, etc. Somehow these lines have to do with the definition of *avisaṃvādi/avisaṃvādana* above: We know that we know, but knowledge as such is no guarantee of its own reliability, or validity; only *vyavahāra* decides this issue. Only knowledge that works when we try it out in practice is reliable. So *theoria* is not enough, it has to go *cum praxi*.

This brings Dharmakīrti to the second definition of *pramāṇa*; it is also *ajñātārthaprakāśa*. This, then, means that *pramāṇa*, valid cognition, is defined not just as *avisaṃvādi*, reliable, but also as something that tells us something new. This definition obviously applies to *pratyakṣa* without any further conditions. But with regard to the other *pramāṇa*, i.e. *anumāna*, a restriction is deemed necessary. Strictly speaking *anumāna* does not impart any entirely new and fresh information. Only *pratyakṣa* does. Nevertheless, as long as perception is not active, *anumāna* may give us some reliable knowledge that may be new to us, but only to the extent that the *svalakṣaṇa*, the object of immediate experience, is beyond our direct perception for the moment being.

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[7] Not to be confounded with the definition of *sthiti* given e.g. in PVSV 71,28: *sthitir hi tasya svarūpāpracyutir eva*.

[8] Nagatomi (cited in note 4) p. 4, Katsura (cited in note 5) 1984: 219, van Bijlert 1989: 125.

[9] Cf. e.g. PVSV 107.

[10] PVin I 32-34 (= Tilmann Vetter, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam*, Wien 1966).

[11] Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya; from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1968: 24f. with notes.

Then Dharmakīrti concludes: The Buddha is, or rather s e r v e s a s , a *pramāṇa* of that sort. Or rather the Buddhist books - for who can consult the Lord in person - impart reliable knowledge not previously available to us.

This, then, is one fairly consistent and meaningful way of taking these verses.

II. But there is also another way. They can be taken as a polemic of debate on contemporary *pramāṇa*-ideas. The first verse may or may not refer to Siddhasena's remark, in the *Nyāyāvatāra*[12], that *prasiddhāni pramāṇāni vyavahāraś ca tatkṛtaḥ* (NA 2ab), i.e. *pramāṇa* is in need of no further definition. Dharmakīrti disagrees. Furthermore, the remark that *śābdajñāna* is not *arthatattvanibandhana* immediately recalls a text that Dharmakīrti (and Dignāga) often criticize elsewhere: *Vākyapadīya* , where I 13ab reads *arthapravṛtti-tattvānāṃ śabdā eva nibandhanam*. So much for Bhartṛhari! Moreover, the statement about *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ, prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa* is a reply to Kumārila's idea about cognition possessing *svataḥprāmāṇya*, i.e. that cognition enjoys self-validity. Certainly this is how Kumārila understood the verse as we can see from the oft-quoted couplets from his lost *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, written (here I agree with Frauwallner) as a reply to Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, i.e. *yathaiva prathamaṃ jñānaṃ tatsaṃvādam apekṣate*, etc.[13] Most likely several other sentences in these verses could be read as replies, or allusions to various other opponents of Dharmakīrti, Naiyāyikas, etc., if only their works were now available to us for identification.

III. There is also a third way of taking these verses. As will be recalled, Dharmakīrti not only accepts two *pramāṇas*, two sorts of valid cognition, but also two "levels" of *pramāṇa*, i.e. a *sāṃvyavahārika-* and a *pāramārthika-pramāṇa*.[14] The *locus classicus* for this theory is the final paragraph of the first chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. On the *sāṃvyavahārika*-level, if we may say so, the samsaric duality of *grāhya* and *grāhaka* is still active due to the power of the *vāsanās*, but on the higher *pāramārthika*-level there is, after *āśrayaparāvṛtti*, only the reality of non-dual cognition, i.e. the *dharmakāya*. These verses can also be read meaningfully to this effect. Such an interpretation is briefly hinted at by one of the old commentators, Prajñākaragupta, but not developed consistently by him.

The "double-level" interpretation would roughly give us the following picture. The lines from *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi* to *śāstraṃ mohanivartanam* would deal with the t w o empirical kinds of *pramāṇa* (ordinary *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*). The absolute, or *pāramārthika-pramāṇa* would start in 5c: *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*.

Let me explain briefly. To take the first half first: *pramāṇa* (note the singular!) only refers to *pratyakṣajñāna* and to *dhīpramāṇatā*. Unlike *anumāna* it is directly related to *arthakriyā* and established through *vyavahāra*. On the other hand *anumāna* is *sāṃvṛta*; it only deals with what it indirectly receives (through the power of the *vāsanās*, etc.) from *pratyakṣa*. As *śāstra, anumāna* does not give us first-hand experience of facts, but dispels any errors we may have about reality.

The second part, then, deals with non-dual cognition. It is a *prakāśa* of something *ajñāta*, unknown to us, i.e. *paramārtha*. Here *artha* stands for *paramārtha* (cf. such expressions as *arthataḥ* in the sense of *paramārthataḥ*; and note also *prakāśa*,[15] masc., not *prakāśanam* to go with *pramāṇam* in 1a; finally the

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[12] A. N. Upadhye (ed.), *Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra and other works*, Bombay 1971: 2. It could be argued that Siddhasena is later than Dharmakīrti (thus Steinkellner). I am not quite convinced, though.

[13] Erich Frauwallner, "Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 6, 1962, 78-90.

[14] Cf. my paper, "Marginalia to Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya I-II", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 28, 1984, 149-175. See also my paper (with Georges Dreyfus), "The Yogācāra Philosophy of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti", *Studies in Central and East Asian Religions* 2, 1989, 27-52.

[15] Compare the usage of *prakāśate* in PVin I 38 (non-dual cognition is said to be self-illuminating).

strongly adversative *vā*, often in Mahāyāna texts indicating the absolute as opposed to the relative point of view). It is a cognition that comes from *svalakṣaṇavicāra*, i.e. a Madhyamaka-sort of *eka-aneka* analysis of empirical reality (well-known from Dharmakīrti also)[16] in the sense that it is a *jñāna* occurring as *prāpta*, a *sāmānyavijñāna* ("universal cognition" - notice *vijñāna* here almost corresponds to *vijñapti* in the *Triṃśikā*!) after the *svarūpādhigatiḥ, avijñāte svalakṣaṇe*, when the empirical world of *sāṃvyavahārika-pramāṇa* is no longer in our awareness. In other words, when *grāhya-grāhaka* is gone.

When we read these verses in this fashion the concluding remark: *tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān* makes a lot of sense. As will be recalled, the *maṅgalaśloka* of the *Pramāṇavārttika* alludes to the *dharmakāya* of the Buddha. The Buddha (i.e. the Buddhist tradition and its scriptures, the Buddha himself not being around any more), then, is not just an authority on the level of *sāṃvyavahārika-pramāṇa*, everyday life, but also in the sense of his incorporating non-dual, or mystical cognition, or gnosis (cf. *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha* 1, etc.).[17] As such he serves as a *pramāṇa* in several ways. He is - as *pramāṇabhūta* - *hetu* as well as *phala*, as Dignāga once put it. (Let me just add that *-bhūta* ifc. where the first member is a substantive, usually has to be translated "serves as", or the like, not "is" or "has become" as modern translators often understand it.)[18]

There are no doubt more ways of understanding these tricky verses. This is but natural in view of the fact, as said, that it mostly is impossible to ascertain where sentences start and end. Moreover, several key-terms are vague, so vague, surely, as to be d e l i b e r a t e l y vague.

What I wished to show was, as said, that Dharmakīrti deliberately wrote these verses in such a way that they c o u l d and s h o u l d be read in several ways, all consistent and meaningful.

Finally I wish to address the question: why would Dharmakīrti want to commit himself to "philosophical punning", as it were?

There are, I think, two major reasons for this state of affairs. On the one hand a historical-philosophical, on the other a more personal.

When I say personal reason, what I have in mind is that Dharmakīrti was more than just a dry and abstract thinker. He was also a poet, and a good one at that. Several verses are ascribed to him in the anthologies. I certainly agree with my distinguished friend Mr. Ingalls, that some of these verses are authentic (personal communication). Dharmakīrti himself tells us that he likes *subhāṣitas*, neat or nice verses. He refers to Kālidāsa, etc.[19] One of these verses is worth quoting in this connection:

hāro 'yaṃ hariṇākṣīṇāṃ luṭhati stanamaṇḍale /
muktānām apy avastheyaṃ ke vayaṃ smarakiṃkarāḥ //[20]

As Mr. Ingalls says in his beautiful book of translations: "Punning verse: 'This necklace rolls about on the circle of women's breasts. If such is the condition of pearls [or, of liberated souls], who are we bondsmen of love (to refrain)?'."[21] In other words, we here have a nice case of *śleṣa* to the effect that the verse can be understood in a *laukika* as well in a not so *laukika* sense. But what is the point of using a *śleṣa*, or rather, a number of *śleṣas* in a p h i l o s o p h i c a l context? This is certainly most unusual.

To answer this question, I must briefly mention the second motive, the historical-philosophical background of Dharmakīrti. Tradition has it that Dharmakīrti was not only a student of logic, of course, but

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[16] E.g. PV I 87 etc.

[17] Ed. in E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 3, 1959 [83-164]: 140.

[18] Cf. my review of van Bijlert *op.cit.*

[19] PVSV 120, ref. to *Kumārasaṃbhava*, etc.

[20] See e.g. D.D. Kosambi and V.V. Gokhale (eds.), *The Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa compiled by Vidyākara*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1957: 87 (no. 479).

[21] Daniel H.H. Ingalls, *An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1965: 503.

also a student of the leading authority on Yogācāra in those days, namely Dharmapāla. T h e issue in Mahāyāna philosophy - I think we can say without exaggeration - was the controversy between Mādhyamika and Yogācāra.[22] It simply threatened to split Mahāyāna. Bhavya and Dharmapāla were the most outstanding spokesmen in this debate. A major issue was the problem of two truths. In his commentary on the final chapter of Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* Dharmapāla raises various philosophical problems that he sees in the works of Bhavya. I cannot here go into details, but only sum up, that after the controversy between Bhavya and Dharmapāla it had become exceedingly difficult to say something sensible, free from absurdities, about the relationship between the two truths. And still the distinction was as canonical as can be. It could not be abandoned. Dharmakīrti avoids facing the issue directly in his extant works.

What, then, does a philosopher who is also a poet, do when he has to cope with such a tricky issue, more an article of faith than of reason? He avails himself of a *śleṣa*! Obviously.

About the usage of punning in general it may be useful if I quote a few lines of Dr. Gerow: "Theoretically, too, the idea of a pun, in which two different meanings inhere in the same phonemic span, is an employment of language which transcends the character of language, at once demonstrating the limitations of non-poetic speech and using those limitations to another purpose. Punning in Sanskrit is not the weak-kneed and self-conscious crudity that it is in most Western languages. A pun involving only one word or a single idea is an object of indifference to the Sanskrit writer; it becomes interesting only when whole ideas and complicated concepts are d o u b l e - e n t e n d u s."[23]

With these word in mind we can now sum up. It is trivial to speak of the absolute in Mahāyāna as something that cannot be spoken of.[24] The Bhavya-Dharmapāla controversy had made it virtually impossible to speak sensibly and rationally about *paramārthasatya* and its relationship to *saṃvṛtisatya*. We note throughout Dharmakīrti (and Dignāga, for that matter) a basic reluctance to discuss the theory of two truths. Nevertheless, it was still a canonical doctrine that Mahāyāna simply could not discard.

So, again, what do you do when you are not only a Buddhist philosopher but also have an inclination for nice verses? You decide to deal with the issue by means of punning. In this fashion you can communicate something too difficult to communicate rationally, without, at the same time, getting yourself responsibly involved in the rational problems involved.

This is how I would advise that we read these tricky verses in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*.

Abbreviations and Literature

PV I — *Pramāṇavārttika* Chapter I: v. PVSV

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes.* Roma 1960.

van Bijlert 1989 — Vittorio A. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority*. Wien.

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[22] See my paper, "Bhavya's Critique of Yogācāra in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa", in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, ed. B. K. Matilal and R. D. Evans, Dordrecht 1986: 239-263.

[23] E. Gerow, *A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech*, The Hague 1971: 290.

[24] Again and again *tattva* is said to be *anabhilāpya, nirabhilāpya*, etc.

DHARMAKĪRTI AND THE UNIVERSALLY NEGATIVE INFERENCE

by

Bimal Matilal, Oxford

I. Let us use such terms as 'things', 'properties' or 'features' in their most general senses (and sometimes I shall use them interchangeably, which, of course, may go against the usual convention of the English language). Thus I will say that one infers a thing (i.e. the presence of that thing) from another thing, or a feature or another property. In all these cases the second item must be known to be present in a particular place. It is only then the inferer can make the inference. In the technical terminology of Indian logic we call the second item by various names (Sanskrit *liṅga*), the inferential mark, the indicator-reason, the reason or the inferential sign. The first item is called *sādhya* or *liṅgin*, inferable feature or property, or simply the inferable or even the major term (then of course we have to call the previous one the middle term).

The general theory of inference propounded by the early Nyāya and accepted with major or minor modification by almost all other schools, is roughly the following. The feature *a* can be the legitimate (inferential) mark of feature *b*, provided (1) *a* is present in a place or location where *b* is also present, and (2) *a* is present nowhere where *b* is not present. We have to add, of course, that (3) *a* is also present in the case under consideration (called *pakṣa* or the subject of the inference or the minor term) where we do not know yet whether *b* is present or not. These three conditions are generally called the triple condition (championed by the Buddhists), which legitimizes the inferential mark. In other words if I have seen *a* and *b* together in one or several places, but never seen *a* without *b* (but might have seen *b* without *a*) then I can infer *b* from *a*.

The relationship between *a* and *b* is variously called *vyāpti, pratibandha, niyama*, pervasion relation, concomitance, invariant relation. Our knowledge of this relation between *a* and *b* is generally derived from experience. What strengthens the inference or the passage of our knowledge of *a* to that of *b* (i.e., inference of *b*) is actually the second condition mentioned here, i.e., the fact that *a* is nowhere found without *b*. It seems that the fact that *a* is present in a location where *b* is present is redundant for the purpose. In fact all logicians in the West would only need this much to legitimise the inference in question. In the Indian tradition Dharmakīrti himself talked about this redundancy and formulated his own logic on the basis of this point. Diṅnāga, however, insisted that the first condition is also necessary (i.e. the fact that *a* is present in at least one place where *b* is present apart from the *pakṣa* itself). I have argued elsewhere that while Buddhist logic generally followed Dharmakīrti in its theory of inference, the Naiyāyikas beginning with Uddyatokara onwards unconsciously followed the model that was originally intended by Diṅnāga.[1]

Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* redescribed the threefold inference of the *Nyāyasūtra*s as *kevalānvayin* (universally positive inference), *kevalavyatirekin* (universally negative inference), *anvayavyatirekin* (inference based on both positive and negative examples). This is one of the alternative explanations of *trividha* ('three-fold') in the *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.5. Of these three the last one is the most commonly accepted form of inference: the hill has fire on it because there is smoke; the positive example is a kitchen and the negative example is a lake full of water. The other two forms of inference were not accepted by the Buddhists. Diṅnāga, in his system, could have accommodated (as he indirectly acknowledged in another context, *Pramāṇasamuccaya*) the first one i.e. the universally positive.

[1] See my Introduction in Matilal/Evans 1986: 12f.

However, the second one was explicitly declared by him as a wrong or inconclusive inference. It is included in what is called *asādhāraṇa*, the uniquely inconclusive inference. It occupies the fifth place in his wheel of reasons. It lacks both a positive example and a negative example. How can you infer that an individual *A* has a property *b* on the basis of its having a unique property *a* or *A*-ness where the second property is such that it does not exist (by definition) in any other individual except *A*. It could clearly be an arbitrary claim: the sound is eternal because it has soundness. For one can equally claim that sound is non-eternal for it has soundness. It is like saying 'John is good, because it is John'.

Of the two valid inferences in Diṅnāga's "wheel" of nine reasons, one is: "Sound is impermanent, for it is a product" and the other is: "Sound is impermanent, for it is made by human effort". Here the first type can be easily assimilated into a *kevalānvayin* (universally positive) form. For if we accept the Buddhist metaphysics, there is nothing that is neither impermanent nor a product. Hence just as in the case of a 'universally positive' form of inference, an example where both the inferable feature (knowability) and the inferential mark (namability) are a b s e n t , is nowhere to be found, similarly, in Buddhist parlance, we cannot find an example (a non-fictional one) where both impermanence and being a product are absent. (Such an example in Buddhism has to be a fictional entity.) There is, of course, one exegetical problem which can be explained with a little ingenuity (I owe it to Professor M. Hattori). One of the three necessary conditions says that the mark should be absent from any place which lacks the inferable. But if there is no such place in actuality, the condition seems to be automatically fulfilled. Hence the problem of exegesis is avoided in Buddhism (*vipakṣe nāsti* → *vipakṣo nāsti*; the later is included in the former. According to Hattori, this could have been Diṅnāga's explanation.)

A major problem is created in this theory of inference, however, by the notion of *kevalavyatirekin*, 'universally negative' form of inference. An example is: "The earth (all solid substances) is nothing but earth because it has smell" or "An equilateral triangle is equiangular because it is equilateral" or "A triangle is nothing but a triangle because it is a plane figure bounded by three sides". All these are correct forms of inference, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to declare them as legitimate following the above theory of inference. For, one condition in the above theory is that we find an example where the inferential mark, *a*, and the inferable, *b*, must be present together. But such an example cannot be found in these cases outside the actual inferable cases, i.e., the *pakṣa*. Hence, such correct inferences would not be covered by the above theory of the triple condition: this led the Buddhist to doubt the correctness of the Naiyāyika's defence of the 'universal negative' forms of inference.

Let us introduce three abbreviations for the three types of inference '± E' for *anvayavyatirekin* (= 'positive-negative'), '+ E' for *kevalānvayin* (= 'universally positive') and '- E' for *kevalavyatirekin* (= 'universally negative'). The problem arises with the last-named: '- E'. Read '± E' as 'an inference where both examples are available - one (at least) illustrating togetherness of *a* and *b* (*hetu* and *sādhya*), and the other where both are absent, and further none illustrating presence of *a* along with absence of *b*. Similarly '+ E' is an inference where all examples illustrate presence of both *a* and *b* (there being no case where *b* is absent), and '- E' is an inference where no examples illustrate absence of *b* along with the presence of *a* (i.e. in all examples, both *b* and *a* are jointly absent). (By "all" in this case, I mean any example which excludes the *pakṣa* or the location or the actual case under consideration.)

The Buddhist (Dharmakīrti) rightly objects to '- E' as follows. What can give certainty to the conclusion of the following inference?

Something has *b*
because it has *a*
and nowhere there is an *a* where no *b* is observed.

For example, if mangoes are never seen in any tree where mango-blossoms do not grow, could we then infer without doubt that that tree with mango-blossoms must have mangoes later on? This is

uncertain because bad weather may destroy the blossoms, as it often does. (It should be noted, however, that Dharmakīrti, perhaps, took *śeṣavat* to mean inference from 'cause to effect', but his criticism is general and thus applicable to the *kevalavyatirekin* also.) Dharmakīrti's own example is: *dehād rāgānumānavat* (PV I 11). It is usually seen that the embodied existence of a (human) being is the causal factor of such qualities as attachment, love, hatred, etc. But our inference of such attachment etc. from the observation of the body will not be correct or (absolutely) certain. (As I have noted elsewhere, certitude is the goal of Diṅnāga's theory of inference.[2]) For example when an Arhat or a Buddhist saint regularly practices different types of meditation to get rid of such qualities as attachment, our inference in the above manner will fail.

Dharmakīrti sums up his argument in the next three verses, PV I 12-14:

> Since our teacher (Diṅnāga) has said: Mere non-observation of the reason in the example where *sādhya* is absent delivers a pseudo-reason, not a proper cognition of reason, as in the case of a t t a c h m e n t in the body; we conclude that invariable concomitance (between *sādhya* and *hetu*) cannot be established simply on the basis of non-observation. For, deviation is possible just as one grain of rice may by chance remain uncooked in a rice-cooking pot. Hence our teacher has illustrated the *śeṣavat* (universally negative) inference as a doubtful case because here simple non-observation of the reason is taken to be proving the correctness of the inference.[3]

Kumārila has also indirectly supported such an argument:

> If one may have one hundredth part of a doubt about lack of concomitance how can the reason have the power to prove the correctness of the inference [quoted in *Nyāyakusumañjali* (Udayana) Ch. III v. 7, and ascribed to Kumārila, but untraceable in *Ślokavārttika*].

It is obvious that we are here closely concerned with the most vexed problem of logic - the problem of defending induction. It is generally agreed that the problem is probably insoluble. Or it could be defended only probabilistically. If anyone claims more certainty regarding induction, then he, as John Mackie has put it, "risks the suspicion of being mildly insane".[4] We are of course not concerned here with the problem of induction as a whole. Nor are we concerned with the defense of induction here. But taking induction here as the problem of generalisation or extrapolation alone, we can at least defend it along with Mackie, by making use of what has been called 'the inverse probability argument' (Mackie [cited in note 4] 1985: 159). We are however concerned here, as is clear from above, with a different set of problems - problems that bothered more the classical Indian philosophers than their Western counterparts - our main problem therefore is to see how the Buddhist does not accept the 'universally negative' as a correct form of inference not simply because it cannot give certainty but also because it suffers from the fault of tautology and redundancy in the qualifications that form part of the inferable property (*sādhya*). And we should also investigate why the Naiyāyikas, while they are well aware of these faults, still accept the 'universally negative' inference.

II. Although the two types of inferences, '+ E' and '- E', seem to be quite different from each other, there is a line of agreement between them. They may even be said to be validated by a similar principle. The invariable concomitance of *a* (*hetu*) with *b* (*sādhya*) is proven in the first case, '+ E', by the supporting example where both *a* and *b* exist together and sometimes it can be a part of the *pakṣa* ("a cloth [or everything] is also nameable because it is knowable"). Similarly, the same relation

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[2] See Matilal/Evans 1986: 1-12.

[3] Note the rice-cooking example takes another interpretation of *śeṣavat* into account.

[4] John Mackie, *Logic and Knowledge*, Vol. I, Oxford 1985: 159f.

between *a* and *b* in the case of the second type of inference, '- E', is supported by a positive example where *a* and *b* may exist together and this example h a s t o b e a part of the *pakṣa*. This may be the reason why some Buddhist philosophers would not distinguish between the two types. In fact, if, as Dharmakīrti once emphatically claimed, citation of supporting examples is not an essential part of the sophisticated formulation of the inference then the distinction between '+ E' and '- E' does not seem to be important (PV I 27).

The later Naiyāyikas explained '- E' types of inference more as illustrative of 'definitional sentences' (*lakṣaṇa-vākya*). Hence the typical example was given as:

Earth is different from what is not earth, because it has earth universals (or, because it has smell).

A definitional sentence is something like this: a block of stone is a piece of earth (an earthly substance). One may ask "since 'different from what is not earth' is equivalent to 'a piece of earth', why do we not say, 'a piece of earth is a piece of earth' etc..?" This is true. But the Naiyāyika's conclusion of an inference is a piece of knowledge, and a piece of knowledge must have the 'novelty' element such that a tautologous sentence does not represent knowledge. "*A* is *A*" is not a piece of knowledge according to them. (It was obvious that they were not concerned with such *a priori* knowledge.) Hence, to avoid this quandary, the Naiyāyikas formulate the said inference as:

"*A* is different from whatever is not *A*, because . . .".

Although "*A* is *A*" and "*A* is different from whatever is not *A*" both mean the same thing, that is, they imply each other, the second expression, nevertheless, represents some novelty in the predicate (for it involves awareness of double negation and other objects). Hence the '- E' inference is formulated in this manner:

"*A* is different from whatever is not *A*, because it has *a*"

where the definition sentence is: "Each *A* has *a* (by definition)". The Buddhist opponent faults this inference because it has redundant qualifiers in the *sādhya*.

We face now at least two problems. The first concerns the definition of a *sapakṣa* 'positive example'. An example (which is not to be included in the *pakṣa*) is a *sapakṣa* if it has *b* (= *sādhya*) in it. This is in accord with one view. But according to another view, an example is to be called a *sapakṣa* if *b* (= *sādhya*) is known to be present there. If we accept the above definition of the '- E' inference, then the second definition of *sapakṣa* given here should be taken into account; otherwise the threefold classification of inference for Nyāya would run into problems. Any piece of earth (solid substance) may be known to be different from water, air etc. But that it is different from the rest of the things in the whole universe (from the other thirteen categories or *padārtha*s: eight substances plus five other *padārtha*s or categories in the Vaiśeṣika scheme of categories) may not be known for certain. Therefore, on this view, we would not have any example that would be known to have the *sādhya* (= *b*) in it. If, on the other hand, we accept the first definition of *sapakṣa*, then when we take one piece of stone as our *pakṣa* (i.e., we want to establish that a piece of stone is a piece of stone, not different from earth) then any other piece of earth could be its *sapakṣa*. In that case the alleged inference will not fall under the category of *kevalavyatirekin* ('universally negative') inference as defined here. (To wit: '- E' is an inference where there is no *sapakṣa*.) Part of the second problem has already been mentioned. Our knowledge of the concomitance between *a* and *b* has to depend here upon only the absence of any (knowledge of) counter-example (an example where *a* is present but *b* is not). It is thus very close to the example of a pseudo-reason (*hetvābhāsa*) called *asādhāraṇa anaikāntika* 'uniquely inconclusive'. I have already indicated briefly how Dharmakīrti has argued that simple non-observation of counter-example does not validate the conclusion, i.e., does not make the conclusion a piece of knowledge or a certainty. To repeat the example:

'Sound is eternal because it is audible.' or

'Sound is eternal because it has soundness.'

The Naiyāyikas held two different views about the nature of the 'uniquely inconclusive' pseudo-reason. One is said to be the view of the older Naiyāyikas and the other the view of the later Naiyāyikas.

The old Naiyāyikas call a reason *a* the 'uniquely inconclusive pseudo-reason' provided the reason *a* is found to be non-concurrent with *b* (= *sādhya*) (e.g. soundness is not concurrent with a non-eternal thing, say, a pot). Co-occurrence of *a* (= *hetu*) with *b* (= *sādhya*) is an essential part of the definition of what we call *vyāpti* 'invariable concomitance'. Now in this case of pseudo-reason, this part of the supporting concomitance is violated, and hence it is a pseudo-reason.

The later Naiyāyikas define the same type of pseudo-reason as one where the alleged reason, *a*, is absent from both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa* (where *sapakṣa* = examples where *b* is present, and *vipakṣa* = examples where *b* is absent). In this case, however, a correct reason, the 'universally negative', will be very similar to an incorrect (unsound) reason (a pseudo-reason), the one that is called the 'uniquely inconclusive'. For instance, in the '- E' inference, "Earth is different from what is not earth, for it has earth-hood", not only there is no *sapakṣa* (for any piece of earth, that is different from what is non-earth is part of the *pakṣa*, i.e. the case under consideration for the inference in question), but also there are *vipakṣa*s (examples, which are non-earth) where the alleged reason, earth-hood, does not exist. Since 'absence of any *sapakṣa*' may be entailed by, in the above manner, 'absence of the reason from the *sapakṣa*', we may say that the reason is absent from both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Thus, how are we to distinguish between the universally negative reason and the uniquely inconclusive reason (a pseudo-reason)?

The ancient Naiyāyikas point out to the lack of co-occurrence of *a* (the *hetu*) and *b* (the *sādhya*) as the main fault of the pseudo-reason, i.e. of the 'uniquely inconclusive' reason, for it invalidates part of the invariable concomitance relation. But the later Naiyāyikas take a different line here. A thing (an example) that is non-earth, i.e., a *vipakṣa*, need not bother us. But a *sapakṣa*, an example that is a piece of earth here, is generally a member of the class of *pakṣa*, or a part of the *pakṣa*. Now can we use such a case as a supporting positive example to strengthen the concomitance relation? Ordinarily we cannot do such things on this theory, because it considers tautology and redundancy in the predicate expressions as unacceptable faults. Besides the criticism of Dharmakīrti as well as other Naiyāyikas persuaded the later Naiyāyikas to admit that a merely negative case cannot strengthen the concomitance relation enough to make the conclusion a certainty. Hence the following suggestion was accepted as adequate.

The *pakṣa* in most such cases of inference is a class term which has many individual members. (Or, it may be a mass term, e.g., water, earth, which has many small parts.) Now, if we believe in the argument that a positive example is necessary to support the Nyāya theory of inference, then a member of the *pakṣa*-class (a piece of stone from Earth) may be chosen as the relevant example. Thus, we will have a stronger positive support for the invariable concomitance relation which will validate the inference under consideration.

There is a further difference of opinion among the later Naiyāyikas which underlines another subtlety here. Some say that just as the example (positive) illustrating the co-occurrence of *a* and *b* strengthens the positive concomitance relation, the example illustrating the co-occurrence of the absences of *a* and *b* strengthens the negative side of the same concomitance relation. But others hold that the positive concomitance relation is the most useful one on this theory of inference, and the example (negative) illustrating the absences *a* and *b* does not support the 'negative side' of the concomitance, but it indirectly supports the accurate positive version of the concomitance relation and it is the latter version which has the adequate power to validate the conclusion of the inference concerned. For us there is no special preference for either of these two views. But it seems that the latter view has more plausibility and hence receives more support.

We may now face the other important question. The Buddhist, as I have already noted, does not accept the soundness of the 'universally negative' inference. It has also been pointed out that under Dharmakīrti's theory of inference the distinction between the 'universally positive' and the 'universally negative' almost collapses. After Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti mainly emphasises upon the threefold inference-yielding relations: *svabhāva* (natural presence), *kārya* (causal relation), and *anupalabdhi* (non-observation). They generally cover all types of sound inferences. In fact, Dharmakīrti goes so far as to say that the citation of the supporting example (positive or negative) is not very important as long as the inference-yielding relations are well understood by the other (opponent) side. Citation of the reason would be enough. Therefore in the Buddhist theory we do not face the problems that we have faced in the Nyāya theory.

III. There is another post-Dharmakīrti development in the Buddhist logical theory, which squarely meets the issue that we have discussed here. This is the distinction of concomitance into *antarvyāpti* (internal concomitance) and *bahirvyāpti* (external concomitance), although this division was not originally meant to avoid the issue of the 'universally negative' inference.[5]

The relation of concomitance between *a* and *b* is usually known to us from our observation of examples. Both the Nyāya and the Buddhist agree in this regard. The examples where *a* (the *hetu*) coexists with *b* (the *sādhya*) are called *sapakṣa*. The examples where they are both absent are called *vipakṣa*. All these examples should not usually form any part of the *pakṣa*. However, where *sapakṣa* forms a part of the *pakṣa*, it is called a case of *antarvyāpti*, internal concomitance. But where the *sapakṣa* example does not form a part of the *pakṣa* itself (as in the case of fire and smoke where the kitchen is the example and the hill is the *pakṣa*) we have a case of *bahirvyāpti*, 'external concomitance'.

Regarding the origin of the distinction between 'external' and 'internal' concomitance, there is a difference of opinion among scholars. Some say that it originated in the Jain tradition. But this cannot be conclusively established. The later Buddhists accepted it and Ratnākaraśānti wrote a short tract on this issue. It is however, quite clear from what I have said above that Dharmakīrti himself was to some extent responsible for the origin of this idea. Here I agree with E. Steinkellner.[6]

If we wish to infer that everything is momentary because everything exists, then we would not be able to find an example which is outside the *pakṣa*, i.e. 'everything'. In such cases, our concomitance can be supported by an internal example. Of course, there are other ways of getting around this difficulty, and the Buddhist logicians, those who rejected 'internal' concomitance, never got tired of pointing them out. My point in this paper, however, is different. I have tried to show that sometimes even the Naiyāyikas accepted *sapakṣa* examples from the domain of the *pakṣa*. They, however, redefined their notion of *sapakṣa* to fit their theory of inference. Those later Naiyāyikas, who were emphatic about the role of the positive example in supporting the concomitance relation, unconsciously, perhaps, followed the Buddhist way in accepting part of the *pakṣa* as a *sapakṣa* example supporting the concomitance relation. The great Naiyāyika Udayana has given an elaborate defence of the theory of *kevalavyatirekin* 'the universally negative inference' in his well-known book *Kiraṇāvalī*. I shall give only a brief account of it here.

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[5] See Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya, "Some Thoughts on *Antarvyāpti, Bahirvyāpti*, and *Trairūpya*", in Matilal/Evans 1986, 89-105.

[6] Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Wien 1967.

IV. In *Kiraṇāvalī*, according to Udayana, the Buddhist opponent poses the following question: what is the use of *lakṣaṇa* or definition? Udayana answers: A definition is nothing but the special reason (*hetu*) of what is called the 'universally negative' inference (Kir 29). Udayana quotes here most probably Śrīdhara (whom he calls reverend *ācārya* 'teacher'), as follows "the purpose of a definition is to differentiate the object from its similar and dissimilar classes". Here a serious objection is raised by the Buddhist. Both sides admit that since tautology does not constitute knowledge, the inferable property and the *pakṣa* cannot be expressed by the same expression. They also admit that a general notion of the inferable property should be available to both arguers, the proponent and the opponent, before the inference is formulated. This means that if some unfamiliar or unknown element is used as the inferable property or as part of its qualifications, then there will arise the fault which will invalidate the inference. Technically, this fault is called *aprasiddha-sādhyaka* ('having an unknown inferable property'), or in the second case *aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇatā* ('the fault of unestablished or unknown qualifications').

Now the Buddhist argues that the inferable property in the universally negative, 'different from non-earth', suffers from the second defect. For, if there is no *sapakṣa* or an example where such an inferable property is present, the prior notion of the inferable property would remain unestablished. Udayana gives a sophisticated answer to this rather technically formulated question. The notion of the inferable property may be first well-established and then be connected, by the inference, to the *pakṣa* or, the actual case under consideration. It is not necessary that, that the property is connected with the *pakṣa* should be established prior to the inference in question here.

The Buddhist asks a further question: Let us accept that every bit of earth, such as a pot, is different from non-earth, and this is established perceptually. Hence it may be all right to use such a pot as the supporting positive example and then infer that the earthly atoms are different from non-earth etc. This will, of course, mean that we do not need the category of inference called the universally negative. Thus the Buddhist question is: 'why accept the universally negative?' Udayana answers with a touch of irony: "Save your friendly advice, for the definition of universally negative can be made faultless" (Kir 29). Thus, the Naiyāyikas regard the category of the universally negative inference as an important one and are reluctant to give it up for it helps us to understand the necessity as well as the nature of definition (*lakṣaṇa*) in philosophy through logic. This type of inference is the other side of the same coin, so to say, the coin of definition or *lakṣaṇa*.[7]

The philosophical method in India is heavily dependent upon what they call *pramāṇa*, the 'means of knowing or establishing' an object or a theory.[8] What they call *lakṣaṇa* or definition forms also an essential part of this method. Now the opponent, says Udayana, wants to retain the method of definition as an acceptable device while rejecting the *pramāṇa* derived from it, that is called, 'the universally negative' inference. Udayana says that this type of opponent is like such person or persons as would condemn drinking while they would go on drinking themselves (Kir 30).

V. An essential part of the theory of inference is obviously the knowledge of concomitance or invariance between the inferable property, *b*, the *sādhya*, and the reason, *a*, the *hetu*. Our knowledge of such invariances is derived, rightly or wrongly, from our observation of such examples illustrating the togetherness of *a* and *b*. We call them *sapakṣa*. But the theory of examples runs into trouble in the case of the universally negative inference. The old *Nyāyasūtra* author insisted upon the citation of the example to justify or support the reason, to show that there is a relation of concomitance or

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[7] See Bimal K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, Delhi 1985: 176-209.

[8] Bimal K. Matilal, *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*, Oxford 1986.

invariance backing the reason.

A question arises regarding how many steps we need in what is called *parārthānumāna* or demonstration to others of the entire process of inference one makes within oneself. A demonstration is something like the verbal articulation of the process of inference. The Naiyāyikas assert that there should be five steps in this verbal articulation of the inference, where the fifth step would re-state the thesis proven by the reason backed by the required invariance relation. The Buddhist on the other hand would need only three steps - statement of the thesis, of the reason and also of the example. Praśastapāda made a very significant comment in his *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, while he was explaining the five-step verbal articulation of the *nyāya* demonstration. The last step is a re-statement of the thesis and hence the opponent obviously points out that it is redundant to take the fifth step for the thesis has already been stated and that it is proven by the adequate reason. The thesis is stated in the first step and the reason in the second step. Hence, says Praśastapāda, if we depend upon what is presented not simply v e r b a l l y but also by implication as well as the s i g n i f i c a n c e of what is presented verbally (cf. *arthāt*), then one can only state the first two steps and satisfy the other (opponent) side. We quote (*Praśastapādabhaṣya* [in Kir] 241):

> "Therefore, after stating the thesis, one should verbally articulate only the reason. For the intelligent people will be reminded of the invariance based upon prior observation of co-presence and the lack of it (in suitable examples), and therefore they will acknowledge the thesis as established. This verbal articulation should end here (with the statement of reason)."

This was apparently a challenge to the Buddhist to bring down, the number of steps in the argument from three to the first two: the thesis and the reason. It is interesting that Dharmakīrti boldly accepted the challenge and said:

> "For the intelligent people only the reasons would be stated" (PV I 27)

There may be a chronological problem here. Praśastapāda assimilated all the logical developments of Diṅnāga into his restatement of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of logic. He is therefore considered to be a junior contemporary of Diṅnāga. But it is believed by some that he preceded Dharmakīrti. I accept this chronology, and my above comment is based upon the truth of such chronology. If however it can be shown that Dharmakīrti preceded Praśastapāda then the above statement has to be modified accordingly. However, my argument here is not concerned with this issue and the chronological controversy would not upset anything else I have said here. Lastly, it is significant to note that Udayana quotes the relevant line of Dharmakīrti while he comments on this particular passage of Praśastapāda (Kir 241).

Abbreviations and Literature

Kir	*Kiraṇāvalī: Praśastapādabhāṣyam With the Commentary Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya*. Ed. Jitendra S. Jetly. Baroda 1971.
Matilal/Evans 1986	Bimal K. Matilal & Robert D. Evans (eds.), *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*. Dordrecht etc.
PV I	*Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter I: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*. Roma 1960.

A BRIEF REFERENCE TO *APOHA* THEORY IN THE SECTION ON *PARALOKASIDDHI* IN *PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA* II

by

Tabe E. Meindersma, Leiden

In dealing with the *paralokasiddhi* section of *Pramāṇavārttika* II (PV II 34-119) one is struck by an elaboration (vv. 88-102) in an otherwise quite consistent treatment of *paralokasiddhi*. Searching in the secondary literature for references regarding these verses I did not find anything. In this study these verses, and in particular those contained in the reference to *apoha* theory (vv. 92-102), are closely examined and an attempt is made to discover their bearing - if any - on the *paralokasiddhi* section in which they are incorporated.

By way of orientation the context in which these verses are placed in this *paralokasiddhi* will be briefly described. For Dharmakīrti, considerations on *paralokasiddhi* are compelling in connection with the question whether the Buddha can be completely compassionate. It is stated (v. 34) that for the Buddha this compassion is the way to become a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), this compassion being brought about by continuous practice in many lives. The possibility of a succession of lives and consequently of rebirth is denied by the opponent; this sparks off a discussion on this topic. The way Dharmakīrti furnishes proof of rebirth consists in explaining that cognition continues over many lives and is essentially independent of the body. To this end the relation between cognition and body etc. is discussed (vv. 35-83). Thereupon it is shown that the body is not a material cause of cognition (vv. 84-111). In confrontation with the Vaiśeṣikas, or more probably materialists using Vaiśeṣika arguments, two aspects of these arguments are investigated: the body as a whole (vv. 84-102) and the body as an accumulation of atoms (vv. 103-111). The first supposition, viz. that the body is a whole, is refuted by Dharmakīrti (vv. 84-87); thereafter - without any longer considering the body - he starts a general discussion on "wholes" (*avayavin*) as applied in the Vaiśeṣika theory; he denies their existence, since in his opinion these "wholes" cannot interact with each other (vv. 88-91). The opponent then proposes the possibility of "connection" (*saṃyoga*) of separate things (v. 89). This and some other Vaiśeṣika (sub)categories are rejected (vv. 89-91). Then the question arises, how notions (such as "number"), if these are denied real existence, still can be used in thinking and speaking. This is reason for a short reference to the *apoha* theory (vv. 92-102). Knowledge and words have conceptual objects which are created by separating things from the dissimilar (*apoha*). Dharmakīrti states that in daily life too this method is applied in thinking and speaking (v. 92). In forming such conceptual objects, one is not - as is assumed by the opponent - making attributions to primary things (vv. 93-94). Thereafter Dharmakīrti dilates upon the practical use of words. It is possible to express in words situations which are conflicting with one's, i.e. with the opponent's, (metaphysical) views, for instance ascribing qualities to things already having one or more qualities, or making use of "not really existing" properties (such as "non-action"). The very aim in these cases is to distinguish a particular quality from the other qualities in a predicated thing (vv. 95-97). Also one can modify expressions; either for making known only one quality or for referring to all qualities of a thing. The way this is done is arrived at by agreement (vv. 98-99). Finally a thing can be designated by using a "collection" (*samudāya*) word (vv. 100-102).

It does not become fully evident why Dharmakīrti follows this line of argument. On and off, he adds arguments although he has already proved his case. His refutation of the view that the body is a "whole" (vv. 84-87) seems quite satisfactory, and the following general discussion on "wholes" (*avayavin*) (vv. 88-91) therefore is merely an addition. The subsequent attack on "connection"

(*saṃyoga*) may be inevitable, but one fails to see why it then is necessary for him to extend his criticism to other Vaiśeṣika (sub)categories (v. 91). Also the need to hold forth quite extensively upon the practical use of words and notions may be questioned (especially the subcategory of "number" (*saṃkhyā*) is considered). Hence he is obliged to touch on the *apoha* theory.

In the reference to *apoha* theory (vv. 92-102) we find some remarkable points based on this theory. The *apoha* theory itself is also briefly summed up: the forming of conceptual objects by conceptualization through exclusion of the dissimilar (v. 92 a-c1, v. 96b).[1] The statements are very concise; evidently it is taken for granted that the reader is acquainted with the theory, which is described extensively in PV I 40-185 (= 42-187); PVSV 24,18-93,5; more especially in PV I 41 (= 43): separate "classes" (*jāti*) based on that from which in each case the [dissimilar] things are excluded, are conceptualized; [which "classes"] are imbued with specificities of those [real particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*)].[2]

Then follow the points based on the *apoha* theory: In general one conceptualizes; people speak about qualities added to things already having qualities (*guṇādiṣv iva*) (which possibility is denied by the Vaiśeṣikas) and people ascribe qualities to things which have disappeared or not yet arisen (*naṣṭājāteṣu vā yathā*) (v. 92c1,d). Even if the added quality is not caused by a separate thing (as it should be in the Vaiśeṣika view) words relating to "numbers etc." in [things having qualities] such as "white" are no synonyms (v. 95a-c). Such words evidently have practical utility.[3] The argumentation on this general use of concepts I could not trace in *Pramāṇavārttika* I. It might seem that in the last mentioned case (v. 95a-c) an opponent is assumed who considers a really existing thing (*vastu*; in this context: *svalakṣaṇa*) for which, if it could be made manifest in word and thought, one word would be sufficient; more words regarding this thing being synonyms (PV I 51 (= 53)).[4] Dharmakīrti however does in proposing his *apoha* theory, not depart from *svalakṣaṇa*, which is known through perception (*pratyakṣa*), but from concepts.

Conceptual objects are not created by attribution (*upacāra*). If in the above mentioned cases - viz. adding qualities to things already having qualities, and ascribing qualities to things which have disappeared etc. - these qualities were merely attributed, then there would be no reason why attribution should not occur in all cases. This universal occurrence is rejected by the opponent keeping to a division of primary and secondary designations. Dharmakīrti states that this division cannot be substantiated (vv. 93-94).[5] I could not find such a consideration regarding the *apoha* theory in

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[1] *śabdajñāne vikalpena vastubhedānusāriṇā / . . . kalpyārthe . . .* PV II 92a-c1
bhinno ['rtho] vyāvṛttibhedataḥ / PV II 96b
Although there is a clear reference to the *apoha* theory, the text is not complete on this point. Instead of "separation (or difference) from a really existing thing" (*vastubheda*) one would have expected "separation from the dissimilar". It is true that the discussion with the opponent starts from really existing things: Dharmakīrti states that one does not deal with real, but rather with conceptualized objects. This discussion is emphasized especially by Prajñākaragupta, although instead of *vastu* the word *arthatattva* is used: *tato nārthatattvaṃ pratiṣṭhāṃ labhate* (PVBh 95,27f.[= *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna 1953]); *tataḥ parikalpitasyaiva bhedo nārthatattvasya* (PVBh 95,28f.); *tato 'py arthatattvavyavasthāpanāyām anavasthā* (PVBh 95,30). That one is nevertheless dealing with the *apoha* theory may be evident from "*vyāvṛttibhedataḥ*" in v. 96b. The commentaries add to the confusion: Manorathanandin: *vastuno bhedo vijātīyād vyāvṛttis* (*Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* 44,20 [= *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin*, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna 1938-1940]; the last mentioned giving additional trouble by putting an equal sign in between *vastuno bhedo* and *vijātīyād vyāvṛttis*); Prajñākaragupta: *vastubhedānusarī . . . vyāvṛttir atathābhūtāt* (PVBh 95,32). Apparently one should read that there is *vastuno bhedo* (as a result) as well as *vijātīyād vyāvṛttis* (as a procedure).

[2] *tasmād yato yato 'rthānāṃ vyāvṛttis tannibandhanaḥ / jātibhedāḥ prakalpyante tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ //* PV I 41 (= 43). For translation cf. also Vittorio A. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority*, Wien 1989: 135.

[3] *guṇādiṣv iva . . . naṣṭājāteṣu vā yathā //* PV II 92c1-d
anarthāntarahetutve 'py aparyāyaḥ sitādiṣu / saṃkhyādiyoginaḥ śabdās . . . PV II 95a-c

[4] *anyathaikena śabdena vyāpta ekatra vastuni / buddhyā vā nānyaviṣaya iti paryāyatā bhavet //* PV I 51 (= 53)

[5] *mato yady upacāro 'tra sa iṣṭo yannibandhanaḥ / sa eva sarvabhāveṣu hetuḥ kiṃ neṣyate tayoḥ //*

Pramāṇavārttika I.

Thereafter, once the *apoha* theory is accepted, Dharmakīrti shows some applications of words. Words can be used for things which (also in the opinion of the opponent) have no substantiality, such as "non-action" (*akarman*) and "non-substance" (*adravya*) (v. 96cd).[6] In the *apoha* section of *Pramāṇavārttika* I there is no reference to this point; perhaps there is some link with conceptual objects along the lines of "something which is not existing" (*abhāvāśraya*) (PV I 205 (= 207)).[7] Further (PV III 7cd) Dharmakīrti states that "something which is not existing" (*abhāva*) is a real object, since in grasping it, it can be known.[8]

Words can refer either to one or to all qualities of a predicated thing depending on the way one has agreed to use words. In the latter case the quality-bearer itself is indicated (vv. 98-99).[9] This is a particularisation of the idea that one can use words at will for expressing distinct meanings, as encountered in PV IV 191c-193 (PVSV 2,7-10 gives the same point in short). At this place the use of the (not-mentioned) word *eva* is intended to distinguish between Caitra and Pārtha as archers.[10] More in particular, an application of words similar to that in vv. 98-99 is to be found in PVSV 33,9ff.; 33,12ff. Here too is dealt with someone who wishes to know (*jijñāsate, jñātum icchati*); and also the fact is stressed that words are used according convention (*-saṃketena*).[11] Later on, viz. PVSV 36,5, it is mentioned that the genitive case may be instrumental[12]; as happens in the example of v. 98d : *yogo 'ṅgulyā iti*.

Words can also designate a "collection" (*samudāya*), for instance "jar" (*ghaṭa*). Without referring to particulars of form etc. (such as specific colors), the word "jar" refers to effects (such as the holding of water) which are common to those things (*tatsamānaphalā*), to the exclusion of what is not a cause of such effects. One has to differentiate between "collection" (*samudāya*) and "class" (*jāti*; like *rūpādayas*). "Class" can however be superimposed on "collection" (*rūpādayo ghaṭasyeti*) (vv. 100-102).[13] *samudāya* appears only once in the *apoha* section of *Pramāṇavārttika* I, viz. PVSV 37,1f., for

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upacāro na sarvatra yadi bhinnaviśeṣaṇam / mukhyam ity eva ca kuto 'bhinne bhinnārthateti cet // PV II 93-94

[6] *syād anarthāntarārthatve 'py akarmādravyaśabdavat //* PV II 96cd

[7] *anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpapariniṣṭhitaḥ / śabdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhayāśrayaḥ //* PV I 205 (= 207)

[8] *jñeyatvena grahād doṣo nābhāveṣu prasajyate //* PV III 7cd

In the preceding verses Dharmakīrti gives a kind of order of the degree of reality of (knowable) objects; in this view an "universal" (*sāmānya*) has, in a sense, reality. *keśa*s etc. have no reality, since they are no "universal" (*keśādayo na sāmānyam* PV III 7a); but *abhāva* has.

[9] *śrutis tanmātrajijñāsor anākṣiptākhilāparā / bhinnaṃ dharmam ivācaṣṭe yogo 'ṅgulyā iti kvacit //*
yuktāṅgulīti sarveṣām ākṣepād dharmivācinī / khyātaikārthābhidāne 'pi tathā vihitasaṃstitiḥ // PV II 98-99

[10] *vivakṣāto 'prayoge 'pi tasyārtho 'yaṃ pratīyate //*
vyavacchedaphalaṃ vākyaṃ yataś caitro dhanurdharaḥ / pārtho dhanurdharo nīlaṃ sarojam iti vā yathā //
pratiyogivyavacchedas tatrāpy artheṣu gamyate / tathā prasiddheḥ sāmarthyād vivakṣānugamād dhvaneḥ //
PV IV 191c-193 (~ PVin II 10c-12)

PVSV 2,7-10 (~ HB [cited in note 16] 2,2-5): *pakṣasya dharmatve tadviśeṣaṇāpekṣasyānyatrānuvṛtter asādhāraṇateti cet, na, ayogavyavacchedena viśeṣaṇāt, yathā caitro dhanurdharaḥ, nānyayogavyavacchedena, yathā pārtho dhanurdhara ity ākṣepsyāmaḥ.*

[11] PVSV 33,9ff.: *yadāyaṃ pratipattā tadanyavyavacchedabhāvānapekṣaḥ piṇḍaviśeṣe 'śvavyavacchedamātraṃ jijñāsate tathābhūtajñāpanārthaṃ tathākṛtasaṃketena śabdena prabodhyata* . . .; PVSV 33,12f.: *yadā punar vyavacchedāntarānirākāṅkṣas taṃ jñātum icchati tadā 'parityaktavyavacchedāntare tatraivāśvavyavacchede* . . .

[12] PVSV 36,5: . . . *vyatireke ṣaṣṭhī* . . .

[13] *rūpādiśaktibhedānām anākṣepeṇa vartate / tatsamānaphalāhetuvyavacchede ghaṭaśrutiḥ //*
ato na rūpaṃ ghaṭa ity ekādhikaraṇā śrutiḥ / bhedo 'yam īdṛśo jātisamudāyābhidhāyinoḥ //
rūpādayo ghaṭasyeti tatsāmānyopasarjanāḥ / tacchaktibhedhāḥ khyāpyante vācyo 'nyo 'pi diśānayā // PV II 100-102

a collection of buildings, people etc.[14] *samudāya* is employed in PVSV 1,12 (and in the same way in PVSV 2,12) as the collection which is imposed on the *pakṣa* (of PV I 1 (= 3) as a quality-bearer).[15] In the analogous place in the *Hetubindu*, Steinkellner defines *samudāya* as: "the quality-bearer and all its qualities".[16] In PVSV 4,23f. the word is used to describe a cow as a collection of its parts.[17] In the same way it appears in PVin III 311b7 (= v. 66); here the same word, *tshogs pa*, appears as in the Tibetan translation of the *Pramāṇavārttika*.[18] In PV III 194, *samudāya* is used for a collection of atoms.[19] In all these cases Dharmakīrti uses *samudāya* to indicate a number of parts and characteristics, which on the one hand are not tightly connected, but on the other hand function in some way as a unity; in this respect, Dharmakīrti takes up a middle position as it were. In the chapter on *Anyāpohaparīkṣā* of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)* "collection" is encountered in two places. In PS V 15 it is said that every thing expressed in words is a "complex entity"; the Tibetan word used is *bsdus pa*, not *tshogs pa* as in the *Pramāṇavārttika* translation.[20] Hayes translates *bsdus pa* as *samudāya* and defines it as "a complex entity; an individual existing as a collection of components or a multiplicity of properties".[21] In the *Vṛtti* on PS V 50a "collection" (*tshogs pa*) is used in roughly the same way as in vv. 100-102: it is necessary to distinguish words for "collection" from the objects constituting this "collection"; the difference between "collection" and "class" (*rigs, jāti*) is elucidated; a word designating a "collection" is used regardless of classification through number, measure and parts.[22] Kumārila deals with *samudāya* in a comparable way; he sets "collection" against "class" (*ākṛti*). It is true that his "collection" is made up of a number of similar individuals forming that

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[14] PVSV 37,1f.: *prāsādapuruṣādīnāṃ vijātīyānām anārambhāt kutas tatsamudāyo dravyam.*

[15] PVSV 1,12: *pakṣo dharmī, avayave samudāyopacārāt.* PVSV 2,12: *pakṣaśabdena samudāyāvacanāt.*

[16] HB 1,10 (= Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil I*, Wien 1967). Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Wien 1967: 84: ". . . Vereinigung, das ist der Beschaffenheitsträger und alle seine Beschaffenheiten, . . ."

[17] PVSV 4,23f.: *yathā gaur ayaṃ sāsnādisamudāyātmakatvād iti.*

[18] According to T. Iwata, "On the Classification of Three Kinds of Reason in Pramāṇaviniścaya III," in this volume pp. 92f.: "Since the cause of ascertainment of whole (ex. of verbal expression "It is a cow") are [parts, which are] possessed of whole (*tshogs pa can*) (ex. horn, dewlap etc.), [between whole and parts there is a necessary connection that] without them (i.e., parts) this (i.e., whole) does not exist; hence the horn-possessed[ness] is [inferred] by [the reason of] cowness. (PVin III 311b7 = v. 66)."

[19] *sañcitaḥ samudāyaḥ sa* . . . PV III 194a

[20] The text is according to Masaaki Hattori, *The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi's Commentary. Chapter Five: Anyāpoha-Parīkṣā. Tibetan Text with Sanskrit Fragments*, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, no. 21, Kyoto 1982: 117,24-26,29 [= PS V 15 (Kanakavarman translation)]:

bsdus pa brjod bya yin pa'i phyir // de ni sṅon po 'ba' źig min //

u tpa la 'ba' źig kyaṅ ma yin // yi ge bźin du don med de //

As translation was used: Richard P. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*, Dordrecht etc. 1988: 279.

[21] Hayes (cited in note 20) p. 320: "*samudāya (bsdus pa)*".

[22] The text is according to the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* ed. Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣa-pariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya,* Cambridge, Massachusetts 1968: 147,24f., 25f., 29-32. In addition use was made of a Sanskrit reconstruction prepared by Mr. W. Harada and received from Prof. M. Namai, Kōyasan.
PSV V ad v. 50a (Kanakavarman translation): *diṅ thā la sogs pa'i sgra tshogs brjod par byed pa de tshogs pa can las tha dad par brjod pa yin no // 'on te rigs daṅ tshogs pa'i sgra dag la khyad par ci yod ce na /*

thigs pa daṅ ni tshogs pa yi // chu tshogs rnams la brjod byed ni //

graṅs daṅ tshad daṅ dbyibs rnams la // ltos pa med par 'jug par byed //

ḍitthādiśabdaḥ samudāyasya vacakaḥ sa (śabdaḥ) samudāyibhyo bhinnasyābhidhānam. nanu jātisamudāyaśabdayoḥ ko viśeṣo 'stīti cet,

saṃkhyāpramāṇasaṃsthānanirapekṣaḥ pravartate / bindau ca samudāye ca vācakaḥ salilādiṣu //

I thank Prof. S. Katsura, Hiroshima, for drawing my attention to this place.

"collection" (trees forming a forest) and *ākṛti* is not the same type of "class" as *jāti*; but there are also resemblances.[23] To Kumārila, the idea of a "collection" (a forest) is something inferior, a *pratyakṣābhāsa*.[24] Dharmakīrti in vv. 100-102 does not give such a value judgement.

The various ways in which *samudāya* is used give no clear indication of the meaning of this word in vv. 100 - 102. Possibly more clarity is found in a discourse about words regarding three notions in *Pramāṇavārttika* I. The first-mentioned of these three is *samūha*, which might be a synonym of *samudāya*. One speaks of *samūha*, when a number of factors combined cause a single effect; in such cases it makes no sense to look at the separate factors, when one only wants information on this single effect; in such cases in daily life it is customary to use words like "jar".[25] There is no discussion on the difference between "collection" and "class" (*jāti*), but "*ghaṭasya rūpādayas*" is mentioned, which in v. 102 exemplifies the superimposition of *jāti* on *samudāya*; here it has a similar import.[26] These considerations in *Pramāṇavārttika* I go back to Dignāga's *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa*. The three notions, *samūha* etc., are applied for the purpose of naming (*prajñaptisat*); thus there is some value judgement: these notions have somehow reduced reality.[27]

All in all one would expect that this digression on *apoha* theory (vv. 92-102) might hark back to the *apoha* section, PV I 40-185 (= 42-187).[28] This is the case in the short summary of the theory itself. But the way of underpinning the theory, arguing that also in practical life concepts are used and that conceptualization is not a form of attribution, is not found in *Pramāṇavārttika* I. Perhaps these arguments are specifically used in the confrontation with Vaiśeṣika views, starting with the controversy about *avayavin*. The observations on the use of words, once the *apoha* theory is accepted, are more clearly connected with ideas in *Pramāṇavārttika* I. An exception (apart from the passage concerning *samūha*) is the designation of "collection". One can conjecture why the notion of "collection" was introduced into this context:

Possibly, in extracting a new notion from a number of items, Dharmakīrti, like Kumārila, felt the need to make clear that the forming of a "class" (*jāti*) is something quite different from constructing a "collection" (*samudāya*). But perhaps, in a sense, Dharmakīrti here continues his discussion with the Vaiśeṣikas, or rather materialists using Vaiśeṣika concepts. Reviewing once more the relevant text, it appears that these opponents are quite fundamentally criticized; in v. 91 a number of (sub)categories (*saṃkhyā, saṃyoga, karman*; and according to the commentary also *vibhāga-paratva-aparatva-sāmānyādi*) are rejected;[29] further on in vv. 95d-96a it is remarked that if an added quality (to something

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[23] *vṛkṣāṇāṃ samudāye ca vanādhīr jāyate yathā // naivaṃ gosamudāye 'pi gotvadhīr upajāyate /* ŚV (ed. Kunhan Raja, Madras 1946) *Vanavāda* 71c-72b

[24] *pratyakṣābhāsagamyatvād vṛkṣebhyo 'nyat tu yad vanam // nākṛtyā saha tasyāsti spardhā pratyakṣagamyayā /* ŚV (cited in note 23) *Vanavāda* 95c-96b

[25] The discourse about the three entities is found in PVSV 68,6-24; *samūha* is treated in PVSV 68,7-18. Cf. Tilmann Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*, Wien 1964: 110-112.
PVSV 68,7-10: *ye samastāḥ kiñcid ekaṃ kāryaṃ kurvanti teṣāṃ tatra viśeṣābhāvād apārthikā viśeṣacodaneti sakṛt sarveṣāṃ niyojanārtham ekam ayaṃ lokaḥ śabdaṃ teṣu niyuṅkte ghaṭa iti.*

[26] PVSV 68,12ff.: *tatra ghaṭasya rūpādaya ity api ghaṭasvabhāvā rūpādaya udakadhāraṇaviśeṣādikāryasamarthā iti yāvat.*

[27] Cf. Hidenori Kitagawa, *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū*, [A study of Indian classical logic] Tōkyō 1965: 430-439; E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 3, 1959 [83-164]: 121-127.

[28] The comparison with *Pramāṇavārttika* I was greatly facilitated by M. Ono and J. Oda, *An Index to the Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti*, Tsukuba 1986.

[29] *saṃkhyāsaṃyogakarmāder api tadvatsvarūpataḥ / abhilāpāc ca bhedena rūpaṃ buddhau na bhāsate //* PV II 91;

already having qualities) were a separate thing, there would be no difference between substance and quality; and that would be contrary to the essential distinction between *dravya* and *guṇa* in Vaiśeṣika doctrine.[30] It seems probable that in vv. 100-102 Dharmakīrti still has Vaiśeṣika views in mind and somehow returns to vv. 84ff. where the discussion on "wholes" started. He may have wanted to stress that the thing under discussion is not a "whole" (*avayavin*), but a "collection" (*samudāya*).

Abbreviations and Literature

PV I — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter I: v. PVSV

PV II, III, IV — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapters II, III, IV: *Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*. Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206. (PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Roma 1960.

Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (cited in note 1) 44,11: *saṃkhyāsaṃyogakarmādeḥ, ādiśabdād vibhāgaparatvāparatvasāmānyāder api.*

30 . . . *tatrāpy arthāntaraṃ yadi // guṇadravyāviśeṣaḥ syād* . . . PV II 95d-96a

ON THE DATE OF THE TIBETAN TRANSLATIONS OF THE *PRAMĀṆASAMUCCAYA* AND THE *PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA*

by

Marek Mejor, Warsaw

The following observations on the date of the Tibetan translations of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* are the results of my former research on the commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośa*. Actually, I first became puzzled over a misleading statement given by M. Hattori in his book *Dignāga, On Perception* (p. 13), and later repeated by B. K. Matilal in his book *Logic, Language and Reality* (p. 67 n. 1), viz. that the Tibetan translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab most probably has originated "later than the last quarter of the fifteenth century".[1] This attracted my interest because the Indian Paṇḍit Kanakavarman was also responsible for a Tibetan translation of one of the commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośa*.[2] Therefore I was led to undertake a more careful study of the relevant sources: the colophons in the Tanjur, the catalogues (lHan kar ma, Źa lu Tanjur), Tibetan historical works (e.g. Bu ston's *Chos 'byuṅ*, *Deb ther sṅon po*, *dPag bsam ljon bzaṅ*, etc.), as well as the modern studies by Tucci, Frauwallner, Naudou, Seyfort Ruegg, Steinkellner, van der Kuijp, Jackson and others.

In the following paper I shall attempt to arrange the available data systematically and to suggest the approximate dates for the Tibetan translations of two main works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, i.e. the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Pramāṇavārttika*, which had a fundamental importance for the further successful establishment and development of the *pramāṇa*-tradition in Tibet.

At the end of the paper two appendices are provided: (a) a summarizing diagram for quick reference, (b) texts of the colophons relevant to the present subject matter.

I. (i) The *Pramāṇasamuccaya* [PS] of Dignāga (480-540 A.D.), the actual founder of the Buddhist school of logic,[3] was that master's greatest and last work. It consists of some two hundred stanzas (*kārikā*) in six chapters and the autocommentary on them (*vṛtti*). The Sanskrit original - except for some fragments quoted in other texts[4] - is not preserved. Two Tibetan translations of the *Pramāṇa-*

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* This is an enlarged version of my paper read during the 2nd Dharmakīrti Conference. The research was carried out during my research fellowship of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung. I thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for the financial support towards my participation in the Conference.
I am very obliged to Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg for his valuable comments and improvements made on an earlier draft of the paper. I am very grateful to Dr. David P. Jackson who made improvements on the final version and corrected my English.

[1] Hattori 1968: 13: "The name of Dad pa(ḥi) śes rab is not mentioned in the *Blue Annals*, which were composed between A.D. 1476 and 1478. It seems that K [= *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, tr. by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab - M. M.] appeared later than the last quarter of the fifteenth century."; cf. ibid., editor's [i.e. Daniel H. H. Ingalls] foreword, p. vi: "Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is preserved in two Tibetan translations, of the eleventh and the early fifteenth century respectively"; van der Kuijp 1985: 102 n. 32 called attention to this confusion; but cf. also Richard P. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*, Dordrecht etc. 1988: 226ff. and n. 6.

[2] Pūrṇavardhana's *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī major* and *minor*, translated together with the Tibetan lotsāva Pa tshab Ñi ma grags, see my forthcoming book on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* and the commentaries in the Tanjur; cf. also Naudou 1968: 187.

[3] Cf. E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung", *WZKSO* 3, 1959, 83-164.

[4] H. N. Randle, *Fragments from Dignāga*, London 1926; E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga und anderes", in *Festschrift für Moriz Winternitz*, ed. Otto Stein und Wilhelm Gampert, Leipzig 1933, 237-242; Hattori 1968; cf. also E. Steinkellner, "Methodological remarks on the constitution of Sanskrit texts from the Buddhist *pramāṇa*-tradition", *WZKS* 32, 1988, 103-129.

samuccaya and one of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* exist in the Tanjur.

(ii) We are informed by Bu ston that a commentary on *Pramāṇasamuccaya* was composed by Īśvarasena (580-640 A.D.), Dignāga's disciple.[5] This work is not extant (nor is any other of Īśvarasena). Īśvarasena is mentioned in the *Deb ther sṅon po*,[6] in a lineage of the transmission of the *Pramāṇavārttika* [PV]; here I reproduce the list, from Vasubandhu to Sa skya Paṇḍita, provided with the approximate dates of their lifetime[7]:

1. Vasubandhu (400-480)
2. Dignāga (480-540)
3. Īśvarasena (580-640)
4. Dharmakīrti (600-660)
5. Devendrabuddhi (630-690)
6. Śākyamati (660-720)
7. Vinītadeva (710-770)
8. Dharmakīrti (sic)
9. Prajñākaragupta (c. 850)
10. Ravigupta
11. Yamāri
12. Jñānaśrīmitra[8]
13. Dharmottara (750-810)
14. Śaṅkaranandana (9-10th c.)[9]
15. Waṃku Paṇḍita[10]
16. Kha che paṇ chen Śākyaśrī (1140s ?-1225)
17. Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251)

According to Frauwallner, it is possible to accept the tradition saying that Īśvarasena was the teacher of Dharmakīrti.

(iii) In the most ancient list of Buddhist texts translated into Tibetan, the *lHan kar ma* catalogue (800-812 A.D.),[11] the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is not mentioned. Nor is it listed in the *Mahāvyutpatti* (814 A.D.).[12]

(iv) Again, we are informed by Bu ston[13] that the Tibetan lotsāva Tiṅ ṅe 'dzin bzaṅ po, after Candrarāhula had been invited, executed the translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and other works. According to the *Deb ther sṅon po*, Candrarāhula was a scholar from Kashmir, from Śrīnagar, and a contemporary of Atiśa (982-1054 A.D.).[14] It is reported in the *Chos 'byuṅ* of Ñaṅ Ral pa can (1136-1204 A.D.) that at the time when Atiśa (Jo bo) dwelled in dBus, Tiṅ (ṅe) 'dzin bzaṅ po from mṄa' ris, born in Kashmir (sic), after Candrarāhula, born in Magadha, had been invited, translated Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and all the "seven treatises" of Dharmakīrti, being the commentary thereon.[15] None of these translations exist. However, some other texts translated by Tiṅ ṅe 'dzin

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[5] Cf. Obermiller 1932: 152. Cf. also *Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India (rGya-gar-chos-'byuṅ)*. Transl. from the Tibetan by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadyaya, ed. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Atlantic Highlands 1981: 229; Hattori 1968: 14 n. 67.

[6] Tr. Roerich 1979: 346.

[7] E. Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic", *WZKSO* 5, 1961, 125-148; Naudou 1968: 104ff.; F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic I*, Leningrad ~ 1930.: 46ff.; Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, Roma 1960: xixff.

[8] He was active in the 2nd half of the 11th c. See Naudou 1968: 177ff.

[9] So G. Bühnemann, "Identifizierung von Sanskrittexten Śaṅkaranandanas", *WZKS* 24, 1980, 191-198; in the Tibetan sources the name has the form Śaṅkarānanda.

[10] Cf. van der Kuijp 1983: 259 n. 12.

[11] Ed. M. Lalou, "Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi Khri sroṅ lde bcan", *JA* 241, 1953, 313-353; E. Frauwallner, "Zu den buddhistischen Texten in der Zeit Khri-Sron-Lde-Btsan's", *WZKSO* 1, 1957, 95-103; G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Vol. II, Roma 1958: 46 n. 1.

[12] On the date, cf. Tucci, *loc.cit.*

[13] *Chos 'byuṅ* 907,6f. (= 138a6f.): *gźan yaṅ tsa ndra rā hu la spyan draṅs te lo tsā ba tiṅ ne 'dzin bzaṅ pos tshad ma kun las btus pa la sogs pa bsgyur ro //*; tr. Obermiller 1932: 215.

[14] Tr. Roerich 1979: 360, 758; Naudou 1968: 161 n. 1, 3.

[15] *rÑiṅ ma'i chos 'byuṅ* plate no. 342,2,1-4 (= 510b1-4): *jo bo dbus su bźugs pa'i dus su </> mṅa' ris pa'i lo tstsha ba*

bzaṅ po and Subhūtiśrīśānti are preserved: *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, *Yuktiprayoga*, *Mañjuśrīvajrasādhana*.[16] Because it is known that Subhūtiśrī came to Tibet after Atiśa, i.e. after 1042 A.D., and, according to the *Deb ther sṅon po*, Atiśa proceeded to dBus when the Great Lotsāva Rin chen bzaṅ po was 85, i.e. in 1043 A.D., and Candrarāhula was a contemporary of Atiśa, it seems probable to put the approximate date of the translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* about the middle of the 11th century.[17]

(v) In the Tanjur - section Tshad ma, vol. Ce - are preserved the following translations of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*:[18]

Peking (Narthang)	Derge (Cone)
Pramāṇasamuccayakārikā:	
5700: gSer gyi go cha (Kanakavarman) and [Mar thuṅ] Dad pa'i śes rab	4203: Sudhanarakṣita (Nor bzaṅs sruṅ) and Źa ma Seṅ [ge] rgyal [mtshan]
Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti:	
5701: Vasudhararakṣita (Nor 'dzin sruṅ ba) and Seṅ [ge] rgyal [mtshan]	4204: Sudhanarakṣita (Nor bzaṅs sruṅ) and Źa ma Seṅ [ge] rgyal Źa ma [mtshan]
5702: gSer gyi go cha (Kanakavarman) and [Mar thuṅ] Dad pa'i śes rab	

As it can be seen from the above, the Peking (and/or Narthang) Tanjur contains as many as three translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)* executed by two different teams of translators, and the Derge (and/or Cone) Tanjur has two translations made by one and the same team. The question arises whether the Indian collaborator of Tibetan lotsāva Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan is the same person or not. Bu ston in his *Chos 'byuṅ* from 1322 A.D. informs us that "Źa ma Seṅ gyal secured the assistance of the Paṇḍit Maṇibhadrarakṣita [Nor bzaṅ sruṅ ba] and others and translated the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* with the Commentary thereon".[19] In the catalogue of works translated into Tibetan and attached to the *Chos 'byuṅ*, Bu ston mentioned the translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayakārikā* by Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan and the translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* by Mar thuṅ Dad pa(')i śes rab.[20] However, in the Źa lu Tanjur catalogue from 1335 A.D., we find the *Pramāṇasamuccayakārikā* translated by Sudānarakṣita and Źa ma Seṅ rgyal, and the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* translated by

tiṅ <ṅe> 'dzin bzaṅ po rgya gar kha cher 'khruṅs pa </> rab tu sbyaṅs pa yul ma ga ltar <read: *dhar*> *'khruṅs pa </> paṇḍita can dra ra* <read: *rā*> *hu la chen po spyan draṅs nas rtog ge rig pa tshad ma'i bstan bcos phyogs glaṅ gis mdzad pa kun las btus pa daṅ </> de'i don gyi 'grel pa chos kyi grags pas mdzad pa'i sde bdun bsgyur ro <//>*

[16] Actually, they revised an earlier translation of the *Sambandhaparīkṣā*. Cf. Naudou 1968: 161 n. 1, 3.

[17] Van der Kuijp 1985: 102 n. 32, thinks that this translation was made "at some time during the last half of the eleventh century".

[18] Cf. van der Kuijp 1985: 81 (his information is somewhat confusing).

[19] *Chos 'byuṅ* 910,4: *źa ma seṅ rgyal gyis kyaṅ paṇḍi ta nor bzaṅ sruṅ ba la sogs bsten nas tshad ma kun las btus rtsa 'grel bsgyur ro //*; tr. Obermiller 1932: 221.

[20] *Chos 'byuṅ* 969,3f. (= 169a3f.): *slob dpon phyogs glaṅ gis mdzad pa la / tshad ma'i mdo kun las btus seṅ ge rgyal mtshan gyi 'gyur / de'i raṅ 'grel mar thuṅ dad pa śes rab kyi 'gyur /*

Sudhararakṣita (sic) and Źa ma Seṅ rgyal.[21] It has been convincingly shown by van der Kuijp that the name of the actual translator, Vasudhararakṣita, was deformed due to a scribal error.[22]

In the *Deb ther sṅon po* of gŹon nu dpal from 1476-1478 A.D. it is stated that "up to the present time logicians have been following this translation [i.e. by Vasudhararakṣita and Źa ma Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan - M.M.]".[23]

Here we are confronted with the fact that out of two different translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)* which were circulating till the final redaction of the Tanjur, the one specified by the *Deb ther sṅon po* is found in the printed edition of Derge/Cone Tanjur. However, the other translation - by Kanakavarman and Mar thuṅ Dad pa'i śes rab - has not been superseded by the former one[24] and this is reflected in the printed Peking/Narthang edition where these two translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* were incorporated side by side.[25]

Now, the question arises: what were the dates of these translations?

(a) According to the *Deb ther sṅon po*, the Tibetan lotsāva Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan from Źa ma studied the art of translation under rMa lotsāva Chos 'bar (1044-1089 A.D.),[26] Pu hraṅs pa, Ga roṅ lotsāva, and rṄog lotsāva Blo ldan śes rab (1059-1109 A.D.). He collaborated with Mahājana on the translation of his *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayārthaparijñāna* and Maitreya's *Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅgakārikā*.[27] On Vasudhararakṣita nothing is known. Because the activity of Seṅ rgyal occurs in the second half of the 11th century, it seems probable that his translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)* was executed towards the end of the 11th century.

(b) The Kashmirian Paṇḍit Kanakavarman,[28] a collaborator of Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055 A.D.), later became one of the main collaborators of the Tibetan lotsāva Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (1055-d. after 1141 A.D.), who is famous for his introducing the Madhyamaka system in Tibet. Ñi ma grags studied for 23 years in Kashmir, returned to Tibet, and in Lhasa, in the monastery Ra mo che, accompanied by Kanakavarman, he revised the Tibetan translation of the *Prasannapadā*. Together with rMa Chos 'bar (1044-1089 A.D.) Kanakavarman also translated Āryaśīla's *Cittaparīkṣā*.[29]

Mar thuṅ Dad pa(')i śes rab is mentioned in the *Deb ther sṅon po* among the translators who took part in the religious council in mṄa' ris, in 1076 A.D.

The Indian scholar gSer gyi go cha, i.e. Kanakavarman, and the Tibetan translator Mar thuṅ Dad

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[21] *bsTan 'gyur gyi dkar chag yid bźin nor bu dbaṅ gi rgyal po'i phreṅ ba bźugs so*. In *The Collected Works of Bu-ston, Part 26 (La)*, ed. Lokesh Chandra. New Delhi 1976 [401-643]: 620,1f.: *slob dpon phyogs kyi glaṅ pos mdzad pa'i tshad ma'i mdo kun las btus pa / paṇḍi ta su dā na rakṣita daṅ / lo tsā ba źa ma seṅ rgyal gyi 'gyur / de'i raṅ 'grel / paṇḍi ta su dha ra rakṣita daṅ / lo tsā ba źa ma seṅ rgyal gyi 'gyur /*

[22] Van der Kuijp 1985: 83 (conclusion).

[23] Tr. Roerich 1979: 220.

[24] Actually, in the opinion of M. Hattori 1968: 18, the translation by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab superceeds the other one by Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ rgyal: "On the whole, K is better than V, but in not a few cases V provides a better reading".

[25] In the Mongolian Tanjur are found exactly the same translations as in the Peking/Narthang Tanjur, as it is indicated in the colophons (vol. 95, foll. 11b, 130a, 249a, respectively). I am very obliged to Dr. R. Kaschewsky, Bonn, for this information.

[26] Tr. Roerich 1979: 220. Cf. also Roerich 1979: 405: "sMa ban Chos 'bar, born in 1044 A.D., when Mar pa was 33." Bu ston says that rMa ban Chos 'bar studied with the Indian paṇḍita Vajrapāṇi (cf. Obermiller 1932: 220).

[27] Mahājana, son of Ratnavajra and a teacher of Atiśa, was active in the 2nd half of the 11th century. Cf. Naudou 1968: 174, 175.

[28] Most exhaustive information about Kanakavarman and Pa tshab is found in Naudou 1968: 171-174, 185, 187, etc.

[29] Cf. Naudou 1968: 188.

pa'i śes rab, executed their translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayakārikā* and the *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti* in the vihāra Śis pa'i (śi ba'i) dge gnas.[30]

Accordingly, I am inclined to put the date of their translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)* about 1100 A.D., perhaps even at the very beginning of the 12th century. In consequence, it seems that this translation was prepared later than that of Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ rgyal.

(vi) Finally I would like to discuss the date of the Tibetan translation of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)*, the *Viśālāmalavatināma Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*.[31] The translation was prepared by dPaṅ lotsāva Blo gros brtan pa (1276-1342 A.D.),[32] working alone, utilizing his expertise in Sanskrit learned from Śoṅ ston lotsāva and others, and after directly reading the Sanskrit text but not relying on a Paṇḍit.[33] This translation is mentioned by Bu ston in his *Chos 'byuṅ*[34] and in the attached catalogue[35] from 1322 A.D. and in the Źa lu Tanjur catalogue[36] from 1335 A.D. These facts enable us to put the approximate date of the translation of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)* at the beginning of the 14th century, but before 1322 A.D.

II. Now am going to discuss the dates of the Tibetan translations of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*.[37]

(i) According to Buddhist tradition, Devendrabuddhi[38] was a direct disciple of Dharmakīrti and prepared a commentary on three chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. This commentary is preserved in Tibetan translation of Subhūtiśrīśānti and dGe ba'i blo gros (see below).
A number of Sanskrit fragments are preserved in Vibhūticandra's glosses to Manorathanandin's *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*.[39]

(ii) The last section of the *lHan kar* catalogue from 800-812 A.D. lists a few works in progress of translation. Among these, one can recognize the *Pramāṇavārttika* (No. 733: *Tshad ma rnam 'grel*) and

[30] Marcelle Lalou, *Répertoire du Tanjur d'après le catalogue de P. Cordier*, Paris 1933, s.v. vihāra Dpal ldan sa skya [Śrīpaṇḍubhūmi].

[31] Peking 5766, Derge 4268. Cf. Richard P. Hayes, "Jinendrabuddhi", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 103, 1983, 709-717. It has been observed by Hayes that the colophon of the *Nyāsa*, a commentary on the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, finds its (almost) literal equivalent in the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* colophon (*bodhisattvadeśīyācārya<śrī>jinendrabuddhipādaiḥ = byaṅ chub sems dpa'i yul pa slob dpon rgyal ba'i dbaṅ po'i blo gros kyi źabs kyis*).

[32] Śoṅ ston studied logic under sTag sde ba Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan (1212-1294 A.D.) and taught his younger brother, Blo gros brtan pa (1276-1342 A.D.); cf. Roerich 1979: 784, 785, 786; Obermiller 1932: 223. See also L. van der Kuijp 1983: 67, 297 n. 247; J. W. de Jong, *Textcritical Remarks on the Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā*, Tokyo 1979: 5: "The Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā was translated into Tibetan by Lakṣmīkara and the Master from Śoṅ, Rdo rje rgyal mtshan, probably between 1260 and 1280".

[33] [P Re. 355a1f.] *tshul 'di ni chos kyi rje śoṅ ston lo tsā (xyl.: tsa) ba rdo rje rgyal mtshan gyis legs par bśad pa'i srol la sogs pa la brten nas legs par sbyar ba brda sprod pa'i tshul la / blo'i snaṅ pa cher rgyas pa dpaṅ lo tstsha ba dge sloṅ dpal ldan blo gros brtan pas / paṇḍita la ma bltos par / (?) ñid kyis rgya dpe la bltas nas bsgyur źiṅ źus te gtan la phab pa'o //*

[34] Tr. Obermiller 1932: 224.

[35] *Chos 'byuṅ* 972,2f.: *paṇḍita rgyal dbaṅ blos mdzad pa'i tshad ma kun las btus kyi 'grel pa stoṅ phrag dgu pa dpaṅ blo brtan gyi 'gyur /*

[36] Ed. Lokesh Chandra (cited in note 21), p. 626,2f.: *yaṅs pa daṅ dri ma med pa daṅ ldan pa źes bya ba'i tshad ma kun las btus pa'i 'grel bśad slob dpon rgyal dbaṅ blos mdzad pa / śu log stoṅ phrag dgu pa / dpaṅ lo tsā ba blo gros brtan pa'i 'gyur bźugs so //*

[37] Cf. van der Kuijp 1985: 80.

[38] E. Frauwallner, "Devendrabuddhi", *WZKSO* 4, 1960, 119-123; Gnoli (cited in note 7) 1960: Introduction.

[39] Cf. Steinkellner (cited in note 4) p. 105 n. 9.

the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (No. 734: *rNam 'grel gyi 'grel pa*).[40] These translations do not survive, and it is not known if they were consulted by the later translators.

The *Mahāvyutpatti* (814 A.D.), chapter No. CC (Nos. 4404-4523: *pramāṇatarkanirgatārthāḥ*), contains a list of technical terms on logic; here we find some characteristic terms of Dharmakīrti, e.g. two distinctive terms of Dharmakīrti's definition of *pratyakṣa* (4467: *kalpanāpoḍhalakṣaṇam*, 4468: *abhrāntalakṣaṇam* [NB I 4]), *trirūpaliṅgam* (4441, [NB II 3]), *pipīlikotsaraṇam* and *matsyavikāraḥ* (4485-4486, *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* [ed. R. Gnoli] 8,13]).

(iii) The problem of the date of translation of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* poses a serious difficulty, because it was translated several times by different teams of translators. According to the colophon, a first translation was prepared by Subhūtiśrīśānti and dGe ba'i blo gros. Subhūtiśrīśānti[41] was invited to Tibet during the reign of the king lHa lde[42] and was famous for his translations of the Prajñāpāramitā texts. Atiśa came to Tibet a few years later, in 1042 A.D., at the invitation of the king 'Od lde. Subhūtiśrī accompanied by Tiṅ ṅe 'dzin bzaṅ po revised an earlier translation of the *Sambandhaparīkṣā*,[43] translated the *Yuktiprayoga* of Ratnavajra (b. about 940 A.D.),[44] and some Tantric texts of the Kālacakra. rMa dGe ba'i blo gros[45] was one of the most important disciples of Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055 A.D.).[46] According to the *Deb ther sṅon po*[47] he played an important role in establishing the systematic study and teaching of *pramāṇa*.

Subhūtiśrīśānti, the Great Master from Kashmir, accompanied by the Tibetan lotsāva rMa dGe ba'i blo gros, executed a translation of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* (see also below), and following the request of Byaṅ chub 'od, also of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* together with Devendrabuddhi's *Pañjikā*. The lotsāva dGe ba'i blo gros himself translated a sub-commentary of Śākyamati.[48] At the order of the king rTse lde[49] and Źi ba 'od, dGe ba'i blo gros and the Kashmirian Jñānaśrībhadra[50] translated Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa*.[51]

It seems that the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* was translated together with the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* and Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*. The date of translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*

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[40] Ed. Lalou (cited in note 11) 1953: 337; cf. Frauwallner (cited in note 11) 1957: 101.

[41] Cf. Roerich 1979: 69f. See exhaustive information in Naudou 1968: 160f.

[42] On the genealogies of the kings of Western Tibet see A. H. Francke, *Antiquities of Indian Tibet, Part II: The Chronicles of Ladakh and Minor Chronicles*, Calcutta 1926: 167-171; Tucci 1988; G. Tucci, *Preliminary Report on Two Scientific Expeditions in Nepal*, Roma 1956: 52ff.

[43] According to the Derge colophon; the Peking mentions Jñānagarbha and Nam mkha' as the only translators.

[44] On Ratnavajra see Naudou 1968: 139ff., 161 n. 1.

[45] Van der Kuijp 1983: 3 apparently by mistake interchanged the date of rMa Chos 'bar (1044-1089 A.D.) with rMa dGe ba'i blo gros.

[46] His biography by dPal ye śes was translated in D. Snellgrove and T. Skorupski, *The Cultural Heritage of Ladakh*, Vol. 2, Warminster 1980: 83-116 (translation, Tibetan text, notes).

[47] Tr. Roerich 1979: 70.

[48] The information in Naudou 1968: 160, is misleading.

[49] Cf. Tucci 1988: 51.

[50] Jñānaśrī is the author of the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, a commentary on a work of Dharmakīrti. It was translated by Jñānaśrībhadra and Chos kyi brtson 'grus. On Jñānaśrībhadra see Naudou 1968: 177ff.

[51] Cf. Cordier p. 439: circa 1050-1076 A.D. Their translation was later revised by the Paṇḍit Dipaṅkara and the lotsāva Dar ma grags. gÑan Dar ma grags is mentioned among the lotsāvas who took part in the religious council of 1076 A.D. [cf. Roerich 1979: 328], and Bu ston informs us that gÑan lotsāva "lived in India 12 years, studied with the Paṇḍit Mati, invited the Paṇḍit Sunayaśrī, and translated the Great Commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra . . ." (tr. Obermiller 1932: 219). Cf. Naudou 1968: 178, 181.

and of the *-pañjikā* can be ascertained in dependence on the name of the patron, Byaṅ chub 'od,[52] the grandson of Ye śes 'od and a successor of 'Od lde, and with all probability it can be put at about the middle of the 11th century. Accordingly, I am inclined to date the first complete translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* to the middle of the 11th century.

(iv) It is known from the colophon of the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* that the translation prepared by Subhūtiśrīśānti and rMa dGe ba'i blo gros was then "slightly corrected" (*cuṅ zad bcos*) by the Kashmirian scholar Bhavyarāja[53] and the Tibetan lotsāva rṄog Blo ldan śes rab (1059-1109 A.D.).[54] Further it is specified that Blo ldan śes rab executed the translation after having heard (the text) from the Kashmirian logician Bhavyarāja. And again it is precisely stated that they prepared their translation in a place called 'Khor lo 'dzin [Cakradhara], to the east of the town Groṅ khyer chen po dpe med [Anupamamahāpura], one of the greatest centres of Buddhism in Kashmir.[55] But before we attempt to give a final answer to the question of the date of the translation of *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā*, another piece of evidence should be carefully studied.

We are, namely, informed that the same team of translators also prepared the translation of the huge commentary by Prajñākaragupta, the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*. Its colophon (as well as the colophons of other works where Źi ba 'od appears as a patron or translator) was studied by Samten Karmay in his paper "An Open letter by Pho-brang Zhi-ba-'od".[56] Karmay comes to the following conclusion: rṄog lotsāva Blo ldan śes rab "made the translation of the text in Kashmir with the help of the Paṇḍita sKal-ldan rgyal-po. This statement shows that the gathering in Tho-ling took place before his departure for Kashmir. He attended the 'Religious Council of the Fire-dragon' held in 1076 when he was eighteen. Although there is no mention of the word *chos-'khor* in this account, it is nonetheless certainly a description of the Religious Council held by the king rTse-lde. Therefore the account is a contemporary record. However, it does not give any date for the event. 'Gos Lo-tsā-ba gZhon-nu-dpal (1392-1481) on his part fails to mention both Zhi-ba-'od and the place where the council was held".[57]

Some Tibetan sources[58] say that it was Zaṅs dkar lotsāva 'Phags pa śes rab[59] who offered his translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* at the time of the religious council of the Fire-Dragon-Year, i.e. in 1076 A.D., convoked by the king rTse lde of mṄa' ris.[60] After the council, the young

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52 Cf. A. H. Francke, *Antiquities of Indian Tibet*, Part I, New Delhi (no year): 41 – an analysis of a historical inscription from the Tabo (Ta pho) monastery, which "was evidently written in the times of king Byang-chub-'od, c. 1050 A.D."; cf. also Tucci 1988: 24, 50. S. Karmay wrongly writes that "although lHa-btsun Byang-chub-'od is famous for his strenuous efforts in inviting Atiśa, there is hardly any record of his acting as patron for translators. . ." (Karmay 1980: 4); cf. also Ñaṅ Ral pa can's *rÑiṅ ma'i chos 'byuṅ* (338.3.3ff.).

53 On him see Naudou 1968: 161ff., 183ff.

54 Most exhaustive information on rṄog lotsāva is found in van der Kuijp 1983: chapter 1.

55 Naudou 1968: 169ff.

56 The colophon of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* was partly transl. and publ. in Karmay 1980: 8.

57 Karmay 1980: 9.

58 *Deb ther sṅon po* (tr. Roerich 1979: 70); *Rva lo tsā ba'i rnam thar* p. 218,3; *Rgyal ba lṅa'i deb ther* p. 112,7.

59 According to the *Deb ther sṅon po* (tr. Roerich 1979: 354f.), Zaṅs dkar lotsāva was active after the death of Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055 A.D.) and during the first two decades of the 12th century; one of his disciples was Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan. See Naudou 1968: 173ff.; Snellgrove/Skorupski (cited in note 46), p. 37ff.

60 We are informed (vide supra, n. 59) that in the year of Fire-Dragon (1076 A.D.), rTse lde, a king of mṄa' ris and a successor of 'Od lde, convoked a large assembly of scholars and translators to the religious council (*chos 'khor*), which took place in Ta bo (Ta pho)*. Among the assembled were present: rṄog lotsāva Blo ldan śes rab, Rva lotsāva, gÑan lotsāva Dar ma grags, bTsan Kha bo che, Khyuṅ po Chos brtson, Mar thuṅ Dad pa śes rab, Maṅ 'or Byaṅ chub śes rab, Dvags po dBaṅ

rṄog Blo ldan śes rab (b. 1059 A.D.), as well as some other lotsāvas, was sent by the king rTse lde[61] to Kashmir for further studies where he spent 17 years (i.e. 1076-1093 A.D.).[62] Among his teachers of logic were Bhavyarāja, Parahitabhadra and Manoratha.[63] It is during that time that Bhavyarāja and rṄog lotsāva executed their translations of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* and other works on logic.[64]

The questions which we are facing here are the following:
When was the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* translated? And when and by whom was the translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* prepared?[65]

It seems that there is enough evidence to believe that the (second) translation (or rather slight correction) of the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* by Bhavyarāja and rṄog lotsāva was prepared a f t e r the religious council, i.e. b e t w e e n 1076 and 1093 A.D., during the stay of the latter in Kashmir.

The answer to the next question(s) is more difficult. L. van der Kuijp offered a possible explanation by hypothecizing the following sequence of events: "Upon its presentation to the participants of the religious council, Zangs-dkar Lo-tsā-ba's translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* was found to be philologically unsatisfactory and it may have been this reaction which provided additional justification to send the most talented young scholars abroad for further study. The young Blo-ldan shes-rab was looked upon as one of the most promising candidates because of his age and intellectual ability, and King Rtse-lde's son, Dbang-phyug-lde, decided to become his sponsor and finance the undertaking. It was sometime during the seventeen years that he spent in Kashmir and elsewhere that he translated,

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rgyal, and Zaṅs dkar lotsāva 'Phags pa śes rab, who reportedly offered his translation of the *Pramāṇa[vārttika]alaṃkāra*. Each of them 'set in motion the Wheel of the Law properly', i.e. recited the texts. At the end of the council, gÑan and Rva went to Nepal (or India), rṄog, bTsan Kha bo che proceeded to Kashmir.

* Cf. Francke (cited in note 52) p. 36ff.; Tucci 1988: 72f.; R. Khosla, *Buddhist Monasteries of Western Himalaya*, Kathmandu 1979: 37ff.

61 According to the *Deb ther sṅon po* (tr. Roerich 1979: 325), it was rTse lde's son, dBaṅ phyug lde, who provided means for rṄog's studies. Cf. Naudou 1968: 172.

62 According to gSer mdog Paṇ chen's *Ṅo mtshar gtam gyi rol mo*, van der Kuijp 1983: 33; but L. Petech, "Ya-ts'e, Gu-ge, Pu-raṅ: A new study", *Central Asiatic Journal* 24, 1980: 86: c. 1077-1094 A.D.; Paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan claims that rṄog came to Tibet in his 35th year, in 1092 A.D. (*chu pho spre'u*) (sic), after Sthirapāla (*'Bum phrag gsum pa*) had been invited [*rṄog lo tstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul mdo tsam du bya ba ṅo mtshar gtam gyi rol mo*, in *The Complete Works (gsuṅ 'bum) of Gser-mdog Paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan*, ed. Kunzang Tobgey, Thimphu Bhutan, vol. 16 (MA), 1975: 446,3].

63 The *Vaiḍūrya g.ya' sel* of sDe srid Saṅs rgyas rgya mtsho (compiled between 1687-1693 A.D.) provides interesting details [ed. T. Tsepal Taikhang, New Delhi 1971, vol. II, p. 953,5ff.]: rṄog lotsāva concluded his studies under Bhavyarāja (sKal ldan rgyal po) with his translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* and of its commentary by Mati (? Sumati[kīrti], rṄog's co-translator of Yamāri's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā*), together with Parahitabhadra (gŹan pham bzaṅ po) he translated the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, its major commentary (Dharmottara's *Ṭīkā*), and many minor works; then he went to eastern India to study the Prajñāpāramitā under Paṇḍit Sthirapāla (brTan [xyl.: bstan] skyoṅ); again went to Kashmir to study the Uttaratantra and the (Dharma)dharmatāvibhaṅga under Paṇḍit Sajjana and Amaragomin; in Nepal he listened to many *Dombiherukasamāgamamantras (ḍo mbhi he ru ka daṅ mjal gsaṅ sṅags). Paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1428-1507 A.D.) mentions Amaragomin, Parahitabhadra and Ratnavajra as his teachers of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, the seven treatises on logic, and the doctrine of Maitreya; the Kashmirian Bhavyarāja is explicitly mentioned as his teacher of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* (*op.cit.*, p. 446.1-2).
Cf. also Bu ston (tr. Obermiller 1932: 215). On Sajjana see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, Paris 1969: 35ff.; S. Dietz, *Die buddhistische Briefliteratur Indiens*, Diss. Bonn 1980, I, pp. 88-93; Naudou 1968: 174ff.

64 Both translators are also responsible for the translations of Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa* and *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, as well as Śaṅkaranandana's *Pratibandhasiddhi* (Naudou 1968: 183f.).

65 Here we are faced with a difficulty because the colophon first ascribes the revision of Bhavyarāja/rṄog's translation to the team Kumāraśrī/'Phags pa śes rab, and then to the team Sumati(kīrti)/rṄog. Both these statements are separated by a long account of Źi ba 'od and rTse lde's initiative.

among many other texts, Prajñākaragupta's work in collaboration with Bhavyarāja. Through some circumstance, this translation arrived in Tibet prior to Rngog Lo-tsā-ba, as Blo-ldan shes-rab must by then have been referred to, and, being the only expert on this text in Tibet, Zangs-dkar Lo-tsā-ba was given the job of editing and proofreading the translation. Upon his return to his native land, Rngog Lo-tsā-ba was rather unhappy with the results Zangs-dkar Lo-tsā-ba had come up with and undertook a complete revision of the text with Sumatikīrti. It was only thereafter, apparently, that the translation found complete acceptance among the Tibetan scholars".[66] However, one should agree with the author of this hypothesis that "to be sure, this is a rather strange turn of events".

First of all, it should be observed that (a) not all the Tibetan sources report the presence of Zaṅs dkar lotsāva at the council; moreover, the expression "at that time" (*dus der*) not necessarily must be understood as having the meaning "during the council", (b) the Peking Tanjur colophon of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*, as confronted with the relevant colophons of the works on logic, offers many precious details.[67]

Let us present here the contents of the colophon:

(a) The Kashmirian scholar Bhavyarāja (sKal ldan rgyal po) and the (Tibetan) translator bhikṣu Blo ldan śes rab prepared the translation,

(b) then their translation was subject of further revision by the Kashmirian scholar Kumāraśrī and the (Tibetan) translator bhikṣu 'Phags pa'i śes rab (so reads D; P: 'Phags pa śen);[68]

(c) hereafter begins a description of the initiatives of the royal patrons Źi ba 'od, a prince monk-translator, and rTse lde,[69] who summoned a great assembly of scholars in an attempt to bring into order the existing translations and to translate new texts; at that time Sunayaśrī[70] from Vikramaśīlā and Kumāraśrī from Kashmir were invited to Tho liṅ;[71]

(d) it is explicitly stated that the translation was made by Bhavyarāja and rṄog lotsāva in Kashmir, in the vihāra Cakradhara, eastward to the town Anupama(mahāpura);

(e) their translation was later revised by the Paṇḍit Sumati(kīrti)[72] and the lotsāva Blo ldan śes rab.

It seems that there can be no doubt about it that the translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* was made by Bhavyarāja and rṄog lotsāva in Kashmir after the council of 1076. Moreover, Karmay's

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66 Van der Kuijp 1983: 31f.

67 Peking The. 343a5-344a6; Derge The. 282a5-7 (sic); see Cordier pp. 441-442; Naudou 1968: 184f.

68 Here ends the colophon in Derge (The. 282a5-7)! Cf. Źa lu Tanjur catalogue (1335 A.D.) (cited in note 21), p. 622,1f.: *TE THE gñis la / tshad ma rnam 'grel le'u gñis pa man chad kyi 'grel pa rnam 'grel gyi rgyan ces bya ba / bam po drug bcu pa / slob dpon Śes rab 'byuṅ gnas sbas pas mdzad pa / paṇḍita sKal ldan rgyal po daṅ / lo tsā ba Blo ldan śes rab kyi 'gyur la / slad kyi paṇḍita Ku mā ra śī la daṅ / lo tsā ba 'Phags pa śes rab kyis bcos pa bźugs so //*

69 The same authorities patronized the translation of Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa* made by the Kashmirian Jñānaśrībhadra and rMa dGe ba'i blo gros (cf. Cordier p. 439), as well as they supported the translation of Jina's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā*, prepared by the Indian scholar from Vikramaśīla, Śrī Dīpaṃkararakṣita, and Maṅ 'or Byaṅ chub śes rab [took part in the council of 1076 A.D., cf. Roerich 1979: 328] (Cordier p. 443). See Karmay 1980: 7ff.

70 According to Bu ston's *Chos 'byuṅ*, tr. Obermiller 1932: 215, Sunayaśrī was invited by the king 'Od lde, but elsewhere he says that Sunayaśrī was invited by gÑan lotsāva Dar ma grags (p. 219); according to the *Deb ther sṅon po* (tr. Roerich 1979: 228), 'Khon phu ba (1068-1144 A.D.) "when Mi-ñag lo-tsā-ba invited to Tibet the Lord Sunayaśrī, he heard from him (. . .) (the exposition) of the principal texts of the Mādhyamika and Nyāya systems. (. . .) He went to India as attendant of Sunayaśrī". 'Khon phu ba returned to Tibet when he was 30 (p. 229). The *rÑiṅ ma'i chos 'byuṅ* of Ñaṅ Ral pa can (1136-1204 A.D.) informs us that Sunayaśrī was invited after rṄog lotsāva had arrived before the king rTse lde (341.3.1 = fol. 511a1f.).

71 This part was published and translated by Karmay.

72 The same team translated Yamāri's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā* in sÑe thaṅ (southern to Lhasa) [Cordier p. 444f.], and revised an earlier translation of Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* [Cordier p. 447f.]. On Sumati(kīrti) cf. Naudou 1968: 172, 174, 185.

identification of the assembly at Tho liṅ with the religious council of the Fire-Dragon year (1076 A.D.) seems to be plausible. Otherwise one would have to admit an occurrence of two great councils one after another, whereas the Tibetan sources explicitly name the king rTse lde as a summoner of a *chos 'khor*. But Karmay's supposition requires a correction.

It has already been shown by Tucci that the expression *chos 'khor* should be understood in a special sense: "*Chos-ḥkhor* means literally *dharmacakra* and calls to mind the *dharmacakrapravartana*, the setting in motion of the wheel of Law performed by the Buddha with the preaching of the doctrine. Thus, I think that *chos-ḥkhor* might be a designation of temples in which on some occasions during the period of the kings of Guge, they convoked councils or preached the Law at least partially taking advantage of the presence of the Indian masters invited to Tibet and from the necessity to make the tradition uniform with regard to the diverse texts translated".[73]

Actually the Tibetan sources provide us with detailed accounts of the activities of the kings of Guge, the most important of which had been the invitation of Atiśa to Tibet in 1042 A.D. and the supporting of Rin chen bzaṅ po's translatory work. A long list of Indian scholars invited to Tibet and the Tibetan lotsāvas going to India (mostly to Kashmir) and Nepal gives us an impressive picture of the religious atmosphere of that period. The religious renaissance of Tibet started by Ye śes 'od and lHa lde was continued by the three sons of the latter - i.e. Byaṅ chub 'od, Źi ba 'od and 'Od lde - and found its supporter in 'Od lde's successor, rTse lde, who is credited with establishing a *chos 'khor* in 1076 A.D. It seems that, following Tucci's remark, this means establishing a kind of a religious meeting held under the royal patronage in one of the main temples in order to preach the Buddha's teachings.[74] The Indian Paṇḍits seem to have been invited specially for the purpose of bringing the corrupt translations in order as well as to prepare new translations, and the Tibetan translators have been sent to India to study the doctrine and to prepare reliable translations. Kashmir was at that time an especially important centre of such studies.

In the case of rṄog Blo ldan śes rab, he was sent to Kashmir by the king rTse lde in 1076 A.D., at the end of the famous council. It can be surmised that the lotsāvas who were present at the assembly had failed to offer a good translation of the texts. This would explain the fact of sending still more Tibetan translators to India and Nepal in large numbers immediately after the council, as well as the fact that the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* were revised (translated) several times before their final versions were accepted. rṄog lotsāva and bTsan Kha bo che (b. 1021 A.D.) studied in Kashmir under Sajjana, and "Btsan returned to Tibet before Rṅog lotsāva".[75] rṄog acquired a special patronage from the prince dBaṅ lde, rTse lde's son.[76] By the request of his royal patrons, he translated the *Pramāṇvārttikālaṃkāra*.[77] During his stay in Kashmir, in Anupama-

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[73] Tucci 1988: 72f.

[74] Cf. Paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan's account: *de dag gi skabs su* [i.e. of lHa lde and Źi ba 'od] *bstan pa 'phel ba'i dga' ston la dge 'dun gyi 'du ba rgya chen po rTse lde źes kyaṅ bya / dBaṅ lde źes kyaṅ bya ba des mdzad / dus der rṄog lo tsā ba daṅ / Dvags (xyl.: dags) po dBaṅ rgyal daṅ / bTsan Kha bo che yaṅ byon / chos kyi bgro ba maṅ du mdzad / bstan pa'i gnas tshad daṅ / 'das lo daṅ 'byuṅ 'gyur gyi tshad rnams yi ger bkod do //* [*Chos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba'i rnam gźag ji ltar grub pa'i yi ge gzu bor gnas pa'i mdzaṅs pa dga' byed* (*The Complete Works (gsuṅ 'bum) of Gser-mdog Paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan*, ed. Kunzang Tobgey, Thimphu Bhutan, vol. 16 (MA), 1975: 464,5-7). (I am grateful to Dr. D.P. Jackson for calling my attention to this text.)

[75] Roerich 1979: 347, 348.

[76] Cf. Roerich 1979: 325; Obermiller 1932: 215.

[77] Cf. Roerich 1979: 325; Obermiller 1932: 215; *The Vaidurya g.ya sel of sDe-srid sangs-rgyas-rgya-mtsho*, Vol. II, reproduced . . . by T. Tsepal Taikhang, New Delhi 1971: 953,5ff. [= IASWR microfiche LMpj 012,725 3/5; this passage is referred to in van der Kuijp 1983: 271 n. 89]. Cf. also Ñaṅ Ral pa can's *rÑiṅ ma'i chos 'byuṅ* 341.3.2ff.: *bdag kha cher 'gro bar źu źus pas </> mṅa' bdag gi źal nas paṇḍita mkhas pa 'di rnams la chos ñon gsuṅs pas </> cis kyaṅ kha cher 'gro bar*

mahāpura, in the Cakradhara monastery, rṄog lotsāva in collaboration with the Kashmirian scholar Bhavyarāja prepared a revised text of the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* and translated the huge *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*. This must have occurred sometime between 1076-1093 A.D. The translation of the latter work was then sent to Tibet (through the good offices of bTsan Kha bo che ?). Both royal patrons, Źi ba 'od and rTse lde, presented their work to the assembled translators. At that time among those invited to the *chos 'khor* were the Indian Paṇḍit Sunayaśrī from Vikramaśīla and the Kashmirian Paṇḍit Kumāraśrī from Anupama(mahāpura) who played (most probably) a leading role at the assembly. Kumāraśrī and Zaṅs dkar lotsāva revised the translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* by Bhavyarāja and rṄog lotsāva. However, their revision still could not have been accepted as a final. Then, after rṄog's arrival in Tibet, a final revision was made by the Indian scholar Sumati(kīrti) and rṄog lotsāva Blo ldan śes rab, perhaps in sÑe thaṅ (near Lhasa).[78] This may have occurred in the last decade of the 11th century.

(vi) The translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* by Bhavyarāja and rṄog lotsāva was in use for more than a century before its final version was prepared. We are informed from the colophon that the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* was revised anew (translated ?)[79] by the Indian scholar Śākyaśrībhadra (1140s-1225 A.D.) and Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ po (1182-1251 A.D.). According to David P. Jackson, their translation most probably was made in 1210 A.D.[80] This translation was later incorporated into the Tanjur.[81] In 1219 A.D. Sa skya Paṇḍita offered his own commentary both on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Pramāṇavārttika*.[82]

III. Summary

Dignāga (480-540)	Dharmakīrti (600-660)
Pramāṇasamuccaya[kārikā] (PS)	*Pramāṇavārttika[kārikā]* (PV)
Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (PSV)	*Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (PVV)

First commentators

Īśvarasena (580-640) not preserved	Devendrabuddhi[83] (630-690) preserved in Tibetan transl. by Subhūtiśrī and dGe ba'i blo gros

źu zer te ma ñan gser brdzaṅs de gtad </> *kha cher gtol tsa na* </> *rgyal po daṅ yul mi kun na re* </> *paṇḍita mkhas pa kun bod yul du bźud* </> *khyed ci byed zer nas* </> *paṇḍita gźan med dam dris pas* </> *'briṅ po 'dra yod zer bas* </> *skal ldan rgyal po la tshad ma brgyan* (read: *rgyan*) *bslabs* </>

[78] Cf. the colophon of Yamāri's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (P 5723; D 4226).

[79] It is a question of further comparative research to ascertain to what extent their work is dependent on the earlier translations.

[80] Jackson 1987: 112 and n. 59.

[81] Cf. Źa lu Tanjur catalogue (cited in note 21), pp. 620,6-621,1: *slob dpon chen po chos kyi grags pas mdzad pa'i tshad ma'i mdo kun las btus pa'i dgoṅs pa 'grel pa la / tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa / paṇḍita subhū(xyl.: bhu)tiśrīśānti daṅ / lo tsā ba dge ba'i blo gros kyi 'gyur / paṇḍita skal ldan rgyal po daṅ / rṅog lo tsā ba blo ldan śes rab kyis bcos śiṅ / slad kyi paṇḍita [621] śākyaśrībhadra daṅ / lo tsā ba kun dga' rgyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ pos gtan la phab pa /*

[82] For the details see van der Kuijp 1983 and Jackson 1987.

[83] His commentary on chapters 2-4 immediately follows Dharmakīrti's *Svavṛtti* on chap. 1. The Tibetan lotsāvas took both works as a whole, keeping the *bam po* numbering throughout. Next follow other commentaries on *Pramāṇavārttika(vṛtti)*: by Śākyamati [translators: Subhūtiśrī and dGe ba'i blo gros], Prajñākaragupta [transl.: Bhavyarāja and Blo ldan śes rab], Jina [transl.: Dīpaṃkararakṣita and Byaṅ chub śes rab], Śaṅkarānanda [transl.: not mentioned], Ravigupta [transl.: not mentioned].

Translations into Tibetan

1. *lHan kar* catal. (800-812) - incomplete, not preserved:

No. 733: *Pramāṇavārttika*
No. 734: *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*

2. Middle of the 11th c., before 1076 (*Chos 'khor*) - not preserved:

Candrarāhula[84] and
Tiṅ ṅe 'dzin bzaṅ po

Subhūtiśrīśānti[85] and
rMa dGe ba'i blo gros[86]

3. After 1076, towards the end of the 11th c.:

not preserved:

Vasudhararakṣita and
Źa ma Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan[87]
made 1076

revision of the above by Bhavyarāja and
rṄog Blo ldan śes rab[88] (1059-1109)
between 1076-1093 A.D.

Kanakavarman[89] and
Mar thuṅ Dad pa'i śes rab
made in 1076

4. Translation from the beginning of the 13th c.:[90]

This translation is preserved in the Tanjur:
Śākyaśrībhadra (1140s-1225) and Kun dga' rgyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ po, Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251)

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[84] Contemporary of Atiśa (1042 came to Tibet), a scholar from Kashmir, Śrīnagar, after having been invited, together with Tiṅ ṅe 'dzin carried out the translation (cf. Obermiller 1932: 215). Candrarāhula and Tiṅ ṅe 'dzin pa translated also commentaries by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati.

[85] Contemporary of Mar pa (1012-1096), came to Tibet after Atiśa (1042), collaborated with Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055); with Tiṅ ṅe 'dzin revised the earlier translation of the *Sambandhaparīkṣā*. rMa lo with Jñānaśrībhadra executed translation of the *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa*, most probably in Tibet, at the order of dPal lHa Źi ba 'od and the souverain dPal lHa btsan po Khri bkra śis mṅa' bdag rTse lde btsan, ca. 1050-1075 A.D. (cf. Cordier p. 439).

[86] He flourished middle of the 11th cent., see Jackson 1987: 112; but van der Kuijp 1983: 3: 1044-1089 (sic!).

[87] He was a student of rMa lo, rṄog lo and others (cf. Roerich 1979: 220.)

[88] He studied 1076-1093 in India, in Kashmir, under Ratnavajra and Bhavyarāja; also in Kashmir translated together with Pa tshab Ñi ma grags Dharmottara's *Paralokasiddhi* (cf. Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmottaras Paralokasiddhi*, Wien 1986: 12f.). rṄog prepared also a Tib. transl. of the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* during his stay in Kashmir (cf. Ernst Steinkellner und Helmut Krasser, *Dharmottaras Exkurs zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Wien 1989: 6). Blo ldan śes rab and Bhavyarāja translated also the commentary by Prajñākaragupta, which in turn was revised by Kumāraśrī and Zaṅs dkar lo 'Phags pa śes rab, towards the end of the 11th c. They also translated the *Vādanyāyavṛtti* in bSam yas. During the 1076 council of mṄa' ris, Zaṅs dkar lo translated the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* (cf. Roerich 1979: 70; van der Kuijp 1983: 31 and n. 85).

[89] He was invited by Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (b. 1055, d. after 1142), after his 23 years spent in Kashmir.

[90] See Jackson 1987: 112 and n. 59.

1219:
Commentary by Sa skya Paṇḍita on the
Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti) and the
Pramāṇavārttika(vṛtti)

5. Beginning of the 14th c. but before 1322:

Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)ṭīkā (PSṬ) by Jinendrabuddhi
(9th c.) transl. by dPaṅ lo Blo gros brtan pa (1276-1342)

Bu ston (1290-1364):

1322 *Chos 'byuṅ*:
PS - by Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan
PSV - by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab
PSṬ - by Blo gros brtan pa

1355 *Źa lu bsTan 'gyur*:
PS - by Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan
PSV - by Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan
PSṬ - by Blo gros brtan pa

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rGyal tshab (1364-1432), wrote a commentary on *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*

'Gos lo gŹon nu dpal (1392-1481) says in his *Deb ther sṅon po* (1476-1478): "Up to the present time logicians have been following this translation [= by Vasudhararakṣita and Źa ma Seṅ rgyal]" (cf. Roerich 1979: 220).

Translations of PS, PSV and PSṬ in the Tanjur:

PEKING (1724), NARTHANG (1741-42)
P 5700 PS - by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab
P 5701 PSV - by Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ ge rgyal mtshan
P 5702 PSV - by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab
P 5766 PSṬ - by Blo gros brtan pa

DERGE (1744), CONE (1753-73)
D 4203 PS - by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab
D 4204 PSV - by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab
D 4268 PSṬ - by Blo gros brtan pa

IV. Sources: Colophons

1. *Pramāṇasamuccayakārikā*
   P 5700, Ce. 1-13a5; Cordier p. 434, XCV 1

[Ce. 13b3] *Tshad ma kun las btus pa* rtsod pa pa chen po śin tu phra ba'i thugs mṅa' ba | slob dpon *Phyogs kyi* $_4$*glaṅ pos* mdzad pa rdzogs so ||
phyogs rnams kun gyi phas kyi rgol ba rnams || 'joms par byed la glaṅ po'i stobs ldan pa ||
Phyogs kyi glaṅ po'i gźuṅ kun las btus pa || bdag ñid kyi ni 'byor pa $_5$la brten nas ||
śis pa'i dge gnas gtsug lag khaṅ gnas su || rgya gar mkhan po *gSer gyi go cha* daṅ ||
sgra bsgyur lo tsā *Dad pa'i śes rab* kyis || bsgyur ciṅ źus te gtan la phab pa yin ||

1a. *Pramāṇasamuccayakārikā*
   D 4203

[Ce. 13a5] || *Tshad ma kun las btus pa* źes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa slob dpon *Phyogs kyi glaṅ pos* mdzad pa rdzogs so ||
|| rgya gar gyi mkhan po *Su dha na ra kṣi ta* daṅ | bod kyi lo tstsha ba dge bsñen *Seṅ rgyal* [6]kyis bsgyur ciṅ źus pa'o ||
|| 'jam ba'i mgon po'i bkas bskul *Phyogs kyi glaṅ po*'i bstan bcos rgya mtsho ltar zab 'di |
rigs ldan rgyal po'i bkas bskul *Nor bzaṅs sruṅ mdzad* ces bye sde bdun bśad mkhan daṅ |
gzus $_7$chuṅ ston pa'i bkas bskul dge bsñen *Seṅ rgyal* źes bya *Źa ma* lo tstshas bsgyur |
dge gaṅ bsod nams bkas bskul 'gro kun rigs lam la gnas byaṅ chub myur thob śog |

2. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*
   P 5701, Ce. 13a6-93b4; Cordier p. 434, XCV 2

[Ce. 93a8] *Tshad ma kun las btus pa'i 'grel pa* rtsod pa (D. ad.: pa) chen po śin tu phrab pa'i (D: phra ba'i) thugs mṅa' ba slob dpon *Phyogs kyi glaṅ pos* mdzad pa rdzogs so ||
[Ce. 93b1] rgya gar gyi mkhan po *Ba su dha ra rakṣi ta* daṅ | bod kyi lo tsa ba dge bsñen *Seṅ rgyal* gyis bsgyur ciṅ źus te gtan la phab pa'o ||
'jam pa'i mgon po'i bkas bskul *Phyogs kyi glaṅ po'i* bstan bcos rgya mtsho ltar zab 'di $_2$rigs ldan rgyal po'i bkas bskul *Nor 'dzin sruṅ ba* źes bya sde bdun bśad mkhan daṅ | gzus chuṅ ston pa'i bkas bskul dge bsñen (P: sñen) *Seṅ rgyal* źes bya *Źa ma* lo tsas bsgyur | dge gaṅ bsod nams bkas bskul $_3$'gro kun rigs lam la gnas byaṅ chub myur thob śog | *| rgya gar gyi mkhan po rigs pa smra ba'i gtsug gi nor bur grags pa *Ba su dha ra ra kṣi ta* daṅ | bod kyi lo tsa ba *Źa ma* dge bsñen *Seṅ rgyal* bsgyur ciṅ źus te $_4$gtan la phab pa'o ||*
--- D. om.

3. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*
   P 5702, Ce. 93b4-177a7; Cordier p. 434, XCV 3

[Ce. 177a5] || *Tshad ma kun las btus pa'i 'grel pa* rtsod pa chen po śin tu phra ba'i thugs mṅa' ba slob dpon *Phyogs kyi glaṅ pos* mdzad pa rdzogs so ||
$_6$phyogs rnams kun gyi phas kyi rgol ba rnams | 'joms par byed la glaṅ po'i stobs ldan pa |

Phyogs kyi glaṅ po'i gźuṅ kun las btus pa | bdag ñid kyi ni 'byor ba la brten nas |
śi ba'i dge gnas gtsug lag $_7$khaṅ gnas su | rgya gar mkhan po *gSer gyi go cha* daṅ |
sgra bsgyur lo tsā *Dad pa śes rab* kyis | bsgyur ciṅ źus te gtan la phab pa yin no ||

4. *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā*, Dharmakīrti
P 5709; Cordier p. 436f., XCV 10
D 4210

[Ce. 250a5] || *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa* | (D om. |, ad.: 'di ni) yul lho phyogs kyi rgyud du byuṅ ba | (D om. |) gźuṅ lug (D: lugs) ṅan ba thams cad ches śin tu 'khrul par 'jug pa | $_6$sñan pa'i grags pas sa'i steṅ pa (? ma) lus pa (D: par) khyab pa | 'gran zla med pa'i mkhas pa chen po dpal *Chos kyi grags pas* mdzad pa rdzogs so ||
rgya gar gyi mkhan po (D ad.: dge sloṅ) *Su bhū ti śri śā nti* daṅ | bod kyi lo tsa ba *dGe ba'i blo gros* kyis bsgyur |

$_7$*yaṅ paṇḍi ta *sKal ldan rgyal po* daṅ |
dge sloṅ *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis cuṅ zad bcos |*
dpal ldan dam pa'i las la mṅon dgyes (D: dges) pa |
smad med che ba'i bdag can rgyal po (?) mchog ||
dge ba'i thugs mṅa' ṅes bas sa (D: des pas) skyoṅ ba ||
mi yi bdag po dbaṅ $_8$lde'i bkas bskul nas ||
brtson ldan lhag par dpyod ldan 'chad po daṅ ||
ñan po rgol daṅ phyir rgol don ṅes daṅ ||
'bel (D: 'brel) gtam dga' ston rgya chen myoṅ gyi (D: bya'i) phyir ||
'dzam gliṅ mkhas pa'i rgyan gyur rgyan 'di bsgyur ||
lha ṅan kun sel [250b1] gñen (D: gñis) su med pa'i (D: yi) ||
don dam rnam dpyod lhur len bstan bcos 'di ||
gźuṅ maṅ don dka' sgrub par dka' na yaṅ ||
'bras bu che phyir 'bad par rigs pa yin ||
log pa'i rgyun phyogs rjes su gźol gyur pa ||
lta ba'i chu bo bzlog par dka' mod $_2$kyi ||
yaṅ dag rigs (D: rig) pas legs par brda sprad na ||
'ga' yi yid la ci ste 'bab mi 'gyur ||
sgra don gñis ka ñams su bder lon te ||
mun sprul gyis ni ma bslar (D: bslad) legs bsgyur ba (D: ||)
sdon gyi sgyur byed dam pa de dag gi |
dri tsam bro ba da lta kho bor $_3$zad ||
dpal ldan kha che'i rigs (D: rig) pa pa'i ||
gtsug gi nor bu skal ldan ni ||
rgyal po źes bya la thos nas ||
Blo ldan bzaṅ pos 'di bsgyur ro ||

groṅ khyer chen po dpe med kyi śar phyogs na | yul 'khor lo 'dzin (D ad.: pa) źes bya ba | grub pa'i $_4$gnas su grags pa'i 'dabs rnam par rgyal ba'i źiṅ źes bya bar | kha che'i paṇḍi ta chen po *sKal ldan rgyal po* daṅ | bod kyi lo tsa ba chen po dge sloṅ *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis bsgyur ba'o || dus phyis sa'i steṅ na 'gran zla thams cad daṅ $_5$bral ba'i mkhas pa bsod sgoms (D: sñoms) pa chen po || (D om. ||) *Śākya śrī bha dra* la sogs pa rnams daṅ | śākya'i dge sloṅ *Kun dga' rgyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ pos* | bsgyur ciṅ źus te gtan la bab pa | (D: pa'o ||)

Chos kyi grags pa'i gsuṅ rab dri ma med | rigs $_6$pa'i mthar thug *Tshad ma rnam 'grel* 'di | sgra don ji bźin blo yis legs rtogs nas | ston pa gaṅs can 'di ni kho bo tsham ||*
---- D om.

5. *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Dharmakīrti
   P 5710; Cordier p. 437, XCV 11

[Ce. 329a7] || *Tshad ma rnam par ṅes pa* źes bya ba | yul lho phyogs kyi rgyud $_8$du byuṅ ba | gźuṅ lugs ṅan pa thams cad chos (?) śin tu 'khrul par 'jug pa | stan ba'i grags pas sa'i steṅ ma lus par khyab pa | 'gran zla med pa'i mkhas pa chen po | dpal *Chos kyi grags pa*s [329b1] mdzad pa rdzogs so ||
rgya gar gyi kha che'i paṇḍi ta *gŹan la phan pa bzaṅ po* la sogs pa daṅ | lo tsā ba *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis | kha che'i groṅ khyer dpe med du bsgyur ba'o ||

6. *Sambandhaparīkṣāprakaraṇa*, Dharmakīrti
   P 5714; Cordier p. 438, XCV 14
   D 4214

[Ce. 358a6] *'Brel pa brtag pa'i rab tu byed pa* | slob dpon mkhas pa chen po *Chos kyi grags pa*s mdzad pa rdzogs so || rgya gar gyi mkhan po *Jñā na ga (r)bha* daṅ | lo tsa (tsā) $_7$ba ban de *Nam mkha*s bsgyur ba'o || (D: bsgyur |) *slad kyi paṇḍi ta *Rab 'byor źi ba* daṅ | lo tsā ba *Tiṅ ṅe 'dzin bzaṅ po*s bcos śiṅ gtan la phab pa(’o) ||*
---- P. om.

7. *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa*, Dharmakīrti
   P 5715; Cordier p. 438f., XCV 16

[Ce. 400a4] slob dpon chen po *Dha rma kīr ti*'i źal sṅa nas kyis mdzad pa rtsod pa'i $_5$rig pa źes pa'i rab tu byed pa rdzogs so || dpal lha btsun pa *Źi ba 'od* źal sṅa nas daṅ | dpal lha btsan po khri bkra śis mṅa' bdag *rTse lde btsan* gyi źal sṅa nas kyis bkas | $_6$rgya gar gyi mkhan po chen po *Jñā na śrī ba dh(r)a*'i źal sṅa nas daṅ | dge sloṅ *dGe ba'i blo gro*s kyis bsgyur ciṅ źus te gtan la phab pa'o || || slad kyis kyaṅ paṇḍi ta chen po *Dhi baṅ ka ra* daṅ | lo tsa $_7$ba dge sloṅ *Dar ma grags* kyis źus śiṅ gtan la phab pa'o ||

8. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*
   P 5717(a); Cordier p. 439, XCV 18

[Ce. 535a2] || rigs pa chen po sa'i steṅ ma lus pa na smra ba'i glaṅ po che'i spyi bo gnon par mdzad pa'i seṅ ge $_3$phyogs ma lus par sñan par grags pa can || dpal slob dpon *Chos kyi grags pa*s sbyar ba las | *Tshad ma* $_4$*rnam 'grel* gyi le'u daṅ po'i *'grel pa* rdzogs so || lan cig źas (źus) ||

9. *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*, Devendrabuddhi
   P 5717(b); Cordier p. 439f., XCV 18 - XCVI

[Che. 390a4] | *Tshad ma rnam 'grel* las *gŹan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa*'i le'u ste bźi pa'o ||
phal cher skal ba med ñid daṅ | $_{5}$du la sdod pa med pa daṅ |
goms pa'i phyir ni mdor bsdus nas | kho bos dka' 'grel 'di byas so ||
smra ba chen po slob dpon *lHa dbaṅ blos* $_{6}$mdzad pa || *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi dka' 'grel* rdzogs so ||
bstan pa gsal daṅ yun riṅ gnas don daṅ | 'grol phan phyir rigs $_{7}$pa'i bstan bcos dag | bsgyur bas bsod nams rnam dgag pa (?) skyes pas || 'khor ba las brgal sku gsum thob par śog | bde skyid dpal lha btsan po lha btsun $_{8}$byaṅ chub 'od kyi bka' luṅ gis so || rgya gar gyi mkhan po chen po *Su bhū ti śrī* daṅ || sgra sgyur gyi lo tsā ba dge sloṅ *dGe ba'i blo gro*s kyis bsgyur ba'o || lan cig źus ||

10. *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*, Śākyamati
    P 5718; Cordier p. 440f., XCVII-XCVIII

[Ñe. 348a5] slob dpon $_{6}$*Śā kya blo*s sbyar ba las *Tshad ma rnam 'grel* gyi le'u bźi ba'i *Ṭī ka*'o || mu stegs rdzun ba'i rtog ge thams cad 'joms nus bstan bcos lugs bzaṅs thams cad kyi ||
cha tsam bdag gis bśad pas mi g.yo śin tu brtan pa'i $_{7}$bsod nams skyes thob pa ||
des na (?) sems can tshogs 'di srid pa gsum pa'i rgya mtsho dag las yoṅs draṅs nas |
tshaṅs sogs kyis kyaṅ thob min saṅs rgyas go 'phaṅ dri med rtag tu thob par śog |
bcom ldan $_{8}$'das 'jam pa'i dbyaṅs kyi źabs sgom pa ||
slob dpon *Śā kya'i blos* sbyar ba *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel bśad* rdzogs so || || 'di ni lo tsa ba *rMa dGe ba'i blo gros* kyis bsgyur ba'o || maṅgālaṃ | lan cig źus |

11. *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*, Prajñākaragupta
    P 5719; Cordier p. 441f., XCIX - C
    D 4221, *----* = colophon, The. 282a5-7 (!)

[P The. 343a5; D The. 282a5] *|| *Tshad ma*'i bśad pa chen po *rnam 'grel gyi rgyan* $_{6}$las | slob dpon (D ad.: mkhas pa) chen po *Śes rab 'byuṅ gnas sbas pa*'i źal sṅa nas (D om.: nas) kyi (D: kyis) mdzad pa rdzogs so || || bam po drug cu lhag chad med par yod do || | kha che'i mkhan po paṇḍi ta *sKal ldan* $_{7}$*rgyal po* daṅ | lo tstsha ba dge sloṅ *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis bsgyur | slad kyi (D: kyis) kha che'i mkhan po paṇḍi ta *Ku mā ra śrī* daṅ | źu chen gyi (D ad.: lotsāba) dge sloṅ *'Phags pa śen* gyis (D: śes rab kyis) źus śiṅ bcos te gtan la $_{8}$phab pa ||*
bod kyi dpal lha btsan po || rigs gsum mgon po'i sprul pa | byaṅ chub sems dpa'i gduṅ brgyud | mi rje lhas mdzad pa | 'phul gyi rgyal po chen po śākya'i dge sloṅ [343b1] lha bla ma *Źi ba 'od* kyi źal sṅa nas daṅ | dbaṅ phyug dam pa'i mṅa' bdag chen po khri bkris *(r)Tse lde btsan* gyi źal sṅa nas rgyal po'i yaṅ rgyal po'i chen po khu dpon gyi sku riṅ la | bod kyi rgyal khams su $_{2}$bstan pa rin po che dar śiṅ rgyas par mdzad pa'i slad du | yon gyi bdag po chen po mdzad de | 'gyur ma dag pa kun bcos śiṅ | ma 'gyur ba rnams bsgyur ba daṅ | dam pa'i chos rgya cher $_{3}$bśad ciṅ | chos mi mthun pa rnams gtan la dbab pa'i sgo nas | bod 'baṅs yoṅs la drin bźag pa'i thugs dgoṅs kyis rgya gar dbus bhraṃ (?) *Ka ma śī la*'i gtsug lag khaṅ chen po mkhas pa $_{4}$maṅ po 'byuṅ ba'i gnas nas | paṇḍi ta mkhas pa chen po dpal *Su na ya śrī mi tra* dga' ba chen pos spyan draṅs | kha che'i groṅ khyer dpe med nas kyi paṇḍi ta mkhas pa *Ku mā ra śrī* spyan draṅs | bod $_{5}$nas dbus gtsaṅ ru bźi daṅ | khams

rgya'i so yan chad kyi ston pa ma lus pa dań | stod mńa' ris skor gsum gyi ser chags ma lus pa tsam źabs druń chen por tshogs | stod smad kyi lo tstsha ba $_6$mkhas pa yań drug bsogs nas | yab med khu dpon gyi thugs dam | sa'i sñiń po tho liń dpal dpe med lhun gyis grub pa'i gtsug lag khań chen por paṇḍi ta dań | gźi byed kyi mkhas pa $_7$rnams kyis theg pa phyi nań gi chos grva mań por dpal ldan dam pa'i las la mńon dgyes pa |

smad med che ba'i bdag can rgyal po mchog | dge ba'i thugs mńa' de bas sa skyoń ba |
mi'i bdag $_8$po dbań sde'i bkas bskul nas | brtson ldan lhag par spyod ldan 'chad po dań |
ñan po rgol dań phyir rgol don ńes dań | 'brel gtam dga' ston rgya cher myoń bya'i phyir |
'dzam gliń mkhas [344a1] pa'i rgyan gyur rgyan 'di bsgyur | lta ńan kun sel gñis su med pa yi |
don dam rnam dpyod lhur len bstan bcos 'di | gźuń mań don mań bsgrub par dka' na yań |
$_2$'bras bu che phyir 'bad par rigs pa yin | log ba'i rgyun phyogs rjes su gźol gyur pa |
lta ba'i chu bo bzlog par dka' mod kyi | yań dag rigs pas legs par brda sbrad (? sprad) na |
dga' $_3$yi yid la ci ste 'bab mi 'gyur | sgra don gñi ga ñams su bdeb (?) lon te |
mun sprul gyis ni ma bslad legs bsgyur ba | sńon gyi sgyur byed dam pa de dag gi |
dri tsam bro bar (?) ltar kho bor zad | $_4$dpal ldan kha che'i regs pa yi |
gtsug gi nor bu skal ldan ni | rgyal po źes bya las thos nas |
*blo ldan bzań po*s 'di bsgyur ro | groń khyer dpe med śar phyogs na |

yul 'khor lo $_5$'dzin ces bya ba grub pa'i gnas rab grags pa yod pa'i 'dabs | rnam par rgyal ba'i źiń źes bya bar kha che'i paṇḍi ta chen po *sKal ldan rgyal po* dań | bod kyi lo tstsha ba *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis bsgyur ba | $_6$slad kyi paṇḍi ta *Su ma ti ra* dań | lo tstsha ba *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis źu chen byas pa'o || || bkra śis par gyur cig || mańgālaṃ

12. *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra-*, Jina
P 5720; Cordier p. 442f., CI - CII

[Ne. 375a3] *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgyan gyi 'grel bśad* slob dpon *rGyal ba can* gyi źal sńa nas mdzad pa rdzogs so ||

|| bcom ldan 'das rigs gsum mgon po'i sprul $_4$pa | byań chub sems dpa'i gduń brgyud mi rje lhas mdzad pa bod kyi lha btsan po śākya'i dge sloń lha bla ma *Źi ba 'od* kyi źal sńa nas dań | bod kyi lha $_5$btsan po dbań phyug dam pa'i mńa' bdag chen po khri bkra śis *rTse lde btsan* gyi źal sńa nas | rgyal po'i yań rgyal po chen po 'phrul gyi lha btsan po khu dpon gyi $_6$bkas | thugs dam sa'i sñiń po tho liń dpal dpe med lhun gyi grub pa'i gtsug lag khań du | rgya gar gyi mkhan po dpal bi kra ma la $_7$śī la'i mkhas pa chen po paṇḍi ta ś(r)ī *Dī paṃ ka ra rakṣi ta* dań | źań źuń gi lo tsa ba chen po mań 'or bande de *Byań chub śes rab* kyis nan tan sñiń por $_8$byas nas gtan la phab par bsgyur ba'o || bstan bcos 'di'i gźuń gi tshad ni bam po drug cu yin no || || mańgālaṃ |

13. *Pramāṇavārttika-*, Śańkarānanda (Śańkaranandana)
P 5721; Cordier p. 443, CIII

[Pe. 338a8] | bram ze chen pos mdzad pa'i *rNam 'grel rjes 'brańs* ji sñed 'gyur ba'o || bkra śis ||

14. *Pramāṇavārttika-*, Ravigupta
P 5722; Cordier p. 443f., CIV 1

[Phe. 208a5] | rtog ge'i sgro nam sñiṅ po'i don | *Tshad ma mam 'grel lHa dbaṅ blo*s |
mun par byas pa śes rab źabs | drin gyis bris las gsal gyur cig |
*Tshad $_6$ma mam 'grel gyi 'grel pa ź*es bya ba las le'u gsum pa'i bśad pa'o || slob dpon chen po *Śes rab 'byuṅ gnas spas pa*'i slob dpon *Ñi ma spas pa*'i źal sṅa nas mdzad $_7$pa rdzogs so ||

15. *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra-*, Yamāri
P 5723; Cordier p. 444f., CIV 2, CV, CVI, CVII

[Tse. 320b8] dpal ldan dbaṅ rgyal dbaṅ phyug lha bur 'byor ldan kun la khyab pa yis |
grags pa gsal ldan zla 'dra'i gźi gyur mchog tu yaṅ dag la gnas pa | [321a1]
raṅ daṅ yid can mkhas pa rnams kyi rtag par śin tu brjod bya gaṅ |
sems can don la mṅon par dgag pa'i sdom rtson dam $_2$pa de'i ṅor (?) |
blo bzaṅ gaṅ na blo bzaṅ blo gros bzaṅ po daṅ |
sgra bsgyur rnams kyi rgyun gyur blo ldan bzaṅ po yis |
rnam 'grel dam $_3$pa'i rgyan du gyur pa'i *Ṭpi* (!) *ka* 'di |
sñe thaṅ brag sna bkra śis gtsug lag khaṅ du bsgyur |
Tshad ma rgyan gyi ṭpi (!) *ka* paṇḍi ta *Su ma ti* daṅ | lo tstsha *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis bsgyur ba'o ||
rṄog lo tsa ba chen po'i phyag bris dṅos la ma dpe (?) bgyis nas bris pa lags so || kra śis || dge'o ||

16. *Vādanyāyavṛtti*, Śāntarakṣita
P 5725; Cordier p. 445f., CVIII 2

[Tshe. 137a5] śiṅ rta chen rnams sgro 'dogs med mdzad pa |
bdag gis cuṅ zad cig ni byar med pas |
de lta na yaṅ blo dman $_6$rtogs pa'i phyir |
rTsod pa'i rigs pa'i mam 'grel 'di byas so ||
rTsod pa'i rigs pa'i 'grel pa don mam par 'byed pa ces bya ba |
slob dpon chen po *Śā nta ra kṣi ta*s mdzad pa rdzogs so ||
$_7$dpal tshaṅs pa'i 'byuṅ gnas bsam yas kyi gtsug lag khaṅ du | rgya gar gyi mkhan po *Ku mā ra śrī bha dra* daṅ | bod kyi lo tsa ba dge sloṅ *'Phags pa śes rab* daṅ | *'Bro seṅ dkar* gyis bsgyur ciṅ źus te gtan $_8$la phab pa'o ||

17. *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*, Ravigupta
P 5726; Cordier p. 446, CVIII 3

[Tshe. 266a5] || bla ma dam pa | dge ba'i bśes gñen *Śes rab 'byuṅ gnas* kyi źabs la bdud de bsten nas | $_6$*Ñi ma sbas pa*s sbyar ba | *Tshad ma mam 'grel gyi 'grel pa* las | tshad ma'i mtshan ñid gyi le'u ste gñis pa'o |||| lan gcig (!) źus || maṅgālaṃ ||

18. *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, Dharmottara
    P 5727; Cordier p. 446f., CIX, CX 1

[We. 209b5] slob dpon *Chos mchog* gis sbyar ba *rNam par ṅes pa'i ṭī ka 'Thad ldan* źes bya ba rdzogs so | |

bstan bcos chen po don daṅ tshig tu bcas | legs rtogs 'gro na ñi bźin gsal byed pa |
$_6$tshul khrims gtsaṅ ma'i dri ṅad ldaṅ ba gaṅ | slob dpon *Chos mchog* rtog ge ṅan 'joms mchog|
yaṅ dag don gsal tshad ma'i bstan bcos 'di | legs par bsgyur las byuṅ ba'i $_7$bsod nams gaṅ |
des ni log lta'i rgyun phyogs skye bo rnams | yaṅ dag rigs pa'i lam du 'jug par śog | |

kha che'i paṇḍi ta *gŹan la phan pa bzaṅ po* la sogs pa daṅ | $_8$bod kyi lo tstsha ba *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis groṅ khyer dpe med du bsgyur pa'o | |

19. *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, Jñānaśrībhadra
    P 5728; Cordier p. 447, CX 2

[We. 355a4] *Tshad ma rnam par ṅes pa'i 'grel bśad* ma bas (?) pa'i grags pas rgya mtsho'i mthas klas phar khyad $_5$pa | slob dpon *Ye śes dpal bzaṅ po*'i źal sṅa nas mdzad pa rdzogs so | | gnas brtan mkhas pa chen po *Jñā na śrī bha dra* daṅ | lo tstsha ba dge sloṅ *Chos kyi brtson 'grus* $_6$kyis bsgyur | | khyuṅ po mchan bźi khams zla hor phrug gis sbyin par bya ba'i chos rnams ñe bar sbyar źiṅ gsel ba btab nas | gźuṅ ñe bar sbyar te brtsams nas bsgyur ba lags so | |

20. *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, Dharmottara
    P 5730; Cordier p. 447f., CXI 2

[Ze. 112b6] *Rigs pa'i thigs pa* $_7$źes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa'i *rGya cher 'grel pa* slob dpon *Chos mchog* gis mdzad pa rdzogs so | |
rgya gar gyi mkhan po *Jñā na garbha* daṅ | źu chen gyi lo tsa ba dge sloṅ *Dharma ā le kas* bsgyur ciṅ $_8$źus te gtan la phab pa | | rgya gar gyi mkhan po *Su ma ti kī rti* daṅ | bod kyi lo tsa ba dge sloṅ *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis slad kyi yul dbus kyi dpe daṅ gtugs te legs par bsgyur ciṅ źus te [113a1] gtan la phab pa'o | |

21. *Hetubinduvivaraṇa*, Arcaṭa
    P 5734; Cordier p. 448f., CXI 6

[Ze. 402a6] *gTan tshigs thigs pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa* bram ze *A ca ṭas* rnam par sbyar ba rdzogs so | | $_7$'dzam gliṅ sñiṅ po kha che'i groṅ khyer du | mkhas pa'i sñiṅ po *Chos kyi grags pa*'i 'grel | dam chos sñiṅ po tshad ma bsgyur ba las | sñiṅ po med pa rnams kyi sñiṅ $_8$por śog | | | bkra śis | | maṅgā laṃ | |

22. *Vādanyāyavṛtti Vipañcitārthānāma*, Śāntarakṣita
    P 5738; Cordier p. 450, CXII 4

[Ze. 183a5] *rTsod pa'i rigs* $_6$*pa'i 'grel pa don rnam par 'byed pa* źes bya ba | slob dpon chen po *Śā nta*

*ra kṣi ta*s mdzad pa rdzogs so || dpal tshaṅs pa'i 'byuṅ gnas bsam yas kyi gtsug lag khaṅ du | rgya gar gyi mkhan po $_{7}$*Ku ma ra śrī bha dra* daṅ | bod kyi lo tstsha ba dge sloṅ *'Phags pa śes rab* daṅ | *'Bro Seṅ dkar* gyis bsgyur ciṅ źus te gtan la phab pa'o ||

23. *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*, Dharmottara
    P 5746; Cordier p. 451, CXII 12

[Ze. 236b1] *Tshad ma brtag pa* slob dpon *Chos mchog* gis mdzad pa rdzogs so || dge sloṅ *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis bsgyur ba'o ||

24. *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*, Dharmottara
    P 5747; Cordier p. 452, CXII 13

[Ze. 252b4] slob dpon *Chos mchog* gis mdzad pa *Tshad ma brtag pa* źes bya ba rdzogs so || lo tsā ba dge sloṅ *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis bsgyur ba'o ||

25. *A[nyā]pohaprakaraṇa*, Dharmottara
    P 5748; Cordier p. 452, CXII 14

[Ze. 264a7] slob dpon *Chos mchog* gis mdzad pa *gŹan sel ba* źes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa rdzogs so || kha che'i paṇḍi ta *sKal ldan rgyal po* daṅ | lo tsā ba dge sloṅ *Blo ldan śes rab* $_{8}$kyis kha che'i groṅ khyer dpe med du bsgyur ba'o ||

26. *Paralokasiddhi*, Dharmottara
    P 5749; Cordier p. 452, CXII 15

[Ze. 267b5] *'Jig rten pha rol grub pa* źes bya ba slob dpon *Chos mchog* gis $_{6}$mdzad pa rdzogs so || groṅ khyer chen po dpe med kyi dbus ratnarasa me'i gtsug lag khaṅ du kha che'i rgyal po śrī *Ha ri śa de ba*'i sku riṅ la | kha che'i paṇḍi ta chen po *sKal ldan rgyal po* daṅ | bod kyi sgra bsgyur gyi lo tsā ba $_{7}$dge sloṅ *Pa tshab Ñi ma grags* kyis bsgyur ba'o ||

27. *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, Dharmottara
    P 5751; Cordier p. 452, CXII 17

[Ze. 278a7] rigs pa chen po lta ba ṅan pa'i rab rib ma lus pa 'joms par mdzad pa sa'i $_{8}$ste ṅan rgyal ba'i mdzad pa la de ñid gñis par gyur pa | dpal slob dpon *Chos kyi grags pa*'i legs par bśad pa mchog gi thugs yoṅs su rgyas pa tshul khrims rin po che daṅ | rtsom pa dam pa'i rgyan daṅ go chas rnam par mdzes [Ze. 278b1] śiṅ mi bzlog pa'i chos can slob dpon *Chos mchog* gi sbyar ba skad cig ma 'jig pa grub pa źes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa rdzogs so || rgya gar gyi mkhan po *sKal ldan rgyal po* daṅ | lo tsā ba dge sloṅ *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis bsgyur $_{2}$ba'o ||

28. *Apohasiddhi*, Śaṅkarānanda (Śaṅkaranandana)
P 5754; Cordier p. 453, CXII 17

[Ze. 325a5] mkhas rlom pas kyaṅ gaṅ la ji bźin blo ma rñed |
rab brtags tshig la'aṅ gsal 'dzin rmoṅs pas phoṅs gyur pa |
$_6$mu stegs lha (? lta) ṅan rgya cher 'joms pa'i *gŹan sel* 'di |
ji bźin gtan la mkhas rnams dpyod par mi byod dam | |
gŹan sel ba grub pa | dge bsñen dam pa | mkhas pa chen po bram ze *Śam ka ra nanda*s mdzad pa rdzogs $_7$so | | groṅ khyer dpe med du | kha che'i paṇḍi ta *Ma no ra tha* daṅ | lo tsā ba *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis bsgyur ba'o | | bsgyur dpe la gtugs | |

29. *Pratibandhasiddhi*, Śaṅkarānanda (Śaṅkaranandana)
P 5755; Cordier p. 453f., CXII 21

[Ze. 326a6] *'Brel pa grub pa* slob dpon mkhas $_7$pa chen po bram ze'i rigs su sku 'khruṅs pa *Chos kyi grags pa* gñis pa źes 'jig rten na gtan du grags śiṅ rtog ge pa phal bo'i gźuṅ 'jig pa daṅ | thogs pa med pa don gyi de kho na rnam par 'jog pa'i blo'i mthu stobs kyis 'gran blo $_8$daṅ bral ba | bde bar gśegs pa'i bstan pa la gces spas su 'dzin pas legs par bśad pa'i ro myaṅ ba la sems gcig tu gźol ba dge bsñen dam pa *Śaṅka rā nanda*s mdzad pa rdzogs so | | paṇḍi ta *sKal ldan rgyal po* daṅ | [Ze. 326b1] lo tsā ba *Blo ldan śes rab* kyis bsgyur ba'o | |

30. *Yuktiprayoga*, Ratnavajra
P 5761; Cordier p. 455, CXII 27

[Ze. 361a7] kha che yul gyi mkhas po chen po dṅos $_7$grub brñes pa bram ze'i slob dpon chen po *Rin chen rdo rje*'i źal sṅa nas kyis mdzad pa *Rigs pa'i sbyor ba* źes bya ba rdzogs so | | rgya gar gyi mkhan po chen po dpal *Rab 'byor źi ba*'i źal sṅa nas daṅ | źu chen gyi lo tsā ba dge sloṅ *Tiṅ ṅe 'dzin bzaṅ po*s bsgyur ciṅ gtan la phab pa'o | |

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Chos 'byuṅ — Bu ston (1290-1364), *bDe bar gśegs pa'i bstan pa'i gsal byed chos kyi 'byuṅ gnas gSuṅ rab rin po che'i mdzod chos 'byuṅ*. In *The Collected Works of Bu-ston. Part 24 (Ya)*. Ed. Lokesh Chandra. New Delhi 1971, 633-1055,1.

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WZKS(O) — *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-* (vols. 1-13: *und Ost-*)*asiens*

THE LATER MĀDHYAMIKA AND DHARMAKĪRTI

by

Seitetsu Moriyama, Kyōto

Here I define later Mādhyamika as the tradition of philosophy developed and practiced by Jñānagarbha (c. 8th century), Śāntarakṣita (c. 725-784), Kamalaśīla (c. 740-797), and Haribhadra (c. 800). It can be said that a very important task for the later Mādhyamika was to answer the objections raised against their theory. There are two main issues - viz., how to prove and perceive the Mādhyamika theory of the non-substantial (*niḥsvabhāva*) character of all *dharma*s from the standpoint of absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*), and how to establish conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*). When they discuss these two issues, they borrow remarkably from Dharmakīrti's theory as regards conventional truth, but reject it from the standpoint of absolute truth.

I would like to discuss here their borrowing from and criticism of Dharmakīrti's theory and their tradition. I will treat the following texts:

Jñānagarbha's	*Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā* (SD)
	Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti (SDV)
Śāntarakṣita's	*Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* (SDP)
	Madhyamakālṃkārakārikā (MA)
	Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti (MAV)
Kamalaśīla's	*Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* (MAP)
	Madhyamakāloka (MĀ)
	Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi (SDhNS)
	Bhāvanākrama
Haribhadra's	*Abhisamayālaṃkarālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyakhyā* (AA)
Dharmakīrti's	*Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter III (PV III)
	Hetubindu (HB)
	Nyāyabindu (NB)
	Vādanyāya (VN)
Dharmottara's	*Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (NBṬ)
Śāntarakṣita's	*Vādanyāyaṭīkā* (VNṬ)

I will examine the relationship of the later Mādhyamika to Dharmakīrti in two respects: one is their borrowings from Dharmakīrti, which are found in their theory of the two truths and in a yogin's direct perception of the non substantial (*niḥsvabhāva*) character of all *dharma*s. I will examine these questions in nos. (1) and (2) below. The other is their criticism of Dharmakīrti's theories of causality and of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). I will examine these questions in nos. (3), (4), (5), and (6).

Their argumentation can be summed up as follows:

(1) In SDV 8 and 12 (5b2-7, 6b5-7a1) Jñānagarbha discusses the issue of correct (*tathya*) and incorrect (*atathya*) conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*). How does he distinguish between correct and incorrect? His idea is based on Dharmakīrti's theory of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and incorrect perception (*pratyakṣābha*). This idea of Jñānagarbha is handed down to Śāntarakṣita et al.

(2) In SDV 37 (14a3f.) Jñanagarbha states that the Omniscient One sees by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) the non-substantial (*niḥsvabhāva*) character of all things. Kamalaśīla says in his *Madhyamakāloka* (P 185b5-186b3; D 170a5-171a2) that the Omniscient One can recognize non-substantiality

(*niḥsvabhāva*) by means of the yogin's direct perception (*yogipratyakṣa*), which is one of the four categorized *pratyakṣa*s in Dharmakīrti's theory.

(3) In SDV 13 (7a2-4) he tries to refute Dharmakīrti's theory of causality according to which causality can be proved by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*).[1]

(4) In SDV 14 and 15 (7a6-8b1, 9a2-b2) Jñānagarbha also tries to refute Dharmakīrti's theory by a method of reasoning named later in Tibet the negation of the four points of origination (*catuṣkoṭy-utpādapratiṣedhahetu*).[2] Later I will give the reason for believing that Dharmakīrti's theory is the target of this attack. This way of attack is also handed down to Śāntarakṣita et al.

(5) There is a controversy between the Mādhyamika and their opponent in Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* (P 149a7-b4; D 138b3-7). The former states that all *dharma*s are non-substantial (*niḥsvabhāva*) because they are dependently originated (*pratītyasamutpāda*). On the other hand, the latter puts forward the idea that all existences which have the potential of producing effects (*arthakriyāsamartha*) are substantial (*sasvabhāvatā*) because they are dependently originated.

Moreover the opponent attacks the Mādhyamika's theory as follows: the reasoning put forward by the Mādhyamika is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) and contradictory (*viruddha*). If existences (*vastu*) do not have substance from the viewpoint of the absolute, then they do not have substance from the viewpoint of the conventional, either.

(6) In the *pūrvapakṣa* of the *Madhyamakāloka* (P 144a8-b5; D 134a7-b4) there is an objection to the Mādhyamika school's theory of emptiness (*śūnyatā*): the emptiness of all entities (*vastu*) cannot be proved by means of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) [that is one of the two *pramāṇa*s] because the domain of direct perception is an entity and an existent is a thing which has the capacity to produce effects (*arthakriyāśakti*). Moreover if it can be perceived by means of direct perception, then [according to the opponent of the Mādhyamika school], emptiness is tantamount to perceiving the location X where an object Y is lacking.

What does the proponent of the emptiness of all *dharma*s directly perceive and how does he perceive emptiness? It will be shown later that this opponent is Dharmakīrti. Now I will consider nos. (1)-(6) from the point of view of the two truths (*satyadvaya*).

No. (1) above has to do with argumentation concerning the establishment of conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*). On the other hand, no. (2) is a debate concerning how and by whom *niḥsvabhāva* can be perceived from the point of view of absolute truth.

Nos. (3) and (4) have to do with argumentation concerning the non-substantial (*niḥsvabhāva*) character of all things; this argumentation purports to refute Dharmakīrti's theory of causation from the point of view of absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*). This is because Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla clearly state that causation is acknowledged from the point of view of conventional truth.

No. (5) is a debate concerning dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Kamalaśīla discusses dependent origination from the viewpoint of the two truths in his *Madhyamakāloka* and *Bhāvanākrama* as follows:[3] a thing which has no cause even in the conventions of daily life (*saṃvṛti*) is not produced even from the viewpoint of the conventional, such as the horns of a rabbit, etc. On the other

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[1] Cf. Y. Kajiyama, "Trikapañcakacintā: Development of the Buddhist Theory on the Determination of Causality", in *Y. Kajiyama, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy*, ed. Katsumi Mimaki, Kyoto 1989, 475-489.

[2] Cf. Christian Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and its Sources", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9, 1981, 161-214, esp. 207. Tom J. F. Tillemans, "Two Tibetan Texts on the Neither One Nor Many-Argument for *śūnyatā*", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12, 1984: 375-388, esp. 361, 371.

[3] MĀ P 184a7-b2; D 169a3-5 = The First *Bhāvanākrama*, in *Minor Buddhist Texts, Part I & II*, ed. G. Tucci, repr. Kyoto 1978: 218f., 22a1-3

hand one which has a cause with no ultimate substantiality is produced, such as an illusion of magic (*māyā*) or reflection (*pratibimba*). Even though this illusion is dependently originated (*pratītya-samutpāda*) in the convention of daily life, it is not existent from the viewpoint of the ultimate (*paramārthataḥ*). This is because it is rejected by investigation and examination (*pramāṇa*).


Similarly, even though all *dharmas* are dependently originated, they are not existences at all from the viewpoint of the ultimate. This is because they are rejected by examination.

No. (6) is an argument concerning two kinds of emptiness (*śūnyatā*). According to the *uttarapakṣa* in Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* (P 185a4-b5; D 169b6-170a5), the emptiness asserted by his opponent is relative (*itaretaraśūnyatā*), that is, not absolute, while the emptiness meant by the Mādhyamika is a lack of marks (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*), that is, absolute.

I will examine the essential parts of each debate in turn in order to clarify their relation to Dharmakīrti.

No. (1) Śāntarakṣita states in his SDP 12 that there are three kinds of conventional (*saṃvṛti*) [truth]: one is correct conventional [truth] (*tathyasaṃvṛti*), the remaining two are incorrect conventional [truth] (*atathyasaṃvṛti*); one of these involves imagination (*savikalpa*) and the other does not (*nirvikalpa*).[4]

The meaning can be illustrated thus:



According to Jñānagarbha's and Śāntarakṣita's idea, correct conventional truth pertains to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). On the other hand, incorrect conventional truth does not. They are distinguished from each other on the basis of capacity (*arthakriyāsamartha*) or incapacity to produce effects.

Where does Śāntarakṣita get this idea of dividing incorrect conventional truth into the imaginary and the non-imaginary from? Moreover, (a) and (c) above are similar in that they involve an appearance (*ābhāsa*) and do not involve imagination (*nirvikalpa*). How, then, does he find a way of differentiating (a) from (c)? Dharmakīrti divides incorrect direct perceptions (*pratyakṣābha*) into two kinds, the imaginary and the non-imaginary, in PV III 299 and 300:

> *suptasya jāgrato vāpi yaiva dhīḥ sphuṭabhāsinī /*
> *sā nirvikalpobhayathāpy anyathaiva vikalpikā //* (299)
>
> "Whether they are a cognition of one who is sleeping or a cognition of one who is awake, when they present a clear appearance, they do not involve imagination (*nirvikalpa*), otherwise they do involve it."
>
> *tasmāt tasyāvikalpe 'pi prāmāṇyaṃ pratiṣidhyate /*
> *visaṃvādāt tadarthañ ca pratyakṣābhaṃ dvidhoditam //* (300)
>
> "Therefore it (i.e. a cognition of a double moon, etc.) does not involve imagination. But it is not a valid cognition because it is inconsistent with the real object. That is why the two kinds of incorrect direct perceptions (with imagination and without it) are established (by Dignāga) (to avoid a cognition of a double moon to be a valid cognition)."

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[4] SDP 27a7: *de ltar na kun rdzob ni rnam pa gsum du bstan te / yaṅ dag pa'i kun rdzob ni rnam pa gcig go // yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa'i kun rdzob la ni rnam pa gñis te / rnam par rtog pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ / rnam par mi rtog pa'i bye brag gi phyir ro //*

This illustrates why I think that Śāntarakṣita is influenced by Dharmakīrti in this case.

Furthermore, Jñānagarbha (SDV 8) divides conventional thinking into two kinds, the correct and the incorrect. He gets this idea, I think, from Dharmakīrti:

pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam. (NB I 4)

"Direct perception is without imaginary thought and without confusion."

arthakriyāyogyalakṣaṇaṃ hi vastu. (HB 3,14)

arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat /
anyat saṃvṛtisat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe // (PV III 3) etc.

"An existent is a thing which has the capacity to produce effects. A thing which has the capacity to produce effects is an absolute existent, a thing which does not is a conventional one."

This is why Jñānagarbha states in SDV 8 that a thing itself (*vastumātra*) which is an empirical appearance (*yathādarśana*) and has the capacity to produce an effect (*arthakriyāsamartha*) pertains to correct conventional truth.

On the other hand, what is constructed in imagination (*parikalpita*) pertains to incorrect conventional truth (SDV 5b3-7). This shows that his idea of differentiating correct and incorrect conventional truth is based on Dharmakīrti's definition of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). We can also find the same kind of idea as Jñānagarbha's in Kamalaśīla's *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* (P 333b5-8; D 288b5-7)[5] and *Madhyamakāloka*, and in Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* (594,18-24).

No. (2) In the *pūrvapakṣa* of Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* (MĀ P 144a8-b6; D 134a7-b6), an opponent criticizes the Mādhyamika's theory of emptiness (*śūnyatā*): If everything is empty (*niḥsvabhāva*) how can this be proved and perceived by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), which may also be non-substantial (*niḥsvabhāva*)? In reply to this objection (MĀ P 185b5-186b3; D 170a5-171a2), Kamalaśīla refers to the direct perception of a yogin (*yogipratyakṣa*), which can be attained by repeated meditation (*bhāvanā*).

Here he seems to reply on the basis of Dharmakīrti's theory of *yogipratyakṣa*, which is stated in his *Nyāyabindu* and *Pramāṇavārttika*:

bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānaṃ ceti. (NB I 11 = MĀ P 184a2f.; D 168b6f.)

"A yogin's cognition arises when he is at the climax of his meditation on a true object."

prāg uktaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ teṣāṃ tad bhāvanāmayam /
vidhūtakalpanājālaṃ spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate // (PV III 281)

"The cognition of yogins is attained through meditation. It manifests itself vividly without the net of imaginary thought."

kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ /
abhūtān api paśyanti purato 'vasthitān iva // (PV III 282) (~ MĀ P 185b5-186b3; D 170a5-171a2)

"Those who are disturbed by desire, grief, and fear and by nightmares of robbers perceive an imagined thing as if it were in their presence."

Just prior to this reply, Kamalaśīla also refers to the definition of *pratyakṣa*:

pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam. (NB I 4)

"Direct perception is without imaginary thought and without confusion."

In this manner Kamalaśīla, using Dharmakīrti's theory of *yogipratyakṣa*, proves that *śūnyatā* can be perceived by a yogin's direct perception (*yogipratyakṣa*). We can also find the same argument as this

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[5] S. Moriyama, "An Annotated Translation of Kamalaśīla's *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi*, Part IV", *The Bukkyō Daigaku Kenkyū Kiyō* 69, 1985: 57.

in Śāntarakṣita's MA 73-75.[6] We examined their borrowing from Dharmakīrti in nos. (1)-(2) above. Now let us examine their criticism of Dharmakīrti in nos. (3), (4), (5) and (6) below.

No. (3) Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita attack the definition of causality of Dharmakīrti found in HB 4,11f.: *pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvas tasya siddhiḥ*, etc. They divide direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) into two kinds of cognitions, one without images (*nirākārajñāna*), and the other with images (*sākārajñāna*). They attack the former on the grounds that there is no proximate (*pratyāsatti*)[7] cause and the latter on the grounds that images (*ākāra*) are not valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*). They also point out that non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) means direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) because it means to perceive the ground where there is no pot. In this way they criticize Dharmakīrti's theory of causality.

No. (4) Jñānagarbha makes the following statement in his SD 14a: "Many do not produce one." He rejects the causal principle that many produce one. This type of causality can be traced back to Dharmakīrti:

> *anekasyāpi caksurāder ekavijñānakriyādarśanāt*. (VN 38,4)
> "It is seen that the many of eyesight, etc. [i.e. color-form, light, and mental concentration] produce a single cognition."
> *na kiñcid ekam ekasmāt sāmagryāḥ sarvasambhavaḥ*. (PV III 534ab)
> "One [effect] is never produced by one [cause], but each effect is produced by an aggregate of causes."
> *yathendriyaviṣayālokamanaskāra . . . rūpavijñānam ekaṃ janayanti*. (*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* [v. PV I] 41,1-3)
> "For example, the sense-organ, the object, light, and mental concentration produce a single visual consciousness."
> *ekakāryo 'neko 'pi* (PV I 82a)
> "Even many produce one effect."

His intention can be illustrated thus:

many causes → one effect
cakṣus
rūpa
āloka   → *cakṣurvijñāna*
manaskāra

Jñānagarbha, et al. argue against this causal principle of Dharmakīrti as follows:

> "If eyesight (*cakṣus*) and other factors in conjunction produce one effect, that is, visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*), distinction of causes (*kāraṇabheda*) does not produce distinction of effects (*kāryabheda*). . . . Therefore distinction and non-distinction of effects have no grounds. Nothing has a cause because it is not separate from the relation of distinction and non-distinction. If this is so, everything is an eternal existent or a non-existent." (SDV 7a6-b1 = AA 969,26-970,5; MĀ P 234a2-5, D 211b6-212a1; SDhNS P 322a6-323a7, D 280b2-281a6)

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[6] MAV (ad MA 73-75) 244-250.

[7] Cf. PV III 46, 47, 324, 325.

This argumentation can also be traced back to Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu*:

> *bhinnasvabhāvebhyaś cakṣurādibhyaḥ sahakāribhya ekakāryotpattau na kāraṇabhedāt kāryabhedaḥ syād iti cet.* (HB 9,13f.)
> *na kāraṇabhedābhedābhyāṃ kāryabhedābhedāv ity ahetukau viśvasya bhedābhedau syātām. . . . tadvyatiriktaś ca na kaścid bhāvasvabhāva ity ahetukatvād bhāvānāṃ nityaṃ sattvam asattvaṃ vā syāt, apekṣasyābhāvāt. apekṣayā hi bhāvāḥ kādācitkā bhavanti.* (HB 21,5-10)

Hence it may safely be said that Jñānagarbha et al. argue against Dharmakīrti's theory of causality by using Dharmakīrti's theory itself. They see distinction (*bheda*) as many (*aneka*) and non-distinction (*abheda*) as one (*eka*). They refute Dharmakīrti's theory of causality by arguing that every case shows inconsistency in number between cause and effect.

Furthermore, the statement of Haribhadra found in AA 970,26-971,1 can also be traced back to Dharmakīrti's statement in HB 9,6-10.[8] This is identical word for word in both texts. This is why I think that Jñānagarbha et al. attacked Dharmakīrti's theory.

Jñānagarbha makes the following statement in SD 14b: "Many do not produce many." He rejects the thesis that many produce many. Dharmakīrti maintains in his *Hetubindu*, to avoid inconsistency with his previous argumentation, that many create many characteristics (*viśeṣa*). This thesis of his is taken by Jñānagarbha et al. to mean that many produce many. One of the main points in their argumentation is entirely the same as that which Dharmakīrti states in his *Hetubindu*:

> *tathā hi* (a) *samanantarapratyayād vijñānāc cakṣurvijñānasyopalambhātmatā* (b) *tasyaivopalambhātmanaḥ sataś cakṣurindriyād rūpagrahaṇayogyatāpratiniyamo* (c) *viṣayāt tattulyarūpatety abhinnatve 'pi vastutaḥ kāryasya kāraṇānāṃ bhinnebhyaḥ svabhāvebhyo bhinnā eva viśeṣā bhavantīti na kāraṇabhede 'py abhedas tatkāryaviśeṣasya.* (HB 10,22-11,5 = AA 972,23-27; SDV 7b2f.; MĀ P 235b2-236b7, D 214a1-4; SDhNS P 322b2-7, D 280b5-281a1)
> "(a) Visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) obtains its cognitive nature (*upalambhātmatā*) on the basis of an immediate cause (*samanantarapratyaya*). (b) Its cognitive nature is limited to perceiving color-form (*rūpa*) in particular on the basis of the visual organ (*cakṣurindriya*). (c) [Visual consciousness] obtains the same kind of nature as its object (*tattulyarūpatā*) on the basis of the object (*viṣaya*). In fact, there is no distinction in the effect, however, particular aspects of the effect are distinguished from each other on the basis of the distinction of the essential natures of the causes. Therefore, there is no non-distinction of particular aspects of an effect on the basis of the distinction of causes. The other cases [for example auditory consciousness, etc.] can also be considered in the same manner."

The intention can be illustrated thus:

many causes	→	many characteristics: (*viśeṣa* = *dharma*)	one effect (*dharmin*)
(1) *samanantarapratyaya*	→	*upalambhātmatā*	
(2) *cakṣurindriya*	→	*rūpagrahaṇa*	*caksurvijñāna*
(3) *viṣaya*	→	*tattulyarūpatā*	

Jñānagarbha et al. attack this theory as follows:

If the theory is true, cognition [*vijñāna*, which must be single], is multiple (*aneka*), because it

[8] *na vai bhāvānāṃ kācit prekṣāpūrvakāritā yato 'yam eko 'pi samarthaḥ kim atrāsmābhir ity apare nivarteran. te hi nirabhiprāyavyāpārāḥ svahetupariṇāmopanidhidharmāṇas tatprakṛtes tathā bhavanto nopālambham arhanti.*

cannot be distinguished from the many characteristics [cognitive nature (*upalambhātmatā*), etc.]. (SDV 7b4f. = AA 972,27-973,2)

If cognition (*vijñāna*) is distinguished from cognitive nature (*upalambhātmatā*), etc., it has no cause. This is because causes (the immediate cause, *samanantarapratyaya*, etc.) affect things (cognitive nature, etc.) other than [cognition]. Otherwise, they (i.e. cognitive nature, etc.) would not be distinguished from one another because they are not separate from single natured cognition. (SDV 7b4f. = AA 973,4-11)

Moreover, they go on to attack Dharmakīrti's theory that even though the effect is not distinguished, the particular aspects (cognitive nature, etc.) of it are distinguished from one another (SDV 7b7 = AA 973,24; HB 11,3-5)

If this is so, *dharma* [particular aspects, *viśeṣa*] and *dharmin* [visual consciousness, *cakṣurvijñāna*] are actually separated from each other. This is because on the assumption that Dharmakīrti's theory is correct, a single-natured effect has two contrary natures (*svabhāva*): distinction and non-distinction. (SDV 7b7-8a1 = AA 973,25-974,1)

Jñānagarbha makes the following statement at SD 14c: "One does not produce many." He rejects the causal principle that one produces many. This type of causality can also be traced back to Dharmakīrti:

> *ekasyāpy anekārthakriyādarśanāt, yathā pradīpasya vijñānavartivikārajvālāntarotpādanāni.* (VN 38,2f.)
>
> "It is seen that one produces many. For example, a lamp produces cognition of it, a change in its wick, and another flame."
>
> *ekaṃ syād api sāmagryor ity uktaṃ tad anekakṛt.* (PV III 534cd)
>
> "One cause produces many effects, because it belongs to two aggregates."
>
> *anekakṛd eko 'pi.* (PV I 83a)
>
> "Even one produces many."

This argumentation can also be found in *Madhyamakāloka* (P 237a6-b2; D 214b3-5), SDhNS P 323b3-7, D 281b2-4, and AA 974,9-976,12.

Jñānagarbha makes the following statement at SD 14d: "One does not produce one." He rejects the causal principle that one produces one. This argumentation can also be found in *Madhyamakāloka* (P 233b7-234a1), SDhNS P 323b7-324a2, D 281b4-6, and AA 976,13-18. This type of causality cannot be traced back to Dharmakīrti, because he also rejects the position that one produces one at PV III 534ab:

> *na kiñcid ekam ekasmāt sāmagryāḥ sarvasambhavaḥ.*
>
> "One effect is never produced by one cause, but each is produced by an aggregate of causes."

In spite of this, Jñānagarbha rejects the position that one produces one. The reason for this may be thought to be that he divides Dharmakīrti's theory of causation into four extreme cases, *catuṣkoṭi*, as it were, and rejects them one by one. In this way, he systematizes the method of arguing against Dharmakīrti's theory of causality. The reasons why I trace these four extreme cases of causality back to Dharmakīrti can be summarized as follows:

[1] the main point of the argument can be identified word for word in Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu*.
[2] Śāntarakṣita quotes PV III 534 in his *Vādanyāyavinpañcitārthā* (VNṬ 38,18f), and Kamalaśīla, showing Śāntarakṣita's influence, presents in the *pūrvapakṣa* of his *Madhyamakāloka* (MĀ P 149a3-7, D 138a7-b2) the basic ideas of PV III 534.

Jñanagarbha's et al. argumentation is put forward from the point of view of absolute truth. They place causation in the realm of conventional truth. On the other hand, from the point of view of absolute truth, they reject Dharmakīrti's theory of causality in order to establish the truth of the non-substantial character of all things.

No. (5) Kamalaśīla puts forward the theory, mentioned above, that the reason for the non-substantiality of all *dharmas* is dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). He also names the reason *pratītyasamutpādahetu* in his *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā*[9] and *Madhyamakāloka*[10]. By this reasoning, whose theory is he trying to refute? The key to this question will be found in a statement of Haribhadra's who was a faithful successor of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Immediately before argument no. (5) shown above Haribhadra cites Dharmakīrti's PV III 3ab in his *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* and states:[11]

> "A thing which has the capability to produce an effect (*arthakriyāsamartha*) is an ultimate existence (*paramārthasat*) [PV III 3ab]. According to which, some people adhere to ideas such as the idea that a thing which is dependently originated (*pratītyasamutpanna*) on the basis of causation (*kāryakāraṇasambandha*) is a true (*tāttvika*) Tathāgata. The statement [of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*] was put forward to exclude their adherence. . . . The idea that the intrinsic nature produced (*janakasvabhāva*) by a gathering (*sāmagrī*) is a true existence (*tāttvika*) is refuted."

The Mādhyamika refutes the opponent's idea by a reasoning on the basis of *svabhāvahetu* as follows:[12]

> "Things dependently produced (*pratītyasamutpanna*) are coherent as long as they are not strictly examined (*avicāraikaramaṇīya*) from the viewpoint of the absolute, such as an elephant etc., conjured up by a juggler. In the same way, all existences such as a material being (*rūpa*) etc. are dependently produced. [All existences such as a material being etc. are coherent as long as they are not strictly examined.] This reasoning is on the basis of *svabhāvahetu*. The logical grounds (*hetu*) of this reasoning are not inadmissible (*asiddha*), contradictory (*viruddha*), or inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). Therefore just as a sound is metaphorically established (*prājñaptika*) in that it is produced depending upon conditions, so the body of Bhagavat is established. It would be useless to commit the logical fault of overextension (*atiprasaṅga*)."

As seen above the opponent's idea is indicated in PV III 3ab. On the other hand Haribhadra thinks that a thing which has the capability to produce any effect (*arthakriyāsamartha*) is tantamount to a thing which is dependently produced (*pratītyasamutpanna*). He evaluates it as a metaphorical existence

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9 MAP 213,6-13: *rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba ni ma brtags na ñams dga' bar 'dod pa kho na yin gyi / don dam par ni ma yin ste / don dam par ni de bžin ñid yod pa daṅ med pa las rnam par 'das pa kho na yin no // . . . de las ni sṅags daṅ sman daṅ sgyu ma'i dpes chos thams cad rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba ñid kyi gtan tshigs kyis don dam par yod pa daṅ med pa ñid las yaṅ dag par 'das par sgrub par byed do //*

10 MĀ P 238a6; D 215a7: *gaṅ dag rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba'i phyir žes bya ba'i gtan tshigs 'di ni ma ṅes pa la sogs par smra ba de dag gi lan kyaṅ sṅar smras zin to //*

On *pratītyasamutpādahetu* cf. Lindtner (cited in note 2) pp. 207, 209; Katsumi Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, Kyōto 1982: 222-227.

11 AA 969,18-25: *yad arthakriyāsamarthaṃ tad atra paramārthasad* [PV III 3ab] *iti vacanāt pramāṇopapanna-kāryakāraṇasambandhabalāt pratītyasamutpanna eva tāttvikas tathāgata ity aupalambhikajanābhiniveśaniṣedhārtham āha . . . na hy ekaṃ janakam iti kathayati. sarveṣāṃ samāyogāc chabdaḥ prajñapyata ity anenāpi prājñaptikaśabdanirdeśena sāmagryās tāttvikaṃ janakasvabhāvaṃ nirasyati.*

Cf. Hirofusa Amano, "Ingaron no ichi shiryō – Haribhadra no kaishaku –", *Kanakura Hakase Koki Kinen Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Ronshū* 1966, 323-350.

12 AA 976,18-24: *ato ye pratītyasamutpannās te paramārthato 'vicāraikaramaṇīyās tadyathā māyākāranirmitāḥ karabhādayaḥ. tathā cāmī sarve rūpādayo bhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ. yathādarśanaṃ pratītyotpādadarśanān nāsiddho hetuḥ. sapakṣe bhāvān na viruddhaḥ. pūrvaprabandhena vipakṣe bādhakapramāṇopadarśanād anaikāntikaś ca na bhavati ity amunā nyāyena pratyayādhīnavṛttitvād yathā śabdaḥ prājñaptikas tathā bhagavatāṃ kāyo vyavasthāpita ity alam atiprasaṅgena.*

MAP 217,25-219,2: *gaṅ daṅ gaṅ dag rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba de dag ni don dam par yod pa daṅ med pa ñid kyi tha sñad kyi lam las 'das pa'i yul yin te / dper na sṅags la sogs pa lta bu'o // rnam par śes pa la sogs pa 'di dag kyaṅ de daṅ 'dra bas na raṅ bžin gyi gtan tshigs so //*

(*prājñaptika*). In other words, it is nothing more than a conventional existence (*saṃvṛtisat*), anything but an absolute existence (*paramārthasat*).

In addition to this, Haribhadra clearly expresses the following idea: "It is said that a thing which has the capability to produce any effect is nothing more than a conventional existence because it cannot endure under strict investigation."[13] This idea had already been expressed by Śāntarakṣita in advance of Haribhadra as follows:

> "A conventional existence is tantamount to that which is coherent as long as it is not strictly examined, has a nature of coming out and falling away, and has the capability to produce any effect. (MA 64)
>
> Here the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) does not indicate verbal custom (*vyavahāra*), but a thing which is experienced, accepted and dependently produced (*pratītyasamutpāda*). It is tantamount to a correct conventional thing (*tathyasaṃvṛti*) but it is not tantamount to an absolute thing because it cannot endure under strict investigation (*vicārākṣamatvāt*)."[14]

This idea of Śāntarakṣita and Haribhadra is also expressed by Kamalaśīla. Their idea can be illustrated as follows: *arthakriyāsamartha* = *pratītyasamutpāda* or *pratītyasamutpanna* = *vicārākṣamatva* = *tathyasaṃvṛti*. Moreover this idea can be traced back to Jñānagarbha:[15]

> "A mere existence (*vastumātra*) (= *svalakṣaṇa*, SDP 22b3) is tantamount to a thing which has appearance (*yathādarśana*) (=*pratyakṣa*, SDP 44b4), that is, which has the capability to produce an effect (*arthakriyāsamartha*). It must be understood that a thing which is dependently produced by causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*) is a correct conventional truth (*tathyasaṃvṛtisatya*)."

Thus the later Mādhyamika examine the theory of *arthakriyāsamartha* of Dharmakīrti as *pratītya-samutpāda* or *pratītyasamutpanna*, which they regard as a correct conventional existence, not as an absolute existence as Dharmakīrti understands it in his PV III 3.

Thus we can safely conclude that the refutation of the later Mādhyamika on the basis of *pratītyasamutpādahetu* is aimed at Dharmakīrti's theory of *arthakriyāsāmarthya*. The later Mādhyamika consider the theory of the *pratītyasamutpāda* from the viewpoint of the two truths (*satyadvaya*). The *pratītyasamutpāda* is tantamount to dependent origination from the viewpoint of correct convention (*tathyasaṃvṛti*), while it is tantamount to non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāva*) or emptiness (*śūnyatā*) from the viewpoint of the absolute (*paramārthataḥ*).

According to Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* argument (4) is included in argument (5). In other words, argument (5) is examined in more detail in argument (4). Thus it is evident that argument (4) and (5) bear a close relation to each other. In this way the later Mādhyamika attacked Dharmakīrti's theory of causality in both debates as indicated above.

No. (6) Following argument no. (6), Kamalaśīla attacks his opponent's idea of relative emptiness (*itaretaraśūnyatā*):

> "They (i.e. common people) understand emptiness as relative emptiness on the model of an entity X that lacks another Y; but this is not absolute truth. . . . The *lakṣaṇaśūnyatā* of all

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[13] AA 637,27f.: *arthakriyāsamartham eva hi vastu vicāravimardākṣamatvāt sāṃvṛtam ity ucyate.*

[14] MAV (ad MA 64) 202,7-204,3:
ma brtags gcig pu ñams dga' źiṅ // skye daṅ 'jig pa'i chos can pa //
don byed pa dag nus rnams kyi // raṅ bźin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs // (MA 64)
kun rdzob 'di ni sgra'i tha sñad tsam gyi bdag ñid ma yin gyi / mthoṅ ba daṅ 'dod pa'i dṅos po rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba rnams ni brtag mi bzod pas yaṅ dag pa'i kun rdzob ste /

[15] SDV (ad SD 8) D 5b4: *dṅos po tsam gaṅ yin pa ni ji ltar snaṅ ba bźin du don byed nus pa'i phyir ro // rgyu daṅ rkyen rnams la brten nas skyes pa de ni yaṅ dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin par śes par bya ste /*

dharmas is cognized by means of cognition (*jñāna*) without appearance (*nirābhāsa*). This is because even though the object's particular and universal characters (*svalakṣaṇa, sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) attain a condition under which they can be perceived (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya*), yogins do not perceive (*anupalabdher*) them as absolute images (*ākāra*). Therefore, relative emptiness (*itaretaraśūnyatā*), which is based in the imaginary thought (*parikalpita*) of common people, has nothing to do with (absolute emptiness)."[16]

Similar argumentation can be found in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* ad MA 73 and Haribhadra's AA 636,27-637,15. The opponent asks the Mādhyamika school why it is that common people cannot understand the nature of things (emptiness), too, because when it (i.e. an existent) can be understood, its own nature (emptiness) will be directly perceived. Just as, when a spot X where there is no pot Y is perceived, the nature of that spot is understood as being empty of a pot, so (emptiness can be directly perceived by common people).

The essential parts of this argument, indicated above by underlining, can be traced back to Dharmakīrti:

tatrānupalabdhir yathā na pradeśaviśeṣe kvacid ghaṭa upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher iti. (NB II 13)

"Non-perception is perceiving a spot without a pot, because even though the conditions for perceiving it are obtained, it is not perceived."

Moreover, to ascertain that the target of their refutation is Dharmakīrti's theory of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), let us examine Kamalaśīla's and Dharmottara's statement.

MĀ P 145a8-b4; D 135a6-b2 (*pūrvapakṣa*):[17] "Non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) also cannot prove it (i.e. the non-substantiality of all *dharmas*). If non-perception of an entity itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*), which enables us to put forward non-existence (*abhāvavyavahāra*), means to understand X as lacking Y by means of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), we bring forth (the theory of *svabhāvānupalabdhi*) to awaken those who are so foolish as to listen to an erroneous treatise and cannot put forward the idea that X lacks Y. On the other hand, you (i.e. the Mādhyamika) do not have anything to enable you to put forward the idea that X lacks Y, which is understood by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) as a thing (X) which lacks all *dharmas* (Y). Otherwise, your statement would collapse."

MĀ P 193b3f.; D 177a2f. (*uttarapakṣa*):[18] "We (i.e. the Mādhyamika) have previously answered[19] the question as to whether the theory of the non-perception of an entity itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*) cannot enable us to prove (that all *dharmas* are non-substantial). If this theory (of *svabhāvānupalabdhi*) is tantamount to the relative *śūnyatā* (*itaretaraśūnyatā*), we do not

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[16] MĀ P 185a7-b5; D 170a2-5: *de'i phyir de la grags pa'i ṅo bor de dag la don gźan gyis dben pa'i dṅos po 'dzin pa'i sgo nas gcig gis gcig stoṅ pa ñid 'di rnam par gźag gi / don dam par ma yin te / . . . chos thams cad kyi mtshan ñid stoṅ pa ñid gaṅ yin pa de ni de dag gi raṅ daṅ spyi'i mtshan ñid ji ltar rnam par gźag pa dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa las rnal 'byor pa rnams kyis don dam pa'i rnam par mi dmigs pa'i phyir chos thams cad snaṅ ba med pa'i ye śes skye ba'i sgo nas rtogs par rnam par bźag go // de'i phyir gcig gis gcig stoṅ pa ñid thams cad kyi tha chad byis pa'i skye bos kun brtags pa la brten nas gleṅs mod kyi / de ni 'brel pa med pa kho na'o //*

[17] *mi dmigs pa yaṅ de sgrub par nus pa ma yin te / 'di ltar re źig raṅ bźin mi dmigs pa med pa'i tha sñad grub pa gaṅ yin pa de ni mṅon sum gyis gźan gyis dben pa'i dṅos po rtogs na dam pa ma yin pa'i bstan bcos mñan pas yid rnam par rmoṅs pa kha cig de la gźan gyis dben par tha sñad 'jug par mi byed pa rnams la de'i tha sñad rab tu sgrub pa'i phyir rab tu sbyor ba yin na khyed la ni gaṅ du de'i tha sñad rab tu bsgrub par bya ba chos thams cad kyis rab tu dben pa'i dṅos po mṅon sum gyis rtogs pa de lta bu cuṅ zad kyaṅ med de / raṅ gi phyogs ñams par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro źes bśad zin pa ñid do //*

[18] *gaṅ yaṅ raṅ bźin mi dmigs pa mi srid do źes smras pa de la goṅ du lan btab pa ñid de / tshul 'di ni gcig gis gcig stoṅ pa ñid yin na 'di yaṅ bsgrub par mi 'dod do // 'o na ci źe na mtshan ñid stoṅ pa ñid yin no //*

[19] MĀ P 185a4-b5; D 169b6-170a5.

assert that this also enables us to prove (that all *dharmas* are non-substantial). Why not? This is because (the *śūnyatā* we mean) is tantamount to the non-substantiality of their marks (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*)."

Dharmottara comments on non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) in his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*:

"Even though a cognition (*jñāna*) that there is no pot arises from non-perception and is tantamount to ascertaining non-existence (*abhāva*), a mere spot (where there is no pot) is perceived by means of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). Therefore [the fact] that here there is no pot is revealed by means of the function of direct perception and is tantamount to ascertaining non-existence." (NBṬ 30,1-4)

According to Dharmottara's ideas on this, it can safely be said that the non-perception of Y is tantamount to the direct perception of X without Y [cf. no (6)]. Therefore I conclude that Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's attack against their opponent's idea of relative emptiness (*itaretaraśūnyatā*)[20] is directed against Dharmakīrti's theory of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), especially non-perception of an entity itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*).

On the other hand, according to the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, prior to them, Candrakīrti had already attacked the opponent's idea of emptiness as a relative emptiness (*itaretaraśūnyatā*) in his *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* (160,17-20; 308,17-309,1) when he attacked the consciousness-only (*cittamātra*) theory of Vijñānavāda.

Having examined the relation between the later Mādhyamika and Dharmakīrti in Nos. (1)-(6) above, the following conclusions may be drawn. On the one hand when they construct their fundamental theories - viz., that of the criterion for distinguishing two types of truth and that of the non-substantial (*niḥsvabhāva*) character of all *dharmas* [nos. (1) and (2) above], they utilize Dharmakīrti's theory of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). On the other hand they criticize Dharmakīrti's theory of causation [nos. (3), (4) and (5) above] and his theory of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*, especially *svabhāvānupalabdhi*) as relative emptiness (*itaretaraśūnyatā*) [no. (6) above].

Thus I conclude that the later Mādhyamika were substantially influenced by Dharmakīrti in that they both borrowed from and reacted against him.

Abbreviations and Literature

AA — *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñapāramitāvyakhyā* (Haribhadra): *Commentary on Aṣṭasāhasrika-Prajñāpāramitā together with the text commented on*. Ed. Unrai Wogihara, Tokyo 1973 [repr].

HB — *Hetubindu*: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*. Wien 1967.

MA — *Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita with his own commentary or Vṛtti and with the subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla*. [2 vols.] Ed. Masamichi Ichigō. Kyoto 1985

[20] D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, Paris 1969: 322, 325, 326, 332, and 343, suggests that the relative *śūnyatā* (*itaretaraśūnyatā*) bears a close relation to the theory of *śūnyatā* as indicated in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (ed. U. Wogihara) 47,17f.: *yad yatra na bhavati tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati yat punar atrāvaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti*.

MĀ — *Madhyamakāloka* (Kamalaśīla): P 5287 (Vol. 101, dBu ma, Sa 143b2-275a4), D 3887 (Vol. 12, dBu ma, Sa 133b4-244a7)

MAP — *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): v. MA

MAV — *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (Śāntarakṣita): v. MA

NB — *Nyāyabindu. Buddijskij učebnik" logiki sočinenie Darmakirti i tolkovanie na nego Nyāyabinduṭīkā sočinenie Darmottary, sanskritskij tekst" izdal" s" vvedeniem" i primĕčanijami* F.I. Ščerbatskoj, Sanktpeterburg" 1918 [repr. Tokyo 1977].

NBṬ — *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): v. NB

PV I — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter I: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*. Roma 1960.

PV III — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter III: Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū – Hōshō 'Pramāṇavārttika' no genryōron. Ed. Hiromasa Tosaki. Tōkyō 1979.

SDhNS — *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* (Kamalaśīla): P 5289 (Vol. 101, dBu ma, Sa 312a5-338a5), D 3889 (Vol. 12, dBu ma, Sa 273a4-291a7)

SDP — *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* (Śāntarakṣita): D 3883 (Vol. 12, dBu ma, Sa 15b2-52b7)

SDV — *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* (Jñānagarbha): D 3882 (Vol. 12, dBu ma, Sa 3b3-15b1)

VN — *Vādanyāya: Ācārya-śrī-Dharmakīrti-viracitā Dharmakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ (2), Vādanyāyaprakaraṇam, ācārya-Śāntarakṣita-kṛta-Vipañcitārtha-vyākhyāyutam* . . . Ed. Dvārikādās Śāstrī. Vārāṇasī 1972.

VNṬ — *Vādanyāyaṭīkā (Vipañcitārthā)* (Śāntaraksita): v. VN

FRAGMENTS FROM DIGNĀGA ?
TRACES OF A PRE-DHARMAKĪRTI BUDDHIST POLEMIC AGAINST THE NYĀYA-*NIGRAHASTHĀNA*

by

M. T. Much, Vienna

Reading Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya* one cannot but notice that Dharmakīrti mentions no authors or texts from the Buddhist tradition dealing with the points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) in debate, with the exception of a general remark in the concluding verses to "the righteous" which had (already once) explained the rules of debate to the world.[1]

And no Buddhist text on the points of defeat from the time between the **Upāyahṛdaya* and *Tarkaśāstra* and the *Vādanyāya* has come down to us. Probably because after the *Vādanyāya* it became obsolete (cf. below sub *aprāptakāla*).

However, Uddyotakara, Dharmakīrti's main opponent in his polemic against the Nyāya-definitions of the points of defeat, preserves some statements on this point. These may hypothetically be ascribed to Dignāga's *Nyāyaparīkṣā*. An attribution to one of the works of Vasubandhu, which are also criticized by Uddyotakara, seems less likely.

This attribution to Dignāga may be based on the following arguments:

Vācaspatimiśra in two places attributes a quotation in the *Nyāyavārttika* to Dignāga (NVTṬ 1185.22, see below sub *nyūna*, and NVTṬ 1189.25, see below sub *ananubhāṣaṇa*).

Aniruddha in one place attributes a quotation in the *Nyāyavārttika* to Dignāgaprabhṛtayaḥ (ViP II 66.5, see below sub *punarvacana*).

Vasubandhu and Dignāga are mentioned in Śāntarakṣita's commentary on the *Vādanyāya*. Śāntarakṣita introduces the explanation of the concluding verses with a rethoric question: "Was not the road of the rule of debate (*vādanyāyamārga*) made into the royal way by the Holy Vasubandhu, the friend who is united with the whole world, in the *Vādhavidhāna* etc.? And was it not stamped on thereafter by the esteemed scholar Dignāga, who is skilled in splitting the necks of drunken elephants, who are crazed by the opinion of the foolish, in the big *Nyāyaparīkṣā*? Why, therefore, do you insist on chewing again the already chewed?"[2]

A further fragment from Dignāga in the context of the points of defeat appears in the *Nyāyamañjarī*. Treating the *nigrahasthāna-sūtra*s from the *Nyāyasūtra*s Jayanta Bhaṭṭa several times argues against Dharmakīrti (whom he always mentions as "Kīrti"[3]). Apart from the introductory verses of the *Vādanyāya*,[4] Jayanta does not quote Dharmakīrti verbatim, but summarizes Dharmakīrti's posi-

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[1] *loke 'vidyātimirapaṭalollekhanas tattvadṛṣṭer vādanyāyaḥ parahitaratair eṣa sadbhiḥ praṇītaḥ /*
tattvālokaṃ timirayati taṃ durvidagdho jano 'yaṃ tasmād yatnaḥ kṛta iha mayā tatsamujjvālanāya // (3)
VN 68.10-13.
"The rule of debate, which scrapes out the blindness and cataract of ignorance of the one who sees the truth, was explained to the world by the righteous, who rejoice in the wellbeing of others. These uneducated people [of the Naiyāyikas] obscure this light of truth; therefore I here undertook the effort to let it shine."

[2] VNṬ 142.13-16: *nanu cāyaṃ vādanyāyamārgaḥ sakalalokanibandhanabandhunā Vādavidhānādāv ārya-Vasubandhunā mahārājapathīkṛtaḥ, kṣuṇṇaś ca tadanu mahātyāṃ Nyāyaparīkṣāyāṃ kumatimatamattamātaṅgaśiraḥpīṭhapāṭanapaṭubhir ācārya-Dignāgapādaiḥ. tat kim idaṃ punaś carvitacarvaṇam āsthitaṃ tvayeti.*

[3] NM II 191.20, 192.25, 197.25, 200.32, 204.11, 205.6, 205.8, 208.15.

[4] NM II 191.12-13.

tion in his own words. In his summary of Dharmakīrti's polemic against *pratijñāvirodha*[5] we find the sentence: *sa hi dṛṣṭānta evokto vaidharmyeṇa suśikṣitair*, which can be identified as PS III 7bc.[6]

A Buddhist source of these fragments under discussion is also affirmed by Dharmakīrti. In some instances one observes that he is either of the same opinion as expressed in the fragments, or that he continues with the refutation of Uddyotakara's rejections.

Finally I want to refer to Erich Frauwallner, who in two articles analyzed fragments from the *Nyāyavārttika*.[7] He mentioned briefly the *nigrahasthāna* fragments and expressed the opinion that they come from Dignāga's *Nyāyaparīkṣā*.[8] He further came to the conclusion, that Vasubandhu did not treat the points of defeat.[9]

The *Nyāyaparīkṣā* is mentioned by Dignāga himself in two places. Traditionally the *nigrahasthāna*s are treated after the *jāti*s. But in the *Nyāyamukha* and in the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* Dignāga does not explain the *nigrahasthāna*s after the explanation of the *jāti*s, but refers to the *Nyāyaparīkṣā*.[10] So we have an indication that Dignāga might have dealt with the *nigrahasthāna*s, whereas we lack such an indication for Vasubandhu.

To sum up, an attribution to Dignāga's *Nyāyaparīkṣā* seems quite reasonable, but the authorship of Vasubandhu may not be altogether excluded.

The fragments from the *Nyāyavārttika* are the following:

Fragment #1 (introductory) NV 1160.10-11:

> *tatra eke varṇayanti pakṣasyeti. evaṃ cāhuḥ, dūṣaṇāni nyūnatāvayavottarākṣepabhāvodbhāvanāni ebhir hy asau parapakṣo dūṣyata iti.*

The words *dūṣaṇāni nyūnatāvayavottaradoṣākṣepabhāvodbhāvanāni* also occur in NV 279.13f.

They are attributed to Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhānasūtra* by Frauwallner.[11] He thinks that Uddyotakara alludes to these words in his discussion of the *vāda*, commenting NSū 2.1.1.[12] Before this

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[5] NM II 194.24-195.1.

[6] NM II 194.27-28 = PS D 6b2, PSV D 42a2. (Quoted also PVBh 563.29, 564.28.) Cf. NMGBh 244.21-22: *Dignāgena sa hi dṛṣṭānta evokto vaidharmyeṇa suśikṣitair iti.*

[7] Frauwallner 1933 and 1957.

[8] S. Frauwallner 1957: 11: "Dignāga ist außerdem der Gegner im Abschnitt über die Gründe einer Niederlage . . ." und 1957: 11 Anm. 12.: "Die Schrift, gegen welche sich Uddyotakara in diesem Abschnitt wendet, ist die verlorene *Nyāyaparīkṣā*, welche Dignāga's ausführliche Polemik gegen den Nyāya enthielt. Doch darüber wird an anderer Stelle zu sprechen sein." But Frauwallner did not take this issue up again.

[9] Frauwallner 1957: 11.

[10] PSV P (Kanakavarman) 176b5-7: *de bźin du ba laṅ yin pa'i phyir ba laṅ du grub pa bźin du źes bya ba de lta bu la sogs pa gźan daṅ gźan mi rigs pa thams cad ni Rigs pa brtag pa las rgyas par śes par bya'o // de bźin du ston pa gźan gyis byas pa rnams 'di phyogs tsam yin te / gźan gyis bśad pa'i sgrub pa daṅ sun 'phyin pa daṅ / der snaṅ ba bstan pa rnams la ñes pa phyogs tsam bstan pa yin la / 'di rgyas par dgag pa daṅ gźal bya dgag pa ni Rigs pa can daṅ Bye brag pa daṅ Graṅs can pa rtag pa rnams las śes par bya'o /*
PSV P (Vasudharakṣita) 92b7-93a1 (PSV D 85a7): *ma brjod pa'i lhag gcod rnams ni ba laṅ yin pa'i phyir źes pa las ba laṅ grub pa med bźin du grub pa yin no źes pa la sogs pa thams cad Rigs pa brtag par rgyas par śes bya'o / de bźin du lhag gcod gźan rnams po de dag ñis phyogs tsam mo źes bya ba bźin sgrub pa po gtan sgrub pa daṅ sun 'byin pa daṅ / de ltar snaṅ ba bstan pa rnams la skyon phyogs tsam bstan pa'o / de dag gis so sor 'gag pa daṅ gźal bya so sor dgag pa rgyas par ni Bye brag pa'i rigs daṅ / rKaṅ mig pa'i rigs pa brtags pa dag las śes bar bya'o /* Cf. NMu (Katsura) VII 65 (Tucci 72). Cf. Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions, translated and annotated*, Cambridge, Mass., 1968: 9.

[11] S. Frauwallner 1933: 283f. and 288; fragment no. 9 on page 301.

[12] NV 344.7-10: *sthāpanā nāma pañcāvayaṃ pakṣasādhakaṃ vākyam. vākyadoṣo dūṣaṇam. tadvākyaṃ nyūnam adhikaṃ ca bhavati avayavābhāsopapannaṃ ca. tadudbhāvanaṃ dūṣaṇam etat sthāpanayā sambadhyate, tadviṣayatvāt. śeṣaṃ tu*

passage Uddyotakara quotes the definitions of *vāda* (NV 342.8) and *pakṣa* (NV 343.10) from the *Vādavidhāna*. Therefore Frauwallner concludes that the *dūṣana* definition in question, supposedly alluded to by Uddyotakara, also belongs to the *Vādavidhāna*.

But to me it does not seem so sure that Uddyotakara refers to this *duṣaṇa* definition. Especially the words *sthāpanā nāma pañcāvayaṃ pakṣasādhakaṃ vākyam* (NV 344.7) do not fit Vasubandhu, who, for all we know, advocated three members of a proof only. Moreover the environment of the *dūṣana* definition in NV 279.13f. is not clear altogether.[13]

Fragment #2 (introductory) NVTṬ 1160.18-19:

tatra ya evam āhuḥ sarvo 'yaṃ sādhanadūṣaṇaprakāro buddhyāruḍho na vāstava iti, tān praty āha . . .

This recalls the quotation from Dignāga's Hetumukha in the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*: *sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhenaiva dharmadharmibhedena na bahiḥ sadasattvam apekṣate.*[14]

Fragment #3 (introductory) NV 1161.8-9:

dvaividhyānupapattir anekābhidhānād iti cet, anekaṃ nigrahasthānaṃ pratijñāhānyādisūtre paṭhyate, tasmād dve nigrahasthāne ity ayuktam.

(*dvaividhyānupapattir* NVTṬ 1161.19; *dvaividhyānupapattir anekābhidhānād iti cet* ViP II 60.7)

This alleges a contradiction between NSū 1.2.13 *viprattipattir apratipattiś ca nigrahasthānam* and NSū 5.2.1, which enumerates the twenty kinds of *nigrahasthānas*. Uddyotakara refutes this by pointing out that the first sūtra gives the general idea (*sāmānya*), the second one a specific classification

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dūṣaṇaṃ na sthāpanayā na svaparapakṣabhyāṃ sambaddham uttaradoṣa ākṣepabhāvāś ceti.

[13] Two lines above we find an unidentified quotation: *pratijñāyāḥ pakṣaviṣayatvāt pratijñādoṣāḥ pakṣadoṣā iti ucyante* (NV 279.10); on the next page one more unidentified quotation: *naiyāyikahetupratiṣedhenākasmiko mukhyārthavyatikramo labhyate iti* (NV 280.8); then the *pakṣa* definition from the *Vādavidhi* (NV 280.11, cf. Frauwallner 1957: 33); and on the next page a discussion of the *pakṣa* definitions from the *Nyāyamukha* (quoted NV 281.6,7,12f.) and *Vādavidhāna* (NV 281.7,11). The latter taken supposedly from Dignāga's *Vādavidhānaṭīkā*, which is quoted NV 282.16. In NV 282.4f. we find a quote from PSV III [PSV P (Vasudharakṣita) 43a5-6, PSV P (Kanakavarman) 125a1 = NMu (Katsura) I 112 (Tucci 6); cf. Frauwallner 1933: 304] and towards the end of this passage the *pratijñā* definition from the *Vādavidhi*.

Frauwallner (1957: 19) inserts this *dūṣaṇa*-definition also into his German version of Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi*, adding to it a passage from Chen t'ai which he also considers to be Vasubandhu:

"[Die Widerlegung (*dūṣaṇam*) besteht darin, daß man zeigt, daß die Beweisführung des Gegners zu wenig (*nyūnatā*) oder zu viel enthält (*adhikatā*), daß ihre Glieder fehlerhaft sind (*avayavābhāsāḥ*), daß seine Entgegnung falsch ist (*uttaradoṣaḥ*), und daß Einwände möglich sind (*ākṣepabhāvaḥ*).][34])

Die Beweisführung des Gegners enthält zuwenig, 1. wenn die Behauptung vorhanden ist, aber Grund und Beispiel fehlen, 2. wenn der Grund vorhanden ist, aber Behauptung und Beispiel fehlen, 3. wenn das Beispiel vorhanden ist, aber Behauptung und Grund fehlen, 4. wenn Behauptung und Grund vorhanden sind, aber das Beispiel fehlt, 5. wenn Behauptung und Beispiel vorhanden sind, aber der Grund fehlt, 6. wenn Grund und Beispiel vorhanden sind, aber die Behauptung fehlt[35]).

[34]) Ergänzt nach Vādavidhānam frg. 9.

[35]) Vgl. Chen t'ai, Li men louen chou ki, T 1839, p. 77 c 6 ff. Meiner Ansicht nach ist von den drei Theorien, welche Chen t'ai anführt, die zweite Vasubandhu zuzuschreiben."

A more elaborate explanation, however, which also might be a quotation is supplied by Vācaspati in NVTṬ 279.23-280.16. It differs from Chen t'ai's commentary and Uddyotakara's discussion of *dūṣaṇa* mentioned above (cf. fn. 12): *na pūnar dūṣaṇāni nyūnatāvayavottara*doṣākṣepabhāvodbhāvanānīti trairūpyasampanno hetuḥ pūrṇaḥ, sa triṣu rūpeṣv anyatamena rūpeṇa rahito nyūno 'siddho vā viruddho 'naikāntiko vā bhavatīti so 'yaṃ nyūnatādoṣo hetoḥ. avayavadoṣaś ca pratijñādoṣaḥ svavacana-virodhādiḥ, hetudoṣo 'siddhatvādiḥ, evam udāharaṇadoṣaḥ sādhyāvikalatvādiḥ, uttaradoṣo jātiḥ prāptāprāptisamādiḥ, tasyākṣepa upādānaṃ svīkāra iti yāvat. bhāvo 'pratibhādiḥ, sa hi vādino vā prativādino vābhiprāyaḥ, tasyodbhāvanāni dūṣanānīti.*

* v.l. *nyūnatāvayavāntara°*

[14] PVSV 2.22-3.1, cf. E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 3, 1959 [83-164]: 103f.

(*bhedavistara*), which is just an illustration because there are countless *nigrahasthānas*.[15]

Fragment #4 (ad *pratijñāhāni*) NV 1165.10-11:

prasaṅgavidhānād iti cet, atha manyase nāsau paścād api śabdasya nityatāṃ pratipadyate, kiṃ tu prasaṅgaṃ karoti. yadi sāmānyam aindriyakaṃ nityaṃ dṛṣṭam, śabdo 'py evaṃ bhavatv iti prasaṅgaṃ vidhatte.

(*śaṅkate prasaṅgavidhānād iti cet.* NVTṬ 1165.25)

The objection seems to say that the opponent does not accept the eternality of sound as such, but as a consequence only if generality would be established as perceptible and eternal. Uddyotakara briefly rejects this by saying that the opponent is defeated, because he does not remove the fallacy of the reason.[16]

Cf. also fragment #13.

Fragment #5 (ad *pratijñāhāni*) NV 1166.2-4:

hetudoṣeṇa caritārthatvān na pratijñāhānir nigrahasthānam ity anye. anye tu varṇayanti naivedaṃ nigrahasthānaṃ yuktaṃ hetudoṣeṇa caritārthatvāt. yasmād aindriyakatvād ity asya hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ doṣas tenāyaṃ nigṛhīta iti.

(*hetudoṣeṇa caritārthatvān na pratijñāhānir nigrahasthānam ity anye.* NVTṬ 1166.7-8)

The same point is made by Dharmakīrti. He says that here the fallacy of the reason leads to defeat.[17]

A Buddhist source of this is ascertained by Vācaspati. In his NVTṬ Uddyotakara's refutation is preceded by a quotation from the *Vādanyāya* instead of the objection given in the *Nyāyavārttika*.[18]

Uddyotakara rejects this by stating that not inconclusiveness leads to defeat, but miscomprehension (*vipratipatti*), which shows up in the attempt of avoiding the mistake of inconclusiveness (*anaikantikatvadoṣaparihāreṇa*).[19]

Fragment #6 (ad *apārthaka*) NV 1180.5-6:

nirarthakāpārthakayor abheda iti cet, atha manyase nirarthakāpārthakaṃ na bhidyate, tatrāpy artho na gamyata ihāpīti.

(*vārttikakāraḥ: śaṅkate nirarthakāpārthakayor iti.* NVTṬ 1180.11. The word *vārttikakāraḥ* is not to be taken as the subject of the verb *śaṅkate*. It introduces Vācaspati's treatment of the *Vārttika*, after having dealt with the *Bhāṣya*.[20])

The objection says that there is no difference between *nirarthaka* of NSū 5.2.9 and *apārthaka*. Dharmakīrti raises a similar criticism in the *Vādanyāya*.[21] But Uddyotakara thinks that, since there

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[15] NV 1161.9-11: *na, sāmānyabhedavistarasya vivakṣātaḥ pravṛtteḥ. sāmānyam adhikṛtya nigrahasthāne dve, bhedavistaravivakṣāyāṃ tu dvāviṃśatidhā bhedaḥ. udāharaṇamātratvāc ca bhedasyānantyam.*

[16] NV 1165.12: *tac ca na, ata eva tatprāpteḥ. yat evāsau hetudoṣoddhāre kartavye prasañjayatyata eva nigṛhyate.*

[17] Cf. VN 25.18f.: *sambhavati hy anyenāpi prakāreṇa hetudoṣodbhāvanādinā* . . . ; and VN 26.14f.: *aindriyakatvasya nityānityapakṣavṛtter vyabhicārād* . . .

[18] NVTṬ 1166.9-10 = VN 26.14-16.

[19] NV 1166.4-5: *na, anaikāntikatvadoṣaparihāreṇa vipratipattes tadupapatteḥ. tasyaivānaikāntikatvasya parihāraṃ kurvāṇo 'yaṃ nigṛhyata ity ato 'naikāntikatvaṃ na nigrahasthānam.*

[20] Vacaspati introduces the sections on the *Vārttika* in several places with the word *vārttikam* or *vārttikakāraḥ*, cf. e.g. NVTṬ 1168.14, 1169.19, 1175.12, 1178.12, 1181.17, 1189.18, 1191.14, 1194.12, 1195.20.

[21] VN 44.1-7.

is a difference between letters and words one can also distinguish between these two kinds of *nigrahasthāna*s.[22]

Fragment #7 (ad *aprāptakāla*) NV 1181.7-1182.3:

naivam api siddher ity eke. eke tu bruvate

[1.] *naitan nigrahasthānam evam api siddher iti,*

[2.] *samayānabhyupagamāc ca: na ca vayam evaṃ pratīcchāma iti,*

[3.] *prayogāc ca: pratyuktaś cāvayavavyatyayaḥ sarvaśāstreṣv iti kasyāyaṃ samaya iti.*

[1. refutation NV 1182.3ff.] *yat tāvan naivam api sidder iti* . . .

[2. refutation NV 1183.5ff.] *yat pūnar etat samayānabhyupagamāt iti* . . .

[3. refutation NV 1184.2ff.] *yat punar etat prayogād iti* . . .

(*evam apy arthasiddher śabdāpetavad etad.* NBhū 366.27.).

The second *naivam api siddher* is quoted in VN 44.11 and VNṬ 103.13. Sāṅkṛtyāyana adds the footnote *Dignāgena kṛta ākṣepaḥ* to this quotation. The reason for this attribution is unknown. Perhaps the editors of the NV follow Sāṅkṛtyāyana when saying in footnote *ka* on p. 1181: *adhikṣepaś cāyaṃ Diṅnāgasyeti sambhāvyate.*

Especially in this place it becomes evident, that Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita no longer refer to the older *nigrahasthāna*-description one can trace in Uddyotakara. Dharmakīrti quotes Uddyotakara's polemic starting with the words *naivam api siddher* and does not mention Uddyotakara's source. With Śāntarakṣita one gets the impression that it fell into oblivion altogether. He says: *naivam api siddher iti Bhāradvājaḥ [!] svayam evāśaṅkya pariharati* . . .

The first objection says that the order of the members of the proof is not important, because the cognition will be established anyway. (The same opinion is maintained by Dharmakīrti.[23]) Uddyotakara replies that one has to keep to the right order just as one keeps to the right language (*prayogāpetaśabdavad*) and does not use dialect.[24]

The second objection says that no general agreement is accepted.[25] In Uddyotakara's opinion the order of the members of the proof is not brought about by agreement, but by the natural order of things (*arthasyānupūrvī*).[26]

The third objection says: "And because of the actual usage [your proposed order of the members of the proof is to be denied]. In all treatises an inverted order of the members is used. So whose agreement is it?" Uddyotakara replies: "In a treatise the arguments (*vākya*) are employed with the aim of condensing a subject (*arthasaṃgrahārtha*). But the one who explains a condensed subject with the help of an argument explains (it) when using a formal proof according to the order starting with the proposition."[27]

Fragment #8 (ad *nyūna*) NV 1185.8:

eke tu pratijñānyūnaṃ nāstīty ācakṣate.

(*eke tu pratijñānyūnaṃ nāma nigrahasthānaṃ nāstīti bruvate.* NVTṬ 1185.18-19)

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[22] NV 1180.6-7.

[23] Cf. VN 48.1-17.

[24] NV 1182.3-1184.5. This is in turn critisized by Dharmakīrti in VN 45.3-47.15.

[25] Cf. VN 1.14f.: *atrāpi na kaścit kramaniyamaḥ.*

[26] NV 1183.5-1184.2: *nāyaṃ samayo 'pi tv arthasyānupūrvī. so 'yam arthasyānupūrvīm anvācakṣāṇo nābhyākhyeya iti.*

[27] NV 1184.3-4: *śāstre vākyāny arthasaṃgrahārtham upādīyante, saṃgṛhītaṃ tv arthaṃ vākyena pratipādayitā prayogakāle pratijñādikānupūrvyā pratipādayati.*

This objection is well in accordance with the Buddhist tradition which denies the proving character (*sādhanatva*) of the *pratijñā*. Cf. e.g. PSV ad PS III 1cd: *asmākaṃ tu yo 'numeyanirdeśaḥ sa hetvarthaviṣayatvena na sādhanatvena.*[28]

Uddyotakara's reply to this objection is not very illuminating. Presupposing a syllogism without proposition he presents us with an alternative: "If [1.] someone is defeated, one may ask (*iti*) why there is a point of defeat. Because there are no fallacies of the reason etc. in this [syllogism] and no mistakes of the reason etc., and one arrives at a defeat under this circumstances. Therefore only the lacking of the proposition (*pratijñānyūna*) [is the point of defeat]. Or [2.] there is no defeat. If a defective argument proves a subject, then the cognition (*siddhi*) is accepted without the means of proof (*sādhanābhāve*)."[29] He continues with a second objection:

Fragment #9 (ad *nyūna*) NV 1185.12-13:

yat tu bravīṣi siddhāntaparigraha eva pratijñā.

(*yac ca bravīṣi Dignāga siddhāntaparigraha eveti.* NVTṬ 1185.22)

"But if you say the proposition is the acceptance of a tenet only," - and Uddyotakara replies - "we do not undertstand this either. The stating of the business is a proposition. The acceptance of a thing which is ascertained in general and in particular is a tenet."[30]

Fragment #10 (ad *adhika*) NV 1186.7-8:

tac ca na dārḍhyād ity eke. eke tu bruvate nedaṃ nigrahasthānaṃ dārḍhyāt. dārdhyaṃ hi jñāpyasya bhūyobhir jñāpakair dṛṣṭaṃ yathā dhūmālokābhyām agner iti.

(*tac ca na dārḍhyād* NVTṬ 1186.29)

"'And this [proof (*vākya*), which contains more (*adhika*) than one reason or more than one example] is not a [point of defeat], because it corroborates [the proof]' some say. Some, however, say: 'This is not a point of defeat, because it corroborates [the proof]. For one observes a corroboration of what is to be known through additional means of knowledge, just like [the corroboration] of fire by both smoke and light."

Uddyotakara rejects this by pointing out, that it is not clear what is meant by 'corroboration' and that an infinite regress (*anavasthā*) would follow.[31]

Dharmakīrti holds a differentiated point of view: in a single proof a statement which contains more (than one reason etc.) is senseless, but not in an extended discussion.[32]

Although we find no attribution to the Buddhist tradition for this fragment, its position in the *Nyāyavārttika* is equal to the position of the other fragments. Moreover it seems unlikely that a Naiyāyika would have argued against his authoritative text, the *Nyāyasūtras*.

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28 Quoted PVBh 488.4f., cf. PVBh 490.17f.; cf. VN II, fn. 198.
For Dharmakīrti's description of the uselessness of the *pratijñā* cf. HB §4.131 and §4.132, and VN 17.9-11.

29 NV 1185.9-12: *yaḥ pratijñānyūnavākyaṃ brūte, kim ayaṃ nigṛhyate, atha neti. yadi nigṛhyate, kataman nigrahashānam. na hi hetvābhāsādayo 'tra santīti na ca hetvādidoṣāḥ santīti nigrahaṃ cābhyupaiti. tasmāt pratijñānyūnam eveti. atha na nigrahaḥ. nyūnaṃ vākyam arthaṃ sādhayatīti sādhanabhāve siddhir abhupagatā bhavati.*

30 NV 1185.13-14: *etad api na buddhyāmahe. karmaṇa upādānaṃ pratijñā. sāmānyaviśeṣavato 'vadhāritasya vastunaḥ parigrahaḥ siddhānta iti.*

31 NV 1186.8-12

32 VN 49.17-20: *yatraikasādhanavākyaprayogapūrvako vicāraḥ, tatrādhikābhidhānam anarthakam iti nigrahasthānam. prapañcakathāyāṃ tu na kaścid doṣo niyamābhāvād iti.*

Fragment #11 (ad *punarukta*) NV 1187.13-1188.5:

nābādhanād ity eke. eke tu bruvate nedaṃ nigrahasthānam abādhanāt. na hi parīkṣāvidheḥ punarbruvatā kiṃcid bādhyate. parapratipādanārthaṃ ca vākyaprayogaḥ. punarabhidhānena sutarām arthaṃ pratipadyate iti na nigrahasthānaṃ pratipādakatvāt.

(*ākṣipati nābādhanād iti.* NVTṬ 1187.19;

nābādhanād ity anye parīkṣā iti ca śeṣaḥ. anye Dignāgaprabhṛtayaḥ. parīkṣāvidher iti parīkṣānyāyaḥ. ViP II 66.5)

The objection says that a repetition does no harm, it even may facilitate the teaching. Uddyotakara replies that it is useless to teach what already has been tought, and therefore this constitutes a point of defeat. Moreover, since there is neither teacher nor pupil, one does not repeat.[33] Dharmakīrti takes up the argument in the *Vādanyāya* saying that everyone who is told something is a 'pupil'.[34] And he even says in another place that the other should be taught until he understands.[35]

Fragment #12 (ad *ananubhāṣaṇa*) NV 1189.9-12:

uttareṇāvasānān nedaṃ nigrahasthānam iti kecit. uttareṇāvasānād uttareṇa guṇadoṣavatā mūḍhatvāmūḍhatvaṃ gamyata iti kiṃ punaruccaranāsti. asti hi uttare kaścit samartho dṛśyate, na pratyuccaraṇe. nāsau tāvatā nigrahasthānam arhati. yaś cārambhya svapakṣaṃ na nirvāhayet, tasya syāt khalīkāramātram iti.

(NV 1189.9-1190.2 quoted VN 52.11-53.5; *uttareṇāvasānān* VN : *uttareṇāvasthānāt* NV.
tam etaṃ bhadantākṣepaṃ samādhatte. NVTṬ 1189.25)[36]

Uddyotakara rejects this: the answer would be without object. And the Naiyāyika do not maintain that everything has to be repeated before the answer, but an answer is wrong without its basis.[37]

Fragment #13 (ad *matānujñā*) NV 1194.7-9:

prasaṅgavidhānān na nigrahasthānam ity anye. apare tu brūvate naitan nigrahasthānaṃ prasaṅgavidhānāt. naivāyaṃ paścād api taṃ doṣaṃ pratipadyate, api tu prasaṅgaṃ karoti. yadi puruṣatvāc cauro bhavati, bhavān api puruṣas tasmāc caura iti.

(*prasaṅgavidhānān na nigrahasthānam ity anye.* NVTṬ 1194.12)

The objection says, that the *prativādin* only points out a consequence for the *vādin*. He does not, however, commit a mistake, viz. accept the statement for himself. The argument is the same as in fragment #4. Uddyotakara rejects this by saying that the consequence is formulated instead of an correct answer. Thus, because the *prativādin* apparently has no answer, he is defeated.[38]

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[33] NV 1188.5-7: *satyaṃ pratipādayati. pratipāditārthapratipādakatvād vaiyarthaṃ syāt. vaiyarthān nigrahasthānaṃ sādhanaviṣayāparijñānāt. na cāyaṃ śiṣyo na guruḥ, tasmān nāyaṃ punaḥ pratipādyate.*

[34] VN 51.3: *pratipādyasya śiṣyatvāt.*

[35] VN 55.12f.: *tathā tathā sa grāhaṇīyaḥ, yathāsya pratipattir bhavati.*

[36] That *bhadanta* refers to Dignāga is clear e.g. from NVTṬ 1151.19-21, where NMu v.26a-c = PS VI 7a-c is quoted (cf. NMu [Katsura] VII,51).

[37] NV 1192.12-1190.3: *na, uttaraviṣayāparijñānāt. yady ayaṃ na pratyuccārayati, nirviṣayam uttaraṃ prasajyeta. athottaraṃ bravīti, kathaṃ noccārayati. tad idaṃ vyāhatam ucyate, noccārayaty uttaraṃ ca bravītīti. apratijñānāc ca. na cedaṃ pratijñāyate, pūrvaṃ sarvam uccārayitavyam, paścād uttaram abhidhātavyam iti, api tu yathākathaṃcid uttaraṃ vācyam, uttaraṃ cāśrayābhāve 'yuktam iti, yuktam apratyuccāraṇaṃ nigrahasthānam iti.*

[38] NV 1194.9-10: *etat tu nāta eva, yata evāyam uttare vaktavye prasaṅgaṃ karoti, tata evottarāparijñānān nigṛhyata iti.*

Fragment #14 (ad *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa*) NV 1195.8-1196.6

nānyavacanād ity anye. anye brūvate nedaṃ nigrahasthānam anyottarasyābhidhānāt. yasmād asau nigrahasthānaprāptaṃ na nigṛhṇāti brūvann anyad uttaram abhidhatta iti.

The objection says: someone who does not point out a point of defeat is not to be defeated, because he gives an other answer. Uddyotakara points out that it would be useless to continue the discussion, if one realized that the opponent in fact is already defeated.[39]

Objections against the points of defeat to be found in the *Nyāyavārttika* have been collected here under the assumption that they come, if not from one source, at least from one tradition. And for the time being the hypothesis is put forward that they could well be bits from Dignāga's *Nyāyaparīkṣā*. Though the future may reveal a different state of affairs, I think this presentation of the material at least shows that Dharmakīrti composed his *Vādanyāya* in continuation of a Buddhist tradition.

[39] NV 1196.8-9: *tac ca nāta eva, yata evāsau nigrahasthāne vaktavye anyad abhidhatte, ata eva nigṛhyate. jānāno hy asau kiṃ artham anyad bravīti.*

Index locorum

Abbreviations and Literature

Frauwallner 1933	E. Frauwallner, "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im *Nyāyavārttikam*." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 40, 281-304.
Frauwallner 1957	E. Frauwallner, "Vasubandhu's Vādavidhi." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 1, 104-146.
NM	*Nyāyamañjarī*: *The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Sūrya Nārāyana Śukla. Benares City 1936.
NMGBh	*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*: *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarigranthabhaṅga*. Ed. Nagin J. Shah. Ahmedabad 1972.
NMu (Katsura)	*Nyāyamukha* (Dignāga): Shōryū Katsura: Inmyōshōrimonron kenkyū [A Study of the Nyāyamukha], (1) *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō 37*, 1977, 106-126; (2): *38*, 1978, 110-130; (3): *39*, 1979, 63-82; (4): *41*, 1981, 62-82; (5): *42*, 1982, 82-99; (6): *44*, 1984, 43-74; (7): *46*, 1987, 46-85.
NMu (Tucci)	Giuseppe Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga. The oldest Buddhist Text on Logic, after Chinese and Tibetan Materials*. Heidelberg 1930. Reprint San Francisco 1976.
NSū	*Nyāyasūtra*: v. NV.
NV	*Nyāyavārttika* (Uddyotakara): *Nyāyadarśanam. With Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha. Calcutta 1936, 1944. Reprint Kyoto 1982.
NVTṬ	*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (Vācaspatimiśra): v. NV.
PVBh	*Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam (Vārtikālāṅkaraḥ) Prajñākaraguptena viracitam*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.
PVSV	*Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Roma 1960.
ViP	*Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikaṭīkāvivaraṇapañjikā of Aniruddhācārya*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Darbhanga 1969.
VN	*Vādanyāya* (Dharmakīrti): M. T. Much, *Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāyaḥ*. Teil I, Sanskrit-Text; Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. Wien 1991.
VNṬ	*Vādanyāyaṭīkā (Vipañcitārthā)* (Śāntarakṣita): *Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya. With the Commentary of Śāntarakṣita*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1935/36.

PERCEPTION IN PRE-DIGNĀGA BUDDHIST TEXTS

by

Hōjun Nagasaki, Kyōto

In order to discuss the concept of perception in early Buddhist logic, we have to begin with perception as discussed in the *Upāyahṛdaya (Fang-pien hsin-lun,* 方便心論). Chronologically the *Upāyahṛdaya*, the earliest Buddhist treatise discussing Buddhist logic, was written after the *Carakasaṃhitā* and before the *Nyāyasūtra*. Therefore, we can find the gradual development of early Indian logic in the line of the *Carakasaṃhitā*, the *Upāyahṛdaya* and the *Nyāyasūtra*.

The *Upāyahṛdaya* is extant only in Chinese translation. Dr. Hakuju Ui made a study of the treatise[1] and Dr. G. Tucci published its Sanskrit reconstruction[2]. Dr. Yūichi Kajiyama, in his paper on the formation of pre-Dignāga Buddhist logic,[3] also discussed the problem of logic in the *Upāyahṛdaya* in comparison with the *Carakasaṃhitā* and the *Nyāyasūtra*. In the present paper, perception as discussed in the *Upāyahṛdaya* is first taken up and later will be compared with perception as found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

I. In the prefatory verse of the *Upāyahṛdaya*, it says:

> If one understands this treatise completely, he is sure to be able to be proficient in argument.
> Such a profound meaning [of this treatise] is what shall now be expounded widely. (T 32.23b)

In connection with the first half of the verse, the author proposes to state in this treatise the eight items of logic, *dṛṣṭānta, siddhānta, vākyapraśaṃsā, vākyadoṣa, pramāṇa, prāptakālavākya, hetvābhāsa,* and *vākchala*. If one understands the eight items precisely, he is sure to be able to be proficient in all kinds of argument. The author goes on to say that the reason for stating the eight items of logic is to elucidate the reasonable meaning of other treatises and also to remove the wrong and useless discussion of Buddhist truth.

Perception, our present topic, is discussed under *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) as one of the eight items of logic. Valid knowledge is represented by the four cognitions, perception (現見, *pratyakṣa*), inference (比知, *anumāna*), identification (喻知, *upamāna*) and verbal testimony (隨經書 , *āptaśruti*). Among the four cognitions, perception is regarded as supreme, because the other three cognitions are based on perception. For instance, after knowing by perception that fire is related to smoke, when one sees smoke, one can infer the existence of fire. As in the case of inference, the other two cognitions are also based on perception, so perception is regarded as supreme.

The *Upāyahṛdaya* continues as follows:

> Now, what kind of perception is most faithful? It is answered thus. The perception through the five senses is sometimes erroneous. Only the wisdom that perceives all phenomena rightly is that which is called the highest (perception). When one perceives a mirage (*marīci*) [as water], a fire-brand being swung in a circular motion [as a circle of fire], a Gandharva-city, an imaginary city in the sky (*gandharvanagara*) [as an actually existing city], even if they are to be called

[1] Hakuju Ui, "Hōbenshinron no chūshakuteki kenkyū", *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* 2, 1925, 473-585.

[2] Giuseppe Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Baroda 1929.

[3] Yūichi Kajiyama, "Bukkyō chishikiron no keisei" [Formation of Buddhist Logic and Epistemology], *Kōza Daijō Bukkyō* 9 – *Ninshikiron to ronrigaku*, 1984.

perception, they are not real perceptions. Also, when the form of a thing is not clear, a perception can be hallucinated. For instance, seeing a small tree stump at night, a man in doubt perceives it to be a person, or after putting one's finger into one's eyes, one perceives two moons. If one gets the perception of emptiness (空智, *śūnyatā*), it is called the real perception (実見). (T 32.25b)

'The perception through the five senses' stands for the ordinary empirical perception and is sometimes erroneous, as the instances of perceiving a mirage as water, and so on. It is notable that 'the wisdom perceiving all phenomena rightly' is stated and is called the highest perception in contrast with empirical perception.

It might be useful to compare the perception of the *Upāyahṛdaya* with that of the *Carakasaṃhitā*, which states:

> Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is perceived by oneself through *ātman* and the five senses (*indriya*). Of its two kinds, the *ātma*-perceptions (*ātmapratyakṣa*) are for pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), passion (*icchā*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and so on, whereas the sense perceptions (*indriyapratyakṣa*) are for sound and so on. (*Carakasaṃhitā*, *Vādamaryādāpadāni*, ed. H. Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* 5, 1925: 594)

In the *Carakasaṃhitā*, perception consists of the *indriyapratyakṣa* gained through the five senses and the *ātmapratyakṣa* that can be construed through the *manas*. Compared with the perception of the *Upāyahṛdaya* and that of the *Carakasaṃhitā*, it must be pointed out that the 'wisdom perceiving all phenomena rightly' in the *Upāyahṛdaya* is stated as corresponding to *ātmapratyakṣa*: the *ātmapratyakṣa* which perceives pleasure, pain etc. through the *manas* is, of course, the perception of the mundane stage, but is contrasted with *indriyapratyakṣa* which perceives things through the senses. Just as the *indriyapratyakṣa* is contrasted with the *ātmapratyakṣa* in the *Carakasaṃhitā*, 'the wisdom perceiving all phenomena rightly' is contrasted with the perception through the five senses in the *Upāyahṛdaya*. 'The wisdom perceiving all phenomena rightly' stands for the perception beyond the mundane stage, hence it is further stated that "if one gets the perception of emptiness (空智 , *śūnyatā*), it is called the real perception (実見)".

II. The *Yogācārabhūmi*, in the explanation of the *hetuvidyā* (因明), 'the science of reasoning (*Śrūtamayībhūmi* chapter 10.3),[4] defines perception (*pratyakṣa*) as *aviparokṣa* (not indirect perception), *anabhyūhitānabhyūhya* (perception of what was not already inferred and not to be inferred) and *avibhrānta* (perception free from illusion).[5] This does not mean, however, that there are three kinds of perception, but that true perception can be defined in terms of these three aspects of wrong perception.

aviparokṣa denotes direct perception of the object, as opposed to indirect cognition such as *anumāna* (inference) and *āptāgama* (trustworthy authority). For *aviparokṣa* to function, the sense-organs

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[4] The *hetuvidyā* comprised of the seven items *vāda*, *vādādhikaraṇa*, *vādādhiṣṭhāna*, *vādālaṃkāra*, *vādanigraha*, *vādaniḥsaraṇa*, and *vāde bahukarā dharmāḥ*, has been called the seven *hetuvidyā* in the Buddhist tradition. Dr. Hakuju Ui made a detailed study of the seven *hetuvidyā* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Hakuju Ui, "Jinna izen ni okeru bukkyō no ronrisetsu", *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* 5, 1929; *Bukkyō ronrigaku* 1933. Dr. Alex Wayman, while editing the Bihar Research Society's manuscript of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, found numerous folios concerning the *hetuvidyā* inserted into the text, and presented an outline of the original Sanskrit words of the seven *hetuvidyā* section along with an index of terms in Tibetan and Chinese. Alex Wayman, "The Rules of Debate According to Asaṅga", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 78/1, 1958, 29-40. Dr. Yūichi Kajiyama (1984, cited in note 3) also took up the problem of logic in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

[5] T 30.357a-c.

(*indriya*) must be faultless (*aparibhinna*) and attention (*manaskāra*) must be presented (*pratyupasthita*). Other conditions concerning the sense-organs and their objects are also said to be necessary.

The second perception, *anabhyūhitānabhyūhya*, is a term denoting perception occurring only in the present, exclusive of 'what was inferred in the past' and 'what is to be inferred in the future'. It includes the following two kinds of perception: 1) that which, "at the very moment one senses it, becomes the object of perception"; 2) the yogin's intuition. The *Yogācārabhūmi* explains the first perception as follows:

> It is like an excellent physician giving a patient medicine which, being perfect in all form, smell, taste and touch, is equipped with a powerful effect. It should be known that at the very moment [the patient] senses the form, smell, taste and touch of medicine, it becomes the object of perception. Before he is cured, the medicine's powerful effect is called 'what is to be inferred [in the future]'. After he is cured, it is called 'what was already inferred [in the past]'. For these reasons, this perception (viz., *anabhyūhitānabhyūhya*) is designated as that which, "at the very moment one senses it, becomes the object of perception". (T 30.357b)

A patient before cure inferring the medicine's effect by sensing its form, etc. is a perception of 'what is to be inferred', and his knowing its effect after he has already been cured is a perception of 'what was already inferred'. Therefore, as in the case of 'what is inferred in the future' and 'what was already inferred in the past', there must be a perception of the medicine's effect in the present. As soon as a patient senses its form, etc., he perceives the medicine's effect and thinks that he is cured. This means that the medicine's effect becomes the object of perception at that very moment. This is called perception of 'what is not already inferred and not to be inferred'.

Turning to *avibhrānta* (the perception free from illusion), it is said to be free from the following kinds of illusions: *samjñābhrānti* (illusion of idea), like the illusion of water seen in a mirage; *saṃkhyābhrānti* (illusion of number), like the illusion of two moons seen by a person suffering from astigmatism; *saṃsthānabhrānti* (illusion of shape), like an illusion of a circle created by a fire-brand swung in a circle; *varṇabhrānti* (illusion of color), like the illusion of yellow seen by one suffering from *kamalā* disease; and *karmabhrānti* (illusion of activity), the illusion of trees on the river bank moving seen by a person sitting on a boat.

Two more kinds of illusions are added to the above five: *cittabhrānti* (illusion of thought), the illusion that one is pleased by the above five illusions; and *dṛṣṭibhrānti* (illusions of views), the illusion that one sees as real and adheres to any of the above illusions.

avibhrānta therefore stands for perception free from these kinds of illusions.

III. Finally, *pratyakṣa* is discussed as: *rūpīndriyapratyakṣa*, the perception of formal sense-organs (i.e., sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch); *manonubhavapratyakṣa*, the perception of mental experience; *lokapratyakṣa*, empirical perception; and *śuddhapratyakṣa*, transcendent perception.

rūpīndriyapratyakṣa denotes perception obtained through the five sense-organs, while *manonubhavapratyakṣa* represents that generated through *manas*. In my opinion, the former can be said to correspond to the *aviparokṣa* and *avibhrānta*, while the latter to the *anabhyūhitānabhyūhya*.

lokapratyakṣa and *śuddhapratyakṣa* are classified in terms of the mundane and supra-mundane knowledges, respectively. *lokapratyakṣa* is comprised of *rūpīndriyapratyakṣa* and *manonubhavapratyakṣa* (T 30.357c). In the *Yogācārabhūmi* we find:

> As for the *śuddhapratyakṣa*, some say that those (perceptions) which belong to the *lokapratyakṣa* are also to be designated *śuddhapratyakṣa*, while others say there is a perception belonging only to *śuddhapratyakṣa* but not to *lokapratyakṣa*. Supra-mundane knowledge (*lokottarajñāna*) is what

functions to perceive what exists as existent, what does not exist as not, what is surpassable as surpassable, and what is unsurpassable as unsurpassable. Such knowledge is not found together with the mundane, and is called *śuddhapratyakṣa* (T 30.357c; cf. Tibetan, Peking vol. 109, 300-2)

According to the Chinese and Tibetan translations, *śuddhapratyakṣa* is defined as 1) that which belongs to *lokapratyakṣa*, being found together with the mundane, and 2) supra-mundane knowledge (*lokottarajñāna*), which is not found together with the mundane. What is to be included under the first definition? As mentioned above, *anabhyūhitānabhyūhya* is defined as that which perceives the medicine's effect and the yogin's intuition. As soon as a patient sees the medicine given to him by a physician, he perceives its effect. Perceiving the medicine's effect at that very moment, designated as a perception (*pratyakṣa*), points to a special kind of perception, which is different from empirical perception obtained through the five sense-organs, for it is through *manas* that one perceives the medicine's effect; this perception can therefore be included under the category of *śuddhapratyakṣa*. In the same way, a yogin's intuition is also to be included under *śuddhapratyakṣa*, since it is generated by means of *manas*.

The second definition of *śuddhapratyakṣa* denotes supra-mundane knowledge (*lokottarajñāna*) which is not found together with the mundane. As the *Yogācārabhūmi* mentions, supra-mundane knowledge is what functions to perceive what exists as existent, what does not exist as not, etc. Such perception is precisely the absolute knowledge of the Truth, thus *śuddhapratyakṣa* refers to the transcendent perception of absolute knowledge.

The main theme of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, needless to say, is to elucidate the system of Yogācāra practice. The *śuddhapratyakṣa* (the second definition), 'the absolute knowledge of truth', is attained by the Yogācārin at the supra-mundane stage of practice; in other words, it is the absolute knowledge attained at the stage of Enlightenment.

IV. The categories of *pratyakṣa* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* can thus be arranged as follows. The first category, *pratyakṣa* on the basis of sense-organs (*indriya*), would consist of *rūpīndriyapratyakṣa* which is generated by the sense-organs, and *manonubhavapratyakṣa* which is generated by *manas*. The second, *pratyakṣa* in terms of the mundane and supra-mundane stages of Buddhist practice, would consist of *lokapratyakṣa*, empirical perception, and *śuddhapratyakṣa*, transcendent perception. according to one interpretation, *lokapratyakṣa* would denote *rūpīndriyapratyakṣa*, and *śuddhapratyakṣa* would denote *manonubhavapratyakṣa*; according to the other, both *rūpīndriyapratyakṣa* and *manonubhavapratyakṣa* would be included under the category of *lokapratyakṣa*. In the latter case, *śuddhapratyakṣa* would mean supra-mundane knowledge (*lokottarajñāna*).[6] In any case, it is significant that these two perceptions, empirical and transcendent, are discussed in the explanation of the *hetuvidyā* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

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[6] These can be schematized in the following two ways:

a. *rūpīndriyapratyakṣa* ——— *lokapratyakṣa*
manonubhavapratyakṣa ——— *śuddhapratyakṣa*

b. *rūpīndriyapratyakṣa* ┐
manonubhavapratyakṣa ┘——— *lokapratyakṣa*
lokottarajñāna ——— *śuddhapratyakṣa*

In closing, it must be pointed out that the discussion of *pratyakṣa* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* is, in some respects, very close to that found in the *Upāyahṛdaya*. In the *Upāyahṛdaya* 'the wisdom perceiving all phenomena rightly' is called 'the highest perception' in contrast with the perception through the five senses. The wisdom to perceive phenomena is nothing but the perception of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and is finally called 'the real perception (実見)'. 'The wisdom perceiving all phenomena rightly', i.e. 'the real perception' in the *Upāyahṛdaya*, corresponds exactly to the supra-mundane knowledge (*lokottarajñāna*) in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, that is, 'what functions to perceive what exists as existent, what does not exist as not, what is surpassable as surpassable, and what is unsurpassable as unsurpassable'. Although the terms *lokapratyakṣa* and *śuddhapratyakṣa* are not used in the *Upāyahṛdaya* to denote respectively the perception through the senses and 'the wisdom perceiving all phenomena rightly', we cannot deny the relationship between the concept of perception in the *Upāyahṛdaya* and that in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

TWO ASPECTS OF *PARALOKASĀDHANA* IN DHARMAKĪRTIAN TRADITION

by

Chishō Mamoru Namai, Kōyasan

abhyāsayogād dhi śubhāśubhāni karmāṇi sātmyeva bhavanti puṃsām /
tathāvidhāny eva yad aprayatnāj janmāntare svapna ivācaranti // (JM XV 1)

0. Two Aspects of *paralokasādhana* in Buddhist Tradition

In the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Dharmakīrti (600-660) tried to prove the existence of other lives. His aim was to establish an existential ground based upon which the Buddha's unlimited compassion for sentient beings could be demonstrated, since such a kind of mercy had become his own nature only by continuous practice throughout many lives. I would here first like to sketch an outline of the Buddhist tradition of proving the existence of other lives (*paralokasādhana*), then to clarify the historical position of Dharmakīrti on this subject and his place in the tradition by referring to the arguments developed by his successors.[1]

Traditionally, Buddhists had tried to establish the theory of 'flow of consciousness' (*vijñānasantāna*) in order to explain transmigration (*saṃsāra*) without supposing any substantial entity such as *ātman*. Later Buddhists were concerned to justify the theory in accordance with Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge. In these traditional proofs of other existences, the following two aspects are evident: the one is to demonstrate the other worlds as the field of the Bodhisattva's activity, the other is to describe the state of transmigration of sentient beings.[2]

When we survey the source materials of the Buddhist refutation of Bārhaspatya (Lokāyata/Cārvāka) philosophy,[3] these two aspects of *paralokasādhana* seem to have appeared in Buddhist literature already before Dharmakīrti. With regard to this, we should examine two texts which both deal with *paralokasādhana* before Dharmakīrti. The one is a source of argument for the Buddhists when they preach *karmaphalasambandha* as a moral principle. To this purpose, the great Buddhist poet Āryaśūra (4c.?) composed the *Jātakamālā* (JM) XXIX. This has the motif of proving the existence of other lives, representative for the genre of Jātaka literature. The other is a work of a Mādhyamika, Bhāvaviveka (500-570), who declares that the Buddhists themselves are not nihilists (*nāstika*) by refuting the nihilists' annihilation of *karmaphalasambandha* and by demonstrating the transmigration of sentient beings. Mādhyamikas, by proving transmigration without presupposing an *ātman*, unlike the dogmatism of eternity (*śāśvatavāda*) based upon the ground of the theory of 'flow of consciousness', distinguish their theory of emptiness (*śūnyavāda*) from the nihilist's dogmatism of annihilation (*ucchedavāda*).

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[1] As mentioned by Prof. Steinkellner (1984 and "Paralokasiddhi texts", in *Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions. Essays in Honor of Dr. Shozen Kumoi on his Seventieth Birthday*, Kyōto 1985, 215-224), there seem to have been two methodologies of *paralokasādhana/paralokasiddhi* in Buddhist tradition, i.e. the methodology 'of the *Saṃdhinirmocana* Sūtra' and that of Buddhist Pramāṇavāda. In this paper, I would like to deal with this theme as far as it is concerned with the method of Buddhist Pramāṇavāda based upon Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge, the tradition in which Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Dharmottara and other successors had endeavoured to prove the other world.

[2] These aspects were the only ones that the so-called 'Buddhist Pramāṇavāda tradition' was concerned with. In this tradition, *paralokasādhana* has the aim of refuting Bārhaspatya philosophy. Therefore it is necessary to trace the arguments taking the development of Bārhaspatya philosophy into account.

[3] The system of Bārhaspatya philosophy has its core in the annihilation of such traditional Indian concepts as *ātman*, *īśvara*, *saṃsāra*, *mokṣa*. That is why the people who followed the philosophy were called '*nāstikas*'. To this nihilistic mode of thought, philosophers of other systems of Indian philosophy had raised objections. Cf. Namai 1976: 30, 69ff.

0.1. Āryaśūra on *paralokasādhana*: *Jātakamālā* XXIX, *Brahmajātaka* vv. 7-13 (14,15)

In *Jātakamālā* chapter XXIX, Āryaśūra describes the appearance of a Bodhisattva to a king whose mind is blinded by nihilistic thought (*ucchedavāda*). The Bodhisattva, perceiving the suffering and helpless state of the king, descends from the Brahmaloka heaven, shows himself to the king, and demonstrates the existence of other worlds. The words of the Bodhisattva were recorded by the great poet in an elegant Sanskrit poem. We can say that most of the traditional arguments on this subject can be traced back to Āryaśūra's description of the Bodhisattva's sermon.[4] Accordingly, his argumentation can be considered as the prototype for the proof of the existence of other lives in the Buddhist tradition. In this text, Āryaśūra deals with the *paralokasādhana* in view of the following aspects:[5]

1. As a generally known fact, there exists a variety of beings, some enjoying a heavenly world, while others are suffering and creeping upon the earth. This can be perceived through one's own sense organs.

2. One can prove the existence of other lives by the following reasoning: no consciousness arises without a previous consciousness, all consciousness is preceded by another previous moment of consciousness; because of this, the first consciousness of an embryo also presupposes previous consciousness which perished a moment before in its former life (i.e. the last consciousness at death). This argumentation is the fundamental Buddhist standpoint[6]. And the refutation of the doctrine of 'spontaneous origination' (*svabhāvavāda*) - that is a tenet which considers the instinctive desires of

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[4] JM XXIX vv. 7-13: *candrārkanakṣatravibhūṣaṇā dyaus tiryagvikalpāś ca bahuprakārāḥ* /
pratyakṣarūpaḥ paraloka eṣa *mā te 'tra saṃdehajaḍā matir bhūt* // (7)
jātismarāḥ santi ca tatra tatra *dhyānābhiyogāt smṛtipāṭavāc ca* /
ato 'pi lokaḥ parato 'numeyaḥ *sākṣyaṃ ca nanv atra kṛtaṃ mayaiva* // (8) (Cf. MH III 203; TS(P) XXII 1945)
yad buddhipūrvaiva ca buddhisiddhir lokaḥ paro 'sūti tato 'py avehi /
ādyā hi yā garbhagatasya buddhiḥ sānantaraṃ pūrvakajanmabuddheḥ || (9)
jñeyāvabodhaṃ ca vadanti buddhiṃ janmādibuddher viṣayo 'sti tasmāt /
na caihiko 'sau nayanādyabhāvāt siddhau yadīyas tu paraḥ sa lokaḥ // (10)
(Cf. MH III 212; ŚV *Ātmavāda* 65-66, 70 [*Ślokavārttika*, ed. Rama Shastri, Benares 1898-1899]; *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* [TUS in Eli Franco, *Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief. A Study of Jayarāśi's Scepticism*, Stuttgart 1987] 268,14-272,11; TS(P) 1864f., 1919-1929.)
pitryaṃ svabhāvaṃ vyatiricya dṛṣṭaḥ śīlādibhedaś ca yataḥ prajānām /
nākasmikasyāsti ca yatprasiddhir jātyantarābhyāsamayaḥ *sa tasmāt* // (11) (Cf. Dharmottara's *Paralokasiddhi* [in Steinkellner 1986] 8,8-22)
paṭutvahīne 'pi matiprabhāve jaḍaprakāreṣv api cendriyeṣu /
vinopadeśāt pratipadyate yat prasūtamātraḥ stanapānayatnam || (12)
āhārayogyāsu kṛtaśramatvaṃ taddarśayaty asya bhavāntareṣu |
abhyāsasiddhir *hi paṭūkaroti śikṣāgaṇam karmasu teṣu teṣu* // (13)
(Cf. NSū 3.1.18-23; MH III 213f.; TS(P) 1939-1963)
Cf. Namai "Notes on Mithyādṛṣṭivigrāha in Buddhist Tradition – On *Jātakamālā* Chap. XXIII –", *The Journal of the Nippon Buddhist Research Association* 48, 1983: 75-80; Steinkellner 1984: 89-91.

[5] In this *paralokasādhana*, the words *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are used – in verse 7 Āryaśūra mentions the demonstration by *pratyakṣa*, and in verse 8cd he mentions the proof by *anumāna* – but not *āgama*. This kind of demonstration has some connection with the *paralokasādhana* in the so-called '*Saṃdhinirmocana* methodology'. About the '*Saṃdhinirmocana*'s tradition of *paralokasādhana*' cf. the following studies: Yūichi Kajiyama, "Bukkyō chishikiron no keisei" [Formation of Buddhist Logic and Epistemology], *Kōza Daijō Bukkyō* 9 - *Ninshikiron to ronrigaku*, 1984: 54-64. Steinkellner's comments on *upapattisādhanayukti* in the *Saṃdhinirmocana*'s tradition of *paralokasādhana*: Steinkellner (cited in note 4) 1984: 89-92, fn. 25, 31; Ernst Steinkellner, *Nachweis der Wiedergeburt, Prajñāsenas 'Jig rten pha rol sgrub pa*, [2 Teile] Teil II, Wien 1988: 9f., 14-19. H. Yaita mentions this type of proof of previous lives found in *Śrāvakabhūmi* (cf. Appendices No. 5 to "Shōmon ji ni okeru sanryō setsu" [On Threefold *pramāṇa* in *Śrāvakabhūmi*] *Taishō Daigaku Sōgōbukkyōkenkyūsho Nenpō* 13, 1989).

[6] This reasoning is a typical proof of other lives in the so-called Buddhist Pramāṇavāda tradition. The proof of previous lives by this reasoning (v. 9) can be traced down to the last stage of the Buddhist tradition of *paralokasādhana* (see fn. 55).

a newborn baby to have no causal reason – is also presented in this argument, where the baby's desire for the mother's breast learned in previous lives is explained by the Buddhist doctrine of the 'repeated practice and forming tendency' (*abhyāsa*). This proof has a close parallelism to the argumentation of the Naiyāyika's refutation of Svabhāvavāda in NSū 3.1.18-23.[7]

In the text we can trace the two aspects mentioned above:

i) As the result of *abhyāsa* of mercy and meditation, the Bodhisattva appeared as an inhabitant of the Brahmaloka heaven and, moved by his compassion for the king, came down to earth.

ii) The second aspect seems to be illustrated by the representation of hell (*naraka*) as the result of one's evil deeds. The poet contrasts this with the heavenly state of those beings who have accumulated their moral merit and have realized their process of meditation.[8]

The theory of *abhyāsa* is the principal theme to be explained in both aspects.

0.2. Bhāvaviveka on *paralokasādhana*: *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP) ad *Madhyamakakārikā* XVI 1.

When we survey those Mādhyamika texts which are concerned with the refutation of Bārhaspatya philosophy, we can find another two aspects:

i) The refutation of a nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) which must be distinguished from the Madhyamaka theory of *śūnyatā* as the 'ultimate truth' (*paramārthasatya*).

ii) The proof of the transmigration of beings as the 'conventional truth' (*saṃvṛtisatya*).

We have a typical example of these two aspects in Bhāvaviveka's arguments. When Bhāvaviveka interprets the Madhyamaka viewpoint on the state of transmigration and deliverance from it (*bandhamokṣa*), he deals with the theme of *paralokasādhana*.[9] Here Bhāvaviveka, commenting on the first verse of the *Bandhamokṣaparīkṣā* chapter of *Madhyamakakārikā* (MK)[10], negates the

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[7] Cf. NSū 3.1.18-23: *pūrvābhyastasmṛtyanubandhāj jātasya harṣabhayaśokasampratipatteḥ* (18); *padmādiṣu prabodhasaṃmīlanavikāravat tadvikāraḥ* (19); *nōṣṇaśītavarṣākālanimittatvāt pañcātmakavikārāṇām* (20, cf. JM XXIX 14,15); *pretyāhārābhyāsakṛtāt stanyābhilāṣāt* (21); *ayaso 'yaskāntābhigamanavat tad upasarpaṇam* (22); *nānyatra pravṛttyabhāvāt* (23, cf. MH III 214; TSP 649,9). Cf. Ch. M. Namai, "Śāntarakṣita's Proving of Previous Existences", *IBK* 25/2, 1977: 912; Steinkellner (cited in note 5) 1988: 46, n. 37.

Most of this kind of arguments may be derived from these arguments of *Nyāyasūtra* against Svabhāvavāda. There may be some hesitation to take the doctrine of Svabhāvavāda for a tenet of Bārhaspatya when we are concerned with early Buddhist literature, since this doctrine is also connected with Niyatavāda of Ājīvika. But in the later Buddhist literature this tenet is recorded as derived from *Bṛhaspatisūtra* (BS A6-A8, Namai 1976: 39, 57-62. Cf. also *Suvarṇasaptati; Māṭharavṛtti* ad *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 61; *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* [in *Carvakadarśanam*, ed. B. Bhattacharya, Calcutta 1985] vv. 4, 6; *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* of Sāyana Mādhava, ed. V. S. Abhyaṃkar, Poona 1951: 13). The arguments on the refutation of Svabhāvavāda in *Carakasaṃhitā* should also be considered (cf. T. E. Meindersma, "Paralokasiddhi in Caraka Saṃhitā", *Indologica Taurinensia* 1990 [forthcoming]; Steinkellner 1986: 50f., fn. 29, 31). The argument on the actions of the 'opening' and 'closing' of a lotus flower in NSū 3.1.19-20 has also close parallels to the dialogue of the Bodhisattva and the king described in JM XXIX 14-15 (Namai [cited in note 4] 1983: 78). The example of 'attraction' of a magnet to iron is also dealt with by Bhāvaviveka (MH III 214) and Kamalaśīla (TSP 649,9). The theme in NSū 3.1.24 is taken up by Dharmakīrti (PV II 189; cf. Vetter 1984: 89) but the context is different.

An investigation into the background of Āryaśūra's arguments against the heretical schools would be necessary, especially in his JM XXIII and XXIX from where Śāntarakṣita derived some logical problems (cf. Namai, "On Śāntarakṣita's Refutation of *ahetuvāda* – Śāntarakṣita on JM XXIII 7 –", *Journal of Kōyasan University* 22, 1987, 87-117; Namai, "Buddhist Refutation of Bārhaspatya Philosophy [IV]", *Journal of Kōyasan University* 22, 1987, 118-126).

[8] In JM XXII vv. 21-45 Āryaśūra describes the states of *durgati*, and in vv. 49-58 he represents the preaching of *saddharma* which leads sentient beings to the heavenly world. On the style of the verses which describe the heavenly destination of meditators, see S. Lienhard, *A History of Classical Poetry, A History of Indian Literature*, Wiesbaden 1984: 266.

[9] Bhāvaviveka refutes Nāstikas in PP ad MK XVII 7 also. Cf. Y. Ejima, "Chūgansha wo kyomuronsha to suru hihan" [On the Refutation of a Criticism that regards Mādhyamikas as Nihilists] *Tōhōgaku* 34, 1967, 62-75; Yūichi Kajiyama, "Chie no tomoshibi" [A Japanese Translation of PPd XVIII] *Sekai no Meicho* 2, 1967: 320f.

[10] *saṃskārāḥ saṃsaranti cen na nityāḥ saṃsaranti te* /

transmigration of the 'causally conditioned things' (*saṃskāra*) and sentient beings from the viewpoint of 'ultimate truth'. An opponent objects to this statement: "The conditioned things cannot move to the next world, and there cannot be any transmigration of sentient beings, as also negated by us Lokāyatas. Therefore the statement is already established and not significant."[11] Bhāvaviveka, counterarguing against this objection from two different points, declares as follows: "We Mādhyamikas never say that the causally conditioned things cannot move to another existence as the nihilists maintain. From the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, there never has been any origination or destruction from time without beginning. However, in conventional truth, all the sentient beings are bound up in the world of birth and death. Only the sage (*vairāgya*) who is freed from the defilements (*kleśa*) of evil passion escapes from the state."[12]

0.3. Two Aspects of *paralokasādhana* in the Two Buddhist Traditions

Now we may say that the aims of *paralokasādhana* of the above mentioned two Buddhists are as follows:

i) For the purpose of preaching the moral principle of *karman* in contrasting bad and good actions, *paralokasādhana* is necessary. In other words, it has the same purpose as the Jātaka literature.

ii) The latter aspect of *paralokasādhana* is closely connected with the arguments related to the wretched plight of sentient beings bound up in the world of *karman* or the world of *saṃskṛta* being contrasted to the state of eternal calm (*nirvāṇa*).

From these arguments, the later Buddhists derive the two main subjects of their philosophical analysis. The first occupies the philosophers who justify the theories of *cittasantāna* and of *pratisaṃdhijñāna*. The other is especially valid for the Mādhyamikas, being concerned with the twofold truth (*satyadvaya*). The former issue had been discussed for centuries with other non-Buddhist philosophical schools, with the heterodox (*nāstika*) as well as with the orthodox ones (*āstika*). In the course

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saṃsaranti ca nānityāḥ sattvo 'py eṣa samaḥ kramaḥ // MK XVI 1

[11] Bhāvaviveka, PP 164a4ff. (ad MK XVI 1): *'dir 'jig rten rgyaṅ phan pa (Lokāyata) dag gis smras pa 'du byed rnams daṅ / sems can rtag pa daṅ / mi rtag pa mi 'khor ro źes bya ba ni grub pa la sgrub pa yin te / . . . 'jig rten 'di nas 'jig rten gźan du chos 'ga' yaṅ mi 'gro źiṅ /*

[12] PP 164b2ff. This translation is not literal, but rather a summary of the following text:
(0) Reply from the viewpoint of two truths (*satyadvaya*)
de la 'dir 'du byed mi rtag pa 'khor ba tha sñad du ma bkag pa'i phyir daṅ / 'du byed rtag pa 'khor ba ni / [kun rdzob daṅ tha sñad gi] gñi gar yaṅ bkags pa'i phyir grub pa la sgrub pa ma yin no //
(i) Refutation of the objection from the viewpoint of 'conventional truth'
(i.1) . . . An objection from Lokāyata to the Buddhist *prayoga* which proves the existence of previous lives using the second and third moment of consciousness after entering a womb as *dṛṣṭānta* (fragment F2 see Namai 1976: 32 fn. 26; 44) (Cf. also Kumārila in ŚV (cited in note 4) *Ātmavāda* 70; Namai, "Buddhist Refutation of Bārhaspatya Philosophy [VI]", *The Mikkyō Bunka* 157, 1987: 87-89, fn. 42) . . .
[de ltar] dpe[α] *yod pa'i phyir / tha sñad du 'jig rten pha rol sṅa ma ma grub pa ma yin no //*
[α] i.e. the *dṛṣṭānta* of the *prayoga* stated by the Buddhist.
(i.2) . . . A syllogism by Lokāyata which negates the Buddhist theory of after-lives using the Buddhist concept of *arhaccaramacitta* (fragment F3 see Namai 1976: 32 fn.26; p.44) . . .
'jig rten pha rol phyi ma yaṅ med pa ma yin te / zag pa daṅ bcas pa'i 'chi ka'i sems ni sems gźan daṅ ñiṅ mtshams sbyor te / zag pa daṅ bcas pa'i phyir dper na 'chi ba'i rgyu'i sems bźin pas tha sñad kyi bden pa daṅ 'gar ba med do //
(ii) Refutation of the objection from the viewpoint of 'ultimate truth'
gal te don dam par lhas byin gyi blo yaṅ rgyud gźan gyi blo thams cad las gźan ñid ma yin te / blo yin pa'i phyir dper na lhas byin gyi blo bźin no źes na / de ni bzaṅ po ma yin te / don dam par lha byin gyi blo'i skyes ba bkag pa'i phyir daṅ . . .
Cf. MH III on *anutpatti* from the viewpoint of *catuṣkoṭi* esp. the fourth *koṭi* (iii-D, synopsis by Y. Ejima): MH III 137-223 (esp. 194-214, 430-444). Especially these arguments on *bandhamokṣa* are closely connected with the statements in MH III 85-87, 99 (see note 43).

of these discussions the Buddhist arguments became summarized into two syllogisms.[13] One proves the existence of previous lives and the other the existence of subsequent lives. The arguments of *paralokasādhana* by the later Buddhists are centered around these two syllogisms. Already in the texts of Bhāvaviveka, we can find these two syllogisms in their early forms, and they are invariably connected with the objections from Lokāyata philosophers.[14] However the later Buddhists had answered their opponents, and tried to explain their position by adopting Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge. The above mentioned two aspects can be seen in the *paralokasādhana* of Dharmakīrti and his followers. We shall now analyze the structure of *paralokasādhana* in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* II, and the arguments developed by his followers.

I. Two Aspects found in Dharmakīrti's *paralokasādhana*

When Dharmakīrti states the Bhagavat as the criterion of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), he first presents the Buddha's compassion as a reason (*sādhana*) for the *prāmāṇya* of the Buddha in interpreting the *maṅgalaśloka* of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.[15] At the beginning of the argument, Dharmakīrti is confronted with a Dehātmavādin. The opponent objects: "It is impossible to accumulate one's compassion for the beings to such a degree that it becomes one's own nature, because no previous life can exist where one had repeatedly developed one's compassion (*karuṇābhyāsa*)."[16] The problem which Dharmakīrti had to confront was how to prove the *karuṇābhyāsa* of the Buddha beyond the span of one life. Dharmakīrti counterargues by logically establishing the theory of 'flow of consciousness' (*cittasantāna*) and justifying the Buddhist doctrine of *abhyāsa*. In dealing with this subject, Dharmakīrti re-analyzes the Ābhidharmika theory of 'immediate causal relation of matters' (*upādānopādeyabhāva*) known as *samanantarapratyayādhipattiphalabhāva*,[17] comparing it with *āśrayā-*

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[13] The Buddhist position is summarized in TS XXII by Śāntarakṣita in these statements:
(i) *tasmāt tatrādivijñānaṃ svopādānabalodbhavam / vijñānatvādihetubhya idānīntanacittavat //* (1896)
anyahetupratikṣepād (in TS 1878-1895) *ahetutve ca saṃsthite / anyathā niyato dharmo nāyaṃ tasya prasajyate //* (1897)
(ii) *maraṇakṣaṇavijñānaṃ svopādeyodayakṣamam / rāgino 'hīnasaṅgatvāt* pūrvavijñānavat tathā //* (1898)
* corrected according to the Tibetan version.
These two syllogisms are representative for the arguments of the later Buddhist's *paralokasādhana* (cf. fn. 41).

[14] These syllogisms were composed in the Buddhist tradition against the Bārhaspatya's objections classified as BS F2, F3 in Namai 1976: 32, 71-73 (cf. note 12). In MH, Bhāvaviveka, when he deals with *saṃsāra* as *saṃvṛtisatya* (cf.v. 194ff.), discusses the same two arguments as concentrated in these two syllogisms. Bhāvaviveka, MH III 199-214:
asti garbhādibuddheḥ prāg anantaraniruddhadhīḥ | *jñeyabhedena tadbhedāt dhītvād vāpi tadūrdhvavat //* (199)
bālasya cyuticittaṃ cet sādhyate 'pratisaṃdhikaṃ | nāstikaiḥ cyuticittatvād arhaccaramacittavat || (202)
syād anaikāntiko hetur atītacyuticetasā / jātismarādisadbhāvād *uktanītyāpi tac ca sat //* (203)
ato garbhādivijñānaṃ vijñānānantarapūrvakam | *vidvadbhir avaboddhavyaṃ grāhakatvāt tadūrdhvavat //* (212)
vatsaḥ pūrvakṛtābhyāsāj *jātasthāhāram eṣate // āhārārthaṃ parispandād yathā pariṇatendriyaḥ //* (213)
nānaikāntikatā hetor ayaskāntopalādibhiḥ / tadāhārābhyavahṛter dṛṣṭatvān nāpy asiddhatā // (214)
Cf. *Tarkajvālā* ad MH III 199 (Tōhoku No. 3856, 105b): *slob dpon dpa' bos (ācāryaśūreṇa)* . . . JM XXIX v. 9 . . . *ces ji skad bśad pa lta bu'o.*

[15] *pramāṇabhūtāya* jagaddhitaiṣiṇe *praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine /*
pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ //
For the interpretation of this verse cf.: Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1968: 73-75; E. Steinkellner, "The Sipritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism", *Nanto Bukkyō* 49, 1982: Sect. II.

[16] *sādhanaṃ karuṇ*ābhyāsāt sā; *buddher dehasaṃśrayāt / asiddho 'bhyāsa iti cen* nāśrayapratiṣedhataḥ || (PV II 34)
And in the following arguments Dharmakīrti investigates *āśrayāśritabhāva* between 'physical body' and 'mind' from the ontological aspect.

[17] The point of issue as concerned with *upādāna-(kāraṇa)* is dealt with in PV II 35ff. especially in 60-78, and 49, 159

śritabhāva as stated in other Indian philosophical schools.[18]

The analysis of the *upādānopadeyabhāva* is made by opposing these two tenets: one opposes the doctrine of Dehātmavāda and the other the doctrine of Ātmavāda. The Dehātmavādins state: "There is no eternal substantial entity without this physical body which can be perceived by these actual sense organs. Therefore there is no substantial existence which transmigrates to the next world when the body ceases its functions at death." The Ātmavādins assume that "there should be an eternal soul which pervades one's personal experiences and receives the reward of those experiences in the next life."[19]

In order to refute the Dehātmavādin, Dharmakīrti proves that the principle of *upādānopādeyabhāva* is only justified in the causal relation between each new moment of consciousness and the consciousness which perished a moment before as being momentary (*kṣaṇika*). And he refutes a direct causal relation between a physical body and consciousness.[20] By this justification of the theory of an independent flow of consciousness, Dharmakīrti at the same time rejects the Ātmavāda as well. In verse PV II 69, Dharmakīrti says: "By this reason, that is that there cannot be any *āśrayāśritabhāva* in general, the dependency of consciousness on some other substance, such as *ātman* as *samavāyikāraṇa*, is refuted."[21]

In this section (vv. 34-119) especially, the *āśraya* of the consciousness is the subject matter to be discussed. As an ontological issue, he demonstrates the independence of the flow of consciousness from a physical body and from an *ātman*, which are not considered as the *āśraya*s of consciousness. Thus, the next world which is only connected with the independent flow of consciousness is demonstrated.[22]

Based on this ground, Dharmakīrti deals with the problem of *karuṇābhyāsa*. This was the primary theme of his *paralokasādhana*. However, the principal doctrine has already been established in a fundamental phase by proving the individual *cittasantāna* to be the *āśraya* for all related consciousness. The topic of *karuṇābhyāsa* is rather to be considered as an application of the principal doctrine of *cittasantāna* and of *abhyāsa* to the special case of the Buddha. In actual fact, Dharmakīrti himself discusses this theme in only 12 verses. Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788) follows this line when he discusses the *sarvajñasādhana* in TS XXVI as Mr. Inami reported in 1986.[23] However, posterior to Dharma-

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where the words of the Buddha are interpreted (cf. Vetter 1984: 66):

sattopakāriṇī yasya nityaṃ tadanubandhataḥ / sa hetuḥ saptamī tasmād upādād iti cocyate // (49)

tadupādāyaśabdaś ca hetvarthaḥ svāśrayeṇa ca / avinirbhāgavartitvād āśrayo 'yuktam anyathā // (159)

[18] As Manorathanandin and others mention in their commentaries ad PV II 34 the opponents state 'cognition' to be *kārya*, *guṇa* or *śakti* of 'body' (or *ātman*).

[19] On this Dehātmavāda or the tenet that regards *deha* as *ātman* (i.e. a foundation of consciousness) cf. Namai 1976: 62-69. Dharmakīrti also criticizes Ātmavāda or the tenet that requires *ātman* as an eternal foundation of consciousness. This historical circumstance for the later Buddhists is represented in the concluding verse of the opponents in TS 1870:

eko jñānāśrayas *tasmād anādinidhano naraḥ* (i.e. *ātmā*) | saṃsārī *kaścid eṣṭavyo yad vā* nāstikatā *parā //*

[20] Logical demonstration of the theory of *cittasantāna* which is independent from *deha/ātman* is dealt with in PV II 35ff., esp. 60-78: *upādānāvikāreṇa nopādeyasya vikriyā / kartuṃ śakyāvikāreṇa mṛdaḥ kuṇḍādino yathā //* (60)

avikṛtya hi yad vastu yaḥ padārtho vikāryate / upādānaṃ na tat tasya yuktaṃ gogavayādivat // (61)

cetaḥśarīrayor evam . . .

tasmāt svasyaiva saṃskāraṃ niyamenānuvartate / tannāntarīyakaṃ cittam atas cittasamāśritam // (78)

[21] *[syād ādhāro jalādīnāṃ gamanapratibandhataḥ / agatīnāṃ kim ādhārair guṇasāmānyakarmaṇām //* (PV II 68)]

etena samavāyaś ca samavāyi ca kāraṇam / vyavasthitatvaṃ jātyāder nirastam anapāśrayāt // (69)

[22] *tasmān na hetuvaikalyāt sarveṣām antyacetasām / asandhir īdṛśaṃ tena śeṣavat sādhanaṃ matam //* (PV II 119)

[23] Śāntarakṣita deals with the *karuṇābhyāsa* of the Buddha in TS XXVI:

mānasānāṃ guṇānāṃ tu cittasantatir āśrayaḥ | *sādhārayogato vṛtter kathaṃcit nirvartate //* (3432)

kīrti, the actual arguments of *paralokasādhana* come to serve as demonstrations for proving the transmigration of sentient beings (*saṃsāra*). Since *abhyāsa* can be understood as the active formation of a vectorial power which could force the sentient beings in a positive and a negative direction, demonstrating the theory of *abhyāsa* or *vāsanā* is the principal subject for Dharmakīrti at this stage.[24] There both of these aspects can be seen.

When he focuses on the behavior of sentient beings that are bound up in various states of transmigration, this theory of *abhyāsa* is discussed in its second aspect by Dharmakīrti. When Dharmakīrti discusses the *duḥkhasatya* as an actual fact for sentient beings, he discusses the origin of mental functions which function as 'love'- or 'hate'-passion, and he adopts the theory of *abhyāsa* in a succession of many lives.[25] This argumentation also demonstrates previous existences. These arguments clarify the origin and the organic mechanism of consciousness, against the realism.[26] Thus, as an epistemological issue, Dharmakīrti demonstrates the origin of conceptual construction and the ego-centralized formation of sentient beings.[27]

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paralokasya prasādhitatvād *bodhisattvānāṃ ca sātmībhūtamahākṛpāṇām ā saṃsāram aśeṣasattvoddharaṇayāvasthānāt tadāśrayavartinī cittasantatir atitarāṃ sthirāśrayā. yā tu śrāvakādīnāṃ santānavartinī sā na sthirāśrayā, teṣāṃ śīghrataraṃ parinirvāṇān mandatvāt kṛpāyās teṣām avasthāne yatnābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ*. (TSP ad TS 3432; cf. PV II 193, 198c-199b.)

On the influence of PV II 120ff. upon the arguments of TS XXVI where Kumārila's criticism was introduced, cf. Inami's report "Dharmakīrti's Arguments relating to *karuṇābhyāsa*", *IBK* 35/1, 1986, 137-141. On these arguments, cf. also E. Frauwallner, "Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 6, 1962, 78-90.

[24] Cf. PV II 73-78 (see note 26), where keenness and dullness of wisdom (PV II 73) or love-passion (PV II 75) are dealt with from same viewpoint.

[25] PV II 146c-176 (cf. Vetter 1984: 53-79):

duḥkhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhā *rāgādeḥ pāṭavekṣaṇāt* // (146cd)
abhyāsān *na yadṛcchāto 'hetor janmavirodhataḥ* / (147ab)
anapekṣya yadā kāyaṃ vāsanābodhakāraṇam | jñānaṃ syāt *kasyacit kiṃcit kutaścit tena kiṃcana* // (163)
[*avijñānasya vijñānānupādānāc ca sidhyati* / (164ab)]

[26] These arguments on the origin of consciousness (love/hate) are treated in the epistemological aspect in opposition to a Bhūtamātravāda (cf. Namai, "Buddhist Refutation of Bārhaspatya Philosophy [V]", *The Mikkyō Bunka* 162, 1988: 159-161). Cf. PV II:

[*buddhivyāpārabhedena nirhrāsātiśayāv api* / prajñāder *bhavato dehanirhrāsātiśayau vinā* // (73)
idaṃ dīpaprabhādīnāṃ āśritānām na vidyate / *syāt tato 'pi viśeṣo 'sya na citte 'nupakāriṇi* // (74)
rāgādivṛ*ddhiḥ puṣṭyādeḥ kadācit sukhaduḥkhajā* / *tayoś ca dhātusāmyāder antarārthasya saṃniddheḥ* // (75)]
etena saṃnipātādeḥ smṛtibhraṃśādayo gatāḥ / *vikārayati dhīr eva hy antarārthaviśeṣajā* // (76)
śārdūlaśoṇitādīnāṃ santānātiśaye kvacit / *mohādayaḥ sambhavanti śravaṇekṣaṇato yathā* // (77) (cf. *Bodhicaryāvatāra* VI 17f.; TSP 644,2)
tasmāt svasyaiva saṃskāraṃ niyamenānuvartate / *tannāntarīyakaṃ cittam atas cittasamāśritam* // (78)

The same doctrines are dealt with in Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *duḥkha*- and *samudaya-satya*:

vyabhicārān na vātādidharmaḥ prakṛtisaṃkarāt // (147cd)
adoṣaś cet tadanyo 'pi dharmaḥ kiṃ tasya nekṣyate / (148ab)
vikalpyaviṣayatvāc ca viṣayā na niyāmakāḥ // (174cd)
sabhāgahetuvirahād rāgāder niyamo na vā / *sarvadā sarvabuddhīnām janma vā hetusaṃnidheḥ* // (175)

In PV II 160f. Dharmakīrti mentions against BS A4, A5 (*tebhyaś caitanyaṃ kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat*) that these passions derive only from a previous cognition:

sajātivāsanā*bhedapratibaddhapravṛttayaḥ* / *yasya rāgādayas tasya naite doṣāḥ prasaṅginaḥ* // (157)
madādiśakter iva *ced vinirbhāgo nāvastunaḥ* / *śaktir arthāntaraṃ vastu naśyen nāśritam āśraye* // (160)
tiṣṭhaty avikale yāti tat tulyaṃ cen na bhedataḥ / *bhūtacetanayor bhinnapratibhāsāvabodhataḥ* // (161)

In PV II 73-78 and 147ff. Dharmakīrti states that these passions never derive directly from the presence of an external object (vv. 75-78, 147) nor are they directly conditioned by the inner physical state of one's body (73-74, 148ff.).

[27] *ananyasattvaneyasya hīnasthānāparigrahaḥ* / *ātmasnehavato duḥkhasukhatyāgāptivāñchayā* // (PV II 80)
duḥkhe viparyāsamatiḥ tṛṣṇā cābandhakāraṇam / *janmino yasya te na sto na sa janmādhigacchati* // (81)
guṇadarśī paritṛṣyan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte / *tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsāre* // (218)
ātmani sati parasaṃjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau / *anayoḥ saṃpratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante* // (219)

This aspect can be observed also further in the traditional arguments after Dharmakīrti. The tendency can be attested by examining verse TS XXII 1958, in which Śāntarakṣita states the theory of *abhyāsa*.[28] This verse is closely connected with the verses of PV II 120-132.[29] In these verses Dharmakīrti has demonstrated how the Buddha's compassion becomes his own nature whereupon it functions effortlessly (*ayatnena*). On the contrary, in this verse Śāntarakṣita says that without efforts sentient beings are forced to do evil and can never accumulate wisdom or compassion for other sentient beings in the state of transmigration. Śāntarakṣita reinterpreted the doctrine of *abhyāsa* here by adopting it for the demonstration of the 'endless transmigration of sentient beings'. For Śāntarakṣita, on this occasion, the issue of *paralokasādhana* is not to prove the previous lives of the Buddha in the context of *karuṇābhyāsa*, but to prove the 'succession of lives' which without undertaking special efforts sentient beings are bound to, and can never be liberated from.

II. The Two Aspects found in Śāntarakṣita's *paralokasādhana*

This second aspect became prominent in the tradition of *paralokasādhana* after Dharmakīrti. Such a deviation from the main aim of Dharmakīrti's *paralokasādhana* clearly appears again in Śāntarakṣita's arguments when he discusses the origin of 'desire' and 'instinct'. To clarify this tendency of later Buddhists, we shall now examine Śāntarakṣita's arguments on this subject.

II.1. Śāntarakṣita on *paralokasādhana* as a Vijñānavāda

As the opening verses of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* state, the *Lokāyataparīkṣā* has the purpose of revealing the actual phase of the *saṃsāra* presented as a 'beginningless and endless flow of consciousness' (*anādyantavijñānasantāna*).[30] As Dharmakīrti has proved,[31] since beginningless time conceptual constructions have been arising as a function differentiating into *sva* and *para*, and, by sticking to a postulated self, they are forming the world of ego-consciousness/subconsciousness, and they motivate one's actual behavior based on such passions of hate, love and so on. Thus the *vikalpa* forms one's inner world as the dynamism of an endless flow of consciousness. Only the sage who knows what is 'superior doctrine' (*saddharma*)[32] can be freed from this state. Citing phrases from the *āgama*, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (ca.740-795) explain their demonstration of *saṃsāra*.

In the arguments in *Tattvasaṅgraha* XXII, Śāntarakṣita inherited Dharmakīrti's arguments for *para-*

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[28] *saṃsārānucitā dharmāḥ prajñāśīlakṛpādayaḥ* / svarasenaiva *vartante tathaiva na madādivat* // (TS 1958)
tathā hi ye prajñāśīlādayaḥ saṃsārānucitāḥ *saṃsāre nābhyastāḥ, te* svarasena *ayatnena na vartate. madādivad iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ.* (TSP ad TS 1958)

[29] Dharmakīrti on *karuṇābhyāsa* in PV II 120-132:
kāṣṭhapāradahemāder agnyāder iva cetasi / abhyāsajāḥ *pravartante* svarasena *kṛpādayaḥ* // (124)
tasmāt sa teṣām utpannaḥ svabhāvo jāyate guṇaḥ / *tad uttarottaro yatno viśeṣasya vidhāyakaḥ* // (125)
yasmāc ca tulyajātīyapūrvabījapravṛddhayaḥ | *kṛpādibuddhayas tāsām saty abhyāse kutaḥ sthitiḥ* // (126)

[30] Cf. Kamalaśīla TSP 17,21-18,2 (ad TS 4): *atha kim ayaṃ dṛṣṭamātrakālabhāvī, yathāhuś cārvākāḥ bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ* (BS B3cd) *iti. nety āha anādyantam* (TS 4) *iti. . . . etad api nirdiṣṭaṃ bhagavatā anavarāgro hi bhikṣavo jātisaṃsāra* (*Saṃyuttanikāya* II 178ff.) *ityādinā . . . etac cānutpannāryamārgān adhikṛtyoktam, utpannāryamārgānāṃ tu sānta eva saṃsāraḥ. ata evoktaṃ dīrgho bālasya saṃsāraḥ saddharmam avijānataḥ* (*Dharmapadā* 5,60) *iti. ayaṃ ca* lokāyataparīkṣo*pakṣepaḥ*.

[31] PV II 218f. (see note 27).

[32] In the context of *āgama* the word '*saddharma*' may perhaps mean 'the doctrine of *catuḥsatya*'. It is in this sense that Dharmakīrti's arguments of *catuḥsatya* become connected to the 'proof of *saṃsāra*'. But, as will be mentioned later, for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla the interpretation has some diversity. Their arguments are centered around the 'origin of desire', more precisely, the 'origin of *kalpanā* in general' which constructs the 'fictitious world of *saṃsāra*'.

lokasādhana. However, Śāntarakṣita's viewpoint is that of a Vijñānavādin.[33] This is obvious when we examine his discussion of the first consciousness of the embryonic state and that of a moment after deep unconscious meditation. Śāntarakṣita may have had in mind the problem of *pratisaṃdhijñāna*. Kumārila had objected to this point, whereas Dharmakīrti had not dealt with it.[34] In these arguments Śāntarakṣita comes very close to Āryaśūra's argumentation. Śāntarakṣita is rather concerned with the origin of mental function, or more precisely, with the origin of *duḥkha*.[35]

While Śāntarakṣita deals with the last consciousness at death, he also discusses the syllogism which had been brought in by the Lokāyatas, which already Bhāvaviveka and Dharmakīrti had argued against.[36] Śāntarakṣita's argumentation in this respect is almost the same as Dharmakīrti's.[37] However, he puts forward the arguments from the Mādhyamika's point of view.[38]

Therefore we could also expect an influence from Bhāvaviveka. In order to testify to this leanings of Śāntarakṣita and to discuss some details, we should examine another of Śāntarakṣita's statement, by means of which his deviations from the argumentation of Dharmakīrti can be shown more clearly.

II.2. Śāntarakṣita on *paralokasādhana* as a Mādhyamika.

In MA 79-82, dealing with the theory of 'non-origination' of phenomena (*anutpatti*), Śāntarakṣita refutes a 'nihilist view' (*ucchedavāda*). However this statement also declares the 'dependent origination of the inner dynamism of consciousness' as *saṃvṛti* against a nihilist (as well as against an eternalist).[39] This line can be traced back to Bhāvaviveka's arguments which demonstrate *saṃsāra*

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[33] The position of Dharmakīrti in dealing with this *paralokasādhana* derives from the Sautrāntika's viewpoint, not from that of the Yogācāravijñānavāda. Needless to say, in PV II Dharmakīrti also takes his stand within Vijñānavāda (e.g. v. 208). Dharmakīrti treats the Vijñānavāda-theory of *cittaprabhāsvara* as Śāntarakṣita also does in TS XXVI 3434, though the contexts are different. Śāntarakṣita's leanings to Vijñānavāda can be clearly observed in his arguments on the consciousness of an embryo. On this point Kumārila presented some objections*; however, Dharmakīrti does not concern himself with this issue. Jayarāśi (knowing this problem of the existence of consciousness in the embryo ?) rewrites the syllogism like this: *māturudaraniṣkramaṇānantaraṃ yad ādyaṃ jñānaṃ taj jñānāntarapūrvakam* (TUS 268,14-16; cf. Franco [cited in note 4] 1987: 516f. n. 331; cf. Namai [cited in note 12] 1987: fn. 42). The problem can be traced back to the justification of the existence of *ālayavijñāna* of early Vijñānavādins in connection with the problem of *pratisaṃdhijñāna*. Kamalaśīla uses the term *ālayavijñāna* only once in this argument (TSP ad TS 1907; cf. also TSP ad 2072 as mentioned by Prof. E. Mikogami, "The Realists' Criticism of the Vijñānavādin Theory", *Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions*, Kyōto 1985), but not in such a closely related context. TSP ad TS 1907: *na hi tava (= pūrvapakṣiṇo) bahirarthābhiniveśino vaktuṃ yuktam – kāyātmakaṃ vijñānam iti. mama tu yuktaṃ vijñānamātravādinaḥ; ālayavijñānasvabhāvatvāt kāyasyety abhiprāyaḥ.*

* S. Mookerjee (*The Buddhist Philosophy of the Universal Flux*, Calcutta 1935: 204 fn. 2) found the objection in ŚV *Ātmavāda*. A further investigation of this point and detailed discussions concerning Kumārila's objection were presented in Namai (cited in note 12) 1987: 85-115.

[34] It is strange that Dharmakīrti does not mention the Buddhist syllogism which proves previous lives and states the existence of consciousness in the state of the embryo. On the other hand, Kumārila does not mention the syllogism which uses the concept of *arhaccaramacitta* as *dṛṣṭānta*.

[35] TS(P) 1939ff., esp. 1939, 1952. We can easily trace these arguments back to the JM XXIX 12f. and MH 213f. where the problem of the 'intrinsic' desire of a newborn baby/calf/(baby monkey in TSP 649) is dealt with similar to NSū 3.1.18ff. In this sense Śāntarakṣita inherited the theory of Dharmakīrti's *paralokasādhana* stated in the latter part of PV II which is concerned with the interpretation of *catuḥsatya*.

[36] Bhāvaviveka: PP ad MK XVI 1, MH III 202; Dharmakīrti: PV II 45f.

[37] TS(P) 1914-1918. Cf. Dharmakīrti: PV II 45f. (v. Namai 1984: 1023f.)

[38] See note 57.

[39] Having demonstrated the *anutpāda* under the influence of Bhāvaviveka (MA 69-72), distinguishing this standpoint from a nihilism (see synopsis by M. Ichigō III.B.5), Śāntarakṣita refutes the Nāstika's view; MA 79-82:

de phyir thog med srid rgyud nas // dṅos daṅ dṅos med rtog sogs kyi //
rigs mthun sa bon yod par ni // rjes su dpag par bya ba yin // (79)
'di ni dṅos po'i mthu stobs kyis // 'byuṅ ba ma yin de med phyir //

as the 'dependent origination of causally conditioned things' as we have seen before.[40] Śāntarakṣita, opposing the nihilist, states that the true reality (*paramārtha*) of phenomena is free from all fictitious construction (*prapañca*). However, on the other hand, he again demonstrates the existence of the other world from the standpoint of *saṃvṛti* by reducing the argument of *paralokasādhana* of *Tattvasaṅgraha* XXII to two syllogisms.[41] As we have seen, the two syllogisms were already dealt with by Bhāvaviveka in his *Prajñāpradīpa*. We can regard Bhāvaviveka as another predecessor of Śāntarakṣita in the tradition of *paralokasādhana*. Bhāvaviveka, in his main work *Madhyamakahṛdaya*, demonstrates the 'non-origination of things', discussed from the viewpoint of *catuṣkoṭi*. When he deals with the fourth lemma, that is, that there cannot be any origination of things without cause (*ahetu*), he introduces a nihilist (*nāstika*) as an opponent who denies the concept of *paraloka*.[42] Here, Bhāvaviveka says that even as *saṃvṛtisatya*, the 'origination of things is without cause' cannot be admitted (MH 194). And *saṃsāra* is demonstrated as 'origination from the cause of one's flow of *skandha*'. Thus, as actual fact, the *paraloka* can be demonstrated as 'dependent origination'. In this context, Bhāvaviveka's argument on *bandhamokṣa* can be understood correctly.[43]

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dṅos po rnams kyi bdag ñid de // rgya cher rab tu bkag pa yin // (80)
rim gyis 'byuṅ phyir glo bur min // rtag 'byuṅ ma yin rtag ma yin //
de bas goms 'dra de ñid phyir // daṅ po raṅ gi rigs las skyes // (81)
de phyir rtag chad lta ba rnams // gźuṅ 'di la ni riṅ du gnas //
ldog daṅ rjes su 'jug pa yaṅ // sa bon myu gu lcug sogs bźin // (82)

[40] See above notes 11 and 14.

[41] On the origin of *kalpanā* (of *bhāva/abhāva*) which forms a false construction: MAV ad MA 79 and 80:
(i) *'di ltar don dam par na dṅos po 'di dag thams cad ni spros pa thams cad daṅ bral ba yin na / de lta bu de dag la blo dkar po ma yin pa rnams kyis dṅos po daṅ dṅos po med pa la sogs pa rnams par rtog pa dag 'byuṅ ste / de dag kyaṅ thog ma med pa'i las daṅ srid pa la sogs pa'i rgyun nas rigs mthun pa'i sa bon bor na rgyu gźan med do //* (cf. TS 1897, see note 13)
(i.1) Refutation of other assumptions on the origin of *kalpanā* as external object: MAV ad MA 80:
(i.1.1) *de dag ni dmigs pa'i stobs kyis 'byuṅ ba yaṅ ma yin te / dṅos po daṅ dṅos po med pa la sogs pa'i bdag ñid kyi dṅos po rnams rgya cher bkag pa'i phyir ro // de la gal te raṅ gi rigs mthun pa'i sa bon gyi rgyu med du zin na / de las lhag ma gźan ci źig yod //*
(i.1.2) *'o na skye ba'i rgyu med pa 'am / rgyu rtag pa skyes pa 'am / bdag ñid rtag pa de yod de / ji ltar glo bur 'byuṅ bar smra ba daṅ / dbaṅ phyug la sogs pa'i rgyu la 'chel ba daṅ / śes pa yod pa rtag ces khas len pa lta bu'o źe na / de lta na yaṅ ma yin te / de dag rim gyis 'byuṅ ba'i phyir ro // rgyu la mi bltos pa daṅ rtag tu ñe bar gnas pa'i rgyu daṅ raṅ bźin rnams ni rim gyis 'byuṅ ba daṅ 'gal lo //* (MAV ad MA 81ab; cf. PV II 179-183a; TS(P) 1878-1985)
(ii) Proof of other lives, by summarizing the arguments of TS XXII into two syllogisms: MAV ad MA 81:
(ii.1) *de bas na dṅos po la sogs par rnam par rtog pa'i phyir tshe 'di la daṅ po byuṅ ba dag kyaṅ 'dra ba la goms pa'i bag chags las skyes bar rjes su dpag ste / skyes pa rnams goṅ nas goṅ du chuṅ ṅu daṅ 'briṅ daṅ chen po la sogs pa'i bye brag gi tha dad pa goms pa'i stobs las 'byuṅ ba dṅos po la sogs pa rnam par rtog pa bźin no /* (cf. TS 1896, see note 13) *de'i phyir thog ma med pa'i srid pa gźan grub po //*
(ii.2) *'dis ni ma 'oṅs pa'i srid pa rjes su dpag pa yaṅ bśad zin te / 'di ltar 'dod chags daṅ ma bral ba'i 'chi ba'i sems ni bdag daṅ bdag gi la chags pa'i phyin ci log gi bag chags daṅ 'brel ba'i phyir sems gźan gyis mtshams sbyor nus te / de sṅon gyi sems skyes pa daṅ 'dra bas sgrub pa gsal lo //* (cf. TS 1898, see note 13)
(iii) Refutation of the two extremes constructed on the false *kalpanā* of *bhāva/abhāva*: MAV ad MA 82:
(iii.1) *don dam par rtag pa daṅ chad pa dag gi skabs med pa ñid de / de gñis ni dṅos po la brten pa yin pas dṅos po med na de dag lta 'ga' la yod /*
(iii.2) *kun rdzob kyi bden pa la brten nas ni sṅa ma sṅa ma'i skad cig log na skad cig gźan daṅ gźan 'byuṅ bas dṅos po rnams la thog ma daṅ tha ma med de / phyi rol pa dag 'dod pa daṅ 'dra bas de gñis śin tu yod par mi 'gyur ro //*
On these arguments on the refutation of the Nāstikas, see "Buddhist Refutation of Bārhaspatya Philosophy [VII] – Śāntarakṣita's Refutation of Nihilism –", *Journal of Kōyasan University* 25, 1990, 55-86.

[42] saṃvṛtyāpi nākasmāj *jātaṃ cakṣur itīṣyate / sāmānyena ca tadyogād viśeṣeṇa ca kuṇḍavat //* (MH III 194)
jātyantaraniruddho *hi* notpannaḥ śivako *mataḥ / nāśitvāt tad yathā kuṇḍaṃ kāryatvād veti cen matam //* (196)

[43] The arguments of Bhāvaviveka on *bandhamokṣa* (MH III 85-87, see synopsis by Y. Ejima ii-A-5) also demonstrate a parallel to the arguments of Śāntarakṣita on *bandhamokṣa* (MA 83, 91-93). We should take notice of the usage of '*niḥsvabhāva*' and '*svahetupratyayavaśād*'; Śāntarakṣita actually uses these arguments in the same manner as MH III 85-87:

The motif of the demonstration of other lives in MA 79-82 is to clarify the origin of *vikalpajñāna* which constructs the 'fictitious world' as *saṃvṛti*. Śāntarakṣita in his TS XXII displays the same tendency. The principle of *abhyāsa* is treated as concerned with the actual desire which is deep-rooted in and stemming from their previous existences.[44] These aspects can be traced back to Dharmakīrti's arguments on *ātmadṛṣṭi*.[45] And Śāntarakṣita puts forward the theories of origination of *kalpanā* and *abhyāsa*, while generalizing these into conceptual cognition through the function of *apoha*. In this sense, Śāntarakṣita came to face the problem of the origin of conceptual consciousness and cognition of word. However, Śāntarakṣita while discussing the theme on this occasion, is concerned with 'desire' in general. He displays close parallels to Āryaśūra's and the Naiyāyika's arguments. Śāntarakṣita presents the problem of the 'instinctive desire of a newborn baby' and of the 'carnal desires of animals', as a kind of conceptual cognition.[46] When Śāntarakṣita criticizes the Bārhaspatya philoso-

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śeṣakriyāniṣedhe 'pi dig eṣā pratipāditā / saṃsāramokṣasadbhāvād *iṣṭā cet sasvabhāvatā* // (85)
yathāvikalpitaṃ rūpaṃ yadaiṣāṃ nāvadhāryate / *tadā nirūpya rūpāṇāṃ* bandhamokṣau *kutaḥ katham* // (86)
yujyete niḥsvabhāveṣu *māyāsvapnopameṣu tu* / svahetupratyayavaśād *viśiṣṭeṣv ātmalābhiṣu* // (87)
. . . [On the refutation of transmigration of *saṃskāra* and *ātman*, cf. PP ad MK XVI 1] . . .
bandhamokṣāv ato neṣṭau kasyacit paramārthataḥ / (99ab)

In MA 37 Śāntarakṣita refutes the tenet of the Suraguru's school (= Bārhaspatya) that derives the origination of the *ekajñāna* from *aneka-mahābhūtas*. This argument in MA 37 has some connection with Bhāvaviveka's arguments in MH III 199 and PP ad MK XVI 1. The opponent states the existence of a single conscious entity as derived from many elements and as lasting until the moment of death. We should confer the 'new soul theory' (or in Jayanta's words '*suśikṣita Cārvāka*' of Lokāyata's theory of knowledge, "die jüngere Lehre" stated by E. Frauwallner (cf. E. Steinkellner 1986: 10f.; Namai [cited in note 26] 1988: 142-144 fns. 24, 25). In TUS (cited in note 4; 262,8-11), Jayarāśi also mentions this tenet. This also reinforces Śāntarakṣita's indebtedness to Bhāvaviveka.

On the other hand, in Śāntarakṣita's interpretation of *paramārtha*, some deviation from Bhāvaviveka is apparent (cf. Ichigō 1985: LXXXVIII-XCI, on MA 70). Śāntarakṣita here shares the viewpoint of the Vijñānavāda adding arguments about the 'non-existence' of external objects (*bāhyārtha*) (MA 80, see note 39), though the arguments were presented already from the Sautrāntika's standpoint by Bhāvaviveka in his *paralokasādhana*.

[44] TS(P) 1939ff., esp. 1943-1960.

[45] Dharmakīrti on origin of *duḥkha* (PV II 146ff.): on *rāga/dveṣa* (PV II 147-176 etc.); on *bandhamokṣa* (PV II 190-203 etc.); on *ātmadṛṣṭi* (PV II 184-211ff., esp. 218-219 [see note 27] etc.)

prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ / *tat prāg apy asamarthānāṃ paścāc chaktiḥ kva tanmaye* // (208)
(cf. TS(P) 3434 on *cittasya prabhāsvara* and *malasyāgantukatva*)

ātmagrahaikayonitvāt kāryakāraṇabhāvataḥ / *rāgapratighayor bādhā bhede 'pi na parasparam* // (211)
mohāvirodhān maitryādeḥ nātyantaṃ doṣanigrahaḥ / *tanmūlāś ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam* // (212)
vidyāyāḥ pratipakṣatvāt caittatvenopalabdhitaḥ / *mithyopalabdhir ajñānam yukteś cānyad ayuktimat* // (213)
vyākhyeyo 'tra virodho yas tadvirodhāc ca tanmayaiḥ / *virodhaḥ śūnyatādṛṣṭeḥ sarvadoṣaiḥ prasidhyati* // (214)

For Dharmakīrti the way of deliverance is to destroy one's *ātmadṛṣṭi* (cf. PV II 256 etc.):

tasmāt anādisantānatulyajātīyabījakam / *utkhātamūlāṃ kurute sattvadṛṣṭiṃ mumukṣavaḥ* // (256)

However, for Śāntarakṣita it is to destroy all of the *kalpanā* that stick to the conception of 'existence' and 'no-existence' and which form such doctrines as nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) or eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*) as well, and it is to take the free way of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) or the free way of Madhyama by avoiding these two extremes.

[46] In TS XVI 891 and 901ff., XVII 1244f., Śāntarakṣita discussed the 'instincts of a newborn baby and animals' (cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Contribution a l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique Indienne*, Paris 1959: 79). Dignāga also treated the 'intuition' (*pratibhā*) of a newborn baby (*Pramāṇasamuccaya* V 46ff.).* His arguments derived from Bhartṛhari. The arguments in the *Śabdārthaparīkṣā* are directly related to Bhartṛhari's and *Pramāṇasamuccaya* V 46, and are concerned with the verbal practice of a newborn baby in its former life. However, the context of the arguments of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in TS(P) XXII differs from the arguments themselves. In the context of TS XXII 1939ff., the theme is generalized to *kalpanā*, and not strictly concerned with 'verbal intuition'. For Śāntarakṣita the theme is to assert the existence of a previous existence where a newborn baby had accumulated its experiences, had functioned *apoha*** there and had formed its mental construction (*kalpanā*). This argument is closely related to NSū 3.1.18ff. and Āryaśūra's JM XXIX 12ff. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla discussed this theme in connection with the traditional account of the Bhagavat's first announcement of his advent just after his birth and his clear memories of previous lives (*jātismaraṇa*) as a religious aspect against the Cārvāka (TS 1944-1946). This argumentation is derived from Āryaśūra's JM XXIX 8 on *jātismaraṇa*. Through the demonstration developed by Bhāvaviveka

phy in these statements of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, Śāntarakṣita deviates from Dharmakīrti's point of view. He proclaims that *kalpanā* is the cause which binds up sentient beings in the state of transmigration. Conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) appears at first as that function which differentiates into 'substantive existence' (*bhāva*) and 'non-existence' (*abhāva*), and constructs a fictitious world (*prapañca*) since beginningless time. As far as the concept of 'non-existence' is concerned with the conception of 'existence', the nihilist's claim of 'non-existence' is only the negative assertion of 'existence'.

Thus, on this occasion, Śāntarakṣita explains himself in the tradition of Nāgārjuna. Therefore Nāgārjuna's definition of the words *nāstika* and *āstika* becomes significant. Śāntarakṣita identifies himself as a Mādhyamika citing a verse from Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī*, and states the necessity to be freed from *prapañca* and to avoid the two extremes by taking a 'middle way' (*madhyama*).[47]

II.3. Two Traditions inherited by Śāntarakṣita

Thus we can draw the following conclusions: in *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, Śāntarakṣita follows the Mādhyamika tradition of *paralokasādhana*, influenced especially by Bhāvaviveka's arguments. However, when he justifies the theory of transmigration from the viewpoint of *saṃvṛtisatya* in *Tattvasaṅgraha* XXII, he follows Dharmakīrti. Yet he takes his stand within the system of Vijñānavāda, whereas Dharmakīrti had dealt with this subject from the viewpoint of Sautrāntika. Bhāvaviveka also, in his refutation of Bārhaspatya, employed Sautrāntika epistemology (MH 199; PP ad MK XI 1). We should assume a historical reason for Śāntarakṣita's leanings to Vijñānavāda. There may be the objections from the realists against which Śāntarakṣita employs an idealistic position. These are, for example, arguments about the existence of external objects (TS 1888-1891, 1929-1935; MA 80 etc.), and also about the existence of consciousness in the embryo state (TS 1919-1922).

III. Dharmottara: *Paralokasiddhi* (PLS)

Dharmottara (ca. 750-810) presented a treatise on *paralokasādhana* as a successor of Dharmakīrti.[48] Dharmottara, in this monograph, develops arguments as an ontological/epistemological issue

(MH III 203), Śāntarakṣita discusses this topic in TS XXII as a *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* of the opponent's objection which stated the 'impossibility of verbal functioning and memories of former lives for a newborn baby'. The traditional arguments by the Naiyāyikas, which are also seen in the *paralokasādhana* of Āryaśūra, are primary sources for these arguments against the Cārvāka's tenets (esp. Svabhāvavāda)*** also.

* Cf. Wasō Harada, "Bunshō no hyōjitaishō toshite no chokkan to jikoninshiki II-1" [On *pratibhā* as *vākyārtha*, and *svasaṃvedana*] *Bukkyō Gakukaihō* 15, 1990. In this paper he will treat this topic from the aspect of Dignāga's semantics.

** In TSP XXII, Kamalaśīla deals with this theme of the *apoha* function independently form TS (cf. Namai [cited in note 7] 1977: 909-911).

*** Cf. Meindersma (cited in note 7). The *apoha* theory of Dharmakīrti found in the *paralokasādhana* section (PV II 100-102) has been pointed out by Dr. Meindersma to be related to Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* V 50 (cf. his paper in this volume). Cf. also NB I 5: *abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā.*

It may be in this sense that Śāntarakṣita treats the 'instinctive desire of a newborn baby' and the 'desire of animals in the forest' in connection with 'conceptual cognition'.

47 MAV ad MA 82 demonstrates the Madhyama to be free from Ucchedavāda and Śāśvatavāda. Śāntarakṣita cites a verse form *Ratnāvalī* (I 60). There the words *nāstika*, *āstika* and *mādhyamika* as free from those two extreme doctrines are clearly defined.

[nāstiko *durgatiṃ yāti sugatiṃ yāti* cāstikaḥ | *yathābhūtaparijñānān mokṣam advayaniśritaḥ* // (57)]

na pratijñā na caritaṃ na cittaṃ bodhiniśrayāt / nāstikatve 'rthato yeṣāṃ kathaṃ te nāstikaḥ smṛtāḥ || (60)

This verse does reply to the opponent's concluding verse in TS XXII (cited in note 19) in that it states the Mādhyamika's standpoint against a Bārhaspatya as well as against an Ātmavādin while revealing the higher level of the Mādhyamika's viewpoint. Cf. MA 82 (see note 39).

48 Tohoku No. 4251. This text was edited by Prof. E. Steinkellner (1986) and translated into German with detailed

concerning consciousness in general from the viewpoint of the later Buddhist theory of knowledge. As Prof. Steinkellner's thorough examination shows, the motif for writing the treatise is to reply to the materialists who state that cognition is derived only from the presence of a mere physical object and the sense organ as a physical function of a body. And a few somewhat more developed arguments are dealt with.[49] To elaborate on these objections Dharmottara explains the organic mechanism of consciousness in general, and he demonstrates the theory of *cittasantāna* developing the arguments discussed by Dharmakīrti in the later part of *Pramāṇavārttika* II (i.e. 146ff.).[50] The latter aspect of Dharmakīrti's *paralokasādhana* can be found here,[51] though no religious issues such as the mercy of the Buddha or the origin of the sorrowful states of sentient beings are treated here. So the title *paralokasiddhi* cannot be correctly understood without clarifying its position in the tradition of *paralokasādhana* of the later Buddhists.

IV. *Paralokasādhana* in the Manuals of Later Buddhist Philosophy

Examination of the Buddhist tradition of *paralokasādhana*, has clarified the historical position of Dharmakīrti's *paralokasādhana*, and the arguments developed in the Buddhist Pramāṇavāda tradition (or rather in the Dharmakīrtian tradition). Based on this short outline, we have analyzed Dharmakīrti's arguments and those of his followers, in synthesis with some problematic details that were related to the opponents.[52] But we should reach a temporary conclusion. We may say that, for the followers of Dharmakīrti, the primary point of the issue is not only connected with the *sarvajña-sādhana*, but is rather to reply to the objections from nihilists and realists. Their problem is to explain

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annotation. There is still a need to investigate his assimilation of Dharmakīrti's arguments (esp. PV II 146ff.) as well as some parallels with Kamalaśīla's arguments in TSP.

[49] Dharmottara does not deal with religious issues such as *karuṇābhyāsa* or *duḥkhasatya* and so on in his *Paralokasiddhi*, and only deals with it in its epistemological/ontological aspects in accordance with Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge. The opponent presents two alternatives, i.e. consciousness is either the same entity as the body or different to the body. This point of view is also seen in Dharmakīrti's arguments where the opponent regards consciousness as *śakti*, *guṇa* and *kārya*. The first two cases amount to regarding consciousness as being the same as body, and the latter is equivalent to consciousness being different to body. In the latter case, consciousness comes to be regarded as a substantial entity which should be derived from the four material elements (*mahābhūta*), or to be more precisely, constitutes an aggregation of them (limited to when the body is formed).

[50] Dharmottara set out the arguments on the origin of *vijñāna* discussed by Dharmakīrti in PV II 147ff. concerning the ontological causal relation between *mahābhūta* and cognition.
(i) Origin of *vijñāna* (PV II 157-159)
(ii) Developed arguments of PV II 160f. Cf.BS A5, A9, the tenet that states that the origin of consciousness is limited to when material elements take the form of a body; cf. Kambalaśvatara's Sūtra.
(iii) Epistemological analysis of *vikalpajñāna*: on the origin of consciousness (PV II 113; cf. TSP 645,11, 13ff.); developed argument of PV II 162; arguments derived from Dharmakīrti's PV II 163.
On the developed Lokāyata tenet ("die jüngere Lehre"), cf. Steinkellner 1986: 10ff; cf. also Namai (cited in note 26) 1988: fns. 24, 36, 39, 42-44.

[51] Or rather the fundamental phase of Dharmakīrti's establishment of the theory of *cittasantāna* in its epistemological/ontological aspect.

[52] As initiated by Prof. E. Steinkellner, the historical developments of Bārhaspatya's tenets should be precisely analyzed and be put into a logical and chronological order. By collecting and arranging the fragmentary sources of Bārhaspatya tenets, it may be possible to describe the system of Bārhaspatya philosophy, as shown by Prof. Steinkellner in his introduction to Dharmottara's *Paralokasiddhi*, based on an unpublished collection of the fragments by E. Frauwallner.

A systematical analysis of a Lokāyata work, the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*, with references to other systems of Indian philosophy has been made by Dr. E. Franco.

My aim is to describe these changing historical phases using above all Buddhist sources, concerned with the Buddhist concepts of *bandhamokṣa* and *cittasantāna* described as *saṃsāra* or 'dynamic flow of consciousness in a succession of lives'.

the saṃsāric state of the sentient beings who are stained by their *kleśa* and are forced to roam in the saṃsāric state by force of *karman*. Dharmakīrti himself dealt with the Lokāyata's objection which had aimed at the negation of the possibility of transmigration using the Buddhist term *arhaccaramacitta* or final consciousness of an *arhat* just before his emancipation into *nirvāṇa*.[53] In that case, the *arhaccaramacitta* is actually a *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* for Buddhists when they use it to demonstrate the saṃsāric state, because for an *arhat* the state of transmigration has already ceased. For Buddhists the proof of transmigration is not that of 'the sages or the Buddha' but that of 'sentient beings who are polluted by their defilements' (*sāsrava*) and are living in the fictional world of *vikalpa*.[54]

In any case, these two aspects surveyed here are mere aspects which seem to be as they are. The principal point of issue was to justify the doctrine of *abhyāsa* as based upon the theory of *cittasantāna* by Dharmakīrti. In the historical world of the later Buddhist philosophical manuals, this first aspect appears again in its original form. Ratnakīrti (ca. 1000-1050) introduces the arguments of *paraloka-sādhana* into the arguments of *sarvajñasādhana* again, as Dharmakīrti had done first.[55] But now, the two syllogisms are reinterpreted from the point of view of Mahāyāna.[56] In the tradition of arguments about the *arhaccaramacitta* also, the phase has changed. The concept of *arhat* comes to be understood as that of one who continues into further lives, and because of his compassion for beings, is never residing in *nirvāṇa*, or never ceasing in *nirvāṇa*.[57]

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[53] Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* II 62ab. For details cf. Lambert Schmithausen, "Zum letzten Citta des Arhat nach den Sarvāstivādins", in Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil II*, 1979, 150f.

[54] The concept of *arhat* in Ābhidharmika doctrine was reinterpreted from the viewpoint of Mahāyāna. The changing phase of the arguments related to the *arhaccaramacitta* from that of the Ābhidharmika concept to that of the ideal state of mahāyānic *nirvāṇa* or *apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa* in TS 1916-1917 has been shown by Namai 1984. This reorientation in the Buddhist tradition is mainly due to the influence of the Buddhist theory of *ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha*, which is concerned with a new and more profound interpretation of the Buddha's statements on his enlightenment as presented in *Śrīmāladevīsiṃhanāda* and by some phrases of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, where it is stated that the *arhat*'s death is not the actual end of his successive lives. Cf. Namai, "Kamalaśīla on *ekayāna* – ad *Madhyamakāloka* VI –", *IBK* 38/2, 1990: 827-832.

[55] Ratnakīrti: *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* (ed. A. Thakur, Patna 1975) 3,8-15: *na ca dvādaśaḥ* (i.e. *bhavāntarābhāvād iti*), *paralokaprasādhanāt. tathā hi*

yac cittaṃ tat cittāntaraṃ pratisandhatte, yathedānīntanaṃ cittam, cittaṃ ca maraṇakālabhāvīti svabhāvahetuḥ. na cārhaccaramacittena vyabhicāraḥ, tasyāgamamātrataḥ pratītatvāt niḥkleśacittāntarajananād vā. hetor vā kleśe satīti viśeṣaṇād ity anāgatabhavasiddhiḥ. evaṃ

yac cittaṃ tat cittāntarapūrvakam, yathedānīntanaṃ cittam.
cittaṃ ca janmasamayabhāvīty arthataḥ kāryahetur ity atītabhavasiddhiḥ.

Mokṣākaragupta (11c.-12c.), in his Tarkabhāṣā (ed. Iyengar, 62,17-63,9), introduces these two syllogisms into the *sarvajñāsādhana* as follows:

syād etat – anekabhavaparamparālakṣaṇena dīrghakālena bhāvyasya saṅkalpārūḍhasya sphuṭābhatvaṃ bhavaparamparāsiddhaye tu kiṃ pramāṇam. – The same *prayoga* as Ratnakīrti's.

iha pūrvajanmābhyāsāt tapodānodhyayanādau sarvasatvānam abhyāse pravṛttir iti pravādaḥ. tatas tatsiddhaye pramānam ucyate. – The same *prayoga* as Ratnakīrti's.

Mokṣākaragupta's statements clearly show why the later Buddhists had tried to prove the existence of other lives (cf. Yuichi Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta*, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters Kyoto University No. 10, 1966: 29.1,2).

The phrases *tasyāgamamātrataḥ pratītatvāt*, *niḥkleśacittāntarajananāt* and *hetor vā kleśe satīti viśeṣaṇāt* in the *sarvajñasādhana* by Ratnakīrti convey concisely all the historically developed arguments.

Moreover, the latter aspect of *paralokasādhana* can also be seen in this treatise. It is described here as a demonstration of *saṃsāra* (on 3rd-7th *pakṣa*) and is concerned with *catuḥsatya* as treated in the later part of Dharmakīrti's PV II (146ff.).

Cf. Gudrun Bühnemann, *Der Allwissende Buddha, ein Beweis und seine Probleme*, Wien 1980: 3-7.

[56] In these two syllogisms, the points of issue are as follows:

1. On *arhaccaramacitta*: omniscient who never stays in *saṃsāra* nor *nirvāṇa*.
2. On *karuṇābhyāsa*: omniscient who has accumulated his merits in previous lives.

[57] As Kamalaśīla comments on the syllogism (TSP ad TS 1917), the later Mahāyānists, especially later Mādhyamikas

Abbreviations and Literature

BS	*Bārhaspatyasūtra* and the fragments of Bārhaspatya tenets compiled in Namai 1976.
IBK	*Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*
JM	*Jātakamālā of Āryaśūra*. Ed. P. L. Vaidya. Darbhanga 1958.
MA	*Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita with his own commentary or Vṛtti and with the subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla*. [2 vols.] Ed. Masamichi Ichigō. Kyoto 1985
MAV	*Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (Śāntarakṣita): v. MA
MH III	*Madhyamakahṛdaya* of Bhāvaviveka, Chapter III: Yasunori Ejima, *Chūgan shisō no tenkai – Bhāvaviveka kenkyū*. [Development of Mādhyamikaphilosophy in India – Studies on Bh.] Tōkyō 1980, 268-361
MK	*Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*. Ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin. St. Peterbourg 1903-1913.
Namai 1976	Chishō M. Namai, "A Survey of Bārhaspatya Philosophy – Buddhist Refutation of Bārhaspatya Philosophy [I]." *Indological Review* 2, 29-74.
Namai 1984	Chishō M. Namai, "TS(P) 1916, 1917 ad PV II 46." *IBK* 32/2.
PP	*Prajñāpradīpa* (Bhāvaviveka): Tohoku 3583
PV II	*Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter II: *Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*. Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206. (PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*)
Steinkellner 1984	"Anmerkungen zu einer buddhistischen Texttradition: Paralokasiddhi." *Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Kl. d. Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 121, 79-94.
Steinkellner 1986	Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmottaras Paralokasiddhi. Nachweis der Wiedergeburt, zugleich eine Widerlegung materialistischer Thesen zur Natur der Geistigkeit. Der tibetische Text kritisch herausgegeben und übersetzt*. Wien.
TS	*Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalshīla*. Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri. [2 Vols.] Varanasi 1981, 1982.
TSP	*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): v. TS
Vetter 1984	Tillman Vetter, *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇvārttika*. Wien.

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understand that the *arhats* do not perfect their aim. The ideal type of *nirvāṇa* is not a ceasing of the *arhats*, but is *apratiṣṭhāna*. TSP ad TS 1915 ff.: [*tathā hi cārvākasya kutaḥ prasiddham arhatāṃ na cittāntaraṃ pratisandhatte maraṇacittam iti athāpi syāt parakīye bauddhe siddhānte paṭhyate kṣīṇā me jātiḥ, uṣitaṃ brahmacaryam, kṛtaṃ karaṇīyam, nāparam asmād bhavaṃ prajānāmīti ataḥ siddham asandhānam iti.*]

ye ceha sudhiyaḥ kecid apratiṣṭhitanirvṛtīn / jināṃs tadyānaniṣṭhatvaṃ yānayoś ca pracakṣate // (1916)

tān pratyayam asiddhaś ca sādhyadharmasamanvitaḥ / dṛṣṭāntaḥ prativādīṣṭasiddhāntāśrayaṇe 'pi te // (1917)

siddhāntāśrayaṇenāpi kāṃścid bauddhān prati sādhyadharmasamanvito na siddho dṛṣṭānta iti darśayann āha ye ceha sudhiya ityādi. iheti saugate pravacane. sudhiyo mahāyānikāḥ. kecid iti mādhyamikāḥ, te hi buddhānām apratiṣṭhitatvaṃ nirvāṇam āhur ekam evedaṃ yānaṃ yad uta mahāyānam iti.

Cf. Namai 1984: 1021-1024.

[I would like to express my profound gratitude to Mr. H. Büscher and Dr. H. Krasser who have read through the manuscript of this paper and have made useful suggestions.]

SVABHĀVAPRATIBANDHA AND THE TYPES OF REASONS IN DHARMAKĪRTI'S THEORY OF INFERENCE

by

Claus Oetke, Hamburg

I. In what follows I will try to disentangle some components of Dharmakīrti's theory of inference not only with the intention to examine their logical dependence or independence of each other - which could be done in order to find out the degree of consistency and coherence of a theory and for other reasons - but also because it seems that these components differ from each other with respect to the presuppositions on which they rest as well as the extent of their acceptability and relevance from our point of view. In particular I will attempt to show that on the one hand there are facts which justly motivated Dharmakīrti to introduce the concept of 'connection by/of self-essence' - *svabhāvapratibandha* - into the theory - or, in case they were not the actual motives, at least would have yielded very good reasons to do that what Dharmakīrti did. But on the other hand those facts should be evaluated in a different way than was done by Dharmakīrti. If one does not follow Dharmakīrti's evaluation and the consequences he derives from it, it is possible to preserve a considerable number of the characteristic features of Dharmakīrti's doctrine without being forced to adopt some of its highly implausible features. Moreover, both the problems Dharmakīrti tried to resolve with his theory of inference and the features of his theory which are preserved after the modification exhibit a striking relevance to the methodology of sciences, even the historical ones, which one would hardly suspect if one looks only at Dharmakīrti's original doctrine.

II. The genesis of the situation which contained the germs for the notion of *svabhāvapratibandha* within the theory of *anumāna* can be reconstructed fairly well. We know that there was quite an old definition of inference which said that inference - *anumāna* - is the establishment of something not perceived from something perceived on the basis of a connection - *sambandha*. Such a view is attested already in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, as reconstructed by E. Frauwallner and ascribed to the Sāṃkhya-philosopher Vṛṣagaṇa. This text contains a definition which runs:

> *sambandhād* ekasmāt pratyakṣāc cheṣasiddhir anumānam*
> "Inference is the establishment of a/the rest from something perceived/perceivable on account of a certain connection". - Cf. E. Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 2, 1958 [84-139]: 123.
> * There is a variant: *sambaddhād* (which is probably corrupt).

This definition almost inevitably raises two questions: 1) In what does the connection mentioned in the definition consist? and 2) in which circumstances is it possible to know that the features which constitute the connection are instantiated in a particular case? The *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, as reconstructed, contains only material for an answer to the first question. Immediately after the definition seven kinds of connection are enumerated and explained by examples. These connections characterize relata as standing in particular relations, e.g. the relation of master and his belongings (*svasvāmibhāva*), of primary matter and its transformation (*prakṛtivikārabhāva*) and so on. An important defect of this account must have been detected quite early, because already in another portion of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*

itself, it is stated that the inference from the effect to its cause, which is described there as 'inference with rest/remainder' (*śeṣavat*) is valid whereas an inference from the cause to its effect, named 'inference with a prior' (*pūrvavat*), is not valid and goes astray (*vyabhicārin*). This implies however that the mere existence of a connection of a particular kind cannot be sufficient for validity and that at least sometimes, "the direction", so to speak, also matters. This insight, of which one finds no trace in the portion of the text which enumerates the seven kinds of connection, and the resulting discrepancy between both parts is, by the way, one of the reasons why I suspect that the reconstructed text of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* embodies different strata, if not with respect to the textual then at least with respect to the theoretical development. However this may be, there cannot be any doubt that the early type of account of the constitution of connectedness which involved specifying different kinds of relations was given up long before Dharmakīrti and it seems that its successor is embodied in the well-known definitions of a logical reason (*hetu*) and of inference (*anumāna*) in Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi*. These run as follows:

Def. I. *tādṛgavinābhāvidharmopadarśanaṃ hetuḥ*
"A logical reason is the pointing out of a property which does not exist/occur without such (an entity)", i.e. which is invariably connected with such.

Def. II. *nāntarīyakārthadarśanaṃ tadvido 'numānam*
"Inference is the perception of a thing which does not occur without (the thing to be inferred) for someone who knows that." - Cf. E. Frauwallner, "Vasubandhu's Vādavidhiḥ", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 1, 1957 [104-146]: 118-120.

One can gather from these definitions that the original account of a connection, a *sambandha*, had become, so to speak "extensionalized". Probably to a large extent because of the fact, already recognized in some part of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, that the mere existence of a certain type of relatedness does not guarantee that an inference is safe, one had reached the point of realizing that the essential condition for safety in this realm consists in the fact that the connection possesses a certain kind of invariance. This invariance is constituted by the fact that the relatum which is used as the starting point in an inference never occurs unless the other relatum which is aimed at in the inference also occurs. At this stage it was possible to give a uniform account of the nature of the *sambandha*, and, quite naturally, its sub-categories, as mentioned in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* - and elsewhere - became irrelevant. If one supposes that the above definitions of Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi* mean what they literally say - and I do not see any reason to question this assumption here - it follows that in this theory any valid logical reason must be such that, without any exception, wherever it occurs, what is to be inferred must also occur, or, to put it in other words, every instance where the logical reason is exemplified must also be an instance where what is to be inferred is exemplified, but not necessarily vice versa. This property, for which we can use the term *avinābhāva* alluding to the related word *avinābhāvin* that occurs in Def. I, is able to yield an excellent basis for an account of what the *sambandha* in the old definition consists in. The suggestion is that the *sambandha* is *avinābhāva*. Obviously this does not yet settle the second of the two questions formulated above as to the conditions under which the existence of a *sambandha* in a particular case can be assumed. But we have gained the material for a new formulation of the question. The question is now: What are the conditions which must be fulfilled in order to assume (justifiably) that *avinābhāva* holds in a particular case? It should be noted that the urge for this question has become augmented considerably by the new explication of a connection because, whereas one might be tempted to find it often quite evident that two things stand in the relation of possessor and possessed or of primary matter and transformation etc., such a situation does not hold for the extensional relation of invariable concomitance. The latter relation in contradistinction

to the former ones has implications with respect to a totality of a domain of entities and it was hardly possible any more to regard the second problem as irrelevant. But it is well known that the theory of *anumāna* has further components, in particular the doctrine of the three forms of a valid reason (*trairūpya*).

It seems that the theory of *trairūpya* was originally designed to filter out acceptable reasons for a thesis from non-acceptable ones. If so, it can be fairly expected that such a theory should at least among other things also capture those conditions which warrant the assumption that an *avinābhāva*-relation is instantiated in each particular case of a proof, if one hypostatizes the state of theoretical development which has been described above. The *trairūpya*-doctrine does indeed contain components which can and probably must be understood in this way. In particular the second and the third condition together relate to the conditions warranting the supposition of an *avinābhāva*-relation. At this place it is however necessary to point out a very important distinction the negligence of which seems to keep hampering an adequate understanding and evaluation of (the varieties of) the *trairūpya*-doctrine till the present day. For the description of the conditions warranting the assumption of an *avinābhāva* can be given in two different ways, if it is cast into the form of statements of characteristics of a logical reason. The one way, which I would call the "epistemic variant" consists in predicating of the logical reason predicates which express the epistemic state which ensures that the assumption of the correctness of an inference or proof, and in particular the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation is justified. Epistemic versions would characteristically contain predicates of knowing or belief as components of these predicates which apply to logical reasons. But it would also be possible to give non-epistemic descriptions which refer to the non-epistemic characteristics of a logical reason which are supposed to prevail if the necessary epistemic requirements are fulfilled. Now, it is not only possible to find in the literature both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of *trairūpya*, or more precisely, formulations which suggest either epistemic or non-epistemic readings of the kind described above, but there are also instances which seem to testify to an oscillation between both points of view. In Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi* we find for example the following formulation:

> *yo dharmaḥ pakṣasya sapakṣe siddho vipakṣe nāsti*
> "[A logical reason is] what is a property/*dharma* of the *pakṣa*, established in the *sapakṣa* and does not exist in the *vipakṣa*."

The same feature is exemplified by the introductory verse defining a logical reason at the beginning of the chapter on *anumāna* in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* - which might have been compiled by a different author than Praśastapāda:

> *yad anumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite /*
> *tadabhāve ca nāsty eva tal liṅgam anumāpakam //*
> Literally: "What is connected with [the thing] to be inferred and definitely known/established in that which is together with that and in case of its non-existence is exclusively not there, that is a mark which lets infer."

Even in Praśastapāda's prose section, which clearly exhibits an epistemic viewpoint, one can observe a fluctuation between formulations using and lacking epistemic operators. Not only do epistemic expressions occur as components of the formulations of conditions two and three while lacking in the first *trairūpya*-condition within the definition of a reason of inference, but also the expression *pramāṇatas* occurring in the third condition of a reason of inference is missing in the later parallel giving the definition of a reason of proof (*hetu*). Certainly such oscillations might in some

cases, as in the case of Praśastapāda, be attributed to a mere lack of explicitness in the formulations, but as a whole this phenomenon seems to testify that the two different manners of description mentioned above were not always clearly separated and that both aspects are closely interrelated.

But still more important is the fact that versions of the *trairūpya*-doctrine exist which exhibit a purely non-epistemic character. Such versions are exemplified by the *Nyāyapraveśa* and in at least some works of Dignāga. The *trairūpya*-doctrine of these texts must probably be understood as embodying an abstraction from the full epistemic account of the conditions which warrant the assumption that a specific logical reason is a proper one and that in particular it exemplifies an *avinābhāva*-relation. Conditions two and three in this version of *trairūpya* tell us which non-epistemic properties are ascribed to a logical reason in those epistemic situations which warrant the assumption that an *avinābhāva*-relation is exemplified.

This characteristic of this particular kind of *trairūpya*, that it results as an abstraction from an epistemic account, is probably realized by some authors propagating such a theory and it might explain the fact that Dignāga in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* II 6 states that the knowledge is implicitly indicated by the three forms (*'dir ni śes pa 'aṅ 'phaṅs pa yin*). If the three non-epistemic conditions are nothing but an abstract moment of the knowledge warranting certain assumptions, it is not surprising that they are regarded as implying that knowledge.

I have once claimed[1] that the most probable interpretation of the *trairūpya*-doctrine, as embodied in Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa* and at least some of the works of Dignāga, is one which gives the following account:

1. Condition: The *hetu* is really exemplified by the *pakṣa*.
2. Condition: There is at least one instance apart from the *pakṣa* where both the property/*dharma* to be proven and the proving property/*dharma* are exemplified.
3. Condition: There is no instance apart from the *pakṣa* where the property/*dharma* to be proven is not instantiated and the proving property/*dharma* is instantiated.[2]

As a consequence of this analysis I had asserted that the kind of invariable concomitance which is implied in the third condition of *trairūpya* is not identical with the *avinābhāva*-relation of Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi*. This result is not at all surprising if one accepts the above account of the status of the *trairūpya*-doctrine. The third condition refers only to the domain excluding the *pakṣa* whereas Vasubandhu's *avinābhāva*-relation holds unrestrictedly, because the theory of *trairūpya* is either an account of the epistemic requirements for the assumption of facts which comprise the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation or an abstraction of such an account. It should, by the way, also not seem any more astonishing that the second condition demands the exemplification of the proving *dharma* and the *dharma* to be proven outside the *pakṣa*. Surely, this transgresses the demands for the mere existence of an *avinābhāva*, but it is not at all the function of the *trairūpya*-doctrine to state merely these conditions and to represent a more detailed duplicate of the *avinābhāva*-theorem.

[1] In my paper: "Zur Interpretation der drei Merkmale des logischen Grundes", in *XXIII. Deutscher Orientalistentag, Ausgewählte Vorträge*, Stuttgart 1989, 392-403.

[2] A possible variant of the third condition is represented by adding to this the phrase: "and there is at least one instance where the property/*dharma* to be proven does not occur."

However, the theoretical situation created by these developments was a highly unstable one and contained a lot of problems, and this for different reasons:

First, the relation to an epistemic description of warranting situations was not explicit in those versions of *trairūpya*. This favoured confusions with different issues. The seemingly objective kind of the *trairūpya*-conditions made it easy to regard it as a specification of what an instantiation of the *avinābhāva*-relation in the *pakṣa*, the subject of inference, consists in. Or the objective of the *trairūpya*-theory could be seen in giving conditions that guarantee the validity or acceptability of a logical reason independently of the situation in which it is used as a means of inference or proof, instead of considering the doctrine as a specification of certain abstract features of such situations.

A second destabilizing factor lies in the artificiality of the viewpoint that has to be adopted in order to appreciate the doctrine. The above adduced set of conditions appears most plausible if it is understood to tell us which characteristics one must be justified in ascribing to a logical reason in order to be justified in assuming that a particular subject of inference instantiates the proving *dharma* and the *dharma* to be proved as standing in an *avinābhāva*-relation. This is, on the one hand, not a specification of the conditions under which the relevant properties/*dharma*s actually stand in an *avinābhāva*-relation and are instantiated in the *pakṣa*, the subject of inference. Nor is it a specification of the full conditions for the justification to assume that such a situation exists. There is good reason to believe that at a certain stage of development it was not even intended that the *trairūpya*-conditions incorporate all the conditions that are necessary in order to be justified in supposing that the *pakṣa* exhibits a property standing in an *avinābhāva*-relation to another property to be inferred or proven. Neither is the *trairūpya*-doctrine taken as giving sufficient conditions for the acceptability of logical reasons. This probably holds for the *Nyāyapraveśa* and at least some stages of Dignāga's theory of inference. The *Nyāyapraveśa* can best be understood, if it is assumed that the three marks of a logical reason furnish only necessary but not sufficient conditions for the acceptability of inferences or proofs. Similarly, they are probably taken as giving some, but not all conditions that are necessary in order to be justified to assume that an *avinābhāva*-relation holds between the logical reason and the property to be inferred/proved. Further restrictions, not covered by the *trairūpya*-conditions, are assumed in this text, e.g. that no contrary, equally valid.reason exists or that the same logical reason does not prove with the same degree of validity something which is opposed to the own nature of the property-possessor, i.e. the subject of inference, or to its specific characteristics. A reason, used under presuppositions of the Vaiśeṣika-system to prove that existence (*bhāva*) is neither a substance nor an action nor a quality is subsumed under the category of fallacious marks, because it serves equally well in order to prove that existence is non-existence (*abhāva*) and that it is not something which causes the notion 'it is existent'. It is also remarkable that this goes together with relatively weak notions of 'proof' and 'non-deviance' (*avyabhicāra*). It is said in connection with the fallacious marks *dharmisvārūpaviparītasādhana* and *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana* that in the same way as the adduced logical reason proves (*sādhayati*) that existence is not a substance, action or quality it also proves that existence is non-existence and that it proves the property of being the cause of the notion 'existent' as well as the property of being the cause of the notion 'non-existent', because it does not deviate in both cases (*ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt*). These cases force one to assume that there exists a use of the words 'to prove'/*sādhayati* and, 'non-deviance'/*avyabhicāra* according to which their application does not entail an *avinābhāva*-relation. It is however probable that the fulfillment of the *trairūpya*-conditions is assumed in these cases and implied in the present notion of proof and that the *avinābhāva*-concept relevant in this context is taken to entail the satisfaction of the second and third or at least the third condition of *trairūpya*. But even so, the theoretical situation was not stable.

It could easily appear unsatisfactory to present mere necessary conditions either for the validity of inferences and the acceptability of proofs or for the justification of the supposition that in a particular instance a property is exemplified that stands in an *avinābhāva*-relation to some other property. The dissatisfaction can perhaps be traced back as far as Praśastapāda. It is at least a possible and plausible reading of the *anumāna*-chapter of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* to take Praśastapāda's *trairūpya*-doctrine as a specification of not only necessary but also sufficient conditions for being a proper logical reason. Not only do Praśastapāda's categories of fallacious reasons systematically correspond to violations of *trairūpya*-conditions, but his non-acceptance of the category of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* and his denial that there are two reasons which taken separately prove opposite properties in a valid way may well be motivated by the attempt to disallow any other source for fallacy than non-compliance with the *trairūpya*-conditions. The endeavour to bring the doctrine of the marks of reasons closer to a canon of sufficient conditions is, however, most clearly testified by the modifications which introduced further marks in addition to the old ones, in particular the doctrine of the six marks of a reason, as discussed and rejected in Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu*. Obviously the doctrine of the six marks resulted from assigning to the *trairūpya*-theory a different role which was, however, closely related to the one testified by the *Nyāyapraveśa* and other texts. It was the outcome of the quite natural move to cancel the original abstraction and go back to the full account of warranting conditions. This entailed the introduction of epistemic notions, a step which Dharmakīrti was not ready to accept. However, the point of view on the basis of which Dharmakīrti criticized the doctrine of the sixfold reason in the *Hetubindu* was not classical either. Dharmakīrti took the *trairūpya*-doctrine as if it should tell us what the *avinābhāva*-relation between logical reason and consequence plus the instantiation of the reason in the subject of inference amounts to. With regard to the theoretical position exemplified in the *Nyāyapraveśa* and similar sources this was not less a deviation than the criticized doctrine of the sixfold reason. But the fact, if it is a fact, that departures from the original doctrine into different directions took place, would only underline the instability of the former theoretical situation.

There is, however, still another feature of the older theory/ies which is even more decisive and entails serious problems. The doctrine of *trairūpya* turns out to be defective even if one regards it in the manner of the *Nyāyapraveśa* as a mere specification of necessary conditions for the justification of the assumption that a particular subject of inference instantiates a property connected by *avinābhāva* with another inferable property. The situation remains basically the same if one enriches the specification by a full account of the epistemic conditions. For all those conditions together do not entail that the *pakṣa* possesses, as a matter of fact, the property to be inferred or proven; however, even the assumption that their fulfillment at least increases the probability that this is the case turns out to be questionable. And because of that the role of warranting the assumption of the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation in a particular instance cannot be unreservedly attributed to those conditions. The reason is simply that it does not generally hold that the accumulation of instances of concomitance makes it more probable that the concomitance universally holds. This fact should by the way not be confused with the fact already observed by some modern interpreters of the Indian theory of inference that concomitance outside the realm of the *pakṣa* does not strictly entail concomitance in the case of the *pakṣa*.

For the above point does not merely refer to the lack of a necessitating connection but relates to the circumstance that increase of instantiations does not automatically increase the probability of instantiation in further cases. This holds regardless of whether one takes the probability in question as epistemic or not. The literature of the tradition before Dharmakīrti already knew examples which

in fact show that such a rule does not universally hold. If some fruits possessing a certain colour or growing on some tree are ripe or possess a particular taste, it does not only not logically follow that other fruits of the same colour or growing on the same tree are equally ripe or possess the same taste; it cannot even be claimed that the former facts generally have a bearing on the probability of the occurrence of the latter states of affairs, as long as further premises are not added. The fact that red cherries or raspberries are ripe does in no way support or increase the probability that red blackberries are equally ripe. Moreover, the fact that fruits of some tree are green at some time could even support the expectation of finding fruits which are not green on the same tree at some other time.

The essence of the problem seems to lie in that not statistical features in themselves but, at least sometimes, factors that are responsible for the existence of statistical facts and condition them possess probabilistic relevance. Concomitance in a range of cases can be also due to mere coincidence or even be conditioned by circumstances which themselves condition non-concomitance of the same features in other cases. The same property of clouds which during daytime generally causes the temperature of the air below to be relatively cool has on some other occasions, e.g. during the night, the opposite effect so that one could find that the existence of clouds is concomitant both with a tendency to cooler temperatures and the opposite tendency in a relevant number of cases. The specification of the support involved in the *trairūpya*-conditions is not only defective because it allows one to make an inference on the basis of facts the occurrence of which is due to circumstances totally irrelevant for the existence or non-existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation or even to circumstances which determine that an *avinābhāva* of the relevant kind does not hold. Those conditions are also unsuitable to obstruct the arbitrary construction of proofs which are made possible by the discovery of any quality whatsoever that is only instantiated both in the *pakṣa* and within the domain of the entities exemplifying the property one wants to prove. Even if one excluded qualities of the type 'being either identical with the *pakṣa* P or with any of the entities possessing the property to be proven F' which vacuously fulfill the relevant condition, it would in the great majority of cases not be too difficult to construe logical reasons with the wanted feature. Thus one can say that at least objectively there was a compelling reason for a major revision of the theory of inference.

III. It is, however, a bit more difficult to say to what extent Dharmakīrti's innovations were, as a matter of fact, motivated by the shortcoming described above. There are many passages which suggest that the adoption of the *svabhāvapratibandha*-theorem together with the doctrine of the three kinds of acceptable reasons were merely meant to avoid the consequence that the fulfillment of the criteria of a valid logical reason do not strictly guarantee that the proposition to be inferred or proven is true. But there are also signs of a different motive.

When Dharmakīrti argues that non-perception cannot establish negative concomitance and that inference cannot rely on the non-observation of the logical reason in negative instances, i.e. instances where the property to be proven does not occur, it sometimes seems that the issue only concerns the impossibility of v e r i f y i n g the state of affairs which must obtain in order that the third *trairūpya*-condition of the above explicated version be fulfilled. That is, it appears, as if Dharmakīrti wanted to argue that non-perception cannot definitely establish the non-occurrence of the *hetu* in the domain of all those things apart from the *pakṣa* which do not possess the property to be proven, because mere non-perception cannot prove that this situation holds without exception in the whole domain. But this is not so. Or rather, this is not the only point nor is it the main one.

Dharmakīrti classifies inferences of a type for which he uses the term *śeṣavat* as fallacious. This kind is according to PVin II 41,31ff. and PVSV 12,15ff. (= PVSV(a) 122,18ff.; Mookerjee/Nagasaki 1964: 61,1ff.) exemplified by the inference that all non-tasted fruits possess the same particular taste as the tasted ones because they have grown on the same branch of a tree. The subject of inference = *pakṣa* is, according to the texts, constituted by the other fruits which have not been tasted. Now, in this case the non-occurrence of the *hetu* in instances of the non-occurrence of the p r o b a n - d u m is definitely ascertained in the whole domain outside the *pakṣa*. For here all the instances outside the *pakṣa* which exemplify the *hetu* have been tested and it has turned out that they possess the particular property which constitutes the probandum with respect to the *pakṣa*. Thereby it had been definitely ascertained that the fact obtains which would fulfill the third *trairūpya*-condition of the above cited version. The rejection of this type of inference and the grounds on which it is refused in the context of the criticism of non-perception indicate that Dharmakīrti did not merely question the possibility of verifying by non-perception the general non-occurrence of the *hetu* in all instances of the non-occurrence of the probandum outside the *pakṣa* but that he thought that even if this situation actually w e r e t o obtain and c o u l d be ascertained, the inference would still be faulty. But that means that Dharmakīrti's dissatisfaction with non-perception (at least) also relied on a view which entailed a deficiency of the "classical" *trairūpya*-conditions.[3]

But if it is so, the question arises as to why the same facts which would guarantee the fulfillment of the three marks of a valid reason in the version of the *Nyāyapraveśa* and other texts would be deficient for Dharmakīrti. Now, one of the arguments which tries to show that the claim of the insufficiency of non-perception and the need of a *svabhāvapratibandha* is in accordance with Dignāga's views, says that Dignāga's criticism of the Vaiśeṣika-argument inferring the existence of air (*vāyu*) as a substratum of the touch-quality exhibiting special characteristics as being neither warm nor cold etc. presupposes the deficiency of non-perception in the same way as Dharmakīrti regards it as deficient. In a passage which is found in parallel versions both in the second chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and in the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* - namely in PVin II 44,6ff. and PVSV 14,18ff. (= PVSV(a) 124,7ff.; Mookerjee/Nagasaki 1964: 66,6ff.) ad verses 20c-22 - Dharmakīrti asserts that the rejection (*pratiṣedha*) of touch-quality possessing the conditions of perception on the basis of an actual non-perception is not correct (*na yuktaḥ*). The reason is that the Vaiśeṣika wanted to reject earth as a substratum of the special variety of touch in general. But there are many varieties of earth-substance, such as cotton, stones, leaves etc. All these exhibit different varieties of touch. Therefore, Dharmakīrti says, the doubt must arise whether that special variety of touch for which a special substance, namely air, as its substratum is postulated by the Vaiśeṣika could not rather inhere in some variety of earth-substance. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika-reasoning is fallacious. Furthermore, the assumption cannot be maintained that a logical reason, even if not connected (by *svabhāvapratibandha*), would be non-deviant on account of a mere non-perception in the realm of dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) in some way (*kathaṃcit*);[4] for things which are seen in certain places, at certain times or under certain circumstances as being of a certain kind are observed as exhibiting different

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[3] It can be safely assumed that our author did not give importance to the possible fact that fruits growing on the same branch of a tree at earlier or later times might not have been tasted. There is hardly any doubt that Dharmakīrti's verdict of non-validity would equally apply if the *pakṣa* were taken as consisting of all the non-tasted fruits growing on some branch of tree at any time or if the logical reason were explicated as the property of growing on the same particular branch of tree at the present time.

[4] The expression 'in some way' = *kathaṃcit* = *ci źig ltar* in PVin II 44,18 (= PVSV 15,11) is probably short for 'without taking into consideration other spatio-temporal regions' (cf. Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Wien 1979: 131, footnote 506).

qualities in other places, at other times or under other circumstances. Herbs growing in a certain area or on a particular kind of soil which possess a special taste or a particular healing power might lack these same qualities if they grow in other areas or on different kinds of soil.

These and similar remarks of Dharmakīrti suggest the following: If one finds a pervasive concomitance of two properties F and G in a range of cases, this does not prove a universal concomitance between the respective properties, because the reason of the observed concomitance might lie in that the property G goes together with the property F, insofar as also a property H is exemplified. If H is lacking, G and F do not necessarily go together. But if this fact constitutes a reason why non-perception without essential connection is deficient for the exclusion of a deviance of a logical reason, concomitance in a range of cases should, by itself, never be a reason supporting a general concomitance. For in the same way as there is always the danger that by generalising from a finite domain of observed cases to a large domain comprising unobserved cases one is using too general concepts, the theoretical possibility is always present that even if any finite domain actually exhibits a pervasive concomitance between a property G and a property F, a universal concomitance would only hold between a more specific property, say G and H, and F. As there are signs that Dharmakīrti was aware of these problems, it is not unreasonable to assume that he not only held that non-perception could not always guarantee the general absence of the *hetu* where the probandum is absent outside the *pakṣa*. Nor did he merely regard non-perception as insufficient, because the proposition it could maximally establish, namely that there is no occurrence of the logical reason outside the *pakṣa* where the probandum does not occur, does not logically entail the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation. Rather one is justified in assuming that Dharmakīrti was also of the opinion that restricted occurrence in any finite domain by itself did not in any way guarantee the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation.

The restriction of the occurrence of the *hetu* to the occurrence of the probandum outside the *pakṣa* or the establishment of this fact by perception and non-perception could yield such a justification only in connection with the establishment of a *svabhāvapratibandha* between logical reason and probandum. By this the demands required for a proper logical reason were increased considerably. The consequence was that mere exemplification of the proving property in the subject of inference together with the actual existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation between *hetu* and probandum were insufficient for the validity of an inference or proof even in cases where the theory exemplified by the *Nyāyapraveśa* and other texts did not contain any material for an exclusion from the domain of proper reasons. In PVin II 39,27 and in the commentary to verse 13 of the *Pramāṇavārttika* Dharmakīrti tells us, when an inference to the effect that the remaining grains of rice in a vessel are cooked is acceptable. It is acceptable if one deduces from the same own essence the possession of a common cause, namely the cause of being cooked on account of which grains of rice can be called 'cooked'. The mere fact of being in the same pot is, however, not proof. Obviously such an inference is not regarded as valid by Dharmakīrti, even if all grains in the same vessel, actually were cooked. All this suggests the following conclusion: Dharmakīrti did not regard it as sufficient that a logical reason is used in a situation where an *avinābhāva*-relation as a matter of fact holds so that with its exemplification by the subject of inference the truth of the inferred proposition is guaranteed by the situation. Rather he demands that the reason be used on the correct grounds, namely grounds which guarantee or at least justify the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation. However, in contradistinction to (some of) his predecessors he did not believe that extensional features of common occurrence or non-occurrence outside the *pakṣa* possess by themselves any warranting force. Those features possess it only insofar as they are derivable from facts that really guarantee the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation. As soon as the

conditions of co-occurrence outside the *pakṣa* were assigned only a secondary and derived role, the revision could consistently lead to the result that co-occurrence conditions which were not logically entailed by the *avinābhāva*-relation itself would become superfluous. This holds in particular for the second "classical" *trairūpya*-condition which demanded that both the *hetu* and the *sādhya* be exemplified outside the *pakṣa*.

It should, however, be noted that by denying facts of co-occurrence outside the subject of inference the role they originally were meant to play and by adopting allegedly more adequate criteria for the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation, Dharmakīrti was not only engaged in the task of setting new standards for the acceptability of proofs and inferences. By doing this he was not solely a reformer of an old practice, but was also involved in an elucidation of the conditions that made the old practice or features of it possible. To this extent Dharmakīrti was concerned with a philosophical activity for which some representatives of certain philosophical traditions like to use the word 'transcendental'. The traditional theory/ies involved a principle which in the following will be referred to by the term 'inductive extension'. By this, states of affairs which hold in one domain or could be established as holding in one domain of entities are by extension taken as holding also in a larger domain. The theory which worked with the *trairūpya*-conditions of the *Nyāyapraveśa*-version implied this principle in the form of the requirement that the invariable concomitance of *hetu* and probandum outside the *pakṣa* constituted at least a justifying basis for the assumption that the *pakṣa* does not represent a counter-instance. And if it is true that the *trairūpya*-theory was connected in the above described way with the justification of an *avinābhāva*-relation, the theory presupposed also that invariable restrictions between properties in finite domains can function as the basis for the assumption of a universal *avinābhāva*. The practice of inference is such as it would be, if the principle of inductive extension with respect to the subject of inference is valid. Now, the 'transcendental' aspect of Dharmakīrti's theory consists in this: despite its rejection of the assumption of the older theory that co-occurrence relations in finite domains give b y t h e m s e l v e s a basis for assuming a universal co-occurrence, it does not only describe under which conditions the practice of inference is justified but also yields an account of w h y it is possible, if it is in fact possible. In particular, Dharmakīrti's theory allows us not merely to conclude that the standard inference from smoke to fire in a particular case is valid but it also enables us to construe an answer to the question of why the practice of inferring in this way is justified. The answer is that it is justified because the concomitance between proving property and property to be proven outside the *pakṣa* holds for reasons which warrant the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation between both properties. Dharmakīrti's answer to the general question why inductional extensions are sometimes possible exhibits the following form: There is some P such that observed co-occurrence restrictions hold because of P and because of P there exists an *avinābhāva*-relation between the respective properties. In other words, Dharmakīrti's theory assures us that inductive extensions with respect to the *pakṣa* are sometimes, as in the case of smoke and fire, possible because co-occurrence restrictions in particular domains sometimes hold for reasons for which also *avinābhāva*-relations hold. By this, it allows us to understand co-occurrence-restrictions in particular domains as something which – despite the fact that it does not necessitate it – i n d i - c a t e s an *avinābhāva*-relation. Whether or not one agrees with Dharmakīrti's theory as a whole or regards it in its entirety as superior to the older theories, this particular aspect certainly represents an important achievement. It seems that the theories before Dharmakīrti did not contain the material to give an answer to the above why-questions. The mere fact that Dharmakīrti provides an account of an essential feature of standard cases of inference at all instead of just taking it for granted should be appreciated highly, even if we are forced to disagree with the account itself. It is this aspect which perhaps marks not simply an improvement but the attainment of an entirely new level of theorizing.

We can respect the value of this achievement, even if we disagree with the following theorem which Dharmakīrti probably also approved:

> Any inductive extension [of the concomitance of A with B] from a domain D is possible if and only if there is a P such that the pervasive occurrence restriction [between A and B] in D holds because of P and because of P there exists an *avinābhāva*-relation [between A and B].

And our appreciation of the value of this component of the theory deserves to be kept apart from our evaluation of Dharmakīrti's elaborate account, relying on the notion of *svabhāvapratibandha*, the two types of essential connection, *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti* and the doctrine of three and only three types of valid logical reasons.

IV. Let us grant, even if it does not strictly follow from the situation described so far, that the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation has to be based on an "essential connection" in the sense that the proving property and the property to be proven stand in a relation which implies a connection not describable in terms of co-occurrence only. From this fact alone Dharmakīrti's theory of two and only two types of connectedness cannot be derived and still less does it seem compelling that *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti* describe these connections and that there are just three types of valid reasons, namely *svabhāva-*, *kārya-* and *anupalabdhihetu*. It seems that Dharmakīrti's claim that some connections have to be introduced into the theory of inference is much better grounded than his thesis that there are just two such connections and that these two are the two he assumes. It also seems that there is much more material in Dharmakīrti's works that supports the need for accepting at least the two types of connection accepted in his theory than the theorem that the doctrine is complete in this respect. It is besides well known that later Brahmanical critics did not agree with this restriction. Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī* (498,10-12) for example criticizes Dharmakīrti's theory for not making allowance for the fact that there is a relation of indicated and indicator (*gamyagamakabhāva*) between the arising of the Kṛttikā- and the setting of the Rohiṇī-nakṣatra. There can moreover hardly be any doubt that Dharmakīrti's standard-example exemplifying a *svabhāvahetu*, namely the inference of something's being a tree from its being a Śiṃśapā, is in important respects related to deductions, involving relations, which cannot be brought in a plausible way into connection with Dharmakīrti's two types of connectedness, in particular with *tādātmya*, and his types of reason, in particular with *svabhāvahetu*, as e.g. the derivation of 'A is longer than B' from 'B is shorter than A' or 'B is A's brother' from 'A is B's brother' or even a derivation like 'There is some offspring of A who is a parent of B' from 'A is B's grandfather' etc. etc. And if there should be a separable class of analytic derivations distinguished by the fact that their verification is evident on the basis of a mere understanding of the terms in question, Dharmakīrti's theory would definitely be much too narrow and could be accused of covering up important kinship-relations between his standard examples and other cases. The verdict of excessive narrowness and veiling important relationships would apply even more, if one were to hold that there exists a large separate category of analytic statements and deductions, comprising among others all mathematical theorems and proofs which do not necessarily exemplify triviality or immediate evidence.

But let us leave the problems of analytic sentences and derivations aside. Even in the field of non-analytic inferences Dharmakīrti's theory is certainly more restrictive than others of his tradition.

Praśastapāda - PBh 504,1f.[5] - mentions the reciting Adhvaryu-priest as an inferential sign of a non-visible Hotṛ-priest and Śrīdhara - NK 503,2ff.[5] - also adduces cases of singing and making music in the palace of the king of Prāgjyotiṣpur in the morning which indicate the awakening of the ruler. It can, however, be guessed that Dharmakīrti would have discarded the latter cases as inconclusive, and if this rejection were not to rely in a circular manner on the doctrine of the two types of *svabhāvapratibandha* and the three acceptable types of reason it would refer to the fact that the connection between the basis and the result of inference in the above case c o u l d also not exist and could be intentionally violated. For the time being what might be disputed will not be disputed, namely, that connections whose existence is subject to the will and intentions of persons cannot yield valid inferences. Even if we grant much of what Dharmakīrti asks us to grant, the completeness claim in the field of non-analytical and non-trivial inferences remains questionable. In particular, Dharmakīrti acknowledges *tadutpatti*, the origination from that (which is to be inferred), as a subtype of *svabhāvapratibandha* and, as a logical reason corresponding to that, the *kāryahetu*, the logical reason that is an effect. He rejects, however, the possibility of inferring a particular effect from the cause offhand, and there is no place in his system for a variety of *svabhāvapratibandha* like *tadutpādana*, "the causation of the thing to be inferred". It is true that Dharmakīrti adopts this position for reasons. In PVin II 15,4ff. for example we are told that the non-existence of something cannot be inferred from the observation of a cause of something contradictory to it. One cannot infer the occurrence of coldness or cold touch-quality from the presence of wood at the same place because causes do not necessarily produce the effect and accordingly the presence of wood does not guarantee the presence of fire which removes coldness. There is no deviance only in the case of the special last state of the complex of causes which immediately precede the production of the effect. However in this case, Dharmakīrti argues, there is no room for inference because at the moment of the remembrance of the connection between *hetu* and probandum, necessary for inference, the effect has been already produced and has become perceivable. Similarly it is said in verse 8 (= 10) of the *Svārthānumānapariccheda* of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and in the autocommentary to this verse that the complex of causes does not allow one to infer an effect because of the possibility of an obstruction (*pratibandhasya sambhavāt*). One can only infer the potentiality or competency (*yogyatā*) for the production of an effect but this instantiates an inference on the basis of a *svabhāvahetu*, because this potentiality/-competency is given with the existence of the complex of causes itself and does not depend on further causal factors. There is certainly reason to feel uneasy with this offhand rejection of all inferences from causes to effects. One might wonder what warrants the assumption that there is always the possibility of an obstruction.

One cannot claim that the idea of causes which inevitably produce certain results at times later than the immediately following moment is inconsistent or absurd, especially in view of the fact that there are varieties of the Karma-doctrine which entail that such cases exist. And even if causes do not guarantee particular outcomes, isn't it possible to assume that the occurrence of certain states or events at earlier times at least restricts the possible outcomes at later times, corresponding to the idea that after the attainment of a certain stage of spiritual development one cannot fall back into bad existences and similar ideas? Moreover there are apparently inferences where on the basis of both earlier and later states-of-affairs some intermediate states-of-affairs are deduced. In the same way as one can sometimes infer which move must have been made in a game of chess, if one knows both the

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[5] *Praśastapādabhāṣya (Padārthadharmasaṅgraha) with Commentary Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdharabhaṭṭa along with Hindi Translation*, ed. Durgādhara Jhā, Varanasi 1963.

earlier and the later positions, it is possible, so it at least seems, that one infer states which have been caused by earlier states or events in view of later outcomes. Thus one might infer that a wood must have been destroyed in a certain area on the basis of having seen a wood before and not seeing it at a later time, and we know that there are unfortunately many occasions for such inferences in the present days. Regarding the fact that such examples not covered by Dharmakīrti's theory are not remote and in view of the lack of intuitive support for the restriction, it seems probable that this feature of the doctrine is due to special theoretical considerations.

Possibly Dharmakīrti based his theory on a peculiar notion of necessity. Inferences which are based on either the *tādātmya*- or the *tadutpatti*-relation possess the special feature that the states-of-affairs which form their basis are such that at the time of their occurrence there is no need of the occurrence of any other events in order that the inferred states of affairs obtain. There is a certain sense of 'necessary', in which one can say that both in the case of a *svabhāvahetu* and in the case of a *kāryahetu* the probandum is necessary in a way in which it would not be necessary in the case of a logical reason relating to a cause.

There is a special relation of necessity between the reasons of the former types and their probanda such that, at the time of the occurrence of that feature of the property-possessor = *pakṣa* which justifies the subsumption under the concept of the logical reason, the occurrence of the feature which corresponds to the concept of the probandum does not require the occurrence of any further casual factors. In this sense one could say that the feature to be inferred is given with or by the feature which corresponds to the logical reason alone. Granting only that the corresponding features are entities of the type to which the term *svabhāva* refers in Dharmakīrti's theory, one could also say that the *svabhāva* corresponding to the property to be inferred is given or necessitated by the *svabhāva* corresponding to the logical reason. If this was Dharmakīrti's idea, the notion of *svabhāvapratibandha*, irrespective of the linguistic meaning of the term, involved both the notion of a relation of restrictedness between *svabhāva*s and the notion of a restriction or necessitation b y the *svabhāva* of the logical reason. With regard to the *anupalabdhihetu* the situation is the same, if one takes the inferred property not as referring to an actual treatment as non-existent but to the fitness of being treated as non-existent. It has to be admitted that seen in this way, Dharmakīrti's theorem of two kinds of *svabhāvapratibandha* is cogent in a certain way. For the completeness claim appears much more plausible, as soon as the idea of a warrant for an *avinābhāva*-relation is combined with the notion of the special time-relative necessity, which allows one to say that the individual feature corresponding to the probandum is necessarily existent when the feature corresponding to the logical reason occurs. On this basis the notions of *tādātmya*, of having the (feature corresponding to) the probandum as its essence, and of *tadutpatti*, of being caused by (the feature corresponding to) the probandum, result from the differentiation between a) the case where the feature corresponding to the probandum immediately depends on nothing but the existence of the feature corresponding to the logical reason itself and b) the case where the feature corresponding to the probandum is immediately dependent on causal factors different from the existence of the other feature. The above described necessity-theorem would require that inferences with respect to states-of-affairs which are future with respect to the occurrence of the proving feature are not valid except in cases where the future occurrence would depend merely on the existence of the feature corresponding to the logical reason, where the warranting relation would be that of *tādātmya*.

It should be clear, by the way, that the above differentiation between a) and b) involves altogether different notions than the analytic-synthetic distinction and one has to reckon with the possibility that

not only the notions on which both distinctions rest differ but that even the extensions of both pairs of concepts do not coincide. Such a non-coincidence of extensions would be implied in Dharmakīrti's own application of the terms *svabhāva* and *svabhāvahetu*, if, when - in *Pramāṇavārttika* I, verses 7-8 and the corresponding passage of *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* - he says that the existence of a causal complex can function as a *svabhāvahetu* for the inference of the potentiality of producing an effect, he means that it can be used to infer the potentiality or competency of producing a particular effect and not merely any effect; if in other words the existence of for example a piece of wood could function as a logical reason for deriving its potentiality of causing fire and not merely its potentiality of causing whatever this particular piece of wood might be able to produce. For in contradistinction to the relation between the concepts of being wood and of being able to produce the effects wood is able to produce the relation between being wood and being able to cause fire can hardly be regarded as a clear case of analyticity.[6]

Now there is reason to believe that this actually corresponds to Dharmakīrti's view. In PV I 9 and PVSV 7,12ff. (= PVSV(a) 119,12ff.; Mookerjee/Nagasaki 1964: 45,2ff.) it is explained how the theory is able to account for certain inferences from properties of things to certain other simultaneous properties (of the same thing), e.g. from a particular taste to a particular colour. Dharmakīrti's explanation suggests that such inferences are possible, insofar as a cause is inferred which possesses the capacity to produce the other simultaneously existing property. This means that in such cases we have to deal with a combination of an inference by a *kāryahetu* with an inference by a *svabhāvahetu*. In the special example of taste and colour, we infer, according to Dharmakīrti's account, first from a particular taste functioning as a *kāryahetu* its cause in the form of the preceding moment which constitutes both the material cause/*upādānakāraṇa* of the taste and the auxiliary condition/*sahakāri-pratyaya* for that moment which is a material cause for the production of a subsequent colour moment. We have to assume that the cause, specified in this way, is allowed to function as a *svabhāvahetu* for inferring the capacity of producing a particular colour at a subsequent moment and that in this sense the existence of particular properties can be derived from the existence of other simultaneous properties. There is no indication, however, that Dharmakīrti regarded it as essential for the derivation of the capacity that the cause inferred in the first step is d e s c r i b e d in a special way, that we refer to it by a description which entails that it is able to produce a colour-moment of a particular kind at the subsequent instant. But if the possibility of the derivation should not essentially depend on the manner of the description of that entity - but on its inherent nature - we could not maintain that analyticity is a necessary ingredient in inferences of this type.

Although the derivation of just those types of valid reasons which Dharmakīrti acknowledges would require further assumptions, in particular the assumption that the situation in inferences from non-perception is essentially similar to that of proper *svabhāvahetu*s - so that *anupalabdhi-* and *svabhāva-hetu*s can be both related to the connection of *tādātmya* - the doctrine of the existence of only two varieties of *svabhāvapratibandha* would appear less arbitrary, if one assumed that Dharmakīrti combined the notion of a connection guaranteeing *avinābhāva* with the notion of being unalterably

[6] The same would hold for the case of the derivation of the non-existence of causes which are not obstructed in their causal potentiality from the non-observation of the effect, mentioned in *Nyāyabindu* II 32 and discussed in PVin II 13,15ff., if Dharmakīrti grants that the non-observation of smoke allows one not only to derive the non-existence of any causes of smoke of which the causal potentiality is unobstructed but also to deduce that fire of which the capability of producing smoke has been non-obstructed = realized is non-existent. For logical reasons which are used to infer the non-existence of sufficient causes from the non-observation of an effect are regarded as *svabhāvahetu*s by Dharmakīrti.

given at the time of the existence of the *hetu*-feature and of the non-requirement of further causal factors at that time. But the fact that this restrictive aspect of the theory was derived from some principles does not show that the restrictions are justified. If Dharmakīrti indeed based the limitation of the possible sub-types of *svabhāvapratibandha* or even the concept of *svabhāvapratibandha* itself on such notions, the attack could be directed against the principles which lie at their root. What has to be questioned in particular is the combination of the notion of a warrant for an *avinābhāva*-relation with the notion of being necessarily, i.e. unalterably, given at the time of the occurrence of the feature corresponding to the logical reason. It is true that according to what we said earlier there were grounds for demanding that the theory disallow that the property of the logical reason and the property to be inferred occur together for merely contingent reasons. To this extent there was justification for requiring a non-contingent relationship between logical reason and probandum. But the sense of necessity involved herein is altogether different from the sense of necessity involved in the basis for the exclusion of inferences from prior to later events. The two kinds of necessity even exemplify different logical types. The necessity-concept required for the exclusion of contingent relationships could be represented by a sentence-operator, like 'it is necessary = not by mere chance the case that p' where instances of 'p' would be furnished by propositions like 'the property G occurs (in domain D) always together with the property F'. The necessity-concept required for the exclusion of inferences of future events, on the other hand is a *de-re*-necessity and would be representable by the expression 'X is at time t necessarily/unalterably/independently of any further course of world history F'. Only a confusion between different necessity-concepts could induce one to demand that the property to be inferred must be exemplified independently of causal factors occurring later than the relevant instantiation of the proving property, just because the co-occurrence- restrictions between *hetu* and probandum should not be fortuitous. It is also noteworthy that the exclusion of inferences like the above mentioned cases of concluding that the king is awake because music is played in the palace or the derivation of previous moves in a game from later positions (alone or in combination with earlier ones) would demand a concept of necessary connection between logical reason and probandum other than that of unalterability by future courses of events.

V. One may ask now, irrespective of the completeness of the canon, whether at least the two sub-types of *svabhāvapratibandha* fulfill the role they should perform. This problem possesses two aspects, because Dharmakīrti seems to have demanded both that a *svabhāvapratibandha* guarantees and that it justifies the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation. Accordingly, as long as one wants to examine the question from a theory-immanent point of view, one has to distinguish between a) whether the presence of one of the types of *svabhāvapratibandha* necessitates *avinābhāva* and b) whether and in what way their presence can be ascertained in individual cases.

Although, as just mentioned, the mere notion of being unalterably given at the time of the instantiation of the feature corresponding to the logical reason is insufficient to yield a guarantee of *avinābhāva*, at least some of the examples which illustrate the concept of *svabhāvahetu* and the corresponding notion of *tādātmya* intuitively conform to the desired standards. However, Dharmakīrti seems to imply a peculiar account of why this is so.

Some passages in his works suggest that he regards the probandum of a *svabhāvahetu*, or more precisely the individual feature corresponding to the property to be proven as an own-essence, a *svabhāva* of the logical reason or its corresponding feature. For example in PVSV (ad PV I 26) 18,5 (PVSV(a) 125,23; cf. Mookerjee/Nagasaki 1964: 77,6): *tathā prasiddhe tadbhāve hetubhāve vānityatvā-*

bhāve kṛtakatvaṃ na bhavati dahanābhāve ca dhūmaḥ. tathā hi sa tasya svabhāvo hetur vā, kathaṃ svaṃ svabhāvaṃ hetuṃ vāntareṇa bhaved iti . . . "If in this way [i.e. by demonstration by an example] the being this (same thing in the form of being its *svabhāva*) or the being (its) cause has been established, (it is certain that) in the case of the non-existence of impermanence there is no producedness and in the case of the non-existence of fire (no) smoke. For it is like that: This is the own-essence/*svabhāva* or the cause (*hetu*) of this. How could it exist without its own-essence/*svabhāva* or its cause? . . ."

A little bit later, in the commentary to *Pramāṇavārttika* I verse 28, Dharmakīrti explains, why the negative concomitance/*vyatireka* can be derived from the statement of the exemplification of a positive concomitance so that the citation of a substratum for the negative concomitance is not needed – and that the same holds vice versa. He says (PVSV 18,19 [= PVSV(a) 127,7ff.; Mookerjee/Nagasaki 1964: 79,2]) that if it is said that what is produced is perishable it is, in the case that both the related entities are not different things, evident that the one has been shown by means of valid cognition to be the own-essence of the other which immediately follows from it alone on account of the restriction that it is that (namely the very same thing in the form of its *svabhāva*). For one who knows this it follows that in the absence of impermanence there is no producedness. For in the absence of the *svabhāva* there is no thing because of the non-difference (*na hi svabhāvasyābhāve bhāvo bhavaty abhedāt*). Otherwise the one could not be invariably there in the presence of the other.

These statements together with other passages in Dharmakīrti's works suggest that one has to differentiate between two aspects of the *svabhāva*-concept in connection with the *svabhāvahetu*. On the one hand both the logical reason and the probandum represent *svabhāva*s of one and the same thing. On this basis Dharmakīrti can say in *Nyāyabindu* II 15 and in many other instances that a *svabhāvahetu* is a *svabhāva* which functions as a logical reason with respect to a property/*dharma* to be proved which is given with the mere existence of the logical reason (itself). But there is probably also another *svabhāva*-connection involved. This consists in the *dharma* to be proved being taken as the *svabhāva* of the logical reason or its corresponding individual feature of the substratum of inference. The guarantee of the *avinābhāva*-relation is probably grounded for Dharmakīrti in this latter relationship. It is the notion that some features of things are essential in the sense that without their occurrence that very thing could not exist, the notion which is exemplified by fire and heat or water and liquidity etc., which is applied to the case of a particular kind of logical reason. The logical reason does not go astray with respect to its probandum because there exists a connection between the individual feature corresponding to the reason and the feature corresponding to the probandum which is of the same kind as that between an individual fire and its heat. And in the same way as the generalization holds in the latter kind that every instance of fire is also an instantiation of heat, so in Dharmakīrti's view every instance of the general characteristic of the logical reason is also an instance of the general characteristic of the probandum. As the relation between an essence and its bearer is asymmetrical, it could account for the fact that, for example, the converse of the inference from being a Śiṃśapā to being a tree is invalid. Accordingly, Dharmakīrti's own account of why the *svabhāvahetu*s as based on *tādātmya*-relationships guarantee an *avinābhāva*-relation would have to appeal to quasi-Aristotelian notions, in particular the notion of something's being essential in the sense that its non-presence would affect the existence and the numerical identity of its possessor. Now, this account presupposes the existence of essences or at least a position which is in relevant respects similar to a philosophical essentialism. Therefore it would be jeopardized if essentialism were seriously attacked. Perhaps essentialism can be maintained after all, but it should at least be noted that the acceptability of Dharmakīrti's account is tied to philosophical assumptions which could easily be overlooked in view

of the fact that his standard examples for a *svabhāvahetu* also allow for an entirely different account in terms of analyticity or even evidence by virtue of expressions. The relevant relationships would on the essentialistic basis be given independently of the descriptions by which we refer to the entities in question. This implies for Dharmakīrti's theoretical position that the ground for the *avinābhāva*-relation should lie in the nature of the corresponding features, e.g. the feature of being a Śiṃśapā and the feature of being a tree and not on the particular concepts we apply in order to refer to them. However, seen in this way, the question of justification of an *avinābhāva*-relation, which was the second desideratum of the theory, becomes problematic, because the difficulty arises of how one can know or justifiedly believe that two entities are essentially connected. It is by no means evident that demonstrations by examples exemplifying positive or negative concomitance are adequate for this task. Therefore one must perhaps conclude that despite the fact that some of Dharmakīrti's examples for a *svabhāvahetu* tend to suggest that the question of how an *avinābhāva* is 1) objectively guaranteed and 2) justified is unproblematic, the situation changes substantially if one looks for the account of why the doctrine of *svabhāvapratibandha* fulfills the desired functions in the case of *svabhāvahetu*s.

The case of *kāryahetu* and its corresponding essential connection *tadutpatti* = "origination from that" differs from the preceding case in that there is not even support in the form of prima facie or intuitive plausibility. Just the contrary, if one recalls the never ending discussions about the cause(s) for the decline of the Roman empire or the extinction of the dinosaurs, one might be surprised that inferences from effects to its causes are associated with anything coming close to certainty at all. But of course, the difficulties could result from a mere lack of information so that if all informations were given the existence of one particular cause or set of causes could be safely derived. But does it really hold that there exists in principle always a sufficient specification of effects from which a particular cause can be uniquely and in a non-circular way determined? The non-initial positions in a game of chess, even if accurately known or described, can be taken as the result of an immense number of previous moves and there remain quite a lot of possibilities even if one exclusively asks for the immediately preceding move. But why shouldn't it be similar in the case of courses of natural events? Now, Dharmakīrti presents in several places of his works arguments intended to show that particular effects can only result from particular causes. He tries to demonstrate that the possibility that smoke results from something else than fire, if it only in some cases is caused by fire, can be ruled out. He undertakes this, e.g. in PV I 34-38 and the corresponding portions of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, in PVin II 33,29-36,12 and in HB 20,2-21,17. The strategy is in all cases to derive from the supposition of different possible causes for the same effect the conclusion that the alleged effect would be absolutely unconditioned by causes and to show that this consequence leads to further absurd consequences. For our purposes only the first part of the argument is of interest.

The most essential part of the argumentation is presented in the following passage of the *Hetubindu*:

> *kasyacit kadācit kutaścid bhāve 'pi sarvas tādṛśas tathāvidhajanmeti kuto 'vasitam. tathā ca nānvayavyatirekāv iti cet, na, atadbhāvinas tasya sakṛd api tato 'bhāvāt. parasparāpekṣayā janyajanakasvabhāvalakṣaṇe kāryakaraṇe. tatra yadi dhūmo 'gnyādisāmagryā anyato 'pi bhavet, tasya tajjanyaḥ svabhāvo na bhavatīti sakṛd api tato na bhaved arthāntaravat, nāpi sāmagrī taṃ janayet, atajjananasvabhāvatvāt sāmagryantaravat. na ca dhūmasya tadatajjanyasvabhāvo yuktaḥ, ekasvabhāvatvāt. dhūmādhūmajananasvabhāvād bhavato dhūmādhūmasvabhāvaḥ syāt, kāryasvabhāvānāṃ kāraṇasvabhāvakṛtatvād akāraṇāpekṣaṇe cāhetutvaprasaṅgāt. tasmād yo dhūmajananaḥ, so 'gnyādisāmagrīviśeṣaḥ, yo 'gnyādisāmagrīviśeṣajanitaḥ, so dhūma iti kāryakāraṇayor evaṃ svabhāvaniyamāt tadvijātīyād utpattir na bhavati* . . . HB 20,2ff.

[Objection:] "How is it ascertained that even if something arises sometime from something everything which is such originates from that kind of thing? And thus [as it cannot be ascertained] there is no common occurrence and common non-occurrence (*anvayavyatirekau*). [Answer:] No, because this thing, if it does not (generally) arise from that, does not even once arise from that. Effect and cause have with respect to each other the characteristic of having the *svabhāva* of the produced and the producer. Now, if the smoke were to also arise from something other than the (causal) complex of fire etc., it would not have the/a *svabhāva* which is produced by that (complex of fire etc.), and therefore it would not even once arise from that (complex) like any other thing, and also the (causal complex) would not produce it because it (would) not have the *svabhāva* of producing it, like any other complex. But it is also not possible to assume that the smoke possesses a *svabhāva* which is (both) produced and not produced from that (complex), because it has one simple *svabhāva*. Something which arises from something which has the *svabhāva* of producing smoke and non-smoke would possess the *svabhāva* of (both) smoke and non-smoke, because the *svabhāva*s of the effects are produced by the *svabhāva*s of the causes and because, if a dependence on a cause did not exist, causelessness would result as a consequence. Therefore that which produces smoke is the particular (causal) complex of fire etc., and that which is produced by the particular (causal) complex of fire etc. is smoke. Therefore, because of such a restriction of the *svabhāva* of cause and effect, no origination from something of a different kind than that occurs . . ."

The crux of the whole argumentation can be already localized in its first step, represented by the sentence: *tatra yadi dhūmo 'gnyādisāmagryā anyato 'pi bhavet, tasya tajjanyaḥ svabhāvo na bhavatīti sakṛd api tato na bhaved arthāntaravat* = "Now, if the smoke were to also arise from something other than the (causal) complex of fire etc., it would not have the/a *svabhāva* which is produced by that (complex of fire etc.) and therefore it would not even once arise from that (complex), like any other thing." It is not clear whether Dharmakīrti wants to refer to smoke in general or to the particular smoke which would under the hypothesis arise from something other than fire, when he uses the expression: "It would not have the/a *svabhāva* which is produced by that". In the first case, one is inclined to point out that the antecedent of the conditional, namely that smoke arises also from something other than fire etc., warrants only the derivation that smoke in general does not o n l y have a *svabhāva* which is produced by fire (etc.) or that it does not have the *svabhāva* of being o n l y produced by fire, at least as long as no further premises are added, whereas the derivation of the proposition that smoke would not even once arise from fire (etc.) would demand the assumption that it is not the case that smoke has a l s o a *svabhāva* which is produced by fire (etc.) or that smoke does not have the *svabhāva* of being a l s o produced by fire (etc.)

If the shift from the former proposition to the latter would be merely the result of two different readings of the phrase "It would not have the/a *svabhāva* which is produced by that", the argument would definitely be fallacious. But it is also possible that Dharmakīrti wants to say that, if smoke arises also from something other than fire, this particular smoke would not have the/a *svabhāva* which is produced by fire. In any case, this proposition must be implied in his statement. Now, in order to draw the further conclusion that under the hypothesis no smoke at all would originate from fire (etc.), it would require one to derive, from the supposition that some smoke is produced by something other than fire (etc.), that that instance of smoke cannot have a *svabhāva* of a disjunctive kind, of being produced by either fire or some particular other cause like an anthill. For otherwise it would be altogether unintelligible why smoke in general cannot result from either fire or some other cause. But obviously the exclusion of the possibility of such a *svabhāva*-property cannot be derived from the mere

supposition of being produced by something else than fire without further premises.

In particular, it could not be derived from that fact in combination with the principle stated in the preceding sentence that effect and cause have as its defining characteristics the *svabhāva* of being produced and of producing with respect to each other. For this principle is plausible only, if it is interpreted in such a way that it entails:

a) It is necessarily the case that for every x, if there is a y such that x is the effect of y then y is the cause of x
or
b) For every x it is necessarily the case that if there is a y such that x is the effect of y then y is the cause of x.

The principle would, however, become highly questionable, if it were understood as implying the following proposition:

c) For every x, if there is a y such that x is the effect of y then it is necessary that y is the cause of x
or
c1) For every x, if there is a y such that x is the effect of y then y is necessarily the cause of x.

Now there is a variant of c)/c1) which refers to a notion of necessity we have already encountered in connection with the exclusion of inferences from causes to effects, and which yields a very plausible theorem. It was the notion of being an established fact at a particular time; the notion of being factual irrespective of any possible later course of events. Let us symbolize this concept by 'N_F'. Then we can formulate the following theorem:

d) For every time t, for every x, if there is a y such that x is the effect of y then at any time t of the existence of x: N_F at t that y is the cause of x/y is N_F the cause of x at t.

Here we have not only a theorem using a *de-re*-modality which sounds intuitively plausible, but moreover a theorem which exhibits a feature that is related to the concept of *svabhāva*. For it can be shown that in Dharmakīrti's theory the notion of a *svabhāva* of a thing is tied to the notion of something which belongs to a thing during its whole time of existence. The above theorem is significantly related to this notion because it states that at all times where the effect is existent, its being caused by the entity which actually caused that effect, is necessarily given. For that reason it is quite conceivable that Dharmakīrti intended to convey this fact or rather that he also intended to convey this fact in the principle that effect and cause have the characteristic of possessing the *svabhāva* of being the produced and the producer with respect to each other, a principle which obviously is meant as a premise of the following argumentation. Now, the impossibility of a disjunctive *svabhāva* could be derived from the assumption that some instance of smoke is actually produced from something other than fire, if one assumes a mingling of two different notions of *de-re*-necessity. The above theorem d) would yield the result that under the supposition of some smoke being produced by something other than fire that the smoke-instance in question is such that at the time of its existence its actual cause is its necessary cause, i.e. as soon as the smoke-instance originates it is an unalterable fact that something other than fire and not fire has produced it. Now it is extremely tempting to derive from this the conclusion that the smoke-instance in question could not have had another cause than the cause it actually had so that the possibility of its having fire as a possible cause is excluded. This leads to the theorem that if a thing has the *svabhāva* of being produced by some

particular entity, or an entity of a particular kind F, resulting from the proposition that it a c t u a l l y was produced by that or such an entity, any thing with that *svabhāva* could not have been produced by another cause. So everything actually produced by fire could not have been produced by something other than fire, if it were, it would lack the *svabhāva* of being caused by fire and therefore the supposition of being caused by different factors entails a change in the *svabhāva*. That is a theorem which is explicitly asserted by Dharmakīrti, e.g. in PVin II 35,26-31, PVSV 23,2ff. (= PVSV(a) 130,19ff.; Mookerjee/Nagasaki 1964: 103,4ff.). By this, disjunctive *svabhāva*s are excluded insofar as such *svabhāva*s include the possibility of the disjuncts. But the exclusion of *svabhāva*s in this sense is sufficient in order to derive the theorem that origination from different causes entails difference in *svabhāva*. Interestingly Dharmakīrti supports this theorem by arguing that difference in essence = *svabhāva* must not be manifest in the external appearance of a thing and incidentally assumes a position which has very interesting consequences as a theory of natural kinds.

Again it can be said that a prima facie surprising, if not counter-intuitive doctrine, the doctrine that not only differences of effects have to be traced back to differences of their causes, but that also differences of causes must result in differences of effects, must not be taken as a whimsical assumption but can be understood as a theorem which possesses far deeper roots than is evident at first glance. Interestingly, according to the above account, the decisive role would be played by the same notion of *de-re*-necessity that could be used for an explanation of the uncompromising exclusion of inferences from causes to effects - an attitude which cannot be made sufficiently plausible merely by the desire to exclude the inference from fire to smoke, the reverse of the popular standard example of inference. But again, as in the former case, the depth of the theory does not result in its acceptability. The theorem of a bilateral one-to-one correspondence between kinds of causes and kinds of effects that entails that types of causes are uniquely determined by the types of effects, would be the outcome of an unjustified mingling of two related, but nonetheless different modal notions. Dharmakīrti's argument presupposes the progression from the idea that something cannot be altered any more, or the idea of something's being unaffected by any possible l a t e r courses of events, to the idea of something's being unaffected by a n y course of events, to the concept of it being impossible for some entity to be otherwise irrespective of what has happened, is happening or will happen. It is even possible to identify one important factor facilitating this merging. It is the concept of *svabhāva* which unites the two necessity-concepts and absorbs their difference. In this way Dharmakīrti's key-concept favoured such a confusion, and we seem to have again a case where philosophical arguments and doctrines essentially relate to philosophical terminology.

As the proposition that the same effects cannot but have same causes is intuitively implausible, and as Dharmakīrti's arguments fail to be convincing concerning the incorrectness of these intuitions, it cannot be maintained that the concepts of *kāryahetu* and *tadutpatti*, which under the presuppositions of Dharmakīrti's theory are equivalent with "originating from that and nothing else", are suited to play the role of a guarantee for the existence of an *avinābhāva* relation. But since they cannot do this, their role in justifying its assumption becomes equally questionable.

VI. One might take this as a ground to give up the attempt of combining the question of the justification with that of a guarantee of an *avinābhāva*-relation. One might at this point even suggest that the search for guaranteeing grounds should be abandoned altogether in favour of looking merely for the conditions which justify the assumption that an *avinābhāva* might be instantiated - or go even one step further and consider it inappropriate to ask for any more than a warrant for the reasonableness

to undertake the inductive extension with respect to the *pakṣa*, i.e. the application of the hypothesis that connections which can be ascertained as holding in a finite domain equally hold for the subject of inference. One might point out that this would relieve us from the necessity to take any position for or against such theorems as the proposition that causes are uniquely determined by their effects. One could say: if, what Dharmakīrti claims, really holds, namely that effects resulting from different causes are always inherently different, despite that difference not always being manifest, then we do not need to care about such differences. Even if there is always the risk that something which appears to be smoke, actually is not real smoke – which, as Dharmakīrti explicitly declares, would hold for all things which are not produced by fire – it does not matter as far as the question of justification is concerned. What matters is that we are justified in assuming the existence of fire. For the same reasons we might equally adopt the contrary position that the same effects could result from different causes. What matters is that we eventually perceive something of which we can justifiedly believe that it is produced by fire, and this could hold even if there are further possible causes for smoke besides fire.

This freedom of being able to leave some issues undecided, has however a high price. In particular, if we reduce our projects in the manner of the above proposal, we run the risk of sacrificing an important aspect of the depth of Dharmakīrti's inquiry. It was precisely the special achievement of Dharmakīrti's questioning that he did not content himself with telling us w h e n an *avinābhāva*-relation is given or can be assumed as existing but tried to give an account of w h y such a relation occurs. An essential part of his enterprise is dedicated to the question of how things in the world must be assumed to be in order that such a phenomenon as *avinābhāva* exists at all. It is typical of Dharmakīrti's theoretical approach that the theorems which imply conditions for the justification of inferences partly result as secondary consequences from this more fundamental questioning. That is probably the main reason why the concept of *svabhāva* plays such an essential role in his theory of inference. The theorems relating to justification result only partly as derived outcomes, because Dharmakīrti probably starts with the assumption that there are certain standard types of inferences which are based on an *avinābhāva*-relation. This eventually generates a quasi cyclic movement from the level of justification to the level of objective guarantee and back to the level of justification. This situation is perhaps exemplified in the treatment of inferences from causes to effects. It is quite possible that Dharmakīrti originally started from the assumption that the inference from the existence of fire to the existence of smoke must be excluded by the theory. It was, however, his special theoretical account of why this is so, related to particular ontological principles and theorems, which could and possibly did serve as a basis for an uncompromising rejection of any inferences from earlier to later states, except those which could be brought under the concept of *svabhāvahetu* and related to the notion of *tādātmya*.

The opponent might, however, not be satisfied with this rejoinder. He might contend that the fault lies at the starting-point. He could say that the initial mistake is to presuppose that standard examples like the inference from the occurrence of smoke to the occurrence of fire derive their validity from the existence of an *avinābhāva*-relation. One can agree, he asserts, that such inferences possess some kind of justification and one can even agree that the theory of inference should give an account of how and why they are justified, without assuming dogmatically that there can be no other basis for these facts than an invariable concomitance. He might further point out that in contradistinction to some of the examples of *svabhāvahetu*, the standard example illustrating the category of *kāryahetu* suggests a different view. There is not only no reason why we should be obliged to assume that smoke can only have fire or some causal complex involving fire as its cause, but, if we perform such inferences in everyday practice, we seem not even committed to the view that counter-instances of the connectedness between smoke and fire never can occur. Dharmakīrti's theorem that things which have not

actually been caused by fire cannot be of the nature of smoke but can at best exhibit a similar appearance is totally irrelevant in this connection, because, if that were the case, our practice would still continue to be valid relying, as a matter of fact, on the appearance of smoke rather than the nature of smoke. Not the practice and its justification would be at stake, only the way of its correct description.

One cannot be entirely content with the outlook of this objection. For not only does it fail to appreciate the intuition that there is something compelling in the famous standard example, it even jeopardizes what seems to be an important insight of Dharmakīrti, namely that inductive supports do not all carry the same weight, even if there is none or no considerable difference in the number of supporting instances. If we arrive at a place where we have never been before and experience that in a considerable number of days the temperature has continually increased from one day to the other, we would still not have any ground to assume that the temperature would increase further and further, it might under certain circumstances even be reasonable to expect a decrease rather than an increase for the following day. One just cannot say that all instances of inductive support are of the same kind as in the instance of fire and smoke.

How can we explain these facts? First of all, we must recall that the distinguishing feature of the standard example of a *kāryahetu* exists also in cases where inferences are not merely based on the occurrence of effects. We have already mentioned the inference that some forest-region must have been destroyed, which was based on the facts that it had been formerly perceived and was not perceived at some later time. This inference seems to exhibit the same kind of cogency as the standard inference which Dharmakīrti is ready to accept as based on a *kāryahetu*.

But how can it seem cogent? The answer is that it is not cogent in an absolute sense, but that the cogency of these kinds of inferences derives from the supposition of sets of assumptions which we are hardly willing to sacrifice. In the case of inferring that some forest must have been destroyed such suppositions are involved as that trees do not spontaneously run away and settle down elsewhere, that they do not play games like hide and seek becoming invisible to the observer, etc. etc. Also more or less rudimentary knowledge of physical and mechanical laws is involved. The decisive point is that the cogency in these cases derives from the fact that what has been inferred is the only possible or at least only conceivable account or explanation which leaves other assumptions intact, assumptions which, for whatever reason, we are reluctant to give up or call in question. In contradistinction to Dharmakīrti's view, we must see the inference from smoke to fire in the same manner: its cogency is not based on the objective fact that there are no other possible causes of smoke than fire but on the circumstance that the supposition that smoke must result from a causal complex involving fire, is deeply rooted in our set of convictions. Or rather we need even less: the fact that it is compelling can equally well derive from the hypothesis that smoke, although not always, at least under certain circumstances originates from fire and that these circumstances are given in the present case. The difference between this and Dharmakīrti's account is that Dharmakīrti presupposes an absolute cogency whereas we assume a relativized cogency, a cogency which is given relative to a set of assumptions. This allows for further specifications and differentiations deriving from how compelling the relevant set of assumptions is in itself or with respect to other assumptions.

More important in the present context is the fact that our notion of relativized-compellingness allows us to free the theory of the restrictions which obviously diminished the value of Dharmakīrti's account. We had just adduced an example that is in relevant respects similar to the standard case of inference, mentioned under the title *kāryahetu*, which is outside the limits drawn by Dharmakīrti for

the realm of proper logical reasons. We can allow for further extensions and expand the scope to cover cases which are not based on natural regularities. In a former paragraph we alluded to inferences with respect to positions or moves of games. Such cases are related to the former ones in that they result from taking different kinds of propositions as the assumptions relative to which cogency is given. In the case of inferences of positions and moves of games it would be a matter of propositions which entail that the rules of the particular game had been observed or are observed. Śrīdhara's example of the inference of the awakening of a king from the playing of music can be equally accounted for: the relevant proposition is that the pertinent conventions have not been broken. In this way it turns out that the criticism from the Brahmanical side was not entirely unjustified. The critics were right insofar they can claim that Dharmakīrti's theory does not account for important analogies.

On the other hand, our shift from absolute to relative cogency allows us both to appreciate Dharmakīrti's insights and to mirror a number of features of his doctrine in the modified account. It is possible to make allowance for the circumstance that regularities observed in a domain sometimes do and sometimes do not warrant inductive extensions. For inductive extensions can be seen as warranted if they are backed by a relative cogency. The backing consists in the propositions representing the inductive extension allowing us to maintain a set of assumptions which we have reason to maintain, whereas the denial of those propositions would force a revision of that set of assumptions. In this way we can nicely account for the fact that, if e.g., some person several times wins in a lottery or some game of chance, we would normally not take this as a reason to expect that he will also win in future cases. But there are exceptions. If a person has won in a considerable number of cases, we might change our expectations. But this is not merely due to the fact that the number of cases is surprisingly high. What happens, if someone wins much more often than can be expected on the basis of chance, is that we might adopt a different attitude and assume for example that there is some causal-like connection between the guesses or predictions that person makes and the outcome of the play. On such occasions we are inclined to suppose that perhaps some kind of fraud is involved or that, if not our initial assumption about the statistical probabilities of possible outcomes were wrong, some persons have as yet unknown powers to exert an influence on the happening of events, or we may even grant that some kind of clairvoyance is possible. As soon as such assumptions have been adopted, the basis for inductive extensions has been changed. Given certain assumptions about the intentions of a player it may now become reasonable to expect that he will win in further cases or to infer that he will have won in cases which have not yet been checked.

Now it should be clear that there is a counterpart to Dharmakīrti's notion of essential connection, of *svabhāvapratibandha*, and it is not too difficult to see what it is. The counterpart is played by the propositions with respect to which inferential cogency is relative. Accordingly, the theorem that an inductive extension must be based on a *svabhāvapratibandha* is mirrored by the theorem that an inductive extension must be rooted in a set of assumptions insofar as a denial of the proposition representing the extension would force a revision of that set of assumptions. It is also possible to preserve the feature exhibited by Dharmakīrti's account that the grounds for the regularities exemplified by the inductive bases are identical with the grounds which condition that the regularities carry over to the subject of inference. For this is nothing but a replica of the fact that the inductive extension is warranted by the non-revision of the relevant set of assumptions.

As Dharmakīrti's *svabhāvapratibandha* has its structural correspondence in the set of assumptions relative to which an inferred proposition is cogent, we can make allowance for a fact which appeared highly problematic with the background of Dharmakīrti's theory. The theorem that a *svabhāvapratibandha* is established on the basis of a finite number of observed cases is mirrored by the theorem

that assumptions relative to which an inference is cogent can be based on a finite number of observed cases. In contradistinction to the situation given in Dharmakīrti's doctrine, there is nothing offensive in the corresponding counterpart. For the sets of assumptions consist or at least can consist of propositions which have merely hypothetical status. We need not require that the basis for inductive cogency is in its entirety definitely established.

But we can go still further in matching counterparts in both accounts. It is possible to construct an analogue to Dharmakīrti's differentiation between two kinds of *svabhāvapratibandha*, the relation of *tādātmya* and the relation of *tadutpatti*. The common feature of all inferences based on *kāryahetus* and according to Dharmakīrti's doctrine on the connection of *tadutpatti* is that the sets of assumptions bestowing cogency include propositions concerning causal regularities. The prototypical instances of inferences based on *svabhāvahetus* do not. At least a relevant subclass of them can be taken as either resting on no assumptions at all or as resting on nothing but logical truths like the proposition that there is nothing which both exhibits some property and does not exhibit that same property. Or one might describe them as resting on the assumption of the truth of those analytical sentences which, as a matter of fact, are true. To this extent, but only to this extent, one might conform to those interpreters who want to connect the notion of *svabhāvahetu* with that of analyticity.

However, the modification by relativizing inferential cogency suggests also extensions which are not mirrored in Dharmakīrti's doctrine. This results from the fact that the reshaping brings to light analogies which remain hidden in Dharmakīrti's account. The most important dimension of expansion involves the admission of different types of propositions with respect to which inferences are cogent. As soon as we give up the restriction that only logical truths or natural regularities or propositions representing them can occupy this position, we are able to extend the scope of the theory in such a way that not only an immense number of inferences in everyday life, but also explanations and the formation of hypotheses in the humanities and the historical sciences become accessible. Inferences in these fields are often based on assumptions that regularities of behaviour are exemplified or that norms, conventions or rules have been complied with. And that is surely a desideratum for a theory of inference. One of the major defects of Dharmakīrti's doctrine is after all that it does not account for the analogy and close relationship between inferences of the smoke-fire kind with explanations of historical events, with the emendations of texts and other reasoning activities in the historical and philological disciplines. However, it can be shown that such extensions are possible while preserving some relevant features of Dharmakīrti's doctrine.

It is more difficult to say whether there is an analogue to Dharmakīrti's question of how the world must be conceived to be for *avinābhāva*-relations to be possible. However, there might be something corresponding to that under the premises of the new account. It seems that establishing the assumptions relative to which inferences obtain the character of cogency is not made at random nor is it entirely arbitrary that we are sometimes reluctant to give up these assumptions. The cogency of inferences obviously presupposes more than a mere incompatibility between a set of assumptions and the hypothesis of the denial of the inferred proposition. If it were thus, inferences would not possess any convincing force, because it would be an entirely arbitrary matter whether we adopt the conclusion of the inference or just declare the set of assumptions bestowing inferential cogency as invalid, provided we leave the law of contradiction undisputed. It does not seem open to us to attack the inference that fire exists at some place or to attack the reconstruction of a crime or the reconstruction of a corrupted portion of a text by simply saying that in this particular case things might have behaved differently than they usually do. Therefore an analogue to Dharmakīrti's question regarding the conditions which make *avinābhāva* possible could be seen in the inquiry into the conditions of the possibility

that inferences possess convincing force and at least sometimes cannot be disputed by any arbitrary arguments.

VII. Now one might feel that the subject-matter has moved a considerable distance away from an interpretation of Dharmakīrti's texts. One might be inclined to ask, what relevance there is in giving a different account and contrasting it with that of the interpreted author. To this the answer must be given that the relevance of such an enterprise has different aspects.

First, it has to be realized that our own account is intended to be an account of the same subject matter as the one of the interpreted author or of some (parts) of his works. To give such an account constitutes a basis for an explanation of why a philosophical author adopted a particular theory and particular theorems. This is, however, not an explanation in terms of the beliefs or desires or other propositional attitudes of the subject whose actions or behaviour one wants to elucidate. Rather accounts of this type have to be seen as ingredients of explanations which try to tell which objective philosophical facts - if there are such things - can be made responsible for the occurrence of certain features of philosophical doctrines of the tradition.

Secondly, the constructive development of an alternative account enables us to see, which elements of a historical philosophical doctrine can be preserved, if certain other elements are rejected or can no longer be maintained in our eyes. In this case it has turned out that there is an alternative account which, although taken as a whole seems essentially superior to the one propounded by Dharmakīrti - or is at least more acceptable to the modern mind - nevertheless exhibits relevant common features with the one given long ago by one of the most famous Buddhist philosophers.

Thirdly, a contrasting account of an identical subject matter allows us to see things which are historically given not merely for themselves but as realized possibilities among alternatives. There is hope that we get deeper insights, if we look at phenomena, in particular at phenomena we encounter in different cultures or milieus in this way. One reason lies in that, if we fix our eyes exclusively on the given, not only are we not forced, but we do not even get the chance to recognize that the fact that some possibility has not been realized in a society or culture might be something that deserves an explanation.

In the case of Dharmakīrti's theory of inference it has turned out that a number of aspects of his developed doctrine are not necessitated by the facts which motivated or could have motivated a dissatisfaction with the prior theoretical development. The alternative account discloses that the same starting point could equally well lead to different consequences. This in turn demonstrates the role which certain other features of Dharmakīrti's doctrine have played and highlights them. In particular, we are able to see, to what extent the course of the theoretical development in Dharmakīrti's doctrine was due to the fact that he assumed - following the older tradition - that certain standard inferences must be traced back to an *avinābhāva*-relation and that its possibility has to be accounted for.

The contrasting account also throws light on the reception of Dharmakīrti's philosophy in its own tradition. For it represents at least one possible manner of taking a position on Dharmakīrti's doctrine of inference. This does not merely yield a basis to judge to what extent later critics of the Indian tradition were justified in their claims, it also constitutes a foil which enables us to see more clearly whether the subsequent history of reception could also have taken different, and perhaps more desirable, courses.

As our rivalling account showed parallels with Dharmakīrti's theory in several respects, it suggests that its inacceptability, taken as a whole, by no means implies that it does not contain valuable ingredients, and it might contain components which are not yet entirely obsolete. It also forms, especially in combination with a consideration of the prior development, a basis for a better appreciation of Dharmakīrti's achievements. It enables us to see that a progress had been made and what it consists in and that this could be acknowledged even if one should find the earlier accounts of Dignāga, Īśvarasena or others as more attractive in certain ways. This can be generalized and one should recognize that the method of giving an alternative account of a subject matter and tracing correspondences in different theories always provides a basis for a better and much more precise identification and description of (philosophical) achievements and progress. Even if there should be qualms with the concept of progress in philosophy, taken absolutely, we can nevertheless in this way apply a relativized version of this notion, relativized with respect to alternative, allegedly more adequate accounts or even to our own position or to what is suggested by (some of) our present day views. (It should be clear, however, that this does not mean that the measure of achievements should, in a naive manner, be directly equated with the number of corresponding features).

From a philosophical perspective the most important aspect of the type of procedure which has been adopted above possibly lies in its procuring a certain protection against falling back behind standards which have been already achieved in the tradition besides sharpening the view for different alternatives. By trying to match features of our account with features of another we get to see more clearly that certain components of traditional doctrines might have more inherent potential than has been realized so far – in both senses of 'realize' – and this helps to prevent the danger that they are dismissed too hastily.

Philosophical systems such as that of Dharmakīrti have to be treated as old buildings which cannot be left as they are. Even if they do not possess any more value as entire edifices and have to be torn down, it is the valuable material from which they are built which counts and deserves to be preserved in a new construction. In this sense, and I am inclined to say, only in this sense should we be conservative (and ecological too).

Abbreviations and Literature

HB — *Hetubindu*: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*. Wien 1967.

Mookerjee/Nagasaki 1964 — S. Mookerjee and Hojun Nagasaki, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. An English Translation of the First Chapter with the Autocommentary and with Elaborate Comments [Kārikās I-LI]*. Patna.

PV I — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter I: v. PVSV

PVin II — *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Chapter II: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte*, Wien 1973.

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Roma 1960.

PVSV(a) — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā ṭaṭīkayā ca sahitam*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Kyoto 1982 [repr.].

DIGNĀGA ON *ŚABDASĀMĀNYA* AND *ŚABDAVIŚEṢA*

by

Ole Pind, Copenhagen

Expositions of Dignāga's *apoha* theory generally focus on Dignāga's claim that words (*śabda*) express (*vācaka*) their meaning (*śabdārtha, artha*) through exclusion of the meanings of other words (*arthāntarāpoha, anyāpoha*). There is, however, another important aspect of Dignāga's *apoha* theory which I shall examine in this paper, though it is hardly ever discussed in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* [PS] - our main source for his philosophy:[1] Dignāga also claims that words express their meaning through exclusion of other words (*śabdāntarāpoha*), thereby emphasizing the functional symmetry between the word (*śabda*) - formally a configuration of phonemes - and its corresponding reference (*artha*). In this regard Dignāga's *apoha* theory stands out as a unified semantic theory, dealing with the word not only from the point of view of its content (*śabdārtha*), but also from the point of view of its being an expression (*śabda*) invested with meaning (*vācaka*).

In the following exposition, I shall deal with the theoretical and historical implications of this aspect of Dignāga's *apoha* theory. I shall also address briefly Dharmakīrti's view, which on this point appears to institute a conspicuous break with Dignāga's philosophy.

I. Indian philosophers writing on the subject of Dignāga's *apoha* theory often quote, when dealing with his view of *śabda*, the following verse which may serve as a convenient point of departure for discussing the theoretical implications of Dignāga's view:

> *nārthaśabdaviśeṣasya vācyavācakateṣyate / tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭatvāt; sāmānyaṃ tūpadekṣyate* //[2]
> It is not claimed that there is a signifier-signified relationship between an individual signified object and an individual word (*arthaśabdaviśeṣa*) because the [individual signified object and individual word] have not previously been observed [together]; their common feature, however, [i.e., the *arthasāmānya* and the *śabdasāmānya*] can be taught.

The verse no doubt stems from one of Dignāga's lost works:[3] in the first place, there are clear parallels between it and two passages of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Secondly, Indian commentators invariably quote it, when elaborating Kumārila's criticism, in ŚV *Apohavāda* 102,[4] of Dignāga's view of *śabda*.

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[1] It is clear that Dignāga must have dealt with the *apoha* theory in other works, of which a few Sanskrit fragments have survived. The *apoha* chapter of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, for instance, is probably largely based upon his lost *Sāmānyaparīkṣā*, fragments of which are quoted in NCV 628,7f. Another work dealing with the *apoha* theory is *Dvādaśaśatikā*, which appears to be quoted by Dharmakīrti in PVSV 62,26f.: *arthāntaravyāvṛttyā tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo gamyate*; cf. Siddhasenagaṇin's *Tattvārthabhāṣyavyākhyā* V 24 [qu. in NCV 548,24-25]: *yathāha Dvādaśaśatikāyām – yady apy uktam aprasaktasya kimarthaṃ pratiṣedhaḥ iti naivaitat pratiṣedhamātram ucyate, kin tu tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 'rthāntaravyāvṛttyā loke gamyate yathā viṣāṇitvād anaśvaḥ iti*.

[2] The verse is inter alia quoted in NCV 615,12-13; cf. TSP ad TS 961 [= ŚV *Apohavāda* 102].

[3] The verse probably stems from Dignāga's lost *Sāmānyaparīkṣā*. See "Unidentified Fragments from Dignāga Concerning the *apoha* Theory" [in preparation].

[4] Kumārila's criticism may well refer to this particular verse [cf. the clause *prāg adṛṣṭitaḥ*]:

> *bhavadbhiḥ śabdabhedo 'pi tannimitto na labhyate / na hy asādhāraṇaḥ śabdo vācakaḥ prāg adṛṣṭitaḥ* //
> Nor do you assume that the difference between words is caused by the [vāsanās], for [according to your theory] an individual (*asādhāraṇaḥ*) word does not designate [its object] because of not previously being observed [together with its signified object].

For the question of the *vāsanās*, see infra.

The central idea of the verse is that the sign function of any given word, being constituted by the relation of an expression (*vācaka*) to its reference (*vācya*), can only be defined in terms of the respective types of the expression and its reference, i.e., in terms of the word universal (*śabdasāmānya*) and the meaning universal (*arthasāmānya*). Their individual realizations (*arthaśabdaviśeṣa*), however, are claimed not to constitute such a relation because they have not previously been observed together.

The idea that it is only possible to establish valid relations between abstract types is fundamental to Dignāga's epistemology. The moot question therefore is what constitutes these types and the relation between them, and why are individuals excluded from the signifier-signified relation (*vācyavācakatā*)? This problem Dignāga addresses briefly in the following texts from *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

II. Dignāga deals twice, in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* V, with the question of *śabdasāmānya* and *arthasāmānya*, although briefly. The first reference is found in the *Vṛtti* on PS V 22cd [= Hattori's ed. § 33]; the second one occurs in the *Vṛtti* on PS V 33ab [= Hattori's ed. § 45]. Since PS V 33ab and its commentary are of a more general nature, I have dealt with this text first. As a whole PS V 33ab is textually less confused in the Tibetan version by Kanakavarman [K] and Dad pa'i śes rab [D] than the version ascribed to Vasudhararakṣita [V] and Seṅ rgyal [S]. I have therefore preferred KD to VS, which I reproduce, with a few emendations in brackets, in the form in which it is found in Hattori's edition § 45. The *Vṛtti* ad PS V 22cd is corrupt in both of its Tibetan versions. I have taken KD as my basis, but I have added a considerable number of conjectures so as to establish a readable text. All conjectures appear in brackets.[5] PS V 33ab and its *Vṛtti* reads:

[*ji*] *ltar don la don gźan gsal ba spyi yin pa de bźin du*
sgra gźan rnam par gcod pa ni / sgra la spyir ni brjod pa yin / [= 33ab]
ji ltar bya[*s*] *pa ñid ma byas pa bsal ba'i phyir mi rtag pa ñid la sogs pa go bar byed pa de bźin du sgra gźan rnam par gcod pa* [*ni*] *sgra la spyir brjod pa yin la / de ñid kyis don rtogs par byed pa yin no //*[6]

As the exclusion of other signified objects (**arthāntarāpoha*) is [claimed to be] the universal (**sāmānya*) of the signified object (**arthasya*), so
the exclusion of other words (**śabdāntaravyavaccheda*) is claimed to be the universal (**sāmānya*) of the word (**śabdasya*).
As [the inferential indicator] "the property of being produced," etc., (**kṛtakatvādi*) indicates the property of being impermanent, etc., (**anityatvādi*) because it excludes [things that are] not produced (**kṛtaka*), so the exclusion of other words is said to be the universal of the word. Only through this [(**tenaiva*) universal] is the signified object (**artha*) indicated.

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[5] For a complete critical apparatus, I refer the reader to my forthcoming edition and translation of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* V.

[6] The two Tibetan translations of this passage read in the versions by VS and KD:
[1] *ji ltar don gźan sel ba de bźin du spyi yaṅ*
sgra gźan rnam par bcad nas ni sgra'i spyi rjod par byed pa yin [33ab]
ji ltar byas pas ma byas pa rnam par bsal ba'i spyi yis mi rtag pa la sogs pa go bar byed pa bźin du sgra gźan rnam par bcad pa'i sgra'i spyis rjod par byed do // [= VS].
[2] *ci ltar don la don gźan gsal ba spyi yin pa de bźin du /*
sgra gźan rnam par gcod pa ni / sgra la spyir ni brjod pa yin // [33ab]
ji ltar bya pa ñid ma byas pa bsal ba'i phyir mi rtag pa ñid la sogs pa go bar byed pa de bźin du sgra gźan rnam par gcod pa'i sgra la spyir brjod pa yin la / de ñid kyis don rtogs par byed pa yin no (//) [= KD]

It appears from Dignāga's concise remarks that he applies the same theoretical considerations to the word (*śabda*) as to its reference (*artha*). It would therefore seem appropriate in this context to review briefly some of the main features of his *apoha* theory, in order to understand why he insists that it is only the word type (*śabdasāmānya*) that is capable of expressing its meaning.[7]

Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* on this paragraph does not contain any information that throws light on how we are to interpret Dignāga's view of the homology between *śabda* and *artha*. However, towards the end of his exegesis he adds the important remark that only the [word] universal (*sāmānya*) expresses a meaning, whereas the word in its individual form (*svalakṣaṇa*) does not do so, because [the individual form] has not previously been observed [together with its individual intended object].[8] The same view is formulated by Dignāga in the *Vṛtti* ad PS V 33ab [q.v. infra], and it is also expressed in the Sanskrit verse analyzed above.

One thing is clear: the *apoha* theory represents Dignāga's solution to the epistemological problem raised by his denial of the existence of universals (*jāti* or *sāmānya*).[9] As is well-known, they were conceived by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika tradition as ubiquitous entities inherent in substances (*dravya*), thereby differentiating them (*viśiṣṭa*) as belonging to a certain class of things having certain definable features. In fact, Dignāga's *apoha* theory only becomes fully understandable when we realize that he used it as a substitute for universals, in contexts where the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school of philosophy would formulate its theories with reference to the existence of universals. Thus, for instance, the Dignāgan expression *arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭa*[10] is the exact equivalent of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika jātiviśiṣṭa.[11] Moreover, in the important section of the *Vṛtti* ad PS V 36d [q.v.], he explicitly attributes the properties of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika universal (*jāti*) to the *apoha*.[12]

Although Dignāga and subsequent Buddhist philosophers easily could point out the logical inconsistencies of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika assumption that universals are real entities, it is nonetheless clear that the rejection of universals must have caused a serious epistemological problem. This, for instance, becomes evident when Dignāga deals with the question of how to establish universally valid connections between types. There is good cause to believe that the tradition which Dignāga opposed referred to universals as a means of establishing such connections.

It appears from a revealing passage in the *Vṛtti* ad PS II 16, in which Dignāga shows the consequences of the assumption that universals are real entities, that certain philosophers attempted to solve the problem of how to justify the existence of universally valid connections between properties [e.g., between smoke and fire], by claiming that knowing the universal in a single substratum is equivalent to knowing it in all.[13] This claim is understandable since it was tacitly assumed that universals

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[7] There are many complicated issues involved in the *apoha* theory. Naturally I must limit the discussion to only those aspects that are pertinent in this particular context.

[8] Cf. PSṬ 198,35-37: *de ñid kyis sgra don rtogs pa byed kyi / raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma yin te / de sṅar mthoṅ ba med pa ñid kyi phyir ro źes pa 'o //*

[9] Dignāga's concise refutation of the assumption that universals are real categories is found in PS II 16; cf. Kitagawa 1973: 464f.; for an English translation, see Hayes 1980: 257f.

[10] Cf.: *śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha* = PS V 36d [*Vṛtti* ad loc.] qu. PVSV 62,27-63,1.

[11] Cf. *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.60 (in *The Nyāyadarśana of Gotam Muni. With the Bhāshya of Vātsyāyana*, eds. Padmaprasād Śāstrī and Harirām Śukla, Varanasi [2]1970): *na, dravyamātram aviśiṣṭaṃ jātyā vinā 'bhidhīyate; kiṃ tarhi? jātiviśiṣṭam.*

[12] Cf. the following Sanskrit fragment ad loc. cit.: *jātidharmāś caikatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraiva tiṣṭhanti*, ŚVṬ 74,9; see also Kamalaśīla's edited version of the *Vṛtti* in TSP 389,9-11.

[13] Cf. Kitagawa 1973: 464: *gal te rten gcig bzuṅ bas kyaṅ thams cad gzuṅ ba yin na ni / de yaṅ rten bźin du du mar 'gyur ro //* [= VS]; *ci ste spyi gcig la brten par gzuṅ na yaṅ thams cad gzuṅ ba yin no źe na de la brten bźin du du mar 'gyur ro //*

would always instantiate in the same way. Hence they could serve as a means of establishing universally valid connections of the kind that was required by the development of contemporary logical theory. However, if one rejects the idea of the universal as untenable, one is left with the problem of accounting for the possibility of universally valid connections. Dignāga evidently solved this fundamental epistemological problem with reference to the *apoha* theory.

Dignāga's thinking evolves, as is well-known, from a fundamental dichotomy: the opposition between the realm of *svalakṣaṇa*, and the realm of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. This dichotomy constitutes the basic theoretical object of his philosophy and defines the nature and scope of his epistemology. The realm of *svalakṣaṇa* consists of any given object as it is reflected in sensation (*pratyakṣa*). Sensation, as such, is restricted to individual occurrences of any given entity (*svalakṣaṇa*) which, by definition, is beyond linguistic representation and thus inexpressible.[14] In contrast to the realm of *svalakṣaṇa*, the realm of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is exclusively defined in terms of abstract types. It consists of those generalized objects (*sāmānya*) that are indispensable for making correct inferences (*anumāna*) or - which structurally amounts to the same - for obtaining knowledge through verbal communication (*śābda*).

The sign, whether it is the inferential indicator (*liṅga, hetu*) or the word (*śabda*) does not primarily concern that particular indicator and indicated or that particular word and signified object, but the invariable relationship (*avinābhāva, sahabhāva, sambandha*) that holds between any occurrence of, e.g., smoke and fire, or of substance (*dravya*) and existence (*sattā*), or between any occurrence of, e.g., the word cow (*gośabda*) and the meaning cow (*gauḥ*). Thus the indicator or the word is type and not occurrence.

Things are only definable in relation to their type. The bare individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*) remain outside the reach of signs.[15] This means that the word or the inferential indicator cannot convey a concept of the individuals in a form that accounts for their individuality, but it can do so in a general form, i.e., through the types that are instantiated through individual occurrences of, e.g., smoke and fire or of the word cow and the meaning cow.

Although types are recognized through their realizations into concrete instances, they are not, however, definable in terms of their realizations: they can only be defined in terms of what they are not, i.e., through negation (*nivṛtti, pratiṣedha*) or exclusion (*apoha, vyavaccheda, vyāvṛtti*) of their complements (*anya*). The reason is, as Dignāga explains in the commentary ad PS II 15,[16] that individual occurrences are always context bound and therefore cannot assume the role of being a type. If one were to establish an invariable connection between, e.g., smoke and fire, on the basis of their individual occurrences, it would never be universally valid, since its form would be restricted to the

[= KD]; for an English translation of this passage, see Hayes 1980: 258. The passage follows characteristically after the paragraph in which Dignāga rejects the possibility of *vidhi*, i.e., an affirmative universally valid rule. Śāntarakṣita quotes [in TS 1096] the following short phrase from Dignāga's Hetumukha [identified by Kamalaśīla ad loc.]: *asambhavo vidheḥ*, and give as the explanation why *vidhi* is impossible that universals, etc., are impossible (*sāmānyāder asambhavāt*). This would indicate that the possibility of *vidhi* traditionally was linked up with the assumption of real universals.

[14] The idea that individuals are inexpressible is also presupposed by the objection quoted in Bhartṛhari's alleged commentary on VP I 69: *pratiniyatasvarūpabhedā vyaktayaḥ. na hy asaṃvedyam avyapadeśyam avidyamānaṃ vā vyaktīnaṃ rūpam*. It probably represents a view that was current among contemporary grammarians and Nyāyavaiśeṣika philosophers, to whom denotability was restricted to generality, i.e., to things as conjuncted with a universal.

[15] As is well-known the realm of *svalakṣaṇa* is exclusively accessible to sensation (*pratyakṣa*), which by definition is devoid of representation (*kalpanā*). The scope of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, however, is defined by the sign function, whether it be the linguistic (*śābda*) or the inferential (*liṅga*) sign, and is thus characterized by representation.

[16] For an English translation, see Hayes 1980: 257. Note that Hayes interprets Tib. *sgrub/bsgrub* [cf. Kitagawa 1973: 463,8f.] as if it were equivalent to Sanskrit *sādhana*. In this context, however, *sgrub/bsgrub* = *vidhi*, which Kitagawa [1973: 114,23] accordingly translates *kentei teki na shikata*.

perception of the properties of that particular smoke and that particular fire, in the same way as sensation (*pratyakṣa*) by necessity is restricted to individual objects. Therefore he concludes that such relations cannot be formulated in an affirmative form that is universally valid (= *vidhi*) - which by definition involves joint presence (*anvaya*) and therefore is restricted to individual occurrences of things - but they can be formulated in terms of exclusion of other which basically generalizes joint absence (*vyatireka*).

In PS V 34 [q.v.][17] he returns more fully to the epistemological question of what constitutes exclusion of other. This passage, moreover, contains Dignāga's answer to the question of induction relative to the establishing of a necessary connection between types. The idea is that in order to establish a connection between two types, one has to proceed by way of induction, which, in the Indian philosophical context, means through the observation of joint presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*) of the two objects through which the types are realized. This procedure entails a division of things into two sets: a set of similar things (*tulya*) and a set of dissimilar things (*atulya*). Thus, for instance, the word tree is only observed to apply to any member of the set of trees, whereas it never applies to things that are members of the dissimilar set, i.e., non-trees. Complete induction through *anvaya*, however, is ruled out a priori because it is not possible to observe the connection, in time and space, between all individual occurrences of, e.g., the word tree and individual trees as they are infinite. Dignāga therefore suggests that one can establish a connection with reference to the mere fact that the word tree is not observed to apply to what is not a tree. The mere non-observation (*adarśanamātra*)[18] of the word's application to things that are dissimilar to the things through which its meaning is realized can be generalized so as to hold for everything dissimilar to the object to which the word tree is applied. The meaning of a term is thus equivalent to an inference based upon the exclusion from its scope of what it does not denote (*vyavacchedānumāna*).[19] Dignāga illustrates his

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[17] For the extant Sanskrit fragments of this paragraph, see Hattori's ed. § 46; for an English translation, see Richard P. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*, Dordrecht etc. 1988: *ad loc.*

[18] Dignāga's view that *adarśanamātra* is constitutive of the invariable connection between the indicator and the indicated or of the connection between the word and its reference raises a number of complicated epistemological issues which can be followed from the Pāṇinian definition of *lopa* [Pāṇ I 1 60: *adarśanaṃ lopaḥ*] through Dignāga's view of *adarśanamātra* and his alleged pupil Īśvarasena's theory of *upalambhābhāvamātra* [cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 10, 1966, 73-85; v. Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Wien 1967: 154f.] to Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi*, which breaks with the Dignāgan tradition. Cf., e.g., Dharmakīrti's implicit criticism of Dignāga's reference to *adarśanamātra* as constitutive of *apoha* in PV III 172a-c (= *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the Commentary 'Vritti' of Manorathanandin*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1968 [Chapter III = I of his edition] [Chapter III = I of his edition]):

anyatrādṛṣṭyapekṣatvāt kvacit taddṛṣṭyapekṣaṇāt / śrutau sambadhyate 'pohaḥ.

The criticism is implicit in the clause *anyatrādṛṣṭyapekṣatvāt*, for which Dignāga would have *sarvatra* [i.e., in the *atulya* in toto]; v. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna 1953) 264,30f. ad loc. cit.; note especially the following reference to Dignāga's view on p. 265,23: *anye tu punaḥ sarvato vijātīyād vyāvṛttir kvacid vidheye vṛttim apekṣata iti vyatireke tātparyam anvaye tu neti, vyatireka eva prādhānyena pratyāyate*; see also Kumārila's criticism of Dignāga's view in ŚV *Anumānapariccheda* 131c-132:

aśeṣāpekṣitvāc ca saukaryāc cāpy adarśanāt //
sādhane yady apīṣṭo vyatireko 'numāṃ prati / tāvatā na hy anaṅgatvaṃ yukti śābde vakṣyate //

Kumārila's reference to *śābda* [i.e., to the chapter on verbal knowledge] is probably to *Apohavāda* 75 [q.v.].

It is perhaps not a random mistake that Jñanaśrīmitra quotes in his *Apohaprakaraṇa* a slightly edited version of Dharmakīrti's verse, substituting *sarvatra* for *anyatra* [v. op. cit. 207,10f.].

[19] Dignāga would thus seem to consider verbal knowledge to be equivalent to an inference based upon *vyatireka*. His critics were not late to point out this apparent violation of the canonical rule of *trilakṣaṇa hetu* [cf., e.g., NC(V) 666,12f.]. From a historical point of view, it is worthy of notice that Kumārila closes his criticism of the *apoha* theory with criticizing inferences through vyatireka. The target of his criticism is probably Uddyotakara and his school whom Kumārila accuses of not having the right to reject Dignāga's view because they accept inferences through *vyatireka*.

point by recalling the fact that if the meaning of the word tree were established through joint presence (*anvaya*) there would be no doubt about the mental image (*ākāra*) it would evoke in a given case. There is doubt, however, because the usage of the word tree does not evoke an image of a particular kind of tree, it only conveys a general notion of treeness that applies to all kinds of trees.

Thus the sign function (*vācyavācakatā*) is constituted by a relation between two generalized types, *arthasāmānya* and *śabdasāmānya*, the natures of which are established through exclusion of other. Dignāga appears to regard *arthasāmānya* as a cognitive image (*ākāra*) having the characteristic of an abstract type (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) being located in the mind. It contrasts with the word's individual reference (*arthaviśeṣa*) which belongs to the domain of individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*) and therefore, by definition, is inexpressible.[20]

Although Dignāga never touches upon the question of the properties of the word type (*śabdasāmānya*), we must assume that it is characterized by the same abstract cognitive features as the *arthasāmānya*. In Dignāga's view, the word thus unites two abstract images, i.e., an acoustic image and a representational image, which together constitute the sign function, whereas the corresponding relation between arthaviśeṣa and *śabdaviśeṣa* belongs to the domain of individuals (= *svalakṣaṇa*) and thus cannot constitute a sign function. This is probably the idea underlying another verse that is ascribed to Dignāga by Haribhadrasūri,[21] in which he claims that it is only words (*śabda*) and representations (*vikalpa*) that are interconnected (*atyantasambandha*), whereas the words are in no direct contact with the objects (*nārthaṅ śabdāḥ spṛśanti*) to which they are applied.[22]

III. Since Dignāga generally substitutes *anyāpoha* for the universal of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school of philosophy, it is natural to assume that his use of the *apoha* theory, relative to the question of what constitutes the word type, is parallelled by a view according to which it is defined in terms of real word universals. This assumption is inter alia confirmed by the following text from the *Vṛtti* ad PS V 22cd:

> *ji ltar 'di la yin pa de ltar sgra la* [*khyad par raṅ las min* (= 22d)] *źes 'jug pa yin no // ba laṅ la sogs pa'i sgra la yaṅ raṅ ñid du rtogs pa'i khyad par yod pa ma yin gyi / 'on kyaṅ /* [*de la don bźin du rnam par dpyad pa'i spyi las khyad par*] *byas pa yin pas so //*
> *'on te* [*ba laṅ daṅ rta la sogs pa'i sgra rnams kyi khyad par*] *mṅon sum ñid yin no źe na //*
> *gal te khyad par la mṅon sum yod kyaṅ / de ni brjod par byed pa ma yin te / don daṅ lhan cig ma mthoṅ ba'i phyir daṅ* [*śiṅ rta la sogs pa*] *blun po la sogs pa rnams kyi sbyor ba ni don* [*gcig*] *brjod par byed pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir sgra rnams la spyis byas pa ñid kyi khyad par yin no //*[23]

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[20] Cf., e.g., PS II 3; cf. Kitagawa 1973: 450; for an English translation, see Hayes 1980: 248f.

[21] Cf. *Anekāntajayapatākā* I 337: *yathoktaṃ Bhadanta-Dinnena: vikalpayonayaḥ*, etc.; v. infra.

[22] The verse is quoted in slightly different versions by Indian philosophers. The following version which is probably the original one is quoted in NCV 547,7f.:

vikalpayonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabdayonayaḥ / teṣām atyantasambandho nārthaṅ śabdāḥ spṛśanty api //

[23] The two Tibetan translations of this passage read in the versions by VS and KD:

'di la ji lta ba bźin du sgra dag raṅ las khyad par yod pa ma yin no źes 'gyur te / sgra la yaṅ ba laṅ la sogs pa raṅ las bye brag tu gyur pa ni med kyaṅ / 'on kyaṅ spyi las bye brag tu byas par zad na de la ni de bźin du rnam par brtag go // gal te mṅon sum ñid la ba laṅ gi sgra la sogs pa'i bye brag ma yin nam źe na? mṅon sum la bye brag yod du zin kyaṅ de ni brjod par bya ba ma yin te / don daṅ lhan cig ma mthoṅ ba'i phyir ro // śiṅ rta la sogs pa rnaṅs pa rnams kyi tha sñad kyaṅ don rjod par byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir te / de bas na spyi las sgra rnams la bye brag tu byed pa yin no // [= VS; PSV 148,2-10]

ji ltar 'di la yin pa de ltar / sgra la yaṅ raṅ ñid du rtogs pa'i khyad par yod pa ma yin gyi / 'on kyaṅ de kho na la rnam par spyi daṅ khyad par gyis byas pas yin no // 'on te ba laṅ daṅ rta la sogs pa rnams kyi khyad par ni mṅon sum ñid yin no źe na? gal te khyad par la mṅon sum yod kyaṅ de ni brjod par byed pa ma yin te / don daṅ lhan cig ma mthoṅ ba'i phyir daṅ blun po

> As in the present case, so also [the proposition] "the difference is not per se (**na svato bhedaḥ*)" applies (**vartate*) to the word (**śabda*). In a word like "cow" there is no difference that can be cognized per se (**svataḥ*), but rather (**kiṃ tarhi*), its difference [(**bheda*) from other words] is caused by its universal (**sāmānyakṛta*) as it is analyzed in the same way as [the difference of] the signified object [(**artha*) from other signified objects]*.
> But is it not so (**nanu*) that a particular instance of a word (**śabdaviśeṣa*) like "cow" or "horse" (**gavāśvādi*) is perceptual (**pratyakṣa*)?
> Even though one may observe a particular instance [of the words "cow" or "horse"], it does not designate [(**na vācakaḥ*) its signified object] because it has not [previously] been observed together with its signified object (**arthena sahādṛṣṭatvāt*) and because [a word] like "wagon," (**rathādi*), whether used by imbeciles [or educated persons (**jaḍādiprayoga*)], denotes the same signified object (**ekārthavācakatva*). Therefore the difference between words is caused by their universal [(**sāmānya*), i.e., exclusion of other words].

This paragraph deals primarily with the question of what constitutes the difference (*bheda*) between words. It occurs in a context where Dignāga criticizes the view that the difference between articulated words is caused by the fact that they manifest the word universals inherent in them. But in addition to this problem he also briefly touches upon the question of the opposition between *śabdaviśeṣa* and *śabdasāmānya*.

Jinendrabuddhi explains the idea underlying Dignāga's argument in the following way:

> If one asks [the opponent] how the difference between the word "cow" and the word "horse" is established, he is forced (**avaśyam*) to say that they are different because they manifest (**vyañjakatva*) their proper universal. Thus the word "cow" manifests cow-wordness (**gośabdatva*) and the word "horse" [manifests] horse-wordness (**aśvaśabdatva*). Therefore, if one maintains that words such as "cow" are different because they manifest different universals, it follows that they are not different per se (**svataḥ*).[24]

Both Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi thus make it quite clear that there were philosophers [= grammarians] who regarded individual words as instantiations of their universals.

In the following discussion, the opponent argues that it is possible to tell the difference between individual articulations of words such as "cow" and "horse," to which Dignāga first objects that since they have not previously been observed together with their signified objects (*artha*) they do not denote (*vācaka*) them. The reason is, of course, that individuals belong to the domain of *svalakṣaṇa* and thus cannot constitute a universally valid connection. It is only the word type (*śabdasāmānya*) that is capable of denoting its object, and in that respect the fool and the wise-man are on the same level.[25]

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la sogs pa rnams kyi sbyor ba ni don cig brjod par byed pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir sgra rnams la spyis byas pa ñid kyi khyad par yin no // [= KD; PSV 127,2-10]

[24] *ba laṅ gi sgra daṅ rta'i sgra dag la khyad par ci źig byas źes brjod pa na raṅ gi spyi mṅon par gsal bar byed pa ñid kyis khyad par ro źes gdon mi za bar brjod par bya'o // de ltar ni ba laṅ gi sgra ni ba laṅ gi sgra ñid kyi* [corr. : *kyis*] *gsal bar byed pa po daṅ / rta'i sgra ni rta'i sgra ñid kyi 'o źes pa (//) de ltar gal te spyi tha dad pa mṅon par gsal bar byed pa ñid kyi phyir ba laṅ la sogs pa'i sgra tha dad par 'dod na / raṅ ñid las tha mi dad par thal bar 'gyur ro //* [PSṬ 185,34-40]

[25] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's commentary ad loc., PSṬ 186,14-21. This rather obscure argument becomes clear when we realize that Dignāga is thinking of the distinction between educated [= *śabda*] and uneducated speech [= *apabhraṃśa*] in the way as it is described by Patañjali in *Mahābhāṣya* I 8,20f. [ad *vārt* 1]: *evam ihāpi samānāyām arthagatau śabdena cāpaśabdena dharmaniyamaḥ kriyate*; cf. also op. cit. I 10,8f. [ad *vārt* 6]: *bhūyaṃso 'paśabdā alpīyāṃsah śabdāḥ. ekaikasya śabdasya bahavo 'pabhraṃśāḥ. tad yathā gaur ity asya gāvī, goṇī, gotā, gopotaliketyevamādayo 'pabhraṃśāḥ*. Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* supports the identification: *de las kyaṅ go ṇi la sogs pa'i sgra rnams kyis don de kho na mi rtogs par 'gyur na rtogs par yaṅ 'gyur ro //* [PSṬ 186,17f.]; see also Bhartṛhari's VP III (*Sambandhasamuddeśa*) 55.

IV. Dignāga's views of *śabda* clearly link up with important trends in contemporary Indian linguistic theory. Thus, for instance, Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* [VP] and Vṛṣabhadeva's *Paddhati* contain a number of strikingly parallel formulations with reference to word universals. In the *Paddhati* ad VP I 23 it is, for example, claimed that individual words do not express their meaning, only the word type [= *jāti*] signifies.[26] One cannot, evidently, exclude the possibility that Vṛṣabhadeva exploits Dignāgan terminology, but the same idea is presupposed by Bhartrihari's own commentary, which deals with what constitutes the main objects of the grammatical rules, namely, the letter types [= the phoneme] and the word types [= any given string of phonemes].

The idea that grammatical rules apply to letter types or word types (*ākṛti* = *sāmānya* = *jāti*) under which all possible instances are subsumed, but not to their individual instantiations, can at least be traced back to Kātyāyana, *Vārttika* 18 (*ākṛtyupadeśāt siddham*) on Pāṇini I 1 1,[27] and to the commentarial tradition that attaches to the Pāṇinian *sūtra* I 1 68: *svaṃ rūpam śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā*. Thus, for instance, it appears from Bhartṛhari's exposition, in the commentary ad VP I 68f., of the views concerning the correct interpretation of this particular *sūtra*, that some scholars interpreted the phrase *svaṃ rūpam* as referring to the word universal. A related discussion also occurs in Bhatṛhari's exposition, in VP I 93 and its commentary, of the views of other scholars concerning the *sphoṭa*, which they interpreted as equivalent to the word universal.[28] It would thus seem that Dignāga to a large extent reformulated ideas that were current among contemporary grammarians, in the light of his *apoha* theory. It is perhaps not wrong to assume that he had in mind certain contemporary formulations of the *sphoṭa* theory, which relies on a radical distinction between type and occurrence, as it finds expression in the opposition between individual articulations of words (*dhvani* = *vyakti* = *svalakṣaṇa*) and the types (*jāti*) which they instantiate.

Although Dignāga never deals explicitly with the property of the phoneme (*varṇa*) in terms of the exclusion of other, it appears implicitly from Kumārila's criticism, in *Ślokavārttika (Sphoṭavāda)*, of the *sphoṭa* doctrine, that either he or one from his school suggested defining the varṇa in this way. This is fully consistent with Dignāga's treatment of the word type. There is therefore no reason to doubt that Kumārila has Dignāga's view in mind when he addresses the question in ŚV *Sphoṭavāda* 28 [= TS 2144]:[29]

dvayasiddhas tu varṇātmā nityatvādi yathaiva ca / kalpitasyeṣyate tadvat siddhasyaivābhypeyatām //

The letter itself (*varṇātman*), however, is approved by both parties, so one might just as well assume permanence, etc., of a real [(*siddhasya*) letter] as of an imaginary (*kalpitasya*) one.

Kumārila's objection relates to the fact that *anyāpoha*, according to Dignāga, is not a substance (*dravya*)[30] like the universal postulated by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school of philosophy. It has exclusively a mental and thus an imagined (*kalpita*) character. However, since Dignāga does not reject the fact that there are letters, one might just as well, according to Kumārila, assume that the properties that apply to the letter apply to a real entity and not just to an imagined one. Kamalaśīla, in his commentary on TS 2144, brings out the implications of Kumārila's criticism by quoting PS V 36d:

kim ityubhayasiddhaṃ varṇātmānaṃ parityajya kalpitasyaivānyāpohasya nityatvānekavyāpitvādayo [corr. : *nityatvānekatvavyāpitvādayo*][31] *varṇyate "jātidharmavyavasthiteḥ"* [= PS V 36d][32] *iti*

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[26] Cf. op. cit. 52,15: *svalakṣaṇāni ca na vācakāni, sāmānyam eva vācakam iti jātiḥ śabdaḥ*.

[27] Cf. Patañjali ad loc.: *avarṇākṛtir upadiṣṭā sarvam avarṇakulaṃ grahīṣyati* [MBh I 13,19f.].

[28] Cf. loc. cit.: *anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti smṛtā*.

[29] Cf. ibid. 19ab: *pratyakṣaviṣayatvāc ca nānyāpoho 'pi yujyate*. Kumārila also refers to Dignāga's view in ŚV *Śabdanityatādhikaraṇa* 320f., q.v.

[30] Cf., e.g., PS V 36b (*Vṛtti*); NCV 733,14-18; ibid. 734,13f.: *adravyatvāc ca bhedāc ca*.

[31] It may also be suggested that one read *nityatvaikatva-*; cf. the following fragment of the commentary ad PS V 36d:

> *vacanāt*.[33]
> Why reject the letter as an entity that is approved by both parties and ascribe permanence, pervasiveness of many, etc., to an assumed one, i.e., exclusion of other, such as appears from the proposition [in PS V 36d:] "because the properties of a universal are contained [in it = *anyāpoha*]".

Thus the assumption that Dignāga substitutes *apoha* for the universal, in all those cases where contemporary scholars would posit real universals, seems to be confirmed.

There is reason to assume that other views of *śabda* were current among Buddhist philosophers at the time when Kumārila wrote his detailed and careful criticism of Dignāga's *apoha* theory. For instance, his criticism of Dignāga's view of *śabda* [in ŚV *Apohavāda* 102] would seem to presuppose that there were Buddhists who regarded the *vāsanās* [i.e., memory traces] as the differentiating factor of the word,[34] thus breaking with Dignāga's claim that difference is due to the difference of the excluded (*apohyabheda*).[35] It is not possible to identify the Buddhist philosopher to whose view Kumārila was referring. It is noteworthy, however, that it seems to be related to Dharmakīrti's view.

V. In view of the fact that Dharmakīrti, at least to some extent, develops Dignāgan theory,[36] it is surprising to find that he apparently never elaborated this aspect of Dignāga's *apoha* theory, which, strange as it may seem, has no well-defined counterpart in Dharmakīrti's own philosophy. His commentator, Vinītadeva, and a few other post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist philosophers refer to *arthasāmānya* and *śabdasāmānya* as constitutive of *kalpanā* [i.e., representation] when discussing Dharmakīrti's definition of *kalpanā* in NB I 5: *abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā*; otherwise the concepts of *arthasāmānya* and *śabdasāmānya* no longer play any role in post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist epistemology.[37]

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jātidharmāś caiketvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraiva tiṣṭhanti, ŚVṬ 74,9; cf. TSP 389,9-11.

[32] Hattori ad loc. reads *jātidharmavyavasthitiḥ* with ŚVṬ 74,8 against Tib. and NR 433,4.

[33] Cf. also TSP ad TS 2310: *bauddhair anyanivarttanam = anyāpoho vācakatvena ya iṣṭaḥ*; TSP ad TS 2313: *bauddhair apy anyāpohavādibhir uktam: "jātidharmavyavasthiteḥ"* [= PS V 36d].

[34] Cf. ŚV *Apohavāda* 100a-c [= TS 959]: *na cāpi vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatāpi vā apohānāṃ prakalpyate*. Kamalaśīla quotes, in TSP ad loc., a passage from the work which Kumārila presumably had in mind. He ascribes the text to certain Buddhists (*kecid bauddhāḥ*) without specifying whom he has in mind: *na khalv apohyabhedād ādhārabhedād vāpohānāṃ bhedaḥ, api tv anādikālapravṛttavicitravitattvārthavikalpavāsanābhedānvayais tattvato nirviṣayair api bhinnaviṣayālambibhir iva pratyayair bhinneṣv artheṣu bāhyeṣu bhinnā ivārthātmāna ivāsvabhāvā apy apohāḥ samāropyante. te ca tathā taiḥ samāropitā bhinnāḥ santaś ca pratibhāsante, tena vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatā cāpohānāṃ bhaviṣyati.*

The views that are set forth in this text as well as its style are strikingly similar to Dharmakīrti's views and style. Cf., for instance, Dharmakīrti's PVSV 42,12-22 and its ideosyncratic use of *iva*.

[35] Cf. PS V 14a: *apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ*. Dignāga deals with the *vāsanās* in the context of *pratibhā*. Cf. the *Vṛtti* ad PS V 47 [= Hattori's ed. § 61].

[36] It is possible to show that Dharmakīrti in several cases is critical of Dignāga's views, although his criticism usually is implicit, like, for instance, his criticism of Dignāga's reference to *adarśanamātra* as constitutive of *sambandha*; for which, v. supra.

[37] Cf. the following passage from Vinītadeva's commentary ad NB I 5, where he claims that *abhilāpa = śabdasāmānya* and that *abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā = arthasāmānya*: *rtog pa ni śes pa la rjod pa daṅ 'drer ruṅ ba snaṅ ba ste źes bya ba smos so // 'dis rjod par byed pas na rjod pa ste smra bar byed pa sgra'i spyi'i ṅo bo yin no // brjod pa daṅ 'dre ba ni rjod pa daṅ 'dre ba ste 'dre ba ni 'brel pa la bya 'o // rjod pa daṅ 'drer ruṅ ba ni 'rjod pa daṅ 'drer ruṅ ba ste don gyi spyi yin no // de ni rjes su 'gro ba daṅ ldog pa daṅ ldan pa ñid kyis khyab pa yin pa'i phyir brjod par nus kyi / don gyi bye brag raṅ gi ṅo bo'i mtshan ñid kyi ṅo bo ni brjod par bźus te* [read *mi nus te*] *de khyab par byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // śes pa gaṅ la rjod pa daṅ 'drer ruṅ ba snaṅ ba yin te / don gyi spyi'i ni don gyi rnam pa śes bya ba'i tha tshig go // gźan yaṅ de ni brjod par bya ba'i*

In his comment on Kumārila's criticism of Dignāga's view of what constitutes the difference between words, Śāntarakṣita restricts himself [TS 1087] to merely saying that the property that applies to *arthāntarāpoha* also applies to *śabdāntarāpoha*.[38] According to Kamalaśīla [ad loc. cit.] this means that the representational picture (*pratibimba*)[39] of one word differs from the representational picture of other words (*pratibimbāntara*),[40] but he avoids going into a discussion of the Dignāgan concept of *śabdasāmānya*.

In their refutation of Kumārila's objection that it is impossible to explain the signifier-signified relation (*gamyagamakatva*) in terms of their respective exclusions because these are imaginary (*avastutvād*), not being grounded in real universals,[41] Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla claim [in TS 1092f. and TSP ad loc.] that it is impossible to explain the relation in terms of real universals, since universals do not exist. And the possibility that the relation between *vācaka* and *vācya* can be defined in terms of their individual occurrences (*svalakṣaṇa*) is impossible because individuals do not subsist. They therefore conclude that the relation between *vācaka* and *vācya* is defined in terms of their respective representational pictures (*pratibimba*), but avoid going into a detailed discussion of how this relation is established.

Considering the fact that Śantarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to a large extent reproduce Dharmakīrti's views, one would assume that their exposition also in this case relies on his views. This apparently is not the case: they have attempted answering Kumārila's objection by merely extending the scope of Dharmakīrti's *apoha* theory so as to include *śabda*. Indeed, it is impossible to point to any passage in Dharmakīrti's extant works where he explicitly defines the signifier-signified relation in terms of a relation between their respective types[42]: apparently he does not assume, in contrast to Dignāga, that the *apoha* theory can also be used for defining the word as type in contrast to its individual realizations. This probably stems from his unwillingness to recognize abstract word types, which, evidently, necessitates a distinction between type and occurrence. Dharmakīrti rejects the validity of this distinction in his argument with the *sphoṭavādin* [= Bhartṛhari], who regards the type as *vācaka* in contrast to its articulation as a sequence of sounds (*dhvani*) in time and space. Dharmakīrti objects that one cannot, in fact, perceive the difference between the articulated sound (*dhvani*) and the word (*śabda*) conveying a particular meaning (*vācaka*); consequently there is no reason to institute a separation between them.[43] Dharmakīrti clearly regards the identity of the word being constituted by a sequence of articulated sounds as a fiction, which ultimately is caused by its assimilation to similar memory traces (*sabhāgavāsanā*).[44] Thus, according to Dharmakīrti, language is basically an

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yin pas rjod pa ste / bśad par bya ba don gyi spyi gaṅ yin pa 'o // rjod pa daṅ 'dre ba ni rjod pa daṅ 'dre ba 'o // rjod ba daṅ 'dre ruṅ ba ni rjod pa daṅ 'drer ruṅ ba ste sgra'i spyi yin no des rjes su 'gro ba daṅ ldog pa 'thad pa ñid kyis don rjod par nus kyi / sgra'i bye brag gis ni mi nus te de thun moṅ ma yin pa'i phyir ro // . . . des ni 'di skad du sgra daṅ don gyi spyi'i rnam pa ma yin pa'i śes pa gaṅ yin pa de ni mṅon sum gyi tshad ma yin no // źes bstan par 'gyur ro // Cf. Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic*, vol. II, p. 23 no. 2; cf. also Vinītadeva's *Ṭīkā* ad *Santānāntarasiddhi* 3,13-15: *'di ltar saṅs rgyas pa thams cad ni brjod par byed pa'i sgra'i spyi'i rnam pa can gyi śes pa yin par 'dod kyi / sgra'i khyad par ni yod kyaṅ ma yin te /*

[38] Cf. TS 1087: *yādṛśo 'rthāntarāpoho vācyo 'yaṃ pratipāditaḥ / śabdāntaravyapoho 'pi tādṛg evāvagamyatām //*

[39] Cf. Dharmakīrti's use of *vikalpapratibimba* and *vikalpapratibhāsa*, qq.v. at PVSV 37,26 and 38,4 and 119,19, respectively.

[40] Cf. TSP ad loc. cit.: *yādṛśa iti pratibimbātmā. tasya ca pratibimbāntarād bhedaḥ sphuṭataram eva saṃvedyata iti.*

[41] Cf. ŚV *Apohavāda* 105ab [= TS 963ab]: *na gamyagamakatvaṃ syād avastutvād apohayoḥ.*

[42] Dharmakīrti's definition of the relation (*sambandha*) in terms of an invariable connection (*avinābhāva*), which he lays down in PVSV 118,14-17: *sa ca śabdo yadabhiprāyaiḥ prayujyamāno dṛṣṭo 'nyathā na dṛṣṭo darśanādarśanābhyām dhūmādivat tatpratītiṃ janayatīti sa eva sambandho 'vinābhāvākhyaḥ*, does not address the question of the status of the word.

[43] Cf. PVSV 133,5f.: *na hi vayaṃ dhvaniṃ śabdaṃ ca vācakaṃ pṛthagrūpam upalakṣayāmaḥ*; cf. ibid. 11f.: *na hi pratyakṣe 'rthe paropadeśa garīyān.*

[44] Cf. PVSV 119,18-20: *tasmād indriyavijñānaviśeṣānubandhī sabhāgavāsanopādānavikalpapratibhāsavibhramaḥ padam.*

indication by the voice (*vāgvijñapti*) of what is in the mind of the speaker (*buddhirūpa*). The invariable relation (*avinābhāva*) that holds between the word and its meaning consists in the knowledge that any given word generates that particular idea. This relation Dharmakīrti describes as a causal relation (*janyajanakabhāva*) and its establishment constitutes the act of convention (*samaya*).[45] An analogous causal relation governs the vocal articulation (*vāgvijñapti*) of the individual string of phonemes that constitute any given word, the articulation of each phoneme being caused by the appropriate mental act (*citta*), which itself gives rise to the next mental act causing the articulation of the following phoneme, and so on.[46] Dharmakīrti thus defines the articulation of the word as a re-activation of memory traces (*saṃskāra*) located in the subconscious. Consequently the identity of the word is exclusively defined in terms of a pre-established causal chain of individual mental acts.

This view is clearly incompatible with the assumption of abstract word types because the word becomes identical with the articulation of the individual (*asādhāraṇa*) phonemes. It is therefore not surprising to find Maṇḍanamiśra criticising Dharmakīrti [in *Sphoṭasiddhi*] for not recognizing the fact that verbal cognition presupposes a common element (*sāmānya*) transcending the individual articulations of words thereby functioning as meaning bearers. Maṇḍanamiśra's objection is parallel to Dignāga's argument against the possibility of establishing a signifier-signified relation between *śabdaviśeṣa* and *arthaviśeṣa*: an individual phoneme cannot make known the meaning of any given word because it has not been observed before (*tasya pūrvam adarśanāt*), only in its general form (*sāmānyātmanā*) does the phoneme convey a meaning.[47] Maṇḍanamiśra naturally assumes that the commen feature [= *sāmānya*] is real and not only defined in terms of exclusion of other.

It is not clear what motivated Dharmakīrti to break with Dignāga's view of *śabda*. A major influence is no doubt the Sautrāntika view of *śabda*. Vasubandhu has recorded in Abhidharmakośa[48] the main lines of the controversy between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas concerning the nature of the word.[49] As is well-known, the Sautrāntikas regard any given word as a particular sequence of sounds (*ghoṣa*) that conveys its meaning in so far as there is agreement among the speakers about the scope of its denotation (*kṛtāvadhi*). They oppose the view of the Vaibhāṣikas who classify language as one of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*s, claiming that the articulated sounds (*ghoṣa*) manifest the name (*nāmnaḥ prakāśakaḥ*), which in turn illumines the meaning (*arthasya dyotakaḥ*). It is obvious that the transcendental nature of the Vaibhāṣika *nāman* [= the word type] has affinity to the *sphoṭa* of the grammarians.

Dharmakīrti, who wrote a detailed criticism of the *sphoṭa* theory, seems to follow the Sautrāntika opposition to the idea of distinguishing between the word type and its individual realization. This would seem to explain why he passes over in silence the distinction between *śabdasāmānya* and *śabdaviśeṣa*, which is a necessary consequence of the epistemological presuppositions of Dignāga's

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Note that Dharmakīrti's use of the term *sabhāga* introduces the indispensable notion of sameness; it functions as a covert universal.

[45] Cf. PVSV 113,25-114,2: *arthaviśeṣasamīhāpreritā vāg ata idam iti viduṣaḥ svanidānābhāsinam artham sūcayatīti buddhirūpavāgvijñaptyor janyajanakabhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ. tataḥ śabdāt pratipattir avinābhāvāt. tadākhyānam samayaḥ.*

[46] Cf. PVSV 160,19-161,1: *cittasamutthāna hi vāgvijñaptir varṇapadavākyābhidhānā. tatra sakārasamutthāpanacetasā samanantarapratyayenākārotthāpanacittam utthāpyate. tathā rephākāravisarjanīyotthāpanāni pūrvapūrvapratyayāni. tad ime 'nyānyahetavo varṇāḥ svakāraṇānupūrvījanmānaḥ.*

[47] Cf. *Sphoṭasiddhi* ad 30: *bhede 'pi hi pratyutpatti varṇānāṃ na tenāsādhāraṇena rūpenārthasya jñāpakāḥ, tasya pūrvam adarśanāt, sāmānyātmaneva tu; tac cāviśiṣṭaṃ sarvatra.*

[48] Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (ed. P. Pradhan, Patna 1967) ad AK II 47f.

[49] For a study of which, cf. P. S. Jaini, "The Vaibhāṣika Theory of Words and Meanings", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 22/1, 1959, 95-107.

apoha theory. On the other hand, Dharmakīrti has to a large extent reconstructed Dignāga's *apoha* theory by establishing it on a different theoretical basis. It is therefore not surprising that he should adopt a different view of *śabda*. However, it is far from clear what motivated Dharmakīrti's reconstruction of Dignāgan epistemology. In spite of extensive research there are still sizeable areas of his thought that require further exploration. To study them in their historical context represents a fascinating research object for the historian of Indian Buddhist philosophy.

Abbreviations and Literature

Hayes 1980 — Richard P. Hayes, "Diṅnāga's Views on Reasoning (*svārthānumāna*)." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 8/3, 219-277.

Kitagawa 1973 — Hidenori Kitagawa, *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū*. Tōkyō [2nd ed.].

NCV — *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī Nayacakravṛtti* (Siṃhasūri): *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakraṃ of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. With the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*. Part 2. Ed. Muni Jambūvijayajī. Bhavnagar 1976.

NR — *Nyāyaratnākara* (Pārthasārathimiśra): v. ŚV

Pāṇ — *Pāṇini's Grammatik*. Ed. Otto Böhtlingk. Leipzig 1887.

PS V — *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chapter V: v. PSV

PS II — *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chapter II: v. Kitagawa 1973

PSV — *The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary. Chapter five: Anyāpoha-Parīkṣā. Tibetan text with Sanskrit Fragments*. Ed. Masaaki Hattori. Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, no. 21. Kyoto 1982.

PSṬ — *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi): v. PSV

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes.* Roma 1960.

ŚV — *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with The Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī. Varanasi 1978.

ŚVṬ — *Ślokavārttikaṭīkā of Bhaṭṭaputra-Jayamiśra*. Ed. Kunhan Raja. Madras 1946.

TS — *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri. [2 vols.] Varanasi 1981, 1982.

TSP — *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): v. TS

VP I — *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentaries Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva. Kāṇḍa I.* Poona 1966.

ON *PRAMĀṆA* THEORY IN TSOṄ KHA PA'S MADHYAMAKA PHILOSOPHY

by

David Seyfort Ruegg, London

I. Introduction

Nāgārjuna, the source of the Madhyamaka school, and even more Candrakīrti, the main representative of its Prāsaṅgika branch,[1] have frequently been taxed with having discarded both logic and epistemology and with relying only on negative criticism and on the unthinkable and inexpressible of mysticism.[2]

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[1] Candrakīrti (seventh century) rather than Buddhapālita (*c.* 500 CE) is often considered to be in the strict sense the establisher of the Prāsaṅgika school, although it is recognized that Buddhapālita had already proceeded like a Prāsaṅgika philosopher. On the term Prāsaṅgika, reconstructed from Tib. Thal 'gyur ba, as the name of a school of the Madhyamaka, see below, note 11. The designation Svātantrika for Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya's school of the Madhyamaka is also reconstructed from the Tib. term Raṅ rgyud pa. As for the name Bhavya, it is being used here although the name of the sixth-century founder of the Svātantrika school is in fact transmitted also as Bhāvaviveka and Bhāvin. Concerning the problems raised by the identity of this master, see recently the present writer's article "On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya", in *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka*, eds. D. Seyfort Ruegg and L. Schmithausen, Leiden 1990, 59-71.

The author wishes to acknowledge his debt not only to Ernst Steinkellner's generous bibliographic assistance but also to his most valuable remarks on this paper for which the present writer naturally assumes sole responsibility. This essay is tentative not only because of the philological and historical problems that arise in a still little-worked field but because of the very considerable problems that the required philosophical reconstruction inevitably poses, and it is thus being offered here with all necessary reservations as a position paper inviting further discussion. As will be seen, Tsoṅ kha pa himself considered the problems raised here to be particularly difficult.

[2] See e.g. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad 1927, *passim*; *Buddhist logic*, part I, Leningrad 1932: 29, 344.

In his valuable lecture *The logical illumination of Indian mysticism* (Oxford 1977: 19-20) B. K. Matilal has opposed the *prāsaṅgika* (whom he described as 'the vitaṇḍin') to the advocate of the Pramāṇavāda, writing: "The first group consists of those who use only the *reductio [ad absurdum]* and the negative form of debate, while the second group comprises those who would establish, in addition to the *reductio*, a system of *pramāṇas* or accredited means of knowledge on the basis of which they would construct a system. One of the platitudes of the Pramāṇavādin, i.e., the second group of philosophers, is that a philosophic debate cannot properly begin unless both parties entering it first admit that *pramāṇas* . . . are acceptable realities." Substantially the same view has been expressed in Bimal K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, Delhi 1985: 14.

The *vitaṇḍā* ('cavil', as a solely negative, and destructive, argument) has, however, been repudiated in Nāgārjuna's *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* (§ 56) and in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* (VI 178; see below, Section IX), as well as in Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya* (= *Vadanyayaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakirti with the Commentary Vipanchitārthā of Acharya Śāntarakṣita*, ed. D. Shāstri, Varanasi 1972: 119-20) with Śāntarakṣita's commentary where it is pointed out that without the acceptance of a philosophical theory (*abhyupagama*) there can be no philosophical debate (*vivāda*). (For Vasubandhu's rejection of *vitaṇḍā* in his *vāda*-treatises, see E. Frauwallner, "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 40, 1933 [281-304]: 289.) On the question of the Madhyamaka and *vitaṇḍā*, cf. K. Bhattacharya, "Mādhyamika et Vaitaṇḍika", *Journal Asiatique* 263, 1975, 99-102; and D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Towards a chronology of the Madhyamaka school", in *Indological and Buddhist studies* (Festschrift J. W. de Jong), eds. L. A. Hercus et al. Canberra 1982: 521 with notes 65-66, and Seyfort Ruegg 1983: 210f., 235.

Moreover, as we shall see, in addition to the Svātantrikas, some Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas have admitted a Pramāṇa-system, though of course one that does not accept the onto-logical presuppositions adopted by the Substantialist schools of Indian philosophy accepting a Pramāṇavāda to the effect that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* possess a *svabhāva* ('own being, self-existence, aseitas') or are established by a *svalakṣaṇa (raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa)*.

From his discussion of the comment on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikās* by Buddhapālita (*c.* 500 CE), it clearly emerges that Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya (sixth century) – whom Candrakīrti (seventh century) designated as given to hypothetical argument (*tārkika*) and as being fond of inference (*priyānumānatā*)[3] – considered that his (proto-)Prāsaṅgika predecessor had left the Madhyamaka philosophy of non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) and Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) open, by reason of his 'exposed' formulations (*sāvakāśavacana*), to attack from its Substantialist opponents.[4] As a philosopher living in the sixth century, Bhavya evidently developed his methodology for use by the Mādhyamika under the influence of masters of *pramāṇa* such as Dignāga (*c.* 500 CE). Bhavya in fact made important moves in the direction of, and apparently in response to, the Pramāṇavāda being developed in the fifth and sixth centuries. Thus, for the Madhyamaka, he accepted an autonomous inference (*svatantram anumānam*) and 'syllogistic' argument (*svatantra-prayogavākya*), for which purpose he sought to find terms that were established in mutual agreement (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa*) between the Mādhyamika proponent (*vādin*) and his Substantialist opponent (*prativādin*).[5] And on the *vyavahāra*-level he admitted an entity that might at least at first sight recall the *svalakṣaṇa* or 'own (specific) characteristic' of the logician.[6]

As for *anubhava* 'experience' NOT being in the strict sense a means of right knowledge of reality, and on the possibility of its being *mṛṣā* 'false', see Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā* (PPMV), p. 58. (Sometimes *anubhava* is indeed equivalent to *vedanā* or *vedanam* 'feeling', e.g. PPMV on MMK XVIII 1 [p. 343.9] and XXVI 5 [p. 554.7].)

On another use of the description 'mysticism' in relation to Nāgārjuna, see e.g. T. Vetter, "A Comparison between the Mysticism of the Older Prajñā-pāramitā Literature and the Mysticism of the Mūla-Madhyamaka-Kārikās of Nāgārjuna", *Acta Indologica* 6, 1984 [495-512]: 497f.

[3] PPMV pp. 25.8, 31.1, and p. 16.1.

[4] For the term *sāvakāśavacana* (rendered in the Tibetan translation of Bhavya's *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP) as *glags yod pa'i tshig*), see PPMV p. 24.1 (where the term is rendered by *glags daṅ bcas pa'i tshig*). The Tibetan expression *glags yod pa'i tshig* in the Tibetan translation of the PP pp. 11-12 and 14, corresponds moreover to *prasaṅgavākyatva* in the PPMV pp. 14-15 and 36, where the Tib. translation has *thal bar 'gyur ba'i tshig/ṅag*; cf. Tsoṅ kha pa, *rTsa śe ṭīk chen*, f. 31a-b (= p. 52). See below, pp. 287-288.

[5] For Bhavya's *svatantra-anumāna* and *prayoga(vākya)*, in addition to the relevant passages of Chap. I of Bhavya's PP many of which are cited in Sanskrit by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā*, see for example PP XIII 1 (D, tsha, f. 147b-148a): *da ni sun 'byin pa'i lan btab pa daṅ / raṅ dbaṅ du rjes su dpag pa'i mthus 'du byed rnams rnam pa las ṅo bo ñid med pa ñid du bstan pa'i don gyi dbaṅ gis rab tu byed pa bcu gsum pa brtsam mo // . . . 'dir sbyor ba'i tshig ni don dam par naṅ gi dṅos po rnams ni ṅo bo ñid stoṅ pa ñid yin te / slu ba'i chos yin pa'i phyir / dper na / sgyu mkhan gyis sprul pa'i bud med kyi lus bźin no //* . . . "Now, in virtue of offering a rebuttal (*parihāra*) of the [opponent's] refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) and of autonomous inference, and in reference to the sense set out as non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), I shall compose Chap. XIII [of the PP] . . . Here there is the syllogism (*prayogavākya*): 'In reality the internal Bases (*āyatana*) are empty of self-existence, for they are of a fallacious nature (*moṣadharman*), just like the body of a woman projected by an illusionist'." – Cf. 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo* (Masuri ed. of 1962), ca, f. 61a; and lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha' Thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*, II, f. 45a (= Sarnath ed. of 1970: 325).

[6] Defined as *arthakriyāsamartha* and *paramārthasat* in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV III 3) in contradistinction to the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* 'general characteristic' defined as *saṃvṛtisat*.

Compare Bhavya's exegesis of the Yogācārin's *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā* and *parikalpitasvabhāva* in his comment on MMK XXV (PP, D, tsha, f. 242af., especially f. 242a5-b1): . . . *de mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid med pa ñid kyis ṅo bo ñid med pa ni rgyu mtshan la sogs pa lṅa po dag gi khoṅs su ma gtogs pa'i phyir ro // de de ltar yod pa ma yin yaṅ miṅ don la 'jug pa las kun nas ñon moṅs pa 'gyur te / ji ltar miṅ don la 'jug pa de ltar byis pa rnams de'i ṅo bo ñid la mṅon par źen par byed do źe na / de la 'dir gal te gzugs źes bya bar yid la brjod pa daṅ / tshig tu brjod pa'i kun brtags pa ṅo bo ñid gaṅ yin pa de med do źe na ni dṅos po las skur pa 'debs pa yin te / yid la brjod pa daṅ / tshig tu brjod pa la skur pa 'debs pa'i phyir ro //* "[Yogācāra *pūrvapakṣa*:] This [constructed nature or *parikalpitasvabhāva*] is non-substantiality by *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā*, for it does not belong to the pentad [of *vastus/dharmas*] consisting in *nimitta* etc. [cf. *Madhyāntavibhāga* III 13 with Sthiramati's *Ṭīkā*; *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 50a-b (= p. 420-1); L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 537-8]. Although it does not exist in this manner, there is Affect (*saṃkleśa*) since a name refers to [its] object, and just as a name refers to [its] object so the foolish conceive attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to its *svabhāva*. – [Bhavya's reply:] Here, in this connexion, to hold that the constructed nature of the conceptualization *(manojalpa) 'rūpa'* and of the verbalization do not exist amounts to denial (*apavāda*) of things,

In his *Legs bśad sñiṅ po* the Tibetan Madhyamaka master Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419) has written that Bhavya was, however, evidently unaware of the fundamental philosophical difference between himself and Buddhapālita in respect to the question of accepting or not accepting an autonomous (*svatantra*) reasoning, and that he simply regarded Budhapālita's method as unsuited for this acceptance of the *svatantra (raṅ rgyud khas len pa 'os med du byas pa)*; and for this reason Bhavya assumed that for both Buddhapālita and himself the negandum (*dgag bya*) in the case of negation of self-existence in the factors of existence and the individual (*pudgala-dharma-nairātmya*) was therefore identical.[7] But this is in fact not so according to Tsoṅ kha pa, who states that the reasoning (*nyāya* or *yukti*) negating the *svatantra (raṅ rgyud 'gog pa'i rigs pa)* is an especially subtle one among all those reasonings in which the negation of this negandum has been set forth on the ground of dependent origination (*rten 'byuṅ* = *pratītyasamutpāda*).[8] Concerning the relationship in Bhavya's thought between his acceptance of a *svatantra* inferential *liṅga* (*raṅ rgyud kyi rtags*) and his doctrine of an entity existing by own-characteristic on the *saṃvṛti* level - i.e. what Tsoṅ kha pa refers to as the *tha sñad du raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa'i raṅ mtshan* - this Tibetan scholar has furthermore given as his opinion that the latter onto-logical doctrine constitutes the reason (*rgyu mtshan*) for Bhavya's having accepted an autonomous *liṅga* in his *svamata*.[9]

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for it is a denial of *manojalpa* and verbalization. . . ." (A translation of the entire passage is to be found in M. David Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter XXV of the *Prajñāpradīpa*", in *Miscellanea buddhica*, ed. Chr. Lindtner, Copenhagen 1985 [25-75]: 49-50.) – For Bhavya's critique of the Vijñānavāda, see further his *Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā* V 55f. (with lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'*, II, f. 47af. [= p. 328f.]).

For Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation of this passage of the PP, and for his attribution to Bhavya of the *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*, see his *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 50a (= p. 420): *kun btags la mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid med do źes smra ba'i kun btags de ṅo bo daṅ khyad par du 'dogs pa'i rtog pa daṅ miṅ la byed na de gñis phuṅ por gtogs pas gźan dbaṅ la mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid med pa'i skur 'debs su bśad pas / gźan dbaṅ la mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid yod par bźed do // de yaṅ dgoṅs 'grel las raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pas mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid med par bśad ciṅ 'di dag kyaṅ mdo de'i don gtan la 'bebs pa yin pas / gźan dbaṅ la raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ṅo bo yod par bźed par gsal lo //* . . . "If no construction or naming attaching either essence (*svabhāva*) or particularity (*viśeṣa*) are stated in respect to the *parikalpita* – of which it is said that this *parikalpita* has no *svabhāva* –, because both [conceptualization and verbalization] belong to a *skandha* [cf. *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* VII 25], [were one to hold to *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā*] this is stated to represent the denial (*apavāda*) that consists in *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā* for the *paratantra* [cf. *Saṃdhinirmocana* VII 20]. It is therefore held that for the *paratantra* there does exist a *lakṣaṇa-svabhāva*. This [*vyavasthā* as *nāman* and *saṃketa*] is explained in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* [VII 4] as *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā* [in respect to the *parikalpita*] because of non-establishment by *svalakṣaṇa*; and the meaning of this Sūtra has been settled. It is therefore clear that it was accepted [by Bhavya] that in the *paratantra* an essence established by own-characteristic (*sva-lakṣaṇa-siddha*) exists." On the basis of this analysis Tsoṅ kha pa classifies Bhavya – even though a Mādhyamika (see *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 91a = p. 488) – as a Substantialist . . . (For the interpretation of this difficult passage, see [Ser byes Tre hor dge bśes] rTa mgrin rab brten, *Draṅ ṅes rnam 'byed legs bśad sñiṅ po dka' gnad rnams mchan bur bkod pa, gzur gnas blo gsal la dga' ston*, f. 106b-107a. A translation of the entire passage is to be found in R. Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence*, Princeton 1984: 266. See also Hopkins 1989: 15-16.)

Here Tsoṅ kha pa has not, however, mentioned any link with the *logicians'* concept of the *svalakṣaṇa*, the connexion he has made being rather between Bhavya's acceptance (under Tsoṅ kha pa's analysis) of the *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* and Bhavya's critique of the Yogācārin's concept of *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā* and his *apavāda* of certain *lakṣaṇas*. For the interpretation by Tsoṅ kha pa and his school of the Svātantrika's *raṅ mtshan : svalakṣaṇa*, and for the idea of *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* on the conventional level, cf. Donald S. Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika*, Ithaca 1987: 66ff.

For Candrakīrti's view of *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, see for example his *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* on verses 8, 57.

[7] *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 63b (= p. 443) and f. 81b-82a (= p. 473). – For a reply possibly made by Jñānagarbha to Candrakīrti, however, see Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 70-71; Shirō Matsumoto, "Jñānagarbha no 'seizuko fushōron' hihan ni tsuite" [J.'s criticism of the theory of *saṃvṛtyanutpatti*], *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu Ronshū* 15, 1984, 418-385.

[8] *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 82a (= p. 473-4); cf. f. 90b (= p. 487). Cf. *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 425a-b (p. 706).

[9] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 425a-b; cf. f. 429a2.

For the necessary link between autonomous (*svatantra*) inference and the postulation of an entity established by own-characteristic (*raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*), see also *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 83bf. (= p. 476f.) (referring to the

In the event, Bhavya's onto-logical initiatives in the direction of the logic and epistemology accepted by other Indian philosophers were soon severely criticized by Candrakīrti and his Prāsaṅgika followers. For us the question then is: Does this mean that the Mādhyamikas, at least to the extent that they were Prāsaṅgikas, in fact throw overboard logic and epistemology, i.e. *pramāṇa*?

II. Some fundamental logical and epistemological issues in Madhyamaka: *prayoga(vākya)* vs. *prasaṅga* and the problem of *pramāṇa/prameya*

A basic difference between the Svātantrika (Tib. Raṅ rgyud pa) and the Prāsaṅgika (Tib. Thal 'gyur ba) Mādhyamikas lies in their gnoseology. That is, it concerns the different modes in which, according to them, understanding of reality arises in the conscious continuum of philosopher-practisers and the way they ascertain reality through reasoning.[10] Since the Svātantrika following Bhavya accepts an independent or autonomous (*svatantra*) form of reasoned thinking embodied in a *parārtha-anumāna* and *prayoga(vākya)* or 'syllogism', he can be designated as an 'Autonomist'. And since the Prāsaṅgika uses instead the *prasaṅga*-type of thinking - i.e. a form of apagogical reasoning that reveals undesired consequences that occur or eventuate (*prasañj-*) in opposed views - he could perhaps be designated as an 'Eventuationist' or 'Apagogist'.[11]

At the outset it should be emphasized that, long before Bhavya and the split of the Madhyamaka school into Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas, Ārya-Deva and Nāgārjuna himself had made a point of employing methods of discussion and establishing modes of knowing that were logically and epistemologically sound.[12] Yet, at least *prima facie*, any move by a Mādhyamika towards a *pramāṇa*-system

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Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra). Conversely, if no *dharma* established by own-characteristic is postulated, it will be necessary NOT to maintain a *svatantra*-type reasoning according to Tsoṅ kha pa; see *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, p. 476.13-18. Tsoṅ kha pa then specifies that absence of *pakṣa* is to be explained as non-assertion of a thing established by '*svalakṣaṇa*' or *svabhāva* (f. 84a = p. 477.10: *phyogs med pa ni raṅ mtshan nam raṅ bźin gyis grub pa'i khas len med pa'i don du bśad de*). See also lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'*, II, f. 45a-b (= p. 326).

At least in principle, it might seem possible to suggest that these two components in Bhavya's philosophy are like the two sides of the same coin. To answer this question there will however be required a fuller philosophical analysis of Bhavya's Madhyamaka, something that would far exceed the limits of this paper.

[10] cf. Tsoṅ kha pa, *Lam rim chen mo*, ff. 343aff. (= p. 573ff.), 404a5ff. (= p. 672ff.), 434a4ff. (= p. 719ff.).

[11] It should be recalled that the names Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika are not attested in Sanskrit as designations of the schools of Bhavya (Bhāvaviveka) and Buddhapālita/Candrakīrti respectively, and that they are based on the Tibetan terms *raṅ rgyud pa* and *thal 'gyur ba* which, as the names of the two Madhyamaka schools in question, evidently became current in Tibet at the time of Jayānanda and (s)Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (born in 1055 ?). Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 58.

For the Prāsaṅgika, the designation 'Consequentialist' has also been used since the term *prasaṅga* denotes a consequence shown by the Prāsaṅgika to occur in, or to follow/eventuate from, an opposed view but which is undesired by the opponent. However, in modern philosophical literature where consequentialism appears as an equivalent of teleology, the term consequentialist is being used in a quite different meaning. (Cf. S. Scheffler, *Consequentialism and its critics*, Oxford 1988.) Even more important is the fact discussed below that, according to Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, the Prāsaṅgika's procedure is not limited solely to demonstrating consequences in opponents' views that are undesired by them, and that the Prāsaṅgika himself regards his *prasaṅga*-type reasoning as valid and as having the force of a *(vyāvahārika) pramāṇa (tha sñad pa'i tshad ma)*. The use of the *thal ba(r 'gyur ba)* or *prasaṅga* in Tsoṅ kha pa's school accordingly renders the expressions 'Conseqentialist' and 'Eventuationist' rather inadequate as a designation for Tsoṅ kha pa's Prāsaṅgika. The word 'Apagogist' is, however, also not altogether satisfactory; and a *prasaṅga*-type argument is not a *reductio ad impossibile/-absurdum* in the sense that all opposed views are refuted in order that the proponent's own counter-view remains as the sole correct one (by *pāriśeṣya*) (cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 36). In the circumstances, it is probably best to retain the designations Svātantrika (reconstructed from Tib. Raṅ rgyud pa) and Prāsaṅgika (reconstructed from Tib. Thal 'gyur ba) even though they are unattested in Sanskrit as names for two schools of the Madhyamaka.

[12] Nāgārjuna's arguments are for example regularly based on the principle of contradiction. And there is little sign here

might seem to have been blocked by Nāgārjuna's critique and dissolution, in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, of the epistemological relation existing between a cognition/cognizer and a cognizable/cognized object, that is, the *pramāṇa-prameya* relation. Nāgārjuna summed up his discussion by saying (VV 51):

> *naiva svataḥ prasiddhir, na parasparataḥ, parapramāṇair vā /*
> *na bhavati, na ca prameyair, na cāpy akasmāt pramāṇānām //*
> "There is no [hypostatic] establishment of [reified] *pramāṇa*s from themselves, or mutually from each other, or from other *pramāṇa*s, or yet by means of [their reified] *prameya*s, or even for no reason at all."[13]

And the set of seer (*draṣṭṛ*), seeing (*darśana*) and the visible (*draṣṭavya*) has been analysed in detail and dissolved by Nāgārjuna in Chap. III of his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s, just after his no less radical analysis and deconstruction in Chap. II of the triad of mover (*gantṛ*), moved on (*gantavya, gata*) and movement (*gati, gamana*).[14]

Moreover, in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (29) Nāgārjuna has explicitly renounced any propositional thesis or assertion (*pratijñā*) in the context of his rejection of the hypostatic existence of any reified entity (*bhāva*) endowed with (positive or even negative) self-existence (*svabhāva* 'aseitas'):

> *yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ /*
> *nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ //*
> "If I had some *pratijñā*, [this] defect would as a consequence attach to me;[15] but I have no *pratijñā*, so that there is no defect for me."

Indeed, as said in the *Ratnāvalī* (II 4), from a position (*pakṣa*) there arises a counterposition (*pratipakṣa*), but neither obtains in fact (*arthatas*).[16]

Nāgārjuna's critique of reified entities and their supposed connexion in a *pramāṇa-prameya* relation was confirmed and fully supported by Candrakīrti – a successor in time of Dignāga and probably a contemporary of Dharmakīrti, neither of whom is however named by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ*.[17] In the introduction to his PPMV, Candrakīrti has indeed continued Nāgārjuna's criticism of the *pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra* posited in terms of a cognizable entity only requiring (a valid means of) correct knowledge (*pramāṇādhīna*) in order to be known in any individual case (pp. 58-59), or of a defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) in relation to its specific referent (*lakṣya*).[18]

Candrakīrti sums up his discussion of the *pramāṇa-prameya* relation in his PPMV on MMK I 1 as follows (p. 75):

> "These are established in mutual dependence (*parasparāpekṣā*): when instruments of correct cognition exist, [so too do] the [corresponding] cognizable objects (*prameyārtha*); and when

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of a 'logic' specific to mysticism, at least of the sort often ascribed to Buddhism (see the discussion by F. Staal, *Exploring mysticism*, Berkeley 1975: 32ff., on so-called 'Buddhist irrationalism'). See above, note 2.

[13] Nāgārjuna's deconstruction of the standard epistemological model founded on a dichotomous (or trichotomous) set of terms was in keeping with the emphasis placed in the Prajñāpāramitā literature on the dissolution, or soteriological 'purification', of the *trimaṇḍala* – e.g. a giver, a beneficiary of the gift and an act of giving.

[14] Or even – based on the meaning 'to know' of the root *gam-* – of the triad of knower, known and knowing.

[15] viz. the defect of insubstantiality and hence non-cogency previously mentioned by the opponent at the beginning of the VV and based on Nāgārjuna's having said that all entities are empty.

[16] Compare also the *Ratnāvalī* I 72 on the complementarity of (hypostatic) *astitva* and *nāstitā*. And see Ārya-Deva, *Catuḥśataka* XVI 21-22 on *hetu*, example and *pakṣa*. – Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, "The uses of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5, 1977, 1-71, and Seyfort Ruegg 1983.

[17] For an explicit reference to Dignāga by Candrakīrti, see his *Bhāṣya* on verse 3 of the final part of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*.

[18] PPMV pp. 59-60; cf. for example MMK V 4. On *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, see also PPMV pp. 68-69, 73-75.

cognizable objects exist, [so too do] the instruments of correct cognition. But since it is indeed not the case that the establishment of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is by self-existence (*svābhāvikī*), let this be the worldly (*laukika*) only, in accordance with what has been experienced (*yathādṛṣṭam*) . . . Taking their stand on experience that is worldly only, the Blessed Buddhas teach the *dharma* (*laukika eva darśane sthitvā buddhānāṃ bhagavatāṃ dharmadeśanā*)."

Given Nāgārjuna's radical analysis and deconstruction in his *Madhyamakakārikā*s of the dyads and triads of reified entities involved in the notions of moving or seeing, and of his seemingly even more radical critique and dissolution in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* of both the (hypostatic) *pramāṇaprameya*-system and of all propositional assertions postulating (reified) entities, the question indeed arises as to whether a Mādhyamika could accommodate either logic or epistemology.

III. The Status of the Thesis (*pratijñā*) in the Madhyamaka

In a previous paper it was shown how Candrakīrti - without going back on what Nāgārjuna in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (29-30) and Ārya-Deva in his *Catuḥśataka* (XVI 25) had said about the Mādhyamika's eschewing a propositional, assertoric *pratijñā* or *pakṣa* involving reified entities - has actually analysed several of Nāgārjuna's *kārikā*s in terms of a five-membered 'syllogistic' argument consisting of a thesis (*pratijñā*), an inferential reason (*liṅga* = *hetu*), an example (*dṛṣṭānta, nidarśana*), an application (*upanaya*), and a conclusion (*nigamana*). And an attempt was also made there to explain why, even for a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika such as Candrakīrti, this procedure is not inconsistent with the basic principles of his school and why it was not considered philosophically flawed. For it appears that what Nāgārjuna had rejected was not ANY and EVERY philosophical statement, thesis or position whatsoever - several are indeed found in his works - but, specifically, any propositional thesis, assertion or probative syllogism either presupposing or explicitly positing a reified self-existent *bhāva* such as to be describable in terms of the hypostatization of any of the four positions of a tetralemma (*pakṣacatuṣṭaya, catuṣkoṭi*).[19]

This is, very briefly stated, the position of the Tibetan Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika master Tsoṅ kha pa and his followers. For one of their major philosophical points is that the Mādhyamika does indeed have a thesis (*dam bca'* = *pratijñā*) and position (*phyogs* = *pakṣa*), and that he may employ inferences (*rjes su dpag pa* = *anumāna*) - and even 'syllogistic' arguments (*sbyor ba, sbyor ba'i ṅag* = *prayoga[vākya]!*) - provided that these *anumāna*s and *prayogavākya*s are not 'autonomous' (*raṅ rgyud pa* = *svatantra*) ones like the Svātantrika's. In other words, they must avoid the logico-epistemological pitfalls into which Bhavya was thought by his critics since Candrakīrti to have fallen in his understandable, but nevertheless vain, attempt to develop 'autonomous' *anumāna*s and *prayogavākya*s with the aim of covering from attack the points on which (as he thought) Buddhapālita had left himself, and the Mādhyamika, exposed.

The question for us is then how this synthesis was achieved by Tsoṅ kha pa in the face of Nāgārjuna's and Candrakīrti's critique of the *pramāṇa/prameya* dyad, as well as of any *anumāna* or *prayogavākya* having as their subject (*dharmin* 'property-possessor' or qualificand) an entity established as existent by a *pramāṇa*, acknowledged in common (*ubhaya[vādi]siddha : mthun snaṅ du grub pa*) by both parties to a discussion, and thus able (according to the general rules of dialectics and disputation or eristics [*vāda*]) to function as a mutually agreed subject of inference in a debate.[20]

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[19] See Seyfort Ruegg 1983. Cf. also Seyfort Ruegg 1977 (cited in note 16).

[20] cf. PPMV p. 35.5-6.

Compare Dignāga's autocommentary on his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III 11-12 (*gñis ka la grub chos de las // tha sñad yin phyir*

In the following study of the problem, the main works by Tsoṅ kha pa to be used will be the *Lam rim chen mo* (completed in the author's 46th year [1402]), the *Draṅ ṅes Legs bśad sñiṅ po* (or *gSuṅ rab kyi draṅ ba daṅ ṅes pa'i don rnam par phye ba gsal bar byed pa*, composed in the author's 52nd year [1408]), the commentary on Nāgārjuna's MMK (the *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* or *rTsa śe ṭik chen*, said to have been composed within the year of the writing of the last work),[21] and finally his great comment on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the *dGoṅs pa rab gsal* (composed shortly before his death in the author's 62nd year [1418]).[22]

IV. INFERENCE (*rjes su dpag pa = anumāna*) IN TSOṄ KHA PA'S MADHYAMAKA THOUGHT

To explain his position on this complex matter in his *Lam rim chen mo*[23], Tsoṅ kha pa has taken as his starting point what Nāgārjuna wrote in his MMK III 2cd:

(svam ātmānaṃ darśanaṃ hi tat tam eva na paśyati /)
na paśyati yadātmānaṃ kathaṃ drakṣyati tatparān //
"(This seeing does not see its very own self.) When [some thing, i.e. the eye] does not see itself, how will it see others [i.e. *rūpa* such as the blue]?"[24]

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gñis ka la'am // gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba la bzlog pa'am // the tshom chos grub 'dod ma yin // . . .) on what constitutes proof and disproof: *ya eva ūbhayaviniścitavācī [hetuḥ] sa sādhanaṃ, dūṣaṇaṃ vā, nānyatarāprasiddhasaṃdigdhavācī (gaṅ źig gaṅ gñis ka la ṅes pa brjod pa ni sgrub pa'am sun 'byin pa yin gyi / gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba la grub pa'am the tshom za ba smra ba ni ma yin no)* (cf. Sh. Katsura, "Inmyōshōrimonron kenkyū – 1", *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* 37, 1977 [106-126]: 126 [on *Nyāyamukha* 2.4] who corrects to *nānyatarāprasiddha*°). For this see further Dharmakīrti, PVSV 153.19-20 and 13.17), as well as Tsoṅ kha pa, *Lam rim chen mo*, ff. 420a (= p. 697), 433b (= p. 719). See in addition G. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*, Heidelberg 1930: 13-15, with the fragment *pakṣadharmo vādiprativādiniścito gṛhyate* (in: Katsura [cited above] p. 122 [on *Nyāyamukha* 2.2]); Śaṃkarasvāmin, *Nyāyapraveśa* (ed. A. B. Dhruva, Baroda 1930) p. 3.11ff.; Dharmakīrti, PVSV 11,3-5 (*dvayor ity ekasiddhapratiṣedhaḥ. prasiddhavacanena saṃdigdhayoḥ śeṣavadsādhāraṇayoḥ sapakṣavipakṣayor api*) with Karṇakagomin's *Ṭīkā*; PV IV 1f.; PVin II (= Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte*, Wien 1973) 68, and PVin III quoted by Śāntarakṣita, *Vādanyāyaṭīkā (ekāprasiddhisaṃdehe . . .*, VNṬ [in VN, cited in note 2] p. 135); and *Nyāyabindu* III 38 (*svarūpeṇaiva svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti*), 42 (*svayam iti vādinā*), 54 (. . . *tenaiva svarūpeṇābhimato vādina iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣaḥ*), and 58 (*ubhayāsiddha*). – On the need for *abhyupagama* in a genuine debate (which does not admit of mere *vitaṇḍā*: cf. above, note 2, and below, p. 299), see Dharmakīrti, VN (cited in note 2) pp. 119f. – Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist logic*, part II, p. 172 note; K. Potter, *Indian metaphysics and epistemology (Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies)*, Princeton 1977: 195f.

In his *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 90a (= p. 486), Tsoṅ kha pa remarks (referring back to PPMV pp. 34-35) that Dignāga too would need to recognize the sufficiency of the *anyatarāprasiddha* form of syllogism since he has recognized the sufficiency of the *svaprasiddha* form in the cases of the *svārthānumāna* and *āgama(bādha)*.

[21] See mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *Dad pa'i 'jug ṅogs* (Varanasi ed. of 1966), p. 86; Dar han mkhan sprul Blo bzaṅ 'phrin las rnam rgyal, *rNam par thar pa thub bstan mdzes pa'i rgyan gcig ṅo mtshar nor bu'i phreṅ ba* (the *rNam thar chen mo*) (mTsho sṅon mi rigs dpe skrun khaṅ ed. of 1984), pp. 295f. and 303f.; and Blo bzaṅ tshul khrims, *bDe legs kun gyi 'byuṅ gnas*, V, f. 73a-b and f. 77b (where an account of the Ming emperor's invitation intervenes). These three works all mention the *Legs bśad sñiṅ po* before the *rTsa śe ṭik chen*. Tshe tan źabs druṅ in his *bsTan rtsis kun las btus pa* (mTsho sṅon mi rigs dpe skrun khaṅ ed. of 1982), p. 212, has placed the *rTsa śe ṭik chen* in 1407, and the *Legs bśad sñiṅ po* in 1408. But the *rTsa śe ṭik chen* itself refers (f. 34a4 = p. 57) to the *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*.

[22] Between the treatments of our topic in these works of Tsoṅ kha pa differences are to be found, to which the author has himself on occasion called attention. See e.g. *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 88b (= p. 484-485), on a difference from the *Lam rim chen mo* (cf. note 76).

In Tsoṅ kha pa's final *lam rim*-text, the *Lam rim chuṅ ba* composed in 1415, there is no detailed treatment of our topic.

[23] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 419aff. (= p. 695), especially f. 429aff. (= p. 711ff.).

[24] At this point it should be made clear that the negation suggested in Nāgārjuna's rhetorical question in MMK III 2 – an utterance in which, according to Candrakīrti and Tsoṅ kha pa, there is embedded the negative inference 'an [entity, i.e.

In Tsoṅ kha pa's analysis, the terms of this question comprise the subject or *dharmin* (qualificand: eye), the (negated) qualifying property or *sādhyadharma* (probandum: not seeing visible matter such as the blue), and an inferential reason or *sādhanadharma* (probans: because of [the eye's] not seeing itself). In other words, Nāgārjuna's statement is construed as an *anumāna* made up, more or less in the standard way, of a *dharmin (gźi chos can)*, a *dharma* to be negated *(dgag bya'i chos)*, and an inferential *liṅga (rtags)* = *hetu (gtan tshigs)*.

Now, very clearly, Tsoṅ kha pa did not claim in his analysis given here to be innovating, for he quotes the explanation of Nāgārjuna's rhetorical question given by Candrakīrti in the first chapter of his *Prasannapadā*. There we in fact read (p. 34.6-10):

> "One [i.e. the Substantialist philosopher] has accepted (*pratipanna*) that the eye sees an other [i.e. visible matter (*rūpa*) such as the blue, even though it does not see itself] <is confuted by an inference that is, precisely, acknowledged by him (*tatprasiddhenaivānumānena*)>, [yet at the same time] holds [also (*kyaṅ*)] the quality of [the eye's] not seeing itself, and still the necessary concomitance (*avinābhāvitva*) of the quality of seeing an other [with that of seeing itself] is held (*aṅgīkṛta*) [by him].[25] Hence (*tasmāt*), wherever self is not seen there an other is not seen either, just as in the case of a pot. Now, for an eye there is no seeing of itself. Hence, there indeed (*eva*) exists for it no seeing of an other either (*api*). Accordingly, a seeing of an other such as the blue [by the eye], which is contrary (*viruddha*) to [its] not seeing itself, is controverted (*virudhyate*) by an inference acknowledged by himself (*svaprasiddhenaivānumānena*)."[26]

It is to be remarked that in thus unpacking Nāgārjuna's statement in MMK III 2cd Candrakīrti has in effect set up a five-membered 'syllogistic' argument containing a *pratijñā* or *pakṣa* [1] together with a *liṅga* [2] and a *dṛṣṭānta/nidarśana* [3] ('. . . just as in the case of a pot'),[27] an *upanaya* [4] ('*ca*, now . . .'), and a *nigamana* [5] ('*tasmāt*, hence . . .').

V. *svatantra-anumāna* AS PROBATIVE INFERENCE, *prasaṅgāpādana* AS APAGOGICAL REASONING, AND THE PROBLEM OF *ubhayasiddhatva*

A basic logical and epistemological objection on the part of the Prāsaṅgikas to Bhavya's *svatantra-anumāna* was that it constituted an attempt by this Svātantrika philosopher to gain a common logical-epistemological ground mutually acknowledged by the Mādhyamika *vādin* – who is by definition a *niḥ-*

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eye] which does not see itself does not see an other [entity, viz. visible matter such as the blue]' (see below) – relates to a cognizer/cognized dyad made up of independent and self-existent substantial entities. Next, in MMK III 3, Nāgārjuna shows that fire – thought of not only as consuming its fuel but also as consuming itself – cannot serve as a counter-instance certifying the substantialist model of seeing that he is criticizing; for it is dissolved according to the method that was applied in Chap. II to movement. (Cf. *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 432a = p. 716.) The empirical, transactional and pragmatic fact of seeing as such – in which hypostatic entities conceived of as possessing self-existence play no part and are not postulated – is certainly not being denied here.

[25] The words in pointed brackets have no equivalent in the Tibetan translation. La Vallée Poussin's edition of the Sanskrit text reads: *tathā hi – paraṃ cakṣuḥ paśyatīti pratipannaḥ sa tatprasiddhenaivānumānena nirākriyate, cakṣuṣaḥ svātmādarśanadharmāvinābhāvitvaṃ cāṅgīkṛtam icchasi* [? for: *icchati* or for *icchadbhiḥ* as in de Jong's note ad loc. in "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā", *Indo-Iranian Journal* 20, 1978: 32 ?], *paradarśanadharmāvinābhāvitvaṃ cāṅgīkṛtam*. The Tibetan version reads: *'di ltar gźan mig (b)lta'o źes bya bar rtog pa de ni mig la raṅ gi bdag ñid mi (b)lta ba'i chos kyaṅ 'dod la / gźan la (b)lta ba'i chos med na mi 'byuṅ ba ñid du yaṅ khas blaṅs pa yin te*. Thus the Tibetan translation has nothing corresponding to *sa tatprasiddhenaivānumānena nirākriyate* in La Vallée Poussin's edition.

[26] i.e., by the opponent (see the note by Bra ti dGe bśes).

[27] In his comment on MMK III 2, Candrakīrti has used instead the example of an ear, etc.: *śrotrādivat*.

svabhāvavādin - and his Substantialist (*dṅos por smra ba : vastusatpadārthavādin*[28]) opponent (*prativādin*), so that a discussion and debate might be meaningfully and regularly conducted between them according to established rules of debate which required, *inter alia*, that the logical reason of an *anumāna* or *prayogavākya* should reside in a subject (*dharmin* = *chos can*) acknowledged as really established (*siddha*) by both sides.

However, according to Candrakīrti and his followers, any such attempt is vain and doomed to failure. For however hard the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika might try to gain such commonly agreed ground, the basic differences in philosophical presuppositions between the Substantialist - for whom the terms of his *anumāna* and *prayogavākya* of course have hypostatic self-existence (*svabhāva*, 'aseitas') and are grounded in a theory of reified entities identified as *prameyas* to which correspond the appropriate *pramāṇas* - and the Mādhyamika - for whom all *dharmas* are on the contrary without self-existence (*niḥsvabhāva*) so that there can be no system of hypostatized *bhāvas* or *prameyas* - preclude the existence of any such common ground agreed by both parties. In other words, according to the (Prāsaṅgika-)Mādhyamika, there exists no *reified entity* established by a *pramāṇa* as having self-existence that could be acknowledged in common (*ubhayasiddha : mthun snaṅ du grub pa*) between *vādin* and *prativādin*.[29]

The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's solution to this problem is, according to Candrakīrti, to make use in discussion and debate with the Substantialist of inferences whose effect is solely to negate the opponent's assertion, but which do not involve him in setting up on his own part an autonomous inference (*svatantra anumāna*) (PPMV p. 34). This is the technique known to the Mādhyamika as *prasaṅgāpādana* (PPMV p. 24.5 and p. 411.7) - or *prasaṅgāpatti* (PP p. 24.7) - and defined in the PPMV (pp. 24 and 34) as issuing simply in the negation of another's thesis (*parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātraphala*).[30]

With regard to the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's *prasaṅgāpādana* as used by Candrakīrti, it was doubtless independent of Dharmakīrti's hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*) (and *a fortiori* of the fully developed *prasaṅgasādhana* 'hypothetical proof', and the *sgrub byed 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur*).[31]

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[28] The term *vastusatpadārthavādin* is attested in Haraprasād Śāstrī (ed.), "Catuḥśatikā by Arya Deva", *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* III/8, Calcutta 1914 [449-514]: 492.13 [on *Catuḥśataka* XI 11]).

[29] See also Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* on *Catuḥśataka* XVI 21-22 for a rejection of the *svatantra-liṅga* in connexion with a discussion of Dharmapāla's doctrine.

[30] As opposed e.g. to the usual probative *sādhana* using a *svatantra-hetu* (or to the technique of the *sādhyaviparyaye [hetor] bādhakapramāṇam*, where the reasoning is based on a correct cognition negating a logical reason in the contradictory of the property to be proved; see note 31).

[31] For Dharmakīrti's *prasaṅga* or negative reasoning comprising a *reductio ad impossibile*, see PV IV 12-13 (where it is to be noted that the *sādhana* or *hetu* is *parakalpita* 'constructed by the opponent'). And for his *prasaṅgasādhana (thal ba bsgrub pa)* or hypothetical (quasi-)proof, see PVin III 2. - According to Manorathanandin's *Vṛtti* on PV IV 12-13, the *hetu* there is not *pāramārthika* because of the lack of *trairūpya*; and it is then the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* - the contrapositive of the *prasaṅga*-formula - that is the *maulahetu*. Compare Ratnakīrti, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (in *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, ed. A. Thakur. Patna 1957: 64.5): *sarvaḥ prasaṅgaḥ prasaṅgaviparyayaniṣṭhaḥ*.

For *prasaṅga*, *prasaṅgasādhana*, *prasaṅgaviparyaya* and the *(sādhya)viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*, see Ratnakīrti, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, p. 63f.; and Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 48 (transl. Yuichi Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy*, Kyoto 1966: 114). Cf. Katsumi Mimaki, *La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa) et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses (kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi)*, Paris 1976: 51, 55ff.; and Tadashi Tani, "The Problem of Interpretation on Pramāṇaviniścaya III vv.1-3. - With the Text and a Translation -", *The Bulletin of The Kōchi National College of Technology* 26, 1987 [1-16]: especially p. 11 with note 16. - For the *bādhakapramāṇa* in Dharmakīrti, see Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya, "Some Thoughts on *Antarvyāpti*, *Bahirvyāpti*, and *Trairūpya*", in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, eds. B. K. Matilal and R. D. Evans, Dordrecht 1986 [89-105]: 93 and n. 28. This subject has been discussed by E. Steinkellner in a privately circulated paper entitled "Remarks on *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*" written for the conference on Dharmakīrti held in Kyōto in 1982, where it is shown that the concept clearly appears in Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*. - On the type of reasoning

VI. *prasaṅgavākya, prakṛtārthaviparyaya, prasaṅgaviparīt(ārth)āpatti* AND THE USE OF *prasajyapratiṣedha* IN THE *prasaṅga*-STATEMENT OF NON-ORIGINATION IN THE MADHYAMAKA

With respect to Buddhapālita's *prasaṅgavākyas* (*thal 'gyur ba'i tshig*), in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* on MMK I 1 there are found allusions to a reversal of an original *prasaṅga*-type proposition (*prakṛtā-rthaviparyaya*, p. 15.1; D, f. 5b: *skabs kyi don las bzlog pa*) leading to the emergence of a probandum and its *dharma* (i.e. the *sādhanadharma*) having a reversed meaning (*viparīt[ārth]asādhyataddharma-vyakti*, p. 15.1; D 5b: *bsgrub pa bya ba dan de'i chos bzlog pa'i don mnon pa*); to a *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* (p. 23.3; D, f. 7b-8a: *thal bar 'gyur ba bzlog pa'i don*) and to the eventual arising of many faults for the opponent owing to the occurrence (or: realization, according to the Tibetan version) of the reversal of the *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅgaviparītāpatti*, p. 23.4; D, f. 8a: *thal ba las bzlog pa bsgrubs pa*); to a *prasaṅga-viparītārthāpatti* (p. 24.5; D, f. 8a); and to *sādhyasādhanaviparyaya* (pp. 36-37) and *viparīta-sādhyasādhanavyaktivākyārtha* (pp. 38-39).

Yet it is to be noted that these allusions in Candrakīrti's text to a reversal of the *prasaṅga* refer back to objections raised by Bhavya against Buddhapālita's procedure. In Bhavya's *Prajñāpradīpa*[32] these objections were based on the fact that Buddhapālita's statements were *prasaṅgavākyas* (*thal 'gyur ba'i tshig*, according to the Tibetan translation of the *Prasannapadā*), i.e. that they were (in Bhavya's opinion) exposed or assailable (*glags yod pa'i tshig*, as translated in the Tibetan version of the *Prajñā-pradīpa*) - which Avalokitavrata has interpreted (P 86a, D 74a2) as meaning that they are open to objection from the (Sāṃkhya) opponent (*rgol ba gźan gyi klan ka'i glags yod pa'i tshig*).[33] Candrakīrti nevertheless states that a connexion with a reversed proposition holds only for the opponent, and not for his own school since it has no thesis (PPMV p. 23: *prasaṅgaviparītena cārthena parasyāiva sambandho, nāsmākam, svapratijñāyā abhāvāt*). And he adds that when a *prasaṅga* is adduced by a Niḥsvabhāvavādin against a Sasvabhāvavādin, there is no reason that a reversed *prasaṅga*-

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known elsewhere as the invalidating *(bādhaka) pramāṇa* through non-apprehension of the pervader *(vyāpakānupalabdhi)* – i.e. the *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhipramāṇa* –, the *prasaṅgasādhana* and the *prasaṅgāpādana*, cf. Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā* 392-4 (cf. 18, 87, 304). In his comment on verses 392-4, Kamalaśīla (who refers to Dharmakīrti's PVSV 26) has specified that an apagogical argument against the opponent (*prasaṅgāpādanaṃ paraṃ prati*) is used in a case where the *hetu* (i.e. '*sattvāt*', in the statement *yat sat tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam*) is inconclusive since it is found also in the heterologue (*vipakṣa*), in place of a *prayoga* that relies on *vyāpakānupalabdhi* establishing a negative relation (*vyatirekasādhinī*) and which works by *svātantrya*. The *Pañjikā* on verses 392-4 reads: *prayogaḥ: yat sat tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam, yathā samanantaraṃ pratipāditāḥ kṣaṇikāḥ padārthāḥ; santaś ca bhavatā vyomādayo bhāvā iṣyante iti svabhāvahetuḥ. . . . 'tvayā iṣyante' ity anena prasaṅgasādhanam etad iti darśayati. . . . . . . na hy asmābhiḥ svātantryeṇa pramāṇatayā vyatirekasādhinyā asyā vyāpakānupalabdheḥ prayogaḥ kriyate, kiṃ tarhi, prasaṅgāpādanaṃ paraṃ prati kriyate. yadi bhavatā teṣāṃ sthirarūpatāṅgīkriyate tadārthakriyāsāmarthyam api nāṅgīkartavyam, tatra kramayaugapadyayogasya tadvyāpakasyābhāvāt. na hi vyāpakanivṛttau vyāpyam avasthātum utsahate, anyathā vyāpyavyāpakabhāva eva tayor na syāt. tataś cārthakriyāsāmarthyanivṛttau sattvam api teṣāṃ nāṅgīkartavyam, arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvāt sattvasyeti. anenōpāyena teṣām abhāva eva pratipādyate. . . .*

As for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's *prasaṅgāpādana*, or apagogical argument, it evidently does not depend on a Dharmakīrtian *svabhāvapratibandha* between *hetu* and *sādhya*. – On the *svabhāvapratibandha*, see e.g. Dharmakīrti, PVin II (cited in note 20) pp. 10, 40, 46 (cf. Steinkellner's translation [Wien 1979:] 44 note 111). Cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 15, 1971 [179-211]: 202, and "*svabhāvapratibandha* again", *Acta Indologica* 6, 1984, 457-476; Shirō Matsumoto, "Svabhāvapratibandha", *IBK* 30/1, 1981, 498-494 [=(10)-(14)]; Shōryū Katsura, "Svabhāvapratibandha Revisited", *IBK* 35/1, 1986, 476-473 [=(26)-(29)].

[32] Ed. Walleser, pp. 11-12, 14, 23-24. – The sentence *de ltar na 'dir glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir / skabs kyi don dgag pa nus śiṅ bzlog pa'i don gsal ba'i tshig gi don to*, which is parallel to what we read in the PP on MMK I 1 (p. 11, cited in the PPMV pp. 14-15), appears in PP on MMK II 18-19 (ed. Walleser, p. 80).

[33] cf. Tsoṅ kha pa, *rTsa śe ṭīk chen*, f. 31a-b (= p. 52); and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *sToṅ thun chen mo*, f. 170b-171a. For Avalokitavrata's explanation, cf. Y. Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpaḥ*", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 7, 1963 [37-62]: 50.

proposition should eventuate (PPMV p. 24.2-3: *prasaṅga āpadyamāne kutaḥ prasaṅgaviparītārtha-prasaṅgitā*). Candrakīrti then observes that since *prasaṅgāpādana* has as its result simply the negation of the opponent's *pratijñā*, there exists no occasion for a reversed *prasaṅga*-proposition.[34]

Candrakīrti does not seem to have accepted on his own account the reversal of a *prasaṅga* (much less its contraposition, i.e. *prasaṅgaviparyaya*) either elsewhere in the first chapter of the *Prasannapadā* or in any other chapter of this work. As for Bhavya's objection to Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga*-statement, it apparently involves the idea not of contraposition but of implicative reversal, namely that a negation of production from self implies the affirmation of production from an other.[35]

Now, the type of negation operating in MMK I 1, in Nāgārjuna's rejection of origination of an (hypostatized) entity (*bhāva*) from itself, from an other, from both, and from no cause at all is described by both Bhavya (PP p. 10.8) and Candrakīrti (PPMV p. 13.5) as absolute *prasajyapratiṣedha* (*med [par] dgag [pa]*), that is, as a negation that is non-implicative and non-presuppositional. Unlike relative negation (*paryudāsa* = *ma yin [par] dgag [pa]*) – which is implicative and presuppositional

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[34] PPMV p. 24.5-6: *tataś ca parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātraphalatvāt prasaṅgāpādanasya nāsti prasaṅgaviparītārthāpattiḥ*. The Tibetan translation reads (D, f. 8a): *de'i phyir thal ba sgrub pa ni pha rol po'i dam bca' [ba] la 'gog pa tsam gyi 'bras bu can yin pa'i phyir thal ba las zlog pa'i don du 'gyur ba yod pa ma yin no*. Cf. PPMV p. 34.5.

[35] In his discussion of Bhavya's criticism of Buddhapālita's statement '*na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ, tadutpādavaiyarthyāt atiprasaṅg[ados]āc ca. na hi svātmanā vidyamānānāṃ padārthānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanam asti. atha sann api jāyeta, na kadācin na jāyeta.*' (cited in Candrakīrti's PPMV p. 14), J. Hopkins – who has made use of the section on *bzlog don* and *thal ba bzlog pa 'phen pa* in the *dBu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod* (Buxa ed., f. 241b2f.) by 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus – writes (*Meditation on Emptiness*, London 1983: 491):

"Bhāvaviveka saw the statement [by Buddhapālita] as indicating two consequences:

1. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced senselessly because of being produced from self.
2. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly because of being produced from self.

When a consequence implies its opposite meaning, the negative of the reason in the consequence is put as the predicate in a syllogism, and the negative of the predicate in the consequences is put as the reason in the syllogism. Bhāvaviveka saw these consequences as implying their opposite meaning:

1. The subjects, things, are not produced from self because their production is not senseless.
2. The subjects, things are not produced from self because their production is not endless.

Candrakīrti answers that Buddhapālita did not state such consequences at all, never mind intending to imply their opposite meaning. Instead, the two consequences should read:

1. It follows the subjects, things, are *produced again* senselessly because of being produced from self (or because of already existing in their own entities).
2. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly because of being produced from self (or because, although existing in their own entities, there is sense in their being produced again)."

The explanation given by Hopkins in his first paragraph amounts to a statement of contraposition. But the first two reasons adduced by Buddhapālita (*utpādavaiyarthyāt* and *atiprasaṅgadoṣāt*) in fact remain reasons in the form in which they appear in Bhavya's text, even though the reason 'because of uselessness' has indeed been converted there to 'because of usefulness' (i.e. *janmasāphalya* in the PPMV) and the reason 'because of overshooting' (viz. because of being endless) has been converted there to 'because of having an end' (i.e *janmanirodha* in the PPMV), so that (according to Bhavya) Buddhapālita will be in contradiction with the Madhyamaka *siddhānta* (PP p. 12.2-3: *skye ba 'bras bu daṅ bcas pa ñid du 'gyur ba daṅ skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir mdzad pa'i mtha' daṅ 'gal bar 'gyur ro*). For, at least on the assumption that the negation here is of the *paryudāsa* kind rather than *prasajyapratiṣedha*, the proponent of the formula in question must maintain that entities originate from an other (see below, in the second part of the present Section). So, not only has Buddhapālita's negated thesis 'Entities ARE NOT produced' been changed in Bhavya's text into a positive statement 'Entities ARE produced', but in addition the specification 'from SELF' has been altered there to 'from AN OTHER' (see below). In other words, in the text of the PP (and indeed also in Hopkins's formulation of the consequences he has numbered 1 and 2), no contraposition in the proper sense is to be found at all. As far as the present writer can detect, then, the question of contraposition – of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* in the strict sense – was to be raised in connexion with Bhavya's and Candrakīrti's passage dealing with *prakṛtārthaviparyaya* and *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* only in later discussions of the logical questions it poses – though Tsoṅ kha pa for example has expressly given as his view that Buddhapālita's particular *prasaṅgavākya* in question here is, exceptionally, NOT susceptible of contraposition (see below, Section VII).

inasmuch as it both commits one to holding the opposite of the statement one has negated and postulates the real existence of the thing to which the negated predicate(s) attach(es) - the *prasajyapratiṣedha* does not then presuppose the existence of reified *bhāvas* which could meaningfully be said to originate in terms of any of the four above-mentioned positions of the *catuṣkoṭi (pakṣacatuṣṭaya)*, and above all it does not allow the implication that by negating origination from self one is committed to postulating origination from an other.

In his discussion of Buddhapālita's statement *'na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ . . .'* (MMV p. 11), Bhavya (PP pp. 11-12, cited PPMV p. 14) has nonetheless criticized his (proto-)Prāsaṅgika predecessor's formula on the ground that - since it is formally what is termed a *prasaṅgavākya (thal bar 'gyur ba'i tshig ~ glags yod pa'i tshig = sāvakāśavacana)* - a probandum and probans with 'reversed' (*viparīta*) meaning will emerge through the 'reversal' (*viparyaya = bzlog pa*) of the meaning in question in the first *pratijñā* of MMK I 1 (PP p. 11, cited in PPMV p. 15.1: *prasaṅgavākyatvāt prakṛtārthaviparyayeṇa viparīt[ārth]asādhyataddharmavyaktau*), namely that birth in the form of origination from an other will be both useful (*janmasāphalya*) and not endlessly repeated (: *janmanirodha*). According to Bhavya, in virtue of this reversal, a Mādhyamika like Buddhapālita will find himself in contradiction with his own established position (*kṛtāntavirodha*, PP p. 12).

However, as already noted above, according to Candrakīrti (PPMV p. 23) a link with a meaning that is the reverse of the *prasaṅga* adduced by Buddhapālita against the Sāṃkhya will in fact not affect the Mādhyamika and arises only for the opponent. This is because the Mādhyamika has here no thesis of his own (*svapratijñā*) - i.e. he has negated (by *prasajyapratiṣedha*) all four conceivable positions concerning the origination of a *bhāva*, as stated in MMK I 1. And for this reason - contrary to what Bhavya has objected against Buddhapālita's statement - the (Prāsaṅgika-)Mādhyamika does not find himself in contradiction with his own *siddhānta*.

Candrakīrti explains (PPMV p. 24) moreover that Buddhapālita has not in fact formulated an assailable statement (*sāvakāśavacana = glags daṅ bcas pa'i tshig[s]*) in which the (Sāṃkhya) opponent would be able to find an assailable point. This is the case according to Candrakīrti because, when the undesired hypothetical consequence is adduced (*prasaṅga āpadyamāne*) by the Niḥsvabhāvavādin against the Sasvabhāvavādin, there occurs no meaning that is the reverse of this *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅgaviparītārthaprasaṅgitā*). This is so because it is on the intention (*vivakṣā = brjod par 'dod pa*) of the speaker (here Buddhapālita, following Nāgārjuna) that the use of words depends; for words are not as it were agents that could like policemen overcome their utterer.[36] Candrakīrti sums the matter up (PPMV p. 24) by stating that no meaning eventuates or follows (*prasañj-*) that is the reverse of the Mādhyamika's *prasaṅga* since his adducing of a *prasaṅga* results simply in the negation of the opponent's thesis.

VII. TSOṄ KHA PA ON *bzlog don* AND *thal bzlog*: THE PROBLEM OF *prasaṅga*-REVERSAL (*prasaṅgaviparīta*) AND *prasaṅga*-CONTRAPOSITION (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*)

The position of some of the Tibetan Mādhyamikas appears more complicated, and Tsoṅ kha pa has explicitly stated that the above-mentioned observation by Candrakīrti (PPMV p. 23) concerning the connexion of the reversed statement with the opponent alone (and not with the Mādhyamika himself given the absence of a *svapratijñā*) does NOT mean that the reversal (*bzlog pa = viparyaya*) of ALL the apagogical arguments (*prasaṅga*) adduced by the Mādhyamika are accepted only by the

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[36] We know from Buddhapālita's discussion that he did not in fact accept any *viparītārtha* of his first *prasaṅga*, namely the proposition that a *bhāva* originates from an other.

opponent to the exclusion of the Mādhyamika himself or that, in general (*spyir*), the Mādhyamika has no *pratijñā* at all.[37]

For Tsoṅ kha pa the references in the *Prasannapadā* to the reversal of a *prasaṅga* (*thal ba [las] bzlog pa* = *prasaṅgaviparīta*) have in fact raised questions which prove to be of some interest also to the historian of the Madhyamaka and its links with the Pramāṇa-school.

In the context of his discussion on Candrakīrti's comment on *Madhyamakakārikā* I 1, Tsoṅ kha pa has observed that the *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* (which according to the Prāsaṅgikas does not occur for the adducer of the Mādhyamika's *prasaṅga* – the *thal ba 'phen mkhan*) would concern the twin consequences (*thal ba*) of the usefulness (*don bcas*) and non-endlessness (*thug bcas*) of renewed origination (*yaṅ skye ba* = *punarutpāda*) as supposed by the Sāṃkhya – but not, be it noted, of origination in general (*spyir skye ba*); and that, elsewhere, the logician does on the contrary operate with a meaning that is the reverse of the *prasaṅga (thal [bar 'gyur] ba bzlog pa'i don)*.[38] Tsoṅ kha pa is here distinguishing between the special case in MMK I 1 of the double *prasaṅga* – viz. uselessness and endlessness adduced by Buddhapālita in the course of his negation (MMV p. 11) of the Sāṃkhya's postulation of origination from self, etc. (referred to by Bhavya in PP pp. 11-12, and by Candrakīrti, PPMV p. 14) – on the one side, and on the other side the logical-epistemological status of *prasaṅga*-type statements in general (which are, apparently, susceptible of *viparyaya* or contrapositon).

Thus he has explained:[39]

> In Candrakīrti's statement '*niḥsvabhāvavādinā sasvabhāvadinaḥ prasaṅga āpadyamāne kutaḥ prasaṅgaviparītārthaprasaṅgitā*' (PPMV p. 24.2-3), it is not a question of the *prasaṅga* in general but of the double *prasaṅga* negating origination from self [adduced by Buddhapālita, MMV p. 11] . . . Therefore, [Candrakīrti's] statement '*tataś ca parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātraphalatvāt*

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[37] *rTsa śe ṭīk chen*, f. 32b (= p. 54): *gźun 'dis dbu ma pas thal ba 'phaṅs pa thams cad kyi bzlog pa pha rol pos khas len gyi raṅ gis khas mi len pa daṅ spyir dam bca' med par bstan pa ma yin no.*

[38] See *rTsa śe ṭīk chen*, ff. 32b-33a (= pp. 54-55); *dGoṅs pa rab gsal*, f. 90a (= p. 163): . . . *de ltar gsuṅs pa ni bdag skye 'gog pa'i skabs kho na yin pas / dbu ma pas 'phaṅs pa'i thal ba kun la min gyi / bdag skye 'gog pa'i thal ba gñis la yin no // de'i thal chos ni skye ba don med daṅ thug med du thal ba tsam min gyi / slar yaṅ skye ba don med daṅ thug med yin la / thal chos de bzlog pa'i don slar yaṅ skye ba don bcas daṅ thug bcas ni graṅs can kho na 'dod kyi / raṅ la de'i dam bca' ba med pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis / de khas blaṅs pa'i grub mtha' daṅ 'gal ba med ces pa'i don te* . . .

The Tibetan tradition has inclined to use the expression *thal ba 'phen pa/'phaṅs pa (: prasaṅgam ākṣip-)* instead of *thal ba (b)sgrub pa (prasaṅgam āpāday-)* found in the PPMV and reproduced from there by Tsoṅ kha pa in his commentaries and treatises. Tsoṅ kha pa also has *thal chos bzlog pa'i don 'phen mkhan (rTsa śe ṭīk chen*, p. 55.10), *bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa* (p. 56.14)/ *'phen pa* (p. 56.16), and *bzlog don 'phen pa (dGoṅs pa rab gsal*, p. 164.3). (However, the *thal ba 'phen pa* to the extent that it belongs to the technique of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* or contraposition in the Pramāṇa-school is apparently distinct from the *thal ba (b)sgrub pa* belonging to Madhyamaka apagogical reasoning.)

On *prasaṅgas* that are *ākṣepaka* of a *sādhana (sgrub pa 'phen pa)* and those that are not *ākṣepaka* (*sgrub pa mi 'phen pa*), see for example Sras Ṅag dbaṅ bkra śis, *Tshad ma'i dgoṅs 'grel gyi bstan bcos chen po rnam 'grel gyi don gcig tu dril ba blo rab 'briṅ tha ma gsum du ston pa legs bśad chen po mkhas pa'i mgul rgyan skal bzaṅ re ba kun skoṅ* (bKra śis 'khyil ed.), f. 144b-148b. – Cf. Tadashi Tani, "A Conflict between Logical Indicators in the Negative Inference (Svabhāvānupalabdhivādin versus Vyāpakānupalabdhivādin)", *IBK* 32/2, 1984, 1106-1100 [= (18)-(24)], and "Dharmakīrti's Interpretation of Antinomic Indicator (viruddhāvyabhicārin)", *IBK* 36/1, 1987, 481-472 [= (1)-(10)]; S. Onoda, "Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge's classification of Thal 'gyur", *Berliner Indologische Studien* 2, 1986, 65-68, and "On the Tibetan controversy concerning the various ways of replying to Prasaṅgas", *Tibet Journal* 13, 1988, 36-41.

[39] *rTsa śe ṭīk chen*, f. 33a-b (= pp. 55-56): *raṅ bźin med par smra bas raṅ bźin daṅ bcas par smra ba la thal ba sgrub pa na thal ba las bzlog pas don can du thal bar ga la 'gyur te / źes pa yaṅ thal ba spyi min gyi bdag skye 'gog pa'i thal ba gñis so // . . . de'i phyir 'thal ba sgrub ba ni gźan gyi dam bca' ba 'gog pa tsam gyi 'bras bu can yin pa'i phyir thal ba las bzlog pa'i don du 'gyur ba yod pa ma yin no' źes gsuṅs pa ni / sṅar bśad pa'i thal ba des thal ba chos bzlog pa'i don slar yaṅ skye ba don daṅ thug bcas kyi rtags kyis bdag skye med pa mi sgrub kyaṅ dgos pa med pa min te / graṅs can mi 'dod pa'i skye ba don daṅ thug med bsgrubs pas graṅs can gyis dam bcas pa'i bdag las skye ba rnam par bcad pa tsam źig sgrub pa'i dgos pa can yin pa'i phyir ro źes pa'i don no //*

prasaṅgāpādanasya nāsti prasaṅgaviparītārthāpattiḥ' (PPMV p. 24.5-6) means that even though the above-mentioned *prasaṅga* [of Buddhapālita] does not prove (*sgrub pa*) absence of origination from self due to the logical arguments that repeated origination (*slar yaṅ skye ba*) – the meaning of the reversed predicate of the *prasaṅga* (*thal chos bzlog pa'i don*) – has [according to the Sāṃkhya opponent's thesis] usefulness and coming to an end, it nonetheless is not without a purpose. For it has the purpose of establishing the simple negative determination (*rnam par bcad pa tsam źig* 'exclusion' [i.e. the *med dgag*]) of the origination from self accepted by the Sāṃkhya by means of establishing that this origination is both useless and endlessly repetitive.[40] Such is the sense.

According to Tsoṅ kha pa, then, Candrakīrti's statement that *prasaṅgāpādana* results solely in the negation of another's *pratijñā* is to be interpreted in a special manner. That is, whereas the above-mentioned *prasaṅga* cannot directly *prove* the non-origination of a *bhāva* from itself in the manner of an autonomous inference, the statement is nevertheless not unmotivated. And this motivation lies precisely in establishing the SIMPLE EXCLUSION of that origination from self (asserted by the Sāṃkhya) by establishing the uselessness and infinite regress of such repeated origination, consequences which would of course be unacceptable to the Sāṃkhya too. Such simple exclusion (*rnam par bcad pa : vyavaccheda*) thus correlates with non-presuppositional and non-implicative negation (*med dgag = prasajyapratiṣedha*). This *prasaṅga* has accordingly the function of an APAGOGICAL REASONING that shows up a consequence undesired by the opponent.

Tsoṅ kha pa has next explained:[41]

> In adducing a *prasaṅga (thal ba 'phen pa)* having the form 'If for a sprout one asserts existence by self-nature established in self-existence, this will not come about in dependence on a seed, for [*ex hypothesi* the sprout already] exists by self-existence', the reverse (*viparīta*) of the predicate of the *prasaṅga (thal chos bzlog pa)* 'There exists for a sprout no self-nature established in self-being, for it has originated in dependence (*pratītysamutpannatvāt*)' is treated as the logical reason. And there then exist many proofs of theses where the reason of the *prasaṅga (thal rtags bzlog pa'i dam bca')* is reversed.[42]

In other words, for Tsoṅ kha pa, in the last case of the *prasaṅga* concerning the sprout, the process will consist not only in APAGOGICALLY establishing a (hypothetical) consequence (as already noted for MMK I 1), but apparently in doing so by relying on contraposition of the original *prasaṅga*-type statement; Tsoṅ kha pa has however specified that the adducing of a *viparyaya (bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa)* does NOT constitute an 'autonomous' (i.e. *svatantra*) *viparyaya* (*bzlog pa raṅ rgyud*, f. 33b4 [= p. 56.15]). And he has concluded that there are two distinct kinds of *prasaṅga*-reasoning, one of which allows of *viparyaya* in the sense of contraposition whereas the other (the one in question in MMK I 1) does not.[43] Moreover, although the Mādhyamika admits (*khas len pa = abhyupagam-*) the establishment of a probandum (*bsgrub bya sgrub byed = sādhyasādhana*) belonging to his own system

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[40] i.e., a fact that has not been accepted by the Sāṃkhya but which has been pointed out by Buddhapālita.

[41] *rTsa śe ṭīk chen*, f. 33b (= p. 56): *myu gu la raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa'i raṅ bźin yod pa khas len pa na sa bon la brten nas 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur te / raṅ gi ṅo bos yod pa'i phyir źes pa'i thal ba 'phen pa lta bu la ni brten nas 'byuṅ ba'i phyir myu gu la raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa'i raṅ bźin med do źes thal chos bzlog pa rtags su byas nas thal rtags bzlog pa'i dam bca' sgrub pa śin tu maṅ ṅo //*

[42] i.e., is negated and functions by contraposition as the predicate in a *prasaṅgaviparyaya*.

[43] It would indeed appear that the three arguments *a contrario* that Candrakīrti has quoted in his PPMV p. 24-25, from the MMK – namely V 1, IV 2 and XXV 4 – and containing the expression *prasajyate* or *prasajyeta*, and which he has described as involving *prasaṅgāpatti*, are susceptible of *viparyaya*. See Tsoṅ kha pa, *rTsa śe ṭīk chen*, p. 129.7-8 (on MMK IV 2): *bzlog pa 'phen pa*; cf. 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus, *dBu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod* (Buxa ed.), f. 242b5-6.

(*raṅ lugs* = *svamata*), this is not, says Tsoṅ kha pa, equivalent to the Mādhyamika's admitting a *svatantra-sādhyasādhana* (as Bhavya and the Svātantrikas would have him do).[44] And Tsoṅ kha pa insists[45] that Candrakīrti's saying (PPMV p. 23.3) that the *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* affects only the opponent, but not the Mādhyamika because the latter has no *pratijñā* of his own, should not be interpreted as meaning that the Mādhyamika does not accept (*khas len pa*) any *viparyaya* of all formulations of a *prasaṅga* (*thal na 'phaṅs pa thams cad kyi bzlogs pa*) and that he has IN GENERAL no *pratijñā (spyir dam bca' med pa)*. For further discussion of this point - which Tsoṅ kha pa describes as very difficult to comprehend - he refers (f. 54a4 = p. 57) to the treatment of it in his *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*.

It would appear that Tsoṅ kha pa's treatment here of the *prasaṅga* and its *viparyaya* is dependent on developments in logic that were probably unknown to (or at least unexploited or deliberately passed over by) Candrakīrti. For while Tsoṅ kha pa - perhaps influenced by the Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti's expression *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* by *thal bar 'gyur ba bzlog pa'i don* - introduces into his discussion the question of the contraposed *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, it would seem that Candrakīrti had in mind only the reversal of a *prasaṅga* whereby the negation of origination from self might (wrongly) be thought to imply the affirmation of origination from an other. Thus, in PPMV p. 15.1, he has referred to a *prakṛtārthaviparyayena viparīt[ārth]asādhyataddharmavyakti (skabs kyi don las bzlog pas bsgrub par bya ba daṅ de'i chos bzlog pa'i don mṅon pa*) and given as an example the proposition *parasmād utpannā bhāvāḥ* ('Entities originating from an other') as the REVERSE of *svata utpannā bhāvāḥ* ('Entities originating from self'); and the first formula corresponds of course not to the contraposition of the second, but rather to the implication of the negative statement *svata utpannā na vidyante bhāvāḥ* if *paryudāsa*-negation rather than *prasajyapratiṣedha* were operating in it. And when referring to a *prasaṅgaviparītārtha (thal bar 'gyur ba bzlog pa'i don)* in PPMV p. 23.3, Candrakīrti has explicitly specified that it is inapplicable to the Mādhyamika because of the fact that he has no thesis of his own asserting the origination of (reified) entities in terms of the tetralemma of MMK I 1. But here again Candrakīrti's reference to the *prasasaṅgaviparīta* does not appear to have anything directly to do with what was known in the Pramāṇa-school as *prasaṅgaviparya* or contraposition of a hypothetical inference.

It might then seem, *prima facie* at least, that the remarks in Tsoṅ kha pa's *rTsa śe ṭīk chen* (f. 32bf. [= p. 54f.]) as well as in his definitive *dGoṅs pa rab gsal* (f. 89bf. [= p. 163]) that *thal ba bzlog pa* does not, EXCEPTIONALLY, operate in the case of Buddhapālita's double *prasaṅga* relating to MMK I 1, whereas it does in the normal way in other cases, could be due to a conflation of the *thal ba (las) bzlog pa bsgrub(s) pa* = *prasaṅgaviparītārthāpatti* being discussed by Candrakīrti in his PPMV (pp. 23-

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[44] *rTsa śe ṭīk chen*, f. 33b (= p. 56): *de ni bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa yin kyaṅ bzlog pa raṅ rgyud 'phaṅs pa min źiṅ thal ba la yaṅ bzlog pa 'phen pa daṅ mi 'phen pa gñis yod do // des na raṅ lugs sgrub pa'i sgrub bya sgrub byed khas len kyaṅ raṅ rgyud kyi bsgrub bya sgrub byed khas len pa min no //*

Tsoṅ kha pa evidently considers that the Mādhyamika may use a contraposed form of the *prasaṅga* that has as its logical reason the fact that things originate in dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*), which he adduces against the Sāṃkhya in order formally to ground an assertion which is founded on the implication of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of Satkāryavāda but which is in fact rejected by the Sāṃkhya as well as by the Mādhyamika. That is, the Mādhyamika induces in the Sāṃkhya a recognition that the contraposed form of the *prasaṅga* originally adduced against him by the Mādhyamika is equally unacceptable to him (the Sāṃkhya). This move will compel the Sāṃkhya to realize the inconsistency in his assertion of the Satkāryavāda; for the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* in question involves a hypothetical consequence that even the Sāṃkhya cannot accept, namely that the sprout exists independently of its seed.

On *pratītyasamutpanna* in a *paraprasiddha-anumāna*, see *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 90a-b (= p. 487).

[45] *rTsa śe ṭīk chen*, f. 32b (= p. 54.18-20), quoted in note 37 above.

24) with the *thal bzlog* = *prasaṅgaviparyaya* (where the *thal chos bzlog pa* is used as a *liṅga*) and with the *bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa/'phen pa* which became of major importance in the Pramāṇa-school's logic and was adopted in the Madhyamaka school by the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas and by later Tibetan Mādhyamikas such as Tsoṅ kha pa himself. For the *thal ba 'phen pa*, in so far as it makes use of the technique of contraposition (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*), is in fact distinct from the *thal ba (b)sgrub(s) pa* (*prasaṅgāpādana* or *prasaṅgāpatti*) belonging to the dialectical technique of Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka school.

A further source for possible confusion is the fact that the Tibetan expression *thal ba (b)sgrub pa* corresponds not only to *prasaṅgāpādana* (e.g. in the Tibetan translation of the PPMV), but also to the term *prasaṅgasādhana*.[46]

But Tsoṅ kha pa could hardly have been unaware of the distinction between the Mādhyamika's apagogical reasoning (*prasaṅgāpādana*, on which is after all based Candrakīrti's rejection of Bhavya's claim that a *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* could affect Buddhapālita's statements) on the one side and on the other the contraposed *prasaṅgaviparyaya* developed in the Pramāṇa-school (together with the hypothetical proof, *prasaṅgasādhana*). Yet he has joined a discussion of these two things when discussing PPMV pp. 23-24. This is perhaps best explained, not by supposing a conflation on Tsoṅ kha pa's part, but by developments in the theory of the *thal ba* and the *thal ba bzlog pa'i don* subsequent to Candrakīrti that took place especially in Tibet, and also by his particular exegesis of this passage of the PPMV. (It is in fact known that the Tibetan logicians and philosophers, for example the school of gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog, devoted special attention to the theory of the *prasaṅga*.) A final clarification of this matter will have to await further research; in the mean time, mKhas grub dGe lẽgs dpal bzaṅ's treatment of the matter in his *sToṅ thun chen mo* can be consulted.[47]

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46 See above, note 31.

47 What sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan and A kya yoṅs 'dzin dByaṅs can dga' ba'i blo gros are concerned with in their *thal bzlog* treatises is, evidently, not the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* in the sense of a contraposed *prasaṅga*-statement. And they deal with *gźan skye* arising, by implication, as the REVERSAL of *bdag skye* if *paryudāsa*-negation (rather than *prasajyapratiṣedha*) operates. – See sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan, *Thal bzlog dka' ba'i gnas gtan la 'bebs pa, 'Jam pa'i dbyaṅs sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan gyis mdzad pa'i tshig gsal gyi lde mig* in *The obligatory texts (Yig cha) for the study of Mādhyamika of Byes grwa-tshaṅ of Se-ra Monastery*, published by lHa mkhar yoṅs 'dzin bsTan pa rgyal mtshan (Mādhyamika Text Series vol. 4, New Delhi 1973); and A kya yoṅs 'dzin dByaṅs can dGa' ba'i blo gros (*c*. 1800), *dBu ma'i thal bzlog gi brjed byaṅ tshigs bcad ma*, published by Lama Guru Deva, *The collected works of A-kya Yoṅs-ḥdzin* vol. 1, New Delhi 1971; and by lHa-mkhar yoṅs-'dzin bsTan-pa-rgyal-mtshan. In: Mādhyamika Text Series vol. 3, New Delhi 1972. (= Tohoku no. 6581).

Compare, however, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *sToṅ thun chen mo*, f. 168b-177b. There the principle of contraposition appears to be evoked when mKhas grub rje cites an opponent's interpretation (*kha cig na re*) of the Sāṃkhya's objection to the Mādhyamika as formulated by Bhavya and of Candrakīrti's reply (f. 169b-170a): *de ltar na thal 'gyur gyi rtags bzlog pa bsgrub bya'i chos daṅ / thal 'gyur gyi bsgrub bya'i chos bzlog pa gtan tshigs su 'gyur bas dṅos po rnams skye ba don bcas daṅ thug bcas yin te / gźan las skye ba yin pa'i phyir // źes pa gtan tshigs yaṅ dag tu khas len dgos pas / de ltar na raṅ gi grub pa'i mtha' daṅ 'gal bar 'gyur ro // źes bya ba yin la / dpal ldan zla bas skyon de ñid spoṅ ba'i tshul ni / dbu ma pa yin na raṅ rgyud khas len pa mi rigs pas thal 'gyur gyis 'phaṅs pa'i sgrub byed khas mi len la / thal 'gyur bkod pa tsam gyis sgrub byed 'phen pa yaṅ ma yin te / smra ba pos sgrub byed 'phen par 'dod nas smras pa ma yin pa'i phyir daṅ / sgra rnams ni smra ba pos brjod par 'dod pa'i don tsam ston pa yin gyi smra ba po raṅ dbaṅ med par byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // des na pha rol po la khas blaṅs naṅ 'gal ston pa'i thal ba 'ba' źig pa tsam yin pas skyon med do źes lan 'debs pa yin no źes zer ro // de ni śin tu mi 'thad de / . . .*

When giving his own interpretation, mKhas grub rje also operates with the principle of REVERSAL (f. 170bf.), stating how the arguments serving as the inferential *liṅga*s in Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga*-statement negating (renewed) production FROM SELF – viz. *atha sann api jayeta* and *na kadācin na jayeta* – and the *sādhya* – viz. *na . . . utpadyante bhāvāḥ* – might yield by implication – through reversal (*bzlog pa*) and on the assumption that the negation was of the *paryudāsa*-variety (and not of the *prasajya*-variety which involves *rnam par bcad pa tsam*) – the affirmation of usefulness (*don bcas : sāphalya*) and non-endlessness (*thug bcas : janmanirodha*) of production FROM AN OTHER (ff. 170b-172a). But this does not in fact correspond to the view of the Mādhyamika, for he of course employs *prasajyapratiṣedha*. And mKhas grub rje demonstrates the incorrectness of deducing production from a (reified) other on the basis of the negation of production from a (reified)

VIII. *prasaṅgāpādana (thal ba [b]sgrub pa ~ thal ba 'phen pa)* AS A FORM OF INFERENCE ACCORDING TO TSOṄ KHA PA

Because in his *Prasannapadā* Candrakīrti has defined the Mādhyamika's *prasaṅgāpādana* (p. 24.5) and *anumāna* (p. 34.5) as issuing exclusively in the negation of the opponent's assertion, it has often been supposed not only that the terms of his inference are unreal (*asiddha*) for the Prāsaṅgika, but also that his *prasaṅga*-type apagogical arguments may as a consequence have for him no logical-epistemological force and cogency.

According to Tsoṅ kha pa this is in fact not so. In the first place, in the inference embedded in MMK III 2cd, the terms are in transactional usage (*tha sñad du*) existent for the Prāsaṅgika too.[48] And the difference between him and the Substantialist *prativādin*[49] therefore lies not within the strict domain of *anumāna* but in the above-mentioned difference in their respective philosophical presuppositions (the eye and visible matter having hypostatic self-existence - *svabhāva* 'aseitas' - for the Substantialist whereas for Candrakīrti they of course do not). For the Prāsaṅgika *vādin*, then, the *dharmin* exists in the domain of transactional usage (*vyavahāra*), which is the proper domain of *anumāna* and *prayogavākya* too.

Therefore, to use Tsoṅ kha pa's terminology, it is necessary clearly to distinguish between unspecified (i.e. total and nihilistic) non-existence (*med pa*) - which the Mādhyamika as an advocate of the Middle Way between eternalism and annihilationism certainly does NOT assert - and non-existence specified in respect to hypostatic self-existence (*raṅ gi ṅo bos med pa*, i.e. non-substantiality, *nairātmya, niḥsvabhāvatā*) - which the Mādhyamika does maintain. Correspondingly, it is necessary clearly to distinguish between (unspecified, i.e. pure and simple) existence (*yod pa*) - which the Mādhyamika accepts in the sense of surface-level existence in *saṃvṛti* (*kun rdzob tu yod pa*) - and existence in the

self (f. 173a). Then (ff. 174a-177b) the *thal ba[r 'gyur ba las] bzlog pa'i don* is taken up once more and described as a matter that is exceedingly difficult to fathom (f. 174b1). The foundation for Bhavya's criticism of Buddhapālita was, mKhas grub rje recalls, the fact that the latter did not set out a *trirūpa-liṅga* proving the Mādhyamika's position, and that he explicitly (*tshig zin la*) stated merely a *prasaṅga* showing that the acceptance of the reverse position is excluded [on the grounds of the resulting uselessness (*don med*) and the endless repetition (*thug med*) of production] (*dam bca' de'i bzlog phyogs khas len pa la ston pa'i thal 'gyur tsam źig*, f. 174b3-4); but according to Bhavya it is not sufficient to set forth *don med* and *thug med* as *liṅgas* to establish one's own system, for which a proper *trirūpa-liṅga* is required (f. 175a). However, Buddhapālita's purpose was not of course to show that some other kind of production, such as from an other, is *don bcas* and *thug bcas*. Nor was it only to establish that *don med* and *thug med* eventuate from the Sāṃkhya's theory of production from self, but to have the *bzlog pa'i don* of the two *prasaṅgas* - viz. *dṅos po rnams chos can / skye ba don med par thal / bdag las skye ba'i phyir* and *de chos can thug med du skye bar thal / bdag las skye ba'i phyir* - establish the Madhyamaka thesis that entities are not produced from self (f. 175a-b). But the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika does this by apagogical rather than by *svatantra*-type reasoning; and in debate he employs for this purpose a *paraprasiddha-anumāna* (see below). At f. 176b, mKhas grub rje has cited a pair of *prasaṅga*-statements concerning (non-)production from self where the (for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika counterfactual) *hetu* of the first is converted by contraposition into the *sādhya* of the second by negating it (*de la thal 'gyur ni myu gu chos can slar yaṅ skye ba don bcas daṅ thug bcas min par thal / bdag las skye ba'i phyir / źes pa daṅ / des bzlog pa sgrub byed 'phaṅs pa ni myu gu chos can / bdag las skye ba med de / slar yaṅ skye ba don bcas daṅ thug bcas yin pa'i phyir / źes pa* . . .). While the first *prasaṅga*-statement is essentially deconstructive only, the second is described as implying a probative demonstration (*sgrub byed 'phaṅs pa*) (though from the Mādhyamika's point of view the reason is of course a counterfactual). (Because of its length, mKhas grub rje's discussion will have to be separately treated elsewhere.) - Cf. J. Hopkins 1983: 490-7; Hopkins 1989: 10f.

[48] To have such transactional-pragmatic (*vyāvahārika*), and surface-level (*sāṃvṛta*), existence is regarded as sufficient because *anumāna* and *prayogavākya* themselves belong to the transactional level of *saṃvṛti*.

[49] Including in this case, according to Tsoṅ kha pa, Bhavya and his Svātantrika followers. See *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 421a-b (= p. 698-9), f. 425a (= p. 705), f. 428a-b (= p. 710); *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 81b-83b-85bff. (= pp. 472-476-480ff.).

absolute *pāramārthika* sense (*don dam du yod pa*) - which the Mādhyamika does not accept.[50]

This analysis of inference and argument following Nāgārjuna's model of the eye's seeing opened the way for Tsoṅ kha pa to build Dharmakīrti's logic into his Madhyamaka theory. This he has done on a large scale, including the *trirūpa-liṅga (tshul gsum)* the very first requirement of which is that the logical reason should reside in a (transactionally real) *dharmin*. And it is in this way that, contrary perhaps to first appearances, *pramāṇa (tshad ma)* is assured a place in Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka.

This *pramāṇa*-system does not, however, rest on a substantialistically conceived dyad of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* (nor on a substantialistically conceived triad consisting of the former pair together with a cognizer or *pramātṛ*), as did the system criticized by Nāgārjuna, but rather on a logic and epistemology in which, for transactional and pragmatic (*vyāvahārika*) purposes, the terms exist without being hypostatically established (*bden par grub pa*).

Accordingly, Tsoṅ kha pa's Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka thought has discarded the prerequisite of *ubhayasiddhatva*, or *mthun snaṅ du grub pa* - i.e. the being onto-logically established in common - demanded by Bhavya following the *vāda*-tradition[51] without, however, giving up the logical and epistemological principle of *pramāṇa* as developed by Dharmakīrti that the subject or qualificand (*dharmin*) in an inference should not be unreal (*asiddha*).[52] For, whilst the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's *dharmin* is certainly not *raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa* 'established in self-existence' and *bden par grub pa* 'hypostatically established', it is not unreal either inasmuch as it exists in transactional usage (*tha sñad du yod*).[53]

IX. On *dūṣaṇa/sādhana* in Candrakīrti and Tsoṅ kha pa

The question of the epistemological and gnoseological status of an argued refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) in relation to what is to be refuted - i.e. the status of the opposite of logical establishment (*sādhana*) in relation to what is to be established (*sādhya*) - has been discussed at some length by Candrakīrti in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI 171-8. This section follows immediately on the discussion of the link between cause and result (*hetu-phala*) conceived of as a pair in a relation of connexion (*prāpti*) or disconnexion (*aprāpti*).[54]

Whereas Candrakīrti has there described the logical *hetu* in an argument as in the strictest sense lacking *upapatti* 'grounding' (*'thad pa*), he has nevertheless stated that a reasoned refutation, albeit empty of self-existence (*svabhāvaśūnya*), is efficacious in rejecting faults in an opposed position, and that a grounded logical reason, although empty of self-existence, establishes a *sādhya* (VI 175 with

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[50] See e.g. *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 424b-425a (= p. 705), and f. 432b (= p. 717).

[51] See above, Section V.

[52] See PPMV pp. 28-30, on *asiddhādhāra*, which is described by Candrakīrti himself as a *doṣa*.

[53] It is important to observe, however, that the Substantialist's *dharmins* IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE POSITED (AS THEY ARE BY HIM) AS ESTABLISHED IN SELF-EXISTENCE (I.E. HYPOSTATICALLY) do not, for the Mādhyamika, really exist even on the transactional-pragmatic and relative level: they are in fact mere fictions or constructs devoid of any kind of reality whatsoever. According to Candrakīrti, origination (*utpāda*) conceived of as a process of production of one reified entity having *svabhāva* from another reified entity having *svabhāva* is thus an altogether inconsistent and anomalous concept, which is as unacceptable on the level of *saṃvṛti* as it is on that of *paramārtha*.

[54] cf. MMK VII 10.

The fallacy of *thal ba(r 'gyur ba) mtshuṅs pa* 'same predicament' - that is, *samaprasaṅgitā* (see PPMV VII 31, p. 173.6) or *tulyaprasaṅgatva* (see PPMV XVI 2, p. 287.2) - treated in MA VI 172-6 appears to be equivalent to the *sādhyasama (bsgrub par bya ba daṅ mtshuṅs pa)* referred to in PPMV VII 11 (p. 153.5).

Bhāṣya).[55] In this way the Mādhyamika does not find his argument exposed to attack (*sāvakāśa*) by an opponent's *dūṣaṇa* 'refutation' and *parihāra* 'rebuttal', for these are based on a duality that was merely constructed on the basis of the nominally existent (*prajñaptisat*, and not on real entities).[56]

Candrakīrti observes, nevertheless, that there can be no question in the Madhyamaka of *vitaṇḍā* 'cavil'. For the Śāstra of the Madhyamaka intends to express the cessation of dichotomizing conceptual construction (*rtog pa ldog pa ñid brjod par 'dod pa*), and 'this HAS been stated by us'. Moreover, because there exists (in reality) no entity to be rejected (*bsal bar bya ba'i dṅos po*), no opposed position (*parapakṣa*) is in reality being rejected. So, since by definition a *vaitaṇḍika* is one who rejects another's position without setting forth his own position, how could there be any question of our being *vaitaṇḍikas*?[57] The defining mark of *vitaṇḍā* is therefore altogether absent in the true Mādhyamika (*Bhāṣya* VI 178).[58]

Tsoṅ kha pa has introduced elements of this discussion by Candrakīrti into his treatment of the status, in his own system (*raṅ lugs* = *svamata*), of an inferential *liṅga* (*bsgrub bya sgrub pa'i rtags*) given the absence in the Prāsaṅgika system of an autonomous (*svatantra*) logical reason.[59] Just as, he writes, the relation between cause and result can be properly understood, according to Candrakīrti, only on condition that neither is hypostatized as a self-existent entity – but never if one postulates self-existent entities related by either *prāpti* or *aprāpti*, as has so often been done by philosophers when they analyse causation – so a *dūṣaṇa* operates effectively only in the frame of the principle of non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). For it could never be effective in the frame of a theory postulating either *prāpti* or *aprāpti* between self-existent things in the case of *dūṣya* and *dūṣaṇa*.

Hence it is only for the Mādhyamika, who entertains no position (*pakṣa*) postulating reified, self-existent entities, that a system of *dūṣaṇa* and *dūṣya* can effectively operate; whereas for his Substantialist opponents – including Bhavya according to Tsoṅ kha pa[60] – a system of *dūṣaṇa* and *dūṣya* will perforce be inoperative.[61]

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[55] The basis for this argument is found in Nāgārjuna's VV.

[56] Candrakīrti here cites Nāgārjuna's MMK IV 8 and Ārya-Deva's CŚ XVI 25.

Candrakīrti observes in addition that the (Svātantrika's) objection that what has been in question in the discussion with the Substantialist opponent is an *utpādakahetu (skyed par byed pa'i rgyu)* – and not the *(abhi)vyañjakahetu (gsal bar byed pa'i rgyu)* against which was raised the argument involving the relation of *prāpti* or *aprāpti* – and that his argument therefore contains no specious refutation (*jāti* [= *dūṣaṇābhāsa* according to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti]) will be of no avail. For the Substantialist opponent will still remain unsatisfied with the counter-argument and will oppose to it his own, so that the (Svātantrika-)Mādhyamika's counter-argument will be exposed (*sāvakāśa*), whether the cause is an *utpādakahetu* or an *(abhi)vyañakahetu*. (On *utpāda/abhivyakti*, cf. PPMV p. 21.9-22.8.) Furthermore, the Svātantrika involves himself in a specious reply (*jāti*) when, in order to establish what the Mādhyamika has asserted (*pratijñātārtha*, i.e. non-substantiality), he refutes the Substantialist opponent's *sādhana* (implicitly accepting a logical reason established in common under the principle of mutual agreement according to which he proceeds; see Jayānanda's *Ṭīkā* [P f. 337b8ff.], and note 67 in H. Tauscher's translation of the MA [Vienna 1981]). So Candrakīrti concludes that his own rebuttal (*parihāra*) of the Substantialist opponent is far superior to the Svātantrika's (*Bhāṣya* VI 175). Moreover, when a reasoning based on a relation of *prāpti* or *aprāpti* is employed in the analysis of causation, a *(jñāpaka)hetu* making known what is to be established (*sādhya*) as well as the *sādhya* itself do not exist hypostatically, so that the Svātantrika will find himself once again in desperate straits since he has left the straight road of non-substantiality and follows the winding path of false speculation (*kutarka*) (VI 176).

[57] Read (with Tsoṅ kha pa) *raṅ gi phyogs ma bźag ciṅ gźan gyi phyogs bzlog ste* . . . (i.e. with the negative *ma*). For the definition of *vitaṇḍā*, see e.g. *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.3: *sa [jalpaḥ] pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā*. See also MA VI 118 on *vāda, vigraha, parapakṣa* and *svapakṣa*.

[58] Compare above, notes 2 and 12.

[59] *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, ff. (81b-)83b-85b (= pp. [472-]476-480). Cf. *Lam rim chen mo*, ff. 416a-418b (= pp. 690-5).

[60] See above, note 49.

[61] The idea is of course to be found in Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 23-27 and 61-69, where *pratiṣedha* (or *vāraṇa*) and

X. *pramāṇa*-THEORY, ERROR AND THE NEED FOR ASCERTAINMENT (*ṅes pa : niścaya*) IN TSOṄ KHA PA'S MADHYAMAKA THOUGHT

To study Tsoṅ kha pa's entire theory of *pramāṇa (tshad ma)* fully would take one very far indeed and exceed the limits set for this paper. More needs nevertheless to be said about the concept of *pramāṇa* that he has advocated in connexion with the problem of the relation between the *svatantra anumāna* and *paraprasiddha anumāna*, or between the autonomous 'syllogistic' argument (*svatantra-prayogavākya*) as used by Bhavya and the special kind of 'syllogistic' argument (*sbyor ba'i ṅag*) employed, according to him, by Candrakīrti and other Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas.

It has to be noted from the outset that whereas Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā* (p. 25) has used the term *prayogavākya* specifically in connexion with Bhavya's autonomous 'syllogistic' argument (*svatantraprayogavākya*) and has stated that Nāgārjuna did not make use of the *prayogavākyas* when writing his comment on the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Tsoṅ kha pa allows the Prāsaṅgika not only an *anumāna* (*rjes su dpag pa*) but also a *prayoga(vākya) (sbyor ba[ʼi ṅag])*, provided that both are understood to be not 'autonomous' (*raṅ rgyud pa* = *svatantra*) ones like the Svātantrika's, but rather *paraprasiddha (gźan la grags pa)* ones.[62] Tsoṅ kha pa's usage may find a certain justification in Candrakīrti's explanations attributing to Nāgārjuna several components of a 'syllogistic' argument.[63] In all these cases, needless to say, no self-existent *bhāva* is being posited, and what Candrakīrti and Tsoṅ kha pa say is certainly not meant by them to conflict with *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29-30.

Tsoṅ kha pa has explained his concept of *pramāṇa* in his *Lam rim chen mo* in connexion with his detailed discussion of the difference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas. Very significantly, he has observed at the outset that the relevant passages of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (pp. 30-36) are particularly difficult to understand (*śin tu rtogs dka' ba*, f. 419a = p. 696).

The need for Tsoṅ kha pa's enquiry arises not only in view of the critique of the Substantialist's *pramāṇa-prameya* model in Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, but also because of the circumstance that *pramāṇa* did not occupy an explicit place in Candrakīrti's discussion, so that the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika has sometimes been suspected of having discarded *pramāṇa*. Whereas for Tsoṅ kha pa - and indeed for much of the Tibetan philosophical traditions - the (valid means of) correct knowledge (*tshad ma*), reasoned knowledge (*rigs śes*) and cognitive ascertainment (*ṅes pa*) were problems of central importance also in Madhyamaka philosophy.[64]

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pratiṣedhya are the terms being discussed.

[62] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 429a-b (= pp. 711-12).

[63] See not only PPMV p. 34, quoted above, but also the mention of *pratijñā* in connexion with MMK I 1 (p. 13.3), VIII 1 and XXI 2, and in MA VI 8 (p. 81.17-18).

[64] It is well known that Tsoṅ kha pa, following the example of his Tibetan predecessors in for example the gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog seminary going back to rṄog Blo ldan śes rab (1059-1109), made very extensive use of Dharmakīrti's work. In addition to minor treatises such as the *Nyāyabindu* and *Hetubindu* and to the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* already extensively employed in Tibet by the 'Middle Tshad ma', Tsoṅ kha pa made use of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, just like his predecesors (such as Sa skya Paṇḍi ta and his disciple 'u yug pa) who developed a 'New Tshad ma' based largely on this work by Dharmakīrti.

Moreover, following some later Indian masters – Śāntarakṣita (see *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* 61), Prajñākaragupta, Jitāri, Ravigupta, Mokṣākaragupta – the Tibetan doxographers undertook a kind of synthesis (or rapprochement) of the Madhyamaka with Dharmakīrti's thought. For Jitāri's view on Dharmakīrti and the Madhyamaka, see his *Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* IV (ed. Kenjō Shirasaki, *Bulletin of the Kobe Women's University* 18/1, 1985: 135ff.); cf. Kenjō Shirasaki, "Jitāri and Śāntarakṣita", *IBK* 27/1, 1978, 495-492 and "Dharmakīrtiwa chūganronsha de aru" [Dh. is a Madhyamaka], *Bukkyō Ronsō* 30, 1986, 110-114; Shirō Matsumoto, "On the philosophical positions of Dharmottara and Jitāri", *IBK* 29/2, 1981, 969-966; and Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 100. Concerning Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Prajñākaragupta as well as Jitāri on Dharmakīrti, see recently E. Steinkellner, "Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?" in *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka*, eds. D. Seyfort Ruegg and L. Schmithausen, Leiden 1990, 72-90. For Mokṣākaragupta, see Kajiyama (cited in note 31) 1966: 7-10. Compare also Abhayākaragupta's

It is indeed on this basis that this tradition has sought to avoid the grave errors of 'ideoclasm', over-emphasis on non-mentation (*yid la mi byed pa*) and the devaluation or outright rejection of philosophical analysis (*dpyod pa*) which it generally ascribed to the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna, that is, to the Chinese Ch'an master Mo-ho-yen who, at the Great Debate of bSam yas toward the end of the eighth century CE, was the protagonist of a purely simultaneist (*cig c[h]ar ba*), 'spontaneist' and non-mentational - i.e. non-analytical - teaching of direct, unmediated and face-to-face recognition of in-born and primal Mind (*sems ṅo 'phrod pa, sems rtogs pa*).[65]

pramāṇa - as (valid means of) right knowledge, the reverse of error or deviation (*'khrul ba* = *bhrānti*) - comprises non-error (*ma 'khrul ba*). It is thus the source of the ascertainment (*ṅes pa*) required for attaining the philosopher's goal, namely understanding of the non-substantiality of the individual and the factors of existence (*pudgala-* and *dharma-nairātmya*) and Emptiness of self-existence (*svabhāvaśūnyatā, niḥsvabhāvatā*) through reasoned knowledge (*rigs śes*).

For *ṅes pa* = *niścaya*, the translation 'ascertainment' is here preferred to 'certainty' or 'certitude' because the reference is to a critical philosophical process achieved through analysis (*dpyad pa*), right cognition (*tshad ma*) and reasoned knowledge (*rigs śes*), and not to a state of either uncritical or quasi-mystical sureness. Philosophical certitude is of course a problematic thing, as is infallible knowledge. But philosophy is (partly) about the attempt to ascertain things by right knowledge, by a knowledge that is non-failing (*avisaṃvāda* = *mi [b]slu ba*) through corresponding to what is to be known. Philosophical ascertainment is thus quite different from any kind of dogmatic certitude and *a fortiori* from unexamined and unjustified belief. The philosophical endeavour of Tsoṅ kha pa and those who thought like him was to demarcate both reasoned knowledge (*rigs śes*) and ascertainment (*ṅes pa*) from inveterated dogma and 'fool's belief' (*blun dad*).[66]

Now, according to Tsoṅ kha pa's view of the matter, in discussion and debate with the Substantialist (*dṅos [por] smra ba : vastusat-padārthavādin*) who in this matter figures as the opponent (*phyi[r] rgol* = *prativādin*), the (Prāsaṅgika-)Mādhyamika as proponent (*sṅa rgol* = *vādin*) does in fact (as observed above) share with the former a TRANSACTIONAL *pramāṇa* (*tha sñad pa'i tshad ma*) that has the function of correctly cognizing (*'jal ba: pramā-*) e.g. eye and visible matter.[67] In other words, great though the differences between the Substantialist and the Mādhyamika are in their respective philosophical presuppositions, the two parties can still stand on agreed common ground in philosophical discussion and debate, where they will be talking of the same *dharmin* as the locus of the logical reason in their *anumānas* (and *prayogavākyas*).[68]

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use of PV II 253 in his *Munimatālaṃkāra* (P 12 f. 189b); cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, "The *gotra, ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* theories of the *Prajñāpāramitā* according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta", in *Prajñāpāramitā and related systems. Studies in honor of Edward Conze*, ed. Lewis Lancaster, Berkeley 1977: 298.

[65] See *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 424b (= pp. 704-5); *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 90b (= pp. 487-8). Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism in a comparative perspective*, London 1989.

[66] Candrakīrti's view on one kind of determination or certitude is, it is true, more negative or at least deconstructive (see PPMV pp. 56-57); but he has nevertheless recognized *avasā- (ṅes pa)* 'ascertainment' based on reasoning (*op. cit.*, p. 58.3-6). For *niścitagrahaṇa, niścaya*, etc. in Dharmakīrti, see recently E. Steinkellner, "Remarks on *niścitagrahaṇa*", in *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata*, eds. G. Gnoli et L. Lancotti, Roma 1988, 1427-1444.

The kind of ascertainment (*avasāya* or *niścaya* = *ṅes pa*) and rigorous reasoning (*yukti* = *rigs pa*) looked for in the Madhyamaka, in particular by Tsoṅ kha pa, has doubtless to be distinguished from the positivism and rationalism that some currents of modern thought have attempted to achieve, and of course from the 'mental *rigor mortis*' criticized for example by P. Feyerabend in his *Against method* (London 1978) and *Farewell to reason* (London 1987). Truly to be a Mādhyamika is clearly to be aware of such pitfalls.

[67] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 424a (= p. 703); *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 90b (= p. 488).

[68] This however does not, for Tsoṅ kha pa, imply that the subject of the inferences will be in the strict sense

In this connexion Tsoṅ kha pa has specified a fundamentally important point concerning cognitive apprehension (*'dzin tshul*). His epistemological scheme is described as made up of the following three modes of apprehension:[69]

(i) a cognition that apprehends its object (e.g. a sprout) as existing by a nature established in self-existence, viz. a cognition that takes its object to 'exist in reality/truth', i.e. hypostatically (*bden par yod par 'dzin pa*);

(ii) a cognition that apprehends its object as existing in the manner of an illusory projection (*māyopama*) but does not exist established in self-existence, viz. a cognition that takes its object to 'exist unreally/falsely', i.e. not hypostatically (*brdzun par yod par 'dzin pa*); and

(iii) a cognition that apprehends its object as simply existing as such, without being specified as to being either 'real/true' or 'unreal/untrue', i.e. established/not established hypostatically (*bden brdzun de dag gaṅ gis kyaṅ khyad par du ma byas par spyir yod pa tsam źig tu 'dzin pa*).[70]

Tsoṅ kha pa observes that the second cognitive mode that apprehends things as being *māyā*-like inasmuch as they do not exist in hypostatized self-existence is available only to such persons as have comprehended non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā, nairātmya*). So long as persons have not yet reached this high level of understanding, they may be observed to have the first mode of cognition that reifies a thing by grasping it as established hypostatically. In addition, however, they have available the above-mentioned third mode of cognition that simply apprehends things without specification, that is, without either positing them as hypostatically established (following mode i) or knowing them to be false in the sense of being simply *māyā*-like projections (following mode ii).[71]

It is, then, this last kind of cognitive apprehension that yields the unspecified TRANSACTIONAL *pramāṇa* found to be available to both the Substantialist and the Mādhyamika, and which thus makes possible a well-founded and meaningful discussion between the two. This is accordingly quite independent of the fact that the two parties do NOT share a common autonomously PROBATIVE *pramāṇa* (*sgrub byed kyi tshad ma*), or a commonly established (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa : ubhayasiddha*) – and on the *saṃvṛti*-level virtually self-existent (*raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*) – subject of inference (*dharmin* = *chos can*) that had been posited by Bhavya.[72]

Such a *vyāvahārika-pramāṇa (tha sñad pa'i tshad ma)*, as it is termed, has then to be distinguished from a *svamata-pramāṇa (raṅ gi lugs kyi tshad ma)* by means of which a *dharmin* might be thought to be established hypostatically or onto-logically.[73]

ONTO-LOGICALLY ESTABLISHED in common (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa*), or *ubhayasiddha*, as Bhavya had evidently assumed in conformity with the established principle of *vāda* discussed above (p. 286-287 with note 20).

[69] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 424a (= p. 703-04).

[70] The last kind of unqualified cognition has of course to be distinguished from a *dharmin* (the so-called *chos can tsam po*) unqualified as to *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* that Bhavya would set up as the *dharmin* of his *svatantrānumāna* as a subject that could be held in common between a Sāṃkhya and a Mādhyamika – but which has been rejected by Candrakīrti (PPMV p. 27-30) and Tsoṅ kha pa (*Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, ff. 86a-89a [= pp. 481-5]).

One or the other of these three modes of cognitively apprehending the existence of an object is stated by Tsoṅ kha pa to underlie all cognitive modes, there being in fact no cognition in the absence of one of them. Other forms of cognizing an object – for example the one that grasps its object (e.g. a sprout) as existing in the mode of the permanent or the impermanent – are accordingly nothing but subvarieties, and they therefore do not require to be enumerated separately (*Lam rim chen mo*, f. 424a [= p. 704]). See also *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 90b (= pp. 487-8).

[71] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 424a-b (= p. 704).

[72] *Lam rim chen mo*, ff. 422b6 (= p. 702), 426b1-3 (= p. 707).

[73] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 424a1 (= p. 703).

Further, were it not for the existence of the last of the above-mentioned three modes of cognition, all transactional activity would inevitably involve hypostatic postulation (*bden 'dzin*). A logical impossibility would thus cancel out everything that the

Tsoṅ kha pa next makes an important observation concerning the multifold actions making up preliminary practice. He writes that if all that belongs to the domain of *caryā* - and that consists in the practice of the wholesome (*dge sbyor spyod pa*) which requires first to be practised through the medium of conceptual construction (*rtog pa : kalpanā*, etc.) - were to be regarded as a mark of false comprehension of Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), and if all that is preliminary were thus nothing but a grasping of phenomenal signs (*nimitta*) fettering the practiser to *saṃsāra*, the mistaken idea could indeed arise that all such practice of the wholesome was taught by the Buddha for those persons only who have not attained the definitive Sense (*nītārtha*) of his Teaching; and all conceptual construction would accordingly be regarded as faulty. But it is precisely through such mistaken understanding that many rejections of Dharma come about. And Tsoṅ kha pa cites the above-mentioned teaching of the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna (Mo-ho-yen) as an example of the rejection of practice involving conceptual construction.[74]

Now, whereas *anumāna* belongs to *vyavahāra* and *saṃvṛti*, it has to be noted that Candrakīrti has described *saṃvṛti* as having for its essence an entity realized in error only (*viparyāsamātrāsāditātmabhāvasattākā saṃvṛtiḥ*).[75] For Tsoṅ kha pa, the restriction '*viparyāsamātra*' does not, however, have the effect of precluding what is thus realized from being realized by a cognition that is not erroneous/deviant (such as *anumāna* and *rigs śes*). This is because the restriction '*viparyāsamātra*' is considered by him to be intended solely to negate the idea that what belongs to *saṃvṛti* is realized (or realizable) through an analysis (*dpyod pa* = *vicāra*) that investigates the mode of existence (*yod tshul*, of entities on the *saṃvṛti* level).[76] Nevertheless, *vyāvahārika-pramāṇa* is in fact required as a cause of the correct cognition of the *paramārtha* (as said by Nāgārjuna, MMK XXIV 10ab).[77]

Finally, in his discussion of the *svalakṣaṇa* (*raṅ gi mtshan ñid*) that he ascribes to the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika (whom he in this context considers to be a *dṅos por smra ba*, as has to be recalled), Tsoṅ kha pa takes care to distinguish this concept (which he has criticized) from the concept of *sva-*

Mādhyamika must maintain transactionally, namely the sense (*don*) set out without being tainted by a ground for error consisting in GRATUITOUS worldly *vyavahāra* (*'jig rten pa'i tha sñad raṅ dga' ba sñar bśad pa'i 'khrul rgyus ma bslad pas rnam par bźag pa'i don*). And because of a mistaken theory (*phyin ci log gi lta ba*) – e.g. one postulating a creator-deity (*dbaṅ phyug* = *Īśvara*) or one making no distinctions with respect to existence and non-existence (i.e. between simple existence/non-existence and reified existence/non-existence in virtue of a hypostatic *svabhāva*) – there would then exist an immense obstacle to the understanding of the sense (*don*) of the Madhyamaka (*Lam rim chen mo*, f. 424b2-4 [= p. 704]).

[74] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 424b (= p. 704); cf. *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 90b (= p. 487-8). See above, note 65.

[75] PPMV p. 68.7-8. Cf. PPMV p. 30.1-3 (*dharmiṇas tadādhārasya viparyāsamātrāsāditātmabhāvasya pracyutiḥ)*, and XII 10 (p. 234.4: *viparyāsamātralabdhātmasattākā duḥkhādisaṃvṛtiḥ*). See also PPMV p. 73.6-7.

[76] See *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 88b (= p. 484): *smra ba po'i brjod 'dod ni yod tshul ji ltar yin dpyod pa'i dpyod byed kyis rñed pa dgag par 'dod nas 'tsam' smos kyi / ma 'khrul ba yin pa'i śes pas rñed pa 'gog pa min te*. Here Tsoṅ kha pa has quoted PPMV p. 68.7-8. See above, note 53.

In this connexion Tsoṅ kha pa has furthermore pointed out (*Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 88b5-6 [= pp. 484-5]) a difference between the explanation given in his *Legs bśad sñiṅ po* and that given in his *Lam rim chen mo* (f. 420a [= p. 697], where he had read *de'i tshe de kho nar* for *tadaiva* in PPMV p. 30.1). Cf. Hopkins 1989: 23-24, who concludes that this reading is an error for *de'i tshe kho nar*, which has then led commentators such as 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa to interpret this passage of the PPMV as referring to *tattva* = *paramārtha*. Interestingly, on f. 36b2 of his *thal bzlog* treatise (cited above, note 47) sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan has also adopted the reading *de'i tshe de kho nar* of the *Lam rim chen mo* and interpreted the passage in terms of the *paramārtha (don dam par*, f. 36b4).

[77] See *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 91a (= p. 488): *tha sñad pa'i tshad ma don dam pa 'jal ba'i rgyur med mi ruṅ ba yin pa 'di ñid /*

tha sñad la ni ma brten par // dam pa'i don ni rtogs mi 'gyur //
źes gsuṅs pa'i don no //

lakṣaṇa associated in the Pramāṇa-school with the principle of capacity for causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā*).[78] And he adds that if Mādhyamikas such as Bhavya – according to whose system there exists transactionally in *dharmas* a *svalakṣaṇa* established in self-existence – also accept in their own system (*svamata*) a *svatantra-liṅga*, the reason is precisely this existence in transactional usage of a *sva-lakṣaṇa*.[79] Consequently, the question as to whether a *svatantra-liṅga* is or is not postulated as part of one's own system hinges also on what is in fact to be regarded as the very subtle negandum (*dgag bya śin tu phra ba*).[80]

For Tsoṅ kha pa, a *pramāṇa* is nonetheless found according to the Prāsaṅgika too even in the case of the *paraprasiddha-anumāna* (or **paraprasiddha-prayogavākya*). This *pramāṇa* as understood by Tsoṅ kha pa is, however, not one cognizing anything established in self-existence and accepted in common between the two parties to the debate as so established (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa*). And it is for just this reason that we have to speak of the absence of anything ESTABLISHED equally for both parties (*gñis ka la grub pa : ubhayasiddha*) – the Substantialist and the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika – but of something that is *paraprasiddha (gźan la grags pa)* or **parasiddha (gźan la grub pa)*.[81]

XI. The logical-epistemological status of the Prāsaṅgika's *paraprasiddha*-argument according to Tsoṅ kha pa

To take once more the analysis of the case of the seeing eye set forth by Nāgārjuna in MMK III 2cd, it is a fact established by *pramāṇa* that the idea of an eye not seeing itself but seeing an other is inconsistent (*viruddha*) so long as one assumes (as the Substantialist does) that the eye and its cognitive object are reified entities established in self-existence. This is therefore not something to be settled through mere assertion (*khas blaṅs tsam : abhyupagamamātra*) on the part of the Mādhyamika *vādin* against the Substantialist *prativādin*.[82] As Candrakīrti has observed, according to a procedure

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[78] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 423b5 (= p. 703). See above, note 6.

[79] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 425a5-6 (= p. 705); cf. f. 429a2 (= p. 711).

[80] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 425a-b (= p. 705). – The nature of the negandum (*dgag bya: pratiṣedhya*, etc.) according to the different schools of Buddhist thought has been briefly defined by dKon mchog 'Jigs med dbaṅ po in his *Grub mtha'i rnam bźag mdor bsdus pa, Rin po che'i phreṅ ba*. (On this subject see further the indices *s.v.* 'object of negation' in Hopkins 1983, especially Chart 37 on p. 299, and *Emptiness Yoga* [Ithaca 1987], and in E. Napper, *Dependent-arising and Emptiness* [Boston 1989] [especially for the Prāsaṅgika school]; in Lopez [cited in note 6; in particular for the Svātantrika school]; and the index *s.v.* 'negatee' in Thurman [cited in note 6].)

The *pramāṇa* onto-logically established in common between a Substantialist and a Mādhyamika, as required by Bhavya, demands in addition an absence of error with respect both to the object that is presented (*snaṅ yul*) in sensory cognition (*dbaṅ śes*) and to the object of conceptual thinking (*źen yul*) in conceptual construction (*rtog pa*). For if error attached to either, there could be neither something established in self-existence (as posited by the Substantialist) nor anything that would be *svatantra* (as posited by the Svātantrika), as the commentator Bra ti dGe bśes observes (f. 278b1-2) on Tsoṅ kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo*. – According on the contrary to Candrakīrti's interpretation – following which the above-mentioned putative *pramāṇas* are erroneous in so far as their objects (*yul*) are presented (*snaṅ ba*) as *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* –, even though there exists no self-nature (*raṅ bźin*) corresponding to the way the Svātantrika's '*svalakṣaṇa*' is represented in philosophy, the certification of the inferential *sādhya* will nevertheless be effected for a Substantialist in virtue of a *dharmin*, etc., established by sensory cognitions (*dbaṅ śes*) presented as such (i.e. as possessing a *svabhāva* established by own-characteristic [*raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i raṅ bźin*], which sensory cognitions are withal erroneous for this very reason in respect to *pramāṇa*). See *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 425b2-3, with the comment of Bra ti dGe bśes, f. 278b.

[81] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 430a1-3 (= p. 713).

[82] Concerning the demonstration, based on a *paraprasiddha* argument, that there exists a logical nexus of pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the eye's not seeing itself and its seeing an other being unestablished in self-existence, Tsoṅ kha pa (*Lam rim chen mo*, f. 431b [= p. 715]) refers to Buddhapālita and also to Ārya-Deva's *Catuḥśataka* XIII 16.

established in transactions in the world (*laukika vyavahāra*) and applicable equally in logic (*nyāya*), an opponent (*prativādin*) can be confuted by means of what he himself maintains (*svavacana*, i.e. what is *svaprasiddha*), but never exclusively by means of what an other - i.e. the proponent (*vādin*) - alone maintains (*paravacana*).[83]

Now, the individual terms of this argument pose no problem for the Substantialist *prativādin*, for whom both the *dharmin* (eye) and the inferential *liṅga* (because of [the eye's] not seeing itself) are in fact established (*siddha*). Only Nāgārjuna's rejection of the (unnegated) predicate (seeing an other) - which is being here maintained by the Substantialist *prativādin* - by means of the mutually acceptable *liṅga* is at the outset unacceptable to the *prativādin*. And it has therefore still to be established for his sake by the Mādhyamika through a *paraprasiddha*-argument.

But this is not to be effected through a *svatantra anumāna* (or a *svatantra prayogavākya*), because this would require a *dharmin* that is mutually agreed on between the parties, i.e. one held to be established ONTO-LOGICALLY (and HYPOSTATICALLY) in common (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa*); for, as already seen, this is something that is impossible according to the Prāsaṅgika. Rather, it can be effected through the Prāsaṅgika's method of *paraprasiddha*-argument, which does nonetheless make use of a proper argument involving a *trirūpa-liṅga* acceptable to the Prāsaṅgika too.

This being the case, it should not be supposed that the showing up of the inconsistency (*'gal ba*, between a self-existent eye-entity's not seeing itself and its nevertheless seeing an other entity) rests EXCLUSIVELY on what is *paraprasiddha*, i.e. on something acknowledged by only ONE party to the debate, namely the Prāsaṅgika's Substantialist opponent. For, as already noted, the inferential *liṅga* (because of [the eye's] not seeing itself) is fully established for BOTH the *prativādin* (the Substantialist) and the *vādin* (the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika).[84] And since it is so established, it does not need to be established anew by the *vādin* against the *prativādin* by means of the argument in question.

Once one knows the difference between (nihilistic) non-being and the non-being of self-existence, and between (hypostatic and eternalistic) self-existence and existence pure and simple, one will come to understand how a non-reified *prameya* is correctly cognized by means of a non-reified *pramāṇa* (*raṅ bźin med pa'i gźal bya la raṅ bźin med pa'i tshad mas 'jal ba la sogs pa yaṅ rtogs par 'gyur ba yin no*).[85]

Thus, by means of reasoned and valid argument, the Mādhyamika *vādin* will be in a position to bring the Substantialist *prativādin* to understand that seeing cannot involve self-existent (albeit interacting) reified entities. And to this end an inferential argument for another (*parārthānumāna*) will be required since direct perception does not prove adequate for the purpose.[86]

In sum, according to Tsoṅ kha pa, in the 'syllogistic' argument embedded in MMK III 2cd, the dharmin (eye), the inferential *liṅga* (because of [the eye's] not seeing itself), and the example (pot, or ear) are held by the Substantialist *prativādin* (who does not negate the predicate) to exist (hypostatically, *yod par 'dzin pa*). But they are considered by the *vādin* (who does negate the predicate) to exist transactionally (*tha sñad du yod pa*). There is therefore no question of these terms of the argument being invalidated by the *vādin*'s reasoning (*rigs pas gnod pa ma yin no*).

Yet, so long as the theory (*darśana*) of *nairātmya* or *niḥsvabhāvatā* has not been attained, a person cannot actually differentiate between simple existence (*yod pa [tsam]*) and existence established in

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[83] PPMV pp. 34.13-35.5. Cf. *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 433a-b (= p. 718).

[84] *Lam rim chen mo*, ff. 430b-431a (= p. 714).

[85] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 432b (= p. 717). See above, p. 297.

[86] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 432b4 (= p. 717).

virtue of self-characteristic (*raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i yod pa*).[87] So it is because they still take absence of self-existence to be pervaded by (nihilistic) non-existence (*med pa*) that philosophers have often held that the system of cause and effect (*rgyu 'bras*) cannot be set forth for that which is empty of *svabhāva*.[88] Such is the case for the Substantialist *prativādin* who does not yet clearly differentiate between (hypostatic and eternalistic) self-existence and simple being (*yod pa [tsam]*) - but not for the true Mādhyamika who does make this distinction and is consequently able to eschew the extreme of nihilism (*ucchedānta*) as well as that of eternalism (*śāśvatānta*). And it is then the sensory object (*yul*) imagined by the Substantialist to be established by a *pramāṇa* correctly cognizing (*'jal ba*) it as a *prameya* established in virtue of hypostatic self-existence that is annulable by reasoning (*rigs pas gnod pa*). But what is established only in transactional cognition (*tha sñad pa'i śes pa*) in the conscious stream of the *prativādin*, the ultimate reality of which is therefore not subject to invalidation or annulment (*gnod pa med pa*), will not have to be negated.[89]

Accordingly, no *pramāṇa* correctly cognizing a *prameya* and established in self-existence is postulated in common in the systems of both the Substantialist *prativādin* and the Mādhyamika *vādin*. At the same time, no thing requires to be proved by an autonomous (*svatantra*) reason for the *prativādin* by the *vādin*. Rather, what the (Prāsaṅgika-)Mādhyamika *vādin* does at this point is to show up the inconsistency in the Substantialist *prativādin*'s own concept postulating the seeing by a self-existent eye of a self-existent object. And this he achieves by means of the above-mentioned inferential *liṅga* or *hetu* (not seeing itself) that is in fact accepted by the *prativādin* as well as by himself, and which is inconsistent with the former's substantialist assumption.[90]

XII. *paraprasiddha-anumāna* AND *prasaṅgāpādana* AS *pramāṇa* AND AS MAIEUTICS

The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's reference to a *paraprasiddha-anumāna* - and even (in the case of Tibetan Prāsaṅgikas) to a **paraprasiddha-prayogavākya* - should not then, according to Tsoṅ kha pa, be understood as conveying or implying that (*qua vādin*) he does not himself hold his inferences for another (*parārthānumāna*) or his 'syllogistic' arguments to be valid - that is, that he does not consider them to have the logical-epistemological force of *pramāṇa*. Rather, this terminology is said by him to have been used to indicate that the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika employs an inferential *liṅga* that his opponent accepts in order to bring him to understand that this logical reason precludes his postulation of any entity established in self-existence.

In this sense, accordingly, the Prāsaṅgika's dialectical method of apagogical reasoning (*prasaṅgāpādana*) functions as a kind of philosophical 'obstetrics' - as a quite special form of *maieutics* - rather than as a regular system of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) and demonstrative proof (*sādhana*) of the kind recognized in the 'autonomous syllogisms' of the Svātantrikas. In the history of the Madhyamaka school it may be appropriate, then, to describe the Svātantrika's arguments as probative syllogistic, and the Prāsaṅgika's reasoning as a kind of elenctic maieutics.[91] And for Tsoṅ kha pa, the version of maieutics

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[87] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 424b-425a (= p. 704-05).

[88] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 425a1-2 (= p. 705). According to Tsoṅ kha pa, in order not to fall into the extreme of nihilism the follower of the Middle Way has to 'save the appearances' by means of the system (*rnam bźag* = *vyavasthā*) of action and agent (*bya byed*) and of cause and effect (*rgyu 'bras*), which operates on the level of pragmatic usage (*tha sñad* = *vyavahāra*).

[89] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 430a-b (= p. 713).

[90] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 430b1-2 (= p. 713).

[91] This is of course not to maintain that the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika's procedure is simply identical with (Plato's idea

practised by the Prāsaṅgika is to be combined with *pramāṇa*.

It is then necessary clearly to distinguish between a reified *pramāṇa* serving to cognize a reified *prameya* the existence of which in its turn guarantees the *pramāṇa* within the frame of a relation between two independent (albeit interacting) hypostatically self-existent entities - something rejected by Tsoṅ kha pa (following for example Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*) together with the *chos can daṅ rtags kyi tshul gsum sgrub pa'i tshad ma* (*Lam rim chen mo*, f. 423b4-5 [= p. 703]) or *raṅ mtshan 'jal ba'i tshad ma* (f. 428b5 [= p. 711]) - and an inference or 'syllogistic' argument validated by the *trairūpya*, which is accepted by Tsoṅ kha pa in agreement with Dharmakīrti and the Pramāṇa-school.

Thus, in view of his explanation of the logical-epistemological structure and function of *anumāna* and *prayogavākya* and the meaning of *paraprasiddha* for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, Tsoṅ kha pa feels free to make full use in his Madhyamaka philosophy of some of the logical and epistemological insights of Dharmakīrti and his school.

Moreover, in establishing the understanding of the real nature of *dharmas* not only negatively - i.e. as not having a *svabhāva* - but also positively - i.e. as having the mark of *nairātmya* - Tsoṅ kha pa has made use of Dharmakīrti's twin notions of *vyavaccheda (rnam par gcod pa)* and *pariccheda (yoṅs su gcod pa)*.[92]

XIII. CONCLUSION

Tsoṅ kha pa's analysis of the structure and function of (non-*svatantra*) *anumāna* and pragmatic-transactional *pramāṇa* studied in this paper, taken together both with his clarification of the two-fold procedure in the understanding of reality and with his conclusion that the Mādhyamika does indeed have a philosophical position (*pratijñā, pakṣa*) - albeit not one that posits any kind of 'aseitas', that is, any hypostatically or onto-logically self-existent entity - which were studied in an earlier paper,[93] reveals Tsoṅ kha pa's debt to Dharmakīrti and the Pramāṇa-school, a debt that Tsoṅ kha pa and his followers have eloquently acknowledged in a number of their works.[94]

In so doing, Tsoṅ kha pa clearly considered that his presentation of Madhyamaka thought took account of important developments in Buddhist philosophy - notably of the highly interesting but problematical and very controversial attempt by Bhavya (*c.* 500 CE) to take over into the Madhyamaka certain achievements of the Pramāṇa-school and, above all, of Dharmakīrti's major contribution to this same school in the seventh century - while striving all the while to remain true to Candrakīrti's interpretation of Nāgārjuna, Ārya-Deva and Buddhapālita in the *Prasannapadā* where, as is well known, the achievements of the Pramāṇa-school are not explicitly made use of, and in which Dignāga is seemingly criticized even though he is not explicitly named.[95]

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of) Socratic maieutics. On the *maieutikē téchnē* and the *elenktikē téchnē* in Greek philosophy, see M. Landmann, *Elenktik und Maieutik* (Bonn 1950).

[92] See Seyfort Ruegg 1983.

It should be pointed out that like many other philosophers Candrakīrti made frequent use of the idea of *pariccheda (yoṅs su gcod pa)*, for example in his *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* (verses 3, 8, 11-12); but he does not appear to have used it as complementarily opposed to *vyavaccheda (rnam par gcod pa)*.

[93] See Seyfort Ruegg 1983.

[94] In Tsoṅ kha pa's collected works, there are to be found his notes on the *pratyakṣa*-chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* compiled by his disciples rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (the *mÑon sum le'u'i brjed byaṅ* [Tohoku no. 5404]) and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ (the *mÑon sum le'u'i ṭīk ka* [no. 5410]), as well as notes on Pramāṇavidyā (the *Tshad ma'i brjed byaṅ chen mo* [no. 5400]) also compiled by Dar ma rin chen, and his *sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo Don gñer yid kyi mun sel* (no. 5416).

[95] PPMV p. 35.5-6. Cf. La Vallée Poussin's edition, pp. 35 n. and 83 n.

Furthermore, whilst the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika has undoubtedly declined the designation of *tārkika (rtog ge pa)* - the designation that Candrakīrti applied to Bhavya (PPMV p. 31.1) as a philosopher characterized by his extreme fondness for *anumāna* (PPMV p. 16.1) - for a Prāsaṅgika like Tsoṅ kha pa the term *tarka (rtog ge)* is no more synonymous with *nyāya (rigs pa)* than it is identifiable with *pramāṇa (tshad ma)*.[96] For him the *tārkika*'s conception of *trirūpa-liṅga* postulating that there must exist entities ontologically established in common agreement (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa*) - and which are accordingly really established (*grub pa*) hypostatically - is clearly not identical with the *trirūpa-liṅga* of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-school, which is acceptable to a Prāsaṅgika such as Tsoṅ kha pa too.

Tsoṅ kha pa considers, then, that it was Candrakīrti's clear intention to distinguish the *prasaṅga* as true inferential reasoning where the *sādhya* is established by the *trirūpa-liṅga* that is *paraprasiddha*, i.e. established for the *prativādin* (but not solely for the latter), from the *svatantra-liṅga* as the autonomous proof of a probandum in the form of a logical reason established by *pramāṇa* for both *vādin* and *prativādin*.[97]

Tsoṅ kha pa has no doubt gone appreciably further than Candrakīrti when he made explicit use of the methods of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-school. Only combined philological analysis and internal philosophical reconstruction can show whether he succeeded in nevertheless remaining faithful, as he clearly intended, to Candrakīrti when thus seeking to bring out what are so to say teleologically latent potentialities in the latter's thinking in the light of developments in Madhyamka and Pramāṇa philosophy that were unknown or subsequent to (or, perhaps, deliberately passed over by) Candrakīrti.

Equally importantly, the question arises whether by any appropriate measure Dharmakīrti's philosophy fits the requirements of the Madhyamaka. That is, was Dharmakīrti's thinking tied exclusively to the Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda schools with which he was connected, or did he develop a logic and epistemology applicable also to other schools?[98]

At all events, in the view of Tsoṅ kha pa, the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka is very far from throwing overboard logic and epistemology, a matter on which he was evidently inspired by Dharmakīrti and his Pramāṇa-school. And the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's *prasaṅga*-type reasoning is not taken by Tsoṅ kha pa to represent a logic opposed to or incompatible with that of Dharmakīrti. Indeed, a logical-epistemological model occupies a place of fundamental importance in the gnoseology of the Tibetan Madhyamaka.[99]

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[96] Nor in the usage of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika does *tarka* have the meaning, attested in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (sometimes in connexion with *prasaṅga* as in Keśavamiśra's *Tarkabhāṣā*), of a kind of *reductio ad impossibile*; cf. P. Tuxen, *An Indian primer of philosophy, or the Tarkabhāṣā of Keçavamiçra*, Copenhagen 1914: 54.

[97] *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 433b5-6 (= p. 719): *tshad mas rgol ba gñis ka la grub pa'i rtags kyis bsgrub bya (b)sgrub pa la raṅ rgyud kyi rtags daṅ des mi 'grub par phyir rgol gźan la grags pa'i tshul gsum gyis bsgrub bya 'grub pa la thal 'gyur bar 'jog pa 'di ni slob dpon gyi dgoṅs par śin tu gsal ba yin no.*

[98] On an aspect of this question, see now E. Steinkellner, "Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?" (cited above, note 64). The question of the philosophical position adopted by Dharmakīrti in his works and that of his ultimate intent (*dgoṅs pa*) can of course be distinct questions. (A similar problem arises e.g. for Vasubandhu as Vaibhāṣika and as Sautrāntika. And in the Tibetan tradition, although most of Asaṅga's works are of course recognized to belong to the Vijñānavāda, his ultimate intent is considered to have been the Madhyamaka because of the comment on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* ascribed to him.) In other words, the Tibetan tradition distinguishes between the position an author may take in certain works and his ultimate intent.

For recent discussions of Tibetan views on Dharmakīrti's intent, see L. van der Kuijp, *Contributions to the development of Tibetan Buddhist epistemology*, Wiesbaden 1983: passim; and David P. Jackson, *The Entrance Gate for the Wise*, Wien 1987: 165ff.

[99] Tsoṅ kha pa and his school have indeed been taken to task by critics, both Tibetan and non-Tibetan, for having thus employed a logical-epistemological model in gnoseology.

Tsoṅ kha pa's treatment of the Madhyamaka examined above does not, however, appear to reflect any real influence from

In sum, in Tsoṅ kha pa's exegesis of Nāgārjuna, Ārya-Deva and Candrakīrti there is found a convergence - or at the very least a close rapprochement - of Madhyamaka thought with Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-school, certain logical-epistemological methods of the latter being applied to the former, rather than a total unification of these two schools. Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-system and Madhyamaka are thus seen as distinct but confluent and integratable.[100]

List of Main Sanskrit and Tibetan Sources

Nāgārjuna:

MMK — *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, ed. Louis de la Vallée Poussin. St.- Pétersbourg 1903-1913. Ed. by J. W. de Jong, Adyar 1977.

VV — *Vigrahavyāvartanī: The dialectical method of Nāgārjuna (Vigrahavyāvartanī)*. Translated by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya with text critically ed. by E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst. Delhi 1978.

Ārya-Deva:

CŚ — *Catuḥśataka. Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka*. Ed. Karen Lang. Copenhagen 1986. Chapters VIII-XVI, ed. (with Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti*) by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, *The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva*, Calcutta 1931.

Buddhapālita:

MMV — *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. sDe dge edition, No. 3842. Chapters I-XII ed. by M. Walleser, Bibliotheca Buddhica XVI, St Petersburg 1913-14.

Bhavya (Bhāvaviveka):

PP — *Prajñāpradīpa-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. sDe dge edition, No. 3853. Chapters I-II ed. by M. Walleser, Bibliotheca Indica New Series No. 1396, Calcutta 1914.

Candrakīrti:

PPMV — *Prasannapadā Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. v. Nāgārjuna's MMK

MA — *Madhyamakāvatāra* and author's *Bhāṣya* (MABh), Tibetan translation: sDe dge ed., Nos. 3861 and 3862 (revised translation only). Beijing ed., Nos. 5261 (old translation of the Kārikās alone), and 5262-3 (revised translation of Kārikās and Bhāṣya). See also the ed. by L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica IX, St Petersburg 1907-12.

MABh — *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*. v. MA

Dharmakīrti's development of hypothetical reasoning (*prasaṅga*) and the *prasaṅgasādhana* (see above, note 31). And it seems that, in connexion with his interpretation of the fundamental character of the Prāsaṅgika's apagogical reasoning (*prasaṅgāpādana*), he did not simply follow Dharmakīrti but developed Candrakīrti's thought.

Tsoṅ kha pa does not appear either to be influenced here by Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas such as Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra. He did, however, compose notes on Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, the *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byaṅ* (no. 5409) (as well as a very extensive commentary on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* entitled *Legs bśad gser phreṅ* [no. 5412] in which he made extensive use of the works of the two Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra). In the *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, f. 82a (= p. 473), he has remarked that, contrary to what might be expected, Śāntarakṣita and his disciples did not rebut the criticisms made by Candrakīrti of Bhavya's Svātantrika-Madhyamaka. (But for a possible criticism of Candrakīrti by Śāntarakṣita's teacher Jñānagarbha, see D. Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 70.)

On the integration in Tsoṅ kha pa's school of *tshad ma* and *lam rim* into a kind of *tshad ma'i lam* – e.g. in rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* – see E. Steinkellner, "*Tshad ma'i skyes bu*", in *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy*, eds. E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher, Vienna 1983, 275-84.

[100] It may be recalled that logic (*tshad ma*) and Madhyamaka (*dbu ma*) are separate subjects in the curriculum of Tibetan seminaries including those of Tsoṅ kha pa's dGe lugs pa school.

Tsoṅ kha pa Blo bzaṅ grags pa (1357-1419):

dGoṅs pa rab gsal	*dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bśad, dGoṅs pa rab gsal.* lHa sa ed. of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ma, cited by folio number. See also *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal*, Varanasi 1973, cited by page number.
rTsa śe ṭik chen	*dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa śes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bśad, Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (also known as the *rNam bśad chen mo* and the *rTsa śe ṭik chen*). lHa sa ed. of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ba, cited by folio number. See also *rTsa śe ṭik chen Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, Varanasi 1973, cited by page number.
Lam rim chen mo	*Byaṅ chub lam rim che ba (Lam rim chen mo).* gTsaṅ (bKra śis lhun po) ed. of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. pa (reprinted by Ngawang Gelek Demo, *The collected works (gSuṅ 'bum) of rJe Tsoṅ-kha-pa Blo-bzaṅ-grags-pa*, vol. 19-20, New Delhi 1977), cited by folio number. And the mTso sṅon (Qinghai) reprint of 1985 of the Bya khyuṅ ed., cited by page number. See in adition *The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsoṅ-kha-pa with the interlineal notes of Ba-so Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, sDe-drug mkhan-chen Ṅag-dbaṅ-rab-brtan, 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa'i-rdo-rje, and Bra-sti dge-bśes Rin-chen-don-drub*, published by Chos-'phel-legs-ldan, New Delhi 1972.[101]
Legs bśad sñiṅ po	*Draṅ ba daṅ ṅes pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos, Legs bśad sñiṅ po.* lHa sa ed. of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. pha, cited by folio number. And the mTsho sṅon (Qinghai) reprint of 1987 of the sKu 'bum ed., cited by page number.

mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ (po) (1385-1438):

sToṅ thun chen mo	*Zab mo stoṅ pa ñid kyi de kho na ñid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos, sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed (sToṅ thun chen mo).* lHa sa ed. of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ka.

Abbreviations and Literature

Hopkins 1983 — Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, London 1983

Hopkins 1989 — Jeffrey Hopkins, "A Tibetan delineation of different views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School", *Tibet Journal* 14/1, 1989, 10-43.

IBK — *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*

PV II, III, IV — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapters II, III, IV: *Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*, ed. Yūsho Miyasaka, *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206 (PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary*, Roma 1960.

Ruegg 1981 — David Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, Wiesbaden 1981.

Ruegg 1983 — David Seyfort Ruegg, "On the thesis and assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma", in *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy*, eds. E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher, Vienna 1983, 205-241.

[101] On this text and its authors, see the discussion in E. Napper, *Dependent-arising and Emptiness*, Boston 1989: 219ff.

THE LOGIC OF THE *SVABHĀVAHETU* IN DHARMAKĪRTI'S *VĀDANYĀYA*

by

Ernst Steinkellner, Vienna

One of the signs of an extraordinarily creative person is continuous work and, what is more important, continuity in this work. Philosophy is - among other things - work. And work results in change: changing problems and changing answers. History and scholarly culture have a tendency to petrify, to create solid forms, structures and systems that can be taken home, stored, studied and transmitted. Difficulties, imbalances, unsolved problems, developments and differences - in short: the qualities of real life in an author's work are usually neglected and, unnoticed, soon disappear from the transmitting consciousness of the heirs to any given tradition.

Dharmakīrti's fascinating mind has suffered this fate. His elaborate efforts established Dignāga's tradition of epistemology and logic in a form that has lasted - within the Tibetan Buddhist culture - up to our times. However, its intrinsic fascination was soon lost in the reception of a highly interesting philosophical system which leaves a great deal of room for later debate.

To understand Dharmakīrti's significance for the subsequent tradition he must be seen independently of it, must be read in his own words, and must be studied within his own context of questions, efforts and solutions. What Dharmakīrti himself achieved is one thing that must be investigated; what his pupils and the even later branches of his tradition contributed is another; what they thought he had achieved is yet another field for investigation.

As soon as we start reading Dharmakīrti on his own terms we find ourselves participating in his philosophical workshop. And the philological situation in his case is luckily such that we can literally observe him at work, taking up a theme again and again, adapting it, fitting it together with other themes he has taken up again, and welding them together so that they seem never to have been separate.

Professor Frauwallner concluded his paper of 1954 on the origin and sequence of Dharmakīrti's works with a statement that points the way to one of the lines of future research on Dharmakīrti: "It will be a fascinating task to trace the origin and gradual development of his thought in detail."[1] Nothing much has happened until now, more than 30 years later, but there is an increasing number of scholars today who have demonstrated in their research[2] that these words were not written in vain.

At the First International Dharmakīrti Conference in Kyōto 1982 I offered a paper with a rough working hypothesis concerning a development in Dharmakīrti's works with regard to a theorem that I consider as central to his logical thought: the theorem of the ascertainment (*niścaya*) of the logical nexus (*vyāpti*) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*). I presented an idea of this theorem's development in Dharmakīrti's major works, starting from the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* together with its so called "autocommentary" through the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Nyāyabindu* to its final form in the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya*. I also said that this development and the reasons for it can be discerned in connection with the development of corollary theorems, and

[1] E. Frauwallner, "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrtis", in *Asiatica, Festschrift F. Weller*, Leipzig 1954 [142-154]: 154.

[2] Cf. e.g. the papers of T. Tani on the development of Dharmakīrti's *prasaṅga*-concept, of T. Iwata on his work on the *svabhāva*- and *kāryahetu*-concepts, and of M. Inami on the treatment of *pakṣābhāsa* in this volume.

that there is a veritable "causal complex" of theories and theorems which finally merge into a complete and consistent logical theory. This I would like to refer to as the "final form of Dharmakīrti's logic".

I regret to have to admit today that I have not yet been able after all these years to fulfil my promise and present a study of this development. Under these circumstances I would like to offer you today not another working hypothesis, but what I would like to refer to as an experiment in interpretation.

Irrespective of my working hypothesis that the "final form of Dharmakīrti's logic" took shape in the formulation of his late works, the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya*, an investigation of the logic in these works as such, without reference to its connections with earlier forms of the same theory is a necessary task in itself. If I call it an experiment I mean that in dealing with Dharmakīrti's final formulations it remains to be seen whether they contain a logical theorem which obviates the need for information from his earlier works and allows us actually to consider it as the nucleus of a coherent logical theory. For, if this hypothetical presumption of conceptual coherency is not accepted with regard to the limited corpus of his late work, the specific works under consideration will have to be seen as being in danger of losing their literary and systematical consistency.

Accordingly I shall base my explanations entirely on the formulations of the *Hetubindu*, where important terms are used for the first time, and above all of the *Vādanyāya*, where their meaning and methodical application is explained to some extent. I shall refer to his other works only in order to clarify his conceptual usage where there is no reasonable doubt of any change in this.

In order to demonstrate the generally binding force of the main statements in the *Vādanyāya* regarding the proof of the logical nexus (*vyāptisādhana*) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) that I would like to investigate, a glance at the context of these statements will be sufficiently revealing.

The subject of Dharmakīrti's last major work, the *Vādanyāya*,[3] is the definition of the so-called "points of defeat" (*nigrahasthānāni*) in disputations (*vāda*) and the refutation of other definitions (in fact those proposed by the early Nyāya school). Within the frame of definition of the "points of defeat"[4] we find in the *Vādanyāya* a complete formulation of Dharmakīrti's logic, i.e. his theory of the logical reasons (*hetu*), when for the major part[5] of the explanation of the term defining the points of defeat for the propounder[6], Dharmakīrti considers a "point of defeat" to be any deficient usage

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[3] Textual references are given to the *editio princeps* of Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (Patna 1935-36). Swami Dwarikadas Shastri's edition (Varanasi 1972) is no improvement on the first edition mainly for methodological reasons. A new and critical edition of the first part of the *Vādanyāya* together with a German translation was submitted by Michael Torsten Much as a PhD dissertation at the University of Vienna in 1983. Meanwhile the second part of the text has been prepared and the complete work will be published by 1991.

[4] For a survey of the system of the kinds of "points of defeat" and their definition as implied in the *śāstraśarīraka* verse of the *Vādanyāya* cf. Michael T. Much, "Dharmakīrti's Definition of 'Points of Defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*)", in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, ed. Bimal K. Matilal and Robert D. Evans, Dordrecht etc. 1986, 133-142 (with a synopsis of the definitions on p. 138).

[5] VN 3,1-60,3.

[6] Dharmakīrti expounds the definitory term *asādhanāṅgavacanam* ("non-means-of-proof-formulation") which entails the definitions of the possible "points of defeat" on the side of the propounder (*vādin*). When the negation is constructed with the second member of the compound (**sādhanāṅgasya avacanam* VN 3,1f.), i.e. "the non-formulation of a means of proof"), it is further taken to mean "the non-formulation of such means (*aṅga*) of inferential cognition (*sādhana* = *siddhi*) as are available in form of the only threefold indicator (*trividham eva liṅgam*)" (VN 3,3f.). He finally says that "non-formulation" (*avacanam*), i.e. "non-presentation" (*anuccāraṇa*) of this indicator, can have two reasons: "silence" (*tūṣṇīṃbhāva*) or "non-justification" (*asamarthana*) of this means (VN 3,2f.).

of logical reasons or indicators, and that such deficient usage consists in non-justified usage. Here "non-justification" (*asamarthana*) is nothing but the fact that the propounder does not indicate a definite, ascertaining cognition (**niścaya*) with regard to all the three forms or aspects (*rūpa*) of the logical reason.[7] This is the context which requires a description of what a proper, i.e. justified (*samarthita*) logical reason is like. And what follows is – apart from various digressions – a succinct formulation of Dharmakīrti's logic.

He first states the three well-known kinds of possible logical reasons as a means for proving something not perceived: essential property (*svabhāva*), effect (*kārya*) and non-perception (*anupalambha*).[8] Such a reason has to be justified, else its propounder is defeated. Justification (*samarthana*) of the reason means proving the reason's presence in the problematic locus and proving the reason's pervasion by the argued property.[9]

There follow detailed descriptions of what exactly constitutes a proof (*sādhana*) of the pervasion (*vyāpti*) by the argued property (*sādhya*) for each of the three kinds of logical reasons, in other words a theory of the ascertainment of a logical nexus.[10]

In this paper I would like to limit the discussion to the prescriptions concerning the mode of establishing a pervasion in the case of an essential property as reason (*svabhāvahetu*), because it is in this area that we find a manifest shape of Dharmakīrti's final logical thought.[11]

Before we go into the details of this theory it is of considerable relevance for our further remarks to acknowledge again the fact that the context that I described briefly above which demands a justification of the logical reason is of a purely general kind. Thus this context will not content itself with an answer provided within the limited frame of the logical operations of a particular inference only, e.g. the *sattvānumāna*. The justification of a *svabhāvahetu* as proposed below must be the result of a method applicable in all cases of essential properties used as logical reasons.

The definition of the proof of pervasion (*vyāptisādhana*) for a logical reason of this kind in the *Vādanyāya* is this: "In the case of this (essential property as logical reason) a proof of pervasion is the demonstration of a valid cognition which negates (the logical reason) in the contradictory opposite (of the argued property)."[12]

This definition is already extant in a fuller linguistic form in the *Hetubindu*, when the ascertainment of positive concomitance (*anvayaniścaya*) is defined,[13] but the complementation of the two terms – namely <*sādhya-*>*viparyaye* and <*hetoḥ*> *bādhaka-* – is also supported by a later repetition in negative form from the *Vādanyāya*.[14]

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[7] VN 5,1f.: *tasya samarthanaṃ sādhyena vyāptiṃ prasādhya dharmiṇi bhāvasādhanam*, and VNṬ 3,26: *sādhanāṅgasyāsamarthanaṃ triṣv api rūpeṇa niścayāpradarśanam*.

[8] VN 3,3f.: *trividham eva hi liṅgam apratyakṣasya siddher aṅgaṃ svabhāvaḥ kāryam anupalambhaś ca*.

[9] VN 5,1f.: *tasya samarthanaṃ sādhyena vyāptiṃ prasādhya dharmiṇi bhāvasādhanam*.

[10] In the case of a *svabhāvahetu*: VN 6,5-13,2, of a *kāryahetu*: VN 13,3-18,2, and of an *anupalambhahetu*: VN 18,3-60,3.

[11] The extent to which the results gained here are also meaningful for an interpretation of the *kāryahetu* remains to be investigated.

[12] VN 6,5f.: *atra vyāptisādhanaṃ viparyaye bādhapramāṇopadarśanam*.

[13] HB 4,5: *sā sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇavṛttiḥ*. The proposition that Arcaṭa relates *sā* to *vastutas tadbhāvatā* (HBṬ 44,3f.) is a mistake, for only . . . *anubandhasiddhiḥ* of the previous sentence can be referred to meaningfully and grammatically.

[14] VN 8,2: <*evaṃ*>*sādhanasya sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśane* . . .

Dharmakīrti follows this definition with a more detailed explanation than that given in the *Hetubindu*. And with the help of these explanations[15] we can now answer several vital questions: What is the *sādhyaviparyaya*, tentatively translated as "the contradictory opposite of the argued property"? What is the meaning of *bādhaka*? And what is the cognition called *bādhakapramāṇa*?[16] And in general, aside from his having to explain how a logical reason is justified, is there an additional reason for explaining the method of ascertainment in yet more detail?

To answer the last question first, an additional reason can be found in Dharmakīrti's life-long concern with the ideas of his teacher Īśvarasena.

The basic motif for defining the pervasion's proof in this way goes back to the lack of certainty with regard to the logical relation between reason and argued property that seems to have been discovered by Īśvarasena.[17] When Dignāga formulated the third characteristic of a logical reason, i.e. its absence in cases where the argued property is absent (*vipakṣe 'sattvam*), he did not provide any means of control for this "induction domain"[18] thereby opening a door to "the demons of doubt" with regard to the realm beyond a non-omniscient ordinary being's powers of cognition. The impossibility of ascertaining the absence of the reason in the absence of the argued property thus became one of the causes for the fact that Dignāga's formulation of these three characteristics of the logical reason can be considered as a statement of "the necessary conditions of certainty",[19] but not as a statement of "the sufficient conditions of certainty".[20]

Īśvarasena, as I have previously shown, not only discovered this problem but also tried to solve it in two ways: by evolving a theory of non-perception (*anupalambha*) in order to provide a means of control with regard to the absence of something (*abhāva*), and by introducing a fourth characteristic

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[15] VN

6,5-11,1	The proof of a logical nexus (*vyaptisādhana*) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*)
6,5-8,2	1) Definition:
6,5-6	a) Definition: demonstration of a valid cognition which negates the reason in the contradictory of the argued property (*viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopadarśana*)
6,6-8,2	b) Example in form of a *prasaṅga* in the case of the *sattvānumāna*
8,2-11,1	2) Explanation:
8,2-9,2	a) The necessity of a *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*: without it the contradiction between the reason and the contradictory of the argued property cannot be established, the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) would therefore be doubtful and the reason indeterminate (*anaikāntika*).
9,1-2	α) The absence of the reason cannot be established merely by the non-perception (*adarśanamātra*) of a non-omniscient person.
9,3-6	b) The function of a *bādhakapramāṇa* (in case of the *sattvānumāna*): hypothetical establishment of the contradictory of the reason through negation of the reason's pervading property in a hypothetical locus.
9,7-11,1*	c) Refutation of the objection: infinite progress (*anavasthā*) is unavoidable if non-perception is not considered as valid.

* = 9,7-12 + 8,5-6 + 10,1-11,1

[16] Earlier interpretations of these terms deviating in part from mine can be found in Yuichi Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy*, Kyoto 1966: 97 and Katsumi Mimaki, *La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa) et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses (kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi)*, Paris 1976: 55 and 59ff.

[17] Cf. Steinkellner 1966: 82.

[18] The term was proposed by Richard P. Hayes, "An Interpretation of *anyāpoha* in Diṅnāga's General Theory of Inference", in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology* (cf. above note 4) [31-57]: 32.

[19] Cf. Richard P. Hayes, "Diṅnāga's Views on Reasoning (*svārthānumāna*)", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 8/3, 1980 [219-277]: note 33. As the second cause can be considered as the fact that in Dignāga's theorem of the three characteristics of a logical reason (*trairūpya*) the problematic case (*pakṣa*) is not part of the "induction domain".

[20] Cf. note 18.

of the reason (*abādhitaviṣayatva*) especially related to this problem.[21]

For both of these attempts he was continuously criticized by his pupil Dharmakīrti.[22] Dharmakīrti made Īśvarasena's problems his own from the very beginning of his logical work, but rejected his solutions, trying rather to find an answer of his own. On another occasion I have tried to show how Dharmakīrti was motivated by this task and how he elaborated his own solutions.[23] Here, all I want to point out is the fact that it is still this same problem he himself declares to be the motif for the last of his formulations concerning the certainty of a logical relation.

With reference to the example of the *sattvānumāna*, he states that this proof of pervasion is the necessary condition for dispelling any insecurity with regard to the logical relation of reason and argued property: "Since there is no incompatibility (*virodha*) [between the proving property and the contradictory of the argued property] if a valid cognition is not demonstrated in this way, such that it negates the proving (property) in the contradictory of the argued property, the suspicion (*śaṅkā*) that it might be existent or produced and still eternal will never wane, even if an occurrence [of the proving property] in [a locus of the occurrence of] the contradictory of the [argued property] is not perceived."[24] And he continues to express himself on this most important basic and original motif of post-Dignāgean logical research by stating: "Since the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) would then be doubtful, this would be a case of the indeterminate apparent reason (*anaikāntikaḥ hetvābhāsaḥ*)."[25]

Finally he repeats for the last time his central objection to Īśvarasena's attempt to avoid this consequence by providing non-perception (*anupalambha*) as an adequate means of control:[26] "For[27] absence (*vyāvṛtti*) [of the reason in the absence of the argued property] is not (established) by mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*), since the non-perception of someone who does not see everything does not prove absence - in the case of matters distant [in terms of place, time and condition] for somebody with a vision of our (ordinary) kind (simply) does not see certain things even though they exist."[28]

So much for the problem that here is expressly stated to be the motif for formulating the definition of the proof of the pervasion in the manner proposed and not in any other. To repeat: the logical relation between reason and argued property is uncertain and the reason therefore is unjustified as long as the negative concomitance remains doubtful.

Now we can return to the terms of the new method proposed and to our previous questions in order to see whether these terms create the necessary conditions for avoiding this problem, thereby offering a means of providing logical certainty.

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21 Cf. Steinkellner 1966: 82f.

22 Cf. Steinkellner 1966: 75ff. and the refutation of the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇo hetu* in the *Hetubindu* (cf. E. Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Wien 1967: chapter VI). My hypothetical assumption that this *hetu*-theory was Īśvarasena's has meanwhile been corroborated by external evidence as well (cf. Steinkellner 1988: note 47).

23 Cf. Steinkellner 1988.

24 VN 8,2-4: *<evaṃ> sādhanasya sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśane virodhābhāvād asya viparyaye vṛtter adarśane <'pi> san kṛtako vā syān nityaś cety anivṛttir eva śaṅkāyāḥ.*

25 VN 8,4-9,1*: *tato vyatirekasya sandehād anaikāntikaḥ syād dhetvābhāsaḥ.*
* The lines VN 8,5-6 are misplaced and belong to the end of the next page, after 9,12.

26 First formulated in PVSV 12,4ff,; cf. Steinkellner 1966: 75f.

27 Following Śāntarakṣita's explanation (VNṬ 12,7): *apiśabdo yasmādarthe.*

28 VN 9,1-2: *nāpy adarśanamātrād vyāvṛttiḥ, viprakṛṣṭeṣv asarvadarśino 'darśanasyābhāvāsādhanāt, arvāgdarśanena satām api keṣāñcid arthānām adarśanāt.*

What is the *sādhyaviparyaya* and - as a corollary to this question - why does Dharmakīrti use the new term *viparyaya*?

The synonyms available, *vipakṣa*[29] and *sādhyābhāva*[30] explain only the logical function of *sādhyaviparyaya* but not the concept of the term itself, i.e. the particular kind of "absence of the argued property" needed.

First of all we may ignore for the time being and for our purposes the ambiguity of the term *sādhyābhāva* and its use which consists in the fact that it either refers to a locus of such nature that it is a case of the occurrence of the discussed property, or to the property itself.

When Dharmakīrti in the above mentioned sentence says that a suspicion regarding the "induction domain" cannot be ruled out, when a *bādhakapramāṇa* is not demonstrated,[31] the reason is given to consist in the absence of the relation of incompatibility (*virodhābhāva*), i.e. an incompatibility between the proving property (*sādhana*) and the *sādhyaviparyaya*. The result of the function of the *bādhaka* is therefore indicated to consist in the cognition of an incompatibility (*virodha*) which makes all doubt impossible.[32] And the *sādhyaviparyaya* in this case is clearly understood as a property, since only as such can it be incompatible with the proving property. Such an incompatibility[33] then necessarily has to cover the whole logical field and cannot be understood as an "incompatibility of contrariety" (*sahānavasthāna*), but only as an "incompatibility of contradiction" (*parasparaparihāra*) between two contradictories, where a third term is impossible.

The requirement of stringency applied to the incompatibility between the proving property and the *sādhyaviparyaya* in order to remove all suspicion entails a like requirement for the definition of the terms that exclude each other, or else the incompatibility would be meaningless for a statement of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*).

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29 Cf. HBṬ 44,4; *sādhyasya viparyayo vipakṣaḥ tatra*.

30 Cf. VN 9,11: "For in this way the reason would be proven to be absent in the absence of the argued property (*sādhyābhāve 'sau*), . . ." (*evaṃ <hi> sa hetuḥ sādhyābhāve 'sau sidhyet*, . . .). And VN 9,9f: *yad adarśanaṃ viparyayaṃ sādhayati hetoḥ sādhyaviparyaye* . . ., where Śāntarakṣita glosses *viparyayam abhāvam* (VNṬ 11,12), although this refers only to the absence of the reason.

31 Cf. VN 8,2-4 (note 23).

32 Dharmakīrti works with two kinds of incompatibility (*virodha*) (cf. PVSV 5,13-16; 104,15-17; PVin II 13,2-6; NB III 72-75 and F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic II*, Leningrad 1930: 187ff.). The first is defined as *sahānavasthāna* (NBṬ 199,3; cf. also PVSVṬ 36,16 [= Karṇakagomin's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā*, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, repr. Kyoto 1982]), exemplified by the case of "cold and warm" (cf. PVSV 6,1f.; NB III 74), to be taken as an incompatibility between two opposed facts, and is translated best when used in the logical context as "contrariety". This kind of incompatibility, when talking of terms, is an incompatibility of contraries, where a third term is always possible.

The other kind of incompatibility is defined as *parasparaparihāra* (NB III 75, or *anyonyopalabdhiparihāra* PVSV 5,14f.), i.e. as "the mutual exclusion" of two terms, and exemplified by the cases of "being and non-being" or "eternal and non-eternal" (NB III 75; PVSV 5,15). This is an incompatibility between contradictories, a third term being impossible. I therefore translate it as "contradiction".

Clear and most useful observations on possible translations of the term *virodha* and the types of opposition it may refer to can be found in a recent paper by Nandita Bandyopadhyay ("The Concept of Contradiction in Indian Logic and Epistemology", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 16, 1988 [225-246]: note 1). Following her considerations we should not translate *virodha* by "opposition" but use the term "incompatibility". She also proposes the term "absolute contradiction" and "relative contradiction" for the relation of contradiction in the strict sense and for the relation of contrariety respectively, and suggests that "contradiction as a term in the wider sense of incompatibility" may be used as an equivalent of *virodha*.

In the case of Dharmakīrti's usage of the term *virodha* it will not be necessary to adopt these latter generalizations because it is clear in most cases which type of *virodha* is intended. I therefore translate *virodha* by "incompatibility", and interpret it as the relation of contrariety on the logical plane when defined as *sahānavasthāna* (meaning "factual or physical contradiction", cf. *ibid.*, 230-232), and as the relation of contradiction when defined as *parasparaparihāra* ("mutual exclusion").

33 Cf. Śāntarakṣita's explanation: *yadi sādhanasya sādhyavipar<ya>yasya ca* p a r a s p a r a ṃ *virodhaḥ syāt, bhaved adarśanamātreṇa(:-se) śaṅkāyā vyāvṛttiḥ* (VNṬ 8,26f. + 11,28f.)

Now, if the *sādhyaviparyaya* were considered to be nothing but *sādhyābhāva*, i.e. the argued property's absence, the insufficiency of induction cannot be accounted for and a contradiction of the reason to it would not yield the required stringency. This is only the case when *sādhyaviparyaya* is understood as "the property which is in contradiction to the argued property", for only the property contradictory to the argued property is not only a certain case of the absence of the argued property but also excludes a third possibility that could be taken as a further area for the occurrence of the reason, thereby causing the latter to be indeterminate.

Accordingly the *vipakṣa* would then have to be taken as "that locus where the contradictory of the argued property occurs." And this amounts to no less than a new way of expressing the *vipakṣa* or *sādhyābhāva*. I would consider the new element as being that the locus of reference for a formulation of the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) is determined by its contradictory character.

If the *sādhyābhāva* is thus contextually defined as that which is a property in contradiction to the argued property or a locus of its occurrence, this new concept itself may have been sufficient reason for Dharmakīrti to use a new term, *viparyaya*, "the reverse" or "contradictory", instead of the traditional *abhāva*.[34] The term *viparyaya* would then be understood as actually defining the absence (*abhāva*) of either the proving or the argued property as their respective contradictories.[35]

In giving such a concrete meaning to the term *viparyaya* instead of merely taking it as a synonym of *abhāva* we are supported by another passage, where Dharmakīrti explains why he does not deny in general that non-perception can prove an absence:[36] "The non-perception (*adarśana*) which proves the *viparyaya* of the logical reason in the *viparyaya* of the argued property is called a valid cognition which negates this (logical reason) because it conceptually establishes (*pratyupasthāpanāt*) [in the *viparyaya* of the argued property][37] a (property which is) c o n t r a d i c t o r y (*viruddha*) (to this reason)[38]."[39]

And we are further supported by the subsequent argument which points to the establishment of the negative concomitance for the sake of certainty as the task of the cognition under discussion: "For in this way the reason would be proven to be absent (*asan*) in the absence of the argued property

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[34] An additional reason might be found in an attempt finally to clarify (also terminologically) the meaning of *vipakṣa* when we think of the three possible interpretations Dignāga had already dealt with in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (cf. note II, 53 in my translation of the *Hetubindu* and the sub-note for these interpretations; cf. also Kajiyama (cited in note 16) note 181 and Steinkellner 1979: note 81).

[35] Dharmakīrti's usage of the term *viparyaya* is, of course, not limited to the meaning "contradictory opposite".

He does, however, use the term when he refers to the incompatibility of "mutual exclusion" (*parasparaparihāra*), which Stcherbatsky (cited in note 32, p. 187 note 3) refers to as the "'logical opposition' or Contradiction". This is the case not only in the *Nyāyabindu* (cf. NB III 85: *sādhyaviparyaya*, cf. also III 81, 84, 88) but can already be found in his earlier works (cf. PVSV 5,2; 121,25; 174,22).

Besides this strict logical usage as "contradictory opposite", a meaning of merely "the opposite" is also attested, e.g. in PVSV 5,4; 78,23 (v. 156c [=158c]); 79,5; 112,19; PV II 226d; PV III 85d; PV IV 195b).

The term also functions in a spiritual context where it serves as a synonym of *pratipakṣa* (cf. PV I 221b [= 223b] and PVSV 111,7; 163,8) and can also connote "change" (cf. PV I 232b [= 234b] and PVSV 116,13; 135,13).

The only evident usage as a synonym of *abhāva* is PVSV 117,22 (cf. PVSVṬ [cited in note 32] 425,12) and possibly also PV III 85d (cf. PVV 143,3).

Under these circumstances it seems evident that in Dharmakīrti's language *viparyaya* cannot be taken simply as a synonym for *abhāva*.

[36] VN 9,9: *na, <a>bhāvasādhanasyādarśanasyāpratiṣedhāt.*

[37] Cf. VNṬ 11,17f.

[38] Cf. VNṬ 11,14: *asyeti vartate.*

[39] VN 9,9-11: *yad adarśanaṃ viparyayaṃ sādhayati hetoḥ sādhyaviparyaye, tad asya viruddhapratyupasthāpanād bādhaka-pramāṇam ucyate.*

(*sādhyābhāve*), if there it were opposed (*bādhyeta*) by a (property) contradictory to itself (*svaviruddha*) for which a valid cognition is available (*pramāṇavat*)."[40] From the second statement we can understand clearly, that the absence (*abhāva*) of the reason is proven, if its contradictory has been established in the absence of the argued property (*sādhyābhāve*). That means that the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) is proven by a cognition that positively establishes the contradictory of the reason. And it is as a statement of this positive establishment of the contradictory of the reason in (the occurrence of) the contradictory of the argued property that we have to understand the beginning of the first statement therefore,[41] and not as a statement of the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*).

I would therefore propose to translate this beginning as "that non-perception which proves the contradictory (*viparyaya*) of the logical reason in the contradictory of the argued property (*sādhyaviparyaye*)." For Dharmakīrti says that this cognition is called negating the reason because it establishes its contradictory. And he continues to say that this is the only way to prove the negative concomitance.

The absence (*abhāva*) of the reason is then a certain consequence of the presence of its contradictory (*viparyaya*), but not the *viparyaya* itself.[42] If the phrase *viparyayaṃ sādhayati hetoḥ* referred not to the contradictory of the reason, but to its absence (*abhāva*) we would have no meaningful area left in this sentence for the contradictory of the reason (*asya viruddha-*) which is said to be conceptually established.[43]

What is the cognition called *bādhakapramāṇa* and what is the meaning of *bādhaka*? Dharmakīrti explains this cognition in two ways. These can be distinguished as referring to its cognitional and its logical function respectively.

Its cognitional function is explained when he says that "it conceptually establishes a (property which is) contradictory" (*viruddhapratyupasthāpanāt* VN 9,10).[44] By the act of *pratyupasthāpana* this cognition "provides" (*ākarṣati* VN 9,4f.)[45] the desired property. This cognitional function has been explained by Dharmakīrti in PV IV 228-236[46] and can be connected with the verb *prakalpayati* (PV IV 233d = PVin II 25d) which refers to the conceptual cognition of establishment of a "usage" (*vyavahāra*) without a real objective basis (*asatyārtha*) when it affirms (*vidhi*) or negates (*niṣedha*). Here in the *Vādanyāya* this function is conveyed by the term *pratyupasthāpana*, which can therefore be translated as "conceptual establishment".

The logical function of the *bādhakapramāṇa* is explained when Dharmakīrti identifies it as *vyāpakadharmānupalabdhi* (VN 8,6),[47] which already occurs in HB 4,18f. as *vyāpakānupalabdhi*[48] in the

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[40] VN 9,11f.: *evaṃ* <*hi*> *sa hetuḥ sādhyābhāve 'san sidhyet, yadi tatra pramāṇavatā svaviruddhena bādhyeta.*

[41] VN 9,9f.: *yad adarśanaṃ viparyayaṃ sādhayati hetoḥ sādhyaviparyaye, ..*

[42] Here I do not follow Śāntarakṣita who glosses *yad adarśanaṃ viparyayam abhāvaṃ* (!) *sādhayati* (VNṬ 11,12f.)

[43] In addition it may be noted that the two formulations *viparyayaṃ sādhayati hetoḥ sādhyaviparyaye* (VN 9,9f.) and *sa hetuḥ sādhyābhāve 'san sidhyet* (VN 9,11) are too close not to be questioned with regard to the reason for their linguistic difference if *viparyaya* and *abhāva/asat* are taken as synonyms.

[44] Arcaṭa paraphrases *tad viparītadharmapratyavasthāpakam* (HBṬ 44,5), where the adjective *pratyavasthāpaka* evidently bears the same meaning as our substantive *pratyupasthāpana*.

[45] Cf. also HBṬ 44,23f.: *tad viparyayarūpasyāsattvākarṣaṇāt.*

[46] These verses were incorporated into PVin II as vv. 20-28 (for the new counting of the verses in PVin II cf. Steinkellner 1988: 1434) and are translated in Steinkellner 1979: 42ff.

[47] The two lines VN 8,5-6 are misplaced and should follow 9,12.

[48] This kind of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is explained in PV I, 29a-c' [=31a-c'] = PVin II 74a-c' (cf. Steinkellner 1979:

same function. This "non-perception of the pervading property" serves as the reason for a negation of its pervaded property, in our case the original logical reason. Its resultant inferential cognition is the non-existence of the pervaded property, its negation. This cognition therefore results in a "conceptual establishment" (*pratyupasthāpana*) "cancelling" or "negating" (*bādhaka*) this property. *bādhaka* thus means strictly "negating" here, and a "*bādhakapramāṇa*" is a "negating valid cognition" which in the case of the *svabhāvahetu* has the form of an inference from the non-perception of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*).

After these clarifications we can summarize in the words of Dharmakīrti that the proof of pervasion (*vyāptisādhana*) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) consists in the demonstration of a valid cognition which negates (*bādhaka*) the logical reason in the contradictory opposite of the argued property, and that this negation is inferred from the non-perception of the reason's pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*).

A final question remains to be asked, however: whether this method of proving the pervasion is to be applied in all cases of essential properties as reason, or whether different methods are still conceivable for different kinds of such reasons as proposed, e.g., in Dharmakīrti's earliest work?[49] I said in the beginning that the context of the *Vādanyāya*, but also of the *Hetubindu*, is of general kind and requires a proposition for the justification (*samarthana*) of a *svabhāvahetu* valid in all cases. Since Dharmakīrti does not in fact offer alternative methods we have to see how the method proposed is put to work not only in case of the *sattvānumāna*, where we can rely on the example provided by the *Vādanyāya*, but also in case of the *śiṃśapātvānumāna* which is not mentioned at all in the *Vādanyāya* or the *Hetubindu*.

Dharmakīrti uses the *sattvānumāna* to exemplify the various points of the logical structure proposed. He begins with the proof as such as an example for the justification (*samarthana*) of a reason which consists in proving its occurrence in the problematic locus (*dharmin*) and proving the pervasion by the argued property:[50] "E.g.: 'What is existent or produced, all that is impermanent; like a pot etc.; (and) sound is existent or produced.'"[51]

He then exemplifies the demonstration of the valid cognition which negates (*bādhakapramāṇopadarśana*) the reason in the contradictory (*viparyaya*) of the argued property as proof for the pervasion

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136f. for a translation). On Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi* as a logical reason for a cognition of non-existence cf. PVin II 11,12ff. as well as HB § 4.3 with its extensive digression on the nature of negative cognition and my translation and notes (cited in note 22: 60ff., 154ff.)

[49] In my paper delivered at the First International Dharmakīrti Conference in Kyōto 1982 I said in conclusion with regard to Dharmakīrti's first work: "While a method to ascertain the causal relation has been already developed here, a likewise generally applicable method of ascertaining the relation of identity is not given. The required valid cognition is said to be demonstrated by the example, but only in the case of the *kṣaṇikatvānumāna* is an additional inference developed for proving the pervasion (*vyāpti*)."

At that time I was under the impression that Dharmakīrti wanted to say that the demonstration by means of an example is in fact a way of ascertaining the pervasion wherever an example can be provided for essential properties. But I now think that this is not the case at all. The task of the presentation of an example is only to indicate an already established valid cognition regarding the real identity and the logical relation of two essential properties based upon it. And this necessary relation between words, concepts, properties as based upon the undivided identity of the instance of reality referred to does not have to be established or ascertained in a particular way for the simple reason that within the culturally given system of linguistic conventions it is already known (*prasiddhi* cf. PVSV 16,30f. and below 321).

[50] VN 5,1: *tasya samarthanaṃ sādhyena vyāptiṃ prasādhya dharmiṇi bhāvasādhanam*. The sequence implied in this formulation is said to be logically irrelevant. (VN 6,2-5).

[51] VN 6,1f.: *yathā yat sat kṛtakaṃ vā tat sarvam anityam; yathā ghaṭādi; san kṛtako vā śabda iti*.

(*vyāptisādhana*): "If everything existent or produced were not perishing at every moment, it would be only non-existent because it would be excluded from what is defined by capability for causal efficiency, since for a non-momentary (thing) causal efficiency is neither possible successively nor simultaneously. For that which is defined such that no capability can be stated (of it), is a non-existent."[52]

The cognitive function of the *bādhakapramāṇa* which negates the reason thereby "conceptually establishing" its contradictory is exemplified with regard to the reason "existence" (*sattva*) as establishing its contradictory "incapability as the defining characteristic of a non-existent":[53] "Where (causal efficiency) is not possible successively or simultaneously, that is incapable for every (effect); and this (impossibility) is extant in a non-momentary (thing)."[54]

And finally Dharmakīrti exemplifies the argument for the particular pervading property (*vyāpaka-dharma*): "In this case the capability (for causal efficiency) is proven as pervaded by the possibility (to produce an effort) successively or simultaneously, because there is no other way (of producing)."[55]

From these exemplifications the following structure results in case of the *sattvānumāna*: the logical pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the essential properties (*svabhāva*) "existence" (*sattva*) as logical reason (*hetu*) and "momentariness" (*kṣaṇikatva*) as argued property (*sādhya*) is proven by a non-perception of the reason's pervading property "possibility of successive or simultaneous (efficiency) (*kramayaugapadyayoga*) in the case of "non-momentariness" (*akṣaṇikatva*) as the contradictory of the argued property, because this non-perception negates (*bādhaka*) the reason thereby conceptually establishing "non-existence" (*asattva*) as its contradictory property (*svaviruddha*).

In this way the non-perception of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) proves the contradictory of the reason (~h) in the contradictory of the argued property (~s) and thereby establishes the pervasion between reason (h) and argued property (s):

s	~s
h	~h

This is the schematic model that can be drawn for the *sattvānumāna* on the basis of the information available in the *Vādanyāya*. For the *śiṃśapātvānumāna* or comparable inferences we are not given any specific indications as to what the schematic model should look like: there are no trees or *śiṃśapā*s in either the *Vādanyāya* or the *Hetubindu*. So we are forced to construct a schematic model on the basis of whatever information i s available in Dharmakīrti's work as a whole, in order to find out whether the newly developed method for the ascertainment of the logical nexus (*vyāpti*) can be applied at all in this case. This is, of course, an experiment whose result will either prove or disprove the assumption that the proposed method is valid for every essential property used as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*).

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[52] VN 6,6-8,2: *yadi na sarvaṃ sat kṛtakaṃ vā pratikṣaṇavināśi syāt, akṣaṇikasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāyogād arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇato nivṛttam ity asad eva syāt. sarvasāmārthyopākhyāvirahalakṣaṇaṃ hi nirupākhyam iti.*

[53] VN 9,3-5: *bādhakaṃ punaḥ pramāṇam ...... iti pravartamānam asāmarthyam asallakṣaṇam ākarṣati.*

[54] VN 9,3-4: *yatra kramayaugapadyāyogaḥ, na tasya kvacit sāmarthyam, asti cākṣaṇike sa iti.*

[55] VN 8,5f.: *tatra sāmarthyaṃ kramākramayogena vyāptaṃ siddham, prakārāntarābhāvāt.*

That we are allowed or rather forced to construct a model for the case of the *śiṃśapātvānumāna* in accordance with that schema given for the special case of the *sattvānumāna* by Dharmakīrti himself, can be justified by two interrelated arguments. Firstly, the assumption that the method prescribed by Dharmakīrti in the *Vādanyāya* was meant to be valid only for the *sattvānumāna* but not for all other cases of possible inferences using an essential property as reason (*svabhāvahetu*) would imply that Dharmakīrti had presented an incomplete theory of logic in both of his last works, an assumption that one can hardly defend in the face of the general meaning of these works, particularly the *Hetubindu*, as formulations of a theory of logical reason (*hetu*). Secondly, we would have to assume that instead of demonstrating the *sattvānumāna* as a crucial inference of especial Buddhist concern by means of, and on the basis of a logical method developed for undisputable ordinary cases of logical reasons, Dharmakīrti had expounded a logical theory developed only for the *sattvānumāna*. An assumption of this kind would be against all historical and systematic reason. Nevertheless, I must again emphasize that what follows is an experiment of interpretation.

If we take the famous example from Dharmakīrti's first work: *vṛkṣo 'yaṃ śiṃśapātvāt*,[56] our *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇam* could be taken to work in the following way:

Since the *pramāṇa* which negates the logical reason in the field of this property is a non-perception of its pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*), we have to answer the question as to what could serve as this pervading property in the case of the property *śiṃśapātva*.

Here a brief line of Dharmakīrti's is of assistance: "Since only a certain particular possessor of branches etc. is known in this way (i.e. as '*śiṃśapā*')."[57] What can we deduce from this sentence that is of relevance for our question?

"Tree" and "*śiṃśapā*" are both designations (*vyavahāra*) which refer to general properties that can be understood as "the capability for the designation 'tree'" (**vṛkṣavyavahārayogyatva*) and "the capability for the designation '*śiṃśapā*'" (*śiṃśapāvyavahārayogyatva*) respectively according to Dharmottara's explanation.[58] In the sentence quoted above Dharmakīrti means that the property "possessing branches etc." (*śakhādimattva*) as extant in the particular thing which is designated as "*śiṃśapā*" is the reason (*nimitta*) for its designation as "tree". If this essential property, when absent, may force the property of a "capability for the designation as '*śiṃśapā*'" to be absent, as stated in the main clause preceding,[59] it is evident that it is conceived as a pervading property (*vyāpakadharma*) of the latter.

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[56] PVSV 2,16; NB II 16.

[57] PVSV 16,30f.: *śākhādimadviśeṣasyaiva kasyacit tathāprasiddheḥ.*

[58] According to Dharmottara the above inference has the following meaning: "This (thing) can be called 'tree', because it can be called '*śiṃśapā*'" (*vṛkṣavyavahārayogyo 'yaṃ śiṃśapāvyavahārayogyatvāt*, NBṬ 106,11: Cf. also the formulation of this proof in DhPr 107,9f.). And Dharmottara goes on to explain: "In this case a stupid person in an area rich in *śiṃśapā*s unversed in the usage of (the word) *śiṃśapā*, when somebody shows him a tall *śiṃśapā* and says 'this is a tree' then out of stupidity determines the *śiṃśapā*'s tallness too as a reason (*nimitta*) for the usage of (the word) 'tree', (and) then (further) determines the small *śiṃśapā* which he sees as a non-tree. This block is introduced into the usage of (the word) 'tree' as having no other reason than *śiṃśapā*ness. Tallness etc. here [in this *śiṃśapā*, or in this area?] do not constitute further reasons for the usage of (the word) 'tree', only *śiṃśapā*ness is the reason; that is: possessing branches etc. (*śākhādimattva*) as extant in a *śiṃśapā* is the reason (*nimitta*)." (*yatra pracuraśiṃśape deśe 'viditaśiṃśapāvyavahāro jaḍo yadā kenacid uccāṃ śiṃśapām upādarśyocyate 'yaṃ vṛkṣa' iti tad asau jāḍyāc chiṃśapāyā uccatvam api vṛkṣavyavahārasya nimittam avasyati tadā yām evānuccāṃ paśyati śiṃśapāṃ tām evāvṛkṣam avasyati. sa mūḍhaḥ śiṃśapātvamātranimitte vṛkṣavyavahāre pravartyate. noccatvādi nimittāntaram iha vṛkṣavyahārasya, api tu śiṃśapātvamātrāṃ nimittam – śiṃśapāgataśākhādimattvaṃ nimittam ity arthaḥ*. NBṬ 106,11-107,2). Cf. also DhPr 107,22-28.


[59] Therefore either an essential property (*svabhāva*) which is connected with that [real existence of the reason] as such may cause the very essence (*bhāva*) [which is propounded as a reason] to be absent (*nivartayet*), [PV I 23a-c'(=25a-c')] – e.g. the tree a *śiṃśapā*." (*tasmāt tanmātrasaṃbandhaḥ svabhāvo bhāvam eva vā / nivartayet – yathā vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapām*. PVSV 16,27-30). Cf. the *prayoga* formulated by Kamalaśīla: *yo yadvyāpakadharmarahitaḥ sa tadvyāptadharmavikalaḥ, yathā vṛkṣatvadharma-*

Therefore we can assume that this property would have been Dharmakīrti's candidate for the position of the *vyāpakadharma* of the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* had he cared to explain the *śiṃśapātvānumāna* as well.

We can therefore consider as a property contradictory to the argued property (*sādhyaviparyaya*) in the case of the *śiṃśapātvānumāna* the property "non-capability for the designation 'tree'" (**vṛkṣa-vyavahārāyogyatva*) and the property "possessing branches etc." (*śākhādimattva*) as the pervading property (*vyāpakadharma*) of the logical reason "capability for the designation '*śiṃśapā*'" (*śiṃśapā-vyavahārayogyatva*).

The logical nexus between the properties "treeness" and "*śiṃśapā*ness" is then clearly ascertainable by means of the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*: in the case of non-capability for the designation 'tree' a capability for the designation '*śiṃśapā*' is denied because of the non-perception of its pervading property "possessing branches etc."

Thus we would arrive at the same schematic model as in the case of the *sattvānumāna* with the only difference being that the argued property (*sādhya*) and the proving property (*sādhana*) are not coextensive:[60]



In this way the difference between these inferences from two kinds of essential properties as reasons would not be constituted by different methods in ascertaining their logical nexus with the respective argued properties. In both cases the logical nexus (*vyāpti*) of the reason and the argued property would be ascertained by an additional inference, the *vyāpakānupalabdhi*-argument, which proves the absence of the first logical reason (*sattva* or *śiṃśapātva*) in the contradictory of the argued property (*akṣaṇikatva* or **vṛkṣavyavahārāyogyatva*) by a non-perception of the first reason's pervading property (*kramayaugapadyayoga* or *śākhādimattva*) as a second logical reason.

This ends our experiment, I feel successfully, and we are now able to draw the following conclusion: the method proposed in the *Hetubindu* and explained in more detail in the *Vādanyāya* for an ascertainment of the logical nexus (*vyāptiniścaya*) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) is in fact, as should be expected, prescriptive for every logical reason. Towards

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śūnyo ghaṭādis tadvyāptaśiṃśapātvadharmavikalaḥ. (*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, ed. D. Shastri, Varanasi 1968: 1025, 17-19).

[60] It is not of logical relevance here that a part of the argued property's loci, i.e. trees other than *śiṃśapā*s would also be loci of the absence of the reason, because the logical nexus is established only with regard to the absence of the argued property proper.

Moreover, Dharmakīrti defined the pervasion (*vyāpti*) in the *Hetubindu* as an asymmetric relation: "Pervasion is the necessary existence of the pervading (property) where (the pervaded property exists) or the existence of the pervaded (property) only when (the pervading property exists)." (HB 2,7f.: *vyāptir vyāpakasya tatra bhāva eva vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāvaḥ*.) These two definitions can be written as (x) (hx → sx) meaning "For all x is valid: if x (is) h, then x (is) s." and as (x) (~sx → ~hx) meaning "For all x is valid: if x (is) not s, then x (is) not h".

the end of his work Dharmakīrti proposed a new and generally valid method, one that was no longer flawed by a different treatment of the same kind of reason.

What is still to be investigated is the question of whether the different treatments of the *svabhāvahetu* and the *kāryahetu* in this respect were not also resolved in a certain sense in order to design a homogeneous logical system, or at least, whether there are not indications to be found in Dharmakīrti's work that he was aiming in this direction.

At the beginning of this paper I referred to Frauwallner, who paved the path towards a historical interpretation of Dharmakīrti's work. Let me now end this investigation by referring to another great scholar who has, in many important ways, promoted our knowledge of Dharmakīrti's thought and tradition with his critical analysis of the theories and later polemics: Satkari Mookerjee.

Satkari Mookerjee long ago recognized with reference to the *sattvānumāna* that its treatment amounts to an acceptance of a theory of "internal concomitance" (*antarvyāpti*), although he knew that it was not accepted in the Buddhist epistemological school except for the late Ratnākaraśānti.[61] Later[62] Mookerjee saw that this theory was a consequence of Dharmakīrti's concept of the *svabhāvapratibandha* as the real fundament of a logical relation: "The relation of *antarvyāpti* is then a deduction from Dharmakīrti's conception of natural concomitance (*svabhāvapratibandha*)."[63]

Mookerjee also felt Dharmakīrti's importance for the beginnings of the Jaina tradition of the *antarvyāpti*-theory with Siddhasena Divākara.[64] In the *Nyāyāvatāra* this theory and the term for it is to be found - according to our present knowledge - in total isolation and without any Jaina background, but in Dharmakīrti we can now say that this theory seems to be the final product of a life-long occupation with the problem of an ascertainment of the logical nexus at least in the case of the *svabhāvahetu*. And although Dharmakīrti did not himself refer to his new theory by the term *antarvyāpti*, he can definitely be considered its creator.[65]

That his own tradition did not choose to follow these new lines of thought in a straightforward way but chose rather to interpret Dharmakīrti with an emphasis on the Dignāgean heritage, is another matter. But we can fully support the late Buddhist *antarvyāptivādin* Ratnākaraśānti, who insists on Dharmakīrti as the propounder of this theory, when he says that the *ācārya* - whom I consider to be Dharmakīrti - regards the example in the formulation of the *sattvānumāna* merely as a concession to slowminded people, but not as logically necessary.[66]

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[61] Cf. *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, (repr.) Delhi 1975: 380ff. (the first edition of this PhD-thesis 1932 appeared Calcutta 1935).

[62] Cf. "A Critical and Comparative Study of Jaina Logic and Epistemology on the Basis of the Nyāyavatāra of Siddhasena Divākara", *Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin* 1, 1971 [1-143]: 4-9. I would like to thank Prof. E. Mikogami of Ryūkoku University, Kyōto, who called my attention to this work and sent me a copy.

[63] *ibid.*, 7.

[64] *ibid.*, 83f.

[65] On Dharmakīrti's authorship of this theory and on the somewhat enigmatic treatment of the *sattvānumāna* in its logical structure by the later Buddhist logicians cf. the valuable observations and materials collected in Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, "Some Thoughts on *Antarvyāpti*, *Bahirvyāpti*, and *Trairūpya*" (in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology* [cf. above note 4] 89-105), which is in parts a reworking of his paper "Ratnākaraśānti and Ratnakīrti" (in *Surabhi, Sreekrishna Sarma Felicitation Volume*, Tirupati 1983, 131-140).

[66] *Antarvyāptisamarthana*, in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts in Sanskrit*, ed. Haraprasād Shāstri, Calcutta 1910, 112,4-9. Cf. Mimaki (cited in note 16) p. 52.

Abbreviations and Literature

DhPr	*Dharmottarapradīpa*: *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa. [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]*. Ed. D. Malvania. Patna 1955.
HB	*Hetubindu*: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text.* Wien 1967.
HBṬ	*Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra.* Ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Shri Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949.
NB	*Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): v. DhPr
NBṬ	*Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): v. DhPr
PV I	*Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter I: v. PVSV
PV II, III, IV	*Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapters II, III, IV: *Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*. Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206. (PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).
PVin II	*Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Chapter II: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte.* Wien 1973.
PVSV	*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*. Roma 1960.
Steinkellner 1966	Ernst Steinkellner, "Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 10, 73-85.
Steinkellner 1979	Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*. Wien.
Steinkellner 1988	E. Steinkellner, "Remarks on *niścitagrahana*." In *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata*. Eds. G. Gnoli et L. Lancotti, Roma 1988, 1427-1444.
VN	*Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya. With the Commentary of Śāntarakṣita*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1935/36.
VNṬ	*Vādanyāyaṭīkā (Vipañcitārthā)* (Śāntarakṣita): v. VN

LOGIC AND TIME-NESS IN DHARMAKĪRTI'S PHILOSOPHY – HYPOTHETICAL NEGATIVE REASONING (*PRASAṄGA*) AND MOMENTARY EXISTENCE (*KṢAṆIKATVA*)

by

Tadashi Tani, Kōchi

What is Dharmakīrti's leitmotif? He seems to dare to make himself stand on the boundary line between logic and time-ness. The self-identity of logic is destructed by time-ness. But the self-difference of time-ness cannot be proved without logic. This antinomic problem could not be solved without hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*). The abyss between logic and time-ness is proved as self-different momentary destruction of existence from the boundary standpoint of Dharmakīrti. Therefore, the paradoxical and crucial investigation runs through all his works, as a continuing low-pitched sound.

0. Focus of problem to be investigated

Dharmakīrti's logical standpoint on self-different or self-displacing boundary line as time-ness of momentary existence.

In opposition to Dignāga, Dharmakīrti introduced *prasaṅga* (hypothetical negative reasoning) as semi-inference on the basis of essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) in PV IV 12. So far as he conforms to both Dignāga and traditional Indian logical theory, the hypothetical indicator of *prasaṅga* without a realization of the indicator in a real locus (*pakṣadharmatā*) cannot be admitted as a proper indicator. Because the proponent's hypothetical indicator cannot be realized in the opponent's hypothetical locus which is to be negated. Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti intended to prove *prasaṅga* as proper proof for reasons of realization of its reversed formula (*viparyaya*) from *prasaṅga* in PVin III ad v. 2. In his last two works, *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*, this new type of complex *prasaṅga* with its reversed formula is transformed into the determinant cognition of negating [the hypothetical indicator] in the reversed form of the property to be proved (*sādhyaviparyaye [hetor] bādhakapramāṇa*; abbr. SVB-*pramāṇa*) which can determine the essential relation [cf. Steinkellner 1982]. The negation of hypothetical indicator is proved by double *prasaṅga*. The twice-using of *prasaṅga* negates two mutual contradictory properties which pervade hypothetical indicator in the hypothetical locus as the reversed form of the property to be proved, on the basis of the law of excluded middle. Thus, the positive essential relation of indicator can be proved, because the negative necessary relation is proved by the negative cognition [or non-cognition] of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*).

There seems to occur a serious logical circularity: The essential relation determines the validity of both *prasaṅga* and negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*). On the other hand, the latter [= the complex formulation of *vyāpakānupalabdhi* with double *prasaṅga* = SVB-*pramāṇa*] reversely determines the essential relation. The negative cognition as logical indicator (*anupalabdhihetu*) is defined as a derivative indicator from the essential indicator (*svabhāvahetu*) which is based on the essential relation in PVSV 105,1f. and PV IV 269 [cf. Steinkellner 1974: 117]. On the contrary, the negative cognition reversely determines the essential relation in his last work, the *Vādanyāya*.

The aim of this paper is to solve this problematical circularity from the boundary standpoint of logic and time-ness. First, the reversion cannot occur without recognition of *prasaṅga* as proper proof. The turning-point of the reversion from essential indicator to indicator of negative cognition seems to be identified with the transformation of *prasaṅga* into SVB-*pramāṇa*. Secondly, let's take notice of the reason why Dharmakīrti must change Dignāga's logic with realizing a hypothetical logic by introducing *prasaṅga*. Dharmakīrti concentrates all his logical effort on the proof of momentary existence. But the formula of the momentariness of all existence with universal quantifier cannot be proved within Dignāga's inference theory, which needs extra exemplified existence [= locus to be exemplified (*dṛṣṭāntadharmin*)] except the very existence to be proved [= locus to be proved (*sādhyadharmin, pakṣa*)]. Further, for Dharmakīrti, the momentary existence does not imply a stationary point-particle but dynamic self-different or self-displacing existence. The self-difference of existence brings the self-identity of logic to a crisis, because the self-identical logical object on which logical consistency can be constructed cannot be constructed on the momentary self-different object. The momentary self-different or self-displacing existence cannot be identified with positive self-identical concept. The identification by ordinary word-convention and the identity of two logical objects cannot be identified with the complete unique moment of existence (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is defined as the completely differentiated aspect of object from both similar and dissimilar class. Strictly speaking, the momentary existence means the existence which cannot possess self-identity even in one moment. There is only the apparent pseudo-self-identical existence which is constructed by conceptualization. Thus, the validity of inference must be based only on the conceptual differentiation (*apoha*) that can be proved by the relation to one of infinite differentiation-lines of complete self-difference/-displacement of existence. It can be indicated only by negative procedure: hypothetical negative reasoning and asymmetric negative cognition (*prasaṅga* and *vyāpakānupalabdhi*). Thus, the essential logical indicator (*svabhāvahetu*) should be interpreted not as identical indicator but as asymmetric necessary essential-indicator. And the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) is also interpreted as asymmetric necessary relation.

It is contradictory that the self-difference of existence is proved by the postulation of self-identity of existence in logical space. The time-ness of self-different existence, which should be regarded as a self-contradictory concept from the standpoint of ordinary word-conventional level, cannot be proved without the hypothetical negative reasoning as indirect proof. Because the existence cannot be identified with its non-existence as destruction on the basis of real identity.

The proof of momentary self-difference of existence not only does imply Sautrāntika's theory but also transformation of basic cognition as *paratantra-svabhāva* (*parāvṛtti*) in Vijñānavāda. Further, it implies the turning point from conventional determinant cognition (*sāṃvyavahārika pramāṇa*) to the ultimate determinant cognition (*paramārthika pramāṇa*) from the standpoint of Mādhyamaka-Śūnyavāda. From these points of view, Dharmakīrti solves the above mentioned serious logical circularity by means of the momentary self-difference or self-displacement of existence. The above mentioned circularity of the logical theory is solved by the conclusion of inference which is based on the very logical theory. Does a new circularity occur here? He devoted himself to the limit of logic with the utmost logical effort. His logical standpoint is constantly placed on the self-different or self-displacing boundary line as the time-ness of momentary existence. This is the reason why he dares, at great risk, to recognize the hypothetical reasoning as the proper proof-formula.

Our starting point is placed on the investigation of the development of Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *prasaṅga*. Next, our investigation steps into its relation to his basic logical theory and his ultimate logical standpoint: the determination of the essential relation and the self-difference or self-displacing time-ness of momentary existence. Thus, the standpoint of this paper will be focused on logic and time-ness in Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

I. Development of Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *prasaṅga*:
[Transformation from hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*) to proper proof (*prasaṅga-sādhana* and *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*)] [The following order of Dharmakīrti's works is based on Frauwallner 1954]

I.1 Hypothetical negative reasoning in meta-language and *prasaṅga* as negative indicator (*anupalabdhi*)

In the first original work *Pramāṇavārttika* I and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* [Dharmakīrti's first original work, the complex of *Pramāṇavārttika* I and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* is called **Hetuprakaraṇa* by Frauwallner 1954], although *prasaṅga* is not investigated as a formula, Dharmakīrti uses the term *prasaṅga* as meta-language which objectivizes the other logical formulae. The term *prasaṅga* and its variants, *prasaṅgāt*, *prasajyate*, etc. occur at least 102 times in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* in the context of indicating the incompatible sequence or the self-contradiction of a hypothetical statement [cf. Ono/Oda 1989; 16 times in *Pramāṇavārttika*; cf. Yūsho Miyasaka, *An Index to the Pramāṇa-vārttika-kārikā*, *Acta Indologica* 3, 1974, 1-157.]. The *prasaṅga* as the hypothetical negative reasoning has been used by Dharmakīrti, just like a Mādhyamika, in the most important part of proving his new logical theory: the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) in the subjunctive sentence-mode.

> PVSV 10,28-11,1: *na hy asati pratibandhe 'nvayavyatirekaniścayo 'sti. tena tam eva darśayan niścayam āha.* For if there were no [essential] relation, neither an affirmative necessary relation nor a negative one could be determined. Therefore, [Dignāga must have] talked of ascertainment indicating this [essential relation] indeed [tr. in Steinkellner 1982].

Though Dignāga extracted the proper indicator from a 9-types-matrix on the basis of his theory of threefold indicator (*trairūpyahetu*), he did not prove his theory itself. This remained a problem for Dharmakīrti. Thus, Dharmakīrti's original theory of essential relation is superposed on Dignāga's theory. But Dharmakīrti's semantical interpretation does not necessarily overlap the latter. Thus a remarkable transformation occurs. Further, according to Steinkellner 1966, *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* must be read in the context of criticism of Dharmakīrti's direct teacher, Īśvarasena.

Īśvarasena maintains that the negative relation can be determined by mere absence of perception (*adarśanamātra*). Then, Dharmakīrti restricts the non-perception to the restricted non-cognition of a hypothetical cognizable object (*dṛśya*). The mere non-restricted non-perception can include a non-perceivable transcendent object. If the negative necessity (*vyatireka*) is determined by mere non-perception, the non-perceivable transcendent object could be proved by the reversed positive necessary relation (*anvaya*). The universe of discourse of logic should be divided on the basis of the law of excluded middle. Thus, negation in logical space should be interpreted not as absolute negation [= locus-negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)] but as relative negation [= property-negation (*paryudāsa*)]. The former negates the locus in which a property occurs. Thus, it does not affirm the counterpositive property, because the property cannot occur without locus. On the contrary, the latter negates only the property on the assumption of existence of locus. Thus, the latter negation implies the counter-positive object in the locus [cf. Yuichi Kajiyama, "Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosopy", *WZKSO* 18, 1973, 161-175; Shaw 1978 and Tani 1983b]. The negation of X should imply affirmation of non-X by relative negation. This is the reason why he can exclude only one-sided necessary relation (*kevalavyatirekin* and *kevalānvayin*) from his logical space. The dichotomized locus based on excluded middle really excludes Dignāga's regulation of perceivable realization of indicator in the real locus (*pakṣadharmatā*). Dharmakīrti transforms it into substitution-rule of indicator in hypothetical locus. But, here, the invading transcendent object is shut out by the restricted non-cognition of a cognizable object (*dṛśyānupalabdhi*). And the exclusion of a one-sided necessary relation proves the equivalency of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Therefore, these transformations

give an occasion for introducing Dharmakīrti's two original inference-formulations: negative cognition as inferential indicator and hypothetical negative reasoning.

His negative cognition as indicator (*anupalabdhihetu*) is at first regarded as a variant of the essential indicator (*svabhāvahetu*). Prof. Steinkellner's references [Steinkellner 1974: 117, note 1] are as follows: PVSV 105,1f.:

> *asattā punar atrānupalabdhir eva, ata eveyaṃ kāraṇāt kāryānumānalakṣaṇatvāt svabhāvahetāv antarbhavatīti vakṣyāmaḥ*. On the other hand, non-existence is nothing but non-cognition with regard to such a (perceptible thing). For this very reason, this (non-cognition of a perceptible thing), since it has the nature of the inference of an effect from the cause, is subsumed under the *svabhāvahetu*, which we will describe [afterwards]. [Yaita 1985a: 209].

According to Yaita 1985a: 200, note 96, PV IV 269ab (cf. Gnoli [in PV I] p. 192): *kāraṇāt kāryasaṃsiddhiḥ svabhāvāntargamād iyam* ("Because an effect (i.e. *asacchabda-*) is established by means of a cause (*anupalabdhi**), it is subsumed under *svabhāva(-hetu)*, so, . . ." [* Perhaps -*saṃsiddheḥ* (*bsgrubs pas na*)). Here, *svabhāvahetu* has asymmetric direction from *kāraṇa* to *kārya* which is the reversed direction from *kāryahetu*. But the negative cognition has an hypothetical aspect. A typical negative cognition as indicator constructs the negative formula as follows: "There is no pot. Because it is not observed in spite of complete causal complex for the observability of the pot. Namely because a counter-positive object [e.g. empty ground or another object] is perceived." If the perceivable factor is taken away from this negative formula, the negative cognition can be regarded as hypothetical negative reasoning. This negative formula presupposes the positive necessary relation (*anvaya*): if the pot were there, it could be observed. The model is the last state of a causal complex that is necessarily transformed into effect. Dharmakīrti counts it as the essential·indicator (*svabhāvahetu*) based on the model of essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*). The hypothetical negative reasoning is based on the [hypothetical] essential relation. Here, the observability is a hypothetical conception. The hypothetical observability is negated by perception of empty place or counter/contradictory object. When, in spite of completeness of the hypothetical causal complex, object A cannot occur in the case of the occurrence of object B, the non-occurrence implies that B negates A or that A is incompatible with B.

Strictly speaking, the incompatibility or negative determination is defined by Dharmakīrti as follows:

> PVSV 5,13-15: *tathā hy aparyantakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāva 'bhāvād virodhagatiḥ sa cānupalabdheḥ anyonyopalabdhiparihārasthitilakṣaṇatā vā virodho nityānityatvavat*. The incompatibility (opposition/contradiction) [between X and Y] occurs in the following two cases: (1) Absence of X occurs from preceding complete causal complexes, when Y occurs. (2) Occurrence of X or Y is characterized by mutual exclusion, for instance, eternal [object] and noneternal [object].

The former depends on an empirical perception of the counterpositive object as opposition. On the contrary, the latter can be determined by pure logical procedure as logical contradiction. Thus, Dharmakīrti uses the latter as hypothetical negative reasoning which can determine the essential relation. These two incompatibilities as negative determinations are applied to two types of negative cognitions; [type 1]: non-cognition of an observable object (*dṛśyānupalabdhi*) and [type 2]: non-cognition of a non-observable object (*adṛśyānupalabdhi*).

[Type 1]: PV I 203-204:

> *dṛśyasya darśanābhāvakāraṇāsambhave sati / bhāvasyānupalabdhasya bhāvābhāvaḥ pratīyate // viruddhasya ca bhāvasya bhāve tadbhāvabādhanāt / tadviruddhopalabdhau syād asattāyā viniścayaḥ //* With regard to a perceptible thing, the absence of the existence is known when (such a thing) is not cognized (in spite of) there being no cause for the absence of seeing. And,

because, when there exists a thing contradictory (to a thing A) it negates the existence of that (= A), (it follows that:) when the thing contradictory to that (= A) is cognized, there must be the firm conclusion of the non-existence (of A). [Yaita 1985a: 210f.]

The non-cognition of observable object is determined by the perception of the counter-positive object on the basis of the first negative determination of incompatibility as empirical incompatibility, opposition. In PV IV non-cognition is regarded as independent cognition, because it is based on self-cognition as perception [cf. PV IV 270-274, especially 274ab: *tasmād anupalambho 'yaṃ svayaṃ pratyakṣato gataḥ* / (Thus, this non-cognition is independently cognized by perception). In NB II 12-14, the former is exemplified as typical indicator of non-cognition:

> . . . *na pradeśaviśeṣe kvacid ghaṭaḥ, upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher iti. upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptir upalambhapratyayāntarasākalyaṃ svabhāvaviśeṣaś ca. yaḥ svabhāvaḥ satsv anyeṣūpalambhapratyayeṣu san pratyakṣa eva bhavati sa svabhāvaviśeṣaḥ*. . . . [Thesis:] There is no pot on the restricted place. [Reason:] Because it is not cognized, though the condition of cognition is fulfilled. The fulfillment of condition of cognition implies the restricted essential property and completeness of the other indirect conditions of cognition. The essential property which is necessarily perceived, if it [= the essential property] exists and the other indirect conditions of cognition [is fulfilled], is the restricted essential property.

This type is regarded as reversed formula of *svabhāvahetu* and is based on perception. If a complete causal complex which consists of the observable object X and other complete conditions of observation of X is existent, the object X is necessarily observed. This is a model of *svabhāvahetu*. It is remarkable that the *svabhāvahetu* is based on the hypothetical presupposition of a completeness of the conditions for cognition: if the observable object X cannot be observed in spite of the completeness of the conditions for observation. This is the reversed formula from the *svabhāvahetu*. Thus, non-cognition of observable object is based on *svabhāvahetu* and on empirical perception.

On the contrary, the second type of non-cognition with the second negative determination, i.e. non-cognition of non-observable object with the pure logical incompatibility as contradiction, is independent of *svabhāvahetu* and empirical perception.

[Type 2:] By means of this negative determinant cognition, Dharmakīrti solved the problem of "non-cognition of non-observable object (*adṛśyānupalabdhi*)" in the statement that the transcendent basic matter (*pradhāna*), etc. does not exist. This new solution is based on hypothetical negative reasoning from a logical point of view, not from a pragmatic standpoint [cf. Tilmann Vetter, "Das Problem des metaphysischen Beweises in der logisch-erkenntnistheoretischen Periode der indischen Philosophie", *ZDMG* 118/2, 1968, 351-356: section I 6].

> PVSV 105,15-18: *atha yad idaṃ na santi pradhānādayo 'nupalabdher iti. tatra katham asadvyavahāravidhiḥ, sadvyavahāraniṣedho vā. kathaṃ ca na syāt. tadarthapratiṣedhe dharmivācino 'prayogād abhidhānasya nirviṣayasya ca pratiṣedhasyāyogāt*. [Opponent:] Now, there is the [word by Dignāga and so on], "The material cause (*pradhāna*), etc., do not exist, because of non-cognition." and here [in this world] why should there be the affirmation of the treatment (*vyavahāra*) [of an object] as non-existent or the negation of the treatment [of an object] as existent? [Question:] Why not? [Opponent:] [No,] because, when [the existence of] such an object [= *pradhānādi*] is going to be negated, [such an] expression [as *pradhānādayaḥ*] denoting the subject [of a proposition] cannot be used, and [because] a negation without an object [to be negated] is impossible. [Yaita 1985b: 1]

In the first work, *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, Dharmakīrti solved the Meinongian Problem [: "Is there the round and square object?"] from the standpoint of his theory of conceptual differentiation (*apoha*) and pragmatic concept.

PV I 206: *tasmin bhāvānupādāne sādhye 'syānupalambhanam / tathā hetur na tasyaivābhāvaḥ śabdaprayogataḥ //* The non-cognition of it as such is the logical reason [in that word of Dignāga etc.]. And the non-existence of the [*śabdārtha "pradhānādayaḥ"*] itself is not [established], because the word [*pradhānādayaḥ*] is employed [in the inference]. [Yaita 1985b: 1]

According to Yaita ("Hosshō no hininshiki", in *Chūgoku no Shūkyō - Shisō to Kagaku, Makio Ryōkai Hakushi Shōju Kinen Ronshū*, Tōkyō 1984 [35-45]: 41), Dharmakīrti here does not prove the non-existence of the object of the concept but only negates the necessary relation of the concept to the reality. This separation of concept from real object is based on Dharmakīrti's theory of conceptual differentiation (*apoha*). Here, the transcendent basic matter (*pradhāna*) remains to be an undeterminable object whether it can exist or not. Next, Dharmakīrti intended to exclude it from the universe of discourse.

PV I 211: *arthakriyāsamarthasya vicāraiḥ kiṃ tadarthinām / ṣaṇḍhasya rūpavairūpye kāminyāḥ kiṃ parīkṣayā //* What is the use of the examination of a thing [i.e. *śabdārtha*] for people who are expecting it [= effective action]? [It is of no use. For example . . .] What is the use for a wanton woman by examining whether an eunuch is handsome or ugly? [Yaita 1985b: 4]

In the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* the transcendent object is only excluded from the universe of discourse from an empirical pragmatic standpoint. But, if the *arthakriyāsamartha* is identified with existence, the indeterminable transcendent existence in the transcendent third scope is transformed into mere hypothetical existence. Further, if the logical incompatibility is proved in the hypothetical existence, the non-cognition of a non-observable object as hypothetical negative reasoning can determine the non-existence of the hypothetical existence, e.g. *pradhāna*. This is the complex formulation of non-cognition of non-observable object and the second negative determination as logical contradiction. Thus, the complex formulation can be regarded as hypothetical negative reasoning. It is most remarkable that the incompatibility [= contradiction or opposition] also is regarded as criterion of negative determinant cognition (*bādhakapramāṇa*) in the context of constructing *prasaṅga* and its reversed formula (*viparyaya*) in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III. Though these two negative determinations are quoted there, only the latter operates in the context of construction of *prasaṅga* as follows: PVin III D 188b7-189a4; P 286b7-287a4; N 301a2-7:

de ltar byed par nus pa ñid kyaṅ ma yin te / sems pa can daṅ de gñis 'gal ba ma grub pas thal ba daṅ bzlog pa'i sgrub par byed pa dag go bar byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // sṅar rgyu ma tshaṅ ba med pa can 'byuṅ ba las gcig yod pas med pa'i phyir ram phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid kyis 'gal bar rtogs pa yin na / skye ba can daṅ mi rtag pa dag daṅ sems pa yod pa la ni de grub pa ma yin no // . . . / de med pa daṅ de yod pa ni phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid kyis (D : *kyi* NP) *'gal ba'i phyir ro // slob dpon dag gis kyaṅ yan lag can dgag pa la sogs pa rnams su don 'di ñid rnam pa du ma'i sgo nas ñe bar bkod pas rnam pa de lta bu'i raṅ bźin 'gog par mdzad pa yin te // gcig ñid daṅ du ma yod pa ni 'gal ba'i phyir ro // 'gal ba dag ni gcig khas blaṅs pa gźan* (NP: *gźan dag ni gcig khas blaṅs pa* D) *btaṅ ba med na med pa'i phyir chos gñis ka yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro //* Further, it is impossible to formulate so [= the reversed formula (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*)], because non-incompatibility [= non-contradiction] between the mental phenomenon [= *buddhi* in Sāṃkhya's theory] and the two [i.e. non-eternity and productive-ness] cannot prove *prasaṅga* and the reversed formulation (*viparyaya*). . . . . . . <*The incompatibility [between X and Y] occurs in the following two cases: (1) Absence of X occurs from preceding complete causal complexes, when Y occurs. (2) Occurrence of X or Y is characterized by mutual exclusion.*> Then, such [incompatibilities] cannot be proved between the mental phenomenon and the two. . . . . . . The existence and its absence are incompatible objects which are characterized by mutual exclusion. In order to reject the totality [the object with its parts (*avayavin*)], etc. preceding teachers also have negated such [singular form of] essential property

on the basis of deducing plurality of the forms. Because the singularity and plurality are contradictory. The contradictory [two properties] imply that, unless one is excluded, the other cannot exist. Thus, co-existence of both of the two properties can never exist. [see section I.4.5 and p. 386, TEXT 3]

<*> is a citation from PVSV 5,13-15: *tathā hy aparyantakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvād virodha-gatiḥ sa cānupalabdheḥ anyonyopalabdhiparihārasthitilakṣaṇatā vā virodho nityānityatvavat*. From the standpoint of formal logic, it is rather natural that all the other formulae are constructed from the exclusion of most basic formula as the logical contradiction. The negative determinant cognition as self-contradiction of essential properties in a hypothetical locus can reversely determine the validity of a *prasaṅga*-proof. The centroid is transported from *anvaya* to *vyatireka* in *prasaṅga*. In the *Pramāṇa-vārttikasvavṛtti* it has not yet been consciously related to the *prasaṅga*-formulation, it rather only implies a foreshadowing. As mentioned above, the model of *svabhāvahetu* is as follows:

[formula 1] Complete causal complex for cognition of the object X → cognition of the object X

Non-existence of the object is proved as follows:

[formula 2] If the counter-cognition or contradictory cognition is cognized in spite of completeness of causal complex for observability of X → the non-existence of object X

This formulation of negative cognition can be regarded as the hypothetical negative reasoning. Here, the completeness is hypothetically presupposed, because complete infinite conditions, actually or empirically, cannot be enumerated.

In *Pramāṇavārttika* III and IV the conditions are regarded as perceivability in the process of an identical cognitive-continuity or strictly the last state of causal complex, on the basis of the Vijñāna-vāda theory of self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*). Thus, in Dharmakīrti's later works, the hypothetical non-perceivable concept can be realized by self-cognition. And, by means of the contradiction in the pervading property, the negative cognition of pervading property can independently determine the essential relation. From formula 2:

[formula 3] Non-cognition of X [= counter-cognition or contradictory cognition] in hypothetical completeness] → non-completeness of causal complex for observability of X

If this contraposition is logically proved on the basis of self-contradiction, the *svabhāvahetu* can be proved. The formula 1 cannot be proved because of infinite enumeration. But the formula 3 can be proved by logical mutual contradiction without any empirical verification and any ontological presupposition. Here, the non-cognition of non-observable object (*adṛśyānupalabdhi*) can be proved as the non-cognition of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) by means of the second negative determination of incompatibility, i.e. logical contradiction where one of two objects is defined as the negation of the other object. [cf. section I.5 (concerning the problem that *vyāpakānupalabdhi* can negate the hypothetical object without real locus)]. [see section I.1.2 (concerning *svabhāvapratibandha* as meta-causal model of both *svabhāvahetu* and *kāryahetu*]. In his first work, the negative cognition is regarded as a derivative indicator from the essential indicator, thus the validity of the former seems to be proved by the latter. But in his later works, *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*, its order is reversed. The essential relation should be rather proved by negative cognition with hypothetical negative reasoning. If he regards negative cognition of a hypothetical observable object as one of three proper logical indicators, it follows that he has regarded *prasaṅga* as the proper proof. But this went unnoticed or unasserted until his last two works: *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*. Now, the above mentioned two negative determinations of incompatibility are quoted in another passage of *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III and NB III 73-75 where the isolated locus to be proved (*pakṣa*) is excluded by the law of excluded middle. The exclusion of the third isolated transcendent locus changes Dignāga's realistic *pakṣa*-interpretation

into the hypothetical presupposition in the process of hypothetical negative reasoning. And Dharmakīrti intended to solve the antinomic indicator (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) [see section A-6]. On the contrary, the quotations of the two negative determinations in PV IV 278-279 and PVin II 13,2-4 imply different types of transformation of positive into negative formulae.

I.2 Transformation of determinator of essential relation from ontological presupposition into negative cognition as hypothetical negative reasoning

I.2.1 The essential indicator (*svabhāvahetu*) and the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) are proved by hypothetical negative reasoning

So far as the ordinary realistic aspect of the context of his early works and later guide book for itemized discussion are concerned, the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) seems to be directly determined by empirical real identical object [or real identity] and causal relation, because he classifies the indicator into two basic types: *svabhāvahetu* and *kāryahetu*. And each indicator is semantically interpreted as *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti*. The negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*) is regarded as a derivative indicator from *svabhāvahetu*. Or it is regarded as negative transformation from two positive types. Two indicators seem to possess different necessity. Thus, the essential relation seems to be based on two empirical necessary connections. But it is a reversed interpretation, because both of the two types are based on the essential relation, not vice versa. In the context of *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, the two types of indicator should be regarded as application of the essential relation. According to the excellent paper of Steinkellner 1982, Dharmakīrti has not yet clarified the determinator of the essential relation in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, though he indicates two types of determinator: (1) the third determinator: respective valid determinant cognition (*yathāsvaṃ pramāṇena*) which can determine a twofold necessity [*anvaya* and *vyatireka*] [PVSV 2,13f]. The confirmation by the determinant cognition (*pramāṇadṛṣṭa*) [18,21]. (2) exemplification: the determinant cognition (*pramāṇa*) which is determined by twofold example (*dṛṣṭāntābhyām*) [= *anvaya* and *vyatireka*], (*pramāṇaṃ dṛṣṭāntena*) [PVSV 17,13-18,2], by single example (*dṛṣṭāntena*) [PVSV 18,3-5]. From mutual reverse determinators of (1) and (2), it is assumed that Dharmakīrti has not yet given answer proving a generally applicable method. From (2), it seems to be identified in the stock-example tree-*śiṃśapā*: "This is a tree. Because it is a *śiṃśapā*." And, in the context of PVSV 98,4f., the proof of momentary destruction of existence (*vināśitvānumāna*) also can be identified with (2) [cf. Steinkellner 1982: 5]. In his later works, the proof of momentary existence (*kṣaṇikatvānumāna*) by the logical indicator of existence (*sattvānumāna*) is substituted for the proof of momentary destruction of existence. What relations are there among the three types of exemplification of the essential indicator in *vināśitvānumāna, sattvānumāna* and *śiṃśapā*-example? Did he need the example for the real identical *svabhāvahetu*, in order to prove the identity of two properties [i.e. being made (*kṛtakatva*) = being impermanent (*anityatva*)], because the indicator in the inference [*śiṃśapā* → tree] is an asymmetric s m a l l e r *svabhāvahetu*? But can existence be identified with its non-existence as destruction? Otherwise he would prove self-contradiction [existence = non-existence] as the real identity. Thus, in his later works, he substitutes the proof of momentary existence (*kṣaṇikatvānumāna*) by logical indicator of existence (*sattvānumāna*) for the proof of momentary destruction of existence. Because the former proof seems to be based on real identity of two positive objects: existence and momentary state of existence. But he describes the momentary state of existence, momentary destruction as non-existence in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. In *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya* the respective valid cognition (1), i.e. the third determinant cognition (*yathāsvaṃ pramāṇa*) is determined as SVB-*pramāṇa*. In *Vādanyāya*, at last, the ultimate determinator of SVB-*pramāṇa* is identified with the negative cognition of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). In the *sattvānumāna* the indicator seems to be identified with the property to be proved, but

its identity can be proved without the asymmetric negative cognition of pervading property (*vyāpakā-nupalabdhi*). The real identity cannot be presupposed before proof of momentary self-different existence. But, as mentioned above, there seems to be serious logical circularity: because the negative cognition of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) is described in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* as a deviative indicator of the essential indicator (*svabhāvahetu*) which is based on the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*). This circularity seems to be solved by introducing a hypothetical concept, because the intermediate examples are proved by hypothetical inference: (1) the *śiṃśapā* example is based on the non-cognition of pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). (2) the proof of momentary destruction of existence (*vināśitvānumāna*) is proved by the hypothetical negative reasoning as asymmetric negative cognition (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). (3) the proof of momentary existence, is proved by the complex formulation with double hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*) and the asymmetric negative cognition (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). As mentioned above, the negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*) is proved as an hypothetical negative reasoning. Thus, SVB-*pramāṇa* consists of hypothetical negative reasoning. The essential relation has been implicitly determined by indirectly negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*) based on hypothetical negative reasoning. In proportion to the development of Dharmakīrti's interpretation on *prasaṅga* in the negative formula (*vyatireka*) the determinator of the essential relation is proved only as the negative determination based on hypothetical negative reasoning. This is the reason why his description of the essential relation is always shadowed by a negative determinant description with hypothetical negative reasoning, even in the first work, *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, as follows:

PVSV 16,28-18,14: *tasmāt tanmātrasambandhaḥ svabhāvo bhāvam eva vā / nivartayet* [v. 23ac], *yathā vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapām, śākhādimadviśeṣasyaiva kasyacit tathā prasiddheḥ. sa tasya svabhāvaḥ. svaṃ ca svabhāvaṃ parityajya kathaṃ bhāvo bhavet. . . . kāraṇaṃ vā kāryam avyabhicārataḥ //* [v. 23cd] *kāraṇaṃ nivartamānaṃ kāryaṃ nivartayati, anyathā tat tasya kāryam eva na syāt. siddhas tu kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ svabhāvaṃ niyamayatīty ubhayathā svabhāvapratibandhād eva nivṛttiḥ. anyathaikanivṛttyanyanivṛttiḥ kathaṃ bhavet /* [v. 24ab] . . . *tasmād vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte neṣṭo 'vaśyam ihāśrayaḥ / tadabhāve ca tan neti vacanād api tadgateḥ //* [v. 26] . . . *tadbhāvahetubhāvau hi dṛṣṭānte tadavedinaḥ / khyāpyate* [v. 27ac] . . . [*tena ca pramāṇena sādhyadharmasya tanmātrānubandhaḥ khyāpyate. svakāraṇād eva kṛtakas tathābhuto jāto yo naśvaraḥ kṣaṇasthitidharmā, anyatas tasya tadbhāvaniṣedhāt.*] . . . *viduṣāṃ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalaḥ /* [v. 27cd] . . . *tatpradarśane 'pi kiṃ vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntāśrayeṇeti manyamāna āśrayaṃ pratikṣipati sma.* Thus, [the property to be proved] which is essentially related to [the proving property] implies that the existence itself of [the proving property] is negated [by the absence of the property to be proved]. . . . How can it continue to exist after its essential property was excluded? . . . Or [the absence of] cause cannot be derivated from [the absence of] effect. Negation of cause negates effect. Otherwise, the latter could not be the effect of the former. Because the establishment of the relation of cause and effect implies that the essential property [of the effect] is restricted [by its cause], both of two indicators [i.e. *svabhāva* and *kārya*] are excluded in the case of absence of the [property to be proved] on the basis of the essential relation. . . . [If there is no essential relation between two terms], how can absence of second property be implied by absence of first property? . . . Thus, [the indicator with essential relation] needs no locus in the case of negative exemplification. Because it is [necessarily] indicated from the [contrapositive] statement that [the indicator] is absent in the case of absence of [property to be proved]. . . . [The essential relation] between presence of indicator and presence of [property to be proved] is indicated in exemplifications [only] for the person who cannot cognize [the essential relation]. . . . . . . But only indicator is indicated for the person who cognizes [the essential relation] (v. 27cd). . . . Considering the reason of need of negative exemplification in the case of having

stated [affirmative relation], [Dignāga] excluded the locus [in the case of negative exemplification].

The negative transformation is not wasteful, because:

[PVSV 18,17-19,1 ad v. 28]: *[yad āha arthāpattyā vānyatareṇobhayapradarśanād iti]. . . . tathā hi yat kṛtakam tad anityam ity ukte 'narthāntarabhāve vyaktam ayam asya svabhāvas tanmātrānubandhī pramāṇadṛṣṭas tadbhāvaniyamād iti jñātatadbhāvasyārthāpattyānityatvābhāve kṛtakatvaṃ na bhavatīti bhavati. na hi svabhāvasyābhāve bhāvo bhavaty abhedāt. anyathā tadbhāve bhavatīty eva na syāt. tathā tadabhāve na bhavatīty ukte. tata eva tadbhāvatāvedinaḥ. tathā hy ayam asya svabhāvo yena tadabhāve na bhavati. anyathāyogād iti tattatsvabhāvatāpratipattyā anvayasmṛtir bhavati.* When the necessary relation which is cognized by means of [example = meta-example / theory], the statement of either of the two [*anvaya* or *vyatireka*] recollects it in the other by implication (v. 28). . . . Namely, in regard to not-other-object in the statement that the object to be constructed by causal complex is non-eternal, this individual is its essential property. And it is necessarily related to only the [individual] itself. Because the confirmation by *pramāṇa* determines the necessity of its existence. The cognition of its existence means [by implication] that the constructed-ness [by causal complex] cannot occur in the case of non-occurrence of the non-eternity. The *bhāva* cannot occur without occurrence of *svabhāva*, because the first is not different from the second. Otherwise, it would not imply that if *bhāva* occurs, *svabhāva* occurs. In the same way, when non-occurrence of A in the case of non-occurrence of B is stated, the occurrence of B [in the case of occurrence of A] is implied only from that implication. Namely for the reason of non-occurrence of A in the case of non-occurrence of B, B is essential property of A. Because, otherwise, [this] would not be impossible. By means of cognition that B is essential property of A, the recollection of affirmative relation [A → B] occurs.

The hypothetical negative reasoning transforms semi-inductive Dignāga's Bahirvyāptivāda into the hypothetical deductive system as Antarvyāptivāda. If the negative necessity (*vyatireka*) can be determined without a real locus, the hypothetical negative reasoning is substituted for empirical exemplification. And the positive necessity (*anvaya*) can be determined by the determination of negative necessity, on the basis of equivalent necessity. Thus, the passage '[the indicator] is absent in the case of absence of [property to be proved].' (v. 26) is transformed into SVB-*pramāṇa* in his later works.

Here, the essential property or essential relation can be determined by negative necessary relation (*vyatireka*) on the basis of 'impossibility in another case (*anyathāyoga*)'. This interpretation seems to be identified with Pātrasvāmin in *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* or Siddhasena's theory of *antarvyāpti* (*anyathānupapannatva*). But Dharmakīrti restricts it to *vyatireka*, because he excludes the transcendent scope by the restricted negative cognition. The essential property or the essential relation is interpreted as 'not other existence (*anarthāntarabhāva*)' or 'non-different (*abheda*)'. Here, *abheda* implies no real identity but only necessary relation. This interpretation can be found in another text, for instance: PV I 39ab and PVSV:

yo hi bhāvamātrānurodhī svabhāvas tatrāvinābhāvo bhāvasyeṣyate / tadabhāve svayaṃ bhāvasyābhavaḥ syād abhedataḥ // It is recognized that *bhāva* is necessary related to the *svabhāva* which is in conformity with only *bhāva*. If *svabhāva* is absent, *bhāva* would be necessarily/independently absent, because [*bhāva*] is not different from [*svabhāva*].

If *bhāva* is interpreted without ordinary self-evident ontology, it should be interpreted as "property without real locus" close to the Buddhist's basic concept of *pratītyasamutpādana*. Thus, *svabhāva* is interpreted as "essential property". There is only a relation between properties. Thus, *bhāva* proves

momentary existence. Although the word *abheda* is translated into real identity by relative negation with affirmation of its counter-object (*paryudāsa*). But this term should be translated into non-difference by *prasajyapratiṣedha*. The non-difference is not necessary real identity for reasons of absence of the same self-identical basic locus where two objects are identified. Because *svabhāva* is the essential property of the *bhāva*, these two are non-different and not identified. If existence is identified with non-existence, serious contradiction will occur. Thus, the latter part of the text can be translated as follows: "If *svabhāva* is absent, *bhāva* would be necessarily absent". By locus-negation, the essential relation implies necessity of self-difference/transformation from existence to non-existence without the eternal self-identical substance of naive realistic ontology. The interpretation that non-difference does not imply identity, is found in Dharmottara's commentary on *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I from the standpoint of Nirākāravijñānavāda. Against Prajñākaragupta he does not regard non-difference of form (*ākāra*) and cognition itself as identity with regard to the problem *sahopalamba-niyama* [cf. Matsumoto 1980a, 1980b]. Thus, the expression of 'conformity of existence itself (*tanmātra-sambandha*)' or reversely *tanmātrānubandha/bhāvamātra-anurodha* does not necessarily presuppose the real identity. Except in a trivial instance, how can the identity and the causal relation be determined? Or should Dharmakīrti's logical effort be restricted within ordinary self-evidence on the assumption of naive realism or uncritical ontology? The identity and causality should not be presupposed but should be proved. In order to avert the self-contradiction in non-existence of existence, Dharmakīrti interprets the existence as self-different existence, momentary existence or spontaneous destructible existence by introducing time-concept. Thus, real identity cannot occur in the self-different existence. For the same reason, though the existence of *śiṃśapā*[-tree] is not different from the existence of tree in perception-scope and word-convention, the necessary relation of *śiṃśapā*-tree to tree is really determined not by ontology of the self-identical existence, but by asymmetric logical relation on the basis of negative cognition of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). Thus, the logical necessity of the inference that this is a tree because of a *śiṃśapā* (*vṛkṣo 'yam śiṃśa-pātvāt*), is really determined by the asymmetric negative cognition: if there is no tree, there is no *śiṃśapā*. [PVSV 16,30-17,1: *yathā vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapām. śākhādimadviśeṣasyaiva kasyacit tathā prasiddheḥ, sa tasya svabhāvaḥ*. (For instance [the absence of] tree implies [the absence] of *śiṃśapā*. Because even what possesses particular branches, etc. is [necessarily] named/proved as "tree", the tree[-ness] is the essential property of *śiṃśapā*[-ness].) [cf. PVSVṬ 74,29-75,13].

According to his conceptual differentiation (*apoha*), *śiṃśapā*[-tree] with a [particular] branch, etc. is more particularly differentiated than tree-ness, thus this negatively ordered differentiation proves the positive necessary logical relation [= the pervasion]: if lesser particular differentiation is excluded, the more particular differentiation cannot exist. Therefore, the reversed positive necessary relation or the essential relation is determined by the inference as the differentiation of conceptualization (*apoha*) without empirical observation or ontological identity. This is the reason why Dharmakīrti comments on it as follows: *śiṃśapā*[-tree] is more specialized as possession of [particular] branch, etc., though the underlined part can be translated as follows: the particular object [restricted] by possession of branch, etc. is identified as tree. Thus, there seems to be an ambiguity that it can be interpreted as real identity. This problem will be investigated in the next section I.2.2. The isomorphic determinator of necessity can be found in Dharmakīrti's proof of momentary existence. It is proved by SVB-*pramāṇa* which is based on *vyāpakānupalabdhi* with double *prasaṅga*. The double *prasaṅga* proves the exclusion of two properties which pervade the hypothetical locus. The existence as the possibility of effective operation (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*) possesses time-ness of operation. The contradiction occurs between the time-ness of operation and the hypothetically eternal self-identity. If the essential property does not exist, the existence of indicator cannot exist. Likewise the tree-ness is the essential property of *śiṃśapā*-[tree]-ness. Thus, the *śiṃśapā*-[tree]-ness necessarily implies the existence of the tree-ness

in the locus. This means only asymmetric essential relation, not identity. If the identity were determined by word-convention, perception or ontological presupposition, the inference would be of no use. The identification depends on our cognizer's intention. If Dharmakīrti's logic were restricted only within ordinary consistency, he could not refer to the ultimate determinant cognition (*pāramārthikapramāṇa*).

The essential property (*svabhāva*) is constructed by causal complex as the model of self-different time-ness of momentary existence: PV I 7:

> *hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryotpādo 'numīyate / arthāntarānapekṣatvāt sa svabhāvo 'nuvarṇitaḥ //*
> In the case where the production of the effect is inferred from the totality of conditions as the indicator, the latter [= indicator] is stated to be a case of essential property (*svabhāva*), because it does not stand in need of any other condition. [cf. S. Mookerjee and H. Nagasaki, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*, Patna 1964.: 33]

Though such an indicator is directly defined as *svabhāvahetu*, the criterion of *svabhāva* is not real or factual identity but only the independence of other cause. The independence corresponds to that of self-different destruction of existence without external cause (*ahetuka vināśa*). Thus, the independence does not mean self-identity of static point-existence, but self-different transformation of existence. The interpretation of *kāryahetu* seems to be separated from the standpoint of ordinary word-conventional level as post-Dharmakīrtian theory: threefold or fivefold determination of *kāryahetu*, independently of *svabhāvahetu*. In the same way as *svabhāvahetu*, the *kāryahetu* is defined from standpoint of hypothetical negative reasoning, as mentioned above. PVSV 17,4-8:

> *kāraṇaṃ vā kāryam avyabhicārataḥ //* [v. 23cd] *kāraṇaṃ nivartamānaṃ kāryaṃ nivartayati, anyathā tat tasya kāryam eva na syāt. siddhas tu kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ svabhāvaṃ niyamayatīty ubhayathā svabhāvapratibandhād eva nivṛttiḥ. anyathaikanivṛttyānyavinivṛttiḥ kathaṃ bhavet /* [v. 24ab]. Or [the absence of] cause cannot be derivated from [the absence of] effect. Excluding the cause excludes the effect. Otherwise, the latter would not necessarily be the effect of the former. The establishment of the relation between cause and effect restricts the essential property [of effect by cause], both of two [indicators, i.e. *svabhāva* and *kārya*] are excluded in the case of absence of the [property to be proved] only on the basis of the essential relation. Otherwise [= if there is no essential relation between two terms], how can absence of the second property be implied by absence of the first property?

Here, the first positive definition of *kāryahetu* in PV I 2acl: *kāryaṃ svabhāvair yāvadbhir avinābhāvi kāraṇe hetu* (The effect is an indicator to the cause, so far as the [restricted] essential properties [of the effect] cannot exist without [non-restricted essential property of the cause].) is defined from the standpoint of hypothetical negative reasoning. Really the causality of *kāryahetu* is not determined by an empirical procedure but by SVB-*pramāṇa*: the hypothetical effect [= indicator] is necessarily negated on the assumption of the reversed formula [= negation] of the hypothetical cause [= the property to be proved]. The different names of two types of indicator are based on the application to a different ordinary scope. Both of them are based on the essential relation.

As mentioned above, *svabhāvahetu* is defined as necessary relation of cause to effect. And if for Dharmakīrti the model of ontological presupposition is only the possibility of effective operation (*arthakriyāsamartha*) on the causal relation (*pratītyasamutpādana*), the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) on which both *svabhāvahetu* and *kāryahetu* can rely be regarded as meta-causal model. Thus, Dharmakīrti proves two kinds of model of *svabhāvahetu*. Then, he proves asymmetric causal relation of two essential properties (*svabhāva*): *kāryasvabhāva* and *kāraṇasvabhāva* in the continuous conceptual relation (*santāna*). This interpretation is especially clarified in *Hetubindu*. The *svabhāvahetu* is based on the necessary relation of cause to effect (*kāraṇa* → *kārya*). The model of *svabhāvahetu* is the

last state of successive causal complex or the completeness of non-successive causal complex. HB 17,1-4:

> . . . *kāryadvaividhyaṃ ca sahakārisañjanitaviśeṣaparaṃparotpattidharmakam anyac cāṅkurādivad akṣepakārīndriyavijñānavac ca kāryakāraṇayaḥ svabhāvabhedād iti sarvam uktam*. . . ., und [daß] es zwei Arten von Wirkung gibt, [nämlich die eine] die aus einer Reihenfolge (*paraṃparā*) von Besonderheiten entsteht, die durch Mitursachen hervorgerufen worden sind, wie der Sproß usw., und die andere [Art, bei der dies nicht der Fall ist], wie die Erkenntnis durch das ohne Verzögerung wirkende Sinnesorgan, da das Eigenwesen von Ursache und Wirkung [in diesen beiden Fällen jeweils] verschieden ist, . . . [Steinkellner 1967: 54].

The essential property of the former is regarded as the last restricted state of causal complex (*antyo 'vasthāviśeṣaḥ*). HB 8,22-9,3:

> *tasmād yo 'ntyo 'vasthāviśeṣaḥ sa evāṅkurādijananasvabhāvaḥ*. . . . *kṣanikeṣu bhāveṣv aparāparotpatter aikyābhāvāt*. Deshalb hat der letzte besondere Zustand (*avasthā*) allein das Eigenwesen, den Sproß usw. hervorzubringen. . . . Somit ist [unsere Begründung] nicht unschlüssig, denn wenn die Dinge als augenblicklich [angenommen werden], gibt es, weil sie aus jeweils anderem entstehen, [bei ihnen] keine Einheit. [Steinkellner 1967: 44].

Thus the former model can be identified with the latter from standpoint of self-difference of one momentary existence without a time lag. The *svabhāva* is interpreted as the necessary asymmetric relation of cause to effect, not as identity. Because there is no self-identical object in the momentary existence. On the contrary, the *kāryahetu* is the reverse necessary relation of effect to cause (*kārya* → *kāraṇa*). There is asymmetric relation between two *svabhāvas*; effect-*svabhāva* and cause-*svabhāva*. Thus, *kāryahetu* is based on two different *svabhāvas*. This is the reason why *kāryahetu* is *svabhāvapratibandha*. The above mentioned PV I 2ab and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* are quoted in the *Hetubindu:*

> HB 19,18f.: *kāryaṃ svabhāvair yāvadbhir avinābhāvi kāraṇe, teṣāṃ hetuḥ, tatkāryatvaniyamāt*, . . . Mit wievielen Eigenwesen in der Ursache deshalb die Wirkung nicht-ohne-vorhanden ist, für diese [Eigenwesen] ist sie der Grund wegen der Ausschließlichkeit des deren Wirkung-Seins; . . . [Steinkellner 1967: 57].
>
> HB 20,11-17: . . ., *kāryasvabhāvānāṃ kāraṇasvabhāvakṛtatvāt* . . . *tasmād yo dhūmajananaḥ, so 'gnyādisāmagrīviśeṣaḥ. yo 'gnyādisāmagrīviśeṣajanitaḥ, so dhūma iti kāryakāraṇayor evaṃ svabhāvaniyamāt yasmāt tadvijātīyād utpattir na bhavati. tat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ na vyabhicarati* . . . . . ., weil die Eigenwesen der Wirkung durch die Eigenwesen der Ursachen erzeugt werden . . . Deshalb ist das, was den Rauch hervorbringt, der besondere [Ursachen-]Komplex Feuer usw. [und] das, was durch den besonderen [Ursachen-]Komplex Feuer usw. hervorgebracht ist, ist Rauch. Infolgedessen gibt es wegen der auf solche [eben beschriebene] Weise [gegebenen] festen Verknüpfung (*niyamaḥ*) des Eigenwesens bei Ursache und Wirkung das Entstehen [der Wirkung] aus einem dieser [sobeschaffenen Ursache] Ungleichartigen nicht. Deshalb verfehlt die Wirkung die Ursache nicht. . . . [Steinkellner 1967: 58f.].

The *kāryahetu* too can be interpreted by the same model of successive causal complex with *svabhāvahetu*. But the necessary direction is reversed and defined between two different momentary existences. The necessary relation can be determined by SVB-*pramāṇa*. Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti did not explicitly explain so.

The last phase of a complete causal complex means the self-difference boundary point. At the momentary state existence is destructed. And, at the same time, new existence occurs. The point of destruction of the preceding existence is filled with the production of a new succeeding existence. The gradually integral causal complex of the seed-phase is necessarily transformed into the sprout-phase. Thus, the time interval between existence and its non-existence or new existence is called momentariness. From the standpoint of ordinary conceptualization this necessary momentary continuity is divided

into two conceptualized terms: existence and non-existence [= destruction]. Strictly speaking, the dynamic transformation should be called the self-difference of existence. This necessity of the continuous stream of self-different existence is interpreted as *svabhāvapratibandha* by SVB-*pramāṇa* of two conceptualized terms. Its asymmetric necessity is not determined by self-identical criterion. Thus, hypothetical negative reasoning must be introduced. If A cannot exist without B, then B is interpreted as the essential property (*svabhāva*) of A (*bhāva*). Then A can indicate B logically. From the standpoint of word-conventional conceptualization the self-different time-ness of existence is interpreted in a twofold aspect. Thus, the indicator is classified into two types. (1) From the standpoint of the present one momentary the essential relation is interpreted as *tādātmya*. (2) From the standpoint of more than two momentaries (*santāna*) it is *tadutpatti*. But here, the vivid self-difference of momentary existence has been transported into the ordinary stationary conceptualized time-point-series. The identification is based on conventional human intention, while the causality is relativized by the identification of effect as the object of human intention. Although Dharamkīrti criticizes the dogmatic transcendent statement of other schools on the basis of conventional identity and causal relation, his ultimate logical standpoint is not placed on proving consistency of conventional or ordinary empirical drill on the assumption of naive realism. Thus, the attainment of mere conventional [human] aim (*arthakriyā*) which can determine the identification of effects/operations of pseudo-continuity of momentary existences (*santāna*) should be negated from an ultimate standpoint, because the convergent/focusing identical effect-point is constructed by human conceptualization. Strictly, the identified effect-point of different operations (*eka-arthakriyā*) is the momentary differentiated in the stream of causal complex [cf. Steinkellner 1967: 127]. Dharmakīrti's logic should not be regarded as normal/formal logic, but it includes negative direction, negation of ordinary conventional logic. Namely, for purposes of enlightenment his logical effort implicitly means self-negation of logic by the proof of essential self-difference of existence.

This is the reason why he places *Pramāṇavārttika* I and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* ahead of *Pramāṇavārttika*. Thus, the existence of object cannot presuppose definition [in *Pramāṇasiddhi*] and perception [in *Pratyakṣa*]. He says at the very outset of *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* as follows: Because the discrimination of object from non-object is based on inference . . . [PVSV 1,8: *arthānarthavivecanasyānumānāśrayatvāt*]. Taking as object the four-fold truth (*catuḥsatya*) transforms adherence of ordinary fixed word-convention, epistemology and ontology. It causes a crack in the self-identical object on ordinary level and differentiates within it. And then it reveals a new object in conformity with the second *pramāṇa*-definition.

Although Dharmakīrti sometimes explains that two objects are not different or identical from the standpoint of *vastutaḥ* or *pāramārthikaḥ*, this should not be interpreted as 'real identity' or 'factual identity' in the realistic context. Strictly speaking, the identity cannot be proved on the ultimate level where conceptualization is excluded. It means the self-difference turning-point of transformation from ordinary realistic existence-understanding to the ultimate level. This is the reason why his logical formulation is always shadowed with negative formula which indirectly relates to differentiation of self-different momentary existence by conceptual differentiation (*apoha*). The focus of *apoha* is the non-stationary point of the self-identical real object. That is the self-difference of momentary existence. This is the reason why Dharmakīrti must prove the momentary existence by locus-negation in the directly succeeding section of *apoha* in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*.

I.2.2 Is *svabhāva* real identity or necessary self-difference?

Why does the essential relation seem to be positively or directly determined by an empirical real identical object and a causal relation? Why does Dharmakīrti seem to describe the semantic interpretation of *svabhāva* [= *tādātmya*] as the identity in the ontological context? Dharmakīrti seems to

need an outer-logical base, an ontology as meta-theory, in order to establish the consistency of Dignāga's threefold determination (*trairūpya*) of proper indicator. Thus, he must have based it by ordinary or empirical necessity on the basis of ordinary ontology for an explanation-assumption. Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti implicitly determined it by the hypothetical negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*) based on hypothetical negative reasoning. Because in order to prove the so-called new ontology or negation of ordinary ontology, i.e. momentary destruction of existence, he cannot presuppose any ordinary ontology. Steinkellner 1984 answered the problem which is posed by Matsumoto 1981. The latter criticizes translation of *tādātmya* as 'identity' in Steinkellner 1974. This controversy very deeply inspired the present writer. Because it seems to be a turning-point of Dharmakīrti-interpretation. In Steinkellner 1984 *svabhāva* is interpreted in two contexts. On the contrary, in Prof. Matsumoto's paper, the asymmetric relation of the essential relation cannot be translated into 'identity'. As mentioned above, the present writer's conclusion rather leans to Matsumoto 1981, although the present writer recognizes the consistency of Prof. Steinkellner's excellent philological investigation. Namely, in this trial paper, the present writer tries to read it in the different context, because the real identity is incompatible to Dharmakīrti's leitmotif of momentary destruction of existence. The essential property in ontological context implies necessity of self-difference of existence. In Dharmakīrti's context, no real self-identical existence is permitted. Only conceptual [= non-real] identification is permitted in the non-real hypothetical same locus (*sāmānādhikāraṇya*) by cross-point of two conceptual differentiations (*apoha*). The reality implies necessary and essential self-difference. This asymmetrical necessity of self-difference is proved by asymmetrical negative cognition with the hypothetical negative reasoning. The momentariness of existence can be proved not by self-identity but by the necessity of self-difference of essential indicator (*svabhāvahetu*). In order to criticize Stcherbatsky's own philosophical background of post-Kantian epistemology, Prof. Steinkellner emphasizes the aspect of empirical real or factual identity. Though the post-Kantian specific concept of a priori and analytic identity should be excluded, the identity of existence and momentariness cannot be proved by empirical verification but it can be proved by *prasaṅga* in SVB-*pramāṇa* The SVB-*pramāṇa* is regarded as empirical verification in Steinkellner 1982, but it should be interpreted as complex formula of asymmetric negative cognition (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) with double *prasaṅga*. Thus, the proof is only based on logical necessity of non-contradiction. For purposes of excluding the inductive gap of infinite empirical verifications Dharmakīrti must determine it by negative procedure: negative cognition of pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). This is the reason why he, in his later work, proves a complex *prasaṅga* formula as proper proof. Dharmakīrti's only presupposition is not an ontological identity but a logically necessary self-difference of existence. But if the logical necessity is based on ordinary empirical or ontological identity of existence, all his logical effort is in vain. Because the primary intention of his logical effort, at least, consists in a transformation of the ordinary level (*sāṃvyavahārika pramāṇa*) into the ultimate standpoint (*pāramārthika pramāṇa*). Namely, because he intends to substitute the self-different time-ness of momentary existence for the ordinary ontology of self-identical existence. Or because the proof of momentary destruction of existence on the assumption of identification of two logical terms [: existence and its non-existence as destruction] paradoxically proves the self-contradiction of the real identified object.

The *tādātmya* primarily seems to imply the indicator which denotes the property to be proved as its essential property, as mentioned above. But the term *svabhāva* is problematical. According to Funayama 1988 in later works, NB II 15, HB 5,10-13, VN 9,5f., etc. the logical indicator is reversely regarded as *svabhāva* with the conditional phrase *bhāvamātrānurodhī* or *vastutaḥ*. [The same problem is found by Hidenori Kitagawa ("*svabhāva* ni taisuru ichikōsatsu", *IBK* 17/1, 1968, 928-935) in the text of Sthiramati's commentary on *Vijñaptimātrasiddhitriṃśikākārikā*.] According to Steinkellner 1984: 475, note 57, both of the two the expressions: '*svabhāva* as *hetu* (indicator)' and '*svabhāva* as *sādhya*

(property to be proved)' are based on 'real identity'. So far as our investigation is restricted to philological analysis, his conclusion seems to be above criticism. Then, why is the tree inferred from *śiṃśapā* and not vice versa? Why is it regarded as the non-cognition of asymmetric pervading property that non-existence of *śiṃśapā* is proved by non-existence of tree in NB II 33? [The same problem will be found in the difference in interpretation of *anupalabdhi* between Dharmottara's *vyāpakānupalabdhi-vādin* and Prajñākaragupta's *svabhāvanupalabdhivādin*. See Tani 1984 and section I.5]. How can an asymmetric logical relation be constructed in symmetric real ontological identity? This problem seems to be solved on the assumption of two contexts: an ontological context and a logical one. The *svabhāva* in the logical context implies asymmetrical relation, on the other hand, the *svabhāva* in the ontological context implies real identity. Broadly speaking, Hayes' ("On the Reinterpretation of Dharmakīrti's Svabhāvahetu", *JIPh* 15, 1987, 319-332), Katsura's ("Svabhāvapratibandha Revisited", *IBK* 35/1, 1986, 26-29), Honshū Nakai's ("Suiron no seiritsu ni tsuite", *IBK* 34/2, 1986, (113)-(118)), Funayama's (1988), and Iwata's ("Hosshō no jishōshōin (*svabhāvahetu*) setsu oboegaki", *Tōyō no Shisō to Shūkyō* 5, 1988, 1-32.) interpretations seem to conform to Prof. Steinkellner's two-contexts-interpretation. And some of them recognize the real identity. [Here, to my deep regret there is no space to investigate the difference and importance of each above mentioned remarkable paper concerning semantic interpretations.] It seems to the present writer that philological procedure has its limit with regard to Dharmakīrti's vivid philosophy. Dharmakīrti seems to make himself stand on the boundary line between the ontological and the logical context. The ambivalence of *svabhāva* should not be reduced to his ambiguous word-using or ordinary word-convention. But it should be attributable to the difficulty of the problem of time-ness itself. There seems to be a serious problem: how can Dharmakīrti prove the momentary self-difference of existence as his leitmotif on the assumption of real identity based on the ontological self identical existence? Is it an impossible assumption that his first original philosophical flash cannot but dim out for reasons of an ordinary ontological explanation for others? Is this the reason why he had to write the desperate verse at the end of *Pramāṇavārttika* [see the verse in the end of the last section II.4]? He must have explained his crucial paradoxical non-ordinary necessity of momentary existence in the logical context as the necessity of ordinary empirical necessity: real identity and causality. It must have been contradictory that the self-different time-ness of the momentary destruction is proved by the necessity of a self-identical object in logic. For Dharmakīrti it means the self-negation of logic on the ordinary word-conventional level. The crisis implies transformation (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) from the ordinary determinant cognition (*sāṃvyavahārika pramāṇa*) to the ultimate determinant cognition (*pāramārthika pramāṇa*). The essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) in this boundary context implies the necessity of momentary existence. This transformation never consists in the positive extended line of ordinary word-convention. This problem will again be indicated in the last section II.4. Thus, the term *tādātmya* should not be interpreted as identity, nor real/factual identity. But it should be interpreted as the asymmetric necessary relation between two logical objects which are conceptualized, or as the necessity of self-difference of existence, though it is ordinarily applied to the identified object and called identical indicator from the standpoint of the ordinary word-conventional level. In the process of a proof of momentary existence the real identical existence cannot be presupposed. The ontological commitment of inference based on conceptualization is determined only by hypothetical SVB-*pramāṇa*. The proof of momentary existence reveals the time-ness of self-difference as *śūnyatā*. *Śiṃśapā* and tree can be easily identified from the standpoint of ordinary empirical perception or word-convention, but neither the identification of existence and non-existence as destruction nor the identification of existence and momentariness can be proved by the ordinary empirical perception and word-convention. Here the concept of momentariness implies that the self-contradiction of existence and non-existence in the same object can be solved by the time-concept of momentary self-different existence. Thus, the *śiṃśapā*-model

should be restricted to only metaphorical instance. It can indicate both ordinary identification of existence in the ontological context and asymmetric relation in the logical context, but it cannot indicate the deeper basic time-ness of self-difference upon which the apparent conceptualized pseudo-self-identity of our ordinary word-conventional object is superimposed.

I.3 The proof of independent self-destruction or self-difference of existence (*vināśitvānumāna*)

I.3.1 The model [meta-theory] of essential relation is proved by hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*)

In PVSV 98,4-100,24 and 141,17-150,5 the determinator of essential relation is proved by the proof of the necessity of independent momentary self-destruction or self-difference of existence (*ahetuka-vināśitvānumāna*). As mentioned above, according to Steinkellner 1982, Dharmakīrti in his first period intended to prove *svabhāvapratibandha* on the basis of illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*) or corresponding valid determinant cognition (*yathāsvaṃ pramāṇa*). These terms indicate *śiṃśapā*-example and the proof of the independent momentary self-destruction or self-difference of existence. The proof of the momentary existence should be regarded not as application-instance but as a determinant meta-inference or new determinant cognition (*pramāṇa*). This is crystallized as SVB-*pramāṇa* in his later works. In the just preceding section of the proof in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* he regards the object of word as the construction which is conceptualized by exclusion of the other (*anyāpoha*). And the existential presupposition on the basis of dogmatic ontology cannot as real identity be regarded as the basis of logical necessity. Thus, he regards the reality not as naive realistic ontological identity but as relation to one of infinite differentiation-lines of complete self-differentiation of real momentary existence. Therefore, it is proved by the negative procedure of *prasaṅga* along with the negative differentiation-line. The spontaneous self-destruction of existence [as causal complex] without any other external cause (*vināśitvānumāna*) is typically proved by an hypothetical negative reasoning as follows: if the destruction depends on an external cause, it cannot be necessarily/essentially related to the existence. Or, though the operation of cause presupposes the effect as positive existence, the destruction means non-existence. Therefore, the destruction of existence is independent of any external cause. The positive constructed existence is caused by causal complex. If destruction or non-existence as the transformation of the positive existence is caused by an external cause, the self-difference/displacement is not necessarily related to the existence. As a general rule the cause presupposes the positively constructed existence as the positive effect. But the destruction or non-existence is not regarded as positive existence; thus it needs no other external cause. For there is no cause [except the existence itself] for the self-destruction. This necessary self-difference or self-displacement is the basis of Dharmakīrti's ultimate logical standpoint.

PVSV 100,14-18: *kathaṃ kriyāpratiṣedho. vināśa iti hi te bhāvābhāvaṃ manyante. tad ayaṃ vināśahetur abhāvaṃ karotīti prāptam. tatra yady abhāvo nāma kaścit kāryaḥ syāt svabhāvaḥ sa eva bhāva iti nābhāvaḥ syāt. tasmād abhāvaṃ karotīti bhāvaṃ na karotīti kriyāpratiṣedho 'sya kṛtaḥ syāt.* [Opponent:] Why is the operation negated? [Answer:] Because the destruction implies the absence of existence. Thus, the cause of destruction implies production of non-existence/absence. If the non-existence were the essential property of existence of an effect, it [= non-existence] would be an existence and would not be proved as non-existence. Thus, the production of non-existence implies not-producing any existence. Therefore, the result of the [cause of destruction] is the negation of operation. [cf. PVSV 146,1f. *kriyāpratiṣedha* is interpreted as *prasajyapratiṣedha*; see the next section I.3.2]

PV I 196a: *asāmarthyāc ca taddhetor* / The cause [of destruction] is incapable.

PVSV 142,2f: *pūrvasya svarasanirodhe 'nyasya viśiṣṭapratyayāśrayeṇa vikṛtasyotpatteḥ. astu vāgniḥ kāṣṭhavināśahetuḥ. sa vināśo 'gni janma kiṃ kāṣṭham eva ahosvid arthāntaram.* [. . . *atiprasaṅgāt,*

... *atiprasaṅgāt*]. When the preceding existence is destructed on the basis of its essential property, other existence produces a change on the basis of restricted indirect causes. Which is the destruction produced by fire, the identical object with wood or the other object, if fire is the cause of destruction of wood? [... Both of presuppositions are proved as absurdity].

It is remarkable that the essential property (*svabhāva*) is based not on the ontological real identity but on a twofold mode of operation [i.e. from existence to non-existence] of self-difference of time-ness of existence. His ultimate logical effort is focused on the momentary self-difference of existence. The model of necessary self-difference of existence is the last state of the complete causal complex. The ordinary causal relation, stock-example, e.g. smoke to fire, is secondary interpretation on the basis of conceptualization of the pseudo-continuity (*santāna*) where two word-objects are conceptualized as two self-identical existences. In his last work *Vādanyāya*, this relation is properly reduced also to the proper model by hypothetical negative reasoning as the SVB-*pramāṇa*, in spite of later commentators' empirical interpretation, threefold or fivefold procedures of observation and non-observation. Though he has already regarded causal relation as one type of the essential relation in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, it is separated as similar independent necessary relation for reasons of his conventional interpretation of logic. Dharmakīrti's proof-formulation in the first period conforms to Vasubandhu's. In 1935 Prof. Frauwallner classified three types of the proof: (1) *vināśitvānumāna*, (2) *sattvānumāna*, (3) proof by direct perception (*pratyakṣasiddhaṃ kṣaṇikatvam*). In 1968/1969, Prof. Steinkellner investigated the development of Dharmakīrti's *kṣaṇikatvānumāna*. He proved that the remarkable substitution of (2) for (1) occurs at first in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. In his excellent paper it is proved, pp. 363f., that the proof is based on an indirect semi-proof-formula: "Daß die verursachten Dinge (*saṃskārāḥ*) augenblicklich sind, wird also in apagogischer Weise aus der Tatsache ihres Vergehens erwiesen: Das Vergehen der Dinge ist nur erklärlich, wenn man ihr Augenblicklich-sein annimmt."

In his note 8 this proof is identified with 'die indirekte Beweisführung als eine zweite Methode der Beweisführung [in Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi*]' in the sense of Vṛṣagaṇa's 'Widerlegung' (*dūṣaṇa*). According to E. Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems", *WZKSO* 2, 1958, 84-139, and "Vasubandhu's Vādavidhiḥ", *WZKSO* 1, 1957, 104-146, and Hakuyū Hadano, "Sūron gakuha no ronri setsu, vīta avīta ni tsuite", *Bunka* 11/3-4, 1944, 177-219 and 300-326, and Kajiyama 1984, the semi-proof can be regarded as *prasaṅga*. Prof. Kajiyama regards the first section of *Ru-shi-lun* (如実論 **Tarkaśāstra*) attributed to Vasubandhu (T 32, 1633) as defence of *prasaṅga* proof-formulation. [He regards 方便心論 as the paper of anti-Nyāya logic (反論理学書) on the basis of affirmation of *prasaṅga*]. Although Dignāga's definition of threefold proper indicator (*trairūpya*) is based on the second section of the same *Ru-shi-lun*, Dignāga criticizes Sāṃkhya's *avīta* and *prasaṅga* [PSV ad PS III 14-17: *prasaṅga* is not a proving formula (*sādhana*) but a logical refutation (*dūṣaṇa*). In PS IV 20a-c *prasaṅga-jāti* or *prasaṅga* is included in *jāti*].

Dharmakīrti gradually recognizes *prasaṅga* as *sādhana* and concentrates his attention on momentary self-difference of existence (*kṣaṇikatva*). From an ontological point of view, this meta-theorem does not prove the real identity but only a necessary essential relation, because both, existence and non-existence, cannot be simultaneously identified in the same identical object. Only self-different transformation of existence can be identified with the self-destruction of operation without a self-identical substantial locus. This proves the time-ness of necessary self-difference of momentary existence. In Vasubandhu's text, the proto-type of this proof by hypothetical negative reasoning can be found. This proof is based on *dṛśya*-[*svabhāva*]-*anupalabdhi*. The proper thesis in the second section of *Ru-shi-lun* is as follows: (1) Sound is non-eternal. (2) Because it is produced by power and is produced immediately (*anantaram*). (3) For instance a pot. It is produced by power. As

soon as it has been produced, it is destructed. (4) It can be applied to sound. (5) Therefore, sound is non-eternal. The reversed formulation is as follows: (2)' If it (existence) is eternal, it cannot be produced by power. (3)' For instance empty space which is eternal and which cannot be produced by power. (4)' It cannot be applied to sound. (5)' Therefore, sound is non-eternal. Because all existences are produced by power, the non-eternity is proved. [Sautrāntika negates existence of *asaṃskṛta*]. Another proto-type proof has been found in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* [AKBh 193,7-9 and 194,12-13; see p. 382, NOTE 1-1].

According to Prof. Steinkellner, Dharmakīrti's proof is different from Vasubandhu's. His keen and deep indication is remarkable: "Das Erkenntnismittel (*pramāṇam*) für diese Vyāpti bringt Dharmakīrtis Antwort:

> 'Weil das Vergehen, da es ursachelos ist, aus dem Eigenwesen folgt.' Damit geht er über die Beweisführung Vasubandhus bereits hinaus. Inhaltlich gleich geblieben ist der Satz von der Ursachelosigkeit des Vergehens. Während jedoch Vasubandhu über die Ursachelosigkeit aus der Tatsache des Vergehens die Augenblicklichkeit ableitet, beweist Dharmakīrti durch die Ursachelosigkeit, daß das Vergehen wesentlich zum Ding gehört. . . . Die logische Form des Beweises ist die eines *svabhāvahetuḥ*. Das heißt, daß die Vyāpti auf der Verknüpfung des Dessen-Selbst-Seins (*tādātmyam*) zwischen den beiden Beschaffenheiten 'Hervorgebrachtsein' und 'Nicht-Ewigsein, Augenblicklichsein', beruht. Die Feststellung der Vyāpti geht jedoch nicht nach der von Dharmakīrti später gegebenen Regel [SVB-*pramāṇa* in *Hetubindu*] vor sich, vielmehr wird die Vyāpti aus der Erfahrungstatsache des Vergehens deduziert. Die Tatsache, daß Dharmakīrti im Pramāṇavārttikam eine besondere Regel für die Feststellung des *anvayaḥ* beim *svabhāvahetuḥ* noch nicht kennt, dürfte der Grund dafür gewesen sein, warum er sich hier noch der apagogischen Form des älteren *vināśitvānumānam* zur Feststellung der Vyāpti bedient [Steinkellner 1968/69: 365f.].
>
> [Steinkellner 1974: 127]: ". . ., we cannot but say that an inference from the concept of an essential property (*svabhāvaḥ*) is as empirical as the inference from the concept of an effect (*kāryam*). For in both cases the cause and the justification of the logical relation used is established by additional and pre-inferential empirical investigations."

There is a difference between the two proofs, but Vasubandhu's proof also seems to have already excluded the empirical factor. Though Vasubandhu's proof is regarded as indirect proof, it is not based on the empirical fact [or 'Tatsache'] of destruction. Rather it is based on hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*) which is not based on empirical contradiction. Further, even Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna* with SVB-*pramāṇa* is based on double *prasaṅga*. Though Steinkellner's stressed word 'empirical' is used for the purpose of the criticism of Stcherbatsky's post-Kantian interpretation, it seems to be too stressed, here also. Because, here, Dharmakīrti's essential relation has been determined by the hypothetical negative reasoning, as in his later work. *svabhāva* means essential property. But it cannot be interpreted as real identity. The cross-point of identification of two properties which have different processes of abstraction on the basis of differentiation (*vyāvṛtti* = *apoha*) never means the same real object. According to Steinkellner 1974: 126, the cross-point is properly interpreted as empty object. It means the hypothetical self-different point which is related to one of infinite differentiation lines of real complete self-differentiation of momentary existence. This is the reason why Dharmakīrti adopted *vināśitvānumāna* as necessary self-difference of existence. Thus, he could criticize other schools' self-identity of existence. Dharmakīrti's basic standpoint consists in negating *śābdaprāmāṇya* which realizes identity of word-object with self-identical existence.

1.3.2 The new interpretation of *vināśitvānumāna* [from *vināśitvānumāna* to *sattvānumāna*]

Steinkellner 1968/69 regards his B type proof [PVSV 141,17-150,5] as *vināśitvānumāna*, not yet as *sattvānumāna*, though the indicator is interpreted as *sattāmātrānubandhitvāt* (because of connection to only existence itself). B type seems to be essentially identified with A type [PVSV 98,4-100,24]. In conformity to Prof. Steinkellner's interpretation, the present writer admits essential difference between *vināśitvānumāna* and *sattvānumāna*. But, here, the present writer dares to investigate the difference between type A and B. Strangely enough, Steinkellner's reason for type B is based on Type A [PVSV 99,24-100,8]. There seems to be remarkable description which is slightly different from type A.

> PVSV 145,26-146,1: *na tasya kiṃcid bhavati na bhavaty eva kevalam* [v. 277ab] . . . *na bhāvatīti ca prasajyapratiṣedha eṣa na paryudāsaḥ*. It [= destruction] does not imply that [other] something exists, but implies that anything absolutely does not exist. . . . This expression 'does not exist' [should be interpreted] not as relative negation [= property-negation] but as absolute negation [= locus-negation].

Thus, in *vināśitvānumāna*, the indicator for destruction cannot be related to the non-existence [cf. PV I 278-279].

This interpretation seems to be a sharper formation of type A's description: PVSV 100,17f.: *tasmād abhāvaṃ karotīti bhāvaṃ na karotīti kriyāpratiṣedho 'sya kṛtaḥ syāt*. (Thus, the production of non-existence implies not-producing any existence. Therefore, the result of the [cause of destruction] is the negation of operation/verb.) The term *kriyāpratiṣedho* is expressed in the context of type B. But this slight difference is remarkable. In the context of type A, the stress is located on the following empirical cognition:

> PVSV 100,4-8: *tam asya mandāḥ svabhāvam ūrdhvaṃ vyavasyanti, na prāk, darśane 'pi pāṭābhāvād iti tadvaśena paścād vyavasthāpyate, vikāradarśaneneva viṣam ajñaiḥ. tad ayaṃ sattāvyatirekeṇa nānyat kiṃcid vināśo 'pekṣata iti tadvyāpī*. Dieses Eigenwesen des [Dinges] stellen langsame Geister [erst] nachträglich fest [und] nicht [schon] früher, weil es [ihnen], obgleich sie [das Vergehen] sehen, an Scharfsinn gebricht. Daher wird kraft dieser [Feststellung erst] später [das vergängliche Eigenwesen] festgestellt, genauso wie die Laien [erst] durch Beobachtung einer [krankhaften] Veränderung Gift [im Körper eines Menschen feststellen]. Daher hängt das Vergehen nicht von etwas anderem, das vom Seiendsein verschieden [wäre] ab. Infolgedessen umfaßt [das Vergehen] das [Seiendsein]. [Steinkellner 1968/69: 367f.].

The momentary destruction is too rapid to be perceived for a slow cognizer. Thus, it is indirectly understood by later cognition of an observable change of existence which is caused by force of destruction. For instance, an ignorant person cannot find poison till he observes a change of his physical condition.

Here, the momentary existence is interpreted in the ordinary time-point-series. Thus, Dharmakīrti's statements 'the destruction is not different from the existence (*bhāva*)' and 'the essential property (*svabhāva*) implies the production in phase of one moment (*ekakṣaṇasthāyī jāta*)' are interpreted in the context of ordinary time-concept. Here, a self-identical existence is implicitly presupposed. On the contrary, in the context of type B, the empirical interpretation is entirely excluded by logical interpretation of negation. The type B stresses the self-difference of momentary existence.

Dharmakīrti's momentary destruction of existence does not imply the transformation in the locus of eternal substantial existence. But it means the transformation of existence itself into non-existence without any basic substance. The negation of a locus as basic substance is done by the absolute negation, locus negation. The relative negation negates only property. It cannot negate the locus in which the property is located. Here, *ālayavijñāna* as substantial locus should not be presupposed. If external cause operates, there will be no internal necessity. All the positive existence depends on external causes. On the contrary, destruction means non-existence. Non-existence does not depend to

any external cause. Namely, any external cause cannot operate on non-existence. Therefore, the destruction [= non-existence] is a necessary essential property in the very existence itself. The proof seems to presuppose the destruction of existence as follows: "if existence is destructed, the destruction should not be caused by an external cause". If it were so, this proof would be based on empirical fact. But the destruction is non-existence as absolute negation [= locus-negation]. Thus, the existence implies its non-existence after itself. The non-existence is independent of any other cause. Therefore, existence implies necessary non-existence. Because the negation is interpreted not as relative negation (*paryudāsa*), the object can be both existence and non-existence. Otherwise, presence and non-presence of the same existence, or existence and non-existence in the same locus would be contradictory. But if non-existence is interpreted by absolute negation [= locus-negation], the hypothetical locus of the positive existence is revealed as non-existence by the negation of the locus (*prasajyapratiṣedha*). This apparent self-contradictory reality is expressed as 'destruction' or 'momentary existence'. The present writer would like to call it self-difference, self-displacement as time-ness of *śūnyatā*. The existence which essentially destructs itself cannot be interpreted as self-identical existence. It should be interpreted as self-different existence. Namely the necessity of destruction implies that the locus of existence has been excluded. This proof seems to be the new and proper deductive proof of *vināśitvānumāna*. In a sense this proof is more important than *sattvānumāna*. Because it proves the negative aspect of momentary existence. Namely because the negative aspect proves the negation of an ordinary ontological presupposition and it indicates a new level for the enlightenment by transformation of the basic locus (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*). The transformation of the basic locus (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) is done by locus-negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*).

Though the indicator is positive existence (*sattva*), the *sattvānumāna* is indirectly proved by negation of hypothetical non-momentary existence on the basis of SVB-*pramāṇa* with double *prasaṅga*. The proof on the basis of relative negation constructs a logical space and it proves the positive aspect of momentary existence. On the contrary, the new *vināśitvānumāna* negates its logically presupposed locus and it proves the negative aspect. The latter proof is also based on hypothetical negative reasoning, because the hypothetical locus must be logically negated in the logical space.

[Fig. 0] A new model of *vināśitvānumāna* [two negations on hypothetical locus]
[The present writer's basic idea of two negations here is much indebted to Shaw 1978. The basic formula (L , P) stands for occurrence of property P in locus L. Here, the asymmetric formula is extended to a twodimensional locus: (L , (L , P)). Thus, the hypothetical locus (bL , (hL , hI)) stands for the formula: (basis Locus, (hypothetical Locus, hypothetical Indicator)). h: hypothetical restriction. b: basic. L: locus. I: indicator.].

(bL , (hL , hI))
(bL , (hL , -hL)) [*prasaṅga*]
-hL → -hI
(bL , -(hL , hI))[locus-negation]
(bL , -hI*)
(bL , bI) [bI = proper/basic indicator] [*prasaṅgaviparyaya*]

[Fig. 0'] Two directions of negation: horizontal and perpendicular

paryudāsa (relative negation or property-negation): horizontal negation 
prasajyapratiṣedha (absolute negation or locus-negation): perpendicular negation 

This locus-negation with perpendicular direction frightens ordinary safety of self-identical object in horizontal logical locus. The isomorphic structure is found in the Buddhist's hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*) which negates the opponent's locus with its property. On the contrary, the hypothetical negative reasoning (*tarka*, *prasaṅga*) of other schools does not negate the real locus but negates only the property in the locus.

[Fig. 1] Isomorphism to *prasaṅga* model (see next section I.4)
(L op stands for the opponent's locus)
Opponent's presupposition: [L , A]
Logical necessity based on *svabhāvapratibandha* (*anvaya*): A → B
prasaṅga: [L , A → B] → [L op , B]
bādhakapramāṇa: -B [L op , -B]
Negative logical necessity (*vyatireka*) -B → -A
prasaṅgaviparyaya: [L op , -B → -A]
[property-negation (*paryudāsa*)] [L op , -A]
[locus-negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)] or [-L op , -A]
prasaṅga reveals opponent's self-contradiction of dogmatic relation:
[L op , A and -A] or [L op and -L op]

Then, [hL , h and -h] is interpreted by two types of negation:
The property-negation (*paryudāsa*) stands for [hL , 0]. On the contrary, the locus-negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) stands for [0 , 0]. The former negation excludes only the property, while the latter excludes the locus including the property. The new proof of momentary destruction of existence is proved by the second locus-negation.

Prof. Steinkellner with keen insight drew the dividing line between Vasubandhu's old proof and Dharmakīrti's from ontological standpoint. But, here, our investigation is restricted to Dharmakīrti's interpretation of locus-negation. Dharmakīrti's new *vināśitvānumāna* is developed from Vasubandhu's *ahetukavināśitvānumāna*. On the contrary, *sattvānumāna* is an old formula: all *saṃskṛta* (causal construction) is non-eternal; and its reversed formula: the eternal object is *asaṃskṛta* (non-causal construction). Though the introduction of Sautrāntika-ontological concept of the ability for an efficient operation (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*) is remarkable, the semantic implication is not so much different from the old formulation. The *saṃskṛta* can be identified with the *sattva* [= the existence as the logical indicator] as *arthakriyāsāmarthya*, while non-*arthakriyāsāmarthya* is superposed on *asaṃskṛta*. Both *arthakriyāsāmarthya* and *saṃskṛta* imply the ability of causal power in a causal complex and successive operation. SVB-*pramāṇa* can be superposed on the reversed form (*vyatireka*). The difference of *sattvānumāna* from the old formulation consists in the introduction of hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*) and asymmetric negative cognition (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). These two can prove the necessary relation of the presupposition of the old formulation. Why did the important new *vināśitvānumāna* go backward in his latter works? The present writer assumes the reason as follows: this proper proof with locus-negation is very difficult to understand. In general, it is apt to be regarded as the old *vināśitvānumāna* in the context of the criticism of eternity (*sthirasiddhi-dūṣaṇa*). Thus, Dharmakīrti introduced it into the *vyatireka*-aspect of *sattvānumāna*. The negation of the hypothetical locus in SVB-*pramāṇa*, locus-negation by double *prasaṅga*, is properly based on the locus-negation in his new *vināśitvānumāna*. Dharmakīrti regards the negative cognition of an observable object (*dṛśyānupa-labdhi*) as a relative negation (*paryudāsa*). Thus, he can exclude metaphysical proof [e.g. the Naiyāyika's proof of Īśvara based on *kevalavyatirekin*, etc.] from the logical space. But in the proof of

momentary existence he negates the hypothetical locus, non-momentary existence, where the successive operation negates non-successive operation by property-negation [= relative negation] (*paryudāsa*). The former negation which negates both of two mutually excluded terms can be interpreted as locus-negation [= absolute negation] (*prasajyapratiṣedha*). In *sattvānumāna* the locus-negation is relativized as property-negation in the new logical locus. Thus, momentary existence can be positively proved.

Further, in type B, the process of transposition of *vināśitvānumāna* to *sattvānumāna* can be found. The former proves the negative aspect as destruction [= non-existence] of momentary existence in the context of ontological proof by means of the interpretation of locus-negation. On the other hand, the latter proves the positive aspect as one-phase-existence of momentary existence in the context of the indirect proof, SVB-*pramāṇa* with hypothetical negative reasoning. The latter substitutes the property-negation in the deeper locus of logical space for the former's self-different locus-negation of the ontological strained boundary line [see p. 382, NOTE 1-2].

I.4 Dharmakīrti's new type of complex *prasaṅga* with its reversed formulation

Parallel to the emergence of Dharmakīrti's new logic the Mādhyamika displayed a tendency to become sharply divided into a Prāsaṅgika- and a Svātantrika-type. The former trends to be reduced to mere refutation without a proponent's statement, the latter to end in a one-sided monologue of dogmatism. So far as these two Mādhyamika sub-schools conform to pre-Dharmakīrti logic, the formula of *prasaṅga* (hypothetical negative reasoning) cannot be regarded as *svatantra-prayoga* (independent proof-formula) for reasons of a lacking realization of an indicator in a locus common between two disputants, while *svatantra-prayoga* cannot include *prasaṅga* with hypothetical locus for the same reason. Between these two a sharp boundary line seems to be drawn. In the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* Dharmakīrti must conform to Dignāga's definition of inference-for-others: that the inference should be an information on the object which is realized in the proponent's cognition. The hypothetical object of *prasaṅga* is cognized only by the opponent; thus it cannot be regarded as a proper inference. Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti must prove the provability of *prasaṅga* on which *vināśitvānumāna* as the model of the essential relation is based.

I.4.1 [PV IV] *prasaṅga* as semi-inference on the assumption of *svabhāvapratibandha*

prasaṅga is at first explicitly introduced in the section of inference-for-others. PV IV 12b1-d: *parakalpitaḥ / prasaṅgo dvayasambandhād ekābhāve 'nyahānaye //* [PVBh *prasaṅga*; PVV *ekāpāya*]: (The *prasaṅga* is [deduced] on the basis of opponent's conceptualization. It serves to negate the other term in the absence of the first term on the basis of a necessary relation of two terms) [cf. Yuichi Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy*, Kyoto 1966: 118; Katsumi Mimaki, *La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa) et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses (kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi)*, Paris 1976: n. 224; Tillemans 1986: 156-159; Tani 1981: 21, 1983a: 2, 1983b: 16].

Dignāga regards *prasaṅga* as confutation (*dūṣaṇa*), not as proof (*sādhana*). According to Dignāga's definition of inference-for-others, a proponent must inform of the object which is realized in his locus [at least] by the proponent himself (*svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśa*). So far as Dharmakīrti conforms to this definition, the *prasaṅga* cannot be regarded as inference. Because the indicator in *prasaṅga* cannot be realized in the proponent's locus. And the indicator should prove the hypothetical consequence to be negated. I.e., it must not prove its consequence. Nevertheless, if *prasaṅga* is efficient for refuting the opponent's statement logically, it would hold at least even indirectly a logical validity. First Dharmakīrti intends to solve this problem by the presupposition of an essential relation. He introduced *pra-*

saṅga as semi-proof formula on the basis of logical transformation from the positive logical necessity [H → S] to its contraposition [-S → -H] in the opponent's hypothetical locus. [H stands for *hetu* (indicator). S for *sādhyadharma* (the property to be proved)]. So far as the first formula is based on the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*), the second formula should be regarded as a proper proof-formulation on the basis of a consistent logical transformation. Here, Dharmakīrti seems to stand on the boundary line between his new theory of the essential relation and Dignāga's *trairūpya*-theory.

[Fig. 2] *prasaṅga* type 1
(stands for equivalent formula in two-places expression [X , Y])

From Dharmakīrti's description *prasaṅga* can be interpreted as being of 2 x 2 types:

prasaṅga type 1-1
Implicit logical necessity based on *svabhāvapratibandha*: [H → S]
prasaṅga: [hH → hS]; ([hL , H → S] → [hL , S])
occurrence of incompatibility: [-hS → -hH]; ([hL , -S] → [hL , -H])

prasaṅga type 1-2
Implicit logical necessity based on *svabhāvapratibandha*: [H → S]
Contraposition in hypothetical locus: [-S → -H]
prasaṅga: [-hS → -hH]; ([hL , -S → -H] → [hL , -H])

Then, [hL , H and -H] is interpreted with two types of negation:
Type A [property-negation (*paryūdasa*) [hL , 0]
Type B [locus-negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)] [0 , 0]
The former negation excludes only a property, while the latter excludes a locus including a property. Dharmakīrti's proper interpretation will be proved as the latter in our succeeding investigation.

I.4.2 [PVin II] Introduction of a new proof of momentary existence (*kṣaṇikatvānumāna*) by existential indicator (*sattvānumāna*)

There seems to be an ambiguity concerning the realization of the indicator in *prasaṅga* type 1, because the hypothetical indicator which is formally transformed by pure logical transformation still cannot be realized in the hypothetical locus. Therefore, Dharmakīrti had to substitute the new model of momentary existence (*sattvānumāna*) for *vināśitvānumāna*. The former is proved by a new type of *prasaṅga* as proper proof. The turning point of the substitution was found by Steinkellner 1968/69. PVin II 56 [Steinkellner 1973, 1979]: *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat / asanto 'kṣaṇikās tasmāt kramākramavirodhataḥ //* (What is capable of causal efficiency, that is truly existent here. Non-momentary (things), therefore, are non-existent, because of a contradiction in case of successiveness and simultaneity (of their activity) [Steinkellner 1982: " . . . but it has not been generalized yet as such a methodical device; it is still nothing but 'the respective valid cognition (*yathāsvaṃ pramāṇaiḥ*)' in case of the property 'existence' used as logical reason."]. The double [-binding] *prasaṅga* operates on all possibility of two hypothetical properties which are based on exclusion of middle in the reversed hypothetical locus [*akṣaṇika*]. The negation of the hypothetical locus implies, affirms proper locus [= *kṣaṇika*]. These two loci are regarded as properties in a more basic locus. The interpretation of this proof cannot be found in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II. But it is solved in Dharmakīrti's new interpretation of *prasaṅga* in his later works, starting from *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III to *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*.

[Fig. 3] *prasaṅga* type 3

definition: Existence = df. E: effective operationability (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*). M stands for momentariness, S for successiveness. > stands for pervasion; A>B: B is pervaded by A.]
Proper thesis: E → M ; [L1 = E , M]
(Existence defined as effective operationability is momentary)
prasaṅga 1 [Hypothetical thesis]: -M → E ; [L2 = -M , E]
(If non-momentary object exists or has effective operationability,)
Double-binding *prasaṅga* 2: (S and -S) > E
Logical necessity (*anvaya*-pervasion): E → (S or -S)
(If it operates, the operation is either successive or non-successive)
prasaṅga 2-1: [- M , S] → contradiction
prasaṅga 2-2: [- M , -S] → contradiction
Logical necessity (*vyatireka*) = *vyāpakānupalabdhi*: -(S and -S) → -E
prasaṅga 1 [consequence]: -M → -E
prasaṅga-viparyaya: E → M
Self-contradiction of *prasaṅga* 1: [L2 = -M , E and -E]
locus-negation: -L2 = M → [L1 , -L2] → [L1 = E , M]
Conclusion: E → M

In this process in order to prove the formula [E → M] its contrapositive formula [-M → -E] is hypothetically presupposed. Namely, if the term [E] is negated in the reversed formulation (*viparyaye*) of the hypothetical term [M] by *prasaṅga* 2, the *prasaṅga* 1 deduces *prasaṅga-viparyaya* 1. This is SVB-*pramāṇa*. Thus, SVB-*pramāṇa* consists of twofold-*prasaṅga* and its reversed form (*prasaṅga-viparyaya*). Therefore, the hypothetical property is transformed into the secondary locus in the twofold-locus. Locus-negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) of L2 which is based on twice using of double-binding property-negations (*paryudāsa*), shifts L2 towards the more basic locus, L1. Indication of contradiction is based on the introduction of the time-concept of self-difference of *arthakriyā*. [The proof-process: (1) Double *paryudāsa* to two contradictory properties in hypothetical locus → *prasajyapratiṣedha* to the locus → *paryudāsa* to the locus → counter-locus].

I.4.3 [PVin III] *prasaṅga* aims at locus-negation: double-binding *prasaṅga* and exclusion of antinomic indicator

[p. 385, TEXT 1]
PVin III D 188a5-188b1; P 286a5-8; N 300a6-300b2
(The *prasaṅga* is [deduced] by means of the other's conceptual constructions. For instance:
[Hypothetical thesis:] The singularity [i.e. the universal (*sāmānya*)] which is supposed as presence in plural [objects] cannot hold differentiated restrictions of the place and so on.
[Hypothetical reason:] Because [the singularity] would be negated by the other essential property that cannot be excluded by mixing it with one individual determined to be restricted in place, time and state. Namely, because it is contradictory that such an essential property is differentiated in different place, etc. If the [second] property B is not recognized, both these properties B and A are negated. Because [these two properties] cannot be separated. Namely, because they are directly [really] connected, although [one property A] seems to be different from [the other property B].
[Objection:] Why can the impossible object be proved? [Answer:] Because the object A to be pervaded by the impossibility [of object B] is proved as the impossible object at the [locus] [on the basis of the

impossibility of the object B, too]. If the latter is recognized, the former is necessarily proved. Thus, [this proof] cannot be reversed). [Text: p. 385, NOTE 2-1]

The *prasaṅga* type 2 does not only imply the indication of a self-contradiction in the opponent's presupposed properties but also the exclusion of the opponent's locus [i.e. the substantial universal or self-identical object (*sāmānya*)] with its properties. Thus, the indicator in *prasaṅga* cannot help being a pseudo-indicator without a locus to be realized (*āśrayāsiddha*), as far as the locus is interpreted in the one-sided inference. The *bādhakapramāṇa* is based on self-contradiction between two essential properties which are presupposed in the opponent's locus. Thus, the locus itself is excluded by self-contradiction of its essential property. Two contradictory properties cannot occur in the identical locus. Exclusion of locus reversely negates its properties. [This procedure is the same type as the exclusion of antinomic indicators (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*); cf. Tani 1987c.]

The self-contradiction occurs in two hypothetical properties of the hypothetical locus in the proponent's locus. The opponent's locus can be excluded in the proponent's locus. Thus, opponent's locus can be transformed into the hypothetical locus as a sub-set in the proponent's locus. The exclusion of two contradictory essential properties can be interpreted as being of the same type as the Mādhyamika's procedure of deducing *śūnyatā* from *parasparāpekṣā*. This is developed into a different theory of double *prasaṅga*: neither-nor exclusion [cf. Śāntarakṣita's interpretation of double *prasaṅga* in his proof of *niḥsvabhāva* – p. 386, NOTE 3].

Here, Dharmakīrti uses the term *grub par 'gyur* in the opponent's argument. The negation of the hypothetical locus and property by his new complex *prasaṅga*-formula [*prasaṅga* + *prasaṅga-viparyaya*] is regarded as proper proof.

[Fig. 4] *prasaṅga* type 2

[L op: opponent's locus (*sāmānya*). L pro: proponent's deeper locus. A: occurrence in plural places, etc. B: plurality. >: more basic presupposition (e.g. X > Y: X is more basic presupposition than Y). I: Implicitly presupposed essential property. I = -B: singularity].

Opponent's presupposition: [L op , A] and (implicit presupposition)
Logical necessity based on *svabhāvapratibandha* (*anvaya*): A → B
prasaṅga: [L op , A → B] ↪ [L op , B]
Implicitly presupposed essential property: I] [L op , I = -B]
-[L op , I = -B and B]
[L op , I = -B] > [L op , B]
[L op , -B]
Negative logical necessity (*vyatireka*): -B → -A
prasaṅgaviparyaya [type 1]: [L op , -B → -A]
[property-negation (*paryudāsa*)] [L op , -A]
[locus-negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)] or [-L op , -A]
[L pro , -[L op , A]]
prasaṅgaviparyaya [type 2]: [L pro , -B → -A]

prasaṅga reveals opponent's self-contradiction:[L op , A and -A]

I.4.4 [PVin III] Dharmakīrti's new type of *prasaṅga-sādhana* combined with *prasaṅga-viparyaya* as *svatantra-prayoga*. — [Fluctuation between *prasaṅga* with indicator and without indicator. The latter possesses basic indicator in its reversed formulation.]

Dharmakīrti combined *prasaṅga* with its reversed formula (*prasaṅga-viparyaya*) as *svatantra-prayoga*. And he transports the centroid from the basic essential relation into *prasaṅga*. Further, the realization of the basic indicator is proved by the negative cognition. Therefore the *prasaṅga*-formula [-hS → -hH] which presupposes the basic formula [H → S] should be respectively interchanged as [hH' → hS'] and its reversed formulation: [- hS' → -hH'] (h stands for hypothetical restriction). The hypothetical negative formula is proved by the negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*). If the formula [-hS' and hH'] is negated for reasons of its contradiction, the formulation [-hS' → -hH'] can be proved. Thus, the contrapositively reversed *prasaṅga*-formula [hH' → hS'] is reversely proved as proper proof. So far as the negative cognition is proved as the proper indicator, the *prasaṅga*-formula too is proved as proper proof. Though, as mentioned above, the negative cognition as a variant of the essential indicator is based on the essential relation in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, the negative cognition is really proved as *prasaṅga*. There seems to occur the logical circularity again. Therefore, in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III, Dharmakīrti still stands on the boundary line between his new theory and Dignāga's theory of *trairūpya*. He describes the double-meaning of the indicator in *prasaṅga* as follows: 'But if the indicator can exists, . . .' and 'Even if the indicator does not exist, . . .' These two expressions seem to the present writer that twofold expression is caused by his new type of complex proof-formulation. The first formula with incompatible consequence is a simple *prasaṅga* in a narrow sense [H' → S'], while the latter [-hS' → -hH'] is the contrapositively reversed formula (*prasaṅga-viparyaya*).

The simple *prasaṅga* cannot be regarded as proper proof-formulation, but the complex *prasaṅga* with its reversed formulation can be a proper proof-formulation. [Commentators call the indicator [-hS'] 'the basic indicator'. Because the hypothetically reversed formula from *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅga-viparyaya*) can be based on non-observation of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*), non-observation of essential property (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*) or observation of self-contradictory object (*svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*)] [see section I.5]. This is a new type of *prasaṅga* which can be regarded as *prasaṅga-sādhana*. [The term *prasaṅgasādhana* in post-Dharmakīrti's texts, *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* and *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* etc. is translated *thal 'gyur*. But *thal 'gyur* in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III cannot be determined without Sanskrit original text.]

[p. 385, TEXT 2]
PVin III D 188b1-7; P 286a8-286b7; N 300b2-301a2

((1) [Objection:] Nevertheless, it follows that the indicator is non-established and the recognition etc. are negated in the statement of thesis, because the object which is other than the proponent's recognition is presupposed.

[Answer:] [Such fallacies] never occur, because there is no [non-logical] recognition in the process of [this] logical investigation. On the ground of the cognition of an object X one recognizes another object Y which can be attained by the efficiency of the cognition [of the object X]. Likewise, if a light is recognized, a lamp is [necessarily] recognized. Thus, this is only the [logical] cognition, not the statement of fallacy on the basis of the opponent's dogma. In so far as [an object A] is recognized, the [second] object B which is presupposed in the [presupposition] by the force of logic should be [determined] whether it is completely affirmed or negated. Thus, this [indicator] is not regarded as non-established [or as non-provable].

(2) If the [hypothetical property A] is presupposed, the second hypothetical property B] is derived. Or if the [second hypothetical property B] cannot be [exist], both of these two [hypothetical] properties cannot [exist]. This implies that these two [hypothetical] properties are connected. If [the hypothetical reasoning (*prasaṅga*) is directly] regarded only as definite [proof], there occurs the fallacy of [non-established indicator]. But if the indicator can exist, [the fallacy] cannot occur. Because the object that is acquired on the basis of logic should be necessarily recognized. It has been explained that logic

cannot be negated by [mere] recognition. Because it is the operation of logic that, if the first property is recognized, the second property is necessarily recognized.
(3) Even if the indicator does not exist, [the hypothetical reasoning (*prasaṅga*)] is a proof-formulation that proves the connection between the pervader and the pervaded of the proper indicator.
(4) But it cannot prove the reversed formula, because the indicator is not based on the valid determinant cognition (*pramāṇa*).) [Text: p. 385, NOTE 2-2]

Logical necessity should be prior to dogmatic theses [= dogmatic loci and their inherent essential properties] which are interpreted from the standpoint of their respective different authorized ontology. Here, *prasaṅga* is separated from the opponent's one-sided locus. Dharmakīrti intends to transform it into a hypothetical presupposition in pure logical locus. His description seems to reveal ambiguity. His descriptions in the above text, (2) 'But if the indicator can exist, . . .', (3) 'Even if the indicator does not exist, . . .' and (4) 'the indicator is not based on the valid determinant cognition' are unsettled. If *prasaṅga* were directly identified with Dignāga's proof, it would be false. But from the standpoint of (1) it should hold the logical indicator. Dharmakīrti stands on the boundary line between Dignāga's *trairūpya*-theory of Bahirvyāptivāda (the theory of external determination of logical necessity) and his original theory of *svabhāvapratibandha* as Antarvyāptivāda (the theory of internal determination of logical necessity). This problem could not be solved without a transformation of the concept of logic itself. Thus, he combined the *prasaṅga* with its contrapositive reversed formula (*prasaṅga-viparyaya*) as *svatantra-prayoga*, i.e. the new type of hypothetical complex-inference. This is Dharmakīrti's solution. This is the reason why his description is unsettled. And Dharmakīrti's solution implies the divergency point of the sharply demarcated interpretations among post-Dharmakīrtian commentators. The transposition of the centroid either on *prasaṅga*-aspect or *svatantra*-aspect causes different interpretations among Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta and Śāntarakṣita, etc. [see the next section I.5; cf. Tani 1983b, 1987a]. Single *prasaṅga* lacks locus, thus it cannot determine the property to be proved. Dharmakīrti intended to exclude the affirmation of reversed form from *prasaṅga* by property-negation (*paryudāsa*). [Bhāvaviveka criticized Buddhapālita as follows: If the property A is negated by *prasaṅga*, the property -A is affirmed by property-negation. Candrakīrti interprets negation as locus-negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) without proof.] Dharmakīrti proves it by self-contradictory properties in a presupposed locus.

I.4.5 *bādhakapramāṇa* as self-contradiction of essential properties in a hypothetical locus reversely determines the validity of *prasaṅga*-proof [transposition of centroid from *anvaya*-formulation to *vyatireka*-formulation]

[p. 386, TEXT 3]
PVin III D 188b7-189a5; P 286b7-287a5; N 301a2-301b1
[Objection:] Even in [the Sāṃkhya's formulation: The non-eternal and the productive are not the mental phenomenon [transcendent mental substance]], the non-eternity and productive-ness are negated only as the reversed formula [: the transcendent mental substance is eternal and non-productive].
[Answer:] No one formulates like that. Further, it is impossible to formulate so, because non-incompatibility [non-contradiction] between the mental phenomenon and the two [i.e. non-eternity and productive-ness] cannot prove *prasaṅga* and the reversed formulation.
(1) The incompatibility [between X and Y] occurs in the following two cases:
(a) Absence of X occurs from preceding complete causal complexes when Y occurs.
(b) Occurrence of X or Y is characterized by mutual exclusion.

Then, such [incompatibilities] cannot be proved between the mental phenomenon and the two. [On the contrary,in our formula] with regard to the singularity, only recognition of non-connection with the other essential property, as mentioned above, [deduces] the absence of an object restricted by difference places, and so on. The existence and its absence are incompatible objects which are characterized by mutual exclusion. In order to reject the totality [the object with its parts (*avayavin*)], etc. preceding teachers also have negated such [singular form of] essential property on the basis of deducing plurality of the forms.
(2) Because the singularity and plurality are contradictory. The contradictory [two properties] imply that, unless one is excluded, the other cannot exist. Thus, co-existence of both of the two properties can never exist.
(3) When the reason of recognition of a basic theory of a school is investigated, [*prasaṅga* is used]. Because, otherwise, i.e. after a [dogmatic basic theory] was [blindly] recognized, it cannot be investigated logically.[1] [Text: p. 386, NOTE 2-3].

I.5 Commentators on Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *prasaṅga*

Between Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta seriously different interpretations occur in regard to the above mentioned text 2 in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III. Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati/-buddhi regard *prasaṅga* as only logical transformation of contraposition from the standpoint of Vijñānavāda's solipsism. Dharmottara proves the transformation of *prasaṅga* into *svatantra-prayoga* by locus-negation on the basis of the non-cognition of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). His standpoint seems to be Alīkākāra-Vijñānavāda. Prajñākaragupta criticizes Dharmottara's interpretation of transformable *prasaṅga* and restricts the *prasaṅga* to only an indication of self-contradiction in the opponent's statement on the basis of cognition of the contradictory to the essential property (*svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*). Though such a standpoint seems to be Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, his reason against Dharmottara can be regarded as Satyākāra-Vijñānavāda's. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla transport Dharmakīrti's complex proof-formulation into Svātantrika-Mādhyamika's base. Kamalaśīla transmitted Dharmakīrti's double *prasaṅga* of proof of momentary existence (*kṣaṇikatvānumāna*) into the proof of non-self-identical existence (*niḥsvabhāvānumāna*). Though the opponent's locus is negated by *prasaṅga*, the proponent's implicit or proper basic locus is not negated. Thus, the fallacy of absence of a locus is excluded [see p. 386, NOTE 3]. Jñānaśrībhadra interprets the application of *prasaṅga* as an exclusion of dogmatic loci and the revelation of a neutral locus. Manorathanandin's interpretation seems to be a neutralization of the difference between Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta or to be rather closer to the latter.

D e v e n d r a b u d d h i and Ś ā k y a m a t i / - b u d d h i
Their standpoints seem to be Sākāra-Vijñānavāda [cf. *mam pa dan bcas pa / mam bden*, JGN: 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa, *Grub mtha'i mam bśad*; lCaṅ skya, *Grub pa'i mtha'i mam par bźag pa*; Hakamaya 1976: 16; 'Cittamātra': Kuijp 1979: 11].
The term *svadṛṣṭa* is interpreted as independence of *āgama*. The proof of the independent logical relation can be recognized by both disputants [*Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* D (4217, Vol. 2, Tshad ma, Che

[1] (1) Cf. preceding section I.1
(2) Self-contradiction is interpreted as contradiction of two essential properties of a hypothetical locus, thus *prasaṅga* can be used twice. Start from A and start from B [= -A] can negate the locus itself [see next section].
(3) Preceding dogmatic loci should be excluded. *prasaṅga* can be regarded as hypothetical logic in dialogue/communication (inter-subjects) level.

1b1-326b4) 270a1f.; P (5717, Vols. 130-131, Tshad ma, Che 1-390a8) 320b7f.]. Here, the transformation of the formula [H → S] into the contrapositive form [-S → -H] leaves the transformation of locus out of consideration [H: *sādhanadharma*, S: *sādhyadharma*]. Śākyamati interprets the term *sva* as *ayogavyavaccheda* (*mi ldan pa mam par gcod pas ṅes par gzuṅ pa*, exclusion of non-connection) on the basis of Dignāga's restriction *ubhayasiddha* [PVṬ D 252b5; P 310b3f.].

P r a j ñ ā k a r a g u p t a

PVBh 475,31f. [D 131a3f.; P 154b4f.]:

[1] *prasaṅgasādhanam tan na tu tataḥ sādhyaniścayaḥ. na hi paropagatimātrakāt sādhyaniścayaḥ.* It is proof-formula as *prasaṅga*. But the object to be proved cannot be determined on the basis of the [*prasaṅga-sādhana*]. Because the object to be proved cannot be determined only on the basis of opponent's recognition.

Though the term *prasaṅga-sādhana* is used here, it is not regarded as proper proof.

[2] PVBh 482,28-31 [D 138a2f.; P 162a5f.]: *pareṇākṛtir eva sāmānyam abhyupagatam anyenānyad* [*yaṅ ma khyab pa'i phyir*] *iti prasaṅgasādhanatā. atha vā vyāptitvāt naikavyaktiniṣṭayopalambhaḥ syād iti prasaṅgārthaḥ. viparyayas tu maulo hetuḥ. prasaṅgas tu maulasya hetor vyāptisādhanārtha eva.* An opponent presupposes the form (*ākṛti*) as the omnipresence and as the universal. Nevertheless, non-provability of the omnipresence establishes the *prasaṅga*. Or, *prasaṅga* indicates that, if it is presupposed as the omnipresence, it could not be perceived as its restriction in one individual. But the reversed (*viparyaya*) has the proper indicator. The aim of *prasaṅga* is to prove/indicate the necessary relation of the proper indicator.

The plurality of *sāmānya, kāla* and *ākṛti* is negated by direct perception. The incompatibility which occurs in perception of form (*ākāra*) is cognized by *dṛśyānupalabdhi* as *svabhāvānupalabdhi*. According to the sub-commentator Yamāri [PVBhṬ D 27a2f.; P 32a6], the term *viparyaya* implies that [the universal] restricted to the singular individual (*ekavyaktiniṣṭhatā*) is perceived. The perception of the reversed object implies *dṛśyānupalabdhi* as *svabhāvānupalabdhi* in *prasaṅgasādhana*.

From descriptions (1) and (2), Prajñākaragupta's standpoint seems to be a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's [cf. Kuijp 1979: 11. And 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa, *Grub mtha'i mam bśad* and lCaṅ skya, *Grub pa'i mtha'i mam par bźag pa* regard it as *mam rdzun dri med* of *cittamātra*]. This interpretation too is verified. These Grub mtha' regard Dharmottara's standpoint as *mam rdsun dri bcas* [cf. Hakamaya 1976: 16; Matsumoto 1980a, 1980b, 1980-1982 (parts 1 and 2) and 1981: 966; Kajiyama 1982].

D h a r m o t t a r a

Materials concerning his unique interpretation are collected from his commentary on *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III as follows:

[1] PVinṬ(Dh) D 6b1-5; P 7b2-7:

thal bar bsgrub pa la ni khyab (corr. : *khyad* DP) *par bya ba'i chos gźan gyis 'dod par mthoṅ nas mi 'dod kyaṅ khyab* (P : *khyad* D) *par byed pa'i chos grub par thal bar brjod pa yin te / khyab par bya ba ni khyab par byed pa med par mi 'byuṅ ba'i phyir ro // dper na spyi la sogs pa du ma la yod par 'dod pa na / mi 'dod kyaṅ du ma ñid du thal ba'am / bdag la sogs pa yod pa ñid yin na skad cig ma ñid du thal ba bźin no // chos can ma grub pa'i phyir du ma la yod pa la sogs pa khyab par bya ba'i chos ma grub pa des na khyab par byed pa'i chos su thal bar ga las* (P : *la* D) *'gyur / tshad ma med pa ni brjod par mi 'thad do źe na / de'i phyir 'di khyab par byed pa med pa'i phyir khyab par bya ba med par brjod par 'dod pa yin no // khyab par byed pa med pa de ni spyi la sogs pa med pa la yaṅ grub pa ñid do // de'i phyir mṅon par 'dod pa go bar byed pa yin pa'i phyir de ñid 'dir rtsa ba'i gtan tshigs su brjod pa yin gyi / gźan gyi spyi la sogs pa grub par bya ba'i phyir ñe bar bkod pa gaṅ yin pa de ni rtsa ba'i gtan tshigs ma yin no źes bya ba ni*

bsdus pa'i don te / In *prasaṅga*, after [a proponent] recognized the property of the pervaded [= the pervaded property] as the intended [property] by an opponent, [the proponent] states the pervader [= pervading property] as the sequence, although [the sequence] is not intended [by the opponent]. Because, if there is no pervader, the property of the pervaded cannot exist. The *prasaṅga* implies, e.g. the recognition of the universal as existence in plural places leads to the consequence of the plurality not to be recognized. Or, e.g. the presupposition that the [eternal] self (*ātman*) exists leads to the consequence of momentary [non-eternal] existence.
[Objection:] The property of the pervaded, i.e. the existence in plural places, etc., cannot be established, because the property-possessor [locus: the universal] is not established. Thus, in what sorts of property-possessor can it lead to the consequence of the pervader? The [consequence] without valid determinant cognition should not be stated.
[Answer:] That is the reason why it should be stated that the absence of property of the pervaded is implied by the absence of the property of the pervader. The absence of the property of the pervader can be established even in the case of absence of the universal [as the property-possessor]. Thus, the [absence of the property ofthe pervader] is regarded as the proper logical indicator, because the intended presentation is the ability of proof. But the presupposed object to be proved, i.e. the universal of the opponent's [conceptual construction] is not the proper logical indicator.

[2] PVinṬ(Dh) D 7b7-8a3; P 9a4-7:

khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa 'di ni grub pa yin pa'i phyir thal ba bzlog pa'i gtan tshigs ni 'di ñid las rtogs par bya ba yin te / . . . du ma med pa tsam ñid ni spyi med pa yaṅ grub pa yin no // de ñid kyi phyir de med pas de la mi 'jug pa'i phyir 'di la gźi gdon mi za bar 'dod pa ma yin no źes bśad do // gźan gyis kun brtags pas thal bar sgrub pa gaṅ yin pa ni raṅ rgyud du bya ba ma yin te / gtan tshigs (P : *tshig* D) *ma grub pa'i phyir ro // 'on kyaṅ thal ba bzlog pa'i mthar thug pa yin no źes bstan pa'i phyir ro //* Only because this non-cognition of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) is established, the indicator of the reversed formula [(*prasaṅga-*)*viparyaya*] can be understood. . . . The absence of the universal is proved only by the absence of plurality. This is the reason why it is said that the locus is not necessarily needed, because the former does not exist there on the basis of the absence of the latter. The *prasaṅga* which is based on the opponent's conceptualization is not constructed as an independent proof, because the indicator is not established, but because it is indicated that [the *prasaṅga*] is carried to the limit as regards quality (*mthar thug pa, paryanta/niṣṭha*) of the reversed formula from the *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*).

The meaning of *prasaṅga* is interpreted as the dependence on *prasaṅgaviparyaya*. The *prasaṅga* does not possess the logical indicator, but it can indirectly possess the logical indicator in the *prasaṅgaviparyaya*. And the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* is interpreted as *vyāpakānupalabdhi* which is the proper logical indicator. Thus, he interpreted Dharmakīrti's passage *gtan tshigs yod na* as follows:

[3] PVinṬ(Dh) D 10a5f.; P 12a4-6:

bzlog pa'i gtan tshigs grub na skyon med pa 'ba' źig tu ma zad kyi / 'on kyaṅ thal ba'i gtan tshigs la yaṅ yin no // dper na rtag par smra ba mams kyis khas blaṅs pa'i yod pas sgra mi rtag par thal bar grub pa bźin no // If the logical indicator in the reversed formula [(*prasaṅga-*)*viparyaya*] is established, there is no error not only [in *prasaṅga*] but also in the logical indicator of *prasaṅga*.

[4] PVinṬ(Dh) D 8a2; P 9a6:

du ma med pa tsam ñid ni spyi med pa yaṅ grub pa yin no / de ñid kyi phyir de med pas de la mi 'jug pa'i phyir 'di la gźi gdon mi za bar 'dod pa ma yin no źes bśad do // The absolute negation [without affirmation of counterpositive (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)] of plurality proves even the absence of the universal. Thus, it is explained that the property-possessor is not necessarily

needed in this [proof-process], because [the universal cannot exist in the case of absence of [plurality]. [cf. PVinṬ(Dh) D 10a5f.; P 12a4-6]

But the hypothetical indicator cannot be directly regarded as proper indicator:

[5] PVinṬ(Dh) D 10b5-11a1; P 12b6-13a2:

gtan tshigs med kyaṅ źes smos te rtsa ba ni rtsom par 'gyur ba daṅ rtsom pa'i rgyu mtshan te / gaṅ gi don du thal bar byed pa ni rtsa ba yin no // thal bar byed pas ni gdon mi za bar 'ga' źig ṅes par byed 'dod pa yin no // ṅes pa'i rgyu mtshan yaṅ gtan tshigs grub pa yin pa'i phyir gaṅ źig der grub pa'i gtan tshig gaṅ yin pa de'i [D *phyir*] *khyab par bya ba daṅ khyab par byed pa'i dṅos po sgrub par byed pa'i bye brag yin no // gaṅ źig du ma la yod pa de ni du ma ñid do źes khyab pa rab tu ston pa tsam yin yaṅ gnod par byed pa'i tshad ma 'phen pa'i phyir sgrub par byed pa yin no // thal bar 'gyur ba'i sgo nas kyaṅ gnod par byed pa'i tshad ma ni 'phen pa yin des na 'di ni sgrub par byed pa'i mam pa gźan yin no // de la 'dir rtsa ba'i gtan tshigs thal ba las bzlog pa'o //*

The text 'even if the indicator does not exist [in *prasaṅga*]' is interpreted as follows: the word 'proper/basic' implies two meanings: (a) material cause [*upādāna*] and (b) agent of cause [*nimittakāraṇa*]. In a sense [i.e. in the second meaning], [the indicator which] constructs the *prasaṅga* is a proper one. The construction of *prasaṅga* aims at determining the necessity of objects, because even the agent of cause in determination establishes the indicator. [The *prasaṅga*] is a sort of proof of the relation between the pervader and the pervaded. [And the relation] makes the indicator prove something in the [proper proof-formulation]. Though the [*prasaṅga*] only indicates the necessary relation that what exists in plural places is necessarily plural, it implies/deduces the negative valid determinant cognition (*bādhakapramāṇa*). Thus, it is regarded as proof. Even by means of *prasaṅga*, the negative valid determinant cognition can be implied/deduced, thus the [*prasaṅga*] is another kind of proof. In this case, the proper/basic indicator of this [*prasaṅga*] exists in the reversed formula from *prasaṅga*.

Prajñākaragupta's objection against Dharmottara

A. Citation of Dharmottara's interpretation

PVBh 482,31-483,3 [D 138a3-b6; P 162a5-b1]:

anye tu virahād iti maulo hetuḥ prasaṅgas tannīyamāna eva. maulaniṣṭhaṃ ca darśayitum evam upanyāso virahād iti ca hetuḥ prasajyapratiṣedharūpaḥ. sa cābhāve 'pi sāmānyasya siddha eva. na hy abhāve hetau vasturūpo dharmy abhyupagamyate. tad abhāvāc ca tan neti vacanād api tad gatiḥ. But others [Dharmottara and so on][2] interpret it as follows: The statement '[the plurality] is excluded' is a proper/basic indicator/reason. The *prasaṅga* necessarily implies/leads to the consequence of this [proper indicator], because such a presupposition denotes the proper state of [logical indicator]. Further, this [proper] indicator 'because of being excluded' is based on the absolute negation [without affirmation of the counterpositive]. This negation can be necessarily proved, even if the universal [property-possessor/locus] is absent. Because if the indicator is absent, the property-possessor of which the real essential property (*vasturūpa*) is [the indicator] cannot be recognized. And because it can be understood on the basis of [Dignāga's] statement 'if it is absent, this is absent'.[3]

[2] PVBhṬ D 27a3; P 32a7: *slob dpon chos mchog la sogs.*

[3] Dignāga regards the negation in *vyatireka* as *prasajyapratiṣedha*. PSV ad PS III 21 [tr.K 131a8f., tr.V P 48b8; D 45b7] = PVSVṬ 78,24: *tadā sandeha eva nāsti tadabhāvād atrāvṛtter* [cf. *Nyāyamukha* 3.4; Tucci 1930: fn. 52; Katsura [2] 129]. PSV [tr. K 148b2f.]: *de lta na sṅa ma la ni ma yin pa yin la phyi ma la ni med par dgag pa yin no źes smras pa yin no // de ltar na rtag pa khas ma blaṅs kyaṅ chos mi mthun pa'i dpe grub pa yin no //* [tr.V P 64a3f.; D 60a6f.]: *de ltar sṅa ma ni ma yin par dgag pa yin la phyi ma ni med par dgag pa yin par brjod do // de lta na ni rtag pa khas blaṅs par chos mi mthun pa'i dpe*

The interpretation of indicator as absolute negation [= locus negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)] by which the basic locus is negated or is not needed, can be attributed to Dharmottara's interpretation.

B. Prajñākaragupta's objection

PVBh 483,4-26 [D 138a5-139a5; P 162b1-163a6]:

> *tad asad eva. . . . abhāvamātrake hetau kva kiṅ kena prasādhyatām. virahamātrakasya hetutve tasya kenacid asambandhāt kathaṃ sādhyasādhanam atha vyaktyantarasaṃsargavirahas tadāpi kasyāsāv iti nirūpyam eva. tasmān niyamena paroktena sāmānyena buddhisthena bhavitavyam. na ca pakṣadharmopasaṃharāntareṇa hetuḥ samarthaḥ sādhyasādhanāya. . . . tasmān nātra maulo hetuḥ sāmānyasya dharminaḥ siddher abhāvāt. . . . tasmād ubhayavādisiddha eva hetur, na tu anyatarasya prativādina eva.* But this interpretation is false. . . . If the indicator is regarded as pure [absolute] absence [*prasajyapratiṣedha*], how, where and what is proved? If the indicator is the absolute exclusion, how can it hold connection of the property to be proved and the proving property, because it cannot connect with anything? Even if the connection with another individual is excluded, the [negation] must be determined by the formula 'this belongs to something or this occurs in the real locus'. Thus, [the locus] must be existent as the presupposition of cognition, 'the universal' of the proponent's denotation. The indicator cannot prove the property to be proved without a realization of the indicator in the present locus. . . . Therefore, this is not the proper indicator, because the universal cannot be proved as locus. . . . Thus, the [proper] indicator is not the established only for opponent, but the established for both of disputants.

The following presuppositions as locus are negated: [1] the universal characterized as *anya-apoha*; [2] only *hetuviraha*; [3] ability of the property to be proved; [4] the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* can prove the absence of real object restricted so and so; [5] the common locus with both existence and non-existence; [6] represent [form] of conceptual construction (*rnam par rtog pa'i snaṅ ba ñid*); [7] *rūpa* etc. . . .

The presupposition [4] is interpreted as follows: PVBh 483,15f.:

> *pratibandhe saty ekābhāvo 'nyābhāvaṃ gamayet. pratibandhaś cānvayena gṛhyate. atas tat-sāmarthyād yatra vyāpako nāsti tatra vyāpyābhava iti vipakṣe 'bhāvamātram ādarśyate. na sa maulo hetuḥ* [Tib. *med na*]. So far as there is connection, it can be assumed that the first is absent in the case of absence of the second. And the connection is grasped by affirmative relation (*anvaya*). Thus, by force of the [affirmative relation], the formula 'the pervaded is absent in the case of absence of the pervader' implies only that [the indicator never occurs in dissimilar locus. Such an indicator is not a proper/basic one.

Prajñākaragupta's standpoint seems to be that of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, because he rejects *prasaṅga* as proper proof. On the other hand, his standpoint seems to be based on the *rnam rdsun dri med* theorem of the Vijñānavādins, because he regards the negation of *prasaṅga* with locus-form (*ākāra*) and does not regard it as proper locus of proof. He regards the first definition of 'non-

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grub pa yin no // [D: *med dgag gi, rtag pa chos ma*] (Namely the former [*sādharmyadṛṣṭānta, anvaya*] is based on the relative negation with affirmation of the counterpositive [*paryudāsa*], while the latter [*vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*] is based on the absolute negation without affirmation of the counterpositive object (*prasajyapratiṣedha*). Thus, the negative exemplification is provable even for the opponent who does not recognize the eternal entities.) [cf. Kitagawa 1965: 187, 242; Katsura [4] 64]. Dharmottara's standpoint of *prasajyapratiṣedha* without locus corresponds to the Alīkākāravāda of the Vijñānavādins; cf. Kuijp 1979: 11 [Cittamātra]. 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa, *Grub mtha'i rnam bśad* and lCaṅ skya, *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bźag pa* [*rnam rdsun dri bcas*]; cf. Hakamaya 1976: 16; Matsumoto 1980a, 1980b, 1980-1982 (parts 1 and 2) and 1981: 966 [Dharmottara as Alīkākāravādin]; and Kajiyama 1982.

deviation' in Dharmakīrti's twofold *pramāṇa*-definition as *sāṃvyavahārika-pramāṇa* and the second of 'revelation of new object' as *pāramārthika-pramāṇa* [cf. section II.4.3]. This rather seems to imply a transcendent truth theory in Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika. The *vyāpakānupalabdhi* is regarded not as a proper indicator, because it can overflow into the non-cognition of a non-observable object (*adṛśyānupalabdhi*) and can be regarded as the pseudo-proof with only negative necessity (*kevala-vyatirekin*) in the transcendent scope. Further, it can be regarded as pseudo-proof with an antinomic indicator (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*). The negative observation (*anupalabdhi*) should be restricted to an observable object (*dṛśya*). There occurs a serious conflict between the Vyāpakānupalabdhivādin and the Svabhāvānupalabdhivādin.

PVBh 638,26-639,16 [D 272b6-273b5; P 331b2-332b5] [abstract]: The *svabhāvānupalabdhi* is restricted to *dṛśyānupalabdhi*, because from an ultimate standpoint the two properties [*vyāpaka* and *vyāpya*] do not exist and they should be reduced to the perceivable individual aspect (*svalakṣaṇa*). The negation should be done by positive cognition of counterpositive essential property (*svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi*). Yamāri interprets the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* as *vyāpakānupalabdhi* without referring to an object [PVBhṬ D 27b3; P 32b8: *yul ñe bar ma bstan pa can gyi khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa*]. In PVBhṬ D 27a3; P 32a6 and D 28a5; P 33b5, Yamāri identifies Dharmottara as Vyāpakānupalabdhivādin [cf. Tani 1984].

Thus, two seriously different interpretations occur on the above mentioned final underlined text of the preceding section I.4.4.

[According to Prajñākaragupta:] Though *prasaṅga* logically refutes the opponent's presupposition, it cannot prove its reversed formula from *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅga-viparyaya*). Because the indicator in [*prasaṅga*] lacks *pramāṇa*.

[According to Dharmottara:] [Abstract from PVinṬ(Dh) D 11a1-6; P 13a3-b2]: So far as the proper indicator in *prasaṅga* is based on the *vyāpti* of the fundamental indicator in the reversed formula, a proper *prasaṅga* can conversely prove its reversed formula by means of *bādhakapramāṇa*. But a pseudo-*prasaṅga* cannot prove its reversed formula from the opponent's presupposition (*khas blaṅs pa las bzlog pa*) [= *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅga-viparyaya*)], because it lacks *bādhakapramāṇa*. [Dharmottara's examples of pseudo-*prasaṅga* correspond to *prasaṅga* formulations by Vinītadeva and Rab tu źi bzad (Praśāntabhadra)[4] in Bu ston's examples. Bu ston [PVinṬ(Bu) 154b2-6] introduces four types of *prasaṅga* as follows:

[Vinītadeva]: Locus = *sāmānya*. *prasaṅga*: it cannot occur in plural places, because of singularity. *prasaṅga-viparyaya*: it is not singular, because of occurrence in plural places. Since *prasaṅga* is based on *vyāpakānupalabdhi*, *svatantra-prayoga* is *viruddhavyāptyupalabdhi*.

[Praśāntabhadra]: Locus = *sāmānya*. *prasaṅga*: it connects only singular object, because of singularity. *prasaṅga-viparyaya*: it is plural, because it connects plural places. Both of them are *svabhāvahetu*s.

[Dharmottara]: (Indicators of *svatantra* formulations in both of the above mentioned *prasaṅga*-formulations are non-established (*asiddha*). Locus = *sāmānya*. *prasaṅga*: it is plural, because of occurrence in plural places. *prasaṅga-viparyaya*: it cannot occur in plural places, because it is excluded by plurality. Since *prasaṅga* is based on *svabhāvahetu*, it can deduce *svatantra*-formulation as *vyāpakānupalabdhi*. And this *vyāpakānupalabdhi* proves absence of *sāmānya* [as hypothetical locus], too.).

[Prajñākaragupta]: (If locus is *sāmānya*, non-occurrence in plural places cannot be proved. And if the indicator is not real [property], it cannot be established/realized in real *sāmānya*. Further, if word can

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4 'Rab tu źi bzad' is probably incorrect for 'Rab tu źi bzaṅ' which may translate 'Praśāntabhadra', a variant of Śāntabhadra (ca. 719-770).

prove real object, indicator will be different [or be of no use]. Thus, locus = cognitive form (*ākāra*) which is recognized as the opponent's observation of cognitive form. *prasaṅga*: it cannot be observed that [the universal-form] is restricted to singular individual, because it is omnipresent in all individuals. Both *prasaṅga* and its negation are *svatantra*-formulation.).

The underlined interpretation seems to be contradictory to the *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*'s interpretation. But if the locus is regarded as the cognitive form (*ākāra*) from the standpoint of Sākāra-Vijñānavāda, Prajñākaragupta's proper interpretation can be identified with Bu ston's interpretation. And this interpretation can be related to Tibetan commentators' interpretation of *raṅ rgyud 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur* (*prasaṅga* with the implication of independent direct proof (*svatantra*)] [cf. p. 387, NOTE 4].

Only Dharmottara explains that *prasaṅga* can exclude the opponent's locus itself by the locus-negation. *prasaṅga* can deduce *vyāpakānupalabdhi* by *svabhāvahetu* in *prasaṅga*. And this *vyāpakānupalabdhi* proves absence of hypothetical locus. The other three's interpretations intend to only indicate contradiction of properties, not to exclude directly opponent's locus.

Jñānaśrībhadra

Dharmakīrti's theory of locus in *prasaṅga* as logical variable is stressed by Jñānaśrībhadra. He regards *prasaṅga* as the revelation of implicit/potential self-contradiction [PVinṬ(J) D 230a3f.; P 274b3f.: *'gal ba'i chos khas blaṅs de'i 'gal ba ston par zad kyi bsgrub par bya ba bsgrub pa ni ma yin no //* [*prasaṅga*] is not a proof of the property to be proved. But it is restricted to the revelation of an implicit [self-]contradiction of the [opponent's] recognition.

He describes double-bind *prasaṅga* as follows: PVinṬ(J) D 230a6-b1; P 274b8-275a2:

gcig bu'i raṅ bźin de lta bu'i raṅ bźin can gyi ni yul la sogs pa ste dus daṅ gnas skabs gźan de mi 'dra ba rnams daṅ 'brel źes bya ba 'jug par (pa) 'gal te / gcig daṅ du ma 'gal ba'i phyir ro // de ltar khas len pa de ni chos du ma la 'jug pa gcig khas blaṅs na / cig śos raṅ bźin tha dad pa khas blaṅs par bstan pa'i don du ste / de ltar na gcig ñid daṅ 'gal lo // gal te tha dad pa ñid khas mi len na ste gcig ñid du 'dod na tha dad par ldog par 'gyur bas du ma la 'jug pa daṅ 'gal lo // It is contradictory that the universal of which essential property is singular is related to dissimilar objects in different places, time-points and situations, etc. Because singularity and plurality are contradictory. Supposed that the singularity exists in plural properties, it is indicated that [the singularity would be regarded as a different essential property from [the singularity]. Then, [this conclusion] is contradictory to the singularity. On the other hand, if the difference is not pre-supposed, namely if the singularity is presupposed, it negates the difference. Thus, it is contradictory to its existence in plural objects.

Even if the interpretation of locus is contradictory to authorized theory (*siddhānta*), the object should be determined only by logical necessity. From this point of view, he proves that the indicator in *prasaṅga* is not *asiddha* as follows: PVinṬ(J) D 231a2f.; P 275b7f.:

gcig tu ṅes par gcig du ma la 'jug pa ñid du yoṅs su bzuṅ nas rtags ma grub pa'i skyon 'dir 'gyur gyi de ltar khas mi len pa ni ma yin no // If the singularity which has been determined exists in plural places [etc], there occurs the fallacy of an indicator without locus. We, however, have not not recognized it as [hypothetically determined locus].

Succeedingly, he interprets the locus as follows:

gźan yaṅ gtan tshigs gcig du ma la 'jug pa ṅes bya ba de med na yaṅ rtsa ba'i gtan tshigs te / gtso bor gyur ba du ma la 'jug pa źes bya ba ñid kyis 'dod pa rtogs te / Or even if the indicator, which indicates the existence of the singular object in plural places, cannot exist, there is a fundamental indicator. [By means of the fundamental indicator] that the fundamental [neutralized] logical subject exists in plural places, the intended object can be understood.

M a n o r a t h a n a n d i n

[Cf. Tillemans 1986: 156-159] (*prasaṅga*: the universal is plural, because the opponent presupposes that it exists in plural places. But this [indicator in *prasaṅga*] is not proper indicator (*pāramārthiko hetu*), because it lacks the threefold characterization. *viparyayaprayoga/prasaṅgaviparyaya*: The universal is not plural. Thus, it does not exist in plural places. This is the fundamental indicator (*maulo hetu*). Though *prasaṅga* is not regarded as proper proof, it can serve recall the valid determinant cognition (*pramāṇa*) which grasps the pervasion between *sādhya* and *sādhana*. This *pramāṇa* is as follows: If X exists in plural individuals in different places and times, etc., X is plural. Because contradictory properties which are [restricted] by this place or non-this place, etc. are attributed to X. [Namely because contradictory properties cannot exist in the same locus].)

Manorathanandin's interpretation seems to mean a neutralization [but rather closer to Prajñākaragupta]. Thus, the relations between *prasaṅga*, *viparyaya* and *bādhakapramāṇa* are not investigated.

Concerning Tibetan commentators and the interpretaion of other Indian schools cf. p. 387, NOTE 4 and p. 388, NOTE 5.

Dharmakīrti's text is interpreted in different contexts from the frozen standpoints of post-Dharmakīrtians. This reversely implies that Dharmakīrti's standpoint stands on a crucial boundary line.

I.6 [HB, VN] Transformation of complex *prasaṅga* into SVB-*pramāṇa* by double *prasaṅga*

Further, the complex *prasaṅga* formula is transformed into SVB-*pramāṇa* in *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*. The logical direction of implication [[H → S] → [-hS → -hH]] is reversed as [[-hS → -hH] → [H → S]]. *sādhyaviparyaye* [-hS] *hetor* [hH] *bādhaka* [-hH] *pramāṇa* is based on negative cognition [or non-observation] of the pervading property. The pervading property is two hypothetical properties [K and -K] which pervade the locus of hH (= -hS) on the basis of the law of excluded middle [K or -K]. Both of these two hypothetical properties [K and -K] are negated by the double *prasaṅga*. In order to exclude doubt of single *prasaṅga* as proper proof, the proof of *kṣaṇikatvānumāna* by positive existential indicator (*sattvānumāna*) is substituted for the proof by negative destruction (*vināśitvānumāna*). Nevertheless, both of these two proofs are still based on *prasaṅga* as the negative determinant cognition based on logical contradiction (*bādhakapramāṇa*). The SVB-*pramāṇa* is constructed as follows: (1) The reversed formula (*viparyaya*) of *prasaṅga* is superposed on the formulation of the negative relation (*vyatireka-prayoga*). (2) The single *prasaṅga* is transformed as double binding *prasaṅga*. (3) The reversed formula is proved by non-cognition of the pervading property which consists of two mutually contradictory sub-properties. The non-cognition is proved by incompatibility of each sub-property on the basis of *prasaṅga*.

HB 4,3-7: *anvayaniścayo 'pi svabhāvahetau sādhyadharmasya vastutas tadbhāvatayā sādhanadharmabhāvamātrānubandhasiddhiḥ. sā sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇavṛttiḥ. yathā yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva. akṣaṇikatve 'rthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇaṃ vastutvaṃ hīyate.* The determination of positive necessity in case of an indicator as essential property is the proof that the property to be proven follows only the presence of the proving property because [the property to be proven] is in reality the essence of that [= proving property as indicator]. This [proof] consists in the occurrence of the determinant cognition (*pramāṇa*) which negates the indicator (*hetu*) in the reversed form of the property to be proven (*sādhyaviparyaye*). For example, what is existent is necessarily (*eva*) momentary existence. If it were not momentary, it would loose the character of reality (*vastutva*), because the efficient operation, i.e. the characterization of reality, is contradictory to non-momentariness of existence.

Here, as above mentioned, the asymmetrical relation is well preserved even in the ontological context. This is different from Prof. Steinkellner's translation where *bhāva* is identified with *svabhāva* on the basis of real identity [cf. Steinkellner 1967 and 1982: 10]. This asymmetric relation cannot be positively proved. Therefore, it must be proved by SVB-*pramāṇa*. Even if the asymmetric relation of *svabhāva* to *bhāva* is identified from an ordinary empirical or transcendent standpoint for the explanation as meta-theory, real identity could not be presupposed by Dharmakīrti's logical theory (*pramāṇa*-theory). Because *bhāva* cannot exist without *svabhāva*, the *bhāva* should not be regarded as empirical or transcendent in the ordinary ontological context. But, from Dharmakīrti's ultimate standpoint, it should be read as a relational concept in a logical context. Even in the ontological context, Dharmakīrti's ontological presupposition is only a relation of [*svabhāva* → *bhāva*] which is the reversed order from logical necessity [*bhāva* → *svabhāva*]. This interpretation is constructed by a re-reading of Matsumoto's *anubandha*-relation in the ontological context [cf. Matsumoto 1981: 12 and Steinkellner 1984: 461-462]. Here, Dharmakīrti introduces SVB-*pramāṇa* which can determine the essential necessary relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) of the essential indicator (*svabhāvahetu*). Thus, *svabhāvapratibandha* based on SVB-*pramāṇa* implies a transformation of his inference into hypothetical inference. Dharmakīrti primarily intends to transform the locus. Namely, he intended to exclude a dogmatic ontology from the logical space, not to transform only the property in the ordinary frozen ontological locus. This is the reason why Dharmakīrti transforms *prasaṅga* into SVB-*pramāṇa* from the standpoint of dialogue/communication (inter-subjects) level. The consistence of independent proper inference (*svatantrānumāna*) is based on the hypothetical inference with *prasaṅga*. By inducing *prasaṅga* as SVB-*pramāṇa* the concept of inference for oneself (*svarthānumāna*) is in reality based on inference for another (*parārthānumāna*), though *Hetubindu* corresponds to *svārthānumāna* from the standpoint of traditional order. This implies that the formula of hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*) in the *parārthānumāna* can be transformed or re-written into the *svatantra-prayoga*, the independent proper formula, in *svārthānumāna*, and vice versa. In the proof of the momentary existence, he transforms the opponent's thesis into the proponent's reversed hypothetical locus. First, the reversed formula [-hS → -hH] [H stand for existence, S for momentariness] is implicitly hypothesized from the proper intended formula [H → S]. And he hypothetically infers as follows: if both of two contradictory properties [K or -K] [K stand for successive operation] which pervade the possibility of [hH] on the assumption of [-hS] are negated by the double *prasaṅga* of self-contradictions of the hypothetical pervader [both K and -K], the reversed formula [-hS → -hH] can be proved by non-observation of the hypothetical pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). In *Vādanyāya*, the intermediate indicator between *prasaṅga* and *svatantra-prayoga* is proved as the asymmetric negative cognition of the hypothetical property to be proved in *Vādanyāya*. VN 9,14 [according to Steinkellner 1982 misplaced to 8,6-10,1; M: 3,6-7]: *tena vyāpakadharmānupalabdhir akṣaṇike sāmarthyaṃ bādhata iti* (Thus, the possibility [of efficient operation] in the case of non-momentary existence is negated by non-cognition of the pervading property.). This interpretation seems to have far-reaching influence on the above mentioned interpretation of Dharmottara and on the Tibetan commentators' theory of *raṅ rgyud 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur* (*prasaṅga* which can imply *svatantra-prayoga*) [cf. section I.5 and p. 387, NOTE 4]. Namely, he constructs a new type of complex proof-formula which consists of *prasaṅga* and negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*). This complex inference can be a kind of hypothetical deductive formulation which is neither a single *prasaṅga* nor *svatantra-prayoga*. Thus, SVB-*pramāṇa* can determine the essential relation. But, as mentioned above, if SVB-*pramāṇa* is based on the negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*) which is regarded as one of the proper indicators on the basis of the essential relation in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, Dharmakīrti's solution may mean a logical circularity. Dharmakīrti's new type of complex *prasaṅga* with its reversed formulation becomes the divergency point of sharply demarcated interpretations among post-Dharmakīrtians. The transposition of centroid on

either *prasaṅga* aspect or *svatantra* aspect is fixed in frozen one-sided context from the standpoint of different interpretators.

According to Steinkellner 1982: 12, the negating capacity of the *bādhakapramāṇa* is due to the occurrence of a logical contradiction (*viruddha*) in the hypostasis (*pratyupasthāpana*). VN 9,9-11 [M 2,20-3,4; Tr. 32 note 33]:

> *yad adarśanaṃ viparyayaṃ sādhayati hetoḥ sādhyaviparyaye, tad asya viruddhapratyupasthāpanād bādhakaṃ pramāṇam ucyate. evaṃ hi sa hetuḥ sādhyābhāve 'san sidhyet, yadi tatra pramāṇavatā svaviruddhena bādhyeta.* Dasjenige Nichtsehen, das das Fehlen (*viparyaya*) des Grundes im Gegenteil (*viparyaya*) des zu Beweisenden beweist, bezeichnen wir als ein aufhebendes Erkenntnismittel für diesen (Grund), weil es die (mit diesem Grund) in Widerspruch stehende (Beschaffenheit des Nichtseiendseins beim Gegenteil des zu Beweisenden) ansetzt (*pratyupasthāpanāt*). So nämlich wäre dieser Grund beim Fehlen des zu Beweisenden als nichtvorhanden erwiesen, wenn er dort durch die (Beschaffenheit), die mit ihm in Widerspruch steht und für die es ein Erkenntnismittel gibt, aufgehoben würde. [cf. Much's notes 33 and 34. Much 1983: 73].

By means of this negative determinant cognition, Dharmakīrti solved the problem of "non-cognition of non-observable object (*adṛśyānupalabdhi*)" in the statement that the transcendent basic matter (*pradhāna*), etc. does not exist [cf. PVSV 105,15-18. Yaita 1985b: 1f.]. This new solution is based on hypothetical negative reasoning from a logical point of view, not from a pragmatic standpoint [see section I.1]. The *prasaṅga* here reveals its original form as *vyāpakānupalabdhi* with double *prasaṅga*. The pervading property (*vyāpaka*) to be negated by twice-using *prasaṅga* in *Vādanyāya* is based on pure logical theory, exclusion of middle (*krama* or *akrama*). The two dichotomized hypothetical pervaders [successively or non successively (*krama* or *akrama*)] of hypothetical possibility of efficient operation (*arthakriyā*) are respectively contradictory to the hypothetical reversed locus [*akṣaṇika*] [see *prasaṅga* type 3 in the section I.4.2]. Though *Vādanyāya* corresponds to inference-for-others in *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, the opponent's locus and indicator in *prasaṅga* are introduced into the proof as hypothetical locus. And the statement of thesis based on the disputant's dogma is excluded from the proof formulation. Thus, single *prasaṅga* as refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) which cannot deduce *prasaṅga-viparyaya* is excluded. *prasaṅga* as one-sided refutation is transformed into *prasaṅga* as hypothetical proof in dialogue/communication (inter-subjects) level.

Vādanyāya: Reduction of *kāryahetu* and *anupalabdhi* into *svabhāvapratibandha*, again

In Dharmakīrti's middle period, *kāryahetu* and *anupalabdhi* seem to have been stressed in their aspect of separation from *svabhāvahetu*; in his last work he returns to his original first interpretation in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. M 3,16-18: *yathedam asmin sati bhavati. satsv api tadanyeṣu samartheṣu taddhetuṣu tadbhāve na bhavatīti.* Diese (Wirkung) ist vorhanden, falls diese (Ursache) vorhanden ist. Auch wenn von dieser (Ursache) verschiedene fähige Ursachen dieser (Wirkung) vorhanden sind, ist sie beim Fehlen dieser (Ursache) nicht vorhanden. [Much 1983: 3 and 33]

The causal relation is based on an essential transformation (*svabhāva*) as the main cause of the last complete causal complex. And the necessity of possible completeness is based on *svabhāvapratibandha*.

> M 4,17-18: *tatropalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptiḥ svabhāvaviśeṣaḥ kāraṇāntarasākalyaṃ ca* [cf. NB 11-13]. Dabei besteht das Erfüllen der Bedingungen für eine Beobachtung in einem bestimmten Wesen und in der Vollständigkeit der anderen Ursachen [für die Beobachtung]. [Much 1983: 34]

The *svabhāva* is the restricted hypothetical object as the last complete causal complex. And the necessity of possible completeness is based on *svabhāvapratibandha*. The model of independent self-

difference of the last momentary phase of a causal complex is based on the self-difference of the boundary line to enlightenment[5] [see section I.2.1].

I.7 How can the proof of momentary existence be free from pseudo-indicators?

I.7.1 Dharmakīrti's transformation of interpretation of dissimilar locus (*asapakṣa* [= *vipakṣa*])

How can Dharmakīrti's logical indicator in the proof of momentary existence be free from pseudo-indicators which are regarded as non-realized indicators (*asiddha*) or non-common ones (*asādhāraṇa*), etc.? He transforms Dignāga's logical theory as such neither by mere exclusion nor by a new additional theory like Īśvarasena. But he transforms it by a radical interpretation of Dignāga's logical theory itself. First, he aims at transforming the concept of *pakṣa* (the locus to be proved). In Dignāga's semi-inductive system, the *pakṣa* is separated from both of the induction-loci: the similar and the dissimilar locus (*sapakṣa* and *asapakṣa*) [cf. the locus to be exemplified as called induction domain by Richard P. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*, Dordrecht etc. 1988]. This separation of *pakṣa* is indicated by Kitagawa 1965 and the place of *pakṣa* is expressed as 'twilight zone' by Bimal K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, Delhi 1985: 129 [Prof. Hattori's information]. According to Dignāga's threefold class-locus, the *sapakṣa* is defined as the object similar (*samānārtha*) to *pakṣa* for reasons that it possesses the identical property to be inferred of *pakṣa*. But the property in *pakṣa* is different from that in *sapakṣa*, because the former is not yet proved, while the latter has been proved. And the dissimilar locus (*asapakṣa*) is defined neither as the other or different (*anya*) nor as the incompatible [opposite or contradictory] (*viruddha*) but as non-existence/absence (*abhāva*). In order to prove the equivalence of the positive necessity (*anvaya*) [= the second characterization of indicator] to the negative necessity (*vyatireka*) [= the third characterization], Dignāga seems to interpret *abhāva* as the logical contradictory counterpart of *bhāva* on the basis of the law of exclusion of middle. But it is remarkable that this law is applied not to all the universe of discourse for reasons of isolation of *pakṣa*.

Dignāga's definition of *asapakṣa*/*vipakṣa* is as follows (PS III 19-20c [tr.K]): *de las gźan daṅ de 'gal ba // gñis po yaṅ mi mthun phyogs ma yin // gtan tshigs med daṅ 'gal ba las // mam par gcod par thal bar 'gyur / de'i phyir mthun phyogs med pa ñid // de ltar mtshan ñid las gcig kyaṅ // du ma'i don ni rtogs par rigs //* Neither the other/different (*anya*) than/from [*sapakṣa*] nor the object incompatible [i.e. contradictory or opposite] (*viruddha*) with [*sapakṣa*] is the dissimilar locus. [If it were the former] the logical indicator could not exist. [If it were the latter, *asapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*] would be [only] excluded from incompatibility [and could not necessarily determine the contradictory locus]. [Because incompatibility implies not only contradiction but also opposition]. Thus, only non-existence or absence (*abhāva*) is the dissimilar locus. Then, many objects can be cognized by only either one of two conditions [i.e. either the second or third characterization of indicator]. [cf. NBṬ 99,3-100,2]

Īśvarasena, the direct teacher of Dharmakīrti, interprets *abhāva* as absolute negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) which can be determined by mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*) [PVin III D 223a1-225b7; P 321b3-324b7] [cf. Steinkellner 1966]. But, so far as the *vyatireka* is equivalent to *anvaya*, even the absence of a transcendent unobservable object which cannot be perceived could prove its *anvaya*. This is the reason why Dharmakīrti refuses Īśvarasena's interpretation. Dharmakīrti regains the *abhāva* as the contradictory term in Dignāga's interpretation. But, in order to defend Dignāga's proper intention,

[5] Prof. Steinkellner's new remarkable study on the *Vādanyāya*: "The Logic of the *svabhāvahetu* in Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*" in these proceedings is beyond the limits of the present writer's investigation at the present time.

he had to transform Dignāga's description. He regards *asapakṣa* as the negative counterpart (*pratiyogin*) which includes all the above mentioned three negative forms. The negative counterpart is directly implied by the absence (*abhāva*) as negative form (*niṣedha*), while it is indirectly implied by the different/other (*anya*) or the incompatible (*viruddha*) as positive form (*vidhi*). The latter is a relative negation (*paryudāsa*). On the contrary, the former can be interpreted as absolute negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*). Excluding Īśvarasena's interpretation, Dharmakīrti furthermore transforms the former into the *paryudāsa*-type of incompatibility between *abhāva* and *bhāva* as mutually exclusive observation (*anyonyopalabdhiparihārasthitilakṣaṇatā*) which is based on the exclusion of middle [in the epistemological context]. Now, the boundary line between *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* is eliminated. Thus, Dharmakīrti excludes Dignāga's separated *pakṣa* and the transcendent unobservable object from his range of inference.

I.7.2 Transformation of the interpretation of non-common indicator [*asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*]

So far as the *pakṣa* is separated from the two induction-loci, the non-common indicator which occurs only in the *pakṣa* [e.g. the audibility in sound] is excluded from all induction-loci. This empty class [= the fifth indicator] in *Hetucakra* is deprived of the faculty of the determinability as indicator. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, so far as the second and the third characterization (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) are equivalent, the non-common indicator which satisfies the first characterization [= *pakṣa-dharmatā*] and the third characterization would be a proper indicator. Dignāga regards it as the antinomic indicator (*viruddhavyabhicārin*) and intends to exclude it by force of an outer-inference-factor, perception. Dharmakīrti intends to transform the interpretation by a radical interpretation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. He quotes Dignāga's text in PVin III D 202b2f.; P 300a2f. [cf. Tani 1989: 10f.]:

> *ji skad du* (om. CD) *bsgrub par bya ba'i chos thun moṅ ma yin pa gaṅ yin pa de ni khyad par ji sñad kyis thams cad bsdus pa de la the tshom za ba'i rgyu yin te / de daṅ ldan pa des bsdus pa'i phyir daṅ gcig tu ṅes par* (*pa* CD) *ldog pa'i phyir ro źes bśad pa lta bu'o //*

PSV ad PS III 25, PSV [tr.V] D 47a4f.; P 50a6f.; [tr.K] P 133a3 [= PVBh 629,13-14]:

> *yo hy asādhāraṇaḥ sādhanadharmaḥ sa yāvatā bhedena sarvasaṃgrahas tatra saṃśayahetuḥ tadvatā tatsaṃgrahād ekāntavyāvṛtteś ca.* [Muni Jambūvijaya, *Dvādaśaraṃ Nyāyacakram*, Bhavnagar 1976: 663,4f. (1) *pakṣadharmaḥ*, fn. 1: *sādhyadharmaḥ*. (2) fn. 2: *tadvatāṃ*] [cf. *Nyāyamukha* T 32,2b; Kitagawa 1965: 200f.; Katsura [3] 74-76].

How can this text be interpreted in Dignāga's original context? In his semi-inductive system, the locus to be inferred is excluded and the non-common indicator is excluded from all induction-loci [i.e. both *sapakṣa* and *asapakṣa*]. Thus, the non-common indicator exists only in the locus to be inferred (*pakṣa*) which has not yet been determined and has all possible determinations. The property separated from any induction-loci [or the empty class in induction-loci] is regarded as indeterminable indicator. From this standpoint, the text can be translated as follows:

> So far as the proving property or indicator [or the property of the locus to be inferred] is non-common [or is absent/empty in both exemplificative and determinable loci], all possibilities are included by the unique locus [i.e. the locus to be inferred itself]. Thus, the [non-common indicator] will be a cause of doubt in the [unique locus]. Namely because all possibilities are included by the possessor of the [non-common indicator] [i.e. the locus to be inferred itself: *tadvatā*] [or: the possessor of the non-common indicator is included by all possibilities (*tadvatām*, *de daṅ ldan pa des bsdus pa'i phyir*)] and [the non-common indicator] is deprived of the faculty of definite determination. [This translation is based on Kitagawa 1965; cf. Tucci 1930: 33 and Katsura [3] 75. The last sentence is translated in other various contexts].

Dharmakīrti re-reads the same text in the context of criticizing Īśvarasena's interpretation as follows: the exclusion of the non-common indicator from the dissimilar locus cannot be determined

by mere non-perception. Because the absence of an unobservable transcendent object cannot be determined by mere empirical perception [PVin II 34,13-21; cf. Steinkellner 1979: 37f.; Tani 1989: fn. [14] and fn. [20]]. Thus, Dignāga's text is read in Dharmakīrti's context as follows:

> Even the locus to be inferred which possesses the non-common indicator must be included in the two scopes [*sapakṣa* and *asapakṣa*] which cover all universe of discourse [by law of exclusion of middle]. Thus, there is no third transcendent scope. And there is no determinator by which the indicator should be included in either of the two.

According to Dharmakīrti, the unprovability of the non-common indicator is not caused by the isolated locus [or empty induction-loci] but by the undeterminability of both *anvaya* and *vyatireka* [cf. Motoi Ono, "Dharmakīrti no giji ronshōinsetsu", *Bukkyōgaku* 21, 1987, 1-21, and Tani 1987c]. The elimination of isolated *pakṣa* excludes the presupposed relation to a transcendent unobservable object (*adṛśya*) and mere ontological identity. Dharmakīrti excludes the antinomic indicator (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) by the isomorphic logical structure with his new complex formulation with *prasaṅga*. For reasons of the reduction of *pakṣa* into a hypothetical locus, the logical space is divided into two classes [*sapakṣa* and *asapakṣa*] by excluded middle. Dignāga's twilight zone of *pakṣa* is radically interpreted as hypothetical locus which extends over all loci. The demarcation between *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* is broken. The reduction of *pakṣa* into *sapakṣa* transforms the empirical induction of *sapakṣa* into a hypothetical deductive locus which is based on the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*). Further, in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III, the first characterization [*pakṣadharmatā*] is regarded as hypothetical presupposition, because Dharmakīrti explains that the dubious indicator satisfies it. Now, the third characterization (*vyatireka*) can be interpreted as *prasaṅgasādhana* of the SVB-*pramāṇa*. The SVB-*pramāṇa* which has the asymmetric relation -S → -H determines the reversed direction H → S of the essential relation. Thus, the statement 'sound is non-eternal because it is an audible object' with introducing the intermediate concept 'efficient operation (*arthakriyā*)' is problematic. Though the indicator is superabundant, it is not an unprovable one. As mentioned above, by elimination of the isolated *pakṣa* as the third scope, Dharmakīrti excludes the mere identification of naming (*pratijñā-ekadeśa*) and transcendent unobservable object. [The non-common indicator as sub-class of *pakṣa* is regarded as unprovable (*asiddha*) indicator of *pratijñārthaikadeśatva* (PVin III D 217b1-219b7; P 315a6-318a2, corresponding to PV IV 181-188)]. The essential relation is neither a tautological identification [of the naming based on word-convention] nor an ontologically real identity [nor a transcendent inherent identity] but the necessary displacement between two different relata. Dignāga's exemplification 'sound is eternal because it is an audible object' is unprovable for reasons of mere identity. Namely, because the necessary relation between eternity and audibility is not proved. But he tried to prove the validity of the other aspect of Dignāga's so-called non-common indicator from the standpoint of the different dimension. In the preceding section [PVin III vv. 30-32], he proved that the non-audibility of sound is negated by the non-common indicator as the operation of direct perception. And this is the isomorphic proof of the momentariness of existence. And the necessity should be proved by a second proof on the basis of introducing the third intermediate relatum [e.g. the non-common indicator as *arthakriyāsāmarthya* in the proof of momentariness of existence (*kṣaṇikatvānumāna*)]. If the third intermediate relatum [= the non-common indicator as *arthakriyāsāmarthya*: the effective operation of the audible object to produce auditory cognition] is introduced into the proof of non-eternity of sound, the indicator would be provable. According to Yūshō Wakahara ("Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan no naihenjū-ron hihan", *IBK* 35/2, 1987: 868), Jinendrabuddhi regards it as he proper indicator, while Dharmottara and Śaṅkaranandana do not regard it as such. Here, Dharmottara seems to regard it not as an unprovable indicator but as a superabundant/extra indicator, because the most efficient indicator is *arthakriyāsāmarthya*. In his new system, the reality (*vastutva*) is not based on static ontological identity but on the necessary relation itself without a static identical core-point. He bases

the necessity of the logical relation on necessary self-different existence. Thus, Dharmakīrti must have regarded audibility as a pseudo-indicator without the presupposition of the efficient operation. Otherwise, he would have substituted for it the proof of momentary existence with universal quantifier. Because his hypothetical *pakṣa* has excluded the ontological presupposition. [p. 389, NOTE 6].

II. Dharmakīrti's ultimate standpoint on the logical boundary line of self-difference or self-displacement as time-ness of momentary existence

II.1 Dharmakīrti's boundary standpoint between oneself and others or transcendent scope

As mentioned above, the *prasaṅga* is introduced for the purpose of proving the essential relation and momentary existence. But there is still another reason. The third reason aims at proving inter-subjects-communication or deepening logical locus. Can two disputants, who are based on different epistemologies or ontologies, really start to discuss from the same point? From the standpoint of the Vijñānavādin's solipsism Dignāga added the restriction of 'locus and indicator common between two disputants (*ubhayasiddha*)' to inference-for-others. The indicator and locus should be common between disputants. Otherwise, the indicator would be a pseudo-indicator, e.g. an indicator non-realized in a locus (*āśrayāsiddha*), a one-sided indicator (*anyatarāsiddha*) or an antinomic indicator (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*). But if inference-for-others was previously restricted to the common locus and indicator, it would prove only common and trivial objects to have been proved on the basis of the same ontology of conventional level. Further, Dignāga defines inference-for-others as the communication of the object realized/confirmed by the proponent himself (*svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśa*). This definition is only an application of the definition of the inference-for-oneself. But one-sided proponent's indicator, similar and dissimilar locus (*sapakṣa* and *asapakṣa/vipakṣa*) cannot continue to be self-identity in the opponent's locus which is based on a different epistemology or ontology. In spite of Dignāga's external restriction, some paradoxes occur in Dignāga's logical limit, e.g. (1) possibility of antinomy or (2) non-common-indicator as proper name (*asādhāraṇa*), which exists only in *pakṣa* without any exemplification-locus, cannot be proved. (3) To make matters worse, it proves contradictory property, so far as *pakṣa* is separated from exemplification-locus in a twilight zone. The proof of momentary existence, which proves all existence as *pakṣa* without any exemplification-locus, must be regarded as an incorrect proof for reasons of the above mentioned pseudo-indicator. Dharmakīrti in his first period brings forward the logic with realization (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*) as inter-subjects-inference. And he excludes the statement of a thesis (*pratijñā* or *pakṣa*) from the proof-elements in order to exclude the dogmatically preconceived indicator which inheres in a one-sided ontological preconceived locus. But such an one-sided basic ideal logic seems to have excluded beforehand proper 'others'. Dharmakīrti here places his standpoint on the boundary line. According to his *Santānāntarasiddhi* (Proof of other momentary continuity), even yogic perception (*pratyakṣa*) has not yet excluded conceptualization until the displacement of the most basic locus, though he defined *pratyakṣa*-in-general as non-conceptualization in *Pramāṇavārttika* III. So far as *pramāṇa* should be restricted to the ordinary conventional level or boundary line, the ultimate proper 'others' cannot be perceived/inferred even by yogic perception. Even in regard to the present object two observers can see different objects on the basis of a different theory of perception. Thus, the inference-for-others should not be regarded as only an application of the inference-for-oneself. How can the common object between two disputants be recognized without solipsism? Thus he intends to introduce *prasaṅga* into proper proof. The *prasaṅga* primarily intends to explode the self-contradiction of the opponent's argument on the basis of the opponent's assumption. Dharmakīrti introduces it into the proof-formula as hypothetical locus. *pakṣa* is interpreted as hypothetically presupposed locus. Thus he excludes any dogmatically

realized statement of thesis on *pakṣa* from the proof-elements [cf. Motoi Ono, "Dharmakīrti ni okeru shuchōmeidai no teigi ni tsuite", *IBK* 30/2, 1986, (109)-(112), and Tani 1987b, and "Pramāṇavārttika IV no mondai (1)", *BKT* 17, 1981, 11-24, and "Pramāṇaviniścaya III kaishaku no mondai (2)", *BKT* 21, 1984, 1-16]. If a complex proof-formulation can be started from dialogue/communication (inter-subjects) level the proponent must criticize not only the opponent's hypothetical locus but also even the proponent's one-sided locus by the *prasaṅga*-aspect of complex proof-formulation. The explosion of self-contradiction can occur not only in the opponent's hypothetical locus but also in the proponent's implicit hypothetical one. Dharmakīrti's new complex proof-formula is based not only on property-negation (*paryudāsa*) in an hypothetical locus but also on locus-negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) of the hypothetical locus itself. Thus, it does not prove a tautological thesis but the revelation of self-displacement of the locus.

The negative determinant cognition of *pakṣa* in Dharmakīrti's first period is superposed on Dignāga's external restrictions on the thesis in spite of negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*). The second half of Dignāga's *pakṣa* definition is as follows: 'the thesis should not be negated by an object of perception, inference, statement of credible person and conventional word in the proponent's locus (*anirākṛtaḥ pratyakṣānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi*)'. Dharmakīrti reduces all of them into inference in the hypothetical locus [cf. Tani 1987b and Tadashi Tani, "The Problem of Interpretation on Pramāṇaviniścaya III vv.26-27", *BKT* 28, 1988, 1-16, and "The Problem of Interpretation on Pramāṇaviniścaya III vv.28-29", *BKT* 29, 1988, 1-16]. Thus all external negative determinant cognitions are transformed internal self-contradiction of a hypothetical inference. The internal negative determinator can possess logical consistency. The negative determination (*bādhakapramāṇa*) of *prasaṅga*-formulation is based on double *prasaṅga* of two possible properties which pervade all hypothetical loci for reasons of the law of excluded middle. Thus, his new type of complex *prasaṅga* does not prove a contradictory counter-property in the identical hypothetical locus. But it proves a new locus by negating the hypothetical locus together with its property. *prasaṅga* can be transformed into *svatantra* not in the identical locus but in the new deepening locus which is revealed by negation of the first locus. Thus he daringly stands on the boundary line against the external transcendent scope.

First he defines non-conceptualization as counterpositive form by property-negation (*paryudāsa*) in the provisionally stabilized locus. Secondly, this demarcation that is based on the law of excluded middle is displaced by locus-negation in the different context. His boundary standpoint is transformed corresponding to the progress of investigation [e.g. transformation of context in *Pramāṇavārttika* III: Sautrāntika → Vijñānavāda → Mādhyamika-Śūnyavāda]. Furthermore, though it is regarded as the element of ultimate valid determinant cognition (*pāramārthikapramāṇa*) in the final part of *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* I the self-difference of cognitive form (*ākāra*) in yogic perception implies the limit-concept on the boundary line between enlightenment and non-enlightenment. From the standpoints of the later commentators the crisis self-difference/displacement of his boundary standpoint is frozen in two extreme static points and middle point i.e. *sākāra*, *nirākāra* and the middle point, or *satyākāra*, *alīkākāra* and the neutralized point [see p. 395, NOTE 11 and section II.4].

II.2 *prasaṅga* and *apoha*: The validity/non-deviation of inference as conceptual differentiation (*anyāpoha*) is proved by indirect relation not to all but to one of the restricted differentiation-lines of the complete differentiation of self-difference (*svalakṣaṇa*)

The problem of identity should be investigated from two standpoints: identification of two different objects or conceptions [a = b] and self-identity of object [a = a]. Contrary to the so-called solution of identity of Frege which concerns only the former identity [a = b], Dharmakīrti's problem of identity concerns also the latter identity [a = a]. The so-called 'real identity [a = b]' presupposes each self-

identity [a = a]. Two objects can be identified in the same basic locus (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*). But the identified basic locus is not the real object. As mentioned above Dharmakīrti proves it as self-difference of momentary existence. Here all realistic presuppositions are excluded. The conceptual differentiation (*apoha*) is not based on the self-identical substance. Then how can *apoha* as relative negation [= property-negation] be related to the real self-difference as absolute negation [= locus-negation]? The boundary line between logic and time-ness should be examined. The asymmetric differentiation can be related to the self-difference of existence or cognition. The identified locus is only the logical construction. It can be regarded as 'an empty symbol' [cf. Steinkellner 1974: 125]. According to Prof. Frauwallner the ultimate perceivable object *svalakṣaṇa* is described as follows:

> d.h. die augenblicklichen Einzeldinge, welche ihrem eigentlichen unteilbaren Wesen nach nicht nur von allen anderen Dingen, sondern auch von den übrigen Augenblicken derselben Augenblicksreihe (*saṃtānaḥ*) vollkommen verschieden sind und . . . Zu den wichtigsten Eigentümlichkeiten der Vorstellung gehört nämlich, daß sich mehrere verschiedene Vorstellungen auf dasselbe Einzelding beziehen . . . Daraus folgt aber, daß der Gegenstand der Vorstellung nicht die Einzeldinge selbst sein können, weil das eine unteilbare Wesen der Einzeldinge keine Teile umfaßt . . . [Frauwallner 1935: 93].

Strictly speaking the *svabhāva* as *svalakṣana* is the ultimate differentiation [= die vollkommene Verschiedenheit], momentary self-different existence [cf. PV I 40-41:

> *sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṃ yasmād vyāvṛttibhāginaḥ // tasmād yato yato 'rthānāṃ vyāvṛttis tannibandhanāḥ / jātibhedāḥ prakalpyante tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ //* Weil alle Dinge von Natur aus nur aus ihrem eigenen Wesen bestehen und daher von Gleichartigem und Andersartigem verschieden sind, darum bildet man auf Grund alles dessen, wovon die Dinge verschieden sind, verschiedene Gattungsbegriffe, welche diese verschiedenen (Verschiedenheiten) erfassen. (E. Frauwallner, "Beiträge zur Apohalehre. I. Dharmakīrti. Übersetzung", *WZKM* 39, 1932 [247-285]: 248)]

The momentary destructible existence cannot be divided into two self-identical objects: existence and non-existence. The object of inference cannot be identified with the perceived object. The validity of inference is based on the relative functional differentiation of the operation of the perceivable object which has been transformed into the conceptualization of differentiation.

Prof. Frauwallner says: "Genau genommen dürfte man eigentlich nicht von einem Hervorbringen der gleichen Wirkung sprechen, da die Dinge, welche die Wirkung darstellen, genau so voneinander verschieden sind wie alle Einzeldinge. . . ." [Frauwallner 1935: 94].

In the Buddhist's scope, no ontological identity can be presupposed. Any existence is necessarily destructed. Existence is not self-identity but self-difference. The necessary destruction, the independent difference-relation, is the most basic validity. The differentiating conceptualization (*apoha*) on which the validity of inference is based can correspond to the restricted scope of the ultimate differentiation of existence. It cannot be directly based on the ultimate existence, because the ultimate existence is not the positive static self-identical core-point but the negative complete self-difference. Namely the ultimate existence as complete self-difference radiates infinite differentiation lines on all sides. Only by means of negative relation (*vyatireka*) based on hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*), the inference is verified by one of the directions of complete self-difference. In other words, within our cognizable scope, the ultimate existence cannot but be expressed as negative difference. The direction of differentiation must be selected by the cognizer's intention. Thus, although the inference is valid within the limit of our cognition, the object of inference is the empty-interval of the ultimate differentiation. The difference cannot be revealed without a displacement of the cognizer's identification-act as conceptual superimposition.

The more differentiated object [ex. *śiṃśapā*-tree] is necessarily pervaded by a less differentiated object [ex. tree]; thus if tree is excluded, *śiṃśapā*-tree necessarily is excluded. Therefore, *śiṃśapā*-tree is necessarily tree. The essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) is determined not by the positive necessity of the self-identical existence but by the negative asymmetric necessity of self-different existence. The asymmetric direction is ultimately based on self-difference of existence, i.e. the momentary destruction of existence. And it is remarkable that the proof of time-ness of momentary existence can be proved only by hypothetical negative reasoning, because the deepening locus shifted by hypothetical locus-negation radiates infinite self-difference-lines of conceptualization. For Dharmakīrti, the existence is not located in the transcendent time-coordinate but the existence itself is time. Namely, the self-differentiation of conceptualization by means of proving momentary existence reversely radiates time-ness.

II.3 Dharmakīrti's theory of time-ness

II.3.1 Proof of self-difference/displacement of momentary existence

The validity of inference which consists of conceptual differentiation (*apoha*) can be proved by the relation to one of the infinite differentiation-lines of a complete self-differentiation of the ultimate perceived existence as *svalakṣaṇa*. The limit of self-difference of existence is described as time-ness of momentary existence. This is the reason why Dharmakīrti could not presuppose a self-identical existence on conventional level as criterion. The proof of momentary self-difference of existence does not only imply a Sautrāntika theory but also a transformation of the basic cognition (*parāvṛtti*) as *paratantra-svabhāva* in Vijñānavāda or a transformation from conventional cognition to ultimate cognition in Mādhyamika-Śūnyavāda. It rather characterizes a shifting standpoint of Dharmakīrti; independently of any frozen sectionalism. What is momentary existence for Dharmakīrti? An explicit definition seems to occur only in one place of *Pramāṇavārttika* III:

> PV III 496ab: *ekāṇvatyayakālaś ca kālo 'lpīyān kṣaṇo mataḥ / buddhis ca kṣaṇikā tasmāt kramād varṇān prapadyate //* [PVK: *'ṇīyān*; PVV, PVBh: *'lpīyān*. Tosaki 1985]. And a moment is regarded as minimum time-interval which passes through one atom. Cognition is momentary. Thus, sound of word is cognized as resulting successively. [Cf. Tilmann Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*, Wien 1964: 17: "Das kleinste Zeitmaß ist eine Zeit, die bemessen ist nach dem Schwund (und Neuerscheinen am nächsten Raumpunkt) eines Atoms: das ist ein Augenblick.]

This description seems to conform to the second of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*'s twofold definition as follows: [AKBh (ad AK III 85) 176,11-13] *kālasya paryantaḥ kṣaṇo . . . kṣaṇasya punaḥ kiṃ pramāṇam / samagreṣu pratyayeṣu yāvatā dharmasyātmalābho gacchan vā dharmo yāvatā paramāṇoḥ paramāṇvantaraṃ gacchati / . . . kṣaṇa* is the limit of time. . . . How long is the *kṣaṇa*? (1) The interval time when a causal-complex possesses the self-property. (2) Or the interval time when a property moves from on one limit-particle to another limit-particle . . .

But this description should be regarded as the hypothetical opponent's in the context of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* III. Against the hypothetical opponent's interpretation of a reconnection of discrete point-particle minimum time by recognition he stresses the non-interrupted continuity of momentary existence [cf. Akira Hirakawa, "Usetsuna to setsunametsu", in *Prof. Kanakura Koki Kinen Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Ronshū*, Kyōto 1966, 159-177]. Dharmakīrti's proper definition seems to be closer to the first definition for reasons of his theory of efficient operation (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*).

He regards the single atom [or spatial limit-particle] as a non-perceivable object. Only a complex of limit-particles can possess form (*ākāra*) [PV III 194-224]. And the directly preceding cognition of form is the cause of cognition [PV III 519-532]. It is a non-measurable infinitesimal transformation

of the existence of cognition. The cognition is not discrete (*vicchinna*). The continuity of the presentation (*satatam bhāsamāna*) of cognition is not an illusion of rapid moving [PV III 490-499]. Even the minimum of a perceivable particle consists of the limit of momentary existence [cf. PV III 495:

sarvāntyo 'pi hi varṇātmā nimeṣatulitasthitiḥ / sa ca kramād anekānusambandhena nitiṣṭhati // Even the self-identity or essential property of the minimum of one syllable (*mātrā*) continues in a wink. The one syllable completes itself successively, because wink-time continuity connects some limit-particles.] The continuity is described by the following terms: *jñānāntareṇānubhava, sañcāra, avicchinna, kramotpatti, anantarahetunā, arthāntare gati* [PV III 484-532].

Dharmakīrti's *kṣaṇa* is not discrete [= staccato movement (in Stcherbatsky: Buddhist Logic I 83)] but is close to a differentiation in continuity without a basic substance [I venture to say, it is isomorphic to the Mathematician Dedekind's cutting in real number for the purpose of proving a continuity of real number, though the Buddhist's momentariness is not an abstract time concept in an abstract set theory but momentary existence; cf. Tani 1973: 23f.; note (3).] Since a single atom cannot be cognized, the momentary interval is not measurable. It is rather assumed that the unmeasurability is based on self-difference of momentary existence. *Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya* should be read in the context of Vasubandhu's criticism of Vaibhāṣika. AKBh ad AK IV 2-3 [AKBh 193,2-4]:

ko 'yaṃ kṣaṇo nāma. ātmalābho 'nantaravināśī. so 'syāstīti kṣaṇikam. . . . sarvaṃ hi saṃskṛtam ātmalābhād ūrdhvaṃ na bhavatīti yatraiva jātaṃ tatraiva dhvasyate. tasyāyuktā deśāntarasaṃkrāntiḥ. What is a moment? Immediate destruction of what obtained itself [= X had been no sooner obtained than X was destructed]. An object in which the moment occurs [= X which has the moment] is called 'momentary'. All causal constructions which have obtained itself do not exist. They are destructed at the place where they were produced. It is unreasonable that they go to another place.

The underlined expression is problematical. It seems to be rather interpreted as self-difference from the radical standpoint of the Sautrāntika's flux-theory, although the context is the negation of movement in conformity with the Vaibhāṣika's standstill-theory. As mentioned above, if the momentariness of existence is an essential property without any external cause (*ahetukavināśitva*), the self-identical essential property [= Itself] must be destructed at the moment. Thus, the essential property of existence should be proved as self-difference. Here, a time-concept is not presupposed. But the interval of self-difference of existence is reversely defined as the moment. The moment should not be regarded as a measurable object-point in frame of reference. Can the immediate destruction of existence be identified with the real identity of existence? Though Dharmakīrti's *svabhāva*-concept seems to be superposed on the one moment-phase of the possessor of an essential self-property (*ātmalābha*) [in (*eka*)*kṣaṇasthāyin*], the moment (*kṣaṇa*) is not the stopping point but the limit-concept of self-different operation. The destruction without external cause (*ahetukavināśitva*) implies the automatical and independent self-destruction of existence without a basic self-identical substance which can keep self-identity in one moment (*ekakṣaṇa*). The momentariness really means self-difference. Thus, Dharmakīrti's concept of *svabhāva* implies not self-identity but necessary self-difference. Dharmakīrti's logical system is based not on identity in space but on self-difference of time-ness.

II.3.2 Necessary or independent momentary self-destruction of existence as *paratantrasvabhāva* in Vijñānavāda-context

The remarkable aspect of momentary self-difference of existence in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is developed into the *pariṇāma* theory in Vijñānavāda: AKBh IX 477,18-20:

yaḥ karmapūrva uttarottaracittapravasaḥ sā saṃtatis tasyā anyathotpattiḥ pariṇāmaḥ. sa punar yo 'nantaraṃ phalotpādanasāmarthaḥ so 'ntyapariṇāmaviśiṣṭatvāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ. A continuity is a continually reverting origination of [new moments of] consciousness which are following an

action. The production of change in [the continuity] is [defined as] transformation (*pariṇāma*). And, the transformation which has the capacity of immediately producing the result is called the differentiated [or ultimate] transformation, because it is differentiated as the last transformation.

ahetukavināśitvānumāna in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Karmasiddhi* is transformed into *pariṇāma*. Dharmakīrti's *svabhāva* as *kṣaṇikatva* can be superposed upon it. According to the *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti*-index [Ono/Oda 1989], Dharmakīrti uses the word *pariṇāma* 9 times in *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti*. It occurs in the following contexts:
(1) The transformation of efficient power complex cause; PVSV 7,3: *sāmagrīphalaśaktīnāṃ pariṇāmānubandhini*; ibid. 7,6: *sāmagrījanmanāṃ śaktīnāṃ pariṇāmāpekṣatvāt kāryotpādasya*; ibid. 7,9: *śaktipariṇāmena*; ibid. 7,10: *śaktipariṇāmapratyayasya*. (2) change in general; ibid. 8,14: *bhūtapariṇāma*. (3) non-eternal relativity of Veda written by human effort (*vedāpauruṣeya*); ibid. 135,12: *kṛtakānām api hetupariṇāmaniyamavatvam aśakyaḥ kramaviparyayaḥ kartum*; ibid. 158,6: *śabdasyānyataḥ svarūpapariṇāmo*. (4) independent change of continuation in conceptualization (*ahetukavināśitva*); ibid. 98,24: *santānapariṇāma*. (5) necessary differentiation of conceptualization (*apoha*); ibid. 88,1: *paryāyo bhedāśraya . . . pariṇāmo vāvyatirekiṇyāḥ viśeṣe vā*.

These above meanings [= successive transformation] do not so far deviate from Vasubandhu's usage. The aspect of continuous self-different transformation without an eternal substance is stressed in Vijñānavāda. The *ahetuka-vināśitvānumāna* in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Karmasiddhi* has been transformed into *pariṇāma*.

Sthiramati's commentary *Triṃśikabhāṣya* (ed. S. Lévi, Paris 1925) 16,1-2:

> *ko 'yaṃ pariṇāmo nāma. anyathātvam. kāraṇakṣaṇanirodhasamakālaḥ kāraṇakṣaṇavilakṣaṇaḥ kāryasyātmalābhaḥ pariṇāmaḥ.* What is the transformation? It means the difference. Simultaneous with the destruction of momentary existence as cause, the effect which is not characterized as the momentary existence as the cause takes its essential property.

Here difference is interpreted as simultaneity of destruction of a preceding momentary existence and the emergence of a succeeding momentary existence. The expression 'simultaneous' is also problematical like the above case. According to Gadjin Nagao, "Tenkan no ronri", in *Chūgan to Yuishiki*, Tōkyō 1952: 243, this simultaneity is interpreted as momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) which is the ground of time and space. The momentariness (Augenblicklichkeit) is not based on an ordinary concept of time, but the concept of time is rather based on the former. Time-ness of self-difference produces the time-aspect/phase. Asaṅga regards momentary existence as *paratantrasvabhāva* which intermediates between *parikalpitasvabhāva* and *pariniṣpannasvabhāva* [p. 390, NOTE 8]. The self-difference of the *paratantrasvabhāva* reveals itself as non-existence-aspect from an ultimate standpoint. Dharmakīrti too ultimately regards it as the non-existence aspect as *śūnyatā* by *prasajyapratiṣedha*. Further, the non-existence aspect of self-difference can be found in Mādhyamika texts. As mentioned above [section I.3.2], for Dharmakīrti the destruction does not imply that another something exists, but it implies that anything absolutely does not exist. The expression 'does not exist' should be interpreted not as a relative negation [= property-negation] but as an absolute negation [= locus-negation] [PVSV 145,26-146,1]. Thus, in *vināśitvānumāna*, the indicator for the destruction cannot relate to the non-existence [PV I 278-279]. Dharmakīrti's momentary destruction of existence does not imply the transformation of a property in the same eternal substantial locus. But it means the transformation of existence itself into non-existence without any basic substance. The basic locus can be excluded by the absolute negation [= locus negation]. On the contrary, the relative negation [= property-negation] negates only a property. It cannot exclude the locus in which the property is located. Here, *ālayavijñāna* as the substantial locus should not be presupposed. The momentary destruction (*kṣaṇabhaṅga*) as *paratantra-svabhāva* is apt to be cognized as *santāna*-transformation and it is conceptualized as an eternal

substantial existence with the stream of *vāsanā* from a *parikalpitasvabhāva* standpoint, though the latter is non-existence from the standpoint of basic truth. On the contrary, the same momentary destruction as *paratantrasvabhāva* can reverse the vector of *vāsanā*, that is, it excludes the constructed existence and the direction of investigation is turned to *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*. Thus, the momentary destruction as *paratantrasvabhāva* itself is excluded in the aspect of *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*. It can be read as the turning point on the boundary line between enlightenment and non-enlightenment in the context of Vijñānavāda: ASBh 50,9-11:

> *asallakṣaṇaṃ yathā nāsti sarvadā duḥkhasatyam ātmātmīyasvabhāvam iti yo 'rthaḥ so 'rtho 'nityaṃ duḥkhasatyam iti. ākārasya pratiṣedhārthatvāt nityaśabdasya ca sarvakālārthatvād iti.* [First, non-eternity denotes] the aspect of non-existence: in the truth of torment, an essential property of Self and the locus of Self do not exist in any time. This is the meaning of the statement: the torment is non-eternal. The prefix '*a*' implies the [absolute] negation ([*prasajya*-]*pratiṣedha*) and *nitya* implies all time.

Sthiramati says: SAVBh P 156b4-6; D 132a4-6:

> *med pa'i don daṅ źes bya ba la / mi rtag ces bya ba'i sgra / rgya gar skad du / a ni ta ta [anitya] źes bya ba 'byuṅ ste / a ni med pa'i don te ni ta ta ni rtag pa'i don te / byaṅ chub sems dpa' rnams kyi skye ba 'jig pa'i don ni mi rtag pa'i don ma yin gyi / gaṅ du rtag tu med pa'i don ni mi rtag pa'i don to // rtag tu med pa yaṅ gaṅ źe na / 'dus byas rnams kun tu brtags pa'i gaṅ zag daṅ / kun brtag kyi chos rnams ni ri bon gi rwa bźin du med de kun brtags kyi mtshan ñid rtag tu med pa'i don ni mi rtag pa'i don to //* In regard to the meaning of non-existence, non-eternity is *anitya* in Indian language. '*a*' implies non-existence/[absolute] negation. For Bodhisattva(s), non-eternity means not only production and destruction but also [absolute] non-existence in any time and places. [Opponent:] What is a non-existence in any time? [Answer:] Neither a subjective cognizer (*pudgala*) who regards constructed objects as [existence] nor the conceptualized object exist, e.g. a hare's horn. It is the meaning of non-eternity that the aspect of conceptualization never exists in any time. [cf. SAVBh P 156b5, D 132a3f.; SAVBh P 157b4f., D 133b3f.; SAVBh P 158b1f., D 133b6f. Asvabhāva's interpretation: *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭikā* (P 5530) 169b6-170a1, (D 4029) 151a6-b; MSA XVIII kk. 82-91; SAVBh P 158b1f., D 133b6-7; *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (ed. U. Wogihara, Tōkyō 1930-1936) 130,25-131,2, 277,16-280,11, 278,9-25; Hsien-yang [cf. L. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna. On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy,* [2 parts] Tokyo 1987 (part II): 261 note 99] 顕揚聖教論 Taishō 31 No.1602 (the fourth section) 成無常品 第四] [p. 390, NOTE 9]

According to Hayashima (cited below, p. 390 note 9) 1989a: 20f., in order to prove the momentariness of all existence, the momentariness of external existence (*kārya*) is proved on the presupposition of momentariness of internal cognition (*kāraṇa*) in the above mentioned Vijñānavāda-texts. This should be regarded as a unique proof of the Vijñānavādin, as mentioned by Hayashima 1988: 25. This will be a criterion of differentiation between Dharmakīrti's proof and ASBh-descending-Vijñānavādin's proof. But Dharmakīrti's shifting standpoint crosses over the boundary line, in regard to the interpretation of non-existence and so forth. These interpretations of momentary existence seem to come within Dharmakīrti's range. [cf. *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ed. K. Shukla, Patna 1973) 485,6-486,17; ASBh 55A-56 (50-53): 53,5-9; MAVBh and MAVṬ ad MAV III 5c-6b]

Next, the non-existence-aspect of self-difference of time-ness can be found in Mādhyamika texts, e.g. Pras VII 173,8-175,6. When the momentary self-difference from existence to non-existence is interpreted from the standpoint of the transformation of basic dimensional cognition, the correlation between existence and non-existence is interpreted as *śūnyatā* in the deeper locus of the Mādhyamika's context. The empty logical space of *śūnyatā* which is proved by *prasaṅga* is interpreted as 'time-

ness' of the momentary self-difference of existence which is proved by SVB-*pramāṇa* with double *prasaṅga* as proper logical proof. Dharmakīrti's logical effort transforms *śūnyatā* into 'time-ness' of the momentary self-difference of existence. But the problem of time-ness and self-difference is placed on the boundary line of logic. The self-difference of time-ness seems to destruct the basic logical presupposition: time-less self-identity of the logical consistency. Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavāda should be interpreted not only as ordinary logic or epistemology but also as a transformation of ordinary logic or epistemology into a cognition of deeper dimensions through locus-negation, i.e. by means of shifting the locus on the basis of the *prasaṅga*-proof. Namely, his logic and epistemology possess a self-different/displacing proto-vector. The proof of momentary [self-different/displacing] existence (*kṣaṇikatvānumāna*) on which Dharmakīrti concentrates his whole logical efforts, paradoxically, proves the displacement of its logical base as self-identity of conceptualization. Namely, not only the opponent's non-momentary substance but also the proponent's hypothetically conceptualized non-momentary universal/conceptualization should be ultimately negated. This paradoxical self-referent proof-formulation is caused by introducing the hypothetical negative reasoning. It does not prove an objective minimum of linear time as a quantity on the assumption of identity of substantial time. But it ultimately proves the non-objectivized self-different time-ness as an empty object [*śūnyatā*] which releases the object in frozen conceptualization. The momentary existence primarily stands for self-difference/displacement. For Dharmakīrti, the logic implies neither an instrument for proving a one-sided dogma nor for proving a consistency in word-convention but a releasing device as creative operator through self-difference/displacement of time-ness of momentary existence. In other words, the ultimate truth is placed neither on inter-logic nor on outer-logic, but on self-difference/displacement of logic as a boundary line. He intends to prove the self-difference/displacement of existence on the assumption of the self-identity of the conceptualized object by means of hypothetical negative reasoning. First, he intentionally constructs a logical system on the basis of a hypothetical identity of conceptualization (*svabhāva*) based on the hypothetical negative determinant cognition (SVB-*pramāṇa*) or the hypothetical complete-ness of the causal-complex which is supposed on a one-moment-state of present existence. Secondly, he proves the ultimate reality as self-different/displacing non-substance (*niḥsvabhāva*) as the self-different momentary time-ness of displacing existence. His key word, *svabhāva*, possesses a twofold meaning. So far as his logical theory is based on the twofold meaning of *svabhāva*, his logical theory contains this self-difference of the turning-point in itself. Thus, in a sense, he continues to write his works with all his logical efforts in order to end/displace his logic. Most post-Dharmakīrtians fix Dharmakīrti's context of a strained self-difference/displacement in a frozen alternative standpoint between self-identical standpoints. [p. 394, NOTE 10].

II.4 Self-different boundary line of time-ness as *śūnyatā*

II.4.1 Truth-criterion as non-eternal momentary self-difference/displacement

It is remarkable that Dharmakīrti's truth-criterion of the determinant cognition (*pramāṇa*) is not an eternal substance but the necessary momentary self-difference. Thus, his logical space does not permit any static self-identical real core-point of existence. From this standpoint, he criticizes the Naiyāyika's proof of the existence of Īśvara and the Mīmāṃsaka's eternal determinant word-cognition (*śābdaprāmāṇya*) [PV II 10-33]. Further, he regards the Buddha as the determinant cognitive existence (*pramāṇabhūta*) who is interpreted as self-different momentary existence. In opposition to later commentators, he interprets Buddha not as omniscient of all existence in space but as the time-ness of self-different momentary existence in PV II 7-9 as follows:

[v. 7] *tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān abhūtavinivṛttaye / bhūtoktiḥ sādhanāpekṣā tato yuktā pramāṇatā //* Just as above mentioned [twofold *pramāṇa*-definition], Buddha is *pramāṇa*. In order to

negate non-produced-ness [= eternity], [Buddha] is called [*pramāṇa-*]*bhūta* [who has been produced]. Thus, [he] is adequate to the property of *pramāṇa*.

[v. 8]: *nityaṃ pramāṇaṃ naivāsti prāmāṇyād vastusaṅgateḥ / jneyānityatayā tasyādhrauvyāt kramajanmanāṃ //* *pramāṇa* is by no means eternal. The property of *pramāṇa* consists of correspondence with reality. Namely because it [i.e. cognition = *pramāṇa*] is non-eternal for reasons of non-eternity of the object to be cognized.

[v. 9]: *nityād utpattiviśleṣād apekṣāyā ayogataḥ / kathañcin nopakāryatvād anitye 'py apramāṇatā //* It is contradictory that successive production is produced from eternal object. It is unreasonable that [the successive production is produced] by co-operation with [a co-operate cause], because an eternal object can never be assisted. [Thus, the cognition of eternal object, Īśvara] cannot be *pramāṇa* for a non-eternal object.

On the basis of the self-different momentary truth-theory, the dynamic displacement of contexts in *Pramāṇavārttika* III and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I is revealed as Dharmakīrti's shifting standpoint on the self-different or self-displacing boundary line. *Pramāṇavārttika* III can be read in the transformation of a threefold [or fourfold] context: (1) Sautrāntika, (2) Vijñānavāda, [(2-1) Satyākāravāda [Sākāra-Vijñānavāda, *mam ldan pa*] and (2-2) Alīkākāravāda [Nirākāra-Vijñānavāda, *mam rdzun pa*] in later terminologies], (3) Mādhyamika-Śūnyavāda. Post-Dharmakīrtians' extreme stationary classification may be in danger of depriving him of the vivid dynamic philosophy. The displacement of context seems to imply that his fundamental standpoint is the ultimate displacement theory (*śūnyatāvāda*). [p. 395, NOTE 11].

II.4.2 Turning-point on self-difference boundary line

Dharmakīrti himself stands on the boundary line between conventional valid determinant cognition (*sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa*) and ultimate determinant cognition (*pāramārthikapramāṇa*). Dharmakīrti's boundary standpoint in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I is revealed in the last paragraph as follows: [The corresponding Sanskrit text was discovered by Yamakami and Christian Lindtner ("Marginalia to Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya 1-11", *WZKS* 28, 1984, 149-175) in NBhūṣ 57,14-19. Shōdō Yamakami, "Nyāyabhūṣaṇa no kenkyū (1)", *Kyōto Sangyō Daigaku Ronshū* 14/11, 1984: 136f., 161 (The underlined text implies his revision). *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I (ed. T. Vetter, Wien 1966): 100,14-25]:

[*ucyate vijñaptimātravādy api*] *upaplavavāsanābhisandhidoṣād aprabuddhasyāpy anāśvāsikaṃ vyavahāram utpaśyann ekam apramāṇam ācakṣīta, aparam ā saṃsāram aviśliṣṭānubandhadṛḍhavāsanātvād iha vyavahārāvisaṃvādāpekṣayā pramāṇam, saṃvyavahārikasya caitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam. atrāpi pare vimūḍhā visaṃvādayanti lokam iti cintāmayīm eva prajñām anuśīlayante vibhramavivekanirmalam anapāyi pāramārthikaṃ pramāṇam abhimukhīkurvanti. de'i yaṅ cha tsam bstan pa yin no //* One [aspect of] cognition is regarded as non-determinant cognition, because word-conventional act can be observed to be trusted by even ignorant person for reasons of error of deceiving of disturbed potential impression. The other [aspect of] cognition, on the contrary, is determinant cognition in ordinary word-conventional level, because it does not deviate from word-conventional act for reasons of necessary connection, in so far as it is transmigration. That is mentioned as the essential property of determinant cognition in ordinary word-conventional level. Because, even with regard to it, ignorant other schools deviate from ordinary world. By means of research-study of concentrating insight with speculation, [the determinant cognition in ordinary word-conventional level] is turned toward the ultimate determinant cognition which is free from illusion, defilement and turning away [= obstacles]. The one aspect of the [ultimate determinant cognition] was at least explained.

Here, Dharmakīrti is regarded as Vijñānavādin. The stream of continuous conceptualization has two mutual-reverse directions. And the *pramāṇa* has two aspects: proper/ultimate and secondary/ordinary [cf. Hiromasa Tosaki, "Kōki Daijō Bukkyō no ninshikiron", *Kōza Bukkyōshisō* 2, 1974 [145-186]: 147f.; Eshō Mikogami, "Śubhagupta no jitte (vāsanā) riron hihan", *Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 38, 1982, 476-477; Tani 1985: 549, n. 35; Yūshō Wakahara, "Senzaiinshō (*vāsanā*) to chikaku (*pratyakṣa*) - chishiki no shingi ni kansuru yuishikiha no kenkai", *Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 44, 1988, 81-98]. The one aspect of the ultimate determinant cognition seems to be identified with yogic perception. [This identification and the Sanskrit text were kindly suggested to me by Prof. Steinkellner in Vienna 1984]. As mentioned above, even yogic perception, if it takes place before *parāvṛtti*, belongs to the ordinary level. And the momentary destruction of existence can be proved in *samādhitraya* from the standpoint of Vijñānavāda. Thus, the present writer would like to regard *de'i yaṅ cha tsam* as the intermediary. This intermediary implies the proof of momentary existence or [yogic] perception of it. But, momentary destruction must not be proved by pure perception, but by inference. Because perception is free from conceptualization. Nevertheless, in *Pramāṇavārttika* III, Dharmakīrti explains: "Non-eternity is not different from the existence itself. Thus, if the existence is perceived, non-eternity as not yet conceptualized object must have been perceived. Only if it has not been perceived, it should be proved by inference. Ordinary statement *dharmin* and *dharma* cannot be directly related to *svalakṣaṇa*." How can momentary destruction be proved in perception without conceptualization? [p. 395, NOTE 12].

The object of inference which is based on *svabhāvapratibandha* can be related to the referred object through efficient operation. The object, however, is not identified with *svalakṣaṇa*. But if *svalakṣaṇa* is complete self-difference of existence, it cannot be indicated as a positive form of cognition but rather as a transformation of the positive form into the negative form by means of hypothetical negative reasoning. The problem of the momentary destruction of existence is located on the boundary line between perception and inference. According to Dharmakīrti's epistemology, strictly speaking, even the perceptual judgement [in a later term: *adhyavasāya*] cannot throw a bridge across the abyss between perception and inference. Presumably, the destruction of existence is perceived not as a positive point self-identical object but as negative self-difference, dynamic emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of time-ness. The self-displacement is interpreted as the positive aspect of the one-moment-phase of the cognitive form in the context of Sākāra-Vijñānavāda and as the negative aspect of the momentary destruction of cognitive formlessness in the context of Nirākāra-Vijñānavāda. But in these fixed contexts, Dharmakīrti's vivid crisis transformation over the abyss has already been excluded.

Further, the crisis boundary line seems to imply that the ordinary level must be transformed on the turning point into a negation of the ordinary level. Thus, there are not two *pramāṇas*. But the *pramāṇa* possesses two aspects or a twofold meaning by conversion on the turning-point. The turning-point toward *pāramārthikapramāṇa* is not indicated by a transcendent force but only by self-negation of *sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa* [concerning the twofold *pramāṇa*-definition, see the next section II.4.3].

The turning-point can be found in a preceding text.

PVSV 51,3f.: *sarveṣāṃ viplave 'pi pramāṇatadābhāsavyavasthā, ā āśrayaparāvṛtter arthakriyāyogyābhimatasaṃvādanāt.* All [cognition] is confusion [*viplava* = *bhrāntatva*, PVSVṬ]. Nevertheless, until the conversion of the ground[6] is realized, the separation of the determinant cognition from

[6] Śākyamati interprets the conversion of the ground as *kun gži mam par śes pa'i 'khrul ba'i sa bon can* (the potential cause of the illusion of *ālayavijñāna*) [PVṬ D 115a1; P 135b6]. Karnakagomin regards it as *bhrāntibījam ālayavijñānam* [PVSVṬ 211]. According to Yūsho Miyasaka, "Ryōhyōshaku no ronri to chosakuteki tachiba", *IBK* 5/2, 1957: 79ff. and Lambert Schmithausen, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā und Triṃśikā", *WZKSO* 11, 1967 [109-136]: 127-129, Dharmakīrti's standpoint in PV III 520 is the Vijñānavāda without *ālayavijñāna*. [It is proved that even the *ālayavijñāna* which produces simultaneously six *pravṛttivijñāna* must presuppose the preceding *vijñāna*. Nevertheless, the existence of the *ālayavijñāna* is

pseudo-determinant cognition depends on whether it has the faculty of effective operation, and/or whether it designates [or does not deviate from] the intended object.

In the process of establishing the Prāmāṇyavāda in *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Dharmakīrti intentionally places his standpoint at the level just prior to enlightenment, i.e. *niṣṭhāśraya-parāvṛtti* (the ultimate transformation of the most fundamental ground by means of realizing the fourfold-truth). This basic transformation implies his displacement of the context [cf. Tani 1985; 1987a: 3f., fn. [3]; 1987b: 13, fn. [15]]. Dharmakīrti's *pramāṇa*-theory itself is based on *prasaṅgasādhana*. *pramāṇa* should be based on *pramāṇa* itself. If there were not *pramāṇa*, *pramāṇa* could not exist. This logical circularity, for at least the Buddhist Dharmakīrti, cannot ultimately be excluded by only pragmatic effective-ness within an ordinary act or naive realism. This self-referent circularity is solved by his self-difference/displacement theory of a twofold Prāmāṇyavāda. In the process of examining the third truth of destruction (*nirodhasatya*), the ordinary consistency of logic by which the pain (*duḥkhasatya*) is proved as logical construction (*samudayasatya*) should be proved as the fabrication and it should be negated as momentary destruction by a counter-proof. Thus, conventional logical consistency of the closed circularity of *vāsanā* can be transformed into the ultimate cognition. Further, the fabrication of consistency of conventional existence which consists of self-identical existence is detected by the proof of momentary self-difference of existence through hypothetical negative reasoning, too. The proof stands on the boundary line of the transformation from a conventional level to an ultimate level. The hypothetical conventional ontology is excluded by hypothetical negative reasoning as SVB-*pramāṇa* with *prasaṅga*. The turning-point is described in PV II as follows:

[132c-133b] *yuktyāgamābhyāṃ vimṛśan duḥkhahetuṃ parīkṣate / tasyānityādirūpañ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣanaiḥ //* With verification by logic and *āgama*, cause of pain and non-eternity, etc. as form of pain are investigated by means of differentiation in pain itself.

[133cd] *yatas tathā sthite hetau nivṛttir neti paśyati /* If the cause exists in that way, non-destruction of the effect is cognized.

[v.134] *phalasya hetor hānārthaṃ tadvipakṣaṃ parīkṣate / sādhyate tadvipakṣo 'pi heto rūpāvabodhataḥ //* Thus, in order to negate the cause, its counter-object is investigated. Because he knows the form of the cause, its counter-object too is proven.

[v.135] *ātmātmīyagrahakṛtaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ / hetur virodhi nairātmyadarṣanaṃ tasya bādhakam //* Affection which consists of grasping Self and Self's possession is the operating object of conventional construction and cause [of pain]. The counterpart [or incompatible object] as cognition of non-Self is the operation negating it [cf. Kimura 1987 and Vetter 1984 on vv. 142-144].

As mentioned above in the directly preceding section, this degree just prior to enlightenment corresponds to *laukikāgradharma* [the highest state within usual illusion], *asallakṣaṇānupraveśopāyalakṣaṇa* [the aspect of the method introducing into the aspect of non-existence], *yoniśomanaskāra* [free construction of existence] and *ekadeśapraviṣṭa/ekadeśānusṛta-samādhi* [the concentration on entrance to one part of truth] [this degree seems to correspond to *de yaṅ cha tsam* of *pāramārthikapramāṇa* at the end of *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I]. These degrees just prior to the ultimate truth consist of *niṣṭāśrayaparāvṛtti* [the ultimate displacement of the most fundamental ground/locus]. And they, at the same time, make one stand in a reflection of the inner word or conceptualization (*manojalpa*) on

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not necessarily excluded]. According to Kimura 1987: 162f. and Vetter 1984: 105, fn. 1, with regard to the term *āśrayaparāvṛtti* in PV II 205d, Prajñākaragupta interprets it as *cittasantāna* or *ālaya*. According to Masahiro Inami, "Dharmakīrti ni yoru rinne no ronshō", *Nanto Bukkyō* 57, 1987 [32-49]: 48, n. 51, with regard to it, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati offer no technical term. Manorathanandin regards *āśraya* as *ālayavijñāna*. Prajñākaragupta and Ravigupta regard it as *cittasantāna* or *ālaya*.

which usual conventional existence (*saṃvṛtisat*) is based [cf. Osamu Hayashima, "Yuishiki no jissen", *Kōza Daijō Bukkyō* 8 - *Yuishiki shisō*, Tōkyō 1982, 145-176.]. This turning-point is transcended by *ānantaryasāmadhi* [concentration of insight to emptiness between two momentary existences which is based on *samananantarapratyaya* (condition of inducing the next momentary existence into the preceding empty momentary place)]. This is the reason why Dharmakīrti focuses his logical effort on the proof of momentariness of existence.

II.4.3 Turning-point of time-ness as *śūnyatā*

Sometimes Dharmakīrti seems to describe a limitation of all his logical effort: from an ultimate standpoint of displacement of the basic locus (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*), the efficient operation (*arthakriyā*) as ultimate-existence (*paramārthasat*) or the boundary line between locus/property-possessor (*dharmin*) and property (*dharma*) as basic structure with realization (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*) should have been excluded. The concept of ultimate truth is here not regarded as the frontward objectivized limit-pole, but as crossing proto-vector-concept on a boundary line. Namely, the limit of logic in the context of Sautrāntika indicates a twofold context: pure self-cognition in the context of Vijñānavāda and complete self-displacement in the context of Mādhyamika-Śūnyavāda:

> [PV III 3] *arthakriyāsamartham yat tad atra paramārthasat / anyat saṃvṛtisat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe //* Here, object with efficient operation is the ultimate existence, while the other is conventional existence. The former is called self[-individual] aspect and the latter universal aspect.
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> [v. 4] *aśaktaṃ sarvam iti ced bījāder aṅkurādiṣu / dṛṣṭā śaktir matā sā cet saṃvṛtyāstu yathā tathā //* [Opponent:] All is incompetency. [Answer:] [No.] Seed, etc. are capable of sprouting, etc. [Opponent:] Its capability is conceptualized on a conventional level. [Answer:] It is reasonable.

According to Tosaki 1979: 61-66, Dharmakīrti's standpoint corresponds to the Mādhyamika's *bhūtasaṃvṛti* or *lokasaṃvṛtisatya*. According to Matsumoto 1980-1982, interpretations of the commentators are sharply divided into two types:

(1) Stress on v. 3: [Vijñānavāda-standpoint] Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi: [operation exists in the context of *paratantrasvabhāva*.

(2) Stress on v. 4: [Mādhyamika standpoint] Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Prajñākaragupta: operation does not exist.

Though the two verses are divided by two interpretations, Dharmakīrti's original interpretation should not be divided. Namely, he intends to possess his standpoint independently of rigid dichotomization. Though the term *atra* in v. 3 is insignificant at a first glance, it seems to be important. It implies no static one-dimensional point but the temporally stabilized context of every flowing transformation. Dharmakīrti proves the positive aspect of momentary existence as the limit of operation of self-identical existence in the one moment state. Then, on the basis of the positive operation, he seems to prove a conventional or pragmatic consistency within the ordinary human effective act. Nevertheless, his ultimate logical effort is really focused only on the negative aspect of momentary existence as self-destruction or self-difference of time-ness of transformation. The essential property (*svabhāva*) of momentary existence possesses two aspects: a positive operation and a negative extinction of operation. Momentariness of existence reveals even the negation of *svabhāva* itself: *niḥsvabhāva* as *śūnyatā*. Dharmakīrti intends to exclude *svabhāva* by logic based on *svabhāvahetu* with *svabhāvapratibandha*:

> [PV II 204-205b] *nityaṃ tam āhur vidvāṃso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati // tyaktvemāṃ hrepaṇīṃ dṛṣṭim ato 'nityaḥ sa ucyatāṃ / ukto mārgas tadabhyāsād āśrayaḥ parivartate /* Men of wisdom

call the non-destruction of essential property of existence (*svabhāva*) 'eternity'. Thus, this ignominious interpretation should be thrown away and it should be called non-eternity. The truth practice has been stated. The basis is transformed by deepening research in it.

The *āgama* [*Majjhima-Nikāya*, ed. V. Trencker and others, [4 vols.] London 1888-1925 [repr. 1974-1979] I 501; DN I 110] 'all that possesses the essential property of emergence/production possesses the property of destruction (*yatkiñcid udayātmakam / nirodhadharmakaṃ sarvaṃ tad*)' is quoted by Dharmakīrti in PV II 284 [p. 389, NOTE 7].

Thus, the term *svabhāva* displays a twofold meaning. It can be translated as real identity in an restricted context of ontology. But, it should be interpreted as asymmetric necessary relation in the context of Dharmakīrti's self-difference. In the context of the Vijñānavādin's cognition of self-essential form (*svarūpasaṃvedana*) in self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*), the positive aspect of the momentary existence is stressed by the following text, too:

[PV III 287] *śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānaṃ tatra kalpanā / svarūpañ ca na śabdārthas tatrādhyakṣam ato 'khilam //* If a cognition X grasps the object of word with regard to object Y, the cognition is conceptualization. But the self-aspect [of the conceptualization] is not object of word. Thus, [the cognition of] all [the self-aspect] is attributed to direct perception.[7]

The intermediation between the positive aspect and the negative one is the third context of Mādhyamika-Śūnyavāda. But the proof of momentary existence is the very self-difference which is free from the above triode, tripolar sectionalism. Dharmakīrti's logical space is constructed by self-destruction of the momentary causal-complex. The momentariness of existence proves non-existence of self-identity of the transcendent basic substance. Further, this necessary causal relation is determined by logical construction, i.e. hypothetical reduction (SVB-*pramāṇa*). From the ultimate standpoint, the meta-theory of momentary existence proves the momentary displacement of logical space where momentary existence can be proved. He superimposed the transformation of the state just prior to enlightenment on the momentary self-destruction of the immediately preceding causal complex. If his logical space is located in the context of Sākāra-Vijñānavāda, his term *tādātmya* as *svabhāva* could be ontologically interpreted as 'real identity' or just 'identity'. But he places his ultimate standpoint closer to the context of Nirākāra-Vijñānavāda or Mādhyamika. Even if Dharmakīrti uses the term in the ontological context, there is no real identical core of existence. His philosophical effort of proving momentary existence aims to transform the ordinary understanding of self-identical existence into the standpoint of the displacement. Namely, he intends to ground the inference not on the static self-identical tautological core-point but on the necessary displacement of self-destruction of existence. Moreover, this is the main reason why his *pramāṇa*-definition is twofold: (1) non-deviation (*avisaṃvāda*) and (2) revelation of new object (*ajñātārthaprakāśa*).

(1) [Definition 1] *pramāṇam avisaṃvādijñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ / avisaṃvādanam* [PV II 1a-c]. *pramāṇa* is non-deviant cognition. The non-deviant cognition means the fulfillment of efficient operation.

(2) *śabde' py abhiprāyanivedanāt // vaktṛvyāpāraviṣayo yo 'rtho buddhau prakāśate / prāmāṇyaṃ tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam //* [1d-2]. The word-cognition is also [non-deviant], because it indicates the [speaker's] intention. The word-cognition is determinant cognition, so far as the object to be intended by speaker can be indicated without deviation] for [hearer or

[7] Cf. PV III 9b-10: So far as the existent of the object is presupposed in the self cognition (*svasaṃvedana*), even the universal [*sāmānya* = non-*svalakṣaṇa*] can be regarded as the *svalakṣaṇa*, because it is perceived by self-cognition. PV III 53d-54: And so long as the object operates efficiently, all valids object are *svalakṣaṇa*. The object cognized by its self-aspect is the *svalakṣaṇa*, while the object cognized by its other-aspect is *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.

speaker's] cognition [by means of the word-cognition]. But [the validity of the word-cognition] is not based on the real object.

(3) *gṛhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ saṃvṛtaṃ dhī pramāṇatā / pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād dheyopādeyavastuni // viṣayākārabhedāc ca dhiyo 'dhigamabhedataḥ / bhāvad evāsya tadbhāvāt /* [3-4c]. The closed conventional tautological cognition is not determinant cognition, because it re-grasps the object which has been already grasped. Inner cognition is determinant cognition, because it is the basic cause of activity towards the object to be avoided or taken [in fourfold truth] and because the difference of cognition corresponds to the difference of form of the object, namely because only if the latter exists, the former exists.

(4) *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ // prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa śāstraṃ mohanivartanam /* [4b-5d]. The self-form/essential property of cognition is self-cognized, while its truth is [determined] by conventional level. Thus, [the writing of] *śāstra* [aims at] excluding reversed cognition [and at a transposition of it into the ultimate standpoint].

(5) [Definition 2] *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā svarūpādhigateḥ param // prāptaṃ sāmānyavijñānam avijñāte svalakṣaṇe / yajjñānam ity abhiprāyāt svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ //* [5c-6]. Or/and [*pramāṇa*] reveals a not yet cognized object. [Without restriction to this definition] the cognition of the universal [which is succeeded to cognition of self-form] would be [a new object as universal, not as self-form]. Thus, it is intended to be restricted as 'as far as the self-aspect (*svalakṣaṇa*) has not been cognized'. Because [only self-aspect should be] investigated. [cf. Katsura 1984: 219f.; Tani 1985: 534-540]

What relation is there between the two definitions? Whether Dharmakīrti's *pramāṇa*-definition is interpreted as twofold definition or as two independent definitions, is a matter for argument. This was suggested to me by Prof. Steinkellner at the Seminar of the University of Vienna in the winter semester 1984. Here, the present writer tries to solve the problem as the twofold definition. In *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*, the relation is interpreted as the correlation (*parasparāpekṣa*). According to *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, the first definition is *sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa*, while the second is *pāramārthikapramāṇa* [Katsura 1984: n. 28; Tani 1985: 542]. The definition 1 is tautological consistency, while the definition 2 implies an open structure. If the twofold definition is consistent, the prefix *a* of *avisaṃvāda* in the definition 1 should be interpreted by *prasajyapratiṣedha*. Thus, the range of Dharmakīrti's *pramāṇa*-definition is not a tautological static space but a dynamic self-different space. Dharmakīrti intends to reduce *prāmāṇya* to *svalakṣaṇa*, where *prāmāṇya* based on *vyavahāra* is paradoxically negated.

This double-meaning seems to be based on a twofold mode of time-ness: (1) state of one moment (*ekakṣaṇasthāyin*) and (2) momentary displacement/destruction (*kṣaṇabhaṅga*). In other words, (1) the transparent shifting identity of present-time-mode and (2) the flowing transformation of self-different momentary present-time-mode. Logical consistency can be proved by idealization of the transparent identity of 'now' as present time-aspect, while the emergence of a new object is proved by the self-difference/displacement of momentary destruction of the present time-aspect. If the negative prefix of 'non-deviation (*avisaṃvāda*)' is interpreted by property-negation (*paryudāsa*), it means tautological identity. But Dharmakīrti does not confine Pramāṇavāda to conventional consistency covered by *vāsanā*. If logic on the conventional level is proved as a completely consistent system, it proves, paradoxically, the incomplete-ness of conventional logic from the ultimate standpoint. Because it cannot prove any 'proper' new object. His second definition is interpreted as the ultimate determinator (*pāramārthikapramāṇa*) by Prajñākaragupta. Though his interpretation may be too radical, the *pramāṇa* must, at least, prove a new object which can break through the circularity of *vāsanā*. Namely, there must be the operation of an object which can reverse the direction of the *vāsanā*-stream by *vāsanā* itself. It may be explained that Dharmakīrti at first is not aware of the different levels between two definitions or of a twofold definition. Namely, the second definition is introduced only in order to exclude the tautological truth in case of memory. And the relation to the twofold or two

definition(s) in Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā* cannot be determined [Lambert Schmithausen, *Maṇḍanamiśra's Vibhramavivekaḥ*, Wien 1965: 193, and Katsura 1984. This is based on Prof. Steinkellner's suggestion]. Nevertheless, the second definition should not be restricted in a pseudo-new tautological self-identical object in the same [not new] locus in *vāsanā*-tail-wind. The momentariness of existence means the turning-point in the reversion of the *vāsanā*-stream. Otherwise, Dharmakīrti's crisis, the reason for his boundary logical effort would come to nothing. Thus, the negative prefix of the first definition should be interpreted by locus-negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), only as non-deviation, not by property-negation (*paryudāsa*), as tautological identity in the same locus. Although these two negations can be multivocal, the property-negation here implies horizontal negation with the counterpositive object in the provisionally stabilized locus, while locus-negation implies perpendicular negation without a counterpositive object in the same hypothetical locus. In other words, the dimension of logical space is transformed by locus-negation as *prasaṅga*. It negates the hypothetical locus and reveals a new locus. His logical space is shifted by locus-negation. Namely, logic is swayed by time-ness. *pramāṇa* cannot be defined without the presupposition of *pramāṇa*. This circularity or self-reference implies that *pramāṇa* cannot but be proved by the complex proof-formulation with hypothetical negative reasoning. The concentration on the proof of momentary existence brings forth efficient operation as new releasing momentary existence. The self-difference or self-displacement of momentary existence must indicate '*śūnyatā* as time-ness'. Dharmakīrti defines existence as the possibility of efficient operation which is based on time-ness. Then, he explodes a self-contradiction between the stabilized time-less concept and time-ness of existence through *prasaṅga*. Namely, the introduction of the *prasaṅga*-aspect into his boundary line between logic and time-ness displaces the logical circularity. This is the same procedure as Nāgārjuna's. And it transforms the transparent self-identical time-ness of ordinary logic into his new logic of self-different/displacing time-ness. In his later works, the logical necessity of the essential relation is not based on real ontological identity but on the necessary displacement of time-ness from the construction of essential property (*svabhāva*) to the destruction/-displacement of the essential property (*niḥsvabhāva*). Dharmakīrti's logic is constructed on the ambivalence of '*śūnyatā* as the momentary present time-ness': transparent self-identical present-mode and self-different/displacing present-mode. If the time-ness of cognition is cognized by self-cognition, the self-difference of time-ness transforms the circularity of self-cognition into the very new self-different cognition. The hypothetical negative reasoning can be realized by every self-different cognition.

From Dharmakīrti's standpoint on the momentary self-displacing and crisis boundary line between logic and time-ness, the momentary existence must have been perceived by deeper and sharper cognition. Strictly speaking, the self-difference/displacement as 'empty interval: *śūnyatā*' is perceived as momentary difference. The difference cannot be fixed as self-identical existence by conceptualization. Thus, the self-difference of *svalakṣaṇa* is freed from the concept of self-identity. Only by inference as differentiation (*apoha*) of hypothetical reasoning (*prasaṅga*), it can be indirectly indicated, because the differentiating operation of inference can be superposed or projected on one of the infinite differentiation-lines of the complete self-difference of *svalakṣaṇa*. And the deepening of the locus [by locus-negation in *prasaṅga*-inference] along negative differentiating-line of conceptual differentiation (*apoha*) seems to be overlapping on the self-difference/displacement of time-ness of momentary existence.

There is a fear of misinterpretation that Dharmakīrti's self-different/displacing standpoint is apt to be interpreted as a self-identical positive Dharmakīrti-image. Actually the divergency point of self-difference has been sharply demarcated in the interpretations among post-Dharmakīrtians. The transposition of the centroid on either the *prasaṅga*-aspect or *svatantra*-aspect and on either the *sākāra*-aspect or *nirākāra*-aspect has given rise to different sectionally frozen interpretations. But the self-identical core point of Dharmakīrti-interpretation does not seem to exist. Thus, only self-difference/-displacement of Dharmakīrti-interpretation can exist in our philosophical context.

Dharmakīrti finished his first main work *Pramāṇavārttika* with the following verse:

anadhyavasitāvagāhanam analpādiśaktināpy adṛṣṭaparamārthasāraṇam adhikābhiyogair api / matam mama jagaty alabdhasadṛśapratigrahakaṃ prayāsyati payonidheḥ paya iva svadehe jarām // Meine Lehre, deren Tiefe auch bei nicht geringer Geisteskraft nicht zu erfassen ist, deren wahrer Gehalt auch bei ungewöhnlichen Bemühungen nicht zu erschauen ist, wird, ohne in der Welt jemand zu finden, der geeignet wäre, sie aufzunehmen, gleich dem Wasser des Meeres in sich selbst altern. [Frauwallner 1954: 151]

According to Bu ston's interpretation, the verse seems to imply that Dharmakīrti's main work *Pramāṇavārttika* could not catch applause and could not be understood even by his direct pupil Devendrabuddhi. Thus, Dharmakīrti despaired to continue writing the *Pramāṇavārttika* [p. 396, NOTE 13]. Though Dharmakīrti's thought seems to be difficult to be understood, the interpretation seems to miss Dharmakīrti's true motive. As Prof. Frauwallner tried to emancipate Devendrabuddhi from the traditional context of Bu ston [E. Frauwallner, "Devendrabuddhi", *WZKSO* 4, 1960 [119-123]: 119f.], Dharmakīrti's verse also should be released from the context. The present writer would like to ascribe the difficulty of Dharmakīrti's thought not to the difficulty of understanding but to that of Dharmakīrti's problem itself. As mentioned above, his self-different crisis standpoint is placed on the boundary line between logic and time-ness. The verse should be interpreted as Dharmakīrti's own despairing monologue for the philosophical difficulty of the problem itself to be solved. This is the reason why the final verse is added to the last section concerning the proof of momentary self-destruction or self-difference of existence (*ahetuka vināśitvānumāna*) [p. 396, NOTE 14]. What makes Dharmakīrti find himself at far distance from Dignāga's interpretation in the process of writing the final section of the fourth chapter of *Pramāṇavārttika*? The different interpretation must imply a proper originality of Dharmakīrti's. And this will be one of trial solutions to Prof. Frauwallner's problem: "Was Dharmakīrti veranlaßte, das *Pramāṇavārttikam* unvollendet zu lassen?" In the last section, Dharmakīrti tries to base logical necessity and independence on negative cognition. And he bases the negative cognition on the necessary momentary destruction of existence which is independent of any external cause (*ahetuka vināśitva*). Generally speaking, logical necessity should be based on a self-identical object; identity of self-identical object or causal relation between two self-identical objects. This interpretation is easy to be understood in the word-conventional level on the basis of self-identity of word/concept. But, Dharmakīrti paradoxically tries to base logical necessity on the self-difference of momentary existence. Here, the proof of momentary destruction is not regarded as an application of *svabhāvahetu*, but as a meta-theory of logical necessity. His logic/*pramāṇa*-theory paradoxically aims at the destruction of ordinary logic which is based on self-identity of word-object/concept. Nevertheless, if Dharmakīrti's logic is not mere tautological language-game but revelation of ultimate cognition toward enlightenment by means of the proof of self-different momentary existence, his logic must imply the negation of ordinary comprehensive logic. This is the reason why he had to leave the *Pramāṇavārttika* incomplete with a final despairing verse. Thus, the final verse rather implies this crucial ambivalence; logic based on self-identity of word-object/concept and time-ness of non-substantialization or non-conceptualization based on self-difference of existence by hypothetical negative reasoning without existential presupposition of self-identity of existence. Then, he bases the logical necessity on the necessary/independent self-difference of existence. The self-difference of logical object, which is caused by the locus-negation of the hypothetical negative reasoning, reversely proves that his logic is based on the time-ness as self-difference. This indicates Dharmakīrti's never-ending logical effort of constructing "the logic with time-ness" which can build a bridge over "the abyss between logic and time-ness".

NOTES

[NOTE 1] Development of interpretation of *vināśitvānumāna* up to *Pramāṇaviniścaya*

[NOTE 1-1]
AKBh 193,7-9: *ākasmiko hi bhāvānāṃ vināśaḥ. kiṃ kāraṇam. kāryasya hi kāraṇaṃ bhavati. vināśaś cābhāvaḥ. yaś cābhāvas tasya kiṃ kartavyam. so 'sāv ākasmiko vināśo yadi bhāvasyotpannamātrasya na syāt paścād api na syād bhavasya tulyatvāt.* [Frauwallner 1969: 105: Das Vergehen der verursachten Gegebenheiten hat nämlich keine Ursache. Warum? Was eine Ursache hat, ist eine Wirkung. Das Vergehen als Nichtsein ist aber keine Wirkung und hat daher auch keine Ursache. Weil nun das Vergehen keine Ursache hat, vergehen (die verursachten Gegebenheiten), kaum, daß sie entstanden sind. Denn, wenn sie nicht gleich anfangs vergehen, dann kann es auch später nicht der Fall sein, weil sie später die gleiche Beschaffenheit haben wie früher [cf. AKBhV [Yaśomitra: ed. U. Wogihara, repr. Tokyo 1971] 348,13-14: *ekakṣaṇālabdhātmano bhavanto vinaśyanti*].

AKBh 194,12-13: *tasmān nāsti bhāvānāṃ vināśahetuḥ svayam eva tu bhaṅguratvād vinaśyanta utpannamātrā vinaśyantīti siddha eṣāṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ* . . . [Frauwallner 1969: 108: Daher hat das Vergehen der Gegebenheiten keine Ursache. Die Gegebenheiten vergehen vielmehr von selbst, weil sie vergänglich sind. Da sie aber von selbst vergehen, vergehen sie, sowie sie entstanden sind. Und durch ihr Vergehen, sowie sie entstanden sind, ist die Ansicht von ihrem augenblicklichen Vergehen erwiesen [cf. Yaśomitra's formulation: ABhKV 345,21-22: *ahetuko vināśaḥ, abhāvatvāt atyantābhāvavat*].

[NOTE 1-2]
The interpretation of *vināśitvānumāna* up to *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II is understood in Dharmakīrti's succeeding texts as follows [*Pramāṇaviniścaya* II mainly corresponds to *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*; cf. Steinkellner 1968/69, PVin II and Steinkellner 1979].

Pramāṇavārttika I and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*

PV I 278: *bhāve hy eṣa vikalpaḥ syād vidher vastvanurodhataḥ / na bhāvo bhavatīty uktam abhāvo bhāvatīty api //* (If X exists, X will be [conceptualized] as A and -A. Because positiveness is necessarily based on reality. On the contrary, [if X does not exist], though it is stated that this is non-existence of X, X does not exist.)

Here, Dharmakīrti's standpoint is closer to the Mādhyamika's interpretation of locus-negation as *śūnyatā*.

PVSV 146,18-20: *bhāvo 'vaśyaṃ bhavantam apekṣate. sa ca svabhāva eva, niḥsvabhāvasya kvacid vyāpāre samāveśābhāvāt. vyāpāra iti hi tathābhūtasvabhāvotpattiḥ.* (Existence necessarily relates to an existing [object]. And this is the essential property. A non-essential property cannot be applied to any operation. Because, the operation implies occurrence of such an essential property.)

Then, his standpoint is concentrated to the correlation of object-subject and is transported to the subjective-cognizer, in order to exclude the inductive-gap [= unconfirmability of need of infinite observations].

PVSV 149,20-27: *na, jñeyādhikarāt. ye kadācit kvacit kenacij jñātāḥ santo na jñāyante, teṣāṃ sattānubandhī nāśa iti brūmaḥ, ta eva kṛtakā anityāḥ sādhyante. . . . sarvasya kenacit kadācij jñānāt.* ([Indeterminability of destruction] never occurs. Because [only] the object of cognition is the topic. If X is cognized by nobody, wherever and whenever, I call X destruction related to existence. The X is proved as non-eternal causal construction. . . . All [objects of cognition] are cognized by somebody some time).

Here, as the other reason, the concept of *arthakriyā* is at first introduced into the context of proving *vināśitvānumāna*. The text 'All [objects of cognition] are cognized by somebody some time' is interpreted in the context of self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) of Vijñānavāda.

PVSV 149,27-150,2: *jñānamātrārthakriyāyām apy asāmarthye vastv eva na syāt. tathā hi tallakṣaṇaṃ vastv iti vakṣyāmaḥ. tasya ca vināśāvyabhicārāt sa sattānubandhī.* (Because, even if X is incapable for an efficient operation of only cognition itself, the real existence is necessarily negated. Namely, I define the real existence as such [= *arthakriyāsāmarthya*]. Since it [= *arthakriyāsāmarthya*] does not deviate from the destruction, it is necessarily related to existence.)

Karṇakagomin comments in entire conformity to Śākyamati/buddhi [PVSV(S) D 5b1f.; P 6a3f.] as follows: PVSVṬ 535,15-17: *tasya cārthakriyāsāmarthasya vastunaḥ krameṇārthakriyāṃ kurvato vināśāvyabhicārād ahetutvāc ca vināśasya sattānubandhī vināśaḥ siddhaḥ.* [The underlined comment indicates their intention of a superposition of *sattvānumāna* on *vināśitvānumāna*.]

Pramāṇavārttika II [*Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter]

(1) [vv. 7-9] *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇabhūta* [= Buddha] as necessary self-difference/displacement of non-eternal momentary existence [see section II.4].
(2) [vv. 63-72] Momentary production and destruction without an external basic cause in form of the materialist's body.

From the Mādhyamika's standpoint, Dharmakīrti negates not only the cause of destruction but also the cause of production by means of *prasaṅga*. He regards momentary existence as an essential property of reality without any basic locus.

[v. 63] *anāśrayāt sadasator nāśrayaḥ sthitikāraṇaṃ / sataś ced āśrayo nāsyāḥ sthātur avyatirekataḥ //* (Since neither existence nor non-existence possess a basic cause, [body] is not a basic cause of [mind]. [Opponent:] The preserving cause exists as the basis [of existence]. [Answer:] That is not a basis, because it [= existence] is not different from the preserving [operator].)
[v. 64] *vyatireke 'pi taddhetus tena bhāvasya kiṃ kṛtam / avināśaprasaṅgaḥ sa nāśahetor mato yadi //*
[v. 65] *tulyaḥ prasaṅgas tatrāpi . . . vastudharmatā //* (Even if the cause is different from [the existence], what [effect] can the cause bring about for the existence? It follows as incompatible consequence (*prasaṅga*) that [the existence] could not be destructed. Even if a destructing cause exists, there occurs the similar incompatible consequence. . . . [The destruction] is the property of real object.)
[v. 70] *parato bhāvanāśaś cet tasya kiṃ sthitihetunā / sa vinaśyed vināpy anyair na śaktāḥ sthitihetavaḥ //* (If the existence is destructed by another [cause], what effect can the preserving cause bring about? If it is destructed without another [cause], the preserving cause is not efficient.)
[v. 71] *sthitimān sāśrayaḥ sarvaḥ sarvotpattau ca sāśrayaḥ / tasmāt sarvasya bhāvasya na vināśaḥ kadācana //* (If all [existence] possesses preserving [cause] as basis and all emergence [possesses] the basis, all existence eternally cannot be destructed.)
[v. 72] *svayaṃ vinaśvarātmā cet tasya kaḥ sthāpakaḥ paraḥ / svayaṃ na naśvarātmā cet tasya kaḥ sthāpakaḥ paraḥ //* (If [existence] possesses the essential property of independent extinction [or self-

destruction], what other preserving cause for it can exist? [On the other hand], if it possesses the essential property of independent non-extinction, what other preserving cause for it can exist?) [cf. Miyasaka 1971/72: 12]
(3) [vv. 132cd-135 and vv. 204-205ab] Transformation of basic cognition as cognition of non-eternity or momentariness of existence in the process of the act of examining the fourfold truth [see section II.4].

Pramāṇavārttika III [*Pratyakṣa* chapter]

(4) [vv. 25-26] *prasaṅga* and spontaneous destruction of existence (*vināśitva*)
[vv. 25-26] . . . *niṣpatter aparādhīnam api kāryaṃ svahetuḥ / sambadhyate kalpanayā* . . . (Effect has accomplished [finished up] by itself, thus it needs not to depend on another object. It is combined by conceptualization.) [Cf. [v. 43c-44] *kāryañ cet [tad anekaṃ syān] naśvarañ ca tan matam // vastumātrānubandhitvād vināśasya na nityatā /* (If it were effect, [it would destruct itself]. Nevertheless, [according your presupposition,] it is not destructible. [The universal] could not be eternal, because the destruction is caused only by reality.)
(5) [vv. 79cd-83; vv. 102-110] *pratyakṣasiddhaṃ kṣaṇikatvam* (non-conceptualized non-eternal or momentary existence is perceived) [see section II.4].
(6) [vv. 416-421] Process of transformation from *vināśitvānumāna* to *sattvānumāna*

Before *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Hetubindu*, the aspect of *sattvānumāna* is found in *Pramāṇavārttika* III [cf. vv. 416-421; Tosaki 1985: n. 155: *sattvānumāna*: *prasaṅga* based on *sakṛt* and *krama*].
[v. 420] *vajropalādir apy arthaḥ sthiraḥ so 'nyānapekṣaṇāt sakṛt sarvasya janayej jñānāni jagataḥ svayam //* (If *vajra*, etc. were regarded as eternal object, it would produce cognition [of it] by itself and simultaneously for all persons. Because they [= eternal objects] need no other cause.)
[v. 421] *kramād bhāvanti tāny asya sahakāryupakārataḥ / āhuḥ pratikṣaṇaṃ bhedaṃ sa doṣo 'trāpi pūrvavat //* (If [cognitions] of them are successively produced owing to a co-operational cause, they would be differentiated in every moment. Thus, this [presupposition] would be faulty as the preceding [presupposition].)

In order to prove the existence of self-cognition, he presupposes a successive (*krama*) transformation of momentary cognition.
(7) Not only the object but also the cognition itself is momentary
[v. 488] *sthāne svayaṃ na naśyet sā paścād apy aviśeṣataḥ / doṣo 'yaṃ sakṛdutpannākramavarṇasthitāv api //* (If [cognition] independently endures, it cannot be destructed even later. Because [the later essential non-destructible property] is not different. If the syllable which occurs as produced simultaneously or non-successively endures, there is the same fault as mentioned above.) [Text: Tosaki 1979 and Miyasaka 1971/72].

This twofold *prasaṅga* formulation can be identified with that in SVB-*pramāṇa*.

Pramāṇavārttika IV [*Parārthānumāna* chapter]

(8) [vv. 280-285] *vināśitvānumāna* as meta-theory of the essential property of existence and the determination of logical necessity (*niyama*) [see section II.4].

[NOTE 2]
[NOTE 2-1] [TEXT 1]

PVin III D 188a5-188b1; P 286a5-8; N 300a6-300b2
<1*gźan gyis kun brtags* (D : *btags* NP) *pas thal ba bsgrub pa*1> *dper na du ma la yod pa'i gcig po ni yul la sogs pa'i khyad par gźan daṅ lan pa ma yin te* / <2*yul daṅ dus daṅ gnas skabs kyi khyad par ṅes pa'i gsal ba gcig daṅ 'dres pas mam par ma bcad pa raṅ bźin gźan gyis stoṅ pa'i phyir te* / *de lta bu'i raṅ bźin ni yul la sogs pa tha dad pa can daṅ ldan par 'gal ba'i phyir ro*2> // *źes* (N 300b) *bya ba lta bu gaṅ yin pa de ni chos gcig khas blaṅs na chos gźan khas blaṅs par bstan pa'i phyir yin te* / *de khas mi len na ni chos gñi ga ldog par 'gyur ro* // *mam par dbye bar bya mi nus pa'i phyir te* / *de ni gźan du de lta yaṅ dṅos su 'brel ba'i phyir ro* // *da ni ji ltar mi* (D188b) *srid pa'i don grub par 'gyur źe na* / *gaṅ źig mi srid pas khyab pa de yaṅ de la mi srid pa'i phyir ro* // *de khas len na gźan gdon mi za bar 'gyur pa'i phyir bzlog par dka'o* //

<1> PV IV 12b1-1c: *parakalpitaiḥ* / *prasaṅgo* . . . (*prasaṅge* PVBh)
<2> PVBh 476,1-3 (D 131a4-6; P 154b5-7): *deśakālāvasthāviśeṣaniyataika(vyakti)saṃsargavyavachinnasvabhāvāntaravirahād anekavṛtter ekasya na deśādiviśeṣavatānyena yogaḥ* . . . *yatas tathābhūtasvabhāvasya virodhād bhinnadeśādiyogena.*
NBhūṣ 231,6f.: *deśakālāvasthāviśeṣaviniyataikasaṃsargavyavacchinnasvabhāvāntaravirahād anekavṛtter ekasya na deśādiviśeṣavatānyena yoga iti.*
Padārthadharmasaṃgraha (*Vyomavatī*) [ed. G. Kaviraj] 681,11-13: *deśakālāvasthāviśeṣaviniyataikasaṃsargāvyavacchinnasvabhāvāntaravirahād anekatra vṛtter ekasya na deśādiviśeṣavatānyena yoga iti.*
Nyāyakaṇikā [ed. Kāśī 1907] 287,3-5: *deśakālāvasthāviśeṣaniyataikasaṃsargavyavacchinnasvabhāvāntaravirahād anekavṛtter ekasya na taddeśādiviśeṣavatānyena yoga iti.* (The text of the *Nyāyakaṇikā* [Vācaspatimiśra's commentary on Maṇḍanamiśra's *Vidhivivekaḥ*, ed. R. S. Tailanga, Kāśī 1907] 204,24f. is the same.)
(The latter two citations were given to me by Mr. E. Stern during my stay at the University of Vienna 1984/85.) [see Tani 1987a: 10]

[NOTE 2-2] [TEXT 2]

PVin III D 188b1-7; P 286a8-286b7; N 300b2-301a2
de lta na (*de lta na* om. NP) (P 286b1) *yaṅ raṅ gis khas blaṅs pa gźan du gnas pa'i phyir gtan tshigs ma grub pa daṅ* / *dam bcas pa la khas blaṅs pa la sogs pas gnod pa ma yin nam źe na* / *ma yin te* / <1*brtag pa'i dus na 'ga' yaṅ khas blaṅs pa med pa'i*1> *phyir ro* // *don gaṅ rtogs par byed pa des ni de rtogs pa'i śugs kyis 'oṅs pa'i don gźan yaṅ khas blaṅs pa yin te* / <2*'od khas blaṅs na sgron ma khas blaṅs pa bźin no*2> // *de'i phyir de ni rtogs pa ñid yin gyi* / *lta ba gźan du gnas pas skyon brjod pa ni ma yin no* // *de ni de'i khas len pa'i dus yin pas der don ji sñed rigs pa'i stobs kyis ṅe bar gnas pa de mtha' dag khas blaṅs par bya ba 'am* / *yaṅ na ni 'ga' yaṅ ma yin no* // *de* (om. NP) *ma grub pa la sogs par 'gyur ba yaṅ ma yin te* / *gal te de ltar yin na 'di yaṅ 'gyur ba 'am* / *ma yin na ni gñi ga yaṅ mi 'gyur ro źes chos gñis 'brel ba ñe bar ston pa yin pa'i phyir ro* // *ṅes pa ñid du yoṅs su 'dzin pa skyon 'dir 'gyur ba 'am* / *gtan tshigs yod na ni ma yin no* // *rigs pas thob pa ni gdon mi za bar khas blaṅ bar 'os pa'i phyir ro* // *khas blaṅs pas rigs pa la gnod par mi nus so źes bśad par bya'o* // *chos gcig khas len pas gdon mi za bar gźan khas blaṅs pa ni rigs pas* (N 301a1) *byas pa'i phyir ro* // <3*gtan tshigs med kyaṅ 'di ni rtsa ba'i gtan tshigs kyi khyab par bya ba daṅ khyab par byed pa'i dṅos po sgrub par byed*

pa'i mam pa yin[3>] *gyi / bzlog pa sgrub par byed pa ni ma yin te / gtan tshigs la tshad ma med pa'i phyir ro //*

<1> NBhūṣ 232,23 and 234,11: *nāpi parīkṣakāle kasyacid abhyupāgamaḥ.*
<2> NBhūṣ 232,27: *prabhābhyupagame pradīpābhyupāgamavat.*
<3> NBhūṣ 232,30 and 234,21: *asati hetau maulasya hetor vyāpyavyāpakabhāvasādhanaprākāra eṣaḥ.* (Cf. PVBh 482,21-483,2: *na tu ayaṃ maulo hetuḥ ... atha vā ... viparyayas tu maulo hetuḥh, prasaṅgas tu maulasya hetor vyāptisādhanārtha eva*. PVV 418,2-7: *na tu ayaṃ pāramārthiko hetus trairūpyābhāvāt ... vyāpyavyāpakabhāvāt sphariṭād ... prasaṅgaviparyayo 'tra maulo hetuḥ sādhyasādhanavyāptigrāhaka pramāṇasmārakas tu prasaṅge prayogaḥ.*) [see Tani 1987a: 12]

[NOTE 2-3] [TEXT 3]

PVin III D 188b7-189a5; P 286b7-287a5; N 301a2-301b1
gal te 'dir yaṅ bzlog pa ñid kyis mi rtag pa ñid daṅ skye ba daṅ ldan pa 'gog par byed pa yin no že na / de ltar byed pa ni su yaṅ med do // de ltar byed par nus pa ñid kyaṅ ma yin te / sems pa can daṅ de gñis 'gal ba ma (D 189a) *grub pas thal ba daṅ bzlog pa'i sgrub par byed pa dag go bar byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro //* <1*sṅar rgyu ma tshaṅ ba med pa can 'byuṅ ba las gcig yod pas med* (P 287a) *pa'i phyir ram phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid kyis 'gal bar rtogs pa yin na*1> */ skye ba can daṅ mi rtag pa dag daṅ sems pa yod pa la ni de grub pa ma yin no // gcig la ni ji skad bśad pa'i raṅ bžin gžan daṅ bral bar khas blaṅs pa kho na'i phyir yul la sogs pa tha dad pa can daṅ ldan pa yod pa ma yin te / de med pa daṅ de yod pa ni phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid kyis* (D : *kyi* NP) *'gal ba'i phyir ro // slob dpon dag gis kyaṅ yan lag can dgag pa la sogs pa mams su don 'di ñid mam pa du ma'i sgo nas ñe bar bkod pas mam pa de lta bu'i raṅ bzin 'gog par mdzad pa yin te // gcig ñid daṅ du ma yod pa ni 'gal ba'i phyir ro // gžan dag ni gcig khas blaṅs pa* (D : *'gal ba dag ni gcig khas blaṅs pa gžan* NP) *btaṅ ba med na med pa'i phyir chos gñis ka yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // grub pa'i mtha' khas len pa'i rgyu mtshan dpyad pa'i skabs su bab pa'i tshe yin te / de ltar ma yin na ni khas* (N 301b) *blaṅs nas mam par dpyod pa mi* (D : *ni* NP) *'thad pa'i phyir ro //*

<1> NB III 73 (~ PVin II 13,2-4): *avikalakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvād virodhagatiḥ.* NB III 75 (~ PVin II 13,5-6): *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatayā vā bhāvābhāvavat.* Cf. PVSV 5,13-15: ... *tathā hy aparyantakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvād virodhagatiḥ. sa cānupalabdheḥ. anyonyopalabdhiparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā vā virodhaḥ, nityānityatvavat.* See Steinkellner 1973: 46-47; Tani 1987a: 14.

[NOTE 3] Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's interpretation of *prasaṅga*

Śāntarakṣita stresses the Mādhyamika-aspect of Dharmakīrti's negation-formula [*parasparāpekṣa* → *śūnyatā*], not a twice-using *prasaṅga* in the *prasaṅga*-formulation of the *kṣanikatvānumāna*, in order to prove *niḥsvabhāva*. Śāntarakṣita uses *prasaṅga* as SVB-*pramāṇa*. His Svātantrika-interpretation seems to deprive the crisis-ridden intention of Dharmakīrti's interpretation, because the loci are temporally fixed and Dharmakīrti's strained standing on the boundary line is retroceded. The momentariness and *arthakriyā* are displaced from the boundary line into *saṃvṛti* level. From the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika's standpoint, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla transformed Dharmakīrti's boundary logical standpoint into the conventional truth-locus (*tathyasaṃvṛti*). After they introduced Dharmakīrti's complex *prasaṅga*-formulation, they excluded the *prasaṅga*-aspect. Although the

indicator in the reversed formula [as SVB-*pramāṇa*] is interpreted as locus-negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), the meaning of negation differs from Dharmakīrti. They based the locus-negation on the transformation of the context of PV IV 143. According to their theory, the locus-negation is not regarded as *āśrayāsiddha*, because the proponent's proper locus (*svadharmin*) continues to exist, though the opponent's merely hypothetical locus (*kevaladharmin*) is negated by *prasaṅga* [cf. Tom J. F. Tillemans, "The Neither One nor Many Argument for *śūnyatā* and its Tibetan Interpretations", *Études de Lettres* 3, 1982 [103-128]: 114: *kevaladharmin* = the merely nominal subject]. The indicator as neither-nor (*ekānekaviyogahetu*) of his proof of non-substantiality of all existence as the reversed formula from *prasaṅga* is based on the proponent's transcendent locus. [cf. Tom J. F. Tillemans, "Identity and Refferential Opacity in Tibetan Buddhist *apoha* Theory", in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, ed. Matilal and Evans, Dordrecht 1988 [207-227]: n. 39ff.]. From this standpoint, *prasaṅga* can be reduced into the direct independent formula (*svatantraprayoga*). But, if the hypothetical locus and its property are eliminated in the ultimate proponent's transcendent locus, the latter locus implies the complete exclusion of logic itself. Though Dharmottara uses *prasajyapratiṣedha* with the risk of infinitely deepening locus, Kamalaśīla uses it without this risk. Because the latter has a twofold locus. Thus, the *prasaṅga* can be easily transformed into the reversed *svatantra*-formula not in the hypothetical opponent's locus but in the proponent's proper locus. His stress on the possibility of reduction of *prasaṅga* into *svatantra* seems to be based on a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika-interpretation. This interpretation had far-reaching influence on Tibetan commentators [see NOTE 4].

[NOTE 4] Tibetan commentators' meta-interpretations on Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *prasaṅga*

raṅ rgyud 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur [hypothetical indirect reasoning (*prasaṅga*) with the implication of independent direct proof (*svatantra*)]

The central problem for the Tibetans consists in the transformation of a boundary line between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika by means of introducing Dharmakīrti's new type of complex *prasaṅga* formulation with its reversed formula (*prasaṅga-viparyaya*).

By introducing Dharmakīrti's new complex *prasaṅga* with its reversed form, the demarcation-line between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika within the scope of Dignāga's logic is swayed or transformed. Phya pa, Sa paṇ and the Sa skya pa base themselves on an apparent/pseudo-new-Svātantrika, i.e. old/radical Prāsaṅgika of Prajñākaragupta's interpretation. According to old/radical Prāsaṅgika, *prasaṅga* is non-transformable into *svatantra*, because *prasaṅga* without real locus cannot be transformed by relative negation (property-negation, *paryudāsa*) and the reversed formula lacks the realization of the indicator in real locus (*pakṣadharmatā*). *prasaṅga* should be restricted only to the refutation by the positive cognition of a contradiction to the essential property (*svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*) in the presence of a real locus. The transformable *prasaṅga* is no other than a proper inference as presumption in the process of debate. On the contrary, 'U yug pa, the early Tsoṅ kha pa and the dGe lugs pa base themselves on Dharmottara's and Kamalaśīla's [in *Mādhyamakāloka*] new Svātantrika-interpretation. All proper *prasaṅga* can be transformed into *svatantra* by absolute negation (locus-negation, *prasajyapratiṣedha*) of *vyāpakānupalabdhi*. But only Tsoṅ kha pa after *Lam rim chen mo* regards the transformed *svatantra*-formula not as old/radical independent *svatantra* but only as a negative formula dependent on *prasaṅga*. This interpretation is based on Dharmakīrti's proper intention. Because Dharmakīrti proves that the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) of *svatantra* formulation is based on hypothetical negative determinant cognition (SVB-*pramāṇa*) which consists of double *prasaṅga* and *vyāpakānupalabdhi* [see my forthcoming paper "*Raṅ rgyud 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur*

[Hypothetical indirect reasoning (*prasaṅga*) with the implication of independent direct proof (*svatantra*)]: Tibetan commentators' meta-interpretations on Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *prasaṅga*." In *Proceedings of 5th International Seminar on Tibetan Studies* (Narita)].

[NOTE 5] Other school's interpretation of *prasaṅga*

The *prasaṅga* of the Buddhist Prāsaṅgika is different from the Naiyāyika's *tarka*, because the latter does not intend to negate the locus but intends to negate only the property on the identical locus. Dharmakīrti negates the locus by absolute negation [= locus negation]. [The Jainas introduced *prasaṅgasādhana* in order to avert the one-sided indicator (*anyatarāsiddhahetu*). *tarka* as *parokṣa-pramāṇa* is the determinator of *vyāpti* and the intermediation between perception and inference. The inter-determination of logical necessity (*antarvyāpti*) is based on the hypothetical reasoning as *anyathā-nupapannatva* [see Tani 1983b: 29, note (22)].

Nyāyasūtra[8] 1.1.40: Hypothetical reasoning/argument (*tarka*):
avijñātatattve 'rthe kāraṇopapattis tattvajñānārtham ūhas tarkaḥ. (When the real character/truth of an object, for the purpose of ascertaining the real character, the provability of reason is investigated. This is hypothetical reasoning.)

NBh (= *Nyāyabhāṣya*)[8] 320,5-321,4: [abstract:] (1) Occurrence of cognition intended to cognize X. (2) Hypothetical mutual-contradictory/incompatible dichotomy [A or non A] based on the law of excluded middle. (3) Either of two is recognized on the basis of provability by the indicator as *pramāṇa*. (4) If A is in X, it is not incompatible with the presupposition. If non-A is in X, it is incompatible with the presupposition.
NBh 330,5-12: [abstract:] This is not a proper inference but the presupposition of ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) of *pakṣa* or *pratipakṣa*. Because two contradictory properties can be compatible in two different transcendent substances or a different time-state of the same substantial object.

U d d y o t a k a r a

Nyāyavārttika[8] 328,5: [Opponent:] *anumānaṃ tarkaḥ liṅgaliṅgisambandhasmṛtyapekṣatvād anumāna-vat.* (Hypothetical reasoning must be regarded as inference, because it is based on the recognition of a necessary relation between indicator and property to be proved).

This objection is closer to the standpoint of Dharmakīrti. Uddyotakara rejects it as follows: the inference must start from a realized indicator in the determined locus. But hypothetical reasoning starts from one not-yet realized in a not-yet determined locus. This criticism seems to have had an impact on Dharmakīrti's introducing *prasaṅga*.

V ā c a s p a t i m i ś r a

The original type of SVB-*pramāṇa* is introduced. *prasaṅga* is identified with *tarka*. If A in X is based on *pramāṇa*, non-A is not based on *pramāṇa*. If non-A implies absurdity, A has provability of being based on *pramāṇa*. Cf. NVTṬ (= *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*)[8] 321,12-17: *tarkeṇa hi prasaṅgāpara-nāmnā . . . yasmin viṣaye pramāṇaṃ pravartitum udyataṃ tadviparyayāśaṅkāyāṃ na tāvat pravartate, na yāvad aniṣṭāpattyā viparyayāśaṅkāpanīyate, tadapanaya eva ca svaviṣaye pramāṇasambhavaḥ.*

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[8] *Nyāyadarśanam. With Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha et al., [2 vols.] Calcutta 1936 [repr. Kyoto 1982]

NVTṬ 321,19f.: *na copapattir eva astu niścayahetuḥ kṛtaṃ pramāṇena iti vaktavyam, upapatteḥ svatantrāyā āśrayāsiddhatayā svato niścayāyogāt.* (But mere possibility should not be described as determinant indicator (*niścayahetu*) which consists of a valid determinant cognition. Because the possibility, which is regarded as independent formula, lacks the locus and because it cannot determine [the property to be proved (*sādhya*)] by itself.) [cf. Shōdō Yamakami, "Nyāya gakuha ni okeru *tarka* no gogi", *IBK* 28/2, 1980: 909f.]

B h ā s a r v a j ñ a

NBhūṣ 232,19 and 235,2-10: Bhāsarvajña criticizes Prajñākaragupta's interpretation: the indicator cannot be realized even in *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, because the locus of *viparyaya* (the universal) is non-existent for Buddhist.

U d a y a n a

tarka as *prasaṅgasādhana* with (*sādhyaviparyaye*) *bādhakapramāṇa* is the determinator of *vyāpti* as *svabhavikasambandha* [Gerhard Oberhammer, "Der Svabhāvikasambandha", *WZKSO* 8, 1964 (131-181): 177].

In Navyanyāya, *tarka* as *prasaṅga* operates as twofold: (1) the determinant of logical necessity (*vyāptigraha*) and (2) reductio ad absurdum (*viṣayapariśodhaka*) [Satkari Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Calcutta 1935: 405].

[NOTE 6]

In the post-Dharmakīrtian period, the problem of the non-common indicator is solved by two types of interpretation: (1) Ratnākaraśānti's Antarvyāptivāda and (2) Jñānaśrīmitra's meta-indicator of *arthakriyāsāmarthya* which can objectivize all definition of existence and inference-act itself [cf. Yūichi Kajiyama, "Ratnākaraśānti 'nai henjūron'", *Bukkyō Daigaku Daigakuin Kenkyū kiyō* 17, 1989, 1-24; Katsumi Mimaki, "Setsunametsu ronshō", *Kōza Daijō Bukkyō* 9, 1984, 217-254., and Tadashi Tani, "A Trial Translation [in Japanese] of Jñānaśrīmitra's Kṣaṇabhaṅga-Adhyāya (Chapter of Momentary Destruction)", forthcoming].

[NOTE 7] Definition of *kṣaṇa*

The *āgama* 'all that possesses the essential property of emergence or production possesses the property of destruction' is quoted in PV II 284: *yatkiñcid udayātmakam / nirodhadharmakaṃ sarvaṃ tad.* [Kimura 1987: 213 indicates MN: *Majjhima-Nikāya* (PTS) I 501; DN: *Dīgha-Nikāya* I 110, etc.; E. Waldschmidt, *Das Catuṣpariṣatsūtra*, p. 152; cf. Vetter 1984]

Dharmakīrti's serious consideration of momentary existence seems to be based on Buddha's last verse (*pacchimā vācā*) in *Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta*, in DN II 156,1f.: . . . *vayadhammā saṃkhārā, appamādena sampādethāti.* (". . .: Die Seinserscheinungen sind ihrem Wesen nach vergänglich. Rüstet euch aus mit Wachsamkeit!" Otto Franke, *Dīghanikāya. Das Buch der Langen Texte des Buddhistischen Kanons*, Göttingen, Leipzig 1913: 244)

Cf. AKBh 193,2-4: Frauwallner 1969: 104f.; AKBh 193,7-9: Frauwallner 1969: 105; cf. AKBh V 348,13f. AKBh 194,12f.: Frauwallner 1969: 108.

Cf. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Documents d'Abhidharma [La Controverse du Temps]", *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5, 1936 [1-158]: 143f. [IV. Conflict Vaibhāṣika-Sautrāntika]: "Pour les Sautrāntikas, l'existence est un continu: l'instant est une coupe arbitraire et idéale dans la durée d'une «série» (*saṃtāna* ou «continu»); les instants, postulats imaginaires, sont en nombre infini dans la durée

la plus courte. . . . Mais, à parler franc, le moment ne dure pas, il périt immédiatement après être né (*utpattyanantaranirodha*)." TS 373 and 374 (= *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*, ed. Dvarikadas Shastri, [2 vols.] Varanasi 1981, 1982) and TSP define the destruction of existence (*nāśa*) from two standpoints: (1) Positive aspect (*vidhilakṣaṇa*); *kṣaṇasthitidharmāṇāṃ bhāvam* (existence standing in state of one moment) [TSP: *kṣaṇasthitidharmā bhāva eva calo vinaśyati*]. (2) Negative aspect (*pratiṣedhalakṣaṇa*); *bhāvasvarūpasya nivṛttiṃ dhvaṃsasaṃjñitām* (destruction or non-existence of essential property of existence, called annihilation) [TSP: *bhāvasvabhāvapracyutilakṣaṇapradhvaṃsāparanāmā vinaśanaṃ vināśa iti*]. The proof of destruction without [external cause] (*ahetuka vināśa*) concerns the latter definition. And TS 388 defines the moment/momentary existence (*kṣaṇa*) as follows: *utpādānantarāsthāyi svarūpaṃ yac ca vastunaḥ / tad ucyate kṣaṇaḥ so 'sti yasya tat kṣaṇikaṃ matam //* (The essential property of real existence which is not standing [or does not continue] immediately after its production, is called 'moment/momentary existence-ness'. And what possesses the [property] is held as 'momentary [existence]'.) [TSP 179,18f.: *utpādānantaravināśisvabhāvo* (corr.: *utpādanantara°*) *vastunaḥ kṣaṇa ucyate* . . . The *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* bases Śāntarakṣita's definition on AKBh 193,2-4 (ad AK IV 2): *ātmalābhānantaravināśī kṣaṇaḥ sa yasyāsti sa kṣaṇikaḥ*.] [Cf. TSP 166,25f. (ad TS 350): *udayānantarāpavargi niranvayanirodhadharmakaṃ vā* (the property of existence which possesses the destruction immediately after its production or the destruction independently.)] Cf. *nityatva* is defined as follows: *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali* (ed. A. Thakur, Patna [2]1987) 103,21f.: *kālāntaraikarūpatayā hi nityatvam*, . . . [= *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ*, ed. A. Thakur, Patna [2]1975: 94,11]; cf. *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali* 83,16: *prāptāparakālayor ekatve niyatvam*. [cf. Tani 1972: (116) 106 corr. into 103, Tani 1973: 23f.] It is remarkable that Dharmakīrti regards the reason of necessity in the last state of causal complex as 'the momentary existence without parts', in PVin II 46,20: *skad cig la cha śas med pa'i phyir ro //* [". . . denn eine Phase (*kṣaṇa*) hat keine [zeitlich unterscheidbaren] Teile." Steinkellner 1979: 54] Sa skya Paṇḍita interprets it as non-extension of momentary existence. Sa paṇ regards the non-extension of momentary existence as the real object of consciousness. It is not ultimate truth without conceptualization (*spros bral gyi don dam*) but the ultimate truth as the ability of effective operation (*don byed nus pa'i don dam*) [*Tshad ma'i rigs pa'i gter* (Sa skya paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan): Bibliotheca Tibetica vol. 5, (Toyo Bunko) Tokyo 1968: I 171/4/1; see Yōichi Fukuda, Seiji Kimura & Hiroaki Arai, *Tibet ronrigaku kenkyū I (Sa skya Paṇḍita cho, tadashii ninshikishudan nitsuiteno ronri no hōko, dai-1-shō, text, wayaku, chūkai)*, Tōkyō 1989: 54f.; 83 note 100]. [Cf. Tani 1972]

[NOTE 8]

According to Kajiyama 1984, the following texts can be regarded as border lines for Dharmakīrti's logical theory: (1) *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* X: Object to be constructed is momentary existence. Because the gross of non-eternity is [perceived] in it, e.g. birth and death. (2) *Yogācārabhūmi*: Inference with *tarka*: *liṅga-*, *svabhāva-*, *karma-*, *dharma-*, *hetuphala-sādṛṣya*. Dharmakīrti's *svabhāva-* and *kāryahetu* seem to be based on it. (3) *Abhidharmasammucaya*: *anupalabdhi*; Prof. Kajiyama regards the transformation of the proof-formula as *prasaṅgaviparyaya*.

[NOTE 9]

This note concerning Vijñānavāda-texts and -interpretation is mainly based on Osamu Hayashima 1988, 1989a, 1989b[9]. Here, the present writer investigates only the relation to Dharmakīrti's proof

[9] 1989a = "Sotonarumono [MSAK XVIII vv.89-91 o chūshin ni]", *Nagasaki Daigaku Kyōikugakubu Shakaikagaku Ronshū*

[cf. section II.4.1 (7)]. Dharmakīrti proves the momentariness of internal cognition by a proof of the momentariness of an external object. This seems to relate to the proof-procedure classifying external object (*bāhyaka*) and internal cognition (*ādhyātma*). This process in *nirvedhabhāgīya* of *prayogamārga* corresponds to *asallakṣaṇānupraveśopāyalakṣaṇa*. Before *darśanamārga*, the transformation from the third degree (*kṣāntigati*) to the fourth degree (*laukikāgradharma*) in the insight into the fourfold truth and its 16 forms (*ṣoḍaśabhir ākārair visāritāni catvāry āryasatyāni*) implies a transformation from the concentrating meditation on entrance into one part of ultimate truth (*ekadeśapraviṣṭasamādhi*). The turning point of the latter degree is the concentrating meditation on emptiness between two momentary existences (*ānantaryasamādhi*). The *vināśitvānumāna* is interpreted in the context of the threefold *svabhāva*. The situation of the proof of momentary existence exactly corresponds to Dharmakīrti's situation of the *pramāṇa*-definition in *Pramāṇavārttika* II. The concentrating meditation on entrance into one part of ultimate truth (*ekadeśapraviṣṭasamādhi*) corresponds to the transformation from *sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa* to *pāramārthikapramāṇa* in the final section of *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I, as mentioned above.

Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra [MSA ed. S.Lévi]:

The *kṣaṇikatva* of the fourfold aspect (*dharmoddānacatuṣṭaya*) is proved in concentrating meditation without desire (*apraṇihitasamādhi*) of the threefold concentrating meditation (*samādhitraya*) [XVIII v. 80 and comm.].

MSA XVIII vv. 82-91 [149,7-11]: *bodhisattvānām asad artha 'nityārthaḥ / yan nityaṃ nāsti tad anityaṃ teṣaṃ yat parikalpitalakṣaṇam / . . . / kṣaṇabhaṅgārtho 'py anityārtho veditavyaḥ paratantralakṣaṇasya /* (For Bodhisattvas, the meaning of non-eternity is the meaning of non-existence. For them, non-eternity implies eternal non-existence. The meaning of non-eternity is regarded as the meaning of momentary destruction from the standpoint of the *paratantra*-aspect.) [cf. SAVBh P 158b1f.; D 133b6f.] The transformation from *anitya* into *kṣaṇika* or *kṣaṇabhaṅga* implies the transformation from *parikalpitalakṣaṇa* into *paratantralakṣaṇa*: [MSA Tome II S. Lévi's translation]. In MSA XVIII vv. 82-91, some of the proof-formulations for the non-eternity of all causally constructed objects as momentary existence are formally *prasaṅga*. Other proofs are based on empirical fact. The *prasaṅga*-aspect on the basis of relational transformation (*prabandha*) is as follows:

The first section [vv. 82-83] seems to have been inserted later than the remaining two sections, because the first ten proofs have a more developed proof-formulation. The non-eternity of causal continuity implies momentary destruction in continuity.

[Type 1] Indirect proof based on an indication of contradiction:

(1) If it were not momentary, causal construction could not operate. Because the operation implies relational action. Without this [operation], both production and destruction could not occur in every moment (149,19f.: *kṣaṇikatvam antareṇa saṃskārāṇāṃ pravṛtter ayogāt. prabandhena hi vṛttiḥ pravṛttiḥ. sa cāntareṇa pratikṣaṇam utpādanirodhau na yujyate*). (2) Production from preceding momentary existence. (3) Contradiction occurs between production and destruction in one object. (4) Contradiction between station and transformation. [Supplementary proof: (5) Non-existence of destruction-cause. (6) Constancy of non-eternity. (7) Similarity (*sārūpya*) as recognition.] (8) Because it is destructed. Namely because stationary object could not be destructed even in the last phase of continuity. [The last phase] is not different from the first momentary existence (*nirodhataḥ. na hi tathaivāvasthitasyānte nirodhaḥ syād ādikṣaṇaniviśiṣṭatvāt*). (9) Because transformation (*pariṇāma* or

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No.37, 63-76; No.38, 51-67; No.39, 11-25.

1989b = "Setsunametsu to jōjūsetsu hihan [Kenyōshōkyōron jōmujō hon o chūshin ni]." *Nagasaki Daigaku Kyōikugakubu Shakaikagaku Ronshū* No.37, 63-76.

anyathātva) can be cognized in the last phase. If the transformation were not given in the first phase, the transformation of both internal and external object in the last phase could not be cognized. Thus, the change must have begun to occur in the first phase. What is successively grown can be revealed in the last phase. For instance, the revelation of milk in the phase of coagulated milk [150,22f.: *ante pariṇāmopalabdheś ca. pariṇāmo hi nāmānyathātvam. tad yadi nādita evārabdhaṃ bhaved ādhyātmika-bāhyānāṃ bhāvānām ante pariṇāmo nopalabhyeta. tasmād ādita evānyathātvam ārabdhaṃ yatkrameṇābhivardhamānam ante vyaktim āpadyate kṣīrasyeva dadhyavasthāyām*].

[Type 2] Analogical proof based on isomorphism of case to effect, from the standpoint of Vijñāna-vāda:

(10) The momentariness of internal cognition proves the momentariness of external object [150,27-151,15]. This is identified with unique proof by Vijñānavāda in ASBh and 顯揚聖教論 成無常品第四 [see below].

The second section concerning the proof of momentariness of internal cognition [vv. 84-88] is based on empirical transformation of cognition. Here, the power of cognition in every moment. [153,2-10: . . . *svabhāvavaśena* . . . *pratikṣaṇaṃ cittavaśena tadutpādāt. ekāntāt sādhitam ādhyātmikaṃ sarva-saṃskṛtaṃ kṣaṇikam iti.*]

The third section concerning the proof of momentariness of external object is almost based on empirical fact, except for only a partly *prasaṅga*-aspect: [154,4f.: *na hy asati kṣaṇikatve pratikṣaṇa-mandataramopalabdhiḥ syāt.*] The last paragraph concerning the connection of similar continuity (*sadṛśasaṃtatiprabandhavṛtti* 154,23) is identified with the discrete-theory which is criticized by Dharmakīrti.

Ś r ā v a k a b h ū m i

The proof is in the context of *lakṣaṇapratisaṃvedimanaskāraḥ* and *ādhimokṣiko manaskāraḥ* in *caturthaṃ yogasthānam*. The first two in ten degrees, *vipariṇāmākāra* by *pratyakṣādhipateyamanaskāra* and *vināśākāra* by inferential act (*anumānikamanaskāra*) for an investigation of *duḥkhasatya* of fourfold truth in the process of *lokottarayoga* should be remarkable [*Śrāvakabhūmi* (ed. K. Shukla, Patna 1973) 470-471; 485,6-488,10; cf. Hayashima 1988: 16]. The first speculation of fourfold-truth is *pratyakṣādhipateyamanaskāra 'vipariṇāmākāra' → anumānika(/anumāna)manaskāra 'vināśākāra'*. 485,9-486,3: . . . *tatra pratyakṣādhipateyaṃ manaskāraṃ niśrityānumānaṃ karoty evañ ca punar anumānaṃ karoti. kṣaṇotpannabhagnavilīnānām eṣāṃ saṃskārāṇām iyaṃ pūrveṇāparā vikṛtir yujyate, na tu tathai-vāvasthitānām iti hi kṣaṇikāḥ saṃskārās teṣu teṣu pratyayeṣu satsu tathā tathotpadyante. utpannāś cānapekṣya vināśak[ā]raṇaṃ svarasena vipa(na)śyanti. yāni punar etāni vipariṇāmākāraṇāni tāny anyathotpattaye satya(ṃ va)rttante vikṛtāyā utpatteḥ kāraṇībhavanti, na tu vināśasya.* (Here, the inference is moreover superposed on the [semi]-inference which is caused by the perception. It is provable that the constructed objects to be distinguished by momentary production and destruction are transformed from preceding state to succeeding state. On the contrary, an object staying self-identically could not be so. Thus, [all] constructed objects are momentary existences which are produced from the correspondent conditional causes. The produced objects destruct themselves by themselves without a cause of destruction. These causes of transformation necessarily exist, when the difference occurs. They are not a cause of destruction but a cause of the production of different objects . . .) The underlined part is remarkable, because it implies *prasaṅga*. The investigation with *alaukikayoga* (了相、勝解作意) belongs to the first component of fourfold truth. It is close to the Sautrāntika-theory [cf. Hayashima 1988: 17].

Abhidharmasamuccaya/-bhāṣya [ASBh]

For an investigation of *duḥkhasatya* of the fourfold truth, 12 types of *anitya*-aspect are mentioned: 55A-56 (50-53): (1) *asallakṣaṇa*, (2) *vināśa*-, [*saṃskārānāṃ bhūtvābhāvaḥ*]. (3) *vipariṇati*, (4) *viyoga-lakṣaṇa*, (5) *saṃnihata*-, (6) *dharmatā*-, (7) *kṣaṇa*-, [*ātmalābhānantaram avaśyavināśitā*] . . .

In order to prove the momentariness of all existence, the momentariness of external existence is proved on the presupposition of momentariness of internal *citta*. Though the object to be proved as effect (*kārya*), analogically proved by cognition as cause (*kāraṇa*), seems to correspond to Dharma-kīrti's *arthakriyāsāmarthya*, this should be regarded as a proof unique to the Vijñānavādin, as mentioned by Hayashima 1988: 25 [cf. The fifth proof-formula: 52,20-24: *cittasyādhipattyasambhūtatām upādāya, sarva hy ādhyātmikabāhyaṃ rūpaṃ cittasyādhipatyena sambhavati. ataḥ kāraṇasya kṣaṇikatvāt kāryasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ veditavyam, ye hetavo ye pratyayāḥ rūpasyotpādāya te 'py anityāḥ, anityān khalu hetupratyayān pratītyotpannaṃ rūpaṃ kuto nityaṃ bhaviṣyatīti sūtrapādānusareṇa*].
[*hetukavināśitva*]: 53,5-9: *utpannasya cānapekṣya pratyayaṃ svarasavināśitām upādāya, sarvasyotpa-nnasya vināśaḥ pratyayam anapekṣya svarasenaiva bhavati. ataḥ pratyayāntaranirapekṣo 'vaśyaṃbhāvī vināśa utpannamātrasyaiva bhāvasya na bhavati paścād bhavatīti na kiṃcid viśeṣāṇām asti. tasmāt sarveṇa vināśinotpannamātreṇa vinaṣṭam iti siddhaṃ kṣaṇikatvam.* (The produced object is based on automatical destruction without a conditional cause. All produced objects destruct themselves by them-selves without any conditional cause. Thus, only produced existence destructs itself independently of any other conditional cause. And it does not exist in the succeeding state. Because there is no difference [between the preceding and succeeding state]. So the momentariness is proved on the basis of all destruction being a destruction only by production.)

According to Hayashima 1988: 20f., the proofs [from the first proof to the sixth] are remarkable, because they prove the external momentary existence by internal momentary cognition, on the basis of *vijñānapariṇāma*.

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According to Hayashima 1988: 25-27, this text stresses the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*'s proof by *vijñānapariṇāma*. Concerning the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*'s 12 types of the *anitya*-aspect, the *prabandhānitya* is reduced to *kṣaṇānitya*. In v. 5, the non-eternity in the sense of non-existence is *pari-kalpita*, while non-eternity in another sense is *paratantra*. The commentary on v. 5 is as follows: from the standpoint of the aspect of *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*, it should be cognized that the sense/object of non-eternity does not exist.

Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya and *-ṭīkā* [MAVBh and MAVṬ]

MAVBh ad MAV III 5c-6b: *asadartho hy anityārtha utpādavyayalakṣaṇaḥ. samalāmalabhāvena mūlatatve yathākramam. trayo hi svabhāvā mūlatatvaṃ teṣu yathākramam asadartho hy anityārtha utpādavyayārthaḥ samalāmalatārthaś ca.* (The meaning of non-eternal is non-existence. And it denotes the aspect of production and destruction. And it denotes being with flaws or without flaws. These can be cognized successively in the basic truth. Basic truth is the three[-fold] *svabhāva*. Therefore, the semantic meaning of non-eternal is classified successively into three. [In the first aspect of *parikalpita*] it means non-existence. [In the second aspect of *paratantra*] it means production and destruction. [In the third aspect of *pariniṣpanna*] it means that it has affliction [by an external superposition] and is [as it is] excluded from affliction.)
[cf. MAVṬ 117,2-9: *yaḥ sarvadā tathāsti sa nityaḥ. tadviparīto 'nityaḥ. . . . sarvadāsadarthānityārthena parikalpitasvābhavo 'nityaḥ. asannityam anityam iti niruktinyāyena veditavyam ity anye. pratikṣaṇam*

utpādavyayalakṣaṇenānityārthenānityaḥ paratantrasvabhāvaḥ, tasya pratyayotpādatvād vināśe cāhetukatvāt. samalāmalatvārthalakṣaṇenāgantukenānityārthenānityo 'vikāradharmo 'pi pariniṣpannasvabhāva iti] [cf. Yamaguchi's Tr. of MAVṬ, 1966: 186 n. (2)].

[NOTE 10]
From the Mādhyamika's standpoint, Dharmakīrti not only negates the cause of destruction but also the cause of production by means of *prasaṅga*. He regards momentary existence as an essential property of reality without any basic locus [PV II 204-205b] [see p. 382, NOTE 1]. The same interpretation can be found in a Mādhyamika's text: [Pras VII 173,8-174,10: *yas tu vināśasyāhetukatvam abhyupetya kṣaṇikatāṃ saṃskārāṇām āha, tasya nirhetukatvāt khapuṣpavad vināśābhāvāt. . . . sahetukatvaṃ spaṣṭam ādarśitaṃ vināśasya. jātimātrāpekṣatvāc cāsya kṣaṇabhaṅgo 'pi sukhasādhya iti [sarvaṃ susthaṃ jāyate] . . . atha syāt, vināśo hi nāmābhāvo yaś cābhāvaḥ kiṃ tasya hetunā kartavyam. ato nirhetuko vināśa iti. nanu ca bhāve 'pi hetvabhāvaprasaṅgo bhavati . . . yasmān na vayaṃ vināśasya hetunā kiṃcit kriyamānam icchāmaḥ. kiṃ tarhi vināśa eva kriyata iti varṇayāmaḥ. nanv evaṃ sati kriyamānatvād vināśo 'pi bhāvaḥ prāpnotīti ced iṣyata evaitat. vināśo hi svarūpāpekṣayā bhāvo rūpādidharmanivṛttisvabhāvatvāt tu na bhāvaḥ.* (If momentary destruction of constructed objects is proved on the basis of the destruction without cause, the destruction is non-existence, like a sky-flower, because of non-cause. . . . It implies the destruction with cause. Only by the production, however, the momentary destruction is easily proved. . . . [Opponent:] The destruction means non-existence. If a cause exists for the non-existence, what is caused by the cause? [Answer:] If it is so, there is no cause for existence [because it is of no use for having been produced]. . . . We do not interpret that the positive entity is caused in destruction. But destruction itself is operated. [Opponent:] If it is so, [the destruction] is a [positive entity]. Because it is being operated. [Answer:] It is recognized. Because it is [a positive entity] with regard to its self-form. And it is not [a positive entity], because it is the essential property of an extinction of properties, e.g. form.).
Pras XI 223,1-5: . . . *yathāpy atra kṣepaḥ patanakāraṇaṃ nānyat evam ihāpi jātim eva kāraṇatvena vināśasya varṇayāmo nānyad iti nāsty ahetukatā vināśasya jātihetukatvāc cāsyodgamanam eva [vināśasya] hetur iti kṛtvā eṣāpi gāthā sunītā bhavati. evime saṃkhatā dhammāḥ sambhavanti sakāraṇāḥ. sa bhāva eva dhammāṇāṃ yaṃ vibhonti samudgatāḥ iti.* (Just as only throwing is the cause of falling without any other [cause], so we interpret that only the production is the cause of destruction without any other cause. Thus, it is not true that destruction is free from a cause. And only production is the cause of destruction, because it is caused by production. Therefore, the following verse is verified: So constructed properties possess cause. The [necessary] destruction of produced objects is an essential property of properties.)

Though in Pras XXI and XXVI, the momentariness with fourfold aspect is criticized, Candrakīrti's standpoint is not different from Vasubandhu's and Dharmakīrti's so far as the momentariness is interpreted as the self-difference of time-ness. This Mādhyamika's interpretation is clear in VII v. 16: *pratītya yad yad bhavati tat tac chāntaṃ svabhāvataḥ / tasmād utpadyamānaṃ ca śāntam utpattir eva ca //* (What is based on relation is the essentially destructible. Thus, the object being presently produced possesses the property to be destructed. And the production implies [destruction].)

In this verse, the term *svabhāva* is regarded as meta-language. This is different from the term in chapter XV, *Svabhāvaparīkṣā*. Dharmakīrti's terms *svabhāvapratibandha* and *svabhāvahetu* should be interpreted as meta-language, too. With regard to the interpretation of destruction as non-existence by absolute locus-negation, the Mādhyamika-standpoint seems to be related to Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the momentary destruction of existence.

[NOTE 11]
Concerning the dynamic displacement of contexts in *Pramāṇavārttika* II and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I, see Tadashi Tani, "The Problem of Interpretation on Pramāṇaviniścaya III vv.30-32", *BKT* 30, 1989 [1-16]: 5-7.

[NOTE 12]
PV III 79c-83, 102-110: *pratyakṣasiddhaṃ kṣaṇikatva* [non-conceptualized non-eternal or momentary existence is perceived]

pratyakṣasiddhaṃ kṣaṇikatva has been noted as the third proof of momentary existence by Frauwallner 1935. It is investigated again by Jñānaśrīmitra [cf. Tadashi Tani, "Shunkanteki sonzai sei ronshō *kṣaṇikatvānumāna* to sono ronri kūkan no mondai [*pratyakṣasiddhaṃ kṣaṇikatvam*]", *IBK* 22/1, 1974, 1035-1044]. In the following text of *Pramāṇavārttika* III concerning perception, the momentary existence can be perceived as existence itself. Thus, the momentariness seems to be identified with existence on the basis of real-identity of perception. But, strictly speaking, real identity cannot be proved, because perception itself has been differentiated by the self-difference of momentary existence. The object of perception is not a self-identical point but complete self-difference as *śūnyatā*. For Dharmakīrti, object of perception means non-objectivized self-difference of self-cognition. Though it cannot be verified by philological method, it is implied from his boundary philosophical standpoint: he cannot describe perception as being free from any conceptualization, without inference of conceptualization. [PV III 79cd] *yojanād varṇasāmānye nāyam . . . //* (The non-eternity of form/color implies that the universal of non-eternity is connected with the universal of form.)

[v. 80] *nāvasturūpaṃ tasyaiva tathāsiddhe prasādhanāt / anyatra nānyasiddhiś cen na tasyaiva prasiddhitaḥ //* (The non-eternity] is not the form of non-reality. Because it has been proved to be established as it is. [Opponent:] [The non-eternity of self-aspect] cannot be proved in the case of the other [non eternity of universal aspect]. [Answer:] No. Because the [non-eternity of self-aspect] is proved [by inference].)

[v. 81] *yo hi bhāvo yathābhūtaḥ sa tādṛg liṅgacetasaḥ / hetus tajjā tathābhūte tasmād vastuni liṅgidhīḥ //* (If an existence B occurs as a situation A, [the existence B] is indirect cause of the cognition of indicator A' corresponding to [the state of existence A]. Thus, the cognition of the object to be indicated B' produced by A' is concerned with the corresponding situation A of real existence B.)

[v. 82] *liṅgaliṅgidhiyor evaṃ pāramparyeṇa vastuni / pratibandhāt tadābhāsaśūnyayor apy avañcanam //* (Because, in spite of the absence of two direct perceptive presentations, these two cognitions of both indicator A' and the object to be indicated B' are indirectly related to the real existence B, they do not deviate from [the reality].) [Cf. PVV 142,1: . . . *ābhāsaḥ sākṣāt svarūpapratibhāsaḥ / tacchūnya tayor api . . .*]

[v. 83] *tadrūpādhyavasāyāc ca tayos tadrūpaśūnyayoḥ / tadrūpāvañcakatve 'pi kṛtvā bhrāntivyavasthitiḥ //* (Though both of these two cognitions do not deviate from the [real] form, they are demonstrated as confusion. Because the two [cognitions] indirectly determine the form of [real existence B], in spite of lacking the form.) Non-eternity is not different from existence. Thus, if the existence is perceived, the non-eternity as not-yet conceptualized object has been cognized. Only if it is not proved [by perception], it should be proved by inference.

[vv. 102-103] *nānyāsyānityatā bhāvāt pūrvasiddhaḥ sa caindriyāt / nānekarūpo vācyo 'sau vācyo dharmo vikalpajaḥ // sāmānyāśrayasaṃsiddhau sāmānyaṃ siddham eva tat / tadasiddhau tathāsyaiva hy anumānaṃ prasiddhaye //* (The non-eternity is nothing but its existence. And it has been already proved by sense perception. . . . When the basic locus of a universal is proved, the universal itself has

been proved. When it [= the basic locus] is not proved, the inference operates for the purpose of proving it as it is.)
[v. 107] *tasyaiva vinivṛttyartham anumānopavarṇanam / vyavasyantīkṣaṇād eva sarvākārān mahādhiyaḥ //* (For the purpose of excluding illusion, inference is stated. But the discerning cognizer can determine all forms by direct perception.)
[v. 108] *vyāvṛtteḥ sarvatas tasmin vyāvṛttivinibandhanāḥ / buddhayo 'rthe pravartante 'bhinne bhinnāśraya iva //* (Cognition which is based on exclusion on the basis of being excluded from all others occurs as if it were based on difference, although the [real] object is not differentiated.)
[v. 109] *yathācodanam ākhyāś ca so 'sati bhrāntikāraṇe / pratibhāḥ pratisandhatte svānurūpāḥ svabhāvataḥ //* (And [the difference] is expressed in conformity to ordinary word-convention. On the contrary, when there is no cause of [subjective] confusion, [the object] reveals itself as presentation corresponding to self-forms.)
[v. 110] *siddho 'trāpy athavā dhvaṃso liṅgād anupalambhanāt / prāg bhūtvā hy abhavan bhāvo 'nitya ity abhidhīyate //* (Or in this case also the absolute destruction is proved by the indicator of negative cognition. The non-existence of having existed in preceding time is named non-eternal existence.) [cf. Tosaki 1979: 185f.]

[NOTE 13]
Cf. Malvania's introduction to NB p. xx, Miyasaka 1971/72: 204; Yūsho Miyasaka, *Dharmakīrti no shōgai to sakuhin*, (1st. pr. 1970) *Indo-Kotenron* II, Tōkyō 1986: 341-343. Bu ston quotes the verse in *Chos 'byuṅ* as follows: [E. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyung) by Bu-ston*, Part 2, Heidelberg 1932: 154f.: "After that he ordered the Paṇḍit Devendrabuddhi to compose a Commentary (on the *Pramāṇavārttika*). Devendrabuddhi did this once and gave it (to the teacher) for review, but (Dharmakīrti) washed it away with water. Devendrabuddhi wrote it another time, but (the teacher) burnt it with fire. After having composed it again, Devendrabuddhi presented it to the teacher saying: — The great part (of the hearers) are unworthy and time does not wait. Therefore, as I have been instructed, I have made a summary and have composed here a commentary on the difficult points. — Dharmakīrti said: — The meaning which is expressed by suggestions and indirectly does not appear as it should be, but that which is expressed directly has a correct form. — However, thought he, — my Logic will never be rightly understood. — And, as runs the tradition, he added at the end of the *Pramāṇa-vārtika*: — Just as a river disappears in the ocean, so (this my science) will disappear and perish. — " Cf. Tāranātha (A. Schiefner, *Taranathae Narratio de Doctrinae Buddhicae in India Propagatione*, St. Petersburg 1868: 143; transl. 1869: 186f.)]

In Frauwallner 1954: 150f., the final verse and first verse in *Pramāṇavārttika* are regarded as the third reason of the non-completion of *Pramāṇavārttika* ("der plötzliche Schluß des Werkes") as follows: "Sein Werk hat also nicht den Beifall gefunden, den er sich erwartete. Und so mag auch diese Enttäuschung dazu beigetragen haben, daß Dharmakīrti die allzubreit angelegte, ihm allmählich zur Last werdende Arbeit am *Pramāṇavārttikam* aufgab und daran ging, ein neues, kürzeres und doch wirkungsvolleres Werk zu schreiben, den *Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ*."

[NOTE 14]
PV IV 280-285: *vināśitvānumāna* as meta-theory of essential property of existence and determination of logical necessity (*niyama*)

Although, according to Frauwallner 1954, *Pramāṇavārttika* IV was discontinued, Dharmakīrti must have ended his work at least with an indication of his intention. The final section of vv. 280-285 seems

to imply such an important indication. Here, he does not prove the self-identical circularity of self-cognition. But he intends to prove the self-difference of cognition and breaks the circularity by the assumption of an independent self-destructible existence.

Context: in order to exclude the transcendent scope in *kevalavyatirekin*, Dharmakīrti restricts the negative object to the perceivable object [by self-cognition]. Thus, *dṛśyānupalabdhi* is based on *pratyakṣa* [= *svasaṃvedana*]. PV IV 274: *tasmād anupalambho 'yaṃ svayaṃ pratyakṣato gataḥ / svamātravṛtter gamakas tadabhāvavyavasthiteḥ //* (Thus, this non-cognition is independently cognized by direct perception [PVV: *svasaṃvedanāt*], because only self-operation is the cognizer of the determination of non-existence [cf. vv. 269-277].) It is remarkable that the independence (*svayam*) of logical necessity is determined not by positive empirical induction but by negative cognition. The independent negative cognition can be determined in the following three types: PV IV 278-279: *tasyāḥ svayaṃ prayogeṣu svarūpaṃ vā prayujyate / arthabādhanarūpaṃ vā bhāve bhāvād abhāvataḥ // anyonyabhedasiddher vā dhruvabhāvavināśavat / pramāṇāntarabādhād vā sāpekṣadhruvabhāvavat //* (The word 'independently' (*svayam*) or 'self-form/essential form' (*svarūpa*) is adapted to the logical formula of the [non-cognition]. The form of opposite/incompatible/contradicory object is based on the following reason: [1] Because, if the existence B occurs in the existence [= complete causal complex] A, the existence A does not occur. [2] Because of differentiation from each other [= *parasparaparihārasthitiviruddha*, PVV], for instance: eternal existence and destruction. [3] Because of incompatibility with another valid determinant cognition, for instance: eternal existence and dependence on [other external cause].) The third reason is proved by the proof of destruction without cause (*ahetukavināśitvānumāna*). Thus, the latter proof should be regarded not as an application but as a meta-theory of logical necessity or logical independence. [Text: Miyasaka 1971/72: 202-204]:

[v. 280ab] *hetvantarasamūhasya* [PVV, PVBh: *samutthasya*] *saṃnidhau niyamaḥ* [PVV: *niyataḥ*] *kutaḥ /* (How is there necessity in presence of the cooperation of other causes?)

[vv. 280c-281b] *bhāvahetubhavatve kiṃ pāramparyapariśramaiḥ // nāśanaṃ janayitvānyaṃ sa hetus tasya nāśanaḥ* [PVV: *nāśakaḥ*] / (If [you conceptualize] that a [positively] existing cause is existent, why do you take great pains to solve it indirectly? [You conceptualize that] the destruction of the [existence] occurs by a production of another destruction through the cause.)

[v. 281cd] *tam eva naśvaraṃ bhāvaṃ janayed yadi kiṃ bhavet //* (But if it is interpreted that the destruction is nothing but the existence, there is no fault.)

[v. 282] *ātmopakāraḥ kaḥ syāt tasya siddhātmanaḥ sataḥ / nātmopakārakaḥ kaḥ syāt tena yaḥ samapekṣyate //* (If the [existence] itself is proved [as momentariness], why does [the existence] need a co-operative cause? If there is no co-operative cause for the [existence] itself, what is it based upon?)

[v. 283] *anapekṣaś ca kimbhavo* [PVV (ed. D. Shastri, Varanasi 1968): *kiṃ bhāvo*] *'tathābhūtaḥ kadācana / yathā na kṣepabhāg iṣṭaḥ sa evodbhūtanāśakaḥ //* (If [the destruction of existence] is not based on [another cause], why can it be [non-destructible] at any time? For instance, it cannot be recognized that the occurrence of destruction has a delayed extention.) [cf. *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*: *utpādānantaraṃ naśvarasvabhāvatayā vinaśyet.* (As soon as it is produced, it is destructed by the essential property of destruction.)]

[v. 284] *kṣaṇam apy anapekṣatve bhāvo bhāvasya neti cet / bhāvo hi sa tathābhūto 'bhāve bhāvas tathā katham //* ([Opponent:] If it is not based on [another cause], [the existence] cannot exist even in the moment. [Answer:] [The destruction implies that] existence transforms itself so. Why can existence be regarded as so in the case of the non-existence? [cf. PVV 512,15f.: *tato labdhajanmato bhāvasya kṣaṇāntaranānuvṛtter naśvaratā.* (Thus, the existence cannot endure in another moment than the moment of production. This means destruction.)]

[v. 285] *ye 'parāpekṣatadbhāvās* [PVBh: *'parāpekṣya°*] *tadbhāvaniyatā hi te / asambhavad vibandha ca sāmagrī kāryakarmaṇi //* (All existence independent of another object is necessary. For instance, the

effective operation of [the last complete causal] complex cannot be interrupted.) The universal quantification is based on intentional-concept.

Abbreviations and Literature

AKBh — *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*. Ed. P. Pradhan ²1975.

ASBh — *Abhidharmasamuccaya-Bhāṣyam*. Ed. Nathial Tatia. Patna 1976.

BKT — *The Bulletin of The Kōchi National College of Technology*

DN — *The Dīgha Nikāya*. Ed. T. W. Rhys Davis and J. Estin Carpenter. [3 parts] London 1890 (repr. 1975).

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HB — *Hetubindu*: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*. Wien 1967.

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IBK — *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies)*

JIPh — *Journal of Indian Philosophy*

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MAV — *Mādhyāntavibhāga*: v. MAVBh.

MAVBh — *Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya. A Buddhist philosophical treatise.* Ed. Gadjin Nagao. Tokyo 1964.

MAVṬ — *Mādhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*: *Sthiramati: Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā. Exposition systématique du Yogācāra-vijñaptivāda* . . . Tome I. Ed. Susumu Yamaguchi. Nagoya 1934 (repr. Tokyo 1966).

Miyasaka 1971/72 — see PV II, III, IV

MSA — *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra: Asaṅga. Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra. Exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule. Selon le système Yogācāra.* Ed. Sylvain Lévi. [2 vols.] Paris 1907 (repr. Kyoto 1983).

Much 1983 — Michael Torsten Much, *Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāyaḥ (siddhāntaḥ). Sanskrit-Text, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen.* Dissertation, Wien.

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Ono/Oda 1989 — Motoi Ono / Jun' ichi Oda, *An Index to the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti.* Tsukuba.

Pras — *Prasannapadā*: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti.* Ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin. St. Pétersbourg 1903-1913.

PS — *Pramāṇasamuccaya.*

PSV — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*: P 5702 (tr. Kanakavarman; Vol. 130, Tshad ma, Ce 93b4-177a7); P 5701 (tr. Vasudhararakṣita; Vol. 130, Tshad ma, Ce 13a6-93b2), D 4204 (Vol. 1, Tshad ma, Ce 14b1-85b7).

PV I — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter I: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes.* Roma 1960.

PV II, III, IV — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapters II, III, IV: *Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan).* Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206. (PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).

PVBh — *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam).* Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953. [Tib. D 4221 (Vols. 5-6, Tshad ma, Te 1b1 - The 282a7), P 5719 (Vol. 132, Tshad ma, Te 1 - The 344a6)]

PVBhṬ — *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyaṭīkā* (Yamāri): D 4226 (Vols. 10-13, Tshad ma, Phe 174b1 - Tse 251a7); P 5723 (Vol. 134-136, Tshad ma, Phe 183a7 - Tse 259a7).

PVin II — *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Chapter II: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte*. Wien 1973.

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PVinṬ(Dh) — *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara) Chapters I, II: D 4229 (Vol. 15, Tshad ma, Dse 1b1-289a7), P 5727 (Vol. 136. Tshad ma, Dse 1-347a7); Chapter III: D 4227 (Vol. 14, Tshad ma, Tshe 1b1-178a3), P 5727 (Vol. 137, Tshad ma, We 1-209b8)

PVinṬ(J) — *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Jñānaśrībhadra): D 4228 (Vol. 14, Tshad ma, Tshe 178a4-295a7), P 5728 (Vol. 137, Tshad ma, We 209b8-355a6)

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): v. PV I

PVSVṬ — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (Karṇakagomin): *ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Kyoto 1982 [Reprint].

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SAVBh — *Sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya* (Sthiramati): P 5531 (Vols. 108-109, Sems tsam, Mi 1 - Tsi 308a8), D 4034 (Vols. 3-4, Mi 1 - Tsi 266a7)

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Vetter 1984	Tilmann Vetter, *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika.* Wien.
VN	*Vādanyāya*. Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1935-1936.
WZKM	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*
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ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*

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[I wish to express my deep gratitude to Prof. Steinkellner and the staff of the Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies for their kind help in my study of Dharmakīrti during the period of studying abroad at the University of Vienna in 1984-1985.]

DHARMAKĪRTI ON SOME SOPHISMS*

by

Tom J. F. Tillemans, Lausanne

"If you can't convince them, confuse them."
- remark sometimes attributed to Harry Truman.

Sophisms, i.e. reasonings which exploit ambiguities, word-play or various other logical tricks to arrive at generally unpalatable conclusions, are usually pejoratively regarded as fairly senseless products of misguided dialectical acumen and devoid of philosophical interest. They were of course originally associated with certain Greek philosophers (often described in Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of the Philosophers*) and received an extensive treatment in the *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, a section of Aristotle's *Topics*, but nowadays, by extension, the word applies informally to various sorts of spurious reasonings usually turning on some form or another of verbal trickery.

This much of a preamble is naturally nothing new, but what is worth emphasizing is that recently, philosophers and logicians have come to see some sophisms in a much more favourable light as actually showing certain real problems which arise in logical theory. Here we need only consider the famous "Liar", which figures in the elaboration of the necessity for a metalinguistic approach in the semantic theory of truth, or the sophism of Eubulides which E.W. Beth has shown to have importance in developing the notion of proof.[1]

My proposal here is a much more modest one than that of Beth in that I certainly do not wish to pretend that Dharmakīrti was anticipating major developments in modern logic, but I think that it is important to see that certain seemingly uninteresting logical tricks on the part of Dharmakīrti's Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents did at least raise real problems in the context of Indian logic, problems which, in spite of their prima facie bizarre character, are not just an irritating excursion into word-spinning. These Indian sophisms did probably contribute significantly to Dharmakīrti's own development of his logic and certainly do have consequences for his system.

The two sophisms which I propose to consider are both found in the fourth chapter of *Pramāṇavārttika* on inference-for-others or *parārthānumāna*. The first, found in PV IV 27, concerns Dharmakīrti's critique of the technique of certain Buddhists - the so-called Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra and others, whose precise names in Sanskrit are unknown to us.[2] Specifically, Dharmakīrti criticizes his fellow

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* My thanks to various people for references and suggestions, but especially to Eli Franco, Masahiro Inami, Torsten Much and Motoi Ono, who kindly informed me of the relevant passages concerning the *sadvitīyaprayoga* in the *Vādanyāya*, *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* and *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*.

[1] See e.g. A. Tarski, "The semantic conception of truth and the foundation of semantics", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 4, 1944; E.W. Beth, "Constants of mathematical thought", in his *Aspects of Modern Logic*, Dordrecht 1970, 146-149. On p. 141, Beth writes: "In my desire for an exposition which is as elementary as possible, I feel strengthened by the fact that various trends of thought which, usually in very 'technical' dressing, play an important role in modern mathematical foundational studies, can be found already in a more primitive form in the Greek philosophers. I allude here to the so-called 'sophisms' which often strongly offended earlier generations; their deeper sense has only been rediscovered in the last decades." See also E.W.Beth, *The Foundations of Mathematics. A study in the philosophy of science*, Amsterdam 1959: 20-25.

[2] As for identifying the commentator(s) on Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*, S. Watanabe reconstructs the Tibetan name "Maṅ po len pa'i bu" (which we find in Śākyamati's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*) as "Bāhuleya". See n. 28 Watanabe 1976. See also T. Tillemans, "Pramāṇavārttika IV (2)", *WZKS* 31, 1987 [141-161]: 157-158. Dharmakīrti again discusses the views of the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra in PV IV 122, but the name Maṅ po len pa'i bu / Bāhuleya is, to my knowledge, not spoken of anywhere else

Buddhists' logical method in refuting a spurious reasoning of the Naiyāyikas concerning the necessity for considering the thesis-statement as being a *sādhana*, or probative element in an inference-for-others.

The second sophism, found in PV IV 34-39, concerns a Cārvāka use of an infamous reasoning known as the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, one which we find used in other forms by Mīmāṃsakas and also by some older Naiyāyikas. At any rate, in the Cārvāka version, which will largely occupy our attention here, the sophist deviously seeks to prove the materialistic position that the mind is no more than a "manifestation", or perhaps shall we say, an "epiphenomenon" of matter. As this latter reasoning is complicated, a fair amount of explanation will be necessary before we can take up the logical point behind it. Nonetheless, it does have a point, specifically, it concerns a nascent theory of relations in Dharmakīrti's logic.[3]

I. Against the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākārādi

Dharmakīrti himself consecrates only one verse to his refutation of the Naiyāyika's reasoning and the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra's reply:

> *sābhāsoktyādy upakṣepaparihārau viḍambanā /*
> *asambaddhā tathā hy eṣa na nyāyya iti sūcitam //* 27
> "The presentation and reply, 'statement which can have fallacies' and so forth, constitute an irrelevant farce. Indeed, it has [already] been explained that this [type of argumentation] is incoherent."

Now, because Dharmakīrti is so brief here and makes allusions to previous passages, we must inevitably rely on the commentators, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyamati, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin, to figure out what is going on. In a previous article published in 1987 in the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*, I translated Manorathanandin's commentary to PV IV 27 along with the *Svavṛtti* passages to which Dharmakīrti alludes. So, to understand the doctrinal and exegetical details of the arguments here let me refer the reader to Appendix I of the present article where I reproduce pp. 155-157 of my 1987 translation including the relevant passage from Manorathanandin's commentary. To get a working idea of the logical problem involved, however, let us sum things up as follows:

a) a Naiyāyika argues that the thesis-statement (*pakṣavacana*) is a *sādhana* because it is something which can have fallacies (*sābhāsārthatva*).
b) the Buddhist Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra introduces counterexamples to the general principle that everything which can have fallacies is a *sādhana*. But each time he introduces a counterexample X to show that the reason is "inconclusive" (*anaikāntika*), the Naiyāyika qualifies the reason *sābhāsārthatva* so that it becomes "everything which can have fallacies and is not X".
c) Dharmakīrti interrupts this endless tit-for-tat process by saying that qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) which do not guarantee a "necessary connection" (*sambandha*) between the reason and what is to be proved (*sādhya*) are bogus and may not be used.

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except in this passage from *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*. Whoever he might have been, he wasn't very well known.

[3] Both these reasonings are also discussed in my article, "*Pramāṇavārttika* IV and its commentaries", appearing in the volume on Mahāyāna Buddhism in *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, ed. K. Potter.

The elaboration of this argument involves various references to passages in *Pramāṇavārttika* I and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* where Dharmakīrti faced a similar problem in dealing with the Mīmāṃsaka's theory of *apauruṣeyatva* - the view that the Vedas are not man-made. For our purposes, though, we can leave those details aside and reformulate the logic of the argument with a simple arithmetical example. Let us suppose a debate between two immortals, A and B, and that A says that a given number is even because it is a natural number. Obviously the principle that all natural numbers are even admits of an infinite number of counterexamples. A, however, step-by-step qualifies the reason "because it is a natural number" to exclude each of B's counterexamples. E.g. the reason might become "because it is a natural number and does not equal 1". So, there could never be a definitive refutation of A's principle, in that for any time t_n when B produces a counterexample, there will be a later time t_{n+1} where A will add a qualifying proviso to the reason which excludes B's counterexample.

This, I think, is the basic logic lying behind Dharmakīrti's and his commentators' arguments, although I grant that there is an ambiguity here which is difficult to clear up: It is not obvious as to whether the Naiyāyika's strategy is supposedly to add more and more qualifications to the reason as the argument goes on, or to just present at t_{n+1} that qualifier which directly rules out the unique counterexample which the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra had proferred at t_n. In the former case, one could imagine that when dealing with properties which have a finite number of instances, it would be possible to systematically accumulate more and more qualifiers to finally arrive at an extremely long but valid reason. In the latter case, the argument which admits of more than one counterexample could always be provided with that very qualifier necessary to parry the opponent, but the proponent's reason itself would never be valid.[4] There is some evidence to suggest that at least Śākyamati took this latter interpretation.[5]

Leaving these unclarities aside, let us ask what importance the problem in PV IV 27 might have in the larger context of Dharmakīrti's system. Now, we know that Dharmakīrti argues repeatedly against general principles or pervasions (*vyāpti*) being established simply because one observes corroborating instances and does not observe a counterexample. This is, of course, the problem underlying the beginning sections of *Pramāṇavārttika* I. Observation of corroborating instances + no observation of counterexamples is not probative. For example, PV I 13 states:

> *na cādarśanamātreṇa vipakṣe 'vyabhicāritā /*
> *sambhāvyavyabhicāratvāt sthālītaṇḍulapākavat //* 13
> "There is no non-deviance due to mere non-observation [of the reason] amongst the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*), for deviance is possible, as [for example] when rice is cooked in a pot."

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[4] To take an arithmetical illustration again: Suppose A says that six is a natural number not less than three because it is a natural number. Taking the former strategy, A could finally come up with the valid reason "because it is a natural number and does not equal zero, does not equal one and does not equal two." Taking the latter strategy, A's reason would remain invalid. B would profer the counterexample "one", on account of which A would emend the reason to "because it is a natural number and does not equal one". B would then cite "two" as a counterexample and A would emend to "because it is a natural number and does not equal two." These steps could, in principle, be repeated endlessly.

[5] See Vibhūticandra's PVV-n, n. 10 to PVV ad k. 27: *atra yadi paraḥ pradūṣayaty adūṣaṇatve sati sābhāsoktir hetus tadā naivānekānta evaṃ yatra yatra nyāyamukhaṭīkākṛtā vyabhicārā ucyate tatra tatra pareṇa viśeṣaṇam ucyata iti paramparā*. The passage closely resembles Śākyamati's PVṬ 314a 4-6. The Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra objects that *dūṣaṇa* ("refutation") would be a counterexample to the Naiyāyika's newly qualified argument, *vacanātmatve sati sābhāsatvāt sādhanatvam* ("it is a *sādhana* because it is something which can have fallacies but is verbal in nature"). Next, according to Śākyamati, the Naiyāyika will give the argument as *adūṣaṇatve sati sābhāsokteḥ sādhanatvam*. The qualification, therefore, just seems to parry the opponent's counterexample; there is no accumulation of qualifiers, at least not following Śākyamati's account.

The fact that one sees that the rice is cooked and does not see any uncooked grains does not allow one to infer that all the rice is cooked. In short, we cannot prove a general statement on the basis of a finite number of observational steps: we need a necessary connection. This much is fairly straightforward, but what Dharmakīrti brings out in the type of argument found in PV IV 27 is, in effect, that there is a parallelism between the case of proof and that of refutation: no-one will be able to refute general statements by presenting counterexamples, unless we recognize that we must introduce a supplementary rule against bogus qualification of the reason. And that rule will again involve demanding necessary connections in order to cut short the series of counterexamples and qualifying provisos.

In other terms we might say that the arguments in *Pramāṇavārttika* I are showing that a limited number of verifying instances coupled with a provisional lack of falsification can not definitively prove a general statement: a proof is impossible without a necessary connection. Now a natural reaction is to say, "Sure, we can't prove a general statement by observing a finite number of instances and not finding a counterexample. But *if* we do find a counterexample then the statement will be *falsified*." Dharmakīrti's merit is to show that the latter method is in itself no improvement over the former, for definitive falsification by producing counterexamples is equally impossible without reliance on some sort of a necessary connection to rule out *ad hoc* qualification.

II. Against the *sadvitīyaprayoga*

I turn now to the Cārvāka's version *sadvitīyaprayoga*, an odd term which we could literally translate as "the reasoning concerning having a second". But in fact as the commentators make clear, "*dvitīya*" here means a "companion"[6], so that a slightly more palatable translation might be "the reasoning concerning being accompanied". Dharmakīrti devotes a few *kārikā*s in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV to this subject and gives it a fairly long treatment in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III. Amongst the commentators, all of them treat of it in some detail, but no doubt the most extensive discussion is in Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*. Finally, let us mention too that S. Watanabe has done a preliminary study of this argument in his 1977 article, where, in addition to the relevant passages from *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, he also translated some brief sections of the *Nyāyamañjarī* and *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*.[7] We shall look at some other uses of the *sadvitīyaprayoga* below after first dealing with the Cārvāka version.

Let us now present and explain the Cārvāka reasoning and then summarize PV IV 34-39:

> *abhivyaktacaitanyaśarīralakṣaṇapuruṣaghaṭayor anyatareṇa sadvitīyo ghaṭaḥ, anutpalatvāt, kuḍyavat.*
>
> "A vase is accompanied by either a vase or by a person characterized as a body having a consciousness which is manifested [by the elements], because it [i.e. the vase] is not an utpala [flower], like a wall."[8]

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[6] Cf. PVinṬ 21a3f.: *de daṅ bum pa de dag las gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ bas gñis pa daṅ bcas pa ste zla bo daṅ bcas pa'o* /

[7] The actual references to the *sadvitīyaprayoga* itself are brief. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*, for example, states: *sadvitīyaprayogās tu na bhavanti prayojakāḥ / utprekṣāmātramūlatvād dhetvabhāsā bhavanti te* // "But the arguments involving being accompanied are ineffectual. As they are based on mere verbal illustrations, they are fallacious reasons." P. 112 in ed. S. N. Shukla, Varanasi 1971.

[8] The text-critical problems are somewhat complicated here. See Appendix II. Note that the instrumental in *anyatareṇa sadvitīyaḥ* is perhaps to be rendered more literally as "has a companion in the form of either a . . . or a . . ." For simplicity of expression I have opted for the version "accompanied by either a . . . or a . . .".

Now, the neophyte's first reaction on hearing this unmistakably sophistical piece of logic is, if not pure shock, probably the common tauro-scatological expletive which we all know.[9] That reaction aside, we can summarize the Cārvāka's strategy as follows:

a) the first point is obvious. A vase is not an utpala flower. Hence the *pakṣadharmatva* holds.
b) the Cārvāka then uses various tricks and pseudo-parallels with Buddhist logic to establish the general principle or pervasion (*vyāpti*).
c) finally, he maintains that a vase cannot be accompanied by itself – *sadvitīyatva* necessitates difference – and therefore it must be accompanied by the person.
d) if the vase is accompanied by a person whose mind is just a manifestation of the elements, then the materialist view on what people are is correct, with the result that all rebirth is impossible, for such "people" would be destroyed at the time of their death.

Naturally, it is point b) which is of interest to Dharmakīrti – the rest is more or less uncontroversial. First of all, Dharmakīrti argues that the real *sādhyadharma* which the Cārvāka intends to prove is "being accompanied by a person who has a consciousness which is manifested by the elements", and because for a Buddhist such a person does not exist, the pervasion does not hold. The Cārvāka then argues that the *sādhyadharma*, or "property to be proved", is simply *sadvitīyatva*, "being accompanied", rather than "being accompanied by either a vase or a person, etc. etc." This he justifies by saying that for him, just as for a Buddhist logician, the *sādhyadharma* is the universal property (*sāmānya*) free from all qualifications concerning individual cases. Just as when a Buddhist proves that sound is impermanent the *sādhyadharma* is "impermanence" and not "sound's impermanence", so too, argues the Cārvāka, the *sādhyadharma* must be *sadvitīyatva*, or *anyatarasadvitīyatva*, without any mention of the person or the vase. Thus, according to the Cārvāka, pervasion between the reason and the *dharma* would be satisfied because all things, such as walls and vases, etc., which are not utpala flowers, are "accompanied" in the sense that they are simply not alone.[10]

Now, when the Buddhist logician proves that sound is perishable because it is produced, like a vase, it is indeed true that he simply takes perishability as the *sādhyadharma*. Otherwise, if it were sound's perishability which was being proven of sound, this could not qualify the example the vase. To cite Manorathanandin:

> "[Cārvāka's] Objection: In the case of the *sādhya* 'perishability' too, if one conceives of it in terms of particular cases, i.e. as connected with the subjects of the *sādhya* and of the example, sound and vase [respectively], then perishability connected with sound would not be the *sādhya*, as there is no concomitance in agreement (*anvaya*) [of the reason and sound's perishability] in the vase. And nor would perishability connected with a vase be the *sādhya*, for it could not occur

[9] The euphemism comes from Tom Wolfe's *Bonfire of the Vanities.*

[10] Cf. PVinṬ 21a6-8: *rtsig pa la ni gñis ka yaṅ yod pa'i phyir rjes su 'gro ba daṅ ldog pa dag grub pa yin la / ut pa la ma yin pa ñid ni phyogs kyi chos yin no // spyir gñis pa daṅ bcas pas ni khyab pa yin te / des na rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i ñes pa med ciṅ bum pa ñid ni bum pa gñis pa daṅ bcas pa ma* yin pa'i phyir śugs kyis de lta bur gyur pa'i skyes bur 'gyur ba yin no żes bya ba de la /* . . . "Because the wall is also accompanied, the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are established. Not being an utpala is the *pakṣadharma* ('property of the subject'). Generally, it [i.e. not being an utpala] is pervaded by being accompanied. So therefore, the fault of no *anvaya* does not occur, and since the vase itself is not accompanied by the vase, then indirectly there would be a person of the sort [which the materialist describes]."

* P omits *ma*

in sound. Thus this is analogous."[11]

In other words, according to the Cārvāka, the sound-impermanent reasoning and the *sadvitīya-prayoga* are analogous in that both should involve a *sādhyadharma* unqualified by particular cases. Dharmakīrti in the second half of k. 36 replies that the analogy does not apply:

> *na siddhena vināśena tadvataḥ sādhanād dhvaneḥ* / 36cd
> "No, it is not [analogous], for through an established perishability there is a proof that sound has this [property, perishability]."

What then, according to Dharmakīrti, is the difference between proving "perishability" and proving *sadvitīyatva*? Simply put, the former is a one-place property while the latter is a two-place relation. Unfortunately, Dharmakīrti and his commentators did not really put things all that simply, but instead framed the problem in terms of universals being inexistent where their instantiations do not exist, as for example the universal "caste" (*jāti*) in people who are none of the four *varṇa*, or the universal "having sense organs" with regard to conceptual cognition. Dharmakīrti and co. then argued that *anya-tarasadvitīyatva* was not established in the *dharmin*, vase, since neither the vase nor the person were its instantiations (*vyakti*).[12]

Dharmakīrti's point about perishability existing unproblematically while *sadvitīyatva*, in the context of the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, does not exist can be formulated as follows:

a) There is an F such that F = perishability and sound has F.
b) There is an F such that F = *sadvitīyatva* and either F holds between a vase and itself or F holds between a vase and a person (taken materialistically).

Now, a) is true while b) is false in that the conjunction in b) is false: F neither holds between a vase and itself nor between a vase and a person (taken materialistically).

Note that Dharmakīrti definitely does not want to say that *sadvitīyatva* never exists anywhere. He argues:

> *tathārthāntarabhāve syāt tadvān kumbho 'pi . . .* / 37ab
> "So also, if a separate object existed, then the vase too would have that [property, viz. *sadvi-tīyatva*]."

Manorathanandin et al. make the point that if we allow one of the relata of *sadvitīyatva* to be a

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[11] PVV 428,3-5 ad k. 36: *nāśe 'pi sādhye śabdaghaṭayoḥ sādhyadṛṣṭāntadharmiṇoḥ sambandhitayā bhedena kalpane śabda-sambandhino nāśasya ghaṭe 'nvayābhāvād asādhyatvaṃ. ghaṭasambandhinaś ca śabde 'sambhavād asādhyateti tulyam idam iti cet.* (The underlined words correspond to those in the first half of k. 36.)

[12] See PV IV 35-36. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (P 5710, Vol. 130, Tshad ma, Ce 250b6-329b1) 290a2f.: *'di'i phyir spyi la brten pa ma yin te / gsal ba thams cad yod par mi srid na de'i spyi mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // dper na bram ze la sogs pa ma yin pa ñid la rigs* (P : *rig* D 192a2) *ñid dam / rtog pa'i śes pa la dbaṅ po la brten pa ñid bźin no //* "So too, [the vase] does not have (*brten pa* = °*bhaj*?) the universal, for when none of the instantiations can exist, their universal is absurd, as for example caste with regard to those who are not Brahmins, etc., or 'having sense organs' with regard to conceptual cognition. Cf. PVinṬ 23b1: *'di la bum par gyur pa daṅ skyes bur gyur pa gñis (pa) ñid kyi khyad par med pa'i phyir gñis pa ñid kyi spyi mi 'thad pa yin no /* "Because the particulars of *dvitīyatva*, viz. the vase and the person, do not exist here, the universal, *dvitīyatva*, is absurd." Finally, see PVBh 497,9-10: *tad asat, yato dehasyāsiddhau vyaktyabhāvāt kutaḥ sāmānyam, na hi govyaktyabhāve sāmānyam.* "This is not correct. Since the instantiations do not exist when the body is not established, how could the universal be? Indeed there is no [cow-]universal in the absence of cow-instantiations."

body without a consciousness (viz. a dead body) then *sadvitīyatva* could be established in such a situation.[13] I.e., in our terms, it may very well be that

c) There is an F such that F = *sadvitīyatva* and F holds between a vase and itself or F holds between a vase and a dead body.

But in such a case, obviously, the Cārvāka will not arrive at his devious aim of proving that a vase is accompanied by a person.

In short, saying that *sadvitīyatva* is or is not established unpacks as a complex statement along the lines of b) and c). It is not just simply

d) There is an F such that F = *sadvitīyatva*.

Nor is it

e) There is an F such that F = *sadvitīyatva* and the vase has F.

which was, in effect, the Cārvāka's attempt to bamboozle Dharmakīrti with a false parallel with perishability. Dharmakīrti, then, was certainly correct in treating *sadvitīyatva* as a two-place relation and saying that the Cārvāka's move to eliminate particular qualifications in proving perishability and *sadvitīyatva* was in fact a pseudo-parallel.

Going one step further, we might say that the problem in fact turns on a misleading grammatical similarity between the predicates ". . . is perishable" and ". . . is accompanied": both *appear* to represent simple properties, but in fact logically they behave quite differently. Writers of elementary logic and semiotics textbooks, such as Henry S. Leonard, give examples such as "All the people in this room are English" and "All the people in this room are acquainted", and no doubt we can multiply such sorts of cases of misleading similarities ad infinitum.[14] To apply a version of Leonard's criterion for relative terms, the second sort of predicate (viz. ". . . is accompanied", ". . . are acquainted") is fundamentally relational in that, contrary to the first sort, it can be analyzed into and presupposes the truth of some statement(s) of the form . . . R . . ., where "R" represents a multi-placed relation. (E.g."A is accompanied by B", "John is acquainted with James".)

Now, usually, when we unpack the second type of case (viz. ". . . is accompanied", etc.) into its relational form, the relata must exist. While it is true that we say "A is a mother" without having to specify then and there who she is a mother of, nonetheless, the truth of this sentence is dependent upon the truth of some formulation in terms of a relation where the relata exist. Obviously, we cannot say "A is a mother" is true and then unpack that statement into "A is the mother of the barren woman's child". To use Dharmakīrtian terms, in such a case, motherhood could not be "established" of the subject A; nor can we speak of *sadvitīyatva* as being established in A unless there is something

[13] PVV 428, 12-14: *yadi punar acetanasvabhāvatayā ghaṭajātīyenaiva dehena sadvitīyatvaṃ ghaṭasya sādhyate tadā sidhyaty eva, tathāvidhasya sadvitīyatvasya siddhatvād vināśavat, kiṃ tu vādino neṣṭasiddhiḥ, dehasya cetanasvabhāvatayā 'siddheḥ*. "Suppose, however, that it were established that the vase was accompanied by a body of the very same sort as the vase, that is, naturally unconscious. Then [*sadvitīyatva*] would indeed be established, for such a type of *sadvitīyatva* is established just like perishability. But then the proponent's intended [proposition] would not be proven, since the body would not be established as being conscious in its nature."

[14] See H.S. Leonard, *Principles of Reasoning, An introduction to logic, methodology and the theory of signs*, New York 1967: 327-328. See section § 19.3 (pp. 207-208) for his distinction between "relative" and "absolute terms" – viz. those which respectively can and cannot be formulated along the lines of ". . . R . . .".

which does accompany A.

In fact, it is basically this discrepancy between similar grammatical structure and different logical form which the Cārvāka opponent in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV is deliberately ignoring in order to establish *sadvitīyatva* independent of its relata. To block this tactic one needs to be able to explain away misleading grammatical phenomena, and for that in turn, one needs some insight into the logic of relations. Instead of Dharmakīrti's account about universals not existing where they lack instantiations,[15] we would nowadays probably prefer to formulate things a little differently, quantifying over individuals rather than properties or relations.[16] I do not wish to deform Dharmakīrti's own logic to make it look like ours, but at least it should be clear that Dharmakīrti, in his own way, was able to provide for a difference between what are one-place predicates and multi-placed relations. Most of the classic examples in Dharmakīrti's logic, of course, deal with one-place predicates – *kṛtakatva, anityatva*, etc. – and certainly pervasion is usually between such terms. But as we see in the discussion concerning the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, Dharmakīrti tried to extend his terminology of universals and instantiations to the case of relations and he was certainly explicitly aware of the importance of distinguishing predicates by the number of arguments which they take.

Finally, a few words on the other schools' uses of the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, as this may shed some light on the general use of this style of argumentation, of which Dharmakīrti's discussion in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* is a particular case.

It seems clear that the *sadvitīyaprayoga* was not just one reasoning used by one school, viz. the Cārvāka, but rather that it was a recurring strategy used by a number of philosophers to prove varying conclusions sophistically – you slipped what you wished to prove surreptitiously into some sort of *sadvitīya*-style formulation. The *Nyāyamañjarī* suggests this plurality of *sadvitīyaprayoga* by using the word in the plural[17], and indeed if we look at Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*, Cakradhara's *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* and Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, it is apparent that there were several versions. The *Vādanyāya* (VN 66,16), for example, mentions the following argument which a Mīmāṃsaka might adopt when arguing as to whether sound is permanent or impermanent[18]:

> *jaiminipratijñātatattvanityatādhikaraṇaśabdaghaṭānyatarasadvitīyo ghaṭaḥ* "The vase is accompanied by either a) a vase or b) a sound which is accepted by Jaimini as being a locus for [its] true nature, permanence."

Cakradhara also states an opponent's *sadvitīyaprayoga* which seems to bear similarity to the Cārvāka version, at least in its choice of a reason and example, but which again differs notably from the Cārvāka's *sadvitīyaprayoga* in that it is not used to prove materialism, but rather to argue against sound's impermanence. The opponent is seeking to counter the usual argument that sound is impermanent because it is a product like a vase. To do so he (much as in *Vādanyāya*'s version) uses

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[15] See above and n. 12.

[16] We would get something like:
(Ex)(Ey) ((x is a vase & y is a person) & (Sx,x v Sx,y)).
(Read "There is an x and y such that x is a vase and y is person and either x is *sadvitīya* by x or x is *sadvitīya* by y.")

[17] See n. 7.

[18] VN 66, 15-17: *nityaḥ śabdo 'nityo veti vāde dvādaśalakṣaṇaprapañcaprakāśanaśāstrapraṇetuḥ jaiminipratijñātatattvanityatādhikaraṇaśabdaghaṭānyatarasadvitīyo ghaṭa iti pratijñām uparacayya dvādaśalakṣaṇārthavyākhyānam**. * Shāstrī : °*lakṣaṇādi*°.

the *sadvitīyaprayoga* to argue that the vase does not have the *sādhyadharma*, viz. impermanence[19]:

> *astu tatsādhyadharmādhikaraṇatvaśūnyadharmighaṭānyatarasadvitīyo ghaṭo 'nutpalatvāt kuḍyavat* "Then let there be the following: The vase is accompanied by either a) a vase or b) a *dharmin* which is void of the property of being the locus for this *sādhyadharma*, because it [i.e. the vase] is not an utpala [flower], like a wall."

In both these cases - and especially in the example from the *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* - we notice that the logical structure is almost exactly the same as in the Cārvāka version discussed in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, although the *sādhyadharma* does differ. Both versions involve a kind of bogus dilemma - expressed by *anyatarasadvitīya* - where the alternative that the vase is accompanied by itself is quickly ruled out in favour of the other alternative, which is, of course, what the proponent actually wants us to believe. Although the explanation is too brief in both works to know exactly how the refutation of these *sadvitīyaprayoga*s would be elaborated, we can surmise that a Dharmakīrtian would proceed just as in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV.

Kamalaśīla cites a few examples of the use of *sadvitīya*-style reasoning by Aviddhakarṇa, a Naiyāyika who seems to have lived some time after Uddyotakara, but of whose oeuvre nothing remains except a few ideas mentioned in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*. In the *Pañjikā* on Śāntarakṣita's *kārikā*s 1583-1585 - i.e. in the section on "the examination of the existence of other valid means of cognition" (*pramāṇāntarabhāvaparīkṣā*) -, we find Aviddhakarṇa cited as using *sadvitīyaprayoga*s to argue against the Buddhist's position of two *pramāṇa*s and two corresponding *prameya*s ("objects of cognition")[20]. To take one representative sample from Aviddhakarṇa:

> *anumānaṃ vā pratyakṣavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt pratyakṣavat.* "Or, inference is accompanied by another *pramāṇa* different from perception, because it is a *pramāṇa*, like perception."

Curiously enough, however, the versions discussed in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* would seem to exhibit some fundamental logical differences from those in the *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, *Vādanyāya*, *Pramāṇavārttika* IV and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. In effect, they are less sophisticated in that they do not have the same structure of a bogus dilemma (expressed by *anyatarasadvitīya*) between self-accompaniment and accompaniment by some (controversial) entity. They simply speak of A's being accompanied by B, rather than A being accompanied by A or by B. Not surprisingly, then, Śāntarakṣita and

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[19] See Cakradhara's *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, ed. Nagin J. Shah, Ahmedabad 1972: 64,12-14: *anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti prayukte paraḥ sadvitīyaprayogeṇa pratyavatiṣṭhate astu tatsādhyadharmādhikaraṇatvaśūnyadharmighaṭānyatarasadvitīyo ghaṭo anutpalatvāt kuḍyavat ityādinā.*

[20] *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (ed. Dvarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1981) 556f.: *Aviddhakarṇas tu dva eva pramāṇe svalakṣaṇasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ cānyat prameyaṃ nāstīty etadvighaṭanārthaṃ pramāṇayati pratyakṣam anumānavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt. anumānaṃ vā pratyakṣavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt pratyakṣavat. tathā svalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyārthāntarasadvitīyaṃ prameyatvāt sāmānyalakṣaṇavat. sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ vā svalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyāntarasadvitīyaṃ prameyatvāt svalakṣaṇavat iti.* "Aviddhakarṇa, however, argues in order to refute [the Buddhist's statement to the effect that] 'there are only two *pramāṇa*s and there are no other *prameya*s (i.e. objects of cognition) apart from particular characters (*svalakṣaṇa*) and universal characters (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*).' He says: 'Perception is accompanied by another *pramāṇa* which differs from inference, because it [i.e. perception] is a *pramāṇa*. Or, inference is accompanied by another *pramāṇa* different from perception, because it is a *pramāṇa*, like perception. Similarly, a particular character (*svalakṣaṇa*) is accompanied by another *prameya* different from a universal character, because it is a *prameya*, like a universal character. Or, a universal character is accompanied by another *prameya* different from a particular character, because it is a *prameya*, like a particular character.'"

Kamalaśīla's refutation of Aviddhakarṇa's reasonings is much simpler than Dharmakīrti's refutation of the Cārvāka, for here the Buddhist does not need to deal with a devious attempt to smuggle in a controversial property in the guise of a bogus dilemma.

It is difficult to speculate on what kind of dialectical advantage Aviddhakarṇa himself might have seen in using a *sadvitīya*-style sophism – the sources are too brief to enable us to say whether he too, like the Cārvāka, wished to exploit a pseudo-parallel with properties like perishability. But, at any rate, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla did not feel the need to introduce considerations, along the lines of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, about one-placed predicates versus two-placed relations. Instead they just gave the more or less standard critique which Buddhist logicians invoke in the case of bad arguments, viz. that there is no necessary connection (*pratibandha*) between the reason and what is being proven, for we cannot rule out (*bādhaka*) the reason's presence in dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*). In short the *vyāpti* is not established and hence Aviddhakarṇa's reasons are inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).

3. Some concluding philosophical remarks

While I mentioned in my initial preamble that I wished to discuss Dharmakīrti's refutations of sophisms primarily in the context of the Indian logic of his time, there are nonetheless certain Western parallels which are worth briefly mentioning. First of all, in the Naiyāyika-Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra discussion, Dharmakīrti's strictures against *ad hoc* qualification of general principles do have some parallels with the problems which occur when twentieth-century philosophers seek to replace talk of verification of theoretical statements with talk of their falsification. What inevitably surfaces in such discussions is the problem of *ad hoc* hypotheses being used to rule out potential falsifying evidence.[21] As Imre Lakatos said in speaking about Karl Popper:

> ". . . the problem is how to demarcate between scientific and pseudoscientific *adjustments*, between rational and irrational changes of theory. According to Popper, saving a theory with the help of auxiliary hypotheses which satisfy certain well-defined conditions represents scientific progress; but saving a theory with the help of auxiliary hypotheses which do not, represents degeneration. Popper calls such inadmissible auxiliary hypotheses *ad hoc* hypotheses, mere linguistic devices, 'conventionalist stratagems'."[22]

Naturally, various solutions to the conundrum are attempted – and I can't enter into details here – but it is noteworthy that Dharmakīrti was at least implicitly aware of the problem of *ad hoc* qualification and that he did propose a type of solution, namely that provisos, to be legitimate, must guarantee a sufficient necessity to the theoretical statement so that no more counterexamples will ever be found. Whether his programme is practicable or not is not for me to investigate here.

Secondly, à propos of the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, it is interesting to note that while Dharmakīrti is certainly not as systematic and detailed as Aristotle in diagnosing the problems behind specious reasonings, he does come up with an important methodological point concerning sophistical reasoning in general. In PV IV 29-41 he elaborates on an aspect of Dignāga's definition of the thesis: optimally

[21] The initial formulation of falsification and falsifiability was by K. Popper in his *Logic of Scientific Discovery*. For the problem of *ad hoc* hypotheses, see p. 32 et seq. in I. Lakatos's "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes" in his collection of essays *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, Cambridge 1978.

[22] Lakatos *op.cit.* p. 33.

there should be no discrepancy between what the propounder really intends to prove and what he states as his thesis, but if there is such a discrepancy then it is what is intended (*iṣṭa*) which should be considered as being the real thesis.[23] No doubt, the principle has a large import which is in keeping with the epistemological school's philosophy of language: words *per se* are of little importance and can be manipulated as we wish, the touchstone must always be what the speaker intends by the words. But while I shall not go into the specific uses of the principle in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV and elsewhere, it is perhaps important to see its potential wide-ranging scope. Indeed, such a principle would probably cover, for example, the whole category of spurious arguments which Aristotle in *De Sophisticis Elenchis* classified as "dependent upon language", namely those which involve ambiguity, amphiboly, combination, division, accent and form of expression.[24] Arguably, we could resolve the problems in each example which Aristotle gives in this connection by first analyzing what the speaker does or does not intend and then examining his intended argument for validity. In short, the principle here is succinct, but it is far from trivial.

[23] The point comes up in PV IV 28 et seq. in connection with the word *iṣṭa* ("intended"; "held") in Dignāga's definition of the thesis in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III 2. Cf. *Nyāyabindu* (ed. D. Malvania, Patna 1955) III 38 et seq. Dharmakīrti initially used the principle to refute the Sāṃkhya sophism: "The eyes, etc. are for the use of another, because they are assemblages, just like the parts of a bed or seat, etc." Here, the Sāṃkhya in fact means "for the use of the uncomposed *ātman*" but by simply using "for the use of another", he hides his intention. See PV IV 29 et seq. and *Nyāyabindu* III 47. The initial rejoinder to the Cārvāka in PV IV 34 invokes the same considerations about *iṣṭa*.

[24] See *On Sophistical Refutations* 165b4ff., p. 17 et seq. in the translation by E.S. Forster in Loeb Library Series, London 1965. Note that Tibetan logicians give numerous examples of sophisms in their *bsDus grwa* texts. A quick perusal of Ṅag dbaṅ ñi ma's *bsDus grwa brjed tho* reveals literally dozens and dozens of examples, most of which arguably could be explained on Aristotelian lines.

Appendix I: Pramāṇavārttika IV 27 plus Manorathanandin's commentary.

sābhāsoktyādy upakṣepaparihārau viḍambanā [1] |
asambaddhā tathā hy eṣa na nyāyya[2] *iti sūcitam* || 27

"The presentation and reply, 'statement which can have fallacies' and so forth, constitute an irrelevant farce. Indeed, it has [already] been explained that this [type of argumentation] is incoherent."
(PVV *ad* k. 27:) "Now our co-religionists [viz. the author of the *Nyāyamukhaṭīkā* and others[3]] state the following opposing position and reply:
Suppose that a [Naiyāyika] says that the thesis-statement is a *sādhana*, because it is something which can have fallacies[4]. This is not correct, as [the reason] is inconclusive in virtue of [the counter-example] 'direct perception' (*pratyakṣa*). Even though direct perception can have fallacies[5], it is not a *sādhana* for any *pramāṇa* whatsoever. Now if [the Naiyāyika] retorts that [the thesis-statement] is [nonetheless] a *sādhana*, because it is something which can have fallacies but is v e r b a l in n a t u r e, this is [also] not correct: [the reason] will be inconclusive in virtue of the counterexample 'refutations' (*dūṣaṇa*). A refutation, although it is something verbal and can have fallacies, is not a *sādhana*. But this, that is to say both the presentation and the reply, 'statement which can have fallacies' and so forth, are a farce in their incoherence. (Here, *sābhāsoktyādī* is explained as being a *bahuvrīhi* compound qualifying *upakṣepaparihārau*.) Thus [Dharmakīrti] says, 'irrelevant'. The point is that the opposing position is irrelevant in that 'can have fallacies' is not a valid reason, for there is no *pramāṇa* which refutes it when [the *sādhya*] is negated (*viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*)[6] Therefore, it is inappropriate to render [the reason] inconclusive by [the counterexample] 'direct perception' when one has granted this [point].
And, when one does not reject the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) which the adversary states, i.e. [that the reason concerns only what is] 'verbal in nature', but then renders [the reason] inconclusive by [the counterexample] 'fallacious refutations', [this] is also incoherent. For, the only qualification of a reason which is justified is one which excludes the reason from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*). Now, between 'being verbal' and 'not being a *sādhana*', there is absolutely no contradiction, [contradiction] which would make the qualification meaningful in that 'not being a *sādhana*' would imply the negation

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1 PV IV, PV-k(iii): °*upekṣapa*°. PV IV, PV-k(i), (ii) and (iii) read *sābhāsoktyādyupakṣepaparihāraviḍambanā* as one long compound. Our amendment, however, is based on PVV ad k. 27 (cf. below n. 10), where Manorathanandin glosses *sābhāsoktyādī* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound qualifying *upakṣepaparihārau*. This rendition also corresponds to PV Tib., *ltar snaṅ bcas sogs bkod pa daṅ // lan* ni 'brel med bźad gad de* (*read *lan* instead of *gźan*), which suggests that the dual, *upakṣepaparihārau*, is the subject of the predicate *viḍambanā asambaddhā*.

2 PV IV, PV-k(i), (iii): *nyāya*.

3 PVV-n 423, n.4: *nyāyamukhaṭīkākārādeḥ*. Cf. PVṬ 313b2-3: *maṅ po len pa'i bu la sogs pa rigs pa'i sgo'i ṭī kā byed pa dag gis*. . .

4 PVṬ 313b3-4 gives a more elaborate presentation of the Naiyāyika's argument: . . *phyogs kyi* tshig sgrub par byed pa yin te / ltar snaṅ daṅ bcas pa brjod pa sgrub par byed pa'i dus su brjod pa'i phyir gtan tshigs daṅ dpe'i tshig bźin no /* (*P *kyis*) "The thesis-statement is a *sādhana*, because it is a statement which can have fallacies and which is said at the time [one presents] a proof, just like the statements of the reason and example".

5 See *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I 6 for *pratyakṣābhāsa*: *'khrul daṅ kun rdzob yod śes daṅ // rjes dpag rjes su dpag las byuṅ // dran daṅ mṅon 'dod ces bya'o // mṅon sum ltar snaṅ rab rib bcas //* Cf. PV III 288-300.

6 *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* = *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*. Note, however, that in this context, *sādhya* means the *sādhyadharma*, the property to be proved, and not the proposition to be proved. The point is that this *pramāṇa* assures that the reason is refuted when the property to be proved is negated, and thus it guarantees that if non-*sādhyadharma* then non-*hetu*, or in other terms, such a *pramāṇa* justifies the *vyatirekavyāpti*. (In the case at hand, this would mean that when X is not a *sādhana*, X is not something which can have fallacies. But, as Manorathanandin shows, such a *pramāṇa* is not to be found.) Cf. VNṬ 8,32f.: *bādhakaṃ pramāṇam. yena sādhyaviparyaye vartamāno hetur bādhyate, tasya kathanaṃ yat tad vyāptisādhanam ity arthaḥ*.

of 'being verbal'.

Indeed, it had been explained earlier that this [type of argumentation] – where one presents a qualification of the reason which does not exclude it from the dissimilar instances – is incoherent[7]. [The argument in the *Svārthānumānapariccheda* and *Svavṛtti* was as follows:] To prove that the Vedas are permanent, [a Mīmāṃsaka] said that [every recitation] has [another] recitation as antecedent. Then, to counter a charge of inconclusiveness with regard to the recitation of the [*Mahā*]*bhārata*, [a text which is recited now, but which is supposed to have been composed by the *ṛṣi*, Vyāsa, and hence does not have an infinite series of anterior recitations[8]], the Mīmāṃsaka then profers the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) 'being a recitation of the Vedas'. But it is possible that [a recitation of the Vedas] could have as antecedent the creative act of an author, just as is the case for the [*Mahā*]*bhārata*. There is no contradiction whatsoever here. Therefore, it had been stated earlier on [in the *Svavṛtti*[9]] that a qualification which does not exclude [the reason] from the dissimilar instances is incoherent."[10]

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[7] See PV I 240-243 and PVSV, especially *ad* k. 243 (cf. below n. 9).

[8] See below note 9. Karṇakagomin's PVSVṬ 447,30 speaks of *vyāsādi*. I have translated *adhyayana* in these contexts by "recitation" rather than "study" essentially because the Tibetan rendition is *'don pa* ("intone, bring forth, read, etc."). Cf. PVBh (Tib., P 5719) 173b6: *'don pa ni 'don pa gźan sṅon du 'gro ba can yin no źes bya ba la. . .* = *adhyayanam adhyayanāntara-pūrvakam iti* (PVBh 493,17-18).

[9] Cf. PVSV *ad* k. 243 (p.124,27-31): *tasmād adhyayanam adhyayanāntarapūrvakam adhyayanād iti bhāratādhyayane 'pi bhāvād vyabhicāri. nanu vedena viśeṣaṇād adoṣaḥ. kaḥ punar atiśayo vedādhyayanasya yad anyathādhyetuṃ na śakyate, na hi viśeṣaṇam aviruddhaṃ vipakṣeṇāsmād dhetuṃ vyāvartayati, aviruddhayor ekatra sambhavāt* "Thus, when one says that a recitation must be preceded by another recitation because it is a recitation, then because [the reason] also applies to recitations of the [*Mahā*]*bhārata*, it is deviant. [Objection:] But surely [the reason, viz. being a recitation] is qualified by [being a recitation of] the Vedas, and thus there is no fault. [Reply:] But what is special about a recitation of the Vedas so that otherwise one could not recite them? Indeed, a qualification which is not contradictory with the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) does not exclude the reason from those [dissimilar instances], for two non-contradictory [properties, e.g. being a Veda and not having another preceding recitation*] could apply to one and the same thing [viz. the words of the Vedas]." (* PVSVṬ 454,19-20: *aviruddhayor vedatvānadhyayanāntarapūrvakatvayor ekatra vedavākye sambhavāt*).

[10] *yā ca svayūthyānāṃ pūrvapakṣaparihāroktiḥ pakṣavacanaṃ sādhanaṃ sābhās(ārtha)tvād iti cet, na pratyakṣenānekāntāt. pratyakṣaṃ sābhāsam api na kasyacit pramāṇasya sādhanam. vacanātmatve sati sābhāsatvāt sādhanatvam iti cet, na dūṣaṇenānekāntāt. dūṣaṇaṃ sābhāsavacanātmatve 'pi na sādhanam iti sāpi sābhāsoktir ādir yasya tau* s ā b h ā s o k t y ā d ī u p a k ṣ e p a p a r i h ā r a u . *tāv eva* v i ḍ a m b a n ā *yuktatayā. ata evāha* a s a m b a d d h ā . *tathā hi sābhāsatvasya viparyaye bādhakapramāṇābhāvād [1] evāhetutvād asambandhaḥ [2] pūrvapakṣaḥ. tatas tam anumatya pratyakṣenānekāntatāpādanam aśobhanam. punar vacanātmatvaṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ paroktam apratikṣipya dūṣaṇābhāsenānekāntatāpādanaṃ cāyuktam. tad eva hi hetor viśeṣaṇam upayuktaṃ yad vipakṣād dhetuṃ vyāvartayati. na ca vacanātmatvāsādhanatvayoḥ kaścid virodho [3] yenāsādhanād vacanātmanivṛtter viśeṣaṇasāphalyaṃ syāt.* t a t h ā h y e ṣ a *vipakṣād avyāvartakahetuviśeṣaṇopanyāso* n a n y ā y y a i t i v a r ṇ i t a ṃ *[4] prāk. vedanityatāsiddhyartham adhyayanapūrvakam ity ukte bhāratādhyayanenānekāntatām āpāditāṃ pratiṣeddhum vedādhyayanatve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ mīmāṃsakenopanyastaṃ tad api karaṇa(kṛti)pūrvakaṃ bhāratādhyayanavat syān na kaścid virodhaḥ. tato vipakṣād avyāvartakaṃ viśeṣaṇam ayuktam ity uktaṃ prāk.*

[1] Sāṅkṛtyāyana as well as D. Shāstrī [*Pramāṇavārttika of Ācārya Dharmakīrti with the Commentary 'vṛtti' of Ācārya Manorathanandin*, Varanasi 1968] read *bādhakapramāṇabhāvād*; but cf. Watanabe 1976: n.19, PVṬ 327a3 [which PVV mirrors]: *ltar snaṅ ba daṅ bcas pa brjod pa la sogs pa la bzlog na gnod pa can gyi tshad ma med pas khyab pa med pa'i phyir gtan tshigs ñid ma yin pas na . . .* [2] Shāstrī: *°ahetutvasambandhaḥ* [3] Shāstrī: *virodhaḥ* [4] Following Shāstrī, *varṇitam* is also to be read in PV-k[ii]).

Appendix II: Philological remarks, a fragment from Śākyamati and supplementary explanations on the *sadvitīyaprayoga*.

First of all, PVV 427,7 erroneously reads *abhivyaktacaitanyaśarīralakṣaṇapuruṣasadvitīyo ghaṭaḥ, anutpannatvāt, kuḍyavad iti*. PVBh 496, 31 has an equally inaccurate *vibhaktacaitanyaśarīralakṣaṇapuruṣaghaṭānyatarasadvitīyo ghaṭaḥ, anutpan(n)atvāt, kuḍyavat*. While PVBh does add °*ghaṭānyatara*°, which is more or less on the right track, it reads *vibhakta*°, which is clearly wrong as we see by the Tibetan *mṅon par gsal ba*. Vibhūticandra's PVV-n 427, n.1 corrects Manorathanandin by giving °*ghaṭayor anyatareṇa*, which is the best reading and is supported by *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*'s gloss (see below) of °*ghaṭa* being in the dual. Note however that *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*'s *anutpannatvāt*, which also occurs in PVBh 496, 31, is an error as we readily see from *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*, *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*'s formulation of the reasoning. PVin (P 5710) 289b1: *bum pa ni mṅon par gsal*[11] *ba'i sems can lus kyi mtshan ñid kyi skyes bu daṅ bum pa gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ bas gñis pa daṅ bcas pa yin te / ut pa la ma yin pa'i phyir rtsig pa bźin no źes bya ba //* See also *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* quoted in our note 10 (p. 407) above.

On the interpretation of this reasoning, see e.g. Śākyamati's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* on Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*. The incomplete Sanskrit fragments found in Vibhūticandra's appendix to *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* are given in E. Steinkellner's "Philological remarks on Śākyamati's Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā." In *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus, Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf*, ed. K. Bruhn and A. Wezler. Wiesbaden 1981, 283-295. See p. 293: (App[endix] 526,10-20 = PVṬ 316a5-316b5): (*de dag gis ni 'di ltar khas blaṅs pa yin te / sems yod pa ñid ces bya ba cuṅ zad kyaṅ yod pa ma yin gyi / 'on kyaṅ*)[12] mahābhūtānām *evābhivyaktiviśeṣo madaśaktivac caitanyam iti. abhivyaktaṃ caitanyaṃ yasmin* dehe sa *(mṅon par bsal ba sems yod pa can ñid do // de dag kyaṅ de yin la lus can yin pas na źes bya* ba las *'dzin par bya'o //) tathābhūto dehaḥ svabhāvo yasya puruṣasya sa tathā. paścād ghaṭaśabdena dvandvaḥ. nirdhāraṇe ṣaṣṭhyāḥ saptamyā vā dvivacanam etad avayavāvayavisambandhe vā ṣaṣṭhī. tayor anyatareṇa ghaṭena puruṣeṇa vā saha dvitīyena vartata iti sadvitīyaḥ.*[13] *asti hi* dṛṣṭānte *'nutpalātmakasya* kuḍyasyāntareṇa *ghaṭena sadvitīyatvam; ekenāpi sadvitīyatve 'nyatareṇa* sadvitīyatvaṃ sāmānyena siddham iti na sādhyena *<niranvayatā>. tathā ghaṭasyāpi sādhyadharmiṇo 'śeṣaghaṭapakṣīkaraṇe tenaiva sadvitīyatvam ayuktam iti sāmānyenāpi sādhane tathābhūtena puruṣeṇa sadvitīyatvaṃ pariśeṣyāt sidhyatīti <anyo> manyate.* **atretyādi** (*Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* [P 5717] 329a4) (*'gog par byed do*). *tādṛśasya puruṣasya (gñis pa daṅ bcas pa) anuktāv api icchāvyāptasya sādhyatvāt tasya cāsiddhatvād dṛṣṭānte 'nanvayadoṣaḥ.*

Steinkellner has italicized the Sanskrit words corresponding to the Tibetan in *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* and supplied the Tibetan of *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* when the Sanskrit is missing. The other non-italicized Sanskrit in Steinkellner is added by Vibhūticandra; we have used underlining for Vibhūticandra's additions and bold + underlining for phrases in *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*.

Translation: "These [philosophers, viz. the Cārvākas] hold the following: Consciousness does not exist at all, but rather, consciousness is a particular manifestation of the elements alone, just like the [alcoholic] power of beer. That body in which is found the manifested consciousness is [said to be] 'what has a manifested consciousness'. The [words '*abhivyaktacaitanyaśarīra*'] should be understood as [a *karmadhāraya* compound] asserting that the body is that [which has a manifested consciousness]. The person whose nature is a body of that sort is [described] by what follows. [In other words,

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[11] D 191b1 *gsal*: P *bsal*.

[12] I have added this initial sentence from *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*.

[13] Read *iti sadvitīyaḥ* instead of *iti ca dvitīyaḥ*. Cf. PVṬ 316a8: . . . *gñis pa daṅ bcas pa 'jug pa'i phyir gñis pa daṅ bcas pa'o /*

abhivyaktacaitanyaśarīralakṣaṇa is a *bahuvrīhi* compound qualifying *puruṣa*.] Next, the word [*abhivyaktacaitanyaśarīralakṣaṇapuruṣa*]*ghaṭayor* is a conjunctive compound (*dvandva*). This [°*ghaṭayor*] is a dual of the genitive or locative in [the sense of] a restriction or it is a genitive in [the sense of] a part-whole connection. Because [the vase] exists together with (*saha*) a 'second' (*dvitīya*) which is either of the two, viz. the vase or the person, it is said to be *sadvitīya* (lit. 'having a second'; 'accompanied'). Indeed, in the case of the example, the wall, which is not of the nature of an utpala flower, is accompanied 'by either', namely, by the vase. 'Being accompanied by either' is in general established when there is accompaniment by even one [of two things]. So therefore the [example] does not lack *anvaya* with the *sādhya*. Similarly, for the case of 'vase', which is the *dharmin* for the *sādhya*, if the entire vase is made the subject [of the inference], then it is incoherent for it to be accompanied by itself. And so, generally too, 'being accompanied' by the above-mentioned sort of person will be proven in the *sādhana* by elimination. Such is the opinion of the opponent. When [Devendrabuddhi in *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*] states 'Here [there is no *anvaya*] and so forth', he refutes [the Cārvāka]. Although [the Cārvāka] does not say that there is accompaniment by such a type of person, the example does have the fault of lacking *anvaya*, for the *sādhya* must be what is implied by the intention [of the proponent] and that [*sādhya*, viz. the person taken in materialist way] is unestablished."

On the Cārvāka's materialism, see M. Namai, "Kōki Bukkyōto ni yoru Bārhaspatya hihan (I) - Bārhaspatya shisō no gaikan." *Indological Review*, Kyōto, 2, 1976, 33-74. See also E. Steinkellner, *Dharmottara's Paralokasiddhi, Nachweis der Wiedergeburt*, Wien 1986:8-12, where we find explained Frauwallner's distinction between the "earlier" and "later" Cārvāka positions, the first being the position that the consciousness is just the elements, the second granting that consciousness does have a different nature (*tattvāntara*) from the elements. Note that Śākyamati, in the above quoted passage, explains the Cārvāka view in terms of the first and earlier sort of materialistic monism stressing that for the Cārvāka "consciousness does not exist at all" (*sems yod pa ñid ces bya ba cuṅ zad kyaṅ yod pa ma yin*). Similarly, indigenous Tibetan commentaries on Pramāṇavārttika, such as rGyal tshab rje's *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* (Sarnath ed.) generally gloss the word *mṅon par gsal ba / abhivyakta* ("manifested") in the *sadvitīyaprayoga* in terms of a materialistic monism: the consciousness and body are said to be "substantially one" (*rdzas gcig*). rGyal tshab (vol. 2, p. 261) gives the *prayoga* as: *bum pa chos can / lus sems rdzas gcig pa'i skyes bu'i lus daṅ bum pa gaṅ ruṅ gi(s) gñis pa daṅ bcas pa yin te / ut pa la ma yin pa'i dṅos po yin pa'i phyir / bum ldan rtsig pa bźin no źes bya ba /* "Take the vase as subject; it is accompanied by either a body of a person whose mind and body are substantially one or by the vase, because it is an entity which is not an utpala [flower], just like a wall which has a vase."

Abbreviations and Literature

k — *kārikā*(s).

PV I — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter I: Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*. Roma 1960.

PV II,III,IV — *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapters II, III, IV: *Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*. Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206. (PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).

PV-k(i) *kārikās* of PV, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in appendixes to the *Journal of the Bihar Oriental Research Society* 24 (1938), Parts I-II.

PV-k(ii) *kārikās* of PV included in Manorathanandin's PVV, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in appendix to the *Journal of the Bihar Oriental Research Society* 24 (1938), Part III.

PV-k(iii) *kārikās* of PV included in Prajñākaragupta's PVBh.

PVBh *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam).* Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.

PVinṬ *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara): P 5727 (Vol.136, Tshad ma, Dse 1a1-347a8).

PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): v. PV I

PVSVṬ *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā*(Karṇakagomin):*ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam(svārthānumānapariccheda) svopajñavṛttyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Kyoto 1982 [Reprint].

PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti: Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1938-1940.

PVV-n Vibhūticandra's notes to PVV, included in R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition.

PVṬ *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śākyamati): P 5718 (Vols. 131-132, Tshad ma, Je 1 - Ñe 348a8)

VN *Vadanyayaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the Commentary Vipanchitārthā of Acharya Śāntarakṣita*. Ed. by D. Shāstri. Varanasi 1972.

VNṬ *Vādanyāyaṭīkā (Vipañcitārthā)* (Śāntarakṣita): v. VN

Watanabe 1976 Shigeaki Watanabe, "Shōrimonron chūshakusha PV 4, 27 shi ron", *Okuda Sensei Kiju Kinen Bukkyōshisō Ronshū*, Ōsaka, 973-985.

DHARMAKĪRTI AND THE YOGĀCĀRA THEORY OF *BĪJA*

by

Alex Wayman, New York

The present essay is divided into two parts: In the first, the terms *bīja* and *ālaya* are discussed in an introductory manner. In the second, the main part, Dharmakīrti's *bīja* verses in *Pramāṇavārttika* will be presented, with a final section on the significance of the procedure.

I. The Threshold

a. The term *bīja*.

bīja is usually rendered 'seed' (or the equivalent in other languages). My 1988 article on Vasubandhu cited his commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* to the effect that seed consciousness is a characteristic feature of the human mind.[1] The *ālayavijñāna* theory of Yogācāra Buddhism is that it contains defiled seeds, and that there is a cessation of the *ālayavijñāna* in certain saintly types, advanced Bodhisattvas, etc.[2] Yet one may continue to have pure compressed *dharma*s that can be called 'seeds'. Mahāyāna Buddhism illustrates this, especially in terms of the Mind of Enlightenment (*bodhicitta*). Thus the *Gaṇḍavyūha* (cited in Śikṣ 6,28) teaches: "Son of the family, the Thought of Enlightenment is the seed (*bījabhūta*) of all the Buddha natures." Again, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (I 34ab) states: "Whose seed is the conviction in the superior vehicle; whose mother is the insight for giving birth to the Buddha natures." According to the Bodhisattva section of Tsoṅ kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo*, here 'seed' (*bīja*) is the 'unshared cause' (*asādhāraṇahetu*) and insight intuiting voidness is the 'shared cause' (*sādhāraṇahetu*) (of accessory conditions) which when incorporated by the seed furnishes additional causes for the shoot.[3]

In Jan. 1989 at the Śaṅkara Mahotsava meeting in Delhi, I presented a paper on the 16 *bīja* passages in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*s. The passages fall into two groups: (1) the 'seed', especially of *karma* and how to get rid of it; (2) the philosophical distinction of the 'seed' and its 'shoot' (*bīja* and *aṅkura*). It has been noticed by students of Indian philosophy that the various commentarial traditions for the *Brahmasūtra*s deny that there are radically different, yet valid interpretations. A main commentary insists on its own correctness, sometimes belligerently opposing the incorrectness of other types of comments. Such attitudes agree with taking the *Brahmasūtra*s as 'seeds', the commentary as the 'shoot'. This is because the symbolism of a seed and its shoot requires the shoot to uniquely represent the seed, e.g. an acorn, if it sprouts and grows, can only grow into an oaktree. If differing interpretations of the *Brahmasūtra*s were allowed as valid, the symbolism of the seed and its shoot would not apply.

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[1] Alex Wayman, "Vasubandhu – Teacher Extraordinary", *Studia Missionalia* 37, 1988: 256-258.

[2] See the essay, "The Sacittikā and the Acittikā Bhūmi, Text and Translation", in *Buddhist Insight; Essays by Alex Wayman*, ed. George R. Elder, Delhi 1984: 330, Asaṅga's four cases for possession of *ālayavijñāna* and/or evolving perception (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*).

[3] From the work by Alex Wayman, expected to appear as *Ethics of Tibet: Bodhisattva Section of the LAM RIM CHEN MO, translated from the Tibetan Original of Tsong-kha-pa*, SUNY Series in Tibetan Studies. Sanskrit for the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* citation available either in the edition of Cecil Bendall or of P. L. Vaidya. Sanskrit for the *Ratnagotra* passage in *Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra*, ed. E. H. Johnston, Patna 1950.

This symbolism of seed and shoot may be employed ln the absence of those words themselves. This happens in the Bodhisattva section of the *Lam rim chen mo*, already alluded to, namely, in the part on insight (*prajñā*) as a Perfection (*pāramitā*), in this passage rendered from the Tibetan original:[4]

> "Therefore, when the precepts are errorless and complete, even if compressed, they have the complete essential for going to all the teaching. When they are elucidated extensively, they complete all the passageways of the path of Sūtras and Tantras and of the upper and lower vehicles."

Here the precepts are like the seed, and we learn the criterion for the precept, inferentially for the optimum seed, "errorless and complete". The extensive elucidations are the shoot, amounting to the path as a kind of trunk, with branches. Clearly, the author, Tsoṅ kha pa, in this case alludes to 'good' seeds.

The metaphorical usage turns up even in the lexical definition of *bīja* found in the *nānārtha* lexicon *Viśvalocana* by Śrīdharasena, to be presented below. It should be pointed out that the lexical traditions of India write the word with initial *v*-. Recently I wrote to my former professor Murray Emeneau about this, and he kindly responded in a letter: "The very tangled matter of v- and -b is clearly in part a matter of uncertainty in the writing system as between the two letters, as well as uncertainty caused by the modern IA developments (in e.g. Bengali). It is clear however that from very early times there is uncertainty about many words." He mentioned that *bīja*- and *vīja*- varied in one Mantra, according to Bloomfield and Edgerton, *Vedic Variants*, vol. 2., and that his late colleague Burrow had tackled the problem in several articles. My own observation was that this writing of the word with initial *v*- implies that the Indian lexicographers had associated this word with the root *vīj*-, to fan, and to sprinkle with water. The interpretation 'to fan', and with causative, 'to ignite', might go with the seed metaphorically as a spark which is fanned into flame, i.e. sprouted. This sense favors the defining word for *bīja*, *aṅkura-kāraṇa*, 'instrumental cause of the shoot'. The sprinkling sense takes the seed as enabled to sprout by furnishing it with needed materials, water, and so forth. This interpretation favors the defining word *ādhāna* or *ādāna*, which overlap in the meaning 'taking', in fact, 'taking to itself'. Although one manuscript of the *Viśvalocana* has the reading *ādāna* in the definition of *bīja*, I am confident now that the translator of Shalu with his rendition *kun tu 'dzin* did it for the term *ādhāna*.

Those defining terms are among those found in the *Viśvalocana*'s definition of *vīja*, as follows:[5]

> *VĪJAṂ hetāv upādāne 'ṅkurakāraṇe retasi, VĪJAM arthādhānatattve*;
>
> *VĪJA* (= *bīja*) means 'cause' (*hetu*), 'material cause' (*upādāna*), 'instrumental cause of the shoot' (*aṅkurakāraṇa*), 'semen' (*retas*); and *VĪJA* means 'the taking to itself' (*ādhāna*), 'goal (oriented)' (*artha*), 'reality' (*tattva*) [the final state].

Here it appears that the first set of definitions is the concrete significance, while the second set amounts to a series of metaphorical extensions.

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[4] *Lam rim chen mo*, Tashilunpo edition, 276b4f.: *de'i phyir gdams pa ma nor ba'i cha tshaṅ źig yin na / mdor bsdus kyaṅ mdo sṅags daṅ theg pa goṅ 'og gi lam gyi 'gag thams cad tshaṅ ba la rgyas par bkral na / bstan pa mtha' dag la 'gro thub pa źig dgos pas . . .*

[5] The definition here is apparently corrupted in all MSS. of the *Viśvalocana* by Śrīdharasena, in varying agreement with the form here given, which was arrived at by comparison with other lexicons, such as the *Medinīkośa* and the *nānārtha* lexicon by Hemacandra; and helped by the Tibetan translation of the *Viśvalocana*.

b. The terms *ādāna* and *ālaya*

Now, the term *ādāna* occurs in the Yogācāra scripture *Saṃdhinirmocana* in the compound *ādāna-vijñāna*.[6] The rendition for this expression, namely, 'appropriating consciousness', which the present writer, and probably others, has employed, is by the following considerations to be deemed incorrect. Since the term *ādāna* is a verbal noun, and as a first member of a compound is undeclined, it could easily be misconstrued as qualifying the term *vijñāna*. It is presumably for this reason that later Yogācāra literature preferred the term *ālayavijñāna*, since the term *ālaya* is recognized as a noun and not in connotation a verbal noun. The *Saṃdhinirmocana* employed two similes: the *ādānavijñāna* can be like a mirror, understood as reflecting many things in a kind of lateral extension; and it can be like a swift current of water (*ogha*), understood as extending backwards and forwards in temporal succession.[7] There is no doubt from the lexicon's definitions that *ādāna* functions as a noun, 'receipt', when in the sense of a 'seed', to show the taking of various elements, water, etc., so as to grow. Accordingly, in the compound, the word *ādāna* expresses the taking, which the word *vijñāna* does not. Similarly, the word *ālaya* expresses the store, which the word *vijñāna* does not. When it is the case of the mirror simile, it must be that *vijñāna* is furnishing the images that are reflected in the mirror. In the case of the stream-of-water simile, it must be that *vijñāna* is furnishing the metaphorical water for the seed. It follows immediately that the compound *ālayavijñāna* is to be construed as "*vijñāna* of, i.e. belonging to, the *ālaya*, the store". So, also the compound *ādānavijñāna*, "*vijñāna* of, i.e. belonging to, the *ādāna*, the receipt". Thus, neither *ādāna-* nor *ālaya-* as first members of the compound are 'kinds of' *vijñāna*. Therefore, if a text wishes to mean a *vijñāna*, it should add the word *vijñāna*. Granted that the term *kliṣṭa-manas* is employed as one of the *vijñāna*s; but allowed because the Abhidharma code has the set, *vijñāna*, *manas, citta*, of alternate, though not synonymous, terminology. Yet, Vasubandhu, commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, evidently prefers the term *kliṣṭavijñāna* when identifying this with the 3rd member of Dependent Origination, denying that this is the *ālayavijñāna*, alternatively, the *ādānavijñāna*. The term *kliṣṭa-manas* (defiled mind) implies that the *mano-vijñāna* (the sixth one) is not defiled. Vasubandhu goes on to bring in the *ālayavijñāna* when treating the curious passage of old Buddhism that 'name-and-formation' (*nāma-rūpa*) arises having the condition of *vijñāna*, and *vijñāna* arises having the condition of 'name-and-formation'. It is this second *vijñāna* that Vasubandhu claims to be the *ālayavijñāna*, alternatively, the *ādānavijñāna*.[8] So Buddhaghosa was right to claim that the *nāma* in *nāma-rūpa* of Dependant Origination is just the triad of personal aggregates (*skandha*), omitting *vijñāna*.[9] So also Vasubandhu, commenting on the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, Derge edition, vol. Ṅi, 147a6, defines 'character of maturation' (*vipāka-lakṣaṇa*) as *ālayavijñāna* arising

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[6] According to the index in Étienne Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*. Louvain 1935, there are four instances of *ādāna-vijñāna* in Chap. V – with the term *ālaya-vijñāna* given as one of the alternate names at the first of these instances – and one further instance of *ādāna-vijñāna* in Chap. VIII. Asaṅga appears to prefer the term *ālaya-vijñāna*.

[7] For a discussion of this scripture's two metaphors for the *ādāna-vijñāna*, see the essay, "The Mirror as a Pan-Buddhist Metaphor-simile", in *Buddhist Insight* (cf. note 2) 130f.

[8] While the present writer read this in Vasubandhu's commentary on *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, and thought to have put all the relevant information in his Vasubandhu article, it turns out that only the part of the *kliṣṭavijñāna* being reborn, i.e. that this *vijñāna* is the Yogācāra interpretation of the third member of Buddhist dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) and the one that falls into the birthplace, was entered in the article (cf. note 1), p. 264. The explanation of *ādāna* (taking) that it takes a 'body' is well explained in Sthiramati's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇavaibhāṣya*, namely, in the explanation of *vijñāna-skandha*, Peking Tanjur, PTT, Vol. 114, 23-4-2,3, that in the expression "*ālaya* of the body", 'body' means 'name-and-form'. Thus, 'name-and-form' is the basis for the *ālaya-vijñāna* being 'all-seeded' (*sarvabījaka*).

[9] See *Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya*, Harvard 1950: 477, para. 187: *nāman ti . . . vedanādayo tayo khandhā*. Thus, Buddhaghosa agrees that the 'name' (*nāma*) personal aggregates are originally three in number, and that the *vijñāna* arising in dependence upon these three is how the '*nāma*' aggregates become four in number.

along with *nāma-rūpa* (*miṅ daṅ gzugs daṅ lhan cig 'byuṅ ba kun gźi rnam par śes pa ste*); and goes on to further explain this *ālayavijñāna* as bringing to completion the shoot of phenomenal life (the *bhava-aṅkura*). This Yogācāra conception of the two kinds of *vijñāna* in the 3rd and 4th members of Dependent Origination involves a conclusion that 'defiled *vijñāna*' in the sense of perception, must precede the "*vijñāna* of, i.e. belonging to, the *ālaya*".[10]

c. Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* verse.

It is well known to specialists in Buddhist logic that Dharmakīrti mentioned the word *ālaya* in a *Pramāṇavārttika* verse, and that Prajñākaragupta interpreted this as the *ālayavijñāna* of the Yogācāra. But if we were to argue: "That can't be, since Dharmakīrti failed to add the term *vijñāna*" – the commentator might well have retorted: "Sir, you haven't read enough. More reading would show that the term *ālaya* can be used by itself and still imply the full expression *ālayavijñāna*." Indeed, to prove his point – although still not justifying his conclusion about Dharmakīrti's verse – we should find a case or other where *ālaya* does intend *ālayavijñāna*. The present writer did find some cases of this while writing an article on the *Guhyagarbhatantra* of tantric Buddhism, published in Japan in an honorary volume.[11] Among the works preserved in the Tibetan Tanjur on this tradition, namely, in vols. Bu and Mu of the Narthang and Peking editions, there is a work attributed to Padmasambhava called *The Lamp for Comprehending the Sūtras and Tantras*, including these two lines:

/ *kun gźi daṅ ni ñon moṅs yid* /

/ *yid daṅ sgo lṅa'i rnam śes daṅ* /

This gives in an abbreviated way the list of eight *vijñānas* characteristic of the Yogācāra. Here, *kun gźi*, the standard equivalent for *ālaya*, does mean the *ālayavijñāna*, simply because it is first in the list of the eight.[12] But this is trivial, and the *ālaya* in Dharmakīrti's verse is not of this type. My essay has some examples that are more relevant. The commentary on the *Guhyagarbhatantra* by Līlavajra (or Lalitavajra), when commenting on the Chap. II phrase, "Ah, from the essential of the Sugata," explains 'essential' as the *garbha* of two kinds, the two *ālaya*. Reading on, we find that these two *ālaya* are 1. *ālaya* as the *bodhicitta*, and 2. *ālaya* as *ālayavijñāna*. Subsequently, the commentator explains that the first *ālaya* is the condensed entity (Tib. *bsdus don*), the *bodhicitta* in the sense of multiple seeds; and that the second kind manifests the streams of consciousness of separate sentient beings.[13] It is clear from this tradition of commentary that the term *ālaya* can mean the *ālayavijñāna*, if defiled seeds are understood to apply in the case. The term *ālaya*, if pure seeds are understood to apply, would be the *bodhicitta*, and not the *ālayavijñāna*.

According to the theory that both pure and impure seeds can continue in the stream of consciousness, can it be that Dharmakīrti employs the term *ālaya* in this general sense? Therefore, Dharmakīrti's verse will be considered with this possibility in mind. This is *Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa* 522:[14]

sakṛd vijātīyajātāv apy ekena paṭīyasā / cittenāhitavaiguṇyād ālayān nānyasambhavaḥ //

Before going to the commentarial theories, let us translate the verse after a few observations. We notice that Dharmakīrti has stressed 'additions' in this verse. Thus, the *api* which inaugurates the

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[10] This shows that the Yogācāra philosophical base cannot ever have been the 'idealism' which surveys of Indian philosophy have attributed to it. This is because the defiled *manovijñāna* precedes as a member of dependent origination, as does *nāma-rūpa* – the *ālaya-vijñāna*, which was deemed in such surveys as able to project its 'seeds' independent of external objects.

[11] Wayman 1981.

[12] Wayman 1981: 14.

[13] Wayman 1981: 7.

[14] The verse is numbered the same in the various editions. The edition by Y. Miyasaka, *Acta Indologica* II, 1971/72, presents the Sanskrit and Tibetan on opposite pages, in transcription.

second *pada*, can here be construed with the definition 'added term' (*yuktapadārtha*), often rendered by the word 'also'. Then *patīyas* is in form the comparative degree, so 'more keen' or 'more perspicacious', suggesting a mental increment. Then the expression *āhita*, a form of *ā-dhā-*, 'to add', 'deposit upon', shows the process of adding to the 'store', the *ālaya*. Now, for the verse itself:

> "When there arises simultaneously an incompatible nature, also by dint of a single more perspicacious thought, there is no other arising from the 'store' *ālaya*, which has added an impotency."

Certainly the verse requires elucidation.

d. Commentaries on the verse.

Both Manorathanandin and Prajñākaragupta discuss the verse as though the term *ālaya* means the *ālayavijñāna*. Manorathanandin starts his treatment as though he believes Dharmakīrti uses the verse to deny the *ālayavijñāna* theory. Thus he writes: *nanu ālayavijñānāt sakṛt ṣaṭ pravṛtivijñānāni jayante ity iṣyate*, "Suppose it be claimed that six evolving *vijñāna*s arise simultaneously from the *ālayavijñāna*." And then this would lead to the situation that nothing else could arise from the *ālayavijñāna*.[15] But the comment seems impossible to defend. The term *sakṛt*, 'simultaneous' (so the Tib. with *cig car*), is not to be applied to the 'evolving *vijñāna*s' in the Yogācāra theory. The next word, *vijātīya*, means 'heterogeneous', 'of different origin'. But the eight *vijñāna*s belong to the same group, for which the Sanskrit word *sajātīya* applies, not its opposite *vijātīya*. We conclude that at least for the present verse this commentator was not up to Dharmakīrti's subtlety and hints.

Passing to Prajñākaragupta's comments, he apparently takes this verse as continuing an argument of the preceding two verses (PV, *Pratyakṣa* 520-521) in which there is the situation of a series of cognitions about a given non-changing object.[16] It is perhaps the most basic position of Buddhist logic that the objects of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are different (namely, the *svalakṣaṇa* and the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), but starting with Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, they believe it possible for more than one *pratyakṣa* to have the same object. Yet this is a difficult topic, starting with Dignāga's first mention of it, being complicated by the position of Buddhist logic that there is no *pramāṇa* (authority) in cognizing the previously apprehended. But in practice - or as the practical example - the theory especially concerns 'introspective perception' (*svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*) and 'perception of the yogin' (*yogi-pratyakṣa*). First we differentiate from 'mental perception' (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) by appeal to Dignāga's PS, *Pratyakṣa* 4cd (my numbering): *mānasàṃ cārtha[ṃ] rāgādisvasaṃvittir akalpikā* / "Also the mental (sense) having the object-entity (*artha*), and self-intuition of passion (*rāga*), etc. are without constructive thought."[17] And in further explanation of *svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*, Dignāga, PS, *Pratyakṣa* 5cd (my numbering), states: *kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt* / "Even constructive thought is admitted as (object for) self-intuition (= introspection), because the

[15] *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1968: 249.

[16] *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna 1953: 457.

[17] Cf. Hattori 1968: 27, where the verse portion is numbered k. 6ab. Of course, my addition of the *anusvara* in brackets can be understood by everyone who has worked with Sanskrit manuscripts – that it is frequently necessary to add this. Grammatically, it is a series with the term *akalpika* agreeing in gender with the last member of the series, namely, *ragādi-svasaṃvittir*; and *akalpika* therefore goes with both members of the series. Hattori's work is a valuable contribution to these researches, but left the reader somewhat in the lurch at this point. One reader, Eli Franco, "Once again on Dharmakīrti's deviation from Dignāga on *pratyakṣābhāsa*", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 14, 1986 [79-97]: 81f., alludes to this very verse portion to conclude that Dignāga did not recognize *svasaṃvedana* as a separate *pramāṇa* to total four such, hence that he recognizes only three. Granted that Hattori's presentation of the verse itself – and not reading more widely – might lend itself to such an interpretation as Franco made. Even so, in this case, it seems that Franco did not do enough research, or had poor advice.

constructive thought (there) is not toward an object." And Dignāga comments (no Skt. available): "When toward an (external) object, like lust, and so forth, it is not a direct perception, because it is not an introspection; (thus) there is no fault."[18] He means that while constructive thought (*kalpanā*) contrasts with direct perception - the former characterizing *anumāna*, not *pratyakṣa* - it is possible for introspective perception without *kalpanā* to have as object, namely, the *svalakṣaṇa*, a bit of constructive thought. The comment explains that introspection does not have an external object - as when one has lust, hatred. or delusion toward external objects - because this constructive thought is itself the object in the mind, and so one is not using constructive thought.[19] For *yogi-pratyakṣa*, PS, *Pratyakṣa*, 5ab (my numbering) has: *yogināṃ gurunirdeśavyatibhinnārthamātradṛk* / "(Also,) the yogins' vision of just the object unmixed with the guru's instruction." According to Bu ston's great commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, at f. 55b, 'unmixed with the instruction' means that the yogin has transcended the insight consisting in hearing (= learning), the *śrutamayī prajñā*, and the one consisting in pondering (*cintāmayī prajñā*) and has reached the third, the *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* (a creative contemplation).[20]

It was that commentator Līlavajra (or Lalitavajra) who, in that commentary on the *Guhyagarbha-tantra*, Chap. 11, took up the matter of *yogi-pratyakṣa* and *svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*; and said, "Taking hold of, is of two kinds: taking hold of, as *yogi-pratyakṣa*; and taking hold of in high degree, as *svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*. He comments on the *svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa* as where all entities included in body and knowledge appear equally.[21] Following the lead of his comment, one may suppose that when *yogi-pratyakṣa* has the single object of thusness, *svasaṃvedana* can have the object of sameness (*samatā*). Similarly, it seems possible in the theories of Buddhist logic for an object of one of the five outer-directed perceptions to be taken as the object of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*. This seems not to violate the non-authoritative character of the previously apprehended, because not previously apprehended by a particular *pratyakṣa*.

But Prajñākaragupta, instead of treating the topic in terms of the set of *pratyakṣa*s (which are also *sajātīya*, and not *vijātīya*), switches to the set of *vijñāna*s, apparently interpreting Dharmakīrti's word *ālaya* as permitting such a switch; and so this commentator took the word *ālaya* as meaning the *ālayavijñāna*. He says, p. 457, under v. 522: *āstām iyam ālayavijñānacintā*, "Let this idea of *ālayavijñāna* be!" And continues: "Besides, there is no fault due to mental constructions (*parikalpita*) by the support of habit-energy (*vāsanā*)." Standard Buddhist doctrine takes this 'habit-energy' as defiled (*kliṣṭa*); and in Yogācāra Buddhism, the *ālayavijñāna* consists of defiled seeds. And so this is what that commentator attributes to Dharmakīrti's verse.

e. A possible solution of the verse

After those two commentators tried to figure out the verse and apparently failed, it seems bold to offer a solution of my own. But once I noticed this passage in the *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra* (Peking

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[18] Cf. Hattori 1968: 27f., verse portion numbered k. 7ab and Dignāga's own comment, as there rendered, with many bracketed expressions.

[19] The present writer discussed this matter in "The Gait (*gati*) and the Path (*mārga*) – reflections on the horizontal." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 103/3, 1985, esp. pp. 582f., and cited the letter from F. Galton to Max Müller where Galton claimed that one could think of the phrase "cogito ergo sum" without using words.

[20] Cf. Hattori 1968: 27, k. 6cd, for the *yogi-pratyakṣa*. Bu ston's great commentary on *Pramāṇaviniścaya* is in his collected works, publ. by Dr. Lokesh Chandra, Vol. 24 (YA). He starts his discussion of *yogi-pratyakṣa* at fol. 55b2. His remarks implicating the three levels of insight (*prajñā*) are at fol. 55b6f. Of interest is the explanation that *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* being free of *kalpanā* can signify *yogi-pratyakṣa*.

[21] Wayman 1981: 12.

ed., Dkon brtsegs, Wi, f.171a7): "Śāriputra, accordingly, in the amount the mind is disturbed by defilements, that much is the host of Bodhisattva meditations and the knowledge of empowering the mind" (*śā ri'i bu de ltar ñon moṅs pas sems dkrugs pa ji tsam par byaṅ chub sems dpa'i bsam gtan gyi tshogs daṅ / sems kyi byin kyi rlabs kyi ye śes kyaṅ de tsam mo*). Clearly, this is a bit of discursive or constructive thought (*kalpanā*). Is the *pratyakṣa* that could have this *kalpanā* as an object the *svasaṃvedana*? Here, the mind disturbed by defilements seems to illustrate the 'incompatible nature', while the host of Bodhisattva meditations seems to illustrate the 'more perspicacious thought'. Now, in the theory of Yoga, the 'one-pointed mind' (*ekāgra-citta*), could consist of Bodhisattva meditations, but could not have simultaneously an incompatible nature. Only the *svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa* could have this simultaneously. And the part of the citation from the scripture, 'in the amount', 'that much' shows the equality previously alluded to as within the province of *svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*. This consideration leads to the conclusion that Dharmakīrti intended this kind of *pratyakṣa* as having its *svalakṣaṇa* object to be this kind of *kalpanā*.

As to the *ālaya* of the verse, it seems that Dharmakīrti means that this *pratyakṣa*, due to the strong thought without mental construction achieves a temporary or permanent shut-off of issuance from something he calls the *ālaya*. This *ālaya* seems to be a store of both good and bad seeds. It appears that Dharmakīrti borrowed this term *ālaya* from Yogācāra literature, but is not using it in the same way as would the Yogācāra with their term *ālayavijñāna*.

These considerations should amount to an introduction to our treatment of the *bīja* verses of *Pramāṇavārttika*.

II. The main part

P. S. Jaini has presented the Sautrāntika theory of *bīja* in his 1959 article.[22] De La Vallée Poussin devotes a chapter to the Yogācāra theory of *bīja* in his *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*.[23] Thus, there is a fund of material to use in regard to Dharmakīrti's verses that have the term *bīja*. It seems best to first present the verses and then to consider them in the light of this scholarly evidence.

a. The *bīja* verses of *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pratyakṣa* chapter

The verses 4 and 393 show the *bīja* word, in both cases with the *aṅkura* (shoot). It will be necessary to also translate the immediately following verses, i.e. v. 5 and v. 394. Thus, I shall present the four verses with translation, and follow with some comments and notes from the commentary.

> *aśaktaṃ sarvam iti ced bījāder aṅkurādiṣu // dṛṣṭā śaktiḥ matā sā cet saṃvṛtyāstu yathā tathā //* (4)
>
> If all capacity is denied, (we respond) one sees the capacity of seeds and so forth toward shoots and so forth. If it is claimed in the conventional sense, let it be like that!
>
> *sāsti sarvatra ced buddher nānvayavyatirekayoḥ // sāmānyalakṣaṇe 'dṛṣṭeḥ cakṣūrūpādibuddhivat //* (5)
>
> If it (the capacity) is (claimed to be) everywhere, (we respond) it is not in the generality character, since cognition does not see the *anvaya* (presence in similar cases) and *vyatireka* (absence in dissimilar cases) as do cognitions of form by the eye, etc.

As to *bījādi*, it evidently means the seed and the other causes; as for a plant seed, the water, etc. As

[22] Jaini 1959.

[23] Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Tome I, Paris 1928: 100-123.

to *aṅkurādi*, it evidently means the shoot and other parts; as in a plant, the branches, flowering, and the like. However, philosophically, the seed represents the capacity (*śakti*) and the shoot, the final form. Also in v. 4, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti do not deny the capacity that is conventionally claimed, since this is the 'function' (*vyāpāra*) or the purposeful activity. The use of the term *śakti* in v. 4, and referred to in v. 5 by *sā*, when in Indian philosophy is as a general force that requires identification with a distinct power in order to apply to a locus.[24] In the present usage the *śakti* is identified with the *bīja* to gain this locus, but the 'generality character' is unable to lend any power to enable it to be a locus for *śakti*.

Furthermore, the eyes and other sense organs are believed to have the power to go out to the sense object, which is why they have the name *indriya*, and so they can provide a locus for *śakti*. *Prajñākaragupta* in his commentary right after presenting v. 5, cites extra verse no. 156:

> *prāg bhāvas tattvato dṛṣṭo yadi nāma na vastunaḥ // tathāpi vyatirekasya darśanād astitāmatiḥ //*
> If an entity has not been seen previously in reality as a given thing - still, through seeing the *vyatireka*, there is the cognition that it exists.

This verse suggests that a cognition is not a locus of *śakti* simply through being a cognition. A cognition can 'see' a *vyatireka*, but it is not like the eye sees forms with a cognition that has 'capacity'.

> *bījād aṅkurajanmāgner dhūmāt siddhir itīdṛśī // bahyārthāśrayiṇī yāpi kāraṇajñāpakasthitiḥ //* (393)
> Given birth of a shoot from a seed and proof of a fire from smoke, such as this is also said (by some persons): "which remains a communication of instrumental cause, which supports an external object."
> *sāpi tadrūpanirbhāsā tathā niyatasaṅgama // buddhir āśritya kalpyeta yadi kiṃ vā virudhyate //* (394)
> (They say:) One may construct it by resorting to a cognition, "If it appears with the (final) form, in that way is it determinately associated." How can it be contradicted?

Despite what these opponents say, it is a fact that the seed has the power to produce a shoot, but the smoke does not have the power to produce a fire. The shoot appears, but the fire has to be inferred. And while the shoot can be regarded as the final form of the seed, fire is not the final form of smoke. Prajñākaragupta, right after presenting these two verses, remarks on the opponent's position: "The need here is just for an appearance, not for an external object, because they do not distinguish a non-existent thing from the existence of something that does not appear" (*pratibhāsenaivātra prayojanaṃ nārthena, apratibhāsamānasya sato 'py asadaviśeṣāt*).

b. A *bīja* verse of *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter

The verse 37 (or 39 in the Varanasi edition) has an interesting implication for the use of the term *bīja*:

> *na sa kaścit pṛthivyāder aṃśo yatra na jantavaḥ // saṃsvedajādyā jayante sarvaṃ bījātmakaṃ tataḥ //*
> There is no spot of earth, etc. where no beings are born, whether born from heat and moisture, or otherwise. Hence, all (spots) have the nature of seed.

This verse alludes to the four kinds of birth, from heat and moisture, from eggs, from wombs, and by transformation (*aupapādika*) as do the gods and hell beings. Here, earth and the other three among the 'great elements' (*mahābhūta*), are one way of referring to the 'receptacle world' (*bhājana-loka*) on which sentient beings (*sattva*) live. According to the Prajñākaragupta commentary, the

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[24] Cf. Alex Wayman, *Delvings in Logic*, Poona 1987: 20-22.

attitude of the verse is: So what? The real problem is why there are these vast differences of sentient beings: "Whence the variegation in color and shape of the living beings?" (*kuto varṇasaṃsthānavailakṣaṇyaṃ prāṇiṇāṃ*). This use of the term *bīja* goes with the lexical definition, 'semen' (*retas*). We recall that Dharmakīrti denied any potency to the 'generality character' (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*); but this is a kind of cognition (*buddhi*), and cognition is located among the sentient beings, not in the 'receptacle world'.

c. A *bīja* verse of *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Svārthānumāna* chapter

Dharmakīrti, in his auto-commentary on this chapter, introduces v. 72 with the remark: "Therefore, not distinguishing a different cognition or a different manifestation is how there is a generalization" (*tataś ca jñānāntaraṃ vyaktyantaraṃ vāvyāpnuvat kathaṃ sāmānyaṃ syāt*). This is v. 72:

> *tasmān mithyāvikalpo 'yam artheṣv ekātmatāgrahaḥ // itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ saṃjñā yad arthikā //*
>
> Hence this construction or deviance apprehends 'external' objects in a single way [a generalization]. The respective differentiation is its seed, and which is the eventual naming act.[25]

There is a textual difficulty for Dharmakīrti's comment on the first statement. The editions by R. Gnoli and by D. Malvania agree, but the Karṇakagomin sub-commentary cites it in a manner with which the Tibetan apparently agrees. In fact, approximately the same idea can be gained from both versions. Here I shall use the version of the Karṇakagomin edition:[26]

> *na hi arthānāṃ bhedenabhedena vāpi yogyātmanāpi kenacit tulyam iti tathaiṣāṃ grahaṇavikalpo 'pi mithyā /*
>
> For whether it be a case of differentiation or of non-differentiation of the 'external' objects, there is no equality of them. Accordingly, it is the (discursive) construction of apprehending them that is the deviance.

As for Dharmakīrti's comment on the second statement, including the word *bīja*, again the editions of R. Gnoli and D. Malvania agree, while the Karṇakagomin one has some rearrangement of expressions. The arrangement in the Gnoli and Malvania editions is as follows:

> *yasya pratyayanārthaṃ saṃketaḥ kriyate, abhinnasāhyān bhavān atatsādhyebhyo bhedena jñātvā tatparihāreṇa pravarteteti. so 'yam itaretarabhedas tasyaikātmatāpratibhāsino mithyāvikalpasya bījam. tam eva gṛhṇan eṣa vikalpaḥ svavāsanāprakṛter evaṃ pratibhāti.*
>
> Of which (i.e. respective differentiation) a sign (i.e. a name) is applied to a believed-in 'external' object - to wit, one cognizes entities that are not provable to be differentiated, by a differentiation according to what is not provable of that (i.e. seed), and proceeds by disregarding that (seed, i.e. as regards its true function) - it is this respective differentiation - the seed(s) of that appearance of oneness (i.e. the generalization), namely, of the construction of deviance. Apprehending precisely that ('external' object), this (discursive) construction manifests that way the actuality of one's own habit-energy.

Here the kind of seed seems to go with the lexical *tattva* (reality), i.e. the eventual kind of seed, the result of the growth process. The Karṇakagomin helped to sort out the parts of Dharmakīrti's

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[25] The epic (MBh xii 7754; 2d hemistich) also refers to *bīja* along with a naming act, as cited by E. H. Johnston, *Early Sāṃkhya*, London 1937: 45: *tad bījaṃ dehināṃ āhus tad bījaṃ jīvasaṃjñitam*, (Sages) declare the seed of body-possessors to be the seed named '*jīva*'.

[26] For the *Svavṛtti* of *Svārthānumāna*, there is Raniero Gnoli, ed., Roma 1960; and Dalsukhbhai Malvaniya, ed., Varanasi 1959. I employ the reprint by Rinsen Book Co., Japan, of Karṇakagomin's Commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Dharmakīrti, as ed. by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana.

comments here. When Dharmakīrti remarks about a sign being applied to an external object, i.e. naming it, he seems not to put the implied dispute in terms of the naming process itself. Therefore, if we accept Jaini's argument,[27] Dharmakīrti does not hold the *bīja* to be separate from the mind; but he does seem to take it as separate from the mental act of naming it.

d. The other *bīja* references

There are four other verses with the word *bīja* in *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter. To briefly allude to, them: PV, *Pramāṇasiddhi* 236 (or 238) has the "seed of one's own affection" (*ātmīyasnehabīja*). PV, *Pramāṇasiddhi* 241 (or 243) has "seed of all attachments" (*bījaṃ sarvasaktīnām*). PV, *Pramāṇasiddhi* 258 (or 260) has: "It is not enough that the seed, etc. have full growth" (*nālaṃ bījādisaṃsiddho* . . .). PV, *Pramāṇasiddhi* 273 (or 275) has: "Without a seed, there is no arising of a shoot" (*vinā bījaṃ nāṅkurasyeva sambhavaḥ*). Such verses, added to the previous ones that have been discussed, show that Dharmakīrti does not employ the term *bīja* in an adversative sense. The seed conception seems a natural thing for him to bring into the discussion.

e. Observations based on the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra theories

Jaini in the mentioned article on *bīja* points out that the *Abhidharmakośa* (by Vasubandhu) espouses the Sautrāntika theory of *bīja*, which is a kind of power (*śakti*) or *vāsanā* (which I render 'habit-energy' following Daisetz Suzuki).[28] We have noticed that Dharmakīrti uses the term *bīja* as a kind of *śakti*, and that he brought in the term *vāsanā* (on PV, *Svārthānumāna* 72) practically equivalent to the *bīja*.In this respect he follows the Sautrāntika position of the *Abhidharmakośa*. Besides, the Sautrāntika accepts both good and bad seeds in the stream of consciousness,[29] which was my own conclusion of Dharmakīrti's use of the term *ālaya* in part I of the present paper.

Dharmakīrti must have been aware that this was a contested topic, since Vasubandhu's opponents (Jaini's "Dīpakāra" and Saṅghabhadra) criticized the Sautrāntika *bīja* theory, arguing that it would have to be different from or identical with the mind.[30] Perhaps the only place where Dharmakīrti committed himself on the 'place' of the seeds, is his verse with the word *ālaya*. In any case, he gives no indication of considering the seeds (of destiny) as distinct from the mind. Indeed, the arguments of Vasubandhu's opponents have the weakness of taking for granted the word for 'mind', namely *citta*. This is because this word has different usages in Buddhist literature. It is sometimes used for multiple entities, whereby it could be rendered 'thoughts'. Also it overlaps the term *manas*, which is a unitary conception, covering the mind as a whole. It sometimes replaces the word *vijñāna*, as in the Yogācāra *cittamātra*. Turning to the Yogācāra theory of *bīja*, as comprehensively exposed in La Vallée Poussin's chapter, we quickly see that the difference, say from the Sautrāntika, is a stress preference. Here in the Yogācāra, *bīja* is treated as 'realm' (*dhātu*) and as 'clan' (*gotra*). While in Indian thought, religion and philosophy are intertwined, it is certainly feasible to bear down on one or the other. The Yogācāra definitely bears down on the religious side, expounding the 'seed', e.g. as the lineages of Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Tathāgatas. This is the theory that the *bīja*s establish three kinds of enlightenment (*bodhi*).[31] The 'seed' way of talking went with the treatment of defilement and purification. It went with instructing on *yoga* and mental training. So in this tradition of tenets, it was

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[27] Jaini 1959: 213.

[28] Jaini 1959: 212.

[29] Jaini 1959: 213.

[30] Jaini 1959: 213.

[31] La Vallée Poussin (cited in note 23) 103f., and notes thereto.

important to speak of different kinds of seeds and to define them. It is well known that Dharmakīrti used his *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter for presenting Buddhist dogmatics, such as the four Noble Truths. It is therefore intriguing that most of Dharmakīrti's *bīja* references are in this chapter, namely, five; while the *Pratyakṣa* chapter has two, the *Svārthānumāna* chapter only one, and the *Parārthānumāna* chapter none.[32] It is clear that Dharmakīrti sympathizes with the *bīja* way of talking, when it is a matter of Buddhist dogmatics. When we consider in addition the two places in the *Pratyakṣa* chapter and the one place in the *Svārthānumāna*, we notice important statements. Therefore, while his use of the word *bīja* does not show a commitment to the Yogācāra way of talking, in terms of particular Yogācāra tenets, it does show a compatibility with this doctrinal system in temperament.

In short, it appears that both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra are in the background of Dharmakīrti's education. Yet, in his mature works he does not allow such systems to control his way of writing or the content of verses, as in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

f. The significance of the approach

Probably the most important *bīja* verse is PV, *Svārthānumāna* 72. This should be taken together with the *ālaya* verse of *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pratyakṣa*. These two verses with the explanations already given in this paper, provide a hint on why Dignāga formulated the non-overlapping objects of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, why there are four kinds of *pratyakṣa*, and why there are claimed to be various kinds of *kalpanā*, including *anumāna*. A necessity for both Dignāga ana Dharmakīrti to have a kind of *pratyakṣa* called 'introspection' (*svasaṃvedana*), is that this is the only faculty of the system that can be credited with the role of figuring out the system as given. Inference (*anumāna*) could not do it, because associated with 'delusion' (*bhrānti*), even though being the best of the faculties so tainted. 'Perception of the yogin' (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) cannot do it, because it was acknowledged to be unmixed with the guru's precepts. But 'introspection' can entertain as object disparate features or images, as though in a mirror; therefore, could feasibly have the entire system as its object (the *svalakṣaṇa*). And Dignāga points to this conclusion by his PS, *Pratyakṣa* (5cd, my numbering) - as was previously cited - "Even constructive thought (*kalpanā*) is admitted as (object for) self-intuition (= introspection) . . ." As to this *kalpanā*, Hattori says that for Dignāga, *kalpanā* means associating a name with a thing, and has for this purpose five categories, *nāman, jāti, guṇa, kriyā*, and *dravya*.[33] Bu ston, his great commentary on *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, fol. 60b2, mentions that Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* reduces the *kalpanā* varieties of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* to three, involved either with 1) signal-support (*saṃketasaṃśraya*), 2) superimposition (*samāropa*), or 3) sense-transcendence (*parokṣa*).

There is a kind of temperamental agreement with the Buddhist attribution of the important varieties to the subject, rather than to the object. A verse in the *Prajñāpāramitāratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā* (XV 81) can be cited in illustration, especially since it has the *ālaya* term:[34]

> *sattvāś ca ālayaratā viṣayābhilāṣī sthita āgrahe abudhayo muho-andha-bhūtāḥ /*
> *dharmo anālayu anāgrahu prāpitavyo lokena sārdha ayu vigraha prādu-bhūto //*
>
> Sentient beings delight in a place (to stay), and crave sense objects. Unwise, as though delusion and blindness (themselves), they remain in grasping. The Dharma that should be reached is not a place (to stay) and not something to grasp. Its opposition to the worldlings is evident.

The place where the subject delights to stay at, and the sense objects he craves, are admittedly there,

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[32] According to Yūsho Miyasaka, *An Index to the Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā*, *Acta Indologica* 3, 1973-4-5.

[33] Hattori 1968: 83.

[34] Cf. *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gathā; Sanskrit and Tibetan Text*, ed. E. Obermiller, 'S-Gravenhage 1960; and (same title) (Sanskrit recension A), ed. Akira Yuyama, London 1976.

but hardly worth an exposition. The use of *ālaya* as tantamount to a 'home' is consistent with the celebrated mountain name Himālaya (place or home of snow) and shows that Dharmakīrti had a perfect right to use the term in his verse and not expect the interpretation *ālayavijñāna*.

Finally, the writer should explain why the subject was approached by way of the term *bīja*. This was in line with his observation made long ago when publishing some of the mirror researches, that one can more skillfully compare one system with another if the comparison is done by means of a symbol, for example, the mirror – as in some of my older published articles; and now the 'seed' (*bīja*). Thus, this turned out to be a powerful way to study Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. So I tried out the same symbol in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*. This is not to deny the value of some other approaches to these topics.

Abbreviations and Literature

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